Tormis, Crystha Joyce Marie S.

Bachelor of Laws-III
Evidence (Case Report)

CASE DIGEST

1. Fulgencio A. Ngayan, Tomasa K. Ngayan and Bella Aurora

Ngayan vs. Atty. Faustino F. Tugade

Facts:

This case refers to disciplinary proceedings initiated by the herein

complainants Fulgencio Ngayan et al. in a letter-complaint dated November
16, 1982 ahainst respondent lawyer for violation of sub-paragraphs (e) and (f)
of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The complainants alleged that they asked Atty. Tugade to prepare an

affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint to be failed against Ms. Rowena
and Robert Leonido as a consequence of latters unauthorized entry into
complainants dwelling. Mrs. Ngayan signed the affidavit and noted the
paragraph where it did not mention that Robert Leonido was with Rowena
Soriano when both suddenly barged into their dwelling. She told the
respondent about the omission and crossed out the paragraph she
complained about and promise to make another affidavit. In the meantime,
the compalinants filed motions to discharge the respondent as their counsel.

Complainants allegedly made a follow up after discharging the

respondent and found that the name of Robert Leonido was not included in
the charge. Since the omission was remedied by their new counsel and the
case was subsequently filed in court, the adverse parties filed a motion for
reinvestigation and attached thereto the first affidavit of complainants which
was crossed out. The complainants alleged that the respondents lawyer was
also a lawyer of the brother of Robert Leonido in an insurance company and
before he executed and submitted his affidavit, respondent sent personal
letter to Fiscal Beza denouncing complainants and stating that he is filing
criminal and civil cases against them.

Complainants claim that paragraph (e) was violated by respondent

when the affidavit he prepared for complainants but subsequently crossed-
out was submitted as evidence against complainants in the motion for
reinvestigation. As to paragraph (f), complainants averred that respondent
violated it when he sent a letter to the fiscal saying that his name was being
adversely affected by the false affidavits of complainants and for that reason,
respondent was contemplating to file a criminal and civil action for damages
against them.

Issues:

Whether or not Atty. Tugade violated paragraphs (e) and (f) of Section
20, Rule 138, of Rules of Court, which provide:

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to

himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation
in connection with his clients business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.

Ruling:

Yes, the actuation made by Atty. Tugade is a betrayal of trust and

confidence of his former clients in violation of par. (e) and (f). The
respondents actuations from the beginning tend to show that he was partial
to the adverse parties as he even tried to dissuade complainants from filing
 charges against Roberto Leonido. Respondents act of executing and
submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Robert Leonido and Rowena Soriano
advancing facts prejudicial to the case of his former clients such as the fact
that the crime charged in complainants affidavit had prescribed and that he
was asked to prepare an affidavit to make the offense more grave so as to
prevent the offense from prescribing demonstrates clearly ban act of
offensive personality against the complainants. Likewise, respondents act of
joining the adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the dismissal of
the case against them shows not only his bias against the complainants but
also constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer.

2. People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Lazarte y Mogallon

Facts:
At around 11:45 o'clock P.M., on October 8, 1986, Lorenzo Lara was
sleeping in his residence at Zone 5 Signal Village, Taguig, Metro Manila. A
knock at the door, awakened him. He stood up and opened the door, but he
saw nobody. Then, to his surprise, someone entered the house through the
window. It was Nonito Jambunganan y Hundana, the owner of the house
which Lara was occupying for free, as a caretaker.

Seeing Lara, Nonito embraced him. As Lara held Nonito, he felt blood in
the latter's clothes and sensed that he had wounds in his body. When he
asked Nonito what happened, the latter replied, "Tol, sinaksak ako sa labas."
"Who stabbed you?" Lara asked. "Tony, Suay Ric and Junior," he answered.
Nonito also "shouted" twice, "Help me!" Frantically, Lara called out to his
neighbors for help. Neighbors came running. When Nonito was about to be
placed on board a jeep, he collapsed. He was declared "DOA," dead on
arrival, at the Nichols Airbase Hospital. Nonito sustained three stab wounds at
the back and died of hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab wounds.

Of the four mentioned assailants, Only Antonio Lazarte y Mogallon

anmd Ricardo Ignacio were apprehended, as the other two, Rodolfo Mundido
and Eliseo Henares, were never arrested, and remain at large. Ricardo
Ignacio on the other hand was acquitted on a demurer to evidence pursuant
to the resolution of the trial court dated February 9, 1989.

Several witnesss were presented by the defense in the trial but the
testimonies of these witnesses did not convince the trial court and rendered a
verdict of conviction against Antonio Lazarte y Mogallon.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court is correct in its judgment based solely on
the dying declaration of the victim?

Ruling:

No, from the records of the case, it is clear that the conviction of the
appellant had been based largely on the on the dying declaration of the
victim. It behooves therefore to determine not only the admissibility, but also
appreciate the weight of the oral dying declaration of the deceased Nonito
Jambuangan testified in by the principal witness for the presecution, Lorenzo
Lara. As a rule a dying declaration maybe considered as an exception to
hearsay evidence if the following requisites must concur, namely: that the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding the
circumstancesof the declarants death; that at the time the
declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
an impending death; that the declarant is a competent witness; and
that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide,
murder or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. A close scrutiny
 of the witnesses testimony cannot support, in the finding of the trial court
that the victim was conscious of his imminent death when he relayed the
statement to Lorenzo Lara . This finding id gratuitous and has no clear basis
in the records. Nonetheless the ante mortem statements of Nonito may be
considered as res gestae. In any event, even if they constitute part of res
gestae or they constitute indeed a dying declaration and accepted by the trial
court and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule, this admissibility
notwithstanding does not suffice to satisfy the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt or moral certainty against any of the four accused, much
less against the accused-appellant. In criminal law, the identity of the
offender must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and to warrant conviction
in criminal cases based upon circumstantial evidence must constitute an
unbroken chain of events so as to lead to a conviction that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

3. Harold V. Tamargo vs. Romulo Awingan, Llyod Antiporda and

Licerio Antiporda

Facts:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail
Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003
along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police
had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo
Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003.
He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking
spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd
Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty.
Tamargo. He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and
that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.

On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.)

executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look
out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan
(alias "Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also
tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son,
respondent Lloyd Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the
latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing
took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in
which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.

During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio

presented Columnas unsolicited handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004
to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in Manila. In the
letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit
and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the
extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no
participation in the killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted an
affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially
repeated the statements in his handwritte Columna categorically
admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He
affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had
been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. Columna
said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against
respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because
of the threats to his life inside the jail. He requested that he be
transferred to another detention center.
 In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610,
the CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because
she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the substantial
matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in
concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused. It
also held that Columnas extrajudicial confession was not admissible
against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession,
there was no other piece of evidence presented to establish the
existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only
after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

Issue:

Whether or not Columnas extrajudicial confession in his afficavit is

admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule res inter alios
acta.

Ruling:

NO. Columnas extrajudicial confession in his affidavit was not

admissible as evidence against respondent. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this
rule is that:

On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans

own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So
are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound
by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to
be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct
be used as evidence against him.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made

by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a

conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.1avvphi1

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator

relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in
evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown
by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.Thus,
in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against
his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be
first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the
admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while
the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it
cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating
 their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on

recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole
evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was
inadmissible as evidence against them.

4. Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank vs. The Honorable Court of

Appeals and Manuel P. Santos

Facts:

Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank acquired ownership over a

motor vehicle (Toyota Corolla) by virtue of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit B),
executed by and between Finasia Investment and Finance Corporation
and the plaintiff bank.

Defendant Santos, in his capacity as manager of plaintiff banks

General Services Department. Was given the privilege to use and
possess the aforementioned vehicle coterminous with his employment.
PSLB, through its President, and First Vice President, for a consideration
of P40,000.00 in cash actually received from Santos in the presence of
bank employees, sold, transferred and conveyed unto the defendant
the motor vehicle, free from all liens and encumbrances.

When Santos ceased to be employed with petitioner bank, he

took the car with him. Petitioner then filed a complaint against Santos
for recovery of the motor vehicle, with a poryaer for the issuance of
writ of replevin.

Petitioner said that there was no consideration in the sale of the

motor vehicle to Santos that the Deed of sale merely served as
security for the time deposit of placements of Santos relatives with
petitioner bank. Petitioner avers that the underlying agreement, a
special arrangement between petitioner and Santos was that in the
event Santos relatives failed to recover their time deposits due to the
banks closure, then respondent could keep the car as recompense.

Issue:

Whether or not the deed of sale of the motor vehicle to Santos may be
proved or altered by parol evidence under the Parol Evidence Rules

Ruling:

The deed of sale of the motor vehicle to Santos cannot be proved or

altered by parol evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule. It is a principle of
law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
instrument.

While parol evidence is admissible in variety of ways to explain the

meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating
into contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

The Court find the merit of the private respondents contention that
petitioner failed to produce any instrument or written document which would
 prove that the deed of sale in question was only a security for the time
deposit placements of respondents relatives in the petitioner bank. The
witnesses for the petitioner, were bank officers; one being a lawyer, and
supposed to be steeped in legal and banking knowledge and practice. As
such, they were expected to know the consequences of their act of signing a
document which out rightly transferred ownership over the subject vehicle in
favor of Santos. They could have incorporated in the deed (if such was the
intention of the parties) a stipulation that transfer of ownership and
registration of the vehicle in Santos name were conditioned on the failure of
his relatives to recover their time deposit placements in petitioner bank. No
such stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale which was an outright
and unconditional transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle.

5. People of the Philippines vs. Sabas Racquel, Valeriano Racquel

and Amado Ponce

Facts:

At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito Gambalan answered the door,

thinking of a neighbor in need. Instead, heavily armed men came through the
door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. Upon hearing the
gunshots, Agapitos wife, Juliet, went out ofn their room and found his lifeless
body while a man took Agapitos gun and left hurriedly with the others.
George Jovillano responded to Juliets plea for help and reported the incident
to the police, who found Amadao Ponce, one of the accused, wounded and
lyring near the Gambalans house. Pince revealed to the police that Sabas
and Valeriano Racquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may
be found in their residence. The Racquels were later apprehended on
different occasions. The trial court found that accused guilty of the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial statement of Ponce pointing the
Racquels as his co-perpetrators of the crime be used as basis to convict
them?

Ruling:

The extrajudicial statement of Ponce cannot be given credence The

identification of the accused as the culprits was based chiefly on the
extrajudicial statement of Ponce pointing to them as perpetrators of the
crime.

As earlier stated, the said accused escaped from jail before he could
testify in court and he has been at large since then.

The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused

may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open
court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-
accused on the latters extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the
same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and
the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the

confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction,
obviously, should be made between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The
former deprives the other accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the
confessant, while in the latter his confession is thrown wide open for cross-
examination and rebuttal.

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against
his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith
and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be
bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to
be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be
used as evidence against him.

Although the above-stated rule admits of certain jurisprudential

exceptions, those exceptions do not however apply to the present case.