MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA V.

COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE

FACTS:
The petitioner Municipality of San Pedro, Laguna filed in the court of first instance a
petition claiming the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right of Escheat. The
respondent Colegio de San Jose, claims to be the exclusive owner of the said hacienda,
assailed the petition upon the grounds that the petitioner does not allege sufficient facts
to entitle themthe remedy for right of Escheat. Carlos Young, claiming to be a lessee of
the hacienda under a contract legally entered with Coelegio de San Jose, also
intervened in the case. Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna objected to the
appearance and intervention of the respondents but such objection was overruled.
Furthermore the lower court dismissed the petition filed for by Municipal Council of San
Pedro.

ISSUE:
W/N the petition for escheats should be dismissed?

RULING:
YES. Escheat is a proceeding whereby the real and personal property of a deceased
person become the property of the State upon his death without leaving any will or legal
heirs. It is not an ordinary action but a special proceeding. The proceeding should be
commenced by a petition and not by a complaint.
According to Sec 1 of Rule 91 of the rules of court, the essential facts which should be
alleged in the petition, which are jurisdictional because they confer jurisdiction upon the
CFI are:
1. That a person died intestate or without leaving any will,
2. That he has left real or personal property and he was the owner thereof,
3. That he has not left any heir or person by law entitled to the property, and
4. That the one who applies for the escheat is the municipality where deceased has his
last residence or in case he should have no residence in the country, the municipality
where the property is situated.
Sec 3 of Rule 91 also provides that after the publications and trial, if the court finds that
the deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal property situated in the country
and has not left any heir or other person entitled there to, it may order, after payment of
debts and other legal expenses, the escheat and in such case, it shall adjudicate the
personal property to the municipality where the deceased had his last residence and the
real property to the municipality/ies where they are situated.
In a special proceeding for Escheat under sec 1 to 3 of Rule 91, the petitioner is not the
sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or Interest
in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested and necessary party
and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat.
When a petition for escheat does not state facts which entitle the petitioner to the
remedy prayed for and even admitting them hypothetically, it is clear that there is no
ground for the court to proceed to the Inquisition provided by law, an interested party
should not be disallowed from filing a motion to dismiss the petition which is untenable
from all standpoint. And when the motion to dismiss is entertained upon this ground the
petition may be dismissed unconditionally.
In this case, Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young had a right to intervene as an
alleged exclusive owner and a lessee of the property respectively.
The Municipal base its right to escheat on the fact that the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan, temporal property of the Father of the Society of Jesus, were confiscated by
the order of the King of Spain. From the moment it was confiscated, it became the
property of the commonwealth of the Philippines. Given this fact, it is evident that the
Municipality cannot claim that the same be escheated to them, because it is no longer
the case of real property owned by a deceased person who has not left any person
which may legally claim it.

Paciente v. Dacuycuy

Facts:

1. Leonardo Homeres died, leaving to his widow Lilia, and two (2) minor children a lot.
Subsequently Lilia sold the lot to Conchita Dumdum for P10,000, who later on sold it to
the petitioner. The petitioner then mortgaged the subject lot to the Citytrust bank as
security for a loan. Thereafter, Lilia was declared guardian of the minors in the
guardianship proceedings.

2. The guardianship court issued an order for the cancellation of the transfer certificate
of title for the lot upon knowing that the said lot is the subject of the guardianship
proceedings. It also ordered the petitioner to pay the minors the price of the lot
alienated.

Issue:

Whether or not the guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the cancellation on the
transfer certificate of title of the subject lot

RULING:
Yes, in this case the title and ownership of the minors over the disputed property is clear
and indisputable They inherited a part of the land in question from their father. The sale
of this land, where they are co-owners, by their mother without the authority of the
guardianship court is illegal

In issuing the above questioned order and resolution, the respondent court did not
exceed its jurisdiction but merely exercised its duty to protect persons under disability.

RESTITUTO CENIZA and JESUS CENIZA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon jointly purchased Lot on installment basis and they
agreed, for convenience, to have the land registered in the name of Dabon. Since then,
Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective portions
of the land, declared the same for taxation, paid real estate taxes on their respective
shares, and made their respective installment payments to the Seminario de San Carlos
de Cebu.

Thereafter, Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza, one of the children of the co-owners
Jose and Vicente, subdivided the property in question into Lot 627 A, B & C. However,
private respondents Magno, Vicenta, Teresita, Eugenia and Tomas all surnamed Dabon,
children of co-owner Vicente refused to convey Lots to the petitioners, children of co-
owner Jose Ceniza. They claimed that their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon,
was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627, by purchase from the Seminario de San
Carlos de Cebu and that petitioners' right of action had already prescribed. Therefore,
case was then filed at RTC where the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners
on the ground of the existence of co-ownership among the parties. However, said
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

w/n the registration of the title of the land in the name of one of the co-owners
constituted a repudiation of the co-ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription.

Ruling:

No. In Custodio v. Casiano, 9 SCRA 841, it has been ruled that:"Where title to land was
issued in the name of a co-heir merely with the understanding that he would act as a
trustee of his sisters, and there is no evidence that this trust relation had ever been
repudiated by said trustee, it is held that a relation of co-ownership existed between
such trustee and his sisters and the right of the successors-in-interest of said sisters to
bring the present action for recovery of their shares therein against the successors-in-
interest of said trustee cannot be barred by prescription, despite the lapse of 25 years
from the date of registration of the land in the trustee's name."

Further, the Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a
general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a
title by prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following
circumstances: a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to the ouster of the cestui que trust; b) that such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que trust; and c) that the evidence thereon should
be clear and conclusive.

Apparently, the foregoing is not present in this case. Hence, respondents cannot claim
title to such property on account of acquisitive prescription.

Lazatin Vs. Jose Campos

Facts:

Margarita de Asis died, leaving a holographic will providing for a legacy of cash, jewelry,
and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to
Rodolfo Gallardo, as on of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta.
Clara, son of petitioner Renato Lazatin

During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box at the bank which either
she or respondent Nora deLeon (adopted daughter) could open. 5 days after her death,
Nora opened the safety deposit box and removed its contents: (a) shares of stock; (b)
her adoption papers and those of her sister, respondent Irma L. Veloso; and
(c) jewellery belonging to her and to her mother. Nora claims that she opened the safety
deposit box in good faith, believing that it was held jointly by her and her deceased
mother

Respondents filed a petition to probate (establish the validity) the will. After having
learned that the safety boxwas opened

Petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara filed a motion to intervene in the
estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child

During the hearing, Renato presented no decree of adoption in his favor. Instead, he
attempted to prove, over private respondents' objections, that he had recognized the
deceased spouses as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death.
Issue:

w/n petitioner was able to establish his status as an adopted child

ruling:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding which creates between two persons a

relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only
an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. The fact of adoption
is never presumed, but must be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its
existence. On the contrary, the absence of a record of adoption has been said to
evolve a presumption of its non-existence. The absence of proof of such order of
adoption by the court, as provided by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol
evidence that a child has lived with a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a
child to establish such adoption. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible
where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to
the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence;
execution; loss; contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to establish the former
existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or destruction. Secondary proof
may only be introduced if it has first beer. established that such adoption paper really
existed and was lost

In re: petition of julian lin carulasan

Facts:

Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and
Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation
of their son so that the childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a
sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional
Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil
Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given
for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against
when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle
names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the
grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the
name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the
name. The RTC said that legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julio
considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could then
decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC.

Issue:

W/n the RTC correct in denying the petition

Ruling:

Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well
as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and
surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of
his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten
instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his
father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a
surname.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a
person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth
or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason
which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or
compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle
name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not
constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

Rep. of the Phil vs. Jennifer Cagandahan

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During
her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed
that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor
menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male
characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According
to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in
her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name
be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view
that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as
a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is
preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.