Hegeler Institute

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO

Author(s): Herbert Spiegelberg
Source: The Monist, Vol. 49, No. 1, Linguistic Analysis and Phenomenology (January, 1965),
pp. 1-17
Published by: Hegeler Institute
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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH
TO THE EGO*

Introductory Remarks

Husserl,who to my knowledge never attended a philosophical

meeting-not to attend was and still is almost a sign of eminence
among German philosophers-once gave as his reason: "At philo
sophical meetings it is only the philosophers who meet, not the
I wonder how far he would be willing to revise this
philosophies."
estimate, had he ever been able to attend a meeting of the APA
and especially of itsWestern Division. At least some of our sym
to make different philoso
posia seem to me determined attempts
face each other and to talk to each other instead of past one
phies
another.

Ours, then, ismeant to be such a confrontation, in which Hus

serl's philosophy, phenomenology, will have a chance to enter
into a live discussion with at least one of itsAnglo-American part
ners, analytic philosophy. Of late, the question of the real differ
ence between philosophical analysis and phenomenology has re
ceived encouraging attention.1 There are those who think that the
two are completely different ways of 'doing philosophy', phenom
to the era before the "revolution in
enology belonging essentially
that the difference has been vastly
philosophy." Others believe
no practical difference
exaggerated and that fundamentally there is
between the two. Personally, I am not ready to side with either
view. Instead, I suggest putting the matter to a concrete testwhich
a
could provide the basis for meaningful comparison. My share in

* as a contribution to the Symposium "The of a Person:

First presented Concept
and at the American Philosophical Association,
Phenomenology Analysis,"
Western Division, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, May 2, 1963.
i on and between Charles
Symposium "Phenomenology Linguistic Analysis"
and A. J. Ayer. Aristotelian Society, Suppl. 33 (1959), 93-124. See also
Taylor
some of the discussion at the Colloque de Royaumont of 1960 on La Philosophie

analytique ( ditions de Minuit, 1962), thus far published only in French.

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2 THE MONIST

this test will in providing one foundation

consist for such a
by offering a of a analysis.
comparison sample phenomenological

..
Conception of Phenomenology-Preliminary Clarifications
This phenomenological analysis calls for some preliminary clar
ifications.
First, my analysis is based on an interpretation of phenomenol
ogy which is anything but orthodox in the Husserlian sense. Thus
there will be no reference to phenomenological reductions, trans
cendental egos or similar concepts. Instead, I shall advocate a
wider conception of phenomenology which includes the common
move
ground of the main currents within the phenomenological
ment. Its guiding principle is: as direct an approach to the phenom
ena as possible, reducing presuppositions and commitments of
a merely theoretical nature to a minimum, and always reserving
the right to re-examine and revise them in the light of the phenom
ena subsequently encountered. In the pursuit of this objective
the following steps can be distinguished:
(1) exploration of particular phenomena in the chosen field by
way of intuiting experience (Anschauung) ;
a study of its components, if any,
(2) analysis of the found by
and their connections;
(3) description of the findings in terms of a conceptual framework;
structure within the particular
(4) exploration of the essential
phenomena and of their essential relationships with other
phenomena;
as they
(5) exploration of the modifications of these phenomena
a
present themselves to viewing subject (modes of appear
ance) ;
in which the phenomena take shape
(6) exploration of the way
as they are realized by a viewing subject ('constitution' in
,2
consciousness)
all these steps must
Not be taken together. The first three,
however, are basic. The last (constitution) will be omitted in the

present paper.

2This of phenomenology is developed more fully in my The

conception
Phenomenological
Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960; 2nd ed. 1965),

Chapter XIV.

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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO 3

Phenomenology and Language

Secondly, the phenomenological approach so conceived focus

ses on the study of the phenomena rather than on the language in
which we talk about them. If I am not mistaken, it is characteristic
of linguistic analysis to ask "What do we mean when we say 'X*
(in quotes) ?" By contrast, the phenomenology I am advocating
asks "What do we see when we look at X (without quotes) ?"
Now this emphasis on the primacy of the phenomena may easily
be misunderstood to mean that phenomenology ignores language
completely. Quite apart from the fact that there is such a thing
as a flourishing phenomenology of language, I should like tomake
it plain from the outset that phenomenology is essentially neither
non-linguistic nor anti-linguistic. From its very beginnings Hus
serl's phenomenology was concerned about meanings, and especially
about the ambiguity of some of the key terms in philosophical
and psychological language, such as 'consciousness* and 'represen
tation* (Vorstellung) .3
Phenomenology has also paid attention to the variety and shades
of actual usage with a view to utilizing it as a guide to a vastly
enlarged range of phenomena which previous discussion had neg
lected or overlooked.
Besides, there is a special form of phenomenology, developed by
Alexander Pf nder, which starts every phenomenological investi
what we mean in our
gation by clarifying really ordinary beliefs
about philosophical issues as expressed in our ordinary language.
Such a clarification (Sinnkl rung) is to free us from distorting and
especially from reductionist misinterpretations by going back to
what we really have in mind when we use fundamental philosophi
cal terms. Only when we have thus clarified our meanings, does it
make sense to verify them by a cautious phenomenology of percep
tion.

in the present context I shall pursue a different phe

However,
start at once with the
nomenological approach, which will phenom
ena, going to them as straight as possible without first attending
to meanings. While in principle such an approach should be pos
sible everywhere (though itmay not always be themost advisable),

3 II, i No. V, 1, 44, 45.

Logische Untersuchungen

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4 THE MONIST

it is indispensable when we are faced with an entirely new and un

labelled phenomenon in uncharted territory.
In saying that such a phenomenology goes to the phenomena
"as straight as possible" I am not implying that
phenomenology, any
more than any other study, can do
completely without language. In
asmuch as phenomenology too is a joint
enterprise of several
it has to use if
phenomenologists, language, only for the purpose
of directing fellow investigators to the same area of
phenomena.
The finger alone won't do as soon as we have passed beyond the
reach of the pointing hand, only discourse can
specify. In this re
spect phenomenology, along with any other descriptive science,
shares what has been called the linguacentric predicament of man
in all his socio-cultural enterprises. But the decisive difference of the
phenomenon-based from the language-based approach remains that
language in the former serves only as a take-off a
place, stepping
stone, and a vehicle that takes us to the work-site, the phenomena,
not as the destination of our explorations.
However, even after the phenomenologist has arrived at the
and carried out
phenomena his exploring and analyzing, he cannot
abandon language for good and all. The task of description, so es
sential to his program, makes him once more
dependent on lan
guage. It is of course no longer certain that existing language will
be adequate to express and accommodate his new findings. In such
cases additions to this language will be needed. Yet such additions
will have to be based on the framework of pre-existing language and
must follow itsgeneral patterns, much as this happens in the
develop
ment of scientific nomenclature and terminology. Thus the conclud
ing task of phenomenology calls for renewed and even increased
interest in a critical analysis of language. But even so, in phenom
enology it will be at best a means to the understanding of the
never an end in itself.
phenomena,

The Choice of the Topic

As a test case for determining the actual difference between the
two ways of 'doing philosophy* I suggested the topic of the ego.
By using this term I myself mean nothing more technical than the
subject of Descartes' "ego cogito," without wanting to deny that
this ego also may do or suffer other things than 'cogitate*. I wish

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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO 5

we could replace the term 'ego* at once by the first person singular
pronoun 'P, as one might do with less hesitation in languages other
than English, where, apart from the risk of phonetic ambiguity,
the noun 'the P has no recognized status. In fact, I wish we could
do entirely without the substantivized form of the pronoun, which
is, to say the least, a grammatical atrocity.What ismore serious, it
may have not only emasculated but nearly destroyed the original
experience in its existential poignancy.
Are there any special reasons for making the case of the ego
the test case for such an experiment, considering the fact that in
the latest philosophy of mind it seems to be an almost abandoned
mine?
While I confess to a private fascination with this topic, I should
like to plead its particular appropriateness on two less
personal
grounds:
(1) The 'ego* has proved a particularly puzzling topic for philos
ophy in the past, ever since David Hume questioned its right
to be, in the face of Descartes' claims to its indubitability.
a remarkable comeback
(2) The 'ego* or 'self has lately made
in psychiatry (Freud) and more recently in psychology (Gor
don W. Allport). But here it has been introduced less on
grounds of direct experience than as an con
indispensable
struct.4 Besides, in psychology, concepts of the 'ego* and the
'self* have proliferated to such a degree that one would al
most like to avoid the terms completely. All the more urgent
is the need of clarification and return to the phenomena. I
submit that this situation is also a challenge to philosophy.

Plan of Approach
In focussing on this ego I shall turn first to what appears, or
what I shall call the ontic features of the ego-phenomenon as it
presents itself in the phenomenological view, then to how it ap
pears, or what I shall call the phenomenal features of the ego
phenomenon through which the ontic features present themselves,
such as perspectives, shades, and the like.

4
See, e.g., Percival M. Symonds, The Ego and the Self (New York: Appleton
Century-Crofts, 1951); also Ruth Wylie, The Self Concept (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1961).

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6 THE MONIST

In each case I shall introduce a distinction which does not

apply
to phenomena generally but which seems to me of considerable
significance for ego-phenomena. There is a difference between
the ego as it presents itself on the level of ordinary experience
and the ego as we experience it under more unusual or 'privileged'
circumstances, a difference which is usually neglected in our
theoretical discussions, philosophical and psychological, as well.
In the first case I shall speak of ordinary, in the second of extra
ordinary ego-phenomena.

FINDINGS
Ontic Features of the Ego. Obviously, the present context does not
allow for a complete phenomenology of the ego. I can select only
some of its facets and shall choose the ones that seem to me best
suited to illustrate the phenomenological approach as here con
ceived. One might wonder whether it is at all possible to select such
facets without first determining the nature of the ego and its onto
logical status. While I would agree that eventually the findings
here presented will have to be integrated into a systematic phenom
enology of the ego, I believe that some facets can be approached
independently. All that needs to be presupposed in this case is that
there is something which corresponds to the term 'ego'; that it is
given in intuitive experience; and that it has a certain structure
which entitles it to a place in the framework of ontology.

Ordinary Ego-phenomena. In studying the everyday ego, I shall

concentrate on what I should like to call its 'volume*. In the past
it has often been asserted or at least implied that the ego is some
thing like an unextended point. Or it has been treated as if it
as studied by the biological
simply coincided with the organism
sciences. What does an inspection of the phenomena reveal as we
try to explore, analyze, and describe them?
The following typical situations, corresponding to first person

singular sentences, seem to stand out:

1. Cases where the circumference of the ego is coterminous with
the outskirts of the body as we experience it:
Thus in such acts as swimming the experiencing ego seems
to be reaching up to the outskirts of his skin. I identify

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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO 7

with my swimming body, as far as I am aware of it, when

I say "I swim." This does not mean that I am equally iden
tified with all parts of the experienced body, e.g., the left
side and the right side, the toes or the hair. There are

degrees of such identifications. But there is no identifica

tion with such unexperienced parts of the biological or

ganism as cells or genes.

2. Gases where the ego includes more than the body:
a. In certain cases the ego incorporates the clothing. Notor
iously, used clothes, as they have adjusted to the shape
and posture of our bodies and to our patterns of motion,
are experienced quite differently from new clothes, and
ones. Clothing has become
especially from poorly fitting
in a sense part of ourselves. How much this is so is con
firmed by phrases such as "I am torn and tattered,mussed
up, down at the heels, etc." "Clothes are the man" ap
plies in this case also to the ego. I submit that the feeling
of nakedness consists partly in the fact that the ordinary
ego feels incomplete without the clothing which envelops
the body.
b. The ego may extend into his tools. This is particularly
true of artificial limbs. Also in writing the ego seems to
am at
incorporate the pen down to its tip. In a sense I
its very tip when I shape my characters, not at the tips
of my fingers or in other parts of my skin, which are in
touch with the pen; of these I am hardly aware. There is
good reason for saying "I am writing," not "My pen is
writing." The identification of the ego with the tip of the
writing tool makes the claims of graphology about the
expressiveness of handwriting particularly plausible and
appealing.
c. Finally, there are cases where the ego incorporates a
vehicle. The experienced driver, in contrast to the learner,
may identify with his car to the degree of experiencing it
as an extension of his own self. Thus he may well say,
"I am going 100miles an hour," not "my car is going 100
miles." This may also explain some of the fascination of
high-speed driving.
3. Gases where the ego does not fill its bodily frame:

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8 THE MONIST

a. Sometimes the ego fills merely part of its body. When

Woodrow Wilson in his famous limerick joked: "My face
I don't mind it, For I am behind it. . . he seems to have
distinguished, however, facetiously, between his face and
his ego. Actually, such experiences are by no means un
common. One need not think of such pathological cases
as the loss of conscious identification with parts of the
body, as in local anaesthesia. Even in normal experience
areas of the body may appear as merely mine, not me,
as possessions, liked or disliked, which I may lose or which
may be altered, e.g., by plastic surgery, without a change
ofmyself.
b. There are even cases where the ego withdraws completely
from the body. In the preceding cases the ego still kept
a firm foothold on the body. But it can also
happen that
it stands completely apart from the body. I am not think
ing so much of the reports about ecstasies, in which sup
posedly the ego leaves its body behind. I have inmind the
way in which some Stoics such as Epictetus seem to have
felt about their entire bodies, namely as possessions of
the soul, as such set off against the ego. A different but
related situation may be observed when, awakening from a
dream, our dream bodies having vanished, we find our
selves reverting to our everyday bodies, of which we have
now to resume possession even before we can again iden
tifywith them. Here too we seem to have been, for a while
at least, completely dissociated from our real body.
In the cases described thus far the ego seems to have definite
volumes of which we can be clearly aware. It must not be over
looked, however, that normally we would be hard put to deter
mine the outskirts of our ego. Here its exact volume remains un
differentiated and indefinite.When the ego sees or hears or imagines
or believes, the idea of the body and its volume simply does not
enter. It would therefore be highly artificial to suggest that in such
situations the ego has any particular volume. In such cases it remains
neutral to the body as such.
Now what exactly is the relation of the ego to all these situations?
Does a special ego correspond to each one of them, each with
a different volume and perhaps even one without any volume?

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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO 9

And if there should be many, are they completely separate or is

one inside the other, as Chinese boxes are, i.e., an ego within an
ego within an ego?
The best way to decide this question is to turn from the statics
of these cases to a consideration of their dynamics. For the ego stands
by no means in a stable relation to its body, its extensions, and
its diminutions. Sometimes it expands beyond it, at other times
it contracts within it, sometimes it identifies with it, and at other
times it dissociates from it. There even seem to be special tech
such as relaxation, by which one can let go, as it were, of
niques,
certain parts of the body and treat them as if they were extraneous
objects. One may retreat from it and advance beyond it, be it only
in imagination, as in putting oneself into the place of another.
Thus the ego on this level is a being capable of expanding and
contracting, comparable in some ways to an amoeba, whose pseudo
podia may reach out at times but are then pulled in again. Only
that the kind of changes of volume of the ego are much more
abrupt and extend much farther.
At this point I shall stop describing the ego at the level of every
day consciousness. Completeness was anyway not my objective, I
merely wanted to show what a phenomenon-focussed phenome
nology of the ego can discover in the case of ordinary phenomena.
But at least I want to acknowledge themajor unfinished business:
(1) A fully developed phenomenology of the ego will have to deal
with such additional features as its functions, active and pas
sive, its potentialities, its dependences and independences.
on its ontological
(2) It will also have to decide status. Any
attempt to classify the ego in terms of a more or less out
moded ontology as either substance or attribute, as an event
or pattern of events, as a continuant or a disposition, would be

premature. The first task is to present something like an ana

tomical preparation of the phenomenon, showing its structure
as distinctly as possible. Then we might reflect on its place
or lack of
place in the framework of ontology.

Extraordinary Ego-phenomena. I shall now try to draw attention

to a dimension of the ego-phenomenon which does not form an
our everyday consciousness and which seems to have
explicit part of
escaped the attention of almost all the philosophers and psychol

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10 THE MONIST

ogists. It will therefore be necessary first to improve the access

to this part of the phenomenal field. In order to do this, I shall
begin by pointing out some explicit cases.
Most children and adolescents are affected by sudden seizures
of an experience which they sometimes express in such seemingly
tautological sentences as "I am me." And nearly all of them seem
to be bothered by persistent questions such as "Why am I me?"5
Since I am now trying to illustrate a phenomenon-based phenom
enological approach, I shall forbid myself to explore the real mean
as
ing of these odd sentences. Instead I want to go as directly
to the phenomena towhich they seem to be pointing.
possible
But first I must try to revive or evoke this experience even
among hardened adults, and especially among the most hardened
among them, the professional students of the ego, philosophical
and psychological.
A literary stimulus may be the quickest way of inducing or
recapturing the phenomenon. It is taken from Carson McCullers*
novel The Member oj the Wedding? in which the twelve-year-old
heroine Frankie suddenly remarks to her older confidant, the
Negro cook Berenice:

Doesn't it strike you as strange that I am I, and you are You? I am

F. Jasmine Addams. And you are Berenice Sadie Brown. And we
can look at each other, and touch each other, and stay
together year
in and year out in the same room. Yet always I am I, and you are

you. And I can't ever be anything else but me, and you can't ever

be anything else but you. Have you ever of that? And does
thought
it seem to you strange?

Whereupon Berenice, after meditating for some time in her

rocking chair finally says: "I have thought of it occasionally."
Now I am not going to try to determine why this situation
strikes this adolescent as so strange. Enough if this passage can

51 have tried to explore the empirical fact with the assistance of members of
the Lawrence of and have on our findings
Department Psychology reported
in an article "On the I-am-me Experience in Childhood and Adolescence" in

Psychotogia 4 (1961), 135-146. Even Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London,
1949), p. 186, mentions the fact that "not only theorists, but also quite unsophisti
cated people, young children, find perplexities in the notion of I."
including
6 Mifflin 138.
(Boston: Houghton Company, 1946), p.

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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO 11

convey her sense of strangeness. I would like to use this case

merely as an opening wedge. I submit that, at least in some of us,
this sense of irretrievable incarnation at a specific point of time,
space, and history results in a feeling of a peculiar dizziness.
The ego gripped by such an experience is no longer the referent
of that noun 'the ego* but the innermost I
impersonalizing
myself in its most personal, most poignant authenticity. Delving
into this experience, and pondering on it, we are faced with a
something which no longer shows the unshakable stability (funda
men tum inconcussum) of Descartes' cogitating ego, the Archi
medean fulcrum of his epistemology. In becoming aware of it one
may well have the feeling of an abyss opening underneath one's
normal self-assured ego, inducing a peculiar existential anxiety
which is related to, but differs from, the more familiar anxiety
of-being of the existentialists. Besides, this ego, of which we are
normally oblivious, is by no means always as conscious as Descartes'
ego. In a sense it may even be called normally unconscious.
It is certainly not always given clearly and distinctly, as the Car
tesian ego is.Yet itmay be indubitable.
I shall, however, not attempt to undertake the much more diffi
cult task of analyzing and describing this ego any further, at least
not in the present context. Suffice it if I can make it accessible for
further exploration. But at least I shall make a try at determining
its relation to the more ordinary phenomena of the ego, lest it be
thought that I am trying tomultiply egos unnecessarily.
I see no reason for maintaining that the extraordinary and
the ordinary ego are ontologically separated. There may be a
certain discontinuity in our experience of them, a jolt as we turn
from the ordinary to the new sense of the ego. But this does
not prove a discontinuity in the referent of our experience. I sug

gest that what is involved here is the discovery of a new dimension

within the ordinary ego, a new facet or deeper layer within the
same
phenomenon.

Perhaps the main significance of this new depth dimension in

the ego is that it gives plastic relief to the ego as a whole. There is

something strangely flat and anemic about the ego that has survived
in the philosophers' books and discussions. No wonder Occam's
razor as wielded by Ernst Mach has come close to eradicating it.Only

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12 THE MONIST

if the poignancy of the original experience can be restored to

it can it regain its full weight and rightful place in philosophy.

Phenomenal Features of theEgo

In turning now from the ego's ontic to its phenomenal fea
tures through which the ontic ones present themselves to a viewer,
I shall distinguish (1) perspectival modifications, which are essen
tially related to the standpoint of the viewer (Abschattungen), and
(2) other modifications such as degrees of clarity and intuitiveness.

(1) Perspectival Modifications. One of the better known phe

nomenological doctrines about perception is that all spatial objects
appear in a variety of perspectives, and that each such perspective
involves characteristic perspectival deformations (Abschattungen)
through which the object appears as the identical intentional re
ferent of all the varying presentations. But thus far it has hardly
been realized that this applies also to the ego, and that the ego
too can appear only through perspectives. Husserl, after first as
serting that there are no Abschattungen of consciousness, later
came to realize that its temporal structure had implications for
its appearance from different points in time. This realization has
bearing also on the presentation of the ego. I shall apply it first
to the ordinary, then to the extraordinary level of the ego.
Instantaneous presentation of the ego to itself is from the very
start something of a problem. Many might consider it a priori im
a somewhat expression as 'reflec
possible. Even such metaphorical
tion* is no answer. The situation may be compared to the case
where the observer of a spatial object is in bodily touch with it,
which means of course that there is no room for any kind of
perspective, not even a frog's perspective. But even if no 'outside
view' of the simultaneous ego is possible, theremight be a different
kind of access, a simultaneous awareness of one's own ego. In this
way we are aware, for instance, of our present feelings. But in
stantaneous awareness of the ego is at best an oblique perspective
which does not allow one to focus on it.The ego itselfwill never be
in the focus of this kind of consciousness.
Our only chance to focus on the ego full-face and to obtain
a 'good* perspective of it is to catch it 'in retrospect*. But this

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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO 13

retrospect on the original experience has to catch it 'in the act'

before the experience has faded out. This is the so-called retentive
as from remem
phase of memory distinguished the phase where the
bered content can only be recovered by a special act of recollection.
The problem is to reach the ego during the retention as soon as it
has come out of the tunnel of simultaneous awareness into the full
light of retentive retrospection and before it escapes from the range
of immediate experience. There is obviously no way of telling when
exactly the retrospective perspective will be at its optimum.
In thus stressing the perspective of the live past I do not mean
to imply that later perspectives based on reconstructive memory are
worthless. There will, however, be a certain shrinkage in the pres
entation of an ego more distant in time, quite apart from other
modifications that affect the usually much depleted trace of
the departed percept.
This problem is obviously intensified for the perspectives of
the deeper layers of the ego. To be sure, in the phase of simultane
ous awareness there is a gripping poignancy to the experience,
making the ego-phenomenon much more vivid, though not more
clear and distinct. There seems to be something strangely elusive
and fleeting about itwhich baffles all attempts to lay firm hold on
it. It seems also harder to focus the phenomenon in retentional
a
perspective. It certainly requires special recapturing effort,which
may well explain why it has escaped the attention of philosophers
and psychologists who entered the scene too late and too cold
to catch the phenomenon 'in the act*.
In addition to the temporal perspective of the ego, another
to be considered, which may best be called the
perspective has
social perspective. It depends on whether or not the perceiving
and the perceived ego coincide. When they do, the ego appears in
the perspective of the 'P. If they do not, it appears as 'you* or
'he\ Personal pronouns are, in fact, index words designating
such social perspectives. The he-perspective is the most common
and neutral one. It becomes a you-perspective only when the per
ceiver is drawn into direct non-cognitive social contact with the
perceived ego, a contact which is apt to change the ontic relation
between the two and thus the very structure and attitude of the
'he', who is now being addressed.
The I-perspective is obviously the closest, so close in fact that it

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14 THE MONIST

prevents direct self-confrontation, except in retrospect. For this

reason the greater distance of the is by no means
he-perspective
a disadvantage. It allows the simultaneous confrontation of the
7
ego by the outside observer. Besides, a certain distance may be
the optimum condition for seeing oneself in proper perspective
. . to see ourselves as others see is considerable
(". us"). There
truth in Nietzsche's paradoxical saying "everyone is the farthest
one from himself (Jeder ist sich selbst der But even if
Fernste)"
this should be true of the ordinary layers of the ego, the deeper,
more 'intimate* levels of the ego may still be essentially inaccessible
to any outside observer.-In this respect, the you-perspective is not
a a more a genuine encounter the
only closer, but revealing one. In
other lays himself open to the observer. This perspective of
the opened self would offer the optimum chance for approaching
the deeper levels of the ego.

(2) Other Modifications. Perspective modifications, which de

pend on the standpoint of the perceiver, are really revealing per
spectives. It used to be feared that the changes in size and shape that
go with these perspectives lead to contradictions which show that
all perception ismerely 'subjective', and that objective perception
is impossible. This fear has long given way to the realization
that it is precisely these changes which allow us to see the identical
size and shape of the perceived through its perspectives.
There are, however, modifications of the ways in which an
is given that do interfere seriously with adequate access to
object
it.

begin with, it should be realized that normally we merely

To
refer to the objects of our discourse without taking the trouble
of following up such mere references by intuitive inspection. To
do this would require a special effort,which is not only too de
our mean
manding for ordinary life, but rarely required. So most of
remain empty of intuitive content. This applies particularly
ings
to the ordinary use of the word T. Starting with this level of
our to more
intuitive emptiness references objects may fill up with
and more intuitive content in a continuous series. Thinking of

7 On this point see also Alfred Schutz, Collected I Mar

Papers (The Hague:
tinusNijhoff, 1962),pp. 173 ff.

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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO 15

an icosahedron we would rarely bother to visualize all its twenty

triangles in their proper positions. But we can always add to such
incipient intuitiveness up to the optimum of what may be called
intuitive fulfillment. It stands to reason that only such fulfillment
can provide adequate verification for our meanings. This is, any
way, the position taken by phenomenological philosophy.
Then, there are the different degrees of clearness and distinct
ness. Thus or less
equally intuitive referents may be given more
distinctly; the contrast between an and a 'realistic*
impressionistic
same scene can illustrate this point. Also, all sorts
painting of the
of interferences may affect clear presentation, such as fog and in
sufficient illumination. So can subjective conditions such as tired
ness or defective vision.
There is certainly little clarity and distinctness about the
presentation of the ordinary ego as given in direct simultaneous
awareness. It may be very intense, but even so it remains usually
at the fuzzy fringe of our everyday consciousness. One reason is
that we can watch it only surreptitiously, while paying our main
attention to the absorbing business of performing our everyday
acts. Thus the ego remains in the twilight zone of cognitive illu
mination.

When the ego moves into the zone of retrospective perception,

the chances for its clear and distinct presentation improve con
siderably. But this does not mean that the ego is now
presented
clearly and distinctly. It still takes considerable reflective effort
to light it up. It is simply a fallacy of Cartesianism to infer from the
fact that the ego is indubitable that it is also clearly and distinctly
given. Most of it is usually in the shadow, if not in the night of
the unconscious. But this does not make the existence of the ego
any less certain.

Besides, any attempt to force the ego into submission by directing

the full light of attention upon itmay have disastrous effects. As
in the case of strong emotions or other phenomena, they are apt to
fade and disappear under such intense lighting. This too may ac
count for the puzzling fact that empiricists such as David Hume,
Ernst Mach, and even William James found nothing to report
when they tried to pin down the pure ego, staring, as it were, into
a void. And yet even Hume put this finding in the form: '7 never
can catch myself." Even more difficult is the problem of presenta

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16 THE MONIST

tion in the case of the more momentous depth phenomena of

the ego. For these can be reached only in "privileged moments" or
by special effort. In spite of their poignancy they remain so elusive
that they can perhaps never be adequately grasped, whether in
immediate awareness or in retrospective retention. Yet even in
eluding us they leave a trace deep enough to make them unmis
takable to those who have experienced them.
At this point I shall stop exploring the phenomenal features
of the ego. Obviously this is merely a beginning, and I shall not
even attempt to outline the unfinished business. The main
purpose of the present discussion was to give an idea of the amount
of new features which a phenomenological approach to this area
can reveal. As such it could merely break the ground and prepare
it for further cultivation.

Summary
The main findings I wanted to exhibit could be restated in
the following manner:
Ontically the ego turns out to be a being of varying volume,
usually including the experienced body, often expanding beyond
it, and sometimes withdrawing from parts or all of it. But this
being has also a depth dimension, reaching down to the most per
sonal level of the I-myself.
Phenomenally this ego with its different levels appears through
different temporal and social perspectives, and these perspectives
are given more or less adequately, depending on the degrees of
intuitiveness, clarity, and distinctness with which they are presented.

Concluding Remarks
I said in the beginning that I expect my fellow symposiasts
not only to prick my phenomenological bubbles but also to tell
you and me what it was that I have been doing. But I cannot
resist the temptation of offering them one final reflection as a
target.
If there is anything to what I have presented here, phenomenol
ogy does considerably more than deal with the phenomena to
which ordinary language refers. Not only does it present them with

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 A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE EGO 17

much more detail, in their undescribed and ultimately indescribable

richness, it also leads to phenomena which have thus far escaped
the meshes of our linguistic nets. As to these nets, it should be
borne in mind that ordinary language, in contrast to poetic lan
guage, for instance, is primarily a practical tool, making only
such distinctions as are needed for purposes of ordinary living.
Phenomenology knows of no such restrictions. It can therefore
serve as a widener and deepener of experience beyond the range
covered by existing language. In this respect it may be compared
to the pioneer squatting in uncharted territory rather than to
the homesteader settling on mapped ground. In the uncharted
areas language has to follow experience; it is not qualified to lead
to it.
Ordinary language fits ordinary phenomena. But not all phenom
ena are ordinary. If there are extraordinary
phenomena, as I have
tried to show in the case of the ego, they call for more than
ordinary language. Such an 'extraordinary* language can be forged
only in the light of an unrestricted direct study of the phenomena
in their own right.
It may be true that "whereof the linguistic analyst "cannot
speak, thereof he must be silent." The phenomenologist has the
temerity to speak up about phenomena before which ordinary
language is apt to capitulate.
HERBERT SPIEGELBERG
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

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