Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 147406 July 14, 2008
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,1 Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal?
This is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information3 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was
filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch
18.4 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.5 Trial on the merits
ensued and on August 19, 1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.6
In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner questioned, among others, for the first
time, the trial courts jurisdiction.7
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to
have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction
of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial courts
lack of jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial courts decision, the
CA affirmed the petitioners conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the
damages awarded.8
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising
the following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the
trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the public prosecutor before the
wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that said issue was immediately raised in
petitioners appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active
participation of the petitioner in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not
by him but by the public prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult to immediately stop a bus
while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for the purpose of avoiding a person
who unexpectedly crossed the road, constitute enough incriminating evidence to
warrant his conviction for the crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the place of accident as
falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
and subsequently ruling that the speed limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour,
when no evidence whatsoever to that effect was ever presented by the prosecution
during the trial of this case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the petitioner for
homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct designation is "reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide") with violation of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code when the prosecution did not prove this during the trial and, more
importantly, the information filed against the petitioner does not contain an
allegation to that effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness Leonardo Hernal that
the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in him getting hit by the bus
driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to acquit him of the crime charged?9
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and
decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.10 In this
case, at the time the criminal information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide with violation of the Automobile Law (now Land Transportation and
Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 12911 had
already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.12 The said provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years,13 jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they
nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already
precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went
on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever
raising the jurisdictional infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack
of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for
the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of
laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by laches,
which continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various
Court decisions on the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred
by some legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.14 We
went on to state in U.S. v. De La Santa15 that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter is fatal,
and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in the court below or
on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large array of cases there cited),
and indeed, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction, the court may
dismiss the proceeding ex mero motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs.
Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given only by law and in the
manner prescribed by law and an objection based on the lack of such jurisdiction can
not be waived by the parties. x x x16
Later, in People v. Casiano,17 the Court explained:
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower court had
jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such
theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent positionthat the
lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has
no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that the indictment is void, or has been
granted an instruction based on its defective character directing the jury to acquit, he
is estopped, when subsequently indicted, to assert that the former indictment was
valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution whether the indictment in the
former prosecution was good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was impaneled
and sworn, the court on accused's motion quashed the information on the erroneous
assumption that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot successfully plead
former jeopardy to a new information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389; italics
ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to be set aside on the ground that the
court was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to assert, in support of a
defense of previous jeopardy, that such court had jurisdiction." (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)18
But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,19 the Court, in not sustaining the
plea of lack of jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following
observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been rendered, that the
plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Courts jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1, 1959. This case was argued on
January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never
impugned until the adverse decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of
counsel leads us to believe that they must have always been of the belief that
notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has jurisdiction of
the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the actual real value of the
properties in question actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Court (over
P200,000). Our minute resolution in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs.
Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is
applicable to the conduct of plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of
Appeals for decision, without questioning the latters jurisdiction until decision is
rendered therein, should be considered as having voluntarily waived so much of his
claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the reason that a
contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants submitting their
cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable judgment, but
with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable: x x x20
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy21 that a party may be barred by
laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling
everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the
plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and,
unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86
A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said
that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the
action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be
toleratedobviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question
the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61
L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659).
And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party
who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to
secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)to the effect that we
frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverseas well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-
14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on
July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of
the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.22
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and
tribunals, in resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of
jurisdiction, have applied the principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v.
Ramirez,23 we pointed out that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule
rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the
action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of
Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been
applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure
from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been
ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches. It was ruled that the
lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed
almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea
may no longer be raised for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is
"failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.24
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of
jurisdiction was the one who invoked the courts jurisdiction, and who later obtained
an adverse judgment therein, we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The
Court accorded supremacy to the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too
plentiful to mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the
rule rather than the exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,25
the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that
estoppel has not supervened." In the instant case, respondent actively participated in
all stages of the proceedings before the trial court and invoked its authority by asking
for an affirmative relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial
courts jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been rendered. In
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of the lower
court x x x in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended
complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower
court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North
Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477,
491), participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included
invoking its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by
estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its
answer to the second amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not
question the lower courts jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989 when it
filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower courts decision that petitioner raised
the question of the lower courts lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its
right to raise the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. vs.
Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial court in its 30 September 1996 decision in
LCR Case No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the petition for
reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and
therefore, it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. However, private
respondents never questioned the trial courts jurisdiction over its petition for
reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No. Q-60161(93). On the
contrary, private respondents actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings
by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They invoked the trial courts
jurisdiction in order to obtain affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles.
Private respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the issue of jurisdiction
by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed
at any stage, a litigants participation in all stages of the case before the trial court,
including the invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, bars such
party from challenging the courts jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579 [1998]; Province of
Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his
case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 298
SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA
36 [1995]). (italics ours)26
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v.
Pastorin,27 where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the
doctrines of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoy stands as
an exception, rather than the general rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.281avvphi1
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,29 the Court clarified that:
Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its case
was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In
effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for
dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which has been used quite
successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals based on lack of jurisdiction.
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine was espoused, held that a party may be
barred from questioning a courts jurisdiction after being invoked to secure
affirmative relief against its opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of
jurisdiction from being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose
is to annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception
rather than the rule.1avvphi1 Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of
lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in
the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy
applies only to exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which
we quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the
action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of
Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been
applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure
from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been
ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred
by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and
to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the
averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.30
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,31 even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction
actively took part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek
exoneration, the Court, reiterating the doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by
estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general
rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only
after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to
the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, which
was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.32
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,33 the Court again emphasized that laches
should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the
exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of
lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in
the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is,
lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had
been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in
the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was
only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at
bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution
finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing
the said courts jurisdiction based on procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her
compliance with the appellate courts directive to show cause why she should not be
cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be
considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case
within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the
mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to
comply.34
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance in
Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La
Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as
it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by
laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction
over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and
consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke collateral attacks.43
unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the
adverse party does not suffer any harm.35 With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues
raised in the petition.
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by
laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
thereof in his appeal before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without
had yet elapsed for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not prejudice.
sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party,
knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party SO ORDERED.
pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his
former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities, and other causes.36 In applying the principle of estoppel by
laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the
patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up
their Calvary once more after more or less 15 years.37 The same, however, does not
obtain in the instant case.

We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored
by law. It is to be applied rarelyonly from necessity, and only in extraordinary
circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be
strong in its favor.38 When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most
effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.39 Moreover, a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void.40 Hence, the Revised
Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts or
tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will even
attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.41 As we have
stated in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,42

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or

government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is
determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed
for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such
reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the
court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the
action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the
parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has
none over the cause of action. x x x

Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or
theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss.
Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the
relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the
subject of the controversy. x x x x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without
FIGUEROA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESJULY 14, 2008NACHURA, The petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the
J.SUBJECT AREA: RTC, consideringthat he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the appellate
Estoppel by laches court. At that time, noconsiderable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
NATURE: DISPOSITIVE:
Petition for review on certiorari Petition for review on certiorari is granted. Criminal case is dismissed.
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
TheRTC found him guilty. In his appeal before the CA, the petitioner, for the first
time, questionedRTCs jurisdiction on the case.The CA in affirming the decision of
the RTC, ruled that the principle of estoppel by laches hasalready precluded the
petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years
with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the
jurisdictional infirmity.The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for the
first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absentherein, the principle of laches
will not be applicable.Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction during the trial of this
case,constitute laches in relation to the doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,
notwithstanding thefact that said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal
to the CA
HELD:
No. Facts: Figueroa, convicted for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide in RTC
RATIO: Bulacan, questioned the trial courts jurisdiction first time on appeal before the CA.
Citing the ruling in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, the Court held that as a general rule, the CA affirmed conviction. It said that Figueroa actively participated in RTC trial,
issueof jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, hence, he is already estopped by laches.
and is not lost bywaiver or by estoppel.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in Issue: Whether or not Figueroa can no longer question jurisdiction of the RTC.
cases inwhich the factual milieu is analogous to that of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.Laches
should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, Held: Yes. Jurisdiction may be questioned.
that is,lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that theparty entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert The general rule remains: a court's lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
it.In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law,
years and at a stagewhen the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA. and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
Sibonghanoy is an exceptional casebecause of the presence of laches.In the case at render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the
bar, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present. Petitioner averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer.
Atty.Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty
of contempt,promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by
jurisdiction based onprocedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC. At that time, no considerable period
with the appellate courts directive toshow cause why she should not be cited for had yet elapsed for laches to attach. The principle in Sibonghanoy case does not
contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to thateffect could not be considered as apply.
an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to takethe case within the
milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the We note that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is
court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her to comply. to be applied rarely--only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances.
The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its
favor.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in
her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control,
over local government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs
and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue
advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot
prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve
their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due
them cannot be directed by administrative fiat.
The Case
Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to
annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.
On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C.
Agra, filed a Motion for Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for Intervention,
[1]
attaching thereto his Petition in Intervention [2] joining petitioner in the reliefs
sought. At the time, intervenor was the provincial governor of Bulacan, national
president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League
of Leagues of Local Governments. In a Resolution dated December 15, 1998, the
Court noted said Motion and Petition.
The Facts and the Arguments
On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full
text, with emphasis on the assailed provisions, is as follows:
"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation
requires continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic
stability and sustain the country's growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management
measures to match expenditures with available resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby
order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state
universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and
local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that
will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested
areas:
1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization
and staffing by deferring action on the following:
a. Operationalization of new agencies;
b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions;
c. Filling of positions; and
d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless
of funding source.
2. Suspension of the following activities:
a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those
which have already been contracted out;
b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles;
c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated
with scholarships and trainings funded by grants;
d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the
government except those clearly essential to Philippine
commitments in the international field as may be determined by
the Cabinet;
e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by
government training institutions and agencies in the performance
of their regular functions and those that are funded by grants;
f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except
those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and
those involving regular competitions/events;
g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source
of compensation from government received by the person
concerned;
h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those
required by law or those already being undertaken on a regular
basis;
i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly
and specifically authorized by law; and
j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by
institutions to victims of calamities.
3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs
4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies,
electricity and other utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation
problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and
reserves
SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify the specific sources of
cost-savings, provided the 25% minimum savings under Section 1 is complied with.
SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated from these measures shall
be submitted to the Office of the President, through the Department of Budget and
Management, on a quarterly basis using the attached format.
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue
allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
SECTION 5. The Development Budget Coordination Committee shall
conduct a monthly review of the fiscal position of the National
Government and if necessary, shall recommend to the President the
imposition of additional reserves or the lifting of previously imposed
reserves.
SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect January 1, 1998
and shall remain valid for the entire year unless otherwise lifted.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 27 th day of December, in the year of our Lord,
nineteen hundred and ninety-seven."
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO
43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of
internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect
exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President,
however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the
principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold
ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local
Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for
the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand
that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the
peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of
supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because
it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total
expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the
withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition
on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such
withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
The Issues
The Petition[3] submits the following issues for the Court's resolution:
"A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering
all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU[']S fiscal
autonomy
"B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA"
In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it
"directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the
same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are
valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local
governments.
Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question whether petitioner had
the locus standi to bring this suit, despite respondents' failure to raise the issue.
[4]
However, the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has rendered academic any
further discussion on this matter.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Main Issue:
Validity of AO 372
Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned
Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important and appropriate to define
certain crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's power of general supervision
over local governments and (2) the extent of the local governments' autonomy.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over
local governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,[5] the Court contrasted the President's power of
supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over
executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms
-- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished
them as follows:
"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law
to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s]
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter."[6]
In Taule v. Santos,[7] we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more
authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their
authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over
such body,"[8] we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[9] the difference between control and
supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the
performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may,
in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even
decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they
themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone,
but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of
execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that
the rules are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the
President.[10] The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely
alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at
whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. [11] In contrast, the heads of political
subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are
subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the
President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy
Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over
local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.[12]
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,[13] we said that local autonomy signified "a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization."The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of
the national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end
the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration
and local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject
to regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.[14]
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not
power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central
government as the law may provide. [15] The difference between decentralization of
administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v.
Mangelin[16] as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base
of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive
and accountable,'[17] and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.'[18] At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises 'general supervision'[19] over them, but only to 'ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law.'[20] He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.[21]
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency."[22]
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has
not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to
political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more
directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and
social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and
economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole,
the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated
towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies
in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government. [23]
The Nature of AO 372
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the
nature of AO 372. As its preambular clauses declare, the Order was a "cash
management measure" adopted by the government "to match expenditures with
available resources," which were presumably depleted at the time due to "economic
difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation." Because of a looming financial
crisis, the President deemed it necessary to "direct all government agencies, state
universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations as well as
local governments to reduce their total expenditures by at least 25 percent along
suggested areas mentioned in AO 372.
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative
autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources
of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local
officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated
at the national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to
local needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints
and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials, [24] who in
any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the
President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of
the government,[25] primarily responsible for formulating and implementing
continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and
programs[26] for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation
and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations
with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government
units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:[27]
"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga,
to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%)
of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding
the current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites
before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not
even try to show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable
public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the
different leagues of local governments.Without these requisites, the President has no
authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue
allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has
been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over local
governments. It is intended only to advise all government agencies and
instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it
does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory,
therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is
not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of
the power of control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone,
and while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local
Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor
general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that
will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular
appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory
or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while
authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a
subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to
recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all
concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction
may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is
in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1.
Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. [28] The Local Government
Code[29] specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU
concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose."[30] As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be
given a compulsory meaning.[31] The provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1,
1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in
the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the
law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something
held back or withheld, often temporarily." [32] Hence, the "temporary" nature of the
retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in
times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter
provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to
withhold the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions
must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily,
laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.
Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent
Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds
that, allegedly, (1) the Petition is premature; (2) AO 372 falls within the powers of
the President as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA is
implied in the President's authority to adjust it in case of an unmanageable public
sector deficit.
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet
occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency
charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope
and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse
effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial
function."
This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil
to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be
it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are
contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts
implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara, [33] this Court held
that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the
mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other
overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld.'[34] Once a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation
of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.'[35]
xxxxxxxxx
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, [36] it will not
shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the
Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department
of the government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy:[37]
"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act
unconstitutional and void."
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the
duty and the responsibility of the courts.
Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the
parties; hence it is deemed waived. Considerations of due process really prevents its
use against a party that has not been given sufficient notice of its presentation, and
thus has not been given the opportunity to refute it.[38]
Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the country. Justice
Kapunan posits that Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with the President's role as chief
fiscal officer, who allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the
observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal
prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional
and statutory mandates."[39] He cites instances when the President may lawfully
intervene in the fiscal affairs of LGUs.
Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been
authorized by law and have not been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On
the other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit
provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other
words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the
opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis.
Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA of LGUs in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit. It must be emphasized that in striking down
Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs
of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of an
unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this Decision, and in
line with Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely
glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -- that such reduction is
subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and,
more importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of local governments.
Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the
national government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that
"local development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem
is that no such interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO
372. This is why the petitioner and the intervenor (who was a provincial governor
and at the same time president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and
chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments) have protested and
instituted this action. Significantly, respondents do not deny the lack of consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287 [40] of the LGC as impliedly
authorizing the President to withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its compliance
with certain requirements.Even a cursory reading of the provision reveals that it is
totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual
budgets 20 percent of their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no
positive power granted the President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors
are hereby permanently PROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order
Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998,
insofar as local government units are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Pimentel v. Aguirre G.R. No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal
revenue allotments.

HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal
autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way
of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by
the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A
directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The
AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the
country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.
The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal
matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector
deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the
Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local
leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department
of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4)
any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which
orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 143596. December 11, 2003]
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA), HON. GREGORIA S. ONG, DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and
HON. SALVACION DALISAY, PROVINCIAL AUDITOR, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Section 2, Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the decision[1] dated September
14, 1999 of the Commission on Audit (COA), affirming the resolution of COA
Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong dated March 29, 1994 which in turn affirmed the
opinion dated October 19, 1993 of the Provincial Auditor of Oriental Mindoro,
Salvacion M. Dalisay. All three denied the grant of P1,600 monthly allowance to
petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes by the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 was formerly
assigned to the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge
of the Municipal Trial Court thereof. As such, his salary and representation and
transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court.
In addition, petitioner received a monthly allowance of P944 from the local funds[2]
of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984.[3]
On March 15, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057,
sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer
regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the
municipality to petitioner judge. On May 7, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan
unanimously approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judges monthly
allowance from P944 to P1,600 (an increase of P656) starting May 1993.[4] By
virtue of said resolution, the municipal government (the Municipal Mayor and the
Sangguniang Bayan) approved a supplemental budget which was likewise approved
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and
Management of Oriental Mindoro. In 1994, the Municipal Government of Naujan
again provided for petitioner judges P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual budget
which was again approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Office of
Provincial Budget and Management of Oriental Mindoro.[5]
On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to the
Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing them to stop the
payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner judge and to require
the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter. She opined that the
Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the
RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court. Her directive was
based on the following:
Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of
equivalent rank as may be determined by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) while in the actual performance of their respective functions
are hereby granted monthly commutable representation and transportation
allowances payable from the programmed appropriations provided for their
respective offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below . . .
National Compensation Circular No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, of the Department of
Budget and Management
Subject: Representation and Transportation Allowances of National Government
Officials and Employees
xxxxxxxxx
4. Funding Source: In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid
from the amount appropriated for the purpose and other personal services savings of
the agency or project from where the officials and employees covered under this
Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than
one source.[6] (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner judge appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong who, however,
upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay and who added that Resolution No.
101, Series of 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with
Section 3 of Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated September 1, 1993 outlining the
conditions for the grant of allowances to judges and other national officials or
employees by the local government units (LGUs). Section 3 of the said budget
circular provides that:
Sec. 3 Allowances. LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to the
national government officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates authorized
by law, rules and regulations and subject to the following preconditions:
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality, city or province as
certified by the Accountant concerned will allow the grant of the
allowances/additional compensation without exceeding the general limitations for
personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of RA 7160 including the full
requirement of RA 6758 have been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as
certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative in the LGU concerned;
c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in
accordance with the provisions of RA 7160;
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions prescribed in RA 7160; and
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national
government to the officials/employees assigned to the LGU.[7]
Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director to the
Commission on Audit. In the meantime, a disallowance of the payment of the P1,600
monthly allowance to petitioner was issued. Thus he received his P1,600 monthly
allowance from the Municipality of Naujan only for the period May 1993 to January
1994.
On September 14, 1999, the COA issued its decision affirming the resolution of
Regional Director Gregoria S. Ong:
The main issue . . . is whether or not the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
can validly provide RATA to its Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the
Supreme Court.
Generally, the grant of (RATA) [sic] to qualified national government officials and
employees pursuant to Section 36 of R.A. 7645 [General Appropriations Act of
1993] and NCC No. 67 dated 01 January 1992 is subject to the following conditions
to wit:
1. Payable from the programmed /appropriated amount and others from personal
services savings of the respective offices where the officials or employees draw their
salaries;
2. Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual General Appropriations Act;
3. Officials /employees on detail with other offices or assigned to serve other offices
or agencies shall be paid from their parent agencies;
4. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.
On the other hand, the municipal government may provide additional allowances and
other benefits to judges and other national government officials or employees
assigned or stationed in the municipality, provided, that the finances of the
municipality allow the grant thereof pursuant to Section 447, Par. 1 (xi), R.A. 7160,
and provided further, that similar allowance/additional compensation are not granted
by the national government to the official/employee assigned to the local government
unit as provided under Section 3(e) of Local Budget Circular No. 53, dated 01
September 1993.
The conflicting provisions of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act of 1993 [RA 7645]
have been harmonized by the Local Budget Circular No. 53 dated 01 September
1993, issued by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to its powers
under Section 25 and Section 327 of the Local Government Code. The said circular
must be adhered to by the local government units particularly Section 3 thereof
which provides the implementing guidelines of Section 447, Par. (1) (xi) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in the grant of allowances to national government
officials/employees assigned or stationed in their respective local government units.
Consequently, the subject SB Resolution No. 101 dated 11 May 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, having failed to comply with the
inherent precondition as defined in Section 3 (e). . . is null and void. Furthermore,
the Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national government official is
prohibited to receive additional RATA from the local government fund pursuant to
Section 36 of the General Appropriations Act (R.A. 7645 for 1993) and National
Compensation Circular No. 67 dated 1 January 1992.[8] (emphasis ours)
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Petitioner judge filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision but it was
denied by the Commission in a resolution dated May 30, 2000. Aggrieved, petitioner
filed the instant petition, raising the following assignments of error for our
consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESOLUTION NO. 1O1, SERIES OF 1993 OF NAUJAN,
ORIENTAL MINDORO, WHICH GRANTED ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCE TO
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL JUDGE OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO AND
INCREASING HIS CURRENT REPRESENTATION AND TRAVELLING
ALLOWANCE (RATA) TO AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO THAT RECEIVED
MONTHLY BY SANGGUNIANG MEMBERS IN PESOS: ONE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED (P1,600.00) EFFECTIVE 1993, IS VALID.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE POWER OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS TO
GRANT ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES STATIONED IN THEIR
MUNICIPALITY IS VERY EXPLICIT AND UNEQUIVOCAL UNDER THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 PARTICULARLY SECTION 447 IN
RELATION TO SECTIONS 17 AND 22 THEREOF.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
(DBM) CAN, BY THE ISSUANCE OF BUDGET CIRCULARS, RESTRICT A
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FROM EXERCISING ITS GIVEN LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF PROVIDING ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER
BENEFITS TO NATIONAL EMPLOYEES STATIONED OR ASSIGNED TO
THEIR MUNICIPALITY FOR AS LONG AS THEIR FINANCES SO ALLOW.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991
PARTICULARLY SECTION 447 (a) (1) (xi) WAS EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY
REPEALED OR MODIFIED BY REPUBLIC ACT 7645 AND THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1993.
V ALLOWANCES TO JUDGES
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE THE
ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES GRANTED TO HIM BY THE MUNICIPALITY
OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO BY VIRTUE OF ITS RESOLUTION NO.
101, SERIES OF 1993.
POSITION OF COA
Respondent Commission on Audit opposes the grant by the Municipality of Naujan
of the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner Judge Leynes for the reason that the
municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the RATA already
received from the Supreme Court.[9] Respondent bases its contention on the
following:
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67 (hereafter NCC No. 67) dated January 1,
1992 of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) which provides that (a)
the RATA of national officials and employees shall be payable from the programmed
appropriations or personal services savings of the agency where such officials or
employees draw their salary and (b) no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from
more than one source;
2. the General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA 7645) which provided that the RATA
of national officials shall be payable from the programmed appropriations of their
respective offices and
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53 (hereafter LBC No. 53) dated September 1, 1993 of
the DBM which prohibits local government units from granting allowances to
national government officials or employees stationed in their localities when such
allowances are also granted by the national government or are similar to the
allowances granted by the national government to such officials or employees.[10]
POSITION OF PETITIONER
Petitioner judge, on the other hand, asserts that the municipality is expressly and
unequivocally empowered by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) to
enact appropriation ordinances granting allowances and other benefits to judges
stationed in its territory. Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of the Local Government Code of
1991 imposes only one condition, that is, when the finances of the municipal
government allow. The Code does not impose any other restrictions in the exercise of
such power by the municipality. Petitioner also asserts that the DBM cannot amend
or modify a substantive law like the Local Government Code of 1991 through mere
budget circulars. Petitioner emphasizes that budget circulars must conform to, not
modify or amend, the provisions of the law it seeks to implement.[11]
HISTORY OF GRANT OF
The power of local government units (LGUs) to grant allowances to judges stationed
in their respective territories was originally provided by Letter of Instruction No.
1418 dated July 18, 1984 (hereafter LOI No. 1418):
WHEREAS, the State is cognizant of the need to maintain the independence of the
Judiciary;
WHEREAS, the budgetary allotment of the Judiciary constitutes only a small
percentage of the national budget;
WHEREAS, present economic conditions adversely affected the livelihood of the
members of the Judiciary;
WHEREAS, some local government units are ready, willing and able to pay
additional allowances to Judges of various courts within their respective territorial
jurisdiction;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of
the Philippines, do hereby direct:
1. Section 3 of Letter of Implementation No. 96 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
3. The allowances provided in this letter shall be borne exclusively by the National
Government. However, provincial, city and municipal governments may pay
additional allowances to the members and personnel of the Judiciary assigned in
their respective areas out of available local funds but not to exceed P1,500.00;
Provided, that in Metropolitan Manila, the city and municipal governments therein
may pay additional allowances not exceeding P3,000.00. (emphasis ours)[12]
On June 25, 1991, the DBM issued Circular No. 91-7 outlining the guidelines for the
continued receipt of allowances by judges from LGUs:
Consistent with the constitutional provision on the fiscal autonomy of the judiciary
and the policy of the National Government of allowing greater autonomy to local
government units, judges of the Judiciary are hereby allowed to continue to receive
allowances at the same rates which they have been receiving from the Local
Government Units as of June 30, 1989, subject to the following guidelines:
1. That the continuance of payment of subject allowance to the recipient judge shall
be entirely voluntary and non-compulsory on the part of the Local Government
Units;
2. That payment of the above shall always be subject to the availability of local
funds;
3. That it shall be made only in compliance with the policy of non-diminution of
compensation received by the recipient judge before the implementation of the salary
standardization;
4. That the subject allowance shall be given only to judges who were receiving the
same as of June 30, 1989 and shall be co-terminous with the incumbent judges; and
5. That the subject allowance shall automatically terminate upon transfer of a judge
from one local government unit to another local government unit. (emphasis ours)
On October 10, 1991, Congress enacted RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.[13] The power of the LGUs to grant allowances and
other benefits to judges and other national officials stationed in their respective
territories was expressly provided in Sections 447(a)(1)(xi), 458(a)(1)(xi) and 468(a)
(1)(xi) of the Code.
On March 15, 1994, the DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (hereafter LBC
No. 55) setting out the maximum amount of allowances that LGUs may grant to
judges. For provinces and cities, the amount should not exceed P1,000 and for
municipalities, P700.
On December 3, 2002, we struck down the above circular in Dadole, et al. vs. COA.
[14] We ruled there that the Local Government Code of 1991 clearly provided that
LGUs could grant allowances to judges, subject only to the condition that the
finances of the LGUs allowed it. We held that setting a uniform amount for the grant
of allowances (was) an inappropriate way of enforcing said criterion. Accordingly,
we declared that the DBM exceeded its power of supervision over LGUs by
imposing a prohibition that did not jibe with the Local Government Code of 1991.
[15]
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INVOLVED
From the foregoing history of the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges, the
following principles should be noted:
1. the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges has long been recognized (since
1984 by virtue of LOI No. 1418) and, at present, it is expressly and unequivocally
provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local Government Code of 1991;
2. the issuance of DBM Circular No. 91-7 dated June 25, 1991 and LBC No. 55
dated March 15, 1994 indicates that the national government recognizes the power of
LGUs to grant such allowances to judges;
3. in Circular No. 91-7, the national government merely provides the guidelines for
the continued receipt of allowances by judges from LGUs while in LBC No. 55, the
national government merely tries to limit the amount of allowances LGUs may grant
to judges and
4. in the recent case of Dadole, et al. vs. COA, the Court upheld the constitutionally
enshrined autonomy of LGUs to grant allowances to judges in any amount deemed
appropriate, depending on availability of funds, in accordance with the Local
Government Code of 1991.
OUR RULING
We rule in favor of petitioner judge. Respondent COA erred in opposing the grant of
the P1,600 monthly allowance by the Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge
Leynes.
DISCUSSION OF OUR RULING
Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provides:
(a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants . . ., and shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective
municipal government, and in this connection shall:
xxxxxxxxx
(xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow, provide for additional
allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high
school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to
the municipality; (emphasis ours)
Respondent COA, however, contends that the above section has been repealed,
modified or amended by NCC No. 67 dated January 1, 1992, RA 7645 (the General
Appropriations Act of 1993) and LBC No. 53 dated September 1, 1993.[16]
It is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot
supersede, abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. A statute is superior to an
administrative circular, thus the latter cannot repeal or amend it.[17] In the present
case, NCC No. 67, being a mere administrative circular, cannot repeal a substantive
law like RA 7160.
It is also an elementary principle in statutory construction that repeal of statutes by
implication is not favored, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. The
legislature is assumed to know the existing laws on the subject and cannot be
presumed to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.[18] Respondent COA
alleges that Section 36 of RA 7645 (the GAA of 1993) repealed Section 447(a)(l)(xi)
of RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991). A review of the two laws, however, shows that this
was not so. Section 36 of RA 7645 merely provided for the different rates of RATA
payable to national government officials or employees, depending on their position,
and stated that these amounts were payable from the programmed appropriations of
the parent agencies to which the concerned national officials or employees belonged.
Furthermore, there was no other provision in RA 7645 from which a repeal of
Section 447(a) (l)(xi) of RA 7160 could be implied. In the absence, therefore, of any
clear repeal of Section 447(a)(l)(xi) of RA 7160, we cannot presume such intention
on the part of the legislature.
Moreover, the presumption against implied repeal becomes stronger when, as in this
case, one law is special and the other is general.[19] The principle is expressed in the
maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, a general law does not nullify a specific
or special law. The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special
character, considers and makes special provisions for the particular circumstances
dealt with by the special law. This being so, the legislature, by adopting a general law
containing provisions repugnant to those of the special law and without making any
mention of its intention to amend or modify such special law, cannot be deemed to
have intended an amendment, repeal or modification of the latter.[20]
In this case, RA 7160 (the LGC of 1991) is a special law[21] which exclusively deals
with local government units (LGUs), outlining their powers and functions in
consonance with the constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy. RA 7645
(the GAA of 1993), on the other hand, was a general law[22] which outlined the
share in the national fund of all branches of the national government. RA 7645
therefore, being a general law, could not have, by mere implication, repealed RA
7160. Rather, RA 7160 should be taken as the exception to RA 7645 in the absence
of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.[23]
The controversy actually centers on the seemingly sweeping provision in NCC No.
67 which states that no one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one
source. Does this mean that judges cannot receive allowances from LGUs in addition
to the RATA from the Supreme Court? For reasons that will hereinafter be discussed,
we answer in the negative.
The pertinent provisions of NCC No. 67 read:
3. Rules and Regulations:
3.1.1 Payment of RATA, whether commutable or reimbursable, shall be in
accordance with the rates prescribed for each of the following officials and
employees and those of equivalent ranks, and the conditions enumerated under the
pertinent sections of the General Provisions of the annual General Appropriations
Act (GAA):
xxxxxxxxx
4. Funding Source:
In all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount
appropriated for the purpose and other personal services savings of the agency or
project from where the officials and employees covered under this Circular draw
their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source.
(emphasis ours)
In construing NCC No. 67, we apply the principle in statutory construction that force
and effect should not be narrowly given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law
but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in one rational view.[24]
Because a statute is enacted as a whole and not in parts or sections, that is, one part is
as important as the others, the statute should be construed and given effect as a
whole. A provision or section which is unclear by itself may be clarified by reading
and construing it in relation to the whole statute.[25]
Taking NCC No. 67 as a whole then, what it seeks to prevent is the dual collection of
RATA by a national official from the budgets of more than one national agency. We
emphasize that the other source referred to in the prohibition is another national
agency. This can be gleaned from the fact that the sentence no one shall be allowed
to collect RATA from more than one source (the controversial prohibition)
immediately follows the sentence that RATA shall be paid from the budget of the
national agency where the concerned national officials and employees draw their
salaries. The fact that the other source is another national agency is supported by RA
7645 (the GAA of 1993) invoked by respondent COA itself and, in fact, by all
subsequent GAAs for that matter, because the GAAs all essentially provide that (1)
the RATA of national officials shall be payable from the budgets of their respective
national agencies and (2) those officials on detail with other national agencies shall
be paid their RATA only from the budget of their parent national agency:
Section 36, RA 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993:
Representation and Transportation Allowances. The following officials and those of
equivalent rank as may be determined by the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) while in the actual performance of their respective functions
are hereby granted monthly commutable representation and transportation
allowances payable from the programmed appropriations provided for their
respective offices, not exceeding the rates indicated below, which shall apply to each
type of allowance:
xxxxxxxxx
Officials on detail with other offices, including officials of the Commission of Audit
assigned to serve other offices or agencies, shall be paid the allowance herein
authorized from the appropriations of their parent agencies. (emphasis ours)
Clearly therefore, the prohibition in NCC No. 67 is only against the dual or multiple
collection of RATA by a national official from the budgets of two or more national
agencies. Stated otherwise, when a national official is on detail with another national
agency, he should get his RATA only from his parent national agency and not from
the other national agency he is detailed to.
Since the other source referred in the controversial prohibition is another national
agency, said prohibition clearly does not apply to LGUs like the Municipality of
Naujan. National agency of course refers to the different offices, bureaus and
departments comprising the national government. The budgets of these departments
or offices are fixed annually by Congress in the General Appropriations Act.[26] An
LGU is obviously not a national agency. Its annual budget is fixed by its own
legislative council (Sangguniang Bayan, Panlungsod or Panlalawigan), not by
Congress. Without doubt, NCC No. 67 does not apply to LGUs.
The prohibition in NCC No. 67 is in fact an administrative tool of the DBM to
prevent the much-abused practice of multiple allowances, thus standardizing the
grant of RATA by national agencies. Thus, the purpose clause of NCC No. 67 reads:
This Circular is being issued to ensure uniformity and consistency of actions on
claims for representation and transportation allowance (RATA) which is primarily
granted by law to national government officials and employees to cover expenses
incurred in the discharge or performance of their duties and responsibilities.
By no stretch of the imagination can NCC No. 67 be construed as nullifying the
power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges under the Local Government Code of
1991. It was issued primarily to make the grant of RATA to national officials under
the national budget uniform. In other words, it applies only to the national funds
administered by the DBM, not the local funds of LGUs.
To rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges as what respondent
COA would like us to do will subvert the principle of local autonomy zealously
guaranteed by the Constitution.[27] The Local Government Code of 1991 was
specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as
mandated by the Constitution. By upholding, in the present case, the power of LGUs
to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of
allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds, we
ensure the genuine and meaningful local autonomy of LGUs.
We now discuss the next contention of respondent COA: that the resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner
judge was null and void because it failed to comply with LBC No. 53 dated
September 1, 1993:
Sec. 3 Allowances. LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to the
national government officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates authorized
by law, rules and regulations and subject to the following preconditions:
a. That the annual income or finances of the municipality, city or province as
certified by the Accountant concerned will allow the grant of the
allowances/additional compensation without exceeding the general limitations for
personal services under Section 325 of RA 7160;
b. That the budgetary requirements under Section 324 of RA 7160 including the full
requirement of RA 6758 have been satisfied and provided fully in the budget as
certified by the Budget Officer and COA representative in the LGU concerned;
c. That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of personnel/functions in
accordance with the provisions of RA 7160;
d. That the LGU has already created mandatory positions prescribed in RA 7160.
e. That similar allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national
government to the officials/employees assigned to the LGU.
Though LBC No. 53 of the DBM may be considered within the ambit of the
President's power of general supervision over LGUs,[28] we rule that Section 3,
paragraph (e) thereof is invalid. RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
clearly provides that provincial, city and municipal governments may grant
allowances to judges as long as their finances allow. Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC
No. 53, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to judges
whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by the national government or (2)
similar to the allowances granted by the national government, violates Section 447(a)
(l)(xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991.[29] As already stated, a circular must
conform to the law it seeks to implement and should not modify or amend it.[30]
Moreover, by prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances similar to the allowances
granted by the national government, Section 3 (e) of LBC No. 53 practically
prohibits LGUs from granting allowances to judges and, in effect, totally nullifies
their statutory power to do so. Being unduly restrictive therefore of the statutory
power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and being violative of their autonomy
guaranteed by the Constitution, Section 3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby
declared null and void.
Paragraphs (a) to (d) of said circular, however, are valid as they are in accordance
with Sections 324[31] and 325[32] of the Local Government Code of 1991; these
respectively provide for the budgetary requirements and general limitations on the
use of provincial, city and municipal funds. Paragraphs (a) to (d) are proper
guidelines for the condition provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 that LGUs may grant allowances to judges if their funds
allow.[33]
Respondent COA also argues that Resolution No. 101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Naujan failed to comply with paragraphs (a) to (d) of LBC No. 53, thus it was null
and void.
issued by the DBM, i.e., paragraphs (a) to (d), Section 3 of LBC No. 53. Respondent
COA also had the burden of showing that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental
Mindoro erroneously approved said resolution despite its non-compliance with the
requirements of the law. It failed to discharge such burden. On the contrary, we find
that the resolution of the Municipality of Naujan granting the P1,600 monthly
allowance to petitioner judge fully complied with the law. Thus, we uphold its
validity.
In sum, we hereby affirm the power of the Municipality of Naujan to grant the
questioned allowance to petitioner Judge Leynes in accordance with the
constitutionally mandated policy of local autonomy and the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991. We also sustain the validity of Resolution No. 101,
Series of 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan for being in accordance with
the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated
September 14, 1999 of the Commission of Audit is hereby SET ASIDE and Section
3, paragraph (e) of LBC No. 53 is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The argument is misplaced.

Guidelines (a) to (d) were met when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental
Mindoro approved Resolution No. 101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan granting
the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge as well as the corresponding
budgets of the municipality providing for the said monthly allowance to petitioner
judge. Under Section 327 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan was specifically tasked to review the appropriation ordinances of its
component municipalities to ensure compliance with Sections 324 and 325 of the
Code. Considering said duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, we will assume, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental
Mindoro performed what the law required it to do, that is, review the resolution and
the corresponding budgets of the Municipality of Naujan to make sure that they
complied with Sections 324 and 325 of the Code.[34] We presume the regularity of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigans official act.

Moreover, it is well-settled that an ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence

of evidence showing that it is not in accordance with the law.[35] Respondent COA
had the burden of proving that Resolution No. 101 of the Sangguniang Bayan of FIRST DIVISION
Naujan did not comply with the condition provided in Section 447 of the Code, the
budgetary requirements and general limitations on the use of municipal funds SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY G.R. No. 156052
provided in Sections 324 and 325 of the Code and the implementing guidelines (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S. November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No.
TUMBOKON, 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial
Petitioners, Present: and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they
agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the
in his capacity as Mayor of the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in
City of Manila, compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint
Respondent. operations and the scale down program.

x----------------------x The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in

Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum
of understanding was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor
PETRON CORPORATION and Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s.
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
CORPORATION,
Movants-Intervenors. Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not the
June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can
x----------------------x amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
Movant-Intervenor. Promulgated: city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has
the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
February 13, 2008 the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding
were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only
until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing
RESOLUTION
Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as
mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
CORONA, J.:

March 7, 2007 THIRD DIVISION

[G. R. No. 136809. July 27, 2004]
Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on
DEMOCRITO D. PLAZA II and VIRGINIA V. TUAZON, petitioners, vs.
CAROLINA M. CASSION, ALBERTA M. SAMPAYAN, JOSEPHINE NATALIA
U. LOPEZ, JOCELYN M. ALMANZOR, LUZVIMINDA G. ARDECER,
MAGDALENA S. BALACUIT, WINDELYN B. CABUSAO, JULIETA R.
JANDAYAN, NERI O. SAMUYA, INES V. YAOYAO, TERESITA I. ROSALES,
MARIA DEBRA M. LANAJA, RUTH O. NICOLASURA, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991,
aims to transform local government units into self-reliant communities and active
partners of the national government in the attainment of effective services to the
people. As a result of the devolution of concerned personnel from the national
government to the various local government units pursuant to the same Code, the
interest of the service demands that their working relations with the local employees
should be harmonious.
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated February 14, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 9, 1998 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 55052, Carolina M. Cassion, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al.
Before the passage of Republic Act No. 7160, the task of delivering basic social
services was dispensed by the national government through the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). Upon the promulgation and implementation of
the Local Government Code, some of the functions of the DSWD were transferred to
the local government units.
The City of Butuan, through its Sangguniang Panglungsod (Sanggunian) passed SP
Resolution 427-92,[3] entitled Resolution Authorizing the City Mayor, Honorable
Democrito D. Plaza II, to Sign the Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of
the DSWD to the City of Butuan.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[4] entered into between the City
of Butuan, through then Mayor Democrito Plaza II, petitioner, and the DSWD, the
latters services, personnel, assets and liabilities, and technical support systems were
transferred to its city counterpart.
By virtue of the same MOA, Mayor Plaza issued Executive Order (EO) No. 06-92[5]
dated October 5, 1992 reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office
(CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 national DSWD employees headed by
petitioner Virginia Tuazon, Social Welfare Officer V. Mayor Plaza designated her
Officer-in-Charge of the reconstituted CSSDO. Its office was transferred from the
original CSSDO building to the DSWD building.
The CSSDO was originally composed of herein respondents, headed by Carolina M.
Cassion, Social Welfare Officer IV. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to
recognize petitioner Tuazon as their new head and to report at the DSWD building.
They contended that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 by Mayor Plaza and the
designation of petitioner Tuazon as Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal.
Despite Mayor Plazas series of orders to respondents to report for work at the
DSWD building, they failed to do so.
On January 18, 1993, Mayor Plaza issued a memorandum to the City Legal Officer
directing him to conduct an administrative investigation against respondents. They
then submitted their respective explanations. Thereafter, they were charged
administratively for grave misconduct and insubordination and were preventively
suspended for 60 days. This prompted them to file with the Civil Service Regional
Office No. 10 a complaint against Mayor Plaza for violation of the Civil Service
Law. However, their complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
Upon expiration of their preventive suspension, respondents informed Mayor Plaza
that they are willing to return to work, but to their old office, not to the DSWD
building.
For the last time, or on April 14, 1993, Mayor Plaza notified respondents to report to
petitioner Tuazon at the new office in the DSWD building, but they remained
obstinate.
On February 9, 1994, Mayor Plaza inquired from the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) on what appropriate action could be taken against respondents for their
continued refusal to report for work since April 1993. In turn, the CSC, through Atty.
Lorea, Director II, informed the Mayor that respondents could be dropped from the
rolls pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993.
On February 16, 1994, Mayor Plaza issued an Order dropping respondents from the
rolls pursuant to the said CSC Memorandum Circular.
Forthwith, respondents appealed to the CSC.
On August 22, 1994, the CSC issued Resolution Nos. 94-4626 and 94-6243
dismissing respondents appeal. In affirming Mayor Plazas Order dropping
respondents from the rolls, the CSC held:
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993 dated September 10, 1993
provides as follows:
Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved
leave are considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) and may be
dropped from the service without prior notice.
A notice or order of the dropping from the rolls of an employee shall be issued by the
appointing authority and submitted to the CSC Office concerned for record purposes.
Based on the above-quoted provision, it is undeniable that the appointing authority
has the legal right to drop from the rolls a civil service officer or employee. Nowhere
in the quoted provision is it stated that only the Commission has the exclusive
authority to drop from the rolls civil service officers or employees. Hence, contrary
to the first contention of the appellants, Mayor Plaza acted in conformity with the
law when he ordered the dropping from the rolls of herein appellants. The records of
the case show the fact that appellants did not report for work from April 1993 up to
the time they were dropped from the rolls. Although they manifested intention to
return to work upon expiration of their preventive suspension, still they adamantly
insisted that they would report only in their old office and not in the new one created
by Executive Order No. 06-92. The legal excuse being given by the appellants is
highly untenable. The Executive Order issued by the Mayor is presumed valid until
annulled by the proper authorities. The same presumption shall also apply insofar as
the designation of Mrs. Tuazon as OIC is concerned. The proper course of action for
the appellants is to comply with the Mayors directives and then challenge the
questioned Executive Order before the proper forum, otherwise, the appellants
should suffer the consequence of their acts.
We find without merit the contention of the appellants that they were denied due
process for lack of notice and opportunity to be heard before they were dropped from
the rolls. The separation of an employee who is dropped from the rolls is a non-
disciplinary action wherein the respondent is entitled to notice and hearing. In the
above-quoted provision, an officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls if he
was continuously absent without official leave for a period of at least thirty days.
Prior notice is not necessary.
As to the last contention of the appellants that it was really the intention of the mayor
to systematically remove them, the Commission likewise finds it without merit. No
evidence was submitted by the appellants to support such contention.
Respondents then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review.
On February 14, 1996, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision setting aside the
assailed CSC Resolutions and EO No. 06-92 issued by Mayor Plaza and reinstating
respondents to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and emoluments
with full back wages and other benefits corresponding to the period from January
1993 up to actual reinstatement. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied.
The Court of Appeals ratiocinated as follows:
The fundamental rule of due process, on the other hand, requires that a person be
accorded notice and opportunity to be heard (Rebuena v. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 115942, 31 May 1995; Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Palmos, 232
SCRA 448 [1994]). Ample opportunity contemplated by law connotes every kind of
assistance which must be accorded to the employee to enable him to prepare
adequately for his defense including legal representation (Segismundo v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 112203, 13 December 1994, 329 SCRA 167, citing Abiera v. NLRC, 215
SCRA 476 [1992]). Non-compliance with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing is fatal because these requirements are conditions sine qua non before a
dismissal may be validly effected (Maneho v. NLRC, 229 SCRA 240 [1994], citing
Tiu v. NLRC, 215 SCRA 540 [1992]). In fact, notice and hearing must be accorded
an employee even though the employee does not affirmatively demand it (Century
Textile Mills v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 528 [1988]).
A circumspect scrutiny of the record leaves Us unconvinced that petitioners were
accorded this opportunity to be heard when they sought relief before respondent
CSCs Regional Office No. X which dismissed their complaint, docketed as ADM.
Case No. ND 93-023, against respondents City Mayor and Virginia V. Tuazon for
violation of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations. x x x
xxx
As regards the validity of the issuance of E.O. No. 06-92, there can be no dispute
over the power of the government to reorganize, whether traditional, progressive or
whatever adjective is appended to it. However, the essence of constitutional
government is adherence to basic rules. The rule of law requires that no government
official should feel free to do as he pleases using only his avowedly sincere
intentions and conscience to guide him. The fundamental standards of fairness
embodied in the bona fide rule can not be disregarded (Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186
SCRA 108 [1990]; see also Romualdez-Yap v. CSC, 225 SSCRA 285 [1993].
In the main, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the
CSC Resolutions dropping respondents from the rolls and EO No. 06-92 directing
the devolution of 19 national DSWD employees to the local or city DSWD to be
headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon.
Private respondents, on the other hand, aver that their refusal to report for work is
justified since EO No. 06-92 is not valid as it was issued without prior approval by
the Sanggunian in violation of Article 164, Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code.
Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of personnel,
assets and liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national
government agency to local government units. Under this Code, the term devolution
refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
As a consequence of the devolution of national agencies, Executive Order No. 503
was enacted by then President Corazon C. Aquino to govern and ensure the efficient
transfer of responsibilities to the local government unit concerned. Section 2 (g)
provides:
The local chief executive shall be responsible for all devolved functions. He may
delegate such powers and functions to his duly authorized representative whose
position shall preferably not be lower than the rank of a local government department
head. In all cases of delegated authority, the local chief executive shall at all times
observe the principle of command responsibility.
Section 2 (a) states that:
Except as herein otherwise provided, devolved permanent personnel shall be
automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon
their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992.
Likewise, Section 22 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992,
specifies that:
The positions absorbed by the local government units from the national government
agencies shall be automatically created upon transfer of their corresponding
budgetary allocation.
Devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief
executive concerned immediately upon their transfer.
However, pending the completion of the new organizational structure and staffing
pattern, the local government executives may assign devolved personnel to
divisions/sections/units where their qualifications are best suited or appropriate.
It is thus clear that Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give
effect to the devolution decreed by the Local Government Code. As the local chief
executive of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved
personnel and may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the
appointment of a regular head, as was done by the Mayor here.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992, provides further that heads of
departments appointed by the local chief executive must have the concurrence of the
majority of all the members of the Sanggunian concerned. While initially, the
Sanggunian rejected petitioner Tuazons appointment as the City Government
Department Head II of the CSSDO, however, it later confirmed her appointment.
The Court Appeals erred in ruling that EO No. 06-92 violated respondents security of
tenure as they were transferred to another office without their consent. There was no
such transfer. Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of
equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service and may be imposed as an
administrative penalty.[6] The change of respondents place of work from the original
CSSDO office to the DSWD building is not a transfer. It was only a physical transfer
of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service. There were no new
movements or appointments from one position to another.
Private respondents argue that they were denied due process when they were
dropped from the rolls.
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, provides:
VI. Requirements For Certain Mode of Separation.
Dropping from the Rolls Non-disciplinary in nature, executory but appealable to the
CSC office concerned within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order or notice.
Officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved
leave are considered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and may be dropped from
the service without prior notice.
A notice or order of the dropping from the rolls of an employee shall be issued by the
appointing authority and submitted to the CSC office concerned for record purposes.
Pursuant to the above provisions and as ruled by the CSC, the dropping from the
rolls of private respondents is not disciplinary in nature. Thus, their assertion that
they were denied due process is untenable. Since the dropping from the rolls is not
an administrative sanction, they need not be notified or be heard.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 14, 1996 of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED. The CSC Resolution No. 94-4626 dated August 22, 1994, and
Resolution No. 94-6243 dated November 17, 1994 dropping private respondents
from the rolls are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G. R. No. 131512. January 20, 2000]

LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE [LTO], represented by Assistant Secretary
Manuel F. Bruan, LTO Regional Office, Region X represented by its Regional
Director, Timoteo A. Garcia; and LTO Butuan represented by Rosita G. Sadiaga, its
Registrar, petitioners, vs. CITY OF BUTUAN, represented in this case by Democrito
D. Plaza II, City Mayor, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The 1987 Constitution enunciates the policy that the territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.[1] In obedience to that, mandate of the
fundamental law, Republic Act ("R.A.") No.7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code,[2] expresses that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy in order to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals, and that it is a basic aim of the
State to provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall
be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
While the Constitution seeks to strengthen local units and ensure their viability,
clearly, however, it has never been the intention of that organic law to create an
imperium in imperio and install an intra sovereign political subdivision independent
of a single sovereign state.
The Court is asked in this instance to resolve the issue of whether under the present
set up the power of the Land Registration Office ("LTO") to register, tricycles in
particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise devolved
to local government units.
The Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City held:[3] that the authority to
register tricycles, the grant of the corresponding franchise, the issuance of tricycle
drivers' license, and the collection of fees therefor had all been vested in the Local
Government Units ("LGUs"). Accordingly, it decreed the issuance of a permanent
writ of injunction against LTO, prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its
employees and other persons acting in its behalf, from (a) registering tricycles and
(b) issuing licenses to drivers of tricycles. The Court of Appeals, on appeal to it,
sustained the trial court. Maniks
The adverse rulings of both the court a quo and the appellate court prompted the LTO
to file the instant petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision,
[4] dated 17 November 1997, of the Court of Appeals affirming the permanent
injunctive writ order of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 2) of Butuan City.
Respondent City of Butuan asserts that one of the salient provisions introduced by
the Local Government Code is in the area of local taxation which allows LGUs to
collect registration fees or charges along with, in its view, the corresponding issuance
of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles.
The 1987 Constitution provides:
"Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and
limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
governments."[5]
Section 129 and Section 133 of the Local Government Code read:
"SEC. 129. Power to Create Sources of Revenue. - Each local government unit shall
exercise its power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges subject to the provisions herein, consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government units."
"SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.
- Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
"xxx.......xxx.......xxx.
"(I) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance
of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles."
Relying on the foregoing provisions of the law, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ("SP")
of Butuan, on 16 August 1992, passed SP Ordinance No.916-92 entitled "An
Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for
the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing Penalties for
Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other
things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-
hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for
the driving thereof. Manikan
Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that,
indeed, has been transferred to local government units is the franchising authority
over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles
and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles.
In order to settle the variant positions of the parties, the City of Butuan, represented
by its City Mayor Democrito D. Plaza, filed on 28 June 1994 with the trial court a
petition for "prohibition, mandamus, injunction with a prayer for preliminary
restraining order ex-parte" seeking the declaration of the validity of SP Ordinance
No.962-93 and the prohibition of the registration of tricycles-for-hire and the
issuance of licenses for the driving thereof by the LTO.
LTO opposed the prayer in the petition.
On 20 March 1995, the trial court rendered a resolution; the dispositive portion read:
"In view of the foregoing, let a permanent injunctive writ be issued against the
respondent Land Transportation Office and the other respondents, prohibiting and
enjoining them, their employees, officers, attorney's or other persons acting in their
behalf from forcing or compelling Tricycles to be registered with, and drivers to
secure their licenses from respondent LTO or secure franchise from LTFRB and from
collecting fees thereon. It should be understood that the registration, franchise of
tricycles and driver's license/permit granted or issued by the City of Butuan are valid
only within the territorial limits of Butuan City.
"No pronouncement as to costs."[6]
Petitioners timely moved for a reconsideration of the above resolution but it was to
no avail. Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its now assailed
decision, the appellate court, on 17 November 1997, sustained the trial court. It
ruled:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the questioned permanent
injunctive writ issued by the court a quo dated March 20, 1995 AFFIRMED."[7]
Coming up to this Court, petitioners raise this sole assignment of error, to wit:
Oldmis o
"The Court of Appeals [has] erred in sustaining the validity of the writ of injunction
issued by the trial court which enjoined LTO from (1) registering tricycles-for-hire
and (2) issuing licenses for the driving thereof since the Local Government Code
devolved only the franchising authority of the LTFRB. Functions of the LTO were
not devolved to the LGU's."[8]
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Department of Transportation and Communications[9] ("DOTC"), through the
LTO and the LTFRB, has since been tasked with implementing laws pertaining to
land transportation. The LTO is a line agency under the DOTC whose powers and
functions, pursuant to Article III, Section 4 (d) (1),[10] of R.A. No.4136, otherwise
known as Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as amended, deal primarily with the
registration of all motor vehicles and the licensing of drivers thereof. The LTFRB,
upon the other hand, is the governing body tasked by E.O. No. 202, dated 19 June
1987, to regulate the operation of public utility or "for hire" vehicles and to grant
franchises or certificates of public convenience ("CPC").[11] Finely put, registration
and licensing functions are vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory
responsibilities had been vested in the LTFRB.
Under the Local Government Code, certain functions of the DOTC were transferred
to the LGUs, thusly:
"SEC. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - Ncm
"xxx.......xxx.......xxx
"(3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, enact ordinances granting
franchises and authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, upon such conditions
and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of
the city and pursuant to this legislative authority shall:
"xxx.......xxx.......xxx.
"(VI) Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation and
Communications, regulate the operation of tricycles and grant franchises for the
operation thereof within the territorial jurisdiction of the city." (Emphasis supplied)
LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire
and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. "To regulate" means to fix,
establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule
or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws.[12] A franchise is defined
to be a special privilege to do certain things conferred by government on an
individual or corporation, and which does not belong to citizens generally of
common right.[13] On the other hand, "to register" means to record formally and
exactly, to enroll, or to enter precisely in a list or the like,[14] and a "driver's license"
is the certificate or license issued by the government which authorizes a person to
operate a motor vehicle.[15] The devolution of the functions of the DOTC,
performed by the LTFRB, to the LGUs, as so aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, is aimed at curbing the alarming increase of accidents in national highways
involving tricycles. It has been the perception that local governments are in good
position to achieve the end desired by the law-making body because of their
proximity to the situation that can enable them to address that serious concern better
than the national government.
It may not be amiss to state, nevertheless, that under Article 458 (a)[3-VI] of the
Local Government Code, the power of LGUs to regulate the operation of tricycles
and to grant franchises for the operation thereof is still subject to the guidelines
prescribed by the DOTC. In compliance therewith, the Department of Transportation
and Communications ("DOTC") issued "Guidelines to Implement the Devolution of
LTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire to Local Government units
pursuant to the Local Government Code." Pertinent provisions of the guidelines
state:
"In lieu of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) in
the DOTC, the Sangguniang Bayan/Sangguniang Panglungsod (SB/SP) shall
perform the following:
"(a) Issue, amend, revise, renew, suspend, or cancel MTOP and prescribe the
appropriate terms and conditions therefor; Ncmmis
"xxx.......xxx.......xxx.
"Operating Conditions:
"1. For safety reasons, no tricycles should operate on national highways utilized by 4
wheel vehicles greater than 4 tons and where normal speed exceed 40 KPH.
However, the SB/SP may provide exceptions if there is no alternative routs.
"2. Zones must be within the boundaries of the municipality/city. However, existing
zones within more than one municipality/city shall be maintained, provided that
operators serving said zone shall secure MTOP's from each of the
municipalities/cities having jurisdiction over the areas covered by the zone.
"3. A common color for tricycles-for-hire operating in the same zone may be
imposed. Each unit shall be assigned and bear an identification number, aside from
its LTO license plate number.
"4. An operator wishing to stop service completely, or to suspend service for more
than one month, should report in writing such termination or suspension to the SB/SP
which originally granted the MTOP prior thereto. Transfer to another zone may be
permitted upon application.
"5. The MTOP shall be valid for three (3) years, renewable for the same period.
Transfer to another zone, change of ownership of unit or transfer of MTOP shall be
construed as an amendment to an MTOP and shall require appropriate approval of
the SB/SP.
"6. Operators shall employ only drivers duly licensed by LTO for tricycles-for-hire.
"7. No tricycle-for-hire shall be allowed to carry more passengers and/or goods than
it is designed for.
"8. A tricycle-for-hire shall be allowed to operate like a taxi service, i.e., service is
rendered upon demand and without a fixed route within a zone."[16]
Such as can be gleaned from the explicit language of the statute, as well as the
corresponding guidelines issued by DOTC, the newly delegated powers pertain to
the franchising and regulatory powers theretofore exercised by the LTFRB and not to
the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of
licenses for the driving thereof. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code
are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of
motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the country.
Thus -
"SEC. 5. All motor vehicles and other vehicles must be registered. - (a) No motor
vehicle shall be used or operated on or upon any public highway of the Philippines
unless the same is properly registered for the current year in accordance with the
provisions of this Act (Article 1, Chapter II, R.A. No. 4136). Scnc m
The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at
anytime to examine and inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said
vehicles are registered, or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or equipped, or
otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible excessive damage to highways,
bridges and other infrastructures.[17] The LTO is additionally charged with being the
central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles.[18]
The Court shares the apprehension of the Solicitor General if the above functions
were to likewise devolve to local government units; he states:
"If the tricycle registration function of respondent LTO is decentralized, the
incidence of theft of tricycles will most certainly go up, and stolen tricycles
registered in one local government could be registered in another with ease. The
determination of ownership thereof will also become very difficult.
"Fake driver's licenses will likewise proliferate. This likely scenario unfolds where a
tricycle driver, not qualified by petitioner LTO's testing, could secure a license from
one municipality, and when the same is confiscated, could just go another
municipality to secure another license.
"Devolution will entail the hiring of additional personnel charged with inspecting
tricycles for road worthiness, testing drivers, and documentation. Revenues raised
from tricycle registration may not be enough to meet salaries of additional personnel
and incidental costs for tools and equipment."[19]
The reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government
units, specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential.
Police power and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of
sovereignty which the State might share with local government units by delegation
given under a constitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a
public purpose and legislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The
basic aim of police power is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses
on the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and
carry out its legitimate objectives. Although correlative to each other in many
respects, the grant of one does not necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The
two powers are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying
in their respective concepts, character, scopes and limitations. To construe the tax
provisions of Section 133(1) indistinctively would result in the repeal to that extent
of LTO's regulatory power which evidently has not been intended. If it were
otherwise, the law could have just said so in Section 447 and 458 of Book III of the
Local Government Code in the same manner that the specific devolution of LTFRB's
power on franchising of tricycles has been provided. Repeal by implication is not
favored.[20] The power over tricycles granted under Section 458(a)(3)(VI) of the
Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to
grant franchises for the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the
tax provisions of Section 133(1) of the Local Government Code must not be held to
have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the
registration of all motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof.
These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory in nature, exercised pursuant to
the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by
insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers
prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be
construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extant body of laws.
[21] Sdaa miso
The Court cannot end this decision without expressing its own serious concern over
the seeming laxity in the grant of franchises for the operation of tricycles-for-hire
and in allowing the indiscriminate use by such vehicles on public highways and
principal thoroughfares. Senator Aquilino C. Pimentel, Jr., the principal author, and
sponsor of the bill that eventually has become to be known as the Local Government
Code, has aptly remarked:
"Tricycles are a popular means of transportation, specially in the countryside. They
are, unfortunately, being allowed to drive along highways and principal
thoroughfares where they pose hazards to their passengers arising from potential
collisions with buses, cars and jeepneys.
"The operation of tricycles within a municipality may be regulated by the
Sangguniang Bayan. In this connection, the Sangguniang concerned would do well
to consider prohibiting the operation of tricycles along or across highways invite
collisions with faster and bigger vehicles and impede the flow of traffic."[22]
The need for ensuring public safety and convenience to commuters and pedestrians
alike is paramount. It might be well, indeed, for public officials concerned to pay
heed to a number of provisions in our laws that can warrant in appropriate cases an
incurrence of criminal and civil liabilities. Thus -
The Revised Penal Code -
"Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. - The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public
officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall
maliciously refrain from instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the
law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses." Sdaad
The Civil Code -
"Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file
an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken."
"Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render
aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal, proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action."
"Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision."
The Local Government Code -
"Sec. 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision which enjoins the Land Transportation Office
from requiring the due registration of tricycles and a license for the driving thereof is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncements on costs.
Let copies of this decision be likewise furnished the Department of Interior and
Local Governments, the Department of Public Works and Highways and the
Department of Transportation and Communication.
SO ORDERED.

LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE [LTO], et al. vs. CITY OF
BUTUAN,represented in this case by Democrito D. Plaza II, City Mayor.
G.R. No. 131512, January 20, 2000
FACTS:
Respondent City of Butuan asserts that one of the salient provisions introduced by
theLocal Government Code is in the area of local taxation which allows LGUs to
collectregistration fees or charges along with, in its view, the corresponding issuance
of allkinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles.Sec. 129.
Power to Create Sources or Revenue
. out its legitimateobjectives. Although correlative to each other in many respects, the
grant of one doesnot necessarily carry with it the grant of the other. The two powers
Each local government unitshall exercise its power to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes,fees, and charges subject to the provisions herein,
consistent with the basicpolicy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusivelyto the local government units.Sec. 133.
Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units
.
Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of thefollowing:x x
x x x x x x x(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for
theissuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof,
excepttricycles.
The City of Butuan asserts that Sec. 129 and Sec.133 of the Local Government Code
is their basis for said ordinance and that, said provisions authorize LGUs to collect
registrationfees or charges along with, in its view, the corresponding issuance of all
kinds of licenses or permits for the driving of tricycles.LTO explains that one of the
functions of the National Government, that , indeed has been transferred to LGUs is
the franchisingauthority over tricycles-for-hire of the LTFRB but NOT the authority
of the LTO toregister all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses
to drive suchvehicles. The RTC of Butuan decreed an issuance of a PERMANENT
WRIT OFINJUCTION against TO prohibiting and enjoining LTO, as well as its
employees andother persons acting in its behalf, from (a) registering tricycles and (b)
issuing licenses
to tricycle drivers. The CA sustained the RTCs decision. The adverse rulings of both
Courts prompted the LTO to file an instant petition for review on certiorari to annul
andset aside the earlier Court decisions.
ISSUE:
WON under the present set up, the power of the Land Registration Office ("LTO")
toregister, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof,
haslikewise devolved to local government units.
RULING: No.
The reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government
units,specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential.
Policepower and taxation, along with eminent domain, are inherent powers of
sovereigntywhich the State might share with local government units by delegation
given under aconstitutional or a statutory fiat. All these inherent powers are for a
public purpose andlegislative in nature but the similarities just about end there. The
basic aim of policepower is public good and welfare. Taxation, in its case, focuses on
the power of government to raise revenue in order to support its existence and carry
are, by tradition and jurisprudence, separate and distinct powers, varying in their
respective concepts,character, scopes and limitations. To construe the tax provisions
of Section 133(1)indistinctively would result in the repeal to that extent of LTO's
regulatory power whichevidently has not been intended