Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Shepsle Chapter 5

    Uploaded by

    Pedro
    6 views28 pages
    Shepsle Chapter 5

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    Shepsle Chapter 5

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    6 views28 pages

    Shepsle Chapter 5

    Uploaded by

    Pedro
    Shepsle Chapter 5

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 28
    A. Suerte 2 MMe & Boncuer Por tes 5 Spatial Models of Majority Rule Kenner AWAlsa ee Our story line to this point has emphasized «tradeoff in group decision making Between the coherence of group choice, on ing, on the ether. Iwo conadermimited nt of groap decision ‘aking circumstances, then we may beable to avid the pain of thie tradoo. Put romewhat diférwaiy, if idividual pret frances happen to arrenge themeeves in particular waa ‘hat reflect a consennus oa specif nort—then group davai (certainly thoe made by majority rule) work ox uit iely Inthe last chapter, we described wngl-peaked preferences a ‘ne kindof eonsenias tht facilitated ccerence in rnjrty rule decision making. In thie chapar we want to give an in Frankly, however, allthis gta pretty boring prety quickly. ‘The authors, and porbape some cf the reader, may eny ech nical iff and phaeophical discourse, but most readers ae ‘mare impatient and anxious to ee ome pay We thi this ‘upier constitutes an important investment, Once we giv single peakadnens a geometric representation we wil be the to apply it to noma intresting plea ituaone—namely, two-party electoral cmpetition and legate committee de. cision making. \ \ ‘Spatial Model of Majority Rule 88 SaTtAL FORMULATION The Simple Geometry of Majority Rule ‘Suppose a grouy's problem i, In effect, to pie point on a line—the group mu elect ome ingle nsec parameter or example, a bank's board of dirctors must deride cack ‘meek onthe wet’ intret rat for 20-year heme mortgages In effect, th relevant interest rates are punta on lies eas endpoint beng 0 porcent tnd the other being some pave ‘number, say 10 pereat. We write this interval as (010) In thin and other cieumstance, we want the read to imagine 1 group of individuals each of whom hav most prefered point on the lie, and prferenes that deine en pons far ‘her away in aither direction ae taken up. In Figure 0.1 we display the preferntes of tho fve-persen board of bank directory G'= (1, 2,8, 4,6). The bear is meeting Fioune 6, [- | a Analyzing Poitis 1 decie the interest rato t charg for home mortgages this ‘cuming week. Boch individual (€ Gas a moet prefered pot (cio called bis point Fidel point), nba , lente on the (0, 10) interval (drew a8 the Borioctal axis) reprenentine his or her mast prefered intrest ree! Thus, director 1 has ‘ mor preferred intrest rato (of jst las than 4 perent, Ainecior 2 (2) is just mare than 4 pernt, andro on. On ths ‘vertical axe we have writin the label "ult" t meavure preferences. For eoch Individual we have graphed a uly uncion which represent the directors preference for var ‘us intareat rate Invle inthe [0,10] interval. Naarally, the ‘ity funtion, labeled, for Mr. or Ma. in hight for ‘mostprofered altarative, 3 and declines ae mire distant ‘points arv considered Ths, Ma 6 most prefers en interest ze litle higher thn 8 persnt, with her preference dedi ng either for higher or lower rates. For obvious reasons Gut Teak at the graphs) we aay thatthe preferences of thee ad vidoe are ingle-pated, which we define ae follows: Single-Peakednets Condition. The preferences of ‘eroup membors are sald to be single peaked ifthe flternatives under consideration can be represented ‘ points on a line, and each of the utility functions representing preferences over theee alternatives hae ‘4 maximum at some point on the line and slopes ‘away from this maximum on either side. Is-thero ay connection betwoen tia definiton of single peakedneos end Dla dtisiton given in the las chaper? ‘Tati do ity fonctions wid «sng oak, ne delayed in Figure 61 have bathing odo with al weer grein that some alterontive "sot worst? You bet! Take any tee in taret ric pled in Figure 8.1 3 persnt, 6 pees, ‘nd 9 percent. Irs prety gary a ne that perenne "Rea 16 Wh ema {he at hr ad or ‘Spatial Model of Majority ule & [= ‘worst among those three rats for any ofthe five members of {ho group. Indeod, we lain that for any thre interet rate levee the render chooses, one of dhve la not wer for any of ‘the fve bankers. Thats what singe peakednevemesaal In ander t develop some tole that we wil uae in subae- ‘quent analysis, let look atone of thee individ banker in lialation @y which we really mean lt lok at an eaated ‘lity fanctin) In Figure 5.2 we show the moet meat apciad ff the bunk:board decors, Me. 6, who mo prefers fry igh intrest rar = 85%? Conder an alternative rate, {Y= 786. The nt of points Ma 5 prefers to yb dened by the fet labeled Pio) in Figure 5:2. This ie Bs 8 prefered tory tet: fy were on offer, ten) dene ll the pants she would prefer toi, given her preference. Au the fare shows, -F(Q) ia computed by determining the wtlty level for y and Ou, rig ing: Ta rat ir ir Sd ‘SNeiponea te ema othe a sae a eA DAD aries te ek ns het ‘Pie oped ries 65 par ec % Analg Pits Spatial Medes of Majority Rate er oon ] Dismar bt | ery ‘Dae Masonry Coatmions oF Gx(L.2,84.5) | Su of Contiton Conttone a aay oa am I" tia ser ta) a | 2A, eat waa) 5 as) i ‘ 2sa,o298, nase) “ fisas easel { 5 gaa a cd cee ws ‘ner 6, ti the election of re prt coalitions hero in_8) are ten such colton), fourperen caaliton (are are Bre ‘hen identying all the intrest rates onthe heriaoatal axis with uty loves greater than th wility for." In Figure 53 we dspey the proferedtoy seta fall ve ‘bank directors (ncte det, thia igure ia ust below & per ‘rat. Noio that those sete overiap to some degree—there are ‘ointa in comamon to P(o) and Pi), fr ample, Tale moans ‘hat there ave specie point thal both Mr. 4 and Me. 6 peor toys Ot great intros to unin the sto pointe a majority rere ‘oj. Ties called the wine of, written aa WK). We define ‘i an fllom, Lat M bo the aot of majorite in our group of ‘mh rent te od p's tare at kn aclee pat te son sey “Tete, a ee ame un nr ena ew erat ‘of tho), and the eulian-f thermo, So, there are axtoen x, ap gates owed = 3° ‘The comuitee decison i really pretty simple If the commit tec median wet, Ms c profes x, to 3%, than she melee @ An amma le yer mi in See ie eee ee era ‘ive ending Snr ads het Spatial Model of Majority Rule wr Roum sie 7 A ‘potion (any motion; if Me. e peur 2 wo x, then the com: ritoe kepe the gatos closed. Ths, all we need t ingpec ‘Ma, e's prferred-io set, PG, to woe whether sis i it or et, Recalling th thre posible cass in the preceding sttion, furthe parameter ordering of care I (°

    You might also like