I.

Parreo vs COA
Facts:
Salvador Parreo (petitioner) served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32
years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of
2nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to
three years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13, 680.
Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January
2001, the AFP stopped petitioner's monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of
Presidential Decree No. 1638[4] (PD 1638), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650.
[5] Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended, provides that a retiree who loses his
Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated
upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but the Judge Advocate
General of the AFP denied the request.
Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension.

II. In Re-Petition for habeas corpus of

CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN, et. al. v. GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, et al.
GR 160792, August 25, 2005

Facts:
A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military
personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a
petition for habeas corpus with SC. The SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to
make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the CA.
CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of coup detat. Habeas
corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees confinement is under a valid indictment.

III. Manalo vs PNP Chief

Facts:
Five armed men forcibly entered Polling Precinct 76-A of Barangay Pinagbayanan
Elementary School, and poured gasoline over a ballot box. They fired several rounds of
ammunitions at the premises, setting it ablaze.
In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses identified some of petitioners as the
perpetrators of the school burning. The investigation also yielded that all six petitioners, who are
all members of the PNP, failed to timely respond to the incident.
Acting on the reports, the PNP hierarchy issued three successive memoranda putting the
Petitioners under restrictive custody. The memoranda provided (1) that all movements of the
Petitioners within the camp should be monitored; (2) that when situation warrants their
movement outside camp, they should be properly escorted on one-on-one basis; and (3) that
a logbook should be maintained to record their place of destination, name of escort,
Estimated Time of Departure, and Estimated Time of Return to Station.
Petitioners thus instituted this action praying that a writ of habeas corpus be issued and
that the Court adjudge their restrictive custody status as illegal.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that by a Memorandum Order the
Director of PNP Regional Office has recalled the assailed restrictive custody order embodied in
the two Memoranda. In view of the recall, it is prayed that the petition be dismissed on ground of
mootness.

IV. US vs Villareal

Facts:
At the beginning stages of his trial, appellant negotiated and entered into a pretrial
agreement with the original convening authority in his case, the Commanding Officer, Naval Air
Station, Whidbey Island, Washington -- Captain Schork.

After the pretrial agreement was signed by all parties, but prior to pleas at trial, the
convening authority unilaterally decided to withdraw from the terms of the pretrial agreement.
According to testimony taken during the pretrial motion, and to the military judges findings of
fact, the reason the convening authority decided to withdraw from the agreement was because of
increasing pressure by the victims family members, who
were vehemently opposed to entering into a pretrial agreement that allowed appellant to plead to
manslaughter instead of murder. 2/

As a result of this pressure, the convening authority sought advice by telephoning his "old
friend and shipmate," who happened to be the acting superior convening authority for this
case. 3/ This superior convening authority, Captain Eckart, stated words to the effect of "what
would it hurt to send the issue to trial," in response to Captain Schorks concerns about
maintaining the original pretrial agreement.

After this conversation, and against the advice of his staff judge advocate, Captain Schork
withdrew from the pretrial agreement. Following this withdrawal, the case was transferred to a
third, and completely separate convening authority - Commander, Naval Base Seattle.

During the pretrial motions stage of the trial, the defense moved unsuccessfully to
dismiss all charges, or in the alternative, for specific performance of the pretrial agreement from
which the original convening authority had withdrawn. Appellants petition for extraordinary
relief, on the same grounds, was denied by the Court of Criminal Appeals in an unpublished
opinion dated September 27, 1995.

On November 20, 1995, we denied appellants writ-appeal petition for review of a

version of the first granted issue, and on January 25, 1996, we denied a motion for
reconsideration of that decision. See 43 MJ 476 (1996). Appellant asked us to consider whether
unlawful command influence caused the revocation of his signed pretrial agreement. We did not
reach the merits of appellants contentions, instead deciding that this issue was a matter to be
reviewed during the course of ordinary appellate review. Specifically, we stated: "If warranted,
the convening authority, the Court of Criminal Appeals, or this Court can grant appellant relief,
regardless of his pleas to the charges and specifications, during the ordinary course of appellate
review." Id. at 476.

We have now considered this claim, the other granted issue, and the specified issue. We
find, first, that appellant did not suffer prejudice to his substantial rights because the forwarding
of the charges to a new general court-martial convening authority, after any perceived taint arose,
cured any appearance of unlawful command influence. See Art. 59(a), UCMJ, 10 USC 859(a).
Second, the military judge ruled that the challenged offenses were multiplicious for sentencing;
hence, appellant was not materially prejudiced by his failure to raise this issue at trial. Finally,
appellant was not prejudiced by the absence from the record of the military judges specific
findings on the motion because appellant was in possession of them and was on notice as to what
those findings were. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court below.

V. Chavez vs Executive Secretary

Facts:

GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the
issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines
banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco Chaves requested DILG to
reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and
injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.

VI. US vs Ling Su Fan

Facts:

Defendant, Ling Su Fan, is accused of attempting to export Philippine silver

coins from the Philippines contrary to Act No. 1411 of the Philippine Commission.
His defenses, among others, involved the deprivation of due process due to the
confiscation of thecoins.

VII. Sto. Tomas vs Paneda

Facts:

This is part of the consolidated case pertaining to the constitutionality of

certain provisions of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
 On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) 8042 or the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, that, for among other purposes, sets
the Governments policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their
families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.

Sections 29 and 30 of the Act commanded the Department of Labor and

Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the
business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and
phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).

On February 12, 2002 respondents Asian Recruitment Council Philippine

Chapter, Inc. and others (Arcophil, et.al.) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against the DOLE Secretary, the
POEA Administrator and the TESDA Director-General, before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 220 to enjoin the latter from implementing the 2002 Rules and Regulations
governing the Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease and
desist from issuing other orders, circulars and policies that tend to regulate the
recruitment and placement of OFWs in violation of the policy and deregulation
provided in Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042.

On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an order granting the
petition and enjoining the government agencies involved from exercising regulatory
functions over the recruitment and placement of OFWs. This prompted the DOLE
Secretary, the POEA Administrator and the TESDA Director-General to file the
present action.

On December 4, 2008 however, the Republic informed the court that on April
10, 2007 which expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA 8042 and adopted the
policy of close government regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs.

The petitioner contends that the case should be dismissed for being moot
and academic.

VIII. Cojuangco, Jr. vs Republic

Facts:

In 1971, RA No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company
(CIC) to administer the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The declaration of martial
law saw the issuance of several presidential decrees, which included PD No. 755
providing for the implementation of the Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers, purportedly designed to
improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy
fund. Relevant to the petition is the acquisition of the First United Bank, which was
renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Concerning the intended
acquisition, FUB was the bank of choice which Pedro Cojuangcos group had control
of. The plan, then, was for PCA to buy all of Cojuangcos shares in FUB which did not
ensue since Cojuangco had the exclusive option to acquire the formers FUB
controlling interests. Two deeds emerged from the agreement: one between Pedro
Cojuangco group and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and the other between PCA and
Eduardo Conjuangco, Jr. The PC-ECJ (1 st contract) agreement allegedly contains,
inter alia, Cojuangcos personal and exclusive option to acquire the FUB (UCPB)
shares from Pedro and his group. The PCA Cojuangco agreement (2 nd contract)
shows PCAs acquisition of the said option from Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.

IX. Ynot vs IAC please refer to the old set of cases

X. US vs Ling Su Fan please refer to Roman Numeral VI

XI. US vs Toribio please refer to old set of cases