178 THE POSSIBILITY OF SOCIAL CHOICE Nobel Lecture, December 8, 1998 by Avera Sev ‘Trinity College, Cambridge, CB2 1TQ, Great Britain “A camel,” it has been said, "is a horse designed by a committee.” This might sound like a telling example of the terrible deficiencies of committee deci- sions, but itis really much too mild an indictment, A camel may not have the speed of a horse, but it isa very useful and harmonious animal ~ well coordi- nated to travel long distances without food and water. A committee that tries to reflect the diverse wishes of its different members in designing 2 horse could very easily end up with something far less congruous: perhaps a centaur of Greek mythology, half a horse and half something else ~ a.m curial creation combining savagery with confusion. ‘The difficulty that a small committee experiences may be only greater ‘when it comes to decisions of a sizable society reflecting the choices “of the people, by the people, for the people.” That, broadly speaking, is the subject of “social choice,” and it includes within its capacious frame various problems ‘with the common feature of relating social judgments and group decisions 10 the views and interests of the individuals who make up the society or the _group. If there isa central question that can be seen as the motivating issue that inspires social choice theory, ics this: how can it be possible to arrive at ‘cogent aggregative judgments about the society (for example, about “social welfare,” or “the public interes,” or “aggregate poverty”), given the diversity of preferences, concerns, and predicaments ofthe different individuals within the society? How can we find any rational basis for making such aggregative judgements as “the society prefers this t that,” or “the society should choose ‘this over that,” or “this is socially right"? Is reasonable social choice at all pos- sible, especially since, as Horace noted a long time ago, there may be “as ma- ny preferences as there are people”? ‘this article cabo published in dhe Amercan Eom Re 89 (uly 1999), For help comments a sngesions un non grateful to Sudhir Anand, Kenneth Arto “Tony Atkinson, Emma Rothchi and Kotro Surumura. Ihave aso benefited fiom discussions swith Amiya Bagel, Pranab Bardhan, Kaushik Bans, Angus Deaton, Raat Deb, Jean Dreve ‘hahar Buta Jes Paul Fou, James Fst, Sig Onna, Praanta Pata, and TonyAmartya K. Sen 179 1. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY In this lecture, I shall wy to discuss some challenges and foundational problems faced by social choice theory asa discipline.’ The i sion for this lecture is, ofcourse, an award, and Tam aware that Lam expected to discuss, in one form or another, my own work associated with this event (however immodest that attempt might otherwise have been). This I will try 10 do, but itis, I believe, also a plausible occasion to address some general {questions about social choice as a discipline ~ its content, relevance, and reach ~and I intend to seize this opportunity. The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences referred to “welfare economics” as the general field of my work for which the award was given, and separated out three particular areas: social choice, distribution, and poverty. While I have indeed been occupied, in va rious ways, with these different subjects, itis social choice theory, pioneering- ly formulated in its modern form by Arrow (1951), that provides a general approach to the evaluation of, and choice over, alternative social possibilities (including inter alia the assessment of social welfare, inequality, and poverty) ‘This I take to be reason enough for primarily concentrating on social choice theory in this Nobel lecture. Social choice theory is avery broad discipline, covering a variety of distinet questions, and it may be useful to mention a few of the problems as illustre- tions ofits subject matter (on many of which I have been privileged to work) When would majonty rule yield unambiguous and consistent decisions? How can we judge how well a socaty as a wholeis doing in the light of the disparate interests of its different members? How do we measure aggragate poverty in view of the varying predicaments and miseries of the diverse people that make up the society? How can we accommodate rights and liberties of persons \hile giving adequate recognition to their preferences? How do we appraise social valuations of public goods such as the natural environment, or epidemiolo- gical security? Also, some investigations, while not directly a part of social choice theory, have been helped by the understanding generated by the study of group decisions (such as the causation and prevention of famines and Inunger, or the forms and consequences of gender inequality, or the demands of individual freedom seen a$ a “social commitment’). The reach and relevance of social choice theory can be very extensive indeed. nediate ocea- Tl, ORIGINS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY AND CONSTRUCTIVE PESSIMISM How did the subject of social choice theory originate? The challenges of so- cial decisions involving divergent interests and concerns have been explored "Thins obviously, not survey ofwcial choice theory and there eno attempt here wo san the relevant Iiteratore.Overiens canbe fund in Alan M- Feldman (1980), Paseo K.Patanalk tnd Maurice Salles (1983), Kotaro Sursmura {J983), Peter | Hasamond (1085), Jon Et and Aanind Hlland (1986), Sen (19863), David Saret (19S8), Deni C. Mueller (198), and more extensively in Kenneth}. Arrow ol (1997) "See also Arrow (1950, 1961, 1865),180 eonomic Sciences 1998, for « long time. For example, Aristotle in ancient Greece and Kauti cient India, both of whom lived in the fourth century B.C., explored various constructive possibilities in social choice in their books respectively entitled Politics and Economics? However, social choice theory as a systematic discipline first came into its ‘own around the time of the French Revolution. The subject was pioneered by French mathematicians in the late eighteenth century, such as J. C. Borda, (1781) and Marquis de Condorcet (1785), who addressed these problems in rather mathematical terms and who initiated the formal discipline of social choice in terms of voting and related procedures. The intellectual climate of the period was much influenced by European Enlightenment, with its in- terest in reasoned construction of social order. Indeed, some of the early social choice theorists, most notably Condorcet, were also among the intel. lectual leaders of the French Revolution, ‘The French Revolution, however, did not usher in a peaceful social order in France. Despite its momentous achievements in changing the political agenda across the whole world, in France itself it not only produced much fe and bloodshed, it also led to what is often called, not inaccurately, a ‘eign of terror.” Indeed, many of the theorists of social coordination, who ‘had contributed to the ideas behind the Revolution, perished in the flames of the discord that the Revolution itself unleashed (this included Condorcet who took his own life when it heeame quite likely that others would do it for him). Problems of social choice, which were being addressed at the level of theory and analysis, did not wait, in this case, for a peacefully intellectual resolution, ‘The motivation that moved the early social choice theorists included the avoidance of both instability and arbitrariness in arrangements for social choice, The ambitions of their work focused on the development ofa frame- work for rational and democratic decisions for a group, paying adequate at- tention to the preferences and interests of all ts members. However, even the theoretical investigations typically yielded rather pessimistic results. They noted, for example, that majority rule can be thoroughly inconsistent, with A defeating B by a majority, B defeating C also by a majority, and Cin turn defeating A, by a majority as well A good deal of exploratory work (often, again, with pessimistic results) continued in Europe through the nineteenth century. Indeed, some very ‘creative people worked in this area and wrestled with the difficulties of social * anhashaur,” the Sanskrit word (the tle of Katinas book), est ranted Hiteraly ax “Economics” eventhough he devoted much space to imvetgating dhe demands of watera 2 confit society. Engh ranclatone of Arnot’ Pl and Kaui Ards can De Foun respectively in, Barker (1958) and LN. Rangarajan (1987).On the interesting medieval European writings on thexe ss see, for example, lan McLean (190), * See Condorcet (1788). There are many commentaries om these anaes, inching Arom (951), Duncan Black (1958), Wim V. Gehriein (1388), H. Peyton Young (1888), and McLean (1980 On dhe poten ubiquity of inconsistency major vxing, See Richard D. MeKelvey (1979) and Norman J Scho (1985)Amartya K. Sen 181 ‘choice, including Lewis Carroll, the author of Alice in Wonderland (under his, real name, C. L, Dodgson, 1874, 1884). When the subject of social choice was revived in the twentieth century by Arrow (1951), he too was very concerned with the difficulties of group deci- sions and the inconsistencies to which they may lead. While Arrow put the dis- cipline of social choice in a structured ~and axiomatic - framework (thereby leading to the birth of social choice theory in its modern form), he deepened. the preexisting gloom by establishing an astonishing - and apparently pessi- istic ~ result of ubiquitous reach. Arrow’s (1950, 1951, 1963) “impossibility theorem” (formally, the "General Possibility Theorem’) isa result of breathtaking elegance and power, which shoved that even some very mild conditions of reasonableness could not be simultaneously satisfied by any social choice procedure, within a very wide fa mily. Only a dictatorship would avoid inconsistencies, but that of course ‘would involve: (I) in polities, an extreme sacrifice of participatory decisions; and (2) in welfare economics, a gross inability to be sensitive to the hetero- igencous interests ofa diverse population. Two centuries after the flowering of the ambitions of social rationality, in Enlightenment thinking and in the wr ings of the theorists of the French Revolution, the subject seemed to be ines capably doomed. Social appraisals, welfare economic calculations, and evalu: ative statistics would have to be, it seemed, inevitably arbitrary or un- remediably despotic. Arrows “impossibility theorem" aroused in (and generated a massive literature in response, including many other im- possibility results)” It also led to the diagnosis of a deep vulnerability in the ‘subject that overshadowed Arrow’s immensely important constructive program, ‘of developing a systematic social choice theory that could actually work. iate and intense interest IIL WELFARE ECONOMICS AND OBITUARY NOTICES Social choice difficulties apply to welfare economics with a vengeance. By the ‘mid-1960s, William Baumol (1965) judiciously remarked that "statements about the signific: cs" had started having “an illcor cealed resemblance to obituary notices” (p. 2). This was certainly the right reading of the prevailing views. But, as Baumol himself noted, we have to ce of welfare econo * hy arying the asomstc sructoe, eited impossibitiy reals can ao be obsined. Examples can be found in Arrow (190, 1951, 1962, 1963, Juan H, Blau (1957, 1972, 1979, Bengt Hansson (19608, b, 1970), Tapas Majumdar (1969, 1973), Sen (1969, 1970a, 1986, 1988, 1995), Patnaik (1971 1973, 1978), Andre MasColle’ and Hugo Sonnenschein (1972), ‘Thoms Scint (1973, 988), Peter Fanburm (1973, 197), Allan F Gibbard (1973), Donal |} Brown (1974, 1973), Ken Binmore (1975, 194), Salles (1975), Mark A. Suterteite (175), Robert Wison (197), Rajat Deb (1976, 1977), Suzumura (1976, b, 1983, Maw and Ded (G07, Jerry 8. Kelly (1978, 1987), Douglas H. Bla and Robert A. Polk (197, 1982), Jeane Jcque’ Latfon (197), Bhaskar Duta (1080), Graciela Chichiishy (1982, b), David Mt (Grether and Chatls R. Plot (1982), Chichilnsy and Geoffrey Heal (1988), Herve Moulin (0083), Patnaik and Salles (1988), Dai Kelsey (19849, ),Beralel Peleg (1884), Hammond (0085, 1097) Mark A. Atzerman and Fuad T Aleshewo (1980, Schofield (1996), andl Asker (0907), among many other coatbatons.Iz Economic Sciences 1998 assess how sound these views were. We have, especially, to ask whether the pes- simism associated with Arrovian structures in social choice theory must be seen to be devastating for welfare economics asa discipline. Asi happens, traditional welfare economics, which had been developed by usiltarian economists (such as Francis. Edgeworth, 1881; Alfred Marshall, 1890; Arthur C, Pigou, 1920), had taken a very different track from the vote- oriented social choice theory. It took inspiration not from Borda (1781) or Condorcet (1785), but from their contemporary, Jeremy Bentham (1789). Bentham had pioneered the use of utilitarian calculus to obtain judgments about the social interest by aggregating the personal interests ofthe different individuals in the form of their respective utilities Bentham's concern and that of utilitarianism in general ~was with the {al wilty oF community. This was irrespective of the distribution of that total, and in this there is an informational limitation of considerable ethical and. political importance. For example, a person who is unlucky enough to have a uniformly lower capability to generate enjoyment and utility out of income (ay, because of a handicap) would also be given, in the utilitarian ideal world, a lower share of a given total, This isa consequence of the single-mind- fed pursuit of maximizing the sumotal of utilities (on the peculiar conse- quences of this unifocal priority, see Sen, 1970a, 1973a; John Rawls, 1971; Claude d’Aspremont and Louis Gevers, 1977). However, the utilitarian inter- est in taking comparative note of the gains and losses of different people is notin itself'a negligible concern, And this concern makes utilitarian welfare ‘economics deeply interested in using a class of information ~ in the form of comparison of utility gains and losses of different persons ~ with which Condorcet and Borda had not been directly involved, Usilitarianisin has been very influential in shaping welfare economics, which was dominated for along time by an almost unquestioning adherence to utilitarian calculus. But by the 1930s utilitarian welfare economics came under severe fire. It would have been quite natural to question (as Rawls [1971] would masterfully do in formulating his theory of justice) the utili rian neglect of distributional issues and its concentration only on utility sum- totals in a distribution blind way. But that was not the direction in which the antiutilitarian eritiques went in the 1930s and in the decades that followed Rather, economists came to be persuaded by arguments presented by Lionel Robbins and others (deeply influenced by “logical positivist” philosophy) that interpersonal comparisons of utility had no scientific bass: “Every mind is scrutable to every other mind and no common denominator of feelings is possible” (Robbins, 1998 p. 696). Thus, the epistemic foundations of utiltae rian welfare economics were seen as incurably defective. There followed attempts to do welfare economies on the basis of the dif= ferent persons’ respective orderings of social states, without any interpersonal comparisons of uilty gains and losses (nor, of course, any comparison of the total utilities of different persons, which are neglected by utilitarians as well). While utilitarianism and utilitarian welfare economics are quite indifferent 0 the distrhution of utilities between different persons (concentrating, as theyAmartya K. Sen 183 do, only on the sumiotatof utilities), the new regime without any interperso- nal comparisons in any form, further reduced the informational base on ‘which social choice could dra. The alreadysimited informational base of Benthamite calculus was made to shrink even further to that of Borda and Condorcet, since the use of different persons’ utility rankings without any in- texpersonal comparison is analytically quite similar to the use of voting infor- king social choice. Faced with this informational restriction, utiltar gave way; from the 1940s onwards, to a so-called “new welfare economics,” Which used only one basic criterion of social improvement, viz, the “Pareto comparison.” This criterion only asserts that an alternative situation would be definitely better if the change would increase the utility of everyones A good deal of subsequent welfare economics restricts attention to “Pareto efficiency” only (that is, only to making sure that no further Pareto improvements are possible). This criterion takes no interest whatever in distributional issues, which cannot be addressed without considering conflicts of interest and of preferences Some further criterion is clearly needed for making social welfare judg- ‘ments with a greater reach, and this was insightfully explored by Abram [Bergson (1938) and Paul A. Samuelson (19447). This demand led directly to Arrow's (1950, 1951) pioneering formulation of social choice theory, relating social preference (or decisions) to the set of individual preferences, and this relation is called a “social welfare function.” Arrow (1951, 1963) went on to consider a set of very mild-looking conditions, including: (1) Pareto efficien- cy (2) nondictatorship, (3) independence (demanding that social choice ‘over any set of alternatives must depend on preferences on over those alter natives), and (4) unrestricted domain (requiring that social preference must be a complete ordering, with full eansitivity, and that this must work for rable set of individual preferences). ;possibility theorem demonstrated that itis impossible to sauisfy these conditions simultaneously” In order to avoid this impossibility result, different ways of modifying Arrow’s requirements were tried out in the litera tue that followed, but other difficulties continued to emerge.’ The force and welfare economics On atleast fit enhanced the anyone. There also he mrt asumption tha thee are at eas owe distinct individuals Qt oti finitely many) and at law thre dtint social sates (not perhaps dhe most unreaisic of ofa lest one person ad did aot harm the interest of {here are various versions including, ofcourse, Arrow (1983). ta Sen (1905) aery shor and ‘ementary~ proot igen. See ako Sen (1s, 197%), Blas (1972), Robert Wilson (1073), ‘Kelly (107), Savador Barbera (1980, 1989) Binmore (1944), al John Geanakopolous (1996), among othe variants "or eral accounts ofthe Kerstre ee Kelly (1978), Feldman (1980), Pauanaih and Salles (m9), Suna (1989), Hammond (1985), Walter Piller a (1986), Sen (1986, 1985), Mueler (1980), a Arrow a (1987),184 Economie Sciences 1998 widespread presence of impossibility results generated a consolidated sense ‘of pessimism, and this became a dominant theme in welfare economies and social choice theory in general. Is this reading justified? IV. COMPLEMENTARITY OF FORMAL METHODS AND INFORMAL REASONING Before I proceed further on substantive matters, it may be useful to comment briefly on the nature of the reasoning used in answering this and related questions. Social choice theory isa subject in which formal and mathematical techniques have been very extensively used. Those who are suspicious of for- ‘mal (and in particular, of mathematical) modes of reasoning are often skep- tical of the usefulness of discussing real- world problems in this way. Their suspicion is understandable, but i is ultimately misplaced. The exercise of trying to get an integrated picture from diverse preferences or interests of dif ferent people does involve many complex problems in which one could be se- riously misled in the absence of formal scrutiny: Indeed, Arrow’s (1950, 1951, 1963) impossibility theorem — in many ways the “locus classicus” inthis field = can hardly be anticipated on the basis of common sense or informal reason- ‘ng. This applies also to extensions of this result, for example to the demon- stration that an exactly similar impossibility to Arrow’s holds even without any imposed demand of internal consistency of social choice (see Sen, 1998a ‘Theorem 3). In the process of diseussing some substantive issues in social choice theory, I shall have the opportunity to consider various results which, too are not easly anticipated without formal reasoning, Informal insights, im- portant as they are, cannot replace the formal investigations that are needed. to examine the congeuicy and cogency of combinations of values and of ap- parently plausible demands, This is not to deny that the task of widespread public communication is crucial for the use of social choice theory: It is centrally important for social choice theory to relate formal analysis to informal and transparent examina- tion. Ihave to confess that in my own case, this combination has, in fact, been something of an obsession, and some of the formal ideas I have been most concerned with (such as an adequate framework for informational broaden- ing, the use of partial comparability and of partial orderings, and the weak ing of consistency conditions demanded of binary relations and of choice functions) call simultaneously for formal investigation and for informal ex- plication and accessible scrutiny. Our deeply felt, real-world concerns have to ‘be substantively integrated with the analytical use of formal and mathematical ‘reasoning. Infact in my main monograph in socal choice theory ~ Celene Chr and Sal Wr (Se, 1970), caper eth formal aan (the arved” chaps) alternate with capers confined > informal dacusion (the “unatarred” chapter)Amartya K. Sen 185 \V. PROXIMITY OF POSSIBILITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY The general relationship between possibility and impossibility results also deserves some attention, in order to understand the nature and role of im- possibility theorems, When a set of axioms regarding social choice can all be simultaneously satisfied, there may be several possible procedures that work, among which we have to choose. In order to choose between the different possibilities through the use of discriminating axioms, we have to introduce {urtheraxioms, until only one possible procedure remains. This is something, ‘of an exercise in brinkmanship. We have to go on cutting down alternative possibilities, moving ~ implicitly ~ tmwards an impossibility, but then stop just before all possibilities are eliminated, to wit, when one and only one option ‘Thus, it should be clear that a full axiomatic determination of a particular method of making social choice must inescapably lie next door to an impos: sibility ~indeed just short of it It Ties far from an impossibility (with various positive possibilities), then it cannot give us an axiomatic derivation of any specific method of social choice. Iti, therefore, to be expected that con- structive paths in social choice theory, derived from axiomatic reasoning, ‘would tend to be paved on one side by impossibility results (opposite to the side of multiple possibilities). No conclusion about the fragility of social choice theory (or its subject matter) emerges from this proximity. In fact, the literature that has followed Arrow’s work has shown classes of impossibility theorems and of positive possibility results, all of which lie quite lose to each other" The real issue is not, therefore, the ubiquity of impossi Dilty ic will always lie close to the axiomatic derivation of any specific social choice rule), but the reach and reasonableness of the axioms to be used. We Ihave to get on with the basic task of obtaining workable rules that satisfy reasonable requirements, VI. MAJORITY DECISIONS AND COHERENCE In the discussion so far, Ihave made no attempt to confine attention to par- ticular configurations of individual preferences, ignoring others. Formally, this is required by Arrow’s condition of “unrestricted domain,” which insists that the social choice procedure must work for every conceivable cluster of ° Sce Hanson (1968, 1960, 1980, 1976), Sen (1969, 1970, 1977a, 884), Schwa (1970, 1972, 196), Patan (1971, 197), Alan Kiran and Dieter Sonderinann (1972), Mae Cate snd Sonnenschein (1972) Wilson (1872, 1875), Fshbury (187%, 1874) Prot (107, 1976), Brow (1974 973). Jon A Ferejobn and Grether (197%), Bmore (1975 1994), Salles (1975), Bla a al (1978), Georges A. Bordes (1976, 1979), Donald F- Camp (1978), Deb (1975, 107), Pars (197Gb, Sunumura (197, , 183), Bu and Deb (1077), Rely (1978), Peleg (G97, 1961), Blair and Pollak (1979, 1962) Blu (1079), Bernard Monjardet (1979, 1985) Barbera (1980, 1983), Chichinsky (1982, 8), Chicky and Hea! (1963), Movin (1983) Kelcy (198, 1985), Vincenzo Denicolo (198), Yami Matumoto (1985), Arman and Aleakeroy (1986), Taras Bandvopadiyay (1966), sae Let (1980), and Campbell and Kelly (4987), among many other contusions186 Economic Sciences 1998 individual preferences. It must, however, be obvious that, for any decision procedure, some preference profiles will yield inconsistencies and incohe- rence of social decisions while other profile will not produce these results Arrow (1951) himself had initiated, along with Black (1948, 1958), the search for adequate restrictions that would guarantee consistent majority de ‘cisions, The necessary and sufficient conditions for consistent majority dec- sions can indeed be identified (see Sen and Pattanaik, 1969)."" While much less restrictive than the earlier conditions that had been identified, they are still quite demanding; indeed itis shown that they would be easly violated in ‘many actual situations, The formal results on necessary or sufficiency conditions of majority deci- sions can only give as much hope ~ or generate as much disappointment ~ about votingbased social choice as the extent of social cohesion and con- frontation (in the actual patterns of individual preferences) would allow. Choice problems for the society come in many shapes and sizes, and there ray be less comfort in these result for some types of social choice problems ‘than for others. When distributional issues dominate and when people seek to maximize their own “shares” without concern for others (as, for example, in a “cake division” problem, with each preferring any division that increases her own share, no matter what happens to the others), then majority rule will tend to be thoroughly inconsistent. But when there is a matter of national outrage (for example, in response to the inability of a democratic govern= ‘ment to prevent a famine), the electorate may be reasonably univocal and thoroughly consistent.” Also, when people cluster in parties, with complex agendas and dialogues, involving give and take as well as some general at titudes to values like equity or justice, the ubiquitous inconsistencies can yield ground to more congruous decisions.” "See alo Kenichi ad (1969, 1970, who hasbeen a major contbutor to his heratare See ko Willa 8. Viektey (2960), Benjamin Ward (1965), Sen (1965, 196), Sen an Patan (1968), and Patnaik (1971). Other pes of etrictons have alo en considered oye con Suen! majority decisions sce Michael. Nichol (1965), Plot (1967), Gordon Tullock {967.1970}, Patnaik (1971), Ono A. Dais al (1972), Fsburn (1978), Kel {U974,b, 1978), Patnaik nd Sengupea (1974), Ese S. Maskn (1976, b, 105), Jean Michel, Grandin (1098), Peleg (1978, 1080), Wulf Gacrinee (1879), Duta (1080) Chichlnsy and Hea (1988), and Suma (1953), among oer contributions. Domata estitons for a wider ‘dae of voting rules hae been invesiated by Patnaik (1070), Maan (1076, b 195), and Ehud lat and F Mair (1977) The vast erature has been detntey surveyed by Gaeriner (8). Thi is one reaon why no famine has ever ocurred in an independent and democratic coum try (not rm ty allenated rulers or by dictator, by oneparty tat). Se Sen (1988), Deze nd Sen (1980), Frances D'Souza (10), Human Rights Wate (1092), and Re Coss and Ret Crescent Societies (1094), "On erent aspect of this general politcal nue se Arrow (151) James M. Buchanan (4954, 6), Buchanan and Tallork (1962), Sen (1070s, 1078, 1074, 19774, 1084), Sueumura (1983) Hammond (1985), Fattanatk and Salles (1085), Andrew Caplin and Barey Nalebull {4985 1967) Young (1988) and Guinier (1091), among eter vaigs. and also the “Sympostm”on voting procedures inthe owrnal of zoom Pct (We 195), ith Cte ‘etons by Jonathan Levin and Nalebull (1095), Douglas W. Rae (1995), Nicolas Ddemnan (M5), Robert J. Weber (195), Michel Le Breton and Join Weymark (1906), and Surumura (198), semen oteAmartya K. Sen 187 So far as welfare economics is concerned, majority rule and voting proce- dures are particularly prone to inconsistency, given the centrality of distribue tional isues in welfare-economic problems. However, one of the basic ques- tions to ask is whether voting rules (to which social choice procedures are effectively restricted in the Arrovian framework) provide a reasonable ap- proach to social choice in the field of welfare economies. Are we in the right territory in tying to make social welfare judgments through variants of vot ing systems? ‘VII. INFORMATIONAL BROADENING AND WELFARE ECONOMICS Voting-based procedures are entirely natural for some kinds of social choice problems, such as elections, referendums, or committee decisions.""They are, however, altogether unsuitable for many other problems of social choice.” ‘When, for example, we want to get some kind of an aggregative index of social welfare, we cannot rely on such procedures for at least two distinct First, voting requires active participation, and if someone decides not to exercise her voting right, her preference would find no direct representation in social decisions. (Indeed, because of lower participation, the interests of substantial groups — for example of African Americans in the United States — find inadequate representation in national politics.) In contrast, in making reasonable social welfare judgments, the interests of the less assertive cannot be simply ignored, Second, even with the active involvement of every one in voting exercises, we cannot but be short of important information needed for welfare-ccono- ‘mic evaluation (on this see Sen, 1970a, 1973a). Through voting, each person can rank different alternatives, But there is no direct way of geting interper- sonal comparisons of different persons’ well-being from voting data. We must go beyond the class of voting rules (explored by Borda and Condorcet as well as Arrow) to be able to address distributional issues. Arrow had ruled out the use of interpersonal comparisons since he had fol lowed the general consensus that had emerged in the 1940's that (as Arrow “There are, however, ome serious problems aking from a posible lack of correspondence be- ‘ween votes and acl preferences which coud fer beens of strategic voting aimed at ‘manipulation of voting emlte On this ace the remarkable impossbiiy theorem of Gibbard (G973) and Sarthe (1975), There isan extensive Uterature on manipulason and on the hallenges oF implementation, on which sce also Patnaik (1073, 1978), Steven} Brats (1975), ‘ed Groves ana John Ledyard (1977, Barbera and Sonnenschein (1973), Dati and Pataralk (G978), Pte (1978, 1984, Sehmeler and Sonnenschein 1974), Dasgupta eal (1970), Green and Lafont (1879), Lafont (1978), Duta (1980, 197), Patanalk and Sengupta (1080), Sengupta (980a,b), Lafont and Mask (1982), Moulin (1988, 1095), and Leo rw a (0985), among other contributions. There lsalsoa nonstate import in exabehing an tract onetorne correspondence between: (I) preferring (2) daprelertin, and (3) being it Aiterenon the one hand, and (1*) voting fr, 2") voung against and (8") abstaining. on the ‘ther hand, no matter whether voting isos oF enjoyable, o neither (ee Sen, 1968. On diy se Sen (1970, 1977).138 Economic Sciences 1998 put it) “interpersonal comparison of utilities has no meaning” (Arrow, 1951 9). The totality of the axiom combination used by Arrow had the effect of confining social choice procedures to rules that are, broadly speaking, of the voting type." His impossibility result relates, therefore, to this class of rules. To lay the foundations of a constructive social choice theory, if we want to reject the historical consensus against the use of interpersonal comparisons in social choice, we have to address two important —and difficult - questions. First, can we systematically incorporate and use something as complex as terpersonal comparisons involving many persons? Will this be a territory of, disciplined analysis, rather than a riot of confusing (and possibly confused) ideas? Second, how can the analytical results be integrated with practical use? (On what kind of information can we sensibly base interpersonal compari- sons? Will the relevant information be actually available, to be used? ‘The first is primarily a question of analytical system building, and the second that of epistemology as well as practical reason, The latter issue requires a reexamination of the informational basis of interpersonal com- parisons, and I would presently argue that it calls for an inescapably qualified response, But the first question can be addressed more definitively through constructive analysis, Without going into technicalities of the literature that thas emerged, I would like to report that interpersonal comparisons of various types can be fully axiomatized and exactly incorporated in social choice pro- cedures (through the use of "invariance conditions” in a generalized frame- ‘work, formally constructed as “social welfare functionals,” on which see Sen, 1970a, 1977¢).." Indeed, interpersonal comparisons need not even be co fined to “allornone” dichotomies, We may be able to make interpersonal ‘comparisons to some extent, but not in every comparison, nor of every type, nor with tremendous exactness (see Sen, 19708, c) ‘We may, for example, have no great difficulty in accepting that Emperor Nero's utility gain from the burning of Rome was smaller than the sum-otal 1 should be explained dh reatiting sci choice procedure to ving cules it not an npn tht ievoked by Aron (1951, 1068; it a part the possi dheorem ete bike! by hin. Teja anal eomequence af the set of appareny reasonable sions paste Inte forraroned socal hie. Interpersonal comparion of lies sof couse, expel ex ‘det the proof of Ars theorem shows that ase of oder assumptions with consderaDe itiliy, talon together, logilly ental ater features of voting rules at well (2 Fernarableanaltical result on tn own)-The desved features incl, parca, the demand ing requtement that no effective note be taken of dhe maf of the socal states: ony of the totes tha re respectively atin favor af and aginst - thers (a property that alten ele “neutral” = wmenhatHatering name fr what safer all only an informational esticton) White the cachewal of interpersonal compartons of wie eliminates the post of aking note of equality of tities (and of allerences inns and fsses of ute), the ental com ponent of etraiy” prevent tention being ire paid to dsetional ies ough Taking explicit note ofthe mature ofthe respecive socal states (fr example, af the income Inequalities in the ifferene state). The oe of induced slormational consrans in enealing imponstiy resis dicted a Sem (1977e, 1979). See alo Patrick Supper (196), Hammond (1975, 1977, 185), Stephen Stasick (1976), Arrow (1977), 6 Apremont and Covers (1977) Maskin (1978, 1979}, Genes (107), Kei W Roers (128s, b), Surumara (1083, 1997), Chale Blackorby eet (984), @Aspremont (1085) and @Alpeemont and Pile Mong (1008), among other contbusonsAmartya K. Sen 189 ‘oF the utility oss of all the other Romans who suffered from the fire. Bus this, does not require us to feel confident that we can put everyone's utilities in an ‘exact onesto-one correspondence with each other, There may, thus, be room inding “partial comparability" ~ denying both the extremes: full com- and no comparability at all. The different extents of partial cor pparability can be given mathematically exact forms (precisely articulating the ‘exact extent of inexactness)." It can also be shown that there may be no general need for terribly refined interpersonal comparisons for arriving at definite social decisions. Quite often, rather limited levels of partial com- parability wll be adequate for making social decisions.” Thus the empirical ‘exercise need not be as ambitious as itis sometimes feared, Before proceeding to the informational basis of interpersonal compari- sons, let me ask a big analytical question: how much of a change in the pos- sibility of social choice is brought about by systematic use of interpersonal comparisons? Do Arrow's impossibility, and related results, go away with the ‘use of interpersonal comparisons in social welfare judgments? The answer briefly is, yes. The additional informational availability allows sufficient discrimination to escape impossbilities of this type, “There is an interesting contrast here. It can be shown that admitting cardi nality of utilities withou! interpersonal comparisons does not change Arrows npossibility theorem at all, which can be readily extended 10 cardinal _measurability of utilities (see Theorem 8*2 in Sen, 1970a). In contrast even ‘ordinal interpersonal comparisons is adequate to break the exact impossbi ty. We knew of course that with some types of interpersonal comparisons de- ‘manded in a full form (including cardinal interpersonal comparability), we ‘can use the classical utilitarian approach.” But it turns out that even weaker forms of comparability would still permit making consistent social welfare judgments, satisfying all of Arrow's requirements, in addition to being sen- sitive to distributional concerns (even though the possible rules will be con- fined toa relatively small class)" ‘The distributional issue is, in fact, intimately connected with the need to go beyond voting rules as the basis of social welfare judgments. As was discussed carlies, utilitarianism too isin an important sense distribution indifferent: its program is to maximize the sum-otalof utilities, no matter how unequally that total may be distributed (the extensive implications of this distributional i See Sen (1970s), Blackorty (1975), Ben J. Fine (1975), Kaushik Basa (1980), Besembinder and fy Acker (1980), and Let (1986). The sty of ienactnee can als be eX ted 1 "Tur characteiatons. See also Anthony B. Atinson (1070), Sen (1070a,¢, 1978), Dayupta al. (1073), and Michael Rothschild and Joseph. Sight (1979). On this se particular John C Harsanys (1955) clic paper, which stood agin the pei Isic erature that followed Arrows (1951) impoubiy theorem, See ano fares A Mies (i989) "See Sen (1970a, 1977), Rawls (1971), Edmund S Phelps (1973), Hammond (1976), Sursick 0976), Aron (1977, @Aepremont ane Gevers (1077), Geter (1970), Robert (i980, ), Sours (1983, 199), Barkorby oa (198), and Arpremont(19RS), among other cont tions.190 Economie Sciences 1998 difference are discussed in Sen, 19734). But the use of interpersonal com: parisons can take other forms as well, allowing public decisions to be sensiti ve to inepualities in well-being and opportunities. ‘The broad approach of social welfare functionals opens up the possibility of using many different types of social welfare rules, which differ in the treat- ‘ment of equity as well as efficiency, and also in their informational require- ments Further, with the removal ofthe artificial barrier that had prohibited interpersonal comparisons, many other fields of normative measurement have also been investigated with the axiomatic approach of soctal welfare ana- lysis. My own efforts in such fields as the evaluation and measurement of inequality (Sen, 1973a, 19922, 1997), poverty (Sen, 1976b, 1983b, 1985a, 19924), distribution adjusted national income (Sen, 1973b, 1976a, 1979a), and en- vironmental eoluation (Sen, 1995a), have drawn solidly on the broadened in- Formational framework of recent social choice theory.” VIII. INFORMATIONAL BASIS OF INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS While the analytical issues in incorporating interpersonal comparisons have been, on the whole, well sorted out, there still remains the important prac tical matter of finding an adequate approach to the empirical discipline of ‘making interpersonal comparisons and then using them in practice. The foremost question to be addressed is this: interpersonal comparison of what? TThe formal structures of social welfare functions are not, in any sense, spe cific to utility comparisons only, and they can incorporate other types of in- texpersonal comparisons as well. The principal issue is the choice of some ac counting of individual advantage, which need not take the form of comparisons of mental states of happiness, and could instead focus on some ‘other way of looking at individual well-being or freedom or substantive op- portunities (seen in the perspective of a corresponding evaluative discipline). "The rejection of interpersonal comparisons of uilities in welfare economic land in social choice theory that followed positivist criticism (such as that of Robbins, 1988) was firmly based on interpreting them entirely as compari- sons of mental states. As it happens, even with such mental state comparisons, the case for unqualified rejection is hard to sustain." Indeed, as has been for On inna relate sues, ee Sen (1970, 1977), Hammond (1976), Aspemont and Gevers, (0977), Robert Deschamps and Gevers (1978), Maskn (197, 1979), Geers (1979), Raber (0960s), Sigur R- Osman (083), Blackory eal (1984), e°Aspremont (1985), 7: Coulhn nd Mong (198), Nick Baigent (1094), and d’Aspremont and Mongin (198), among many ‘ther contbutions See als Harsuy (1435) and Suppes (1906) for proneering anaes of the ‘evo interpervnal comparisons ElaerandJohn Roemer (1981) have provided fine eel ac Count ofthe vast ieranure on thi subject. My work on inequalisy beginning with Sen, 1978) has Been particulary influenced bythe pioneering contributions of Aktwon (1970, 1988, 1980). The Iterature on this bjt has frown very fat in cece eas fo xa sry aswell at references the comtemporary $teratre se James Foster and Sea (1997),Amartya K. Sen 191 cefully argued by the philosopher Donald Davidson (1986), itis difficult to see how people can understand anything much about other people's minds and feelings, without making some comparisons with their own minds and feelings. Such comparisons may not be extremely precise, but then again, we know from analytical investigations that very precise interpersonal com- parisons may not be needed to make systematic use of interpersonal com parisons in social choice (on this and related issues, see Sen, 1970a, ¢, 1997; Blackorby, 1975) So the picture is not so pessimistic even in the old home ground of mental tate comparisons. But, more importantly, interpersonal comparisons of per- sonal welfare, or of individual advantage, need not be based only on com- parisons of mental states. In fact, there may be good ethical grounds for not concentrating too much on mental-state comparisons ~ whether of pleasures ‘or of desires. Utilities may sometimes be very malleable in response to per sistent deprivation. A hopeless destitute with much poverty, or a downtrod- den laborer living tinder exploitative economic arrangements, oF a subjugat- ‘ed housewife in a society with entrenched gender inequality or a yrannized Citizen under brutal authoritarianism, may come to terms with her depr tion, She may take whatever pleasure she ean from small achievements, and adjust her desires to take note of feasibility (thereby helping the fulfilment of, her adjusted desires). But her success in such adjustment would not make her deprivation go away. The metric of pleasure or desire may sometimes be qui- te inadequate in reflecting the extent ofa person's substantive deprivation.” ‘There may indeed be a case for taking incomes, or commodity bundles, or resources more generally, to be of direct interest in judging a person's advan- tage, and this may be so for various reasons ~ not merely for the mental states they may help to generate." In fact, the Difference Principle in Rawls's (1971) theory of “justice as fairness” is based on judging individual advantage in * MW interperonalcomparions are taken to be entirely mater of opinions oF of vale jg ‘nents then the quem can alo be razed as ow the diergen opinions or vations of di erent persons may be combined tether (dh look ikea socal choice excree oa is ov) Roberts (1005) has extensively investigated his puriculr formulation, ing ilerpersoral emparion io bean exer of aggregation of oploions. Ie howerer, interpersonal compan ‘retaken to havea firmer fatal bi (e some people being objecely more miserable that ‘thers) then dhe use of interpersonal comparisons wil eal fora efferent set of axiomatic de- ‘mands ~ more appropriate for epistemology than for etles, Por contrasting perspectives on it ‘eepersnal comparisons of wellbeing, se lan Lite (1987) Sen (1070, 1085), bor Sets (96), Donald Davidson (1986), and Gabbard (1085); see also empirical suds of observed mt sery (for example, Drere and Sen, 1089, 1990, 1905, 1907; Ek Schakdaeet and Lue Van ‘Gotegem, 100, Robert M. Solow, 195). "This ine and i farseachng cial and economic implications are dscused in Sen (1980, 19864, 1085} See also Bas a (1905). The welare relevance of eal income comparisons canbe diwocated from the mentaltate correlates: ee Sen (19703). See also the elated iuerature on “thes” seen interns of now ‘nv for example, Duncan Foley (1067), SengeChistophe Kolm (1000), Esha A Parner and David Schmesler (1974), Hal R Varian (1974, 1975), LarsGunnar Seenson (1977, 1980). ‘Ronald Dworkia (1981), Suzumura (1989), Young (1985), Campbell (1992), and Moulin and Wiliam Thomson (197). Dizet socal judgments on interpersonal dstsbutons over comme dies have Deen analyze by Frankia M- Fer (1950).192 Economie Sciences 1998 terms of a person's command over what Rawls calls “primary goods,” whieh are general-purpose resources that are useful for anyone to have no matter what her exact objectives are ‘This procedure can be improved upon by taking note not only of the ownership of primary goods and resources, but also of interpersonal di ferences in converting them into the capability to live well. Indeed, T have tried to argue in favor of judging individual advantage in terms of the respective capabilities, which the person has, to live the way he or she has reason to value.” This approach focuses on the substantive freedoms that people have, rather than only on the particular outcomes with which they ‘end up. For responsible adults, the concentration on freedom rather than ‘only achievement has some merit, and it can provide a general framework for analyzing individual advantage and deprivation in a contemporary society. The extent of interpersonal comparisons may only be partial - often based on. the intersection of different points of view But the use of such partial com- parability can make a major difference to the informational basis of reasoned social judgments. However, given the nature of the subject and the practical difficulties of in- formational availability and evaluation, it would be overambitious to be severely exchisive in sticking only to one informational approach, rejecting all ‘others. In the recent literature in applied welfare economies, various ways of making sensible interpersonal comparisons of wellbeing have emerged. ‘Some have been based on studying expenditure patterns, and using this (0 surmise about comparative welkbeing of different persons (see Pollak and ‘Terence J. Wales, 1979; Dale W. Jorgenson f al, 1980; Jorgenson, 1990 Daniel T: Slesnick, 1998), while others have combined this with other infor. ‘mational inputs (see Angus S. Deaton and John Muellbauer, 1980; Atkinson land Francois Bourguignon, 1982, 1987; Fisher, 1987, 1990; Pollak, 1991, Deaton, 1995).” Others have tried to use questionnaires and have looked for regularities in people's answers to questions about relative wellbeing (see, for example, Arie Kapteyn and Bernard M.S. van Praag, 1975). TThere have also been illuminating works in observing important features ‘of living conditions and in drawing conclusions on quality of life and compa ™ See Sen (198, 19854, b, 1924), Dreze and Sen (1989, 195), and Martha Nusbaum and Sen (1999), See also Roemer (1082, 1990), Bass (1987), Numbaum (1088), Richard J Arneson {1982), Atkinson (198, 105), C. A. Coen (1980, 190), Bourguignon and G. Beds (19) Keith Grifin and Jon Knight (199), David Crocker (1002) Sudhie Anand and Marti Revallon (1903), Arrow (IIH), Meghnad Dess (1998), and Patanalh. (1997), among other onaibutions There have als been several important nonposia on de capabiiy perspective, Such 28 Giorae dg Lame «dsl di Etnomia (199) ed Nate Pai (1900, Special Volume), inching contributions by Alewandro Baleurino (199, 1906), Giovanni Andrea Corns (1909), Elena Grama (094, 1990), Enviea Chiappero Martinet (1084, 1920), Sebastiano Rawta (1908), lan Carter (1996), Leonardo Cain and leopo Beret (1996), and ‘Sahashoub Rar 1900) ace aln Sem (184, 1960) wid my esponses wo these contbutions = On this see Sen (1970, ¢, 1985, 1982, 19% 199), Sees Sesh (1098).Amartya K. Sen 193 ratve living standards on that basis; indeed there is « wellesablished trad tion of Scandinavian studies in this arca (sce, for example, Alladt ea [1981] and Robert Erikson and Rune Aberg {1987}. The literature on “basic needs” and their fulfilment has also provided an empirical approach to un- derstanding comparative depriations™ Further, under the intellect leadership of Mahbub ul Haq (1995), the United Nations Development Pro- gramme (UNDP) has made systematic use of a particular ype of informa: tional broadening to make comparisons based on observed features of King conditions (reported in UNDP, Human Deelipment Report). Teiscasy enough to pick holes in each ofthese methodologies and to crt ire the related metic of interpersonal comparisons But there can be ite ‘doubt about the welfare-cconomic intrest inthe farreaching uses of empiri ‘al information that have emerged from these works. They have substantially broadened our understanding of individual advantages and their empirical correlates Each ofthese methodologies cleary has some Kmitations well as tirtues, and our evaluation of ther relative merits may well diverge, depend: ing on our respective priries. [have had the occasion to argue elsewhere {and briefly also in this lecture, earlier on) in favor of partial comparables based on evaluation of capabilites," but beyond that specific ase (om which others may well take a diferent view), I want to emphasize here the more {general point thatthe possiblies of practical welfare economics and social hice have been immensely widened through these innorative, empirical works In fact, despite their differences, they fit in general into the overall pattern of informational widening to which recent analytical work in social choice theory has forcefully pointed. The analytical systems explored in the recent literature on welfare economics and socal choice are broader than those in the Arrovin model (and correspondingly less uptight, al less impossible fon which ace Sen, 1970a, 1977)" They are also analytically general enough to allow different empirical interpretations and to permit alternative infor- ‘ational bases for social choice. The diverse empirical methodologies 0 sidered here, canal be sen inthis Broader analytical perspective. The move- ‘ments in “high theory” have been, in this sense, closely inked to the advances in “practical economics." It isthe sustained exploration of consiructive pos io to the asc need approach canbe ound in Fal Sete eal (198). (0895), Dharam Ga fal (1977, Janes P. Grant (1978), Mosts D, inky (100), Nanak Kaban (18,1084). FaulSueeten (1984), Brances Stewart (1985), Robert Goodin (198), and Alan Hains Philip Pet (1080), among oer be waced to Figo (1920) "Se for example United Nations Development Programme (190) and dhe subset yeast ‘Ham Drolpmant Rpt Sc alo Sen (1973, IRBs), Adeenan (1975), Grant (1078), Motes (109), Sreten oat (1981, Dos (1985). and Anand and Sem (1007) on related ste See partielle (19923), The trate on implementation” haan grown in the dieetion of practical application: for nals of wome ofthe diferent ies invoked, sce Llfont (1979), Mskin (185), Mou (1905, Scsumurs (1985), Dats (1007), aed Mas ane Tomas st194 Economie Sciences 1998 sibilities — at the analytical as well as practical levels - that has helped to dispel some of the gloom that was associated earlier with social choice and welfare economics. IX, POVERTY AND FAMINE ‘The variery of information on which social welfare analysis can draw can be ‘well illustrated by the study of poverty. Poverty is typically scen in terms of the lowness of incomes, and it has been traditionally measured simply by count. ing the number of people below the povertyline income; ths is sometimes called the headcount measure. A scrutiny of this approach yields two diffe rent types of questions, First, is poverty adequately seen as low income? Second, even if poverty i seen as low income, is the aggregate poverty of a so- ciety best characterized by the index of the head-count measure? take up these questions in turn, Do we get enough of a diagnosis of indi- vidual poverty by comparing the individual's income with a socially given povertyline income? What about the person with an income well above the poverty line, who suffers from an expensive illness (requiring, say, kidney dialysis)? Is deprivation not ultimately a lack of opportunity to lead a mini- mally acceptable life, which can be influenced bya number of considerations, including of course personal income, but also physical and environmental ‘characteristics, and other variables (such as the availability and costs of medi- ‘eal and other facilites)? The motivation behind such an exercise relates closely to seeing poverty as a serious deprivation of certain basic capabilites, ‘This alternative approach leads to a rather different diagnosis of poverty from the ones that a purely income-based analysis can yield.” This is not to deny that lowness of income can be very important in many contexts, since the opportunities person enjoys in a market economy can be severely constrained by her level of real income. However, various contingen cies can lead to variations in the “conversion” of income into the capability to live a minimally acceptable life, and if that is what we are concerned with, there may be good reason to look beyond income poverty. There are at least srent sources of variation: (1) personal heterogeneities (for example, < 10 illness), (2) environmental diversities (for example, living in a storm-prone or flood-prone area), (3) variations in social climate (for exam- ple, the prevalence of crime or epidemiological vectors), and (4) differences in relative deprivation connected with customary patterns of consumption in particular societies (for example, being relatively impoverished in a rich See Sen (1980, 1988, 986, 1992, 1993, 1900), Kawa (1084), Nussbaun (1988), Deze and Sen (1989, 1095), Grin ad Knight (1900), MeRar Hossain (1090), Sehokkaert and Van ‘Oozcgem (1000), Nusbaum and'Sen (198), Anand an Sen (1007), nd Foster and Sen (1997). among other conubutions.Amartya K. Sen 195 society, which can lead to deprivation of the absolute capability to take part in the life of the cormmunity).” There is, thus, an important need to go beyond income information in poverty analysis, in particular to see poverty as capability deprivation. However (as was discussed earlier), the choice of the informational base for poverty analysis cannot really be dissociated from pragmatic considerations, particularly informational availability. It is unlikely that the perspective of poverty as income deprivation can be dispensed with in the empirical litera- ture on poverty, even when the limitations of that perspective are entirely ‘lear, Indeed, in many contexts the rough-and-ready way of using income in formation may provide the most immediate approach to the study of severe deprivation.” For example, the causation of famines is often best seen in terms ofa radi- ‘cal decline in the real incomes ofa section of the population, leading to star= vation and death (on this see Sen, 19764, 1981).” The dynamics of income ‘earning and of purchasing power may indeed be the most important compo- nent of a famine investigation. This approach, in which the study of causal Aluences on the deter 1 of the respective incomes of different groups plays central part, contrasts with an exclusive focus on agricultural produc: tion and food supply, which is often found in the literature on this subject. ‘The shift in informational focus from food supply to entitlements (invol ving incomes as well as supply, and the resulting relative prices) can make a radical difference, since famines can occur even without any major decline ~ possibly without any decline at all ~ of food production or supply." If, for ‘example, the incomes of rural wage laborers, of of service providers, or of craftsmen collapse through unemployment, or through a fall of real wages, or trough a decline in the demand for the relevant services or eraft products, the affected groups may have (o stare, even if the overall food supply in the economy is undiminished, Starvation occurs when some people cannot estab lish entitlement over an adequate amount of food, through purchase or On thisse Sen (1982) and Foster and Sen (1987). The at concern ~that a eave pri tion of income can lead to an absolve deprivation of «base capil wet discussed by ‘Asn Smith (1770) Aan Sith claim that neces goods” (and corresponding minim inermes needed t mod base depriation) must he defined diferent for dilleren societies, lo eiggeas 2 gencral approach of using parametialariahle“posertine" income, Sich “ariatons can fe used to reflect the disparate conditions of ferent persons (ieluding, for ‘example, proneness to iliness).On these sues, see Deaton and Muebaer (1880, T886), Fongenson (109), Pols (1991), Deaton (1985), and Slenick (1998), among other conto Hone Under certain conditions, the definition of poverty ax having an income below the ars ‘metialy determined -ponery Hine” wil e congrient with the characterstion of poverty ‘apabiiy depriaion (ithe parametric variations are firmly inked to the income needed {oi specified levels of capability deprivation. These Sues are nhl scratnied by Philippe Van Paris (190. "See alto Mohiedin lame (1980), Ravin (1087, Deve and Sen (0989, 190), Jeffrey (Coles and Hammond (1885), Desa (199), Osman (1980), and Peter Svedberg (i929) 0m felaed maters Arempircal dis of famines bring ou, some acta famines have ocurred with ite oF no Accline in food production (eich a the Bengal famine of 1913, he Ethiopian famine of 1973, oF the Bangladeah famine of 1974), wherea ethers have heen inience! subtantly by decines infond production (on thisee Sen, 158.196 Economic Sciences 1998 through food production, and the overall supply of food is only one influen- ‘ce among many in the determination of the entitlements of the respective ‘groups of people in the economy. Thus, an income-sensitive entitlement ap- proach can provide a better explanation of famines than can be obtained through an exclusively production-oriented view: It can also yield a more ef fective approach to the remedying of starvation and hunger (on this see par ‘icularly Dreze and Sen, 1989), ‘The nature of the problem tends to identify the particular “space” on ‘which the analysis has to concentrate. It remains true that in explaining the exact patterns of famine deaths and sufferings, we can get additional under- standing by supplementing the income-based analysis with information on the conversion of incomes into nourishment, which will depend on various other influences such as metabolic rates, proneness t illness, body size, ete." ‘These issues are undoubtedly important for investigating the incidence of nutritional failures, morbidities, and mortalities. However, ina general analy- sis of the occurrence and causation of famines, affecting large groups, these additional matters may be of secondary importance. While I shall not enter farther into the famine literature here, [ would lke to emphasize that the in- formational demands of famine analysis give an important place to income deprivation which have more immediacy and ready usability than the more subtle ~ and ultimately more informed ~ distinctions based on capability com parisons (on this see Sen [1981] and Dreze and Sen [1989]) turn now to the second question. The most common and most traditional measure of poverty had tended to concentrate on head counting. But it must also make a difference as to how far below the poverty line the poor individ ally ae, and furthermore, how the deprivation is shared and distnbuted among the poor, The social data on the respective deprivations of the individuals ‘who constitute the poor in a society need to be aggregated together to arrive at informative and usable measures of aggregate poverty. This is a soci choice problem, and axioms can indeed be proposed that attempt to capture ‘our distributional concerns in this constructive exercise (on this see Sen, 19766). Several distribution-sensitive poverty measures have been derived axio- ‘matically in the recent social choice literature, and various alternative pro- posals have been analyzed. While I shall, here, not go into a comparative as. sessment of these measures (nor into axiomatic requirements that can be Aa important farther ie i the dssibution of fod within the any, whieh may be i ‘uence by several acon aber than fay icome, bse of gender inequality and the reat tment of children and ld people canbe port inthis context Eatiement sai can be ‘htended in these directions by going beyond the fanly income into the conventions ad rales ‘of ntafamy dion. On these sues, sce Sen (108, b 1984, 1900), Vaughan 1887), Dreze Sd Sen (1889), Barbara Haris (1000), Bina Agarwal (1904), Nancy Fle (1998), Kanbur (1995), and Nusbaum and Jonathan Glover (1998), among other contributions “The walled "Sen meanareof poner” ea infact, be iproved by an important but simple ‘artaton illuminating proposed ty Antony FShorracks (16). Thave to confesfivoring the ‘SenShorrorks mentre arr the original Se indexAmartya K. Sen 197 used to discriminate between them), elsewhere I have tried to address this issue, jointly with James Foster (Foster and Sen, 1997).*' However, 1 would like to emphasize the fact that we face here an embarrassment of riches (the opposite of an impasse or an impossibility), once the informational basis of social judgments has been appropriately broadened. To axiomatize exactly particular poverty measure, we shall have to indulge in the “brinkmanship” of ‘which T spoke earlier (Section V), by adding other axiomatic demands until \we are just short ofan impossibility, with only one surviving poverty measure, X. COMPARATIVE DEPRIVATION AND GENDER INEQUALITY Atone level, poverty cannot be dissociated from the misery caused by it, and in this sense, the classical perspective of uilty also can be invoked in this ana- lysis. However, the malleability of mental attitudes, on which T commented ‘earlier, may tend to hide and mufile the extent of deprivation in many cases. ‘The indigent peasant who manages to build some cheer in his life should not be taken as nonpoor on grounds of his mental accomplishment. ‘This adaptability can be particularly important in dealing with gender inequality and deprivation of women in traditionally unequal societies. This partly because perceptions have a decisive part to play in the cohesion of fa- rmily life, and the culture of family living tends to put a premium on making allies out of the ill treated. Women may often enough work much harder than men (thanks to the rigours of household chores), and also receive less attention in health care and nutrition, and yer the perception that there isan ineorrigible inequality here may well be missing in a society in which asym- metric norms are quietly dominant. This type of inequality and deprivation ‘may not, under these circumstances, adequately surface in the scale of the ‘mental metric of dissatisfaction and discontent. ‘The socially cultivated sense of contentment and serenity may even affect the perception of morbidity and illness. When, many years ago, was working ‘ona famine-related study of post-famine Bengal in 194, I was quite struck by the remarkable fact that the widows surveyed had hardly reported any inci- dence of being in “indifferent health,” whereas widowers, complained mas- sively about just that (Sen, 1985a Appendix B). Similarly, it emerges in inter- state comparisons in India thatthe states that are worst provided in education * James Foster ix major contributor tothe poverty Hteratre se, for example, Foster (198, Foner sal (1084), sl ester an Shorrcks (198), For dean of some major sues in the Choice of an aggregate measure ol poner, nce also Anand (1977, 1083), Blackorby and Donaldson (1978, 1080). Kanbur (1988), Adkinson (1987, 188), Christian Se (138), Saya R CChateaarry (1990), Camilo Daguon and Michele Zengo (190), Ravalion (1804), Frank A. {Comell (126) -and Shorvocks (185), among many others (here ran exten biography of ‘his lage trate in Foster and Sen, LA} One ofthe important est Be addeessed the ‘need for ~ snd lnitaions of ~"Mecompenabiy” (and the weaker requirement of “wabproup ‘Consneney"on which see ako Shorvock, 1984). Foster (198) gives arguments in aor of de ‘omporigy (an did Anand, 1977, 1988), whereas Sen (197Sa, 197%) presents arguments ‘Sua ie Theve ss stious tempt in Foster and Sen (1997) to ees Both dhe pron ad the ‘ins ofdecomposablty and subgroup consistency ‘Oa thisace Sem (1984, 190, 199%, andthe heratre cited there,198 Economic Sciences 1998 and health-care facilities typically report the lowest levels of perceived mor bidity, whereas states with good health care and school education indicate higher selfperception of illness (with the highest morbidity reports coming from the best provided states, such as Kerala).* Menu reactions, the main- stay of classical utility, can be a very defective basis for the analysis of depriva- ‘Thus, in understanding poverty and inequality, there is a strong case for looking at real deprivation and not merely at mental reactions to that depri- vation, There have been many recent investigations of gender inequality and women’s deprivation in terms of undernutrition, clinically diagnosed morbi- dity, observed illiteracy, and even unexpectedly high mortality (compared ‘with physiologically justified expectations). Such interpersonal comparisons, can easily be a significant basis of studies of poverty and of inequality between the sexes. They can be accommodated within a broad framework of welfare ‘economics and social choice (enhanced by the removal of informational con- straints that would rule out the use of these types of data) XLT HE LIBERAL PARADOX ‘This lecture has included discussion of why and how impossibility results in social choice can be overcome through informational broadening. The formational widening considered so far has been mainly concerned with the use of interpersonal comparisons, But this need not be the only form of broadening that is needed in resolving an impasse in social choice. Consider, for example, an impossibility theorem which is sometimes referred to as “the liberal paradox,” or “the impossibility of the Paretian liberal” (Sen, 1970a, b, 1976), The theorem shows the impossibility of satisfying even a very minimal demand for liberty when combined with an insistence on Pareto efficiency (given unrestricted domai ‘Since there have been some debates on the content of liberty in the recent Ticerature (see, for example, Novick, 1974; Peter Gardenfors, 1981; Robert Sugden, 1981, 1985, 1993; Hillel Steiner, 1990; Gaertner ef al, 1992; Deb, 1994; Mare Fleusbaey and Gaertner, 1996; Pattanaik, 1996; Suzumura, 1996), pethaps a quick explanatory remark may be useful. Liberty has many diffe rent aspects, including two rather distinct features: (1) it can help us to ‘The methodological se underlying thi problem invones‘postonal ojectviywhat i b- servation abject from a ven poston but may not be maainable i inurpstinacompa ‘sone Ths conta and a farreachng ecwance diced in Sen (193) {The bteratureon “missing women” (i comparion noth de expected nubs of women inthe absence of unvstaly high feminine morality rates found in some socltes) Is one example oF Sch empirical analysis om ths ace Sen (1884, 19%2), Vaughan (1087), Dreze ad Sen 1989 Mbp) Adey J. Coale (1901), ad Stephan Klsen (1994). See abo Jocelyn Kynch and Sen (ae); Harre (1000), Rast Kambur and Lawrence Haddad! (1900): Agarwal (1904), Folee (as), Nira and Glover (15), among other works ‘There alo sme analyte ineret inthe “wuree” of the Smponsbiy result involved ere, pavtiaary since bn Pareto ficenc” and minimal bert" are characterised i ters ofthe ‘ne wet of preferences of thes indus On this see Sem (176, 1902),Amartya K. Sen 199 achieve what we would choose to achieve in our respective private domains, for example, in personal life (this sits “opportunity aspect"), and (2) it can leave us directly in charge of choices over private don may or may not achieve (this is its "process aspect’). In social choice theory, the formulation of liberty has been primarily concerned with the former, that is, the opportunity aspect. This may have been adequate to show the possible conflict between the Pareto principle and the opportunity aspect of liberty (on which Sen [1970a, b] concentrated), but an exclusive concentration on the opportunity aspect cannot provide an adequate understanding of the de- mands of liberty (in this respect, Sugden [1981, 1993] and Gaertner et al, [1992] were certainly right to reject the sufficiency of the opportunity-cen- {ered formulation in standard social choice theory)." However, social choice theory can also be made to accommodate the process aspect of liberty through appropriate recharacterization, and particularly through valuing. ‘due process in addition to substantive opportunities (on this see Sen, 1982b, 1997a, 1999b; Stig Kanger, 1985; Deb, 1994; Hammond, 1997; Suzumura, 1996; Martin van Hees, 1996), Its also important to avoid the opposite narrowness of concentrating ex fied. This has indeed been largely an upbeat lecture ~ emphasizing the possi- bility of constructive social choice theory, and arguing for a productive inter- pretation of the impossibility results. Indeed, these apparently negative results can be seen to be helpful inputs in the development of an adequate framework for social choice, since the axiomatic derivation of a specific social choice procedure must lie in between ~ and close to ~an impossibility, ‘on one side, and an embarrassment of riches, on the other (sce Section V). ‘The possbility of constructive welfare economies and social choice (and their use in making social welfare judgments and in devising practical ‘measures with normative significance) turns on the need for broadening the ‘informational basis of such choice. Different types of informational enrich: ‘ment have been considered in the literature, A crucial element in this broadening is the use of interpersonal comparisons of welLbeing and indivi- dual advantage. It is not surprising that the rejection of interpersonal com- parisons must cause difficulties for reasoned social decision, since the claims Of different persons, who make up the society, have to be assessed against each other. We cannot even understand the force of public concerns about poverty; hunger, inequality, or tyranny, without bringing in interpersonal ‘comparisons in one form or another. The information on which our informal judgments on these matters rely is precisely the kind of information that has to be ~ and can be ~ incorporated in the formal analysis of systematic social choice (Sections VII-X1), ‘The pessimism about the possibility of interpersonal comparisons that fuelled the “obituary notices" for welfare economics (and substantially fed the fear of impossibility in social choice theory) was ultimately misleading for ‘wo distinet reasons. Fist, it confined attention to too narrow an info tional base, overlooking the different ways in which interpersonally compara tive statements can sensibly be made and can be used to enrich the analysis of welfare judgments and social choice. An overconcentration on comparisons Of mental states crowded out a plethora of information that can inform us about the real advantages and disadvantages of different persons, related to, their substantive well-being, freedoms, or opportunities. Second, the pessi= :mism was also based on demanding too much precision in such comparisons, overlooking the fact that even partial comparisons can serve to enlighten the reasoned basis of welfare economics, social ethics, and responsible politics." “Addressing these problems fits well into a general program of strengthen- 1g social choice theory (and “nonobituarial” welfare economics). In general,202 Beanomic Sciences 1998 informational broadening, in one form or another, isan effective way of over coming social choice pessimism and of avoiding impossbilities, and it leads directly to constructive approaches with viability and reach. Formal reasoning. about postulated axioms (including their compatibility and coherence), as ‘well as informal understanding of values and norms (including their relevan- ‘ce and plausibility), both point in that productive direction. Indeed, the deep, complementarity between formal and informal reasoning ~ so central to the social sciences ~ is well illustrated by developments in modern social choice theory: REFERENCES ‘Adelman, Ima. ‘Development Feonomict~A Reatessment of Goals” American Exonomic Review May 19% (Pape and Procetings, 65(2), pp. 302-0. Agarwal, Bina A id of one's cum: Gener anlar in South Asia, Cambri: Cambridge University Press, 1904, [Arrman, Mark A. and Aleshero, Fuad T. 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