PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, VOL.

8, 219-231 (1988)

The military and bureaucracy in Greece - 1967-1974

CONSTANTINE P. DANOPOULOS
San Jose Stare University

SUMMARY

This article attempts to examine and analyse the Greek military regimes (1967-1974)
relations with the countrys administrative apparatus. After briefly tracing the historical and
ecological dimensions of these two institutions the article analyses their relations during the
7-year period on the basis of Eckstein and Gurrs superordinate-subordinate theoretical
framework. The relevant data, which include interviews with senior civil servants as well as
military officers, indicate that due to the nature of their profession, which emphasizes
discipline and strict subordination, the military as political governors create an atmosphere
to which the less regimented and more give-and-take-oriented bureaucracies have difficulty
becoming accustomed. Military regimes and administrators d o not enjoy the best of
relations.

The 21 April 1967 intervention of the Greek military, and the ensuing 7-year rule
(eptuetia), spurred on what had been a sporadic scholarly interest in the affairs of
modern Greece. An increasing number of studies appeared during the military
regimes tenure in office (1967-1974) and after, examining, among other things, the
reasons for the coup, and the military governments performance, including the
Cyprus debacle of July 1974. In addition there was a proliferation of works covering
a broad range of aspects spread throughout Greeces existence as an independent
state.
In spite of its increasing intensity, however, this renaissance in the study of
modern Hellenism did little t o generate scholarly research in the area of Greek
public administration and bureaucratic politics that seems to have become a focal
point of contemporary political science throughout the world, and particularly in
the West. This paper purports to fill a small part of this gap-and hopefully
stimulate some scholarly attention in the workings of the intricate world of the
Greek bureaucracy-by focusing on the state and nature of relations between the
Greek military regime and the countrys administrative apparatus.
There seems to be widespread agreement among students of civil-military
relations that contemporary military organizations are bureaucratic structures
composed of professional officers whose primary purpose is the protection of their

*Dr Danopoulos teaches Political Science at San Jose State University and the University of Santa Clara.
The author wishes to thank the editors of the journal, and Professor Roy Christman, for their valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article.

This paper employs Bengt Abrahamssons (1972) definition of professionalism, which includes
specialized theoretical knowledge accompanied by methods and devices for application; responsibility,
grounded on a set of ethical rules; and a high degree of corporateness deriving from common training
and devotion to specific doctrines and customs.

027 1-2075/88/020219-13$06.50
01988 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
220 C. P. Danopoulos
client, the state. The increasing complexity of modern warfare, in turn, has forced
the military to broaden their training and preparedness by exposing themselves to
all sorts of disciplines including engineering, management, administration, and
social sciences, in addition to standard military training. As a result, contemporary
officers possess both modern managerial skills and traditional characteristics such
as bravery, heroism, and discipline (Abrahamsson, 1974, pp. 40-58; Perlmutter,
1977). The parallel existence of both sets of values provides the military with the
necessary skills to govern complex organizations (such as their own), and at the
same time fosters the belief that they also command the ability and expertise to
administer the civilian society (Abrahamsson, 1974). The burning question, then,
is whether military professionals, given the unique nature of their profession,
possess the necessary skills and flexibility to administer the less-regimented and
conflict-riddled civilian bureaucratic organizations.
Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr provide a theoretical framework as a basis
for evaluating superordinate-subordinate relationships consisting of: directive-
ness-referring to the extent to which activities . . . are subject to directiveness,
rather than being left to the free discretion of members; participation-denoting
the level of input by and needs of their subordinates; responsiveness-meaning the
extent to which superordinates are disposed to be influenced by the input of their
subordinates; and compliance-manifesting the disposition of subordinates to
behave according to the directives of their superiors. These four variables. Eckstein
and Gurr conclude, are central to any authority patterns and constitute the basis
of relations among superordinates and subordinates which is indispensable to
decisional efficacy (Eckstein and Gurr, 1974, p. 53).
Using these four variables as a framework of analysis, this article will seek to
examine and analyse the Greek military rulers relations with the administrative
apparatus of the state, and evaluate the role of military professionalism in this
endeavour. Hopefully, the findings of this study will make some contributions
towards a better understanding of administrative-government relations in countries
under o r likely to experience military rule; and add a small impetus to the re-
emerging field of comparative public administration.2
Before proceeding to analyse the Greek military regimes relations with their
countrys civil service on the basis of the four variables mentioned above, it would
be useful to discuss the historical and ecological dimensions of the state
administrative apparatus, and the evolution and level of professionalization in the
Greek military.

HISTORICAL AND ECOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS (1828-1967)

There is widespread agreement in the literature that general societal dimensions,
historical antecedents as well as the political culture of a society, explain that

This paper is partly based on interviews with high civil servants and military officers, conducted during
the authors many visits to Greece from 1978 to 1982. As always, Greek bureaucrats and army officers
showed reluctance to speak on the record and to have their names revealed. The interviews were
conducted in bits and pieces, and in different places and times, which made it almost impossible for the
author to provide systematic details regarding timing, circumstances, and method of selecting
interviewees. In spite of these problems, however, the author is satisfied that the interviewees spoke
their minds, and the information they revealed constitutes true statements of their beliefs and
experiences.
 The military and bureacracy in Greece - 1967-1 974 22 1
societys orientation towards administration and affect the attitudes, behaviour,
norms and characteristics of its bureaucratic structure. For societal outlooks, and
particularly a countrys political culture, either support o r potentially undermine
the effectiveness of administrative structures (Peters, 1978, p. 41). Socioeconomic
forces plus internal organizational adaptations also have an impact upon the level
of professionalization and the attitudes of the military (Abrahamsson, 1972, pp.
15-1 7).
These so-called ecological factors have a telling impact on the degree of
acceptability a bureaucracy enjoys, and the level of professionalization in the
military. Acceptability and other key organizational imperatives, such as willing-
ness on the part of the public to accept bureaucratic impersonality and universality
of rules, have been used as a basis to array political cultures along a continuum
from underdeveloped to rationalist or modern. The greater the degree of
acceptance and rule universality the more developed a culture, and vice-versa
(Riggs, 1966, pp. 225-255). Similarly, the more developed a society, the higher the
level of military professionalization and vice-versa. A political system and its
political culture pass through a process of development from traditional to
transition before reaching an advanced stage referred t o as developed. This
process, and especially the transition phase of it, constitute the norm in the so-
called developing o r changing societies of the Third World (Riggs, 1964).
The traditional society (which nowadays exists only in a few isolated parts of the
world) is characterized by: ascription, minimal urbanization, low mobility, lack of
education, subsistence agrarian economy, parochial political culture, low empathy,
and a political system that performs very few functions (Palmer, 1985, pp. 44-45).
Administration, to the extent it exists, performs minimal functions such as
collecting taxes and enlisting people for compulsory unpaid labour. The armed
forces of such societies are characterized by low levels of organization, expertise,
responsibility and corporateness. Non-professional criteria such as kinship and
patronage-as opposed to achievement, discipline, and ability-are used as bases
for promotion and advancement within the military.
In contrast, transitional societies are characterized by weak political institutions,
lack of regime legitimacy, fragmented social organizations, unevenly developed
economies, individualism, and ethnic and class cleavages. Developing societies
seek simultaneously to develop economic infrastructures, differentiate their
economies, and meet the rising expectations of their people-all with poor and
often overstretched resources. The bureaucratic structures of these societies-
which by and large tend to be replicas of prototypes in developed countries-are
called upon to accomplish these monumental tasks.
Lacking expertise and other ingredients associated with modern bureaucratic
organizations, the administrative structures of these states are further handicapped
by lack of rule universality and acceptability of administration. Taking their cues
from the social milieu, the bureaucracies of developing societies are permeated by
formalism, apparent rationality in the pattern of organization, and general reliance
on traditional criteria of decision-making. Bureaucratic rules provide only a point
of departure for bargaining and negotiation in all public civil service relations
(Riggs, 1964, pp. 200-202; Eisenstadt, 1959, pp. 302-320).
Though not altogether immune from the social milieu, the military are in a better
position to take their own road. Unlike in developed societies where there is a close
222 C . P . Danopoulos
linkage between the civilian and military sectors-due to the formers ability to
make available to the latter technology, sophisticated weapons, and managerial
and other skills-the armed forces of developing countries are forced to look
beyond their own borders (i.e. to developed countries) for such essentials. This
dependency, coupled with the very mission and the nature of the profession, keeps
the military of changing societies a good distance apart from the social milieu, and
makes it possible for them to adhere more closely to imported models of
organization, training, and mode of conduct than their counterparts in the
bureaucracy. The military tend to be the most developed parts of developed
societies, but also the most vulnerable to influence by the developed patron
country.
The genesis, evolution and character of the military and administration in
Greece, from the late 1820s when the country became independent to 1967,
exemplify the traditional-transition scheme outlined above. The first 50 years of
independence seem to correspond with the traditional phase of societal-political-
administrative-military culture. The decades from 1880 on portray a process of
transition characterized by a substantial enlargement of the role of the state in the
economic and social life of the country. The transition phase lasted until 1967, and
even after.
Early attempts to forge a modern French-modelled bureaucratic structure in
Greece failed. The new country possessed all the characteristics of a traditional
society and its independence was only marginal. The Ottoman Empire-from
which Greece gained her independence in the 1820s following a protracted
struggle-was a corporatist entity. The only contact between the subject people
and the Muslem authorities was when the latter came either to collect taxes or to
draft people for compulsory and unpaid labour. These much-detested practices
encouraged individualism and the existence of brigandry. Subject people distrusted
authority and instead sought the protection of local primates and chieftains-
practices which continued in the decades following independence.
As though parochialism and distrust were not enough, the new nation faced
other insurmountable difficulties. Its small size, rocky terrain, lack of an economic
infrastructure, a largely illiterate population, and an economy based on subsistence
farming were some of the many ills that plagued it. To these, one must add the
overwhelming influence of the Great Powers. The administrative apparatus which
was established was a highly centralized structure based on a wholesale and
indiscriminate adoption of foreign prototypes, especially Frances (Diamandouros,
1972, p. 300). Little regard was paid to the differences in culture, economic and
social disparities and historical experiences. Thus, Greece bureaucracy during the
decade following independence did not reflect sufficiently the nature of the Greek
society (Argyriades, 1965, p. 298). The civil service became the dumping group
which accommodated thousands who could not find employment in the desperately
poor economy, and a source of patronage offered by politicians to their
constituents in exchange for political support. Lack of a tenure system, low pay,
and lack of prestige sufficed to keep the elites away from the ranks of the
bureaucracy, all of which rendered the civil servants pawns in the hands of their
elected patrons.
By the 1870s the bulk of the countrys budget was utilized to keep up a huge,
highly centralized and grossly ineffective bureaucracy (Dertilis, 1977, pp. 138-140;
 The military and hureacracy in Greece - 1967-1974 223
Mouzelis, 1978, p. 37). From the outside, Greeces administrative structure gave
the appearance of modern organization, when in reality it possessed none of the
characteristics associated with rationalist administrative institutions. Greek politi-
cal culture provided a very low degree of acceptability of bureaucracy and
universality of rules.
The nations military suffered from the same ills. Refusal of the elites to
encourage their scions to follow careers in the military, coupled with the enormous
economic difficulties, parochialism, and the crushing dominance of the foreign
powers explain the low levels of professionalism, organization, and effectiveness of
Greeces armed forces in this period.
The 1880s ushered Greece into a new period. A new generation of leaders
emerged, more aware of the need to modernize the countrys archaic economic
infrastructure. A devastating vine disease in France allowed Greeces grape exports
to rise dramatically, becoming a lucrative source of foreign exchange. To this
should also be added the international crisis which forced financiers to turn to
Greece and other Balkan countries to invest their capital. The modernizing
Tricoupis administration took advantage of these factors and began laying the
groundwork for an economic infrastructure. Though subsequent reductions in
exports and the withdrawal of foreign capital caused the failure of these
development efforts, nonetheless an urge for social and economic change had been
generated.
The rise to power of a new generation of leaders in the first decade of this
century, headed by E. Venizelos, and the emergence of a small but energetic
entrepreneurial class, gave development a shot in the arm. As a result of the
warfare in which Greece participated, the size of the country increased, as did its
productive population and gross national product. Greece had entered a transition
period which, in spite of reverses in the early to mid-1920s and late 1930s, the
devastation of the Second World War, and the civil war that followed, continued at
a slow but steady pace. American economic and military assistance from 1947
ushered Greece in to a period of healthy economic growth, rapid urganization and
dramatic increases in per capita income, literacy, and consumption rates which
lasted until the 1967 coup and even beyond. In spite of these gains, however, Greek
society continued to be permeated by excessive individualism, and lack of respect
for authority and bureaucracy.
Efforts were made during this period (1880-1967) to reorganize and modernize
the nations armed forces and administrative system. In the early 1880s Prime
Minister Tricoupis passed legislation to reorganize and modernize the military,
which included: upgrading of the military schools, purchase of more and better
weapons from abroad, sending officers to France to observe French military
exercises, and a law prohibiting lower echelon officers from running for political
office. Tricoupis also sought to revamp the nations administrative apparatus. He
established a mechanism to punish and even expel civil servants guilty of graft and
other unethical practices; forbade the transfer of bureaucrats from one ministry,
bureau, or office to another before they had met promotion requirements; tied
promotion to the level of education; and mandated an examination as a
prerequisite to employment in the civil service. But the Prime Ministers reform
effort to neutralize and reorganize the bureaucracy and the military failed, due to
the same clientelistic and cultural traits which carried over into the new era.
224 C. P . Danopoulos
Tricoupis political rivals abolished all relevant legislation when they took power
some years later (Argyriades, 1968, pp. 343-344; Tsoucalas, 1977, pp. 108-109).
A new effort was undertaken by E. Venizelos in the period 1910 to late 1920s.
His phenomenal military reforms included: the establishment of army and naval
schools for captains; the organization of a responsible general staff; a division of the
army into permanent units; and the appropriation of funds for arms and material.
These reorganization efforts significantly upgraded the Greek militarys profes-
sional standing and its fighting effectiveness.
The political divisions of the 1920s and 1930s, coupled with the advent of the
Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1940), the Second World War and Civil War that
followed, politicized the armed forces, warped the professionalization gains of the
first decade of the century, and destroyed its cohesiveness. But the introduction of
American military and economic aid to Greece in 1947 changed all that. Under
American auspices the Hellenic military was thoroughly professionalized, purged
of all liberal and leftist elements, and was elevated as the countrys most powerful
political institution through which America managed to exercise a crushing
domination over economic and political developments in post-war Greece.
Efforts at administrative reform were also introduced by Venizelos and
succeeding governments without overwhelming success. A series of laws were
passed in the first decade of this century designed to modernize Greeces
administrative apparatus, which included the introduction of a tenure system aimed
at neutralizing the civil service and other reforms in many ways similar to those
introduced earlier by Tricoupis. Additional safeguards were introduced in 1951,
through the introduction of a Civil Service Code, which created a permanent
commission responsible for overseeing all facets of administration including the
recruitment, promotion, retirement, grading, pay, discipline, rights and duties of
administrative personnel (Argyriades, 1965, p. 299).
In spite of these and past efforts of administrative reform, the Greek bureaucracy
continued to suffer from hydrocephalism, excessive centralization, a lack of
interagency communication and coordination, the absence of a service ethos, and
independence. These, plus political interference, extremely detailed laws, and
remoteness from the masses, created a paralyzing effect and encouraged the
shelving of responsibility. Greeces administrative machine, Professor Langrod
concluded in 1964, represents a mosaic of not quite coordinated components
isolated from one another, and each consisting of a separate fortress, firmly
entrenched against any extraneous attempts at reform (1964, p. 33). In other
words, as Beck and Fainsod have separately argued, progress towards industrializa-
tion does not necessarily bring about a corresponding emergence of bureaucratic
rationality (1963, pp. 268-300 and 233-267).
O n Langrods recommendations the Papandreou government proceeded to
adopt a series of reforms aimed at improving Greeces administrative apparatus.
These included: greater emphasis on technical and administrative training;
trimming out unnecessary personnel; and decentralization. But when the military
took over in 1967 it quickly scrapped these measures-most of which had not been
fully implemented-denouncing them as communist-inspired. In short, the military
regime took over the responsibility to modernize the country with an administra-
tive machinery which possessed few of the traits associated with developed
administration.
 The military and bureacracy in Greece - 1967-1974 225
THE MILITARY IN POWER

Claude Welch classifies military regimes into two broad types: personalist and
corporatist. The personalist type is characterized by the concentration of authority
in the hands of the leader, who makes most major administrative decisions. The
corporatist, on the other hand, is based on collegiality with a group of officers-
usually of common background-exercising political authority. The leader of the
group may enjoy a position of first among equals, and later could emerge as the
dominant figure (1974, pp. 131-135).
The Greek military regime that surfaced as a result of the 1967 intervention
clearly belonged to the corporatist category, with Colonel George Papadopoulos as
first among equals. Though in time he managed to elbow out most of his
collaborators, he never achieved the kind of domination common in personalist
regimes. Though Papadopoulos and his collaborators had no trouble pushing out
the politicians, they soon realized that the bureaucracy was there to stay, and could
not be supplanted. Let us then evaluate military regime bureaucracy relations in
Greece on the basis of Eckstein and Gurrs four superordinate-subordinate
variables of directiveness, participation, responsiveness and compliance.

Di rectiveness
The ability of superordinates to influence the behaviour and actions of subordinates
is crucial to authority patterns and decisional efficacy. Directiveness, as Eckstein
and Gurr see it, depends on such dimensions as the degree of regimentation,
breadth of coverage, latitude (i.e. degree of discretion allowed to subordinates),
extent of supervision, and threshold of sanctions (1975, pp. 53-56). What is at stake
here is the ability of the superordinates (the military) to issue clear, direct,
cohesive, relevant, and efficacious directions, and the disposition of the subordi-
nates to such directives.
The collegial nature of Greek military regime, factionalism in its highest organ
(the Revolutionary Council), and differences as to the future role of the armed
forces in the political affairs of the country prevented the regime from issuing clear
and cohesive policy directives. Policies were announced, altered and abandoned.
For example, one of the first acts of the military regime was to bring back an old
agreement with Litton Industries which had been set aside as too costly by the
previous government. But as soon as it appeared that the agreement was not
feasible the colonels abandoned it, and instead sought to negotiate an alternative
with two Greek shipping magnates, Niarchos and Onassis. The rate of signing and
repealing agreements with these two rivals reached comical proportions consider-
ing the fact that those agreements were never implemented (Danopoulos and
Patel, 1980, p. 197).
Interviews with high civil servants provide complementary evidence indicating
lack of clear and cohesive directions on the part of the military rulers. The majority
of those interviewed spoke of contradictions, strenuous restrictions, high-
handedness, and rigidity in the policies and directives issued by the military rulers.
One civil servant went as far as to say that there was no government in the true
sense. There was a dictator and his collaborators, each of whom had his own
226 C . P. Danopoulos
purposes and goals. Another put it differently: The real power-holders (the
military) were unclear with only circumstantial programmes and perspectives.
While decision-making in the highest echelons of the regime appeared
haphazard, the military sought to subordinate the civilian bureaucracy, dismissing
several thousand civil servants who they considered politically unreliable (Keefe et
al., 1977, p. 157), and placing a retired army officer in every bureau as a watchdog
to monitor the activities of the civil servants. In addition the regime threatened,
especially in the initial stages, to do away with the tenure system altogether. As
might be expected, this terrorized the civil servants, as did the abrasiveness of the
watchdog and the rigidity and high-handedness of the regimes directives.
Rigid and high-handed decisions could generate proper results if a system of
communication and filtering down is in place. As seen earlier, the Greek
administrative apparatus lacked intra- and interagency coordination and communi-
cation. Given the contradictory nature of the military regimes collegial decision-
making processes, decisions and commands often never reached many bureaus,
and many bureaucrats learned what they could through the grapevine or the heavily
censored press. The failure of the military regime to influence the behaviour of the
civil service in the area of directiveness was summed up by the Greek diplomat
during the 1974 Cyprus crisis when he said that we had absolutely no contact with
Ioannides [he replaced Papadopoulos in November 19731, our biggest problem was
determining who ruled the goverment (Stern, 1977, p. 101).

Participation
Input by subordinates into the decision-making process is the second variable in
evaluating the effectiveness of superordinate-subordinate relationships. Subordi-
nate participation depends on the degree to which the channels of communication
remain open, the relevancy of these channels, and the frequency and quality of
communications and exchanges (Eckstein and Gurr, 1974, pp. 61-64). In other
words, even if channels of communication exist, communications and participation
by subordinates in the decision-making process may still be undermined. For unless
these channels are allowed to function uninhibited by restrictions such as reprisals,
lack of time and misunderstanding as to the hierarchy of command and
responsibility, the chances of effective subordinate input are seriously weakened.
By the very nature of their profession, military-dominated regimes stress the
military virtues of hierarchy and discipline, and . . . give short shift to the processes
of explanation, persuasion, and discussion (Fainsod, 1963, p. 236). At the same
time such regimes see the need to employ the services of the civilian bureaucracy in
order to run the affairs of the country. The question therefore becomes: can the
military gain the confidence of administrative personnel and comply with the
latters mode of operation which emphasizes discussion, explanation, and the use of
persuasive skills? Put differently, can two organized bureaucracies (the military and
the civil service), with different modes of conduct, work togethei?
As discussed earlier, the nature and low level of development of the Greek
administrative apparatus, coupled with the lack of trust the military showed
towards it, and the regimes inability to articulate and communicate policy
directives effectively, caused a strain in their relations. Interviews with civil
servants reveal an absence of trust between them and the military rulers. Many
 The military and bureacracy in Greece - 1967-1974 227
interviewees complained that they were never consulted, and that when they were
their opinions were not taken into account by their superiors. As one respondent
put it, There were no consultations. There was a monologue by the Minister or the
Secretary-General of the ministry. The majority of the respondents indicated that
the military rulers were genally insensitive to their suggestions and proposals, and
unwilling to accept unfamiliar proposals.
Lack of trust and inability to work together manifested themselves in other ways.
For example, many civil servants found it necessary to withhold information from
their superiors. When asked under what circumstances did you find it necessary to
withhold information?, the respondents included reasons as: When I thought that
it was harmful t o the country in general, or Whenever I considered it safe.
Military officers (though not necessarily directly involved in the regime) also
displayed distrust and lack of esteem for Greeces administrative apparatus.
Almost all of the officers interviewed said that the nations administrative machine
was, and continues to be, fragmented, disjointed, and ineffective. George
Papadopoulos, leader of the regime for most of its 7-year duration, expressed his
governments contempt towards the bureaucracy when he said that the administra-
tive machinery has become an unbridled . . . organ which has all but ceased being
the servant of the people (Papadopoulos, 1968, Vol. 1).
In order to achieve its goals the regime proceeded largely to ignore the
bureaucracy. Instead, it tapped the services of a number of special bureaucrats
(ekruktoi) with the proper o r safe ideological beliefs, whom it placed in key
administrative and advisory roles. To these the regime added those from within the
bureaucracy with correct political credentials, and the watchdogs. Operating in
different government bureaus, the latter worked more as spies and informants than
agency coordinators. The bureaucracy as a whole participated little in the decision-
making process and its input into the policies adopted by the military regime was, at
best, marginal.

Responsiveness
Responsiveness is the complement of participation. It is the extent to which
superordinates are disposed to be influenced by the input of their subordinates.
Eckstein and Gurr argue that there are two polar extremes to responsiveness-
autocracy and its opposite extreme alterocracy. The more autocratic a regime the
more it is inclined to disregard and even inhibit input by subordinates. Autocratic
regimes define their own problems and issues, keep their own counsel, issue
whatever directives they please, . . . and ignore or block off feedback, except for
information required to sanction noncompliance. Alterocracies, to the extent they
exist, respond to the wishes of public opinions and their subordinates (1974, p. 67).
While it is virtually impossible for both totally autocratic and purely alterocratic
regimes to exist in the real world, nevertheless the Greek military regime displayed
a number of characteristics associated with the former. The military rulers
apparently responded to the input of a limited number of civil servants considered
politically safe. But as mentioned, they ignored the rest of the countrys
administrative apparatus. The majority of the Greek civil servants interviewed felt
left out of the decision-making process and were afraid to voice their opinion for
fear of reprisals and possible dismissal. On the other hand, the military showed
228 C. P . Danopoulos
contempt towards the bureaucracy and felt no need to respond to inputs coming
from an institution whose record of achievement the military considered less than
noteworthy.

Compliance
Compliance is the last variable in Eckstein and Gurrs superodinate-subordinate
authority patterns, and is seen as the disposition of subordinates to behave
according to the directives of superordinates. Compliance depends on allegiance
and legitimacy. Higher degrees of allegiance of subordinates towards their
superiors, and the greater the degree of superordinate (regime) legitimacy, the
higher the level of compliance. The opposite is true in cases where allegiance and
legitimacy are low (1974, pp. 71-74).
In the initial stages at least, regimes owing their existence to force may enjoy a
degree of public tolerance but not necessarily allegiance and legitimacy. Allegiance
is directly related to regime legitimacy, i.e. the extent to which a polity is regarded
as worthy of support (Eckstein and Gurr, 1974, p. 449), and depends on the ability
of the regime to convince the public of its capacity to make rational decisions and to
perform to their expectations. Legitimacy and allegiance are long-term objectives.
Compliance dimensions under authoritarian conditions may be difficult to
discern and differentiate from submissiveness under duress. When administrators
are confronted with martial law, threats of dismissal, and other reprisals they can
be forced to show compliance. But this does not signify regime acceptance.
Evidence of overt administrative non-compliance while the army ruled Greece
did not surface. Openly defying martial law and the other restrictions the military
rulers had imposed was beyond the courage of even the most daring of civil
servants. The dismissal of several thousands of their colleagues and the towering
presence of the military watchdogs dissuaded all but the most audacious ones.
Under conditions of repression, however, refusal to pay allegiance and accept
the legitimacy of a regime can manifest themselves in different ways. Refusal to
pass on information, work slowdowns and similar acts of civil disobedience can be
cited as examples. Greek civil servants engaged in such acts to show their
opposition to the military regime. But when the Greek populace refuses to extend
legitimacy to the regime (Danopoulos, 1983) the administrative machinerys
rejection of it should come as no surprise.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This article set out to analyse and evaluate the Greek military regimes relations
with the nations administrative apparatus. Eckstein and Gurrs superordinate-
subordinate framework of directiveness, participation, responsiveness, and com-
pliance was utilized as the basis of analysis. Data deriving from interviews with high
civil servants and military officers, and other sources were utilized as evidence to
evaluate military-civil service relations in Greece during the years of military rule
(1967-1974).
Prior to analysing the military regimes relations with the nations civil service,
the paper briefly traced the evolution of military professionalism and the historical
 The military and bureacracy in Greece - 1967-1974 229
and ecological dimensions of Greek public administration. In analysing the
evolution of Greek public administration throughout the years, the paper accepted
the position that administrative culture is a reflection of societal characteristics and
political culture.
The findings support this thesis, but with one important caveat. Improvement in
the standard of living and a greater degree of industrialization do not always suffice
to transform bureaucracies from underdeveloped to modern-rationalist structures.
Rapid economic change is possible. Social habits, norms, habits and evaluative
structures, on the other hand, tend to follow a much slower pace of change. Even
though the nations economy experienced a dramatic change, especially in the
1950s and 1960s, Greeces societal, political and, by implication, administrative
cultures retained those characteristics prevalent in transition cultures, i.e. excessive
individualism and low rates of acceptability of bureaucracy and rule universality.
These traits were reflected in the Greek bureaucratic apparatus which, as seen, was
characterized by a lack of service ethos, by fragmentation, and by an absence of
autonomy, independence, and responsibility.
As far as the evolution of military professionalism is concerned, the preceding
analysis indicates that while domestic considerations are important, especially in
the traditional phase, it is the ability of the military (due to the very mission and
nature of the profession) to adopt foreign-born models of professionalism that
plays the most important role in their professionalization. The latter seems more
prevalent in transitional cultures such as Greece.
Analysing the Greek military regimes relations with the countrys administrative
apparatus, on the basis of directiveness, participation, responsiveness and
compliance, it was found that the two sides failed to forge an effective relationship.
The regime failed to issue clear policy directives, allow bureaucratic participation in
the decision-making process, and be responsive to the needs and suggestions of
administrative personnel. The bureaucracy responded by refusing to lend
legitimacy and allegiance to the regime. The military rulers failed to transform and
modernize the nations administrative apparatus which they had targeted as one of
their main objectives.
Even though the less than adequate state of Greeces bureaucratic structure
contributed to the strained relations between superordinates and subordinates,
nonetheless the major culprits in this failure were the military rulers and their
governing style. For the professional military mind contains both modern
managerial qualities (partly foreign-born), and traditional values such as bravery,
discipline, and obedience. The former leads soldiers to believe that they possess the
necessary skills to administer the civilian society (including civilian bureaucratic
organizations), while the latter affects their governing style. Attempting to
transplant military perceptions, norms, standards, and decision methods in
bureaucratic organizations-which are hierarchical but not regimented, and where
persuasion and discussion rather than strict obedience to commands predominate-
leads to inconsistencies and failures. Organizations operate effectively and
efficiently only when the superordinates and subordinates share attitudes and
perceptions, and information is allowed to flow in both directions. Military
superordinates are ill-prepared to operate and adapt to such organizational
environments.
In sum, the findings of this paper disagree with the long-held view that military
230 C. P. Danopoulos
governments form coalitions with the civil bureaucracies (Shils, 1962, p. 57; Heady,
1979). Instead, Bienens position, which sees the military and the bureaucracy as
not always enjoying the best of relations, is supported by t h e G r e e k experience
(Bienen, 1978, p. 233). Their inflexible style inevitably brings military political
governors into a collision course with civilian bureaucracies whose operating mode
emphasizes discussion, compromise, and accommodation.

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