#1 Cruz vs Secretary of ENR
#4 Oh Cho vs Director of Lands
The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership
since time immemorial. Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain.
The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as
never to have been public landdomains and lands held under native title are,
therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is
held under the indigenous concept of ownership which maintains the view that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property.
For areas certified as ancestral domain, jurisdiction of the government agency or
agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. HOWEVER, the
jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral
domains does not terminate by such certification because said agencies are
mandated under existing laws to administer the natural resources for the State,
which is the owner thereof.
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, where
all the parties involved are members of the same indigenous group. It therefore
follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous
group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the
application of customary law is not required.
#2 Carino vs Insular Govt
Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the agreement merely a
contract to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has yet to occur, private
respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land in question through
acquisitive prescription.
The records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the
possession of Guzman Cario, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent,
continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with just
title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest, well
beyond the period required under law to acquire title by acquisitive prescription
which, in this case, is 10 years.
Although arguably Sioco Cario may not have been the owner of the subject
property when he executed the "Deed of Absolute Sale" in 1938 in favor of his son,
the requirement of just title is nonetheless satisfied, which means that the mode of
transferring ownership should ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor
been the owner. After the dismissal of that case, Guzman Cario was left
undisturbed in his possession of the subject property until his death.
Thereafter, Guzman's widow and son, herein private respondent, continued
possession of the subject property in the same manner.
By the time the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the property in
question had already been vested in private respondent. The executive issuance can
only go so far as to classify public land, but it cannot be construed as to prejudice
vested rights.
All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in
interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private
property even before the Spanish conquest. The applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.
Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the applicant, he is not entitled to a
decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain.
Under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant's immediate predecessors
in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they
applied for its registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of
his immediate predecessors in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed
also to have been acquired by him. The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26,
1894. This the applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did
not have any vested right in the lot amounting to tile which was transmissible to the
applicant. The only right is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their
predecessors in interest, may be availed of by a qualified person to apply for its
registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified.
#5 Director of Lands vs Santiago
For although tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder had a claim of title over the property.
The SC ruled that Section 48 (b) of Public Land Act applies exclusively to
agricultural lands of the public domain. In this case, it appears that the subject
lands were forest lands and only later declared as alienable or disposable by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Thus, even on the assumption that
the Corporation, through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession for at
least thirty years, such possession never ripened into private ownership. Maria
Garcia and Vicente Obdin, from whom the Corporation purchased the subject lots,
must have applied for sales patents precisely because they wanted to acquire
ownership over the subject lands. An examination of the dates will show that the
filing of the sales applications, apparently on October 24, 1971, was done after the
lands had been declared as alienable and disposable.
#6 Grey Alba vs De la Cruz
Although the appellee, occupying the two small parcels of land in question under the
circumstances was not served with notice, he was made a party defendant by
publication; and the entering of a decree be held to be conclusive against all
persons, including the appellee, whether his name is mentioned in the application,
notice, or citation.
The said decree should not have been opened on account of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, and could have been opened only
on the ground that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not
obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they honestly believed
that the appellee was occupying these two small parcels of land as their tenant.
Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the Court of Land
Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific, intentional acts to
deceive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be
alleged and proved; that is, there must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished
from constructive fraud.
#8 Junio vs De los Santos
The Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), as a Land Registration
Court, can hear cases otherwise litigable only in ordinary civil actions, since the
Courts of First Instance are at the same time, Courts of general jurisdiction and
could entertain and dispose of the validity or invalidity of respondent's adverse
claim, with a view to determining whether petitioner is entitled or not to the relief
that he seeks.
An adverse claim may be cancelled only after it is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious
by the Court acting either as a land registration Court or a Court of general
jurisdiction. The two other co-vendees, however, should be impleaded as parties so
that the entire controversy as to ownership may be threshed out in a single action
to prevent multiplicity of suits.
#9 Arceo vs CA
Act No. 496 has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in
the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former
law when acting merely as a cadastral court.
The fact that Jose wrested possession thereof does not amount to adverse
possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use
thereof cannot by itself prejudice the light of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he
paid taxes thereon is not controlling either because payment of real estate taxes
does not necessarily confer title upon a claimant. The fact finally that Virginia, et al.
had sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive because there
is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had made this known to Pedro, et al.
The weight of authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the done to comply with
charges imposed in the donation, 24 or by reason of ingratitude. The disposition
under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose (whose rights were transmitted to Virginia, et al.)
should be respected.
#10 De los Angeles vs Santos
It is well settled that the Director of Lands' jurisdiction, administrative supervision
and executive control extend only over lands of the public domain and not to lands
already of private ownership. Accordingly, a homestead patent issued by him over
land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of force and effect against the
owner.
Since the existence or non-existence of applicants' registrable title to Lot 11 is
decisive of the validity or nullity of the homestead patent issued as aforestated on
said lot, the court a quo's jurisdiction in the land registration proceedings could not
have been divested by the homestead patent's issuance.
Proceedings for land registration are in rem, whereas proceedings for acquisition of
homestead patent are not. A homestead patent, therefore, does not finally dispose
of the public or private character of the land as far as courts acting upon
proceedings in rem are concerned. Applicants should thus be given opportunity to
prove registrable title to Lot 11.
#12 Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136 (San Pedro vs vs CA)
Spanish titles like the Titulo de Propriedad upon which the heirs of San Pedro y
Esteban rely can no longer be used as evidence of ownership in any land
registration proceeding under the Torrens system. The Titulo de Propriedad relied
upon by the San Pedro heirs is thus declared null and void.
#13 Manigat vs Castillo
The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of
deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. (See
articles 74 to 91, inclusive, Rules of Court.) In order to settle the estate of a
deceased person it is one of the functions of the probate court to determine who the
heirs are that will receive the net assets of the estate and the amount or proportion
of their respective shares.
In the case at bar the petitioners, who are strangers, claimed the right to be
subrogated to the rights of the heirs Demetrio, Elena, and Maria de Jesus by virtue
of their purchase of the respective interests of the latter, while on the other hand
the respondent Sixto de Jesus as a coheir claimed that same right by virtue of
article 1067 of the Civil Code; and since at the time these conflicting claims were
presented to the court the estate of the deceased was still in the process of
administration and settlement, it was incumbent upon the probate court to
adjudicate and settle said claims according to law. The probate court had
jurisdiction to enter the order complained of.
#14 Director of Lands vs Heirs of Isabel Tesalona
The original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence
by private respondents. Such omission is fatal to their application as the submission
of the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
The basis of the claim of the Heirs of Tesalona, is a Spanish title, a possessory
information title issued to Maria Rosita Lorenzo pursuant to a Royal Decree. But
private respondents did not submit the original of the possessory information title.
The rash of anomalies prompted the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 892
which outlawed all Spanish titles, including possessory information titles, unless
they were authenticated in appropriate registration proceedings before August 16,
1976.
#15 Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying
The extra-judicial partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and
binding only as to their who participated in the execution thereof, hence, the heirs
of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, who undisputedly did not participate therein
cannot be bound by said documents. However, the facts on record show that (the
realty company) acquired the entire parcel of land with the mistaken belief that all
the heirs have executed the subject document.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribed in ten years and not otherwise. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that
an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribed in
ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
It also had been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the
date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title
over the property, but if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is an actual
possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
#16 Naawan Community Rural Bank vs CA
Where a person claims to have superior proprietary rights over another on the
ground that he derived his title from a sheriff's sale registered in the Registry of
Property, Article 1544of the Civil Code will apply only if said execution sale of real
estate is registered under Act 496.
Unfortunately, the subject property was still untitled when it was acquired by
petitioner bank by virtue of a final deed of conveyance. On the other hand, when
private respondents purchased the same property, it was already covered by the
Torrens System. Under the said system, registration is the operative act that gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
The issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of relieving the land of all claims
except those noted thereon. Accordingly, private respondents, were not required by
law to go beyond the register to determine the legal condition of the property. They
were only charged with notice of such burdens on the property as were noted on the
register or the certificate of title.
Even assuming that the sheriff's deed of final conveyance in favor of petitioner bank
was duly recorded in the book of the Register of Deeds under Act 3344, ownership
of the subject real property would still be theirs as purchasers in good faith because
they registered the sale first under the Property Registration Decree. Mere
registration of title in case of double sale is not enough; good faith must concur with
the registration.
#17 Noblejas vs Teehankee
The resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is an administrative function, not
a judicial one. Under the law, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner
"shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon
other parties. This limitation in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land
Registration Commissioner with those of any other bureau director, whose
resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the Commissioner's
resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative.
#18 National Land Titles and Deeds vs CSC
Executive Order No. 649 authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA). It abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and
required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA.
The abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good
faith suffers from no infirmity.
The position which private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was
abolished pursuant to Executive Order No. 649, a valid reorganization measure.
There is no vested property right to be re-employed in a reorganized office. Not
being a member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the
reorganization law for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she
cannot be reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate
of the law.
#19 Director of Lands vs Dano
The period fixed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act (CA 141), as amended, is not
jurisdictional but is more of a time limitation. The extension granted by RA No. 6236
up to December 31, 1967 retroacted to and covered the application filed by private
respondent on January 8, 1969, or during the intervening period from January 1,
1969 up to December 31, 1976.
"Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in extending the
period for filing such applications time and time again, to give full opportunity to
those who are qualified under the law to own disposable lands of the public domain
and thus reduce the number of landless among the citizenry." The jurisdiction of
respondent Court in entertaining the instant application for registration and
resolving the same, must be upheld.
#20 Republic vs Alcoanaba
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
Respondents' bare assertions of possession and occupation by their predecessors-
in-interest since 1940 or since 1949 are hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible"
evidence required in cases of this nature. They cannot just offer general statements
which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. They also
failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. It seeks to delimit the all-encompassing
effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of
a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.
#21 Director of Lands vs Buyco
The applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable public land and (b) his
possession, in the concept must be either since time immemorial, or for the period
prescribed in the Public Land Act.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the
property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable parcel of land of
the public domain. On the contrary, based on their own evidence, the entire
property which is alleged to have originally belonged to Charles Hankins was
pasture land.
Even if Charles had indeed declared the property for taxation purposes and actually
paid taxes, such facts are still insufficient to justify possession thereof, much less a
claim of ownership thereon. The declaration of ownership for purposes of
assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient to prove ownership.
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before filing, it
goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an
imperfect title, over the property before they lost their Philippine citizenship.
#22 Republic vs CA and Naguit
Section 14(1) merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
There are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True,
the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the
Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that
"alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." Clearly,
the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property
by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later
than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and
exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with
coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms
its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to
the application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
#23 Palomo v. Court of Appeals
The adverse possession which may be the basis for the grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the
public domain.
Forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it to private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
The principle of estoppel does not operate against the Government for the
acts of its agents.
#24 Bracewell v. Court of Appeals
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land, and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be
since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in said law.
When the conditions set by the Public Land Act are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued.
#25 Republic vs CA and Bernabe
Said lot was declared public land by virtue of a court decision which has become
final and as held by the Supreme Court aforesaid decision is res judicata. It is
therefore beyond question that the trial court has no jurisdiction to reopen the
cadastral proceeding and the decision therein rendered is null and void ab initio.
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of
forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest
land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the
power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
Even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private
respondents have not qualified for a grant under Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
141, the facts being that private respondents could only be credited with 1 year, 9
months and 20 days possession and occupation of the lots involved.
If a decree issued in pursuance of a valid decision, obtained by fraud, may be
annulled within one (1) year from entry of said decree, there is more reason to hold
that the same is true if entered in compliance with a decision suffering from a fatal
infirmity, such as want of due process, or lack of jurisdiction of the court that
decided the cadastral case. Thus, on both counts, the case at bar can properly be
the subject of review, it having been shown that the Solicitor-General was not
properly furnished the requisite notices and copy of the assailed decision but more
importantly, the lower court had no jurisdiction to re-open the cadastral proceeding.
In the case at bar, it will be noted that in granting titles to the land in dispute, the
lower court counted the period of possession of private respondents before the
same were released as forest lands for disposition, which release is tantamount to
qualifying the latter to a grant on said lands while they were still non-disposable.
#26 Susi v. Razon
Petitioner Susi has been in open, continuous, adverse and public
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of a certain parcel of
land since 1880. Then the Director of Lands sold the said land to the
respondent by virtue of an application for purchase filed on August 15,
1914. The court ruled that by the time the respondent filed his application
for purchase the petitioner has already possessed the land for thirty-four
years, the petitioner already had a right over the land. By that time ,the
land ceased to be public and therefore removing it from the disposition of
the Director of Lands therefore making the sale between the Director of
Lands and Razon invalid.
#27 Musina vs Sonza
If by legal fiction, plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of
the State, it follows that the same had ceased to be part of the public
domain and had become private property and, therefore, is beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and
the original certificate of title covering said lot issued by the Director of
Lands in favor of defendants can be said to be null and void, for having
been issued through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.
Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a
motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by
the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory that
a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud
one year after the issuance and entry of the decree, which theory does not
apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and
has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the opinion that the
trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a
chance to prove his claim. It would have been more proper for the court to
deny the motion on the ground that its object does not appear to be
indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial
court.
#28 Republic vs IAC and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lucena
A determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of
the registration proceedings must be made. If they were then still part of
the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other
hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition
against their acquisition by private corporation or association obviously
does not apply.
The doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable
public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property.
There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its incorporation
is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal
property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private
corporation because whether or not it be so treated as such, the
Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.
The lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time
the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979.
#29 Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao vs Land
Registration Commission
The power of a corporation sole to purchase real property is not restricted
although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes is. If corporations sole
can purchase and sell real estate for its church, charitable, benevolent, or
educational purposes, can they register said real properties? As provided
by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes me be subject of
registration (section 69, Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole to
register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be
issued in its name.
Corporation sole in the Philippines are mere administrators of the
"temporalities" or properties titled in their name and for the benefit of the
members of their respective religion composed of an overwhelming
majority of Filipinos.
It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole is composed of
only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese (2) the
corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the
temporalities located in the territory comprised by said corporation sole;
(3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the faithful
residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the
latter, as such, has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent
Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management or
administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the
faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
#31 Director of Lands vs IAC and Acme Plywood
Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, only Filipino citizens or natural persons
are allowed to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land.
The conditions as specified in the [Section 48(b)] are complied with, the possessor
is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent
and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
Confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character
and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested.
The land was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by
Acme. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were
brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that
law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper, This
Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot
impair vested rights.
#32 Meralco vs Castro-Batolome
As between the State and the Meralco, the said land is still public land. It would
cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the
Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be
dismissed.
"The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate
predecessors-in-interest are or constitute a grant or concession by the State; and
before they could acquire any right under such benefits, the applicant's immediate
predecessors-in-interest should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of
such benefits.
"The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of the land of which they
had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the applicant's immediate
predecessors-in-interest (meaning the Piguing spouses in the instant case) failed to
do.
"They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title which was
transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be called, is their
possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors-in-interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as
the applicant who is disqualified."
#33 Republic vs Villanueva
"No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area." The right of an
occupant of public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under section
48(b) of the Public Land Law is a "derecho dominical incoativo" and that before the
issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true
owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
#34 Republic vs Iglesia Ni Cristo
A corporation sole, (1) it is not entitled to register lands under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law, which refers only to Filipino citizens, and (2) that it is disqualified
under section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution to hold alienable public lands
except by lease.
#35 Natividad vs CA and Republic
Determinative of this issue is the character of the parcels of land whether
they were still public land or already private when the registration
proceedings were commenced. If they were already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against acquisition by a private corporation would
not apply.
The parcels of land in question had already been converted to private
ownership through acquisitive prescription by the predecessors-in-interest
of TCMC when the latter purchased them in 1979. All that was needed was
the confirmation of the titles of the previous owners or predecessors-in-
interest of TCMC.
Being already private land when TCMC bought them in 1979, the
prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain except through lease did not apply to
them for they were no longer alienable lands of the public domain but
private property.
The Director's contention that a corporation may not apply for confirmation
of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, the Public Land Act,
was disposed of in the Acme case where this Court ruled that the defect in
filing the confirmation proceedings in the name of a corporation was simply
an "accidental circumstance, . . . in nowise affecting the substance and
merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings."
#36 Republic vs CA and Baloy
Private land could be deemed to have become public land only by virtue of
a judicial declaration after due notice and hearing.
Without a judgment or order declaring the land to be public, its private
character and the possessory information title over it must be respected.
Since no such order has been rendered by the Land Registration Court it
necessarily follows that it never became public land thru the operation of
Act 627.
Clearly, the occupancy of the U.S. Navy was not in the concept of owner. It
partakes of the character of a commodatum. It cannot therefore militate
against the title of Domingo Baloy and his successors-in-interest. One's
ownership of a thing may be lost by prescription by reason of another's
possession if such possession be under claim of ownership, not where the
possession is only intended to be transient, as in the case of the U.S.
Navy's occupation of the land concerned, in which case the owner is not
divested of his title, although it cannot be exercised in the meantime.
#37 Ayog vs Cusi
Said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Bian Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired
a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took
effect.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the
issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the
public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process.
Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the defendants in the
ejectment suit. Nor do they derive their right of possession from the said
defendants. Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land distinct
and separate from the portions occupied by the said defendants.
We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners who
were not defendants in that litigation or who were not summoned and
heard in that case. Generally, "it is an axiom of the law that no man shall
be affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger".
The constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to
stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no retroactive
application to that case and does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to
enforce that judgment.
#38 Santa Monica Industrial and Devt vs CA
The Republic has failed to make out a convincing case for the annulment of
the decree in Land Registration Case No. 6431. It has been established
that the land registration court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of
land.
Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act was the law applicable to De
Perio's petition for confirmation of his title to the two (2) parcels of land.
A person who had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of public agricultural land for a period of at least
ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904 could petition for the confirmation of
his title over the land he had so possessed and occupied.
Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land was released in
1961. In a few more months, the possessors of the land would acquire title
to the portions they adversely possess through acquisitive prescription,
without need of title or of good faith, pursuant to the Civil Code.
#39 Zara vs Director of Lands
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for
registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial
confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claims based on adverse and
continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although
they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a
bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the
proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had
constructive notice of publication.
Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view
of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public
land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed
or foreclosed by such declaration, for precisely the proceeding
contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141
presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial
confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately
owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by
reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant.
#40 Diector of Lnads vs CA and Pastor
The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the
application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral
proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated
in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act. A judicial declaration
that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant
from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same
land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land
remains alienable and disposable.
#41 Republic vs CA and Tancinco
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the
names of the private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of
the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified as property of the public
domain. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act.
The adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names
of the private respondents is null and void.
#42 Ignacio vs Director of Lands
The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or
deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was
caused by action of the Manila Bay.
Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the
executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in
question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for
special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership.
"The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore
by accretion, without previous permission from the proper authorities,
although the occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen
years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer,
inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to
the national domain; it is intended for public uses and for the benefit of
those who live nearby."
#43 International Hardwood and Veneer Co. vs UP
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more
specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of
petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself
of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to
the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the
existing concession.
The right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired
or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the
Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were
effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the
above transfer of full ownership.
Forest charges due from and payable by petitioner for timber cut pursuant
to its License Agreement ]within the area ceded and transferred to the
University of the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall be paid to the
University of the Philippines.
#44 Republic, rep by the Mindanao Medical Center vs CA
Proclamation No. 350 legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical
Center of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial registration under the
Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" title
or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. It proceeds
from the recognized competence of the President to reserve by executive
proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific public use
or service.
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful
settlement on them can be acquired. The claims of persons who have
settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is later
included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are
usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issues a
proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all persons to depart
therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in such lands by
a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of
purchase. And patents for lands which have been previously granted,
reserved from sale, or appropriated, are void.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp
site" was executed between Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut, such
donation would anyway be void, because Eugenio de Jesus held no
dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in
1936. In that year, Proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already
withdrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved it for military
purposes
The right granted to the sales awardee is only "possessory right" as
distinguished from "proprietary right," for the fundamental reason that
prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration thereof, title to
the land is retained by the State. The mere desistance of the sales
applicant to pursue the requirements called for would cause the virtual
revocation of the donation.
#45 Republic vs Doldol
Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is
alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the
disputed lot since his occupation of the same started only in 1959, much
later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set by
law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question
as to segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore,
assert a right superior to the school, given that then President Corazon
Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.
The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers
no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of
the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public,
or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government
of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a
settler. Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no
lawful settlement on them can be acquired.
#47 Director of Lands vs Reyes
Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration
proceeding. A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not
final is a nullity, that a decree shall be issued only after the decision
adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of
said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding
certificate of title.
The original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, which must be
approved by the Director of Lands, was not submitted in evidence. The
submission of such plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by the
Director of Lands, the same are not of much value.
It cannot be claimed that the registration of possession has been legally
converted into a registration of ownership because Melecio Padilla had not
complied with the requirements of Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage
Law. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and
the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as
to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the
statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against
the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the
same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
constitute a grant from the State.
Lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land
grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible. Section 48[b] of CA No, 141, as
amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forest are excluded. 33 It is well-settled that forest land
is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be
one issued during the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens
system of registration, nullifies the title.
#49 Mendoza vs CA
Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the
registration of the land subject matter of a registration proceeding in the
name of the buyer or of the person to whom the land has been conveyed
by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of
the application for registration and the issuance of the decree of title.

The law does not require that the application for registration be amended
by substituting the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has been
conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the
"person to whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case.
He may thus be a total stranger to the land registration proceedings. The
only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to
the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be
considered in relation with the application; and (2) that prior notice be
given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied
with.
The only ground upon which a decree of registration may be set aside is
fraud in obtaining the same. What the applicant-petitioner actually invokes
in this case is not fraud in obtaining the decree of registration but the
alleged failure of the vendees-respondents to pay the purchase price of the
landholdings. "(B)reach of contract is not a ground for a petition for a
review. And the registration court has no jurisdiction to decide the
contentions issue of whether or not the deed of sale should be rescinded
for the alleged failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price. The issue
on the breach of contract has to be litigated in the ordinary court."
#50 Lopez vs Enrique
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person
whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system
in anothers name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible
and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held
free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an
ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land
registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the
property has not passed to an innocent third person for value.
A party declared in default loses his standing in court. A party in default
cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be entitled to notice.
A party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the
court, unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the
grounds.
In land registration cases, an order of general default was deemed to have
been issued based on the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings.
Records disclosed that without first filing a motion to lift the order of
general default, petitioners filed a motion to declare as null and void the
decrees and titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court,
petitioner could not be considered as a party to the action. They are
deemed movants whose personality as far as the case is concerned is not
yet admitted by the court considering that the order of default has not
been lifted. By filing their motion to have the decrees and the
corresponding certificates of title declared void, they took the role of
oppositors to the application for land registration.
#51 Republic vs Manna Properties Inc
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land
registration court. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and
copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA. This involves a
process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation. The
facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date
was set beyond the 90-day maximum period.
Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from
the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that
open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private land.
Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms
the earlier conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having
occurred in law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete.
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-
in-interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in
question since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply
for confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of
Lands v. IAC, Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for
judicial confirmation of the land without need of a separate confirmation
proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first.
The land in question has not become private land and remains part of the
public domain. Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine
that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Any applicant for
confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is
qualified to have the land titled in his name. Although Section 48 of CA 141
gives rise to a right that is only subject to formal recognition, it is still
incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open, continuous and adverse
possession for the requisite period of time. It is only when the applicant
complies with this condition that he may invoke the rights given by CA
141.
#52 Director of Lands vs CA and Abistado
Publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the
land registration court. Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial
hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of
which must be complied with. Land registration is a proceeding in rem.
Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in
the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise
imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed
provision.
#53 Republic vs Marasigan
Since the requirement therein of service of notice of the initial hearing to
the adjoining owners and the actual occupants of the land was not
complied with in this case, the court below did not, therefore, acquire
jurisdiction over the petition for the reconstitution.
The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting
and service of the notice as directed by the court "are mandatory and
jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render all proceedings
utterly null and void.
In so far as publication is concerned, there is sufficient compliance if the
notice is published in the Official Gazette, although the law mandates that
it be published "once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines." However, publication in the latter
alone would not suffice. This is to accord primacy to the official publication.
#57 Republic vs Maxino
In this case, where it is contended that the registration is void allegedly
because public forestal land was registered and the State sought to declare
the decision void, the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes
or errors of its agents.
The area registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not
alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation.
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a
title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the
Torrens system, nullifies the title. Possession of public forestal lands,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
Spanish titles are not indefeasible. The instant case bears similarities to
Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where
an adjustment title issued in 1896 was held to be void because it was
fraudulent and it covered public forestal land not subject to registration.
Presidential Decree No. 892 effective February 16, 1976 discontinued the
use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.
#58 De Castro vs Marcos
An order of court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to
make it include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new
publication is made as a preliminary to such step" and that "additional
territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new
publication." Upon the other hand, the jurisdiction of a court to issue
orders providing for exclusion of land included in the original plan is not
affected by failure to order a new publication.
In sum, the subject matter of the petition for reopening - a parcel of land
claimed by respondent Akia - was already embraced in the cadastral
proceedings filed by the Director of Lands. Consequently, the Baguio
cadastral court already acquired jurisdiction over the said property. The
petition, therefore, need not be published.
Persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and have
applied with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary
personality to oppose registration. An award under a sales application has
"the effect of withdrawing the lands of the public domain that were
`disposable' by the Director of Lands." Under Republic Act 931, the petition
for reopening is possible "only with respect to such of said parcels of land
as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government."
#59 Republic vs CA and Arquillo
Republic, or its government is usually not estopped by mistake or error on
the part of its officials or agents. It is settled that forest lands or forest
reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property.
When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a
particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry
should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it
may be stated, should and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the
opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry
matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General
for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence, will not
stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
The possession of the subject properties by the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest has commenced since time immemorial while the
alleged Presidential Proclamation No. 338 was issued only on October 24,
1938. Granting in gratia argumenti that the land sought to be registered in
fact lies within in Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve, private
respondents' rights cannot be prejudiced. ". . . While the Government has
the right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a private
individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior
to such classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by
after-events which could not have been anticipated.
#60 Valisno vs Plan
There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at
bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b]
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d]
there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action.
The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido
Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a
difference in parties between the two cases.
Between the two cases there is identity of causes of action because in
action reinvidicatoria, possession is sought on the basis of ownership and
the same is true in registration cases.. In both cases, the plaintiff and the
applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in
question. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is
directed against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the
exclusion is directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of
action remains the same.
#61 Ong Ching Po vs CA
Save in cases of heredity succession, no private lands shall be transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands in the public domain.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire
lands of the public domain".
Aliens \, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from
acquiring private lands. Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen;
therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property.
Assuming that the genuineness and due e Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a
Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning
real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution of Exhibit
"B" has been established, the same is null and void, it being contrary to
law.
Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance. When the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot clearly be inferred." If what petitioners meant was that private
respondent never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was
because her family had settled in Iloilo.
#62 Republic vs CA and Lapina
It matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the
subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession.
Private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the
time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired
vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept
of owner and the prescribed period of time held by their predecessors-in-
interest under the Public Land Act.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of residential
land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino
citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in
question. What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private
land, they could apply for registration. Considering that private
respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their
application for registration of title must perforce be approved.
#64 Moss vs Director of Lands
The proclamation of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946 did not impair
Moss' proprietary rights over the said land because the 1935 Constitution
provides that upon the proclamation of Philippine independence "all
existing property rights of citizens or corporations of the United States shall
be acknowledged, respected, and safeguarded to the same extent as
property rights of citizens of the Philippines"
Since Moss and his predecessors in interest have been in possession en
concepto de dueo of Calumpihan Island for more than thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of his application for confirmation of his
title, he is entitled to the registration of his title to the island.
#65 De Castro vs Tan
Independently of the doctrine of pari delicto, the petitioner cannot have the
sale annulled and recover the lot she herself has sold. While the vendee
was an alien at the time of the sale, the land has since become the
property of respondent Joaquin Teng, a naturalized Philippine citizen, who
is constitutionally qualified to own land.
The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no
longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized
citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There
would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania
to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.
#66 Barsobia vs Cuenco
There should be no question that the sale of the land in question in 1936
by Epifania to Ong King Po was inexistent and void from the beginning
because it was a contract executed against the mandatory provision of the
1935 Constitution, which is an expression of public policy to conserve lands
for the Filipinos.
The litigated property is now in the hands of a naturalized Filipino. It is no
longer owned by a disqualified vendee. Respondent, as a naturalized
citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. There
would be no more public policy to be served in allowing petitioner Epifania
to recover the land as it is already in the hands of a qualified person.
#67 Vasquez vs Li Seng Giap
In the United States the rule is that in a sale of real estate to an alien
disqualified to hold title thereto the vendor divests himself of the title to
such real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the
latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate and
the vendee may hold it against the whole world except as against the
State. It is only the State that is entitled by proceedings in the nature of
office found to have a forfeiture or escheat declared against the vendee
who is incapable of holding title to the real estate sold and conveyed to
him.
However, if the State does not commence such proceedings and in the
meantime the alien becomes naturalized citizen, the State is deemed to
have waived its right to escheat the real property and the title of the alien
thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its conveyance or
transfer to him. The rule in the United States that in a sale of real estate to
an alien disqualified to hold title thereto, the vendor divests himself of the
title to such real estate and is not permitted to sue for the annulment of his
contract, is also the rule under the Civil Code. Persons sui juris cannot,
however, avail themselves of the incapacity of those with whom they
contracted.
#68 Relosa vs Gaw Chee Hun
The contract in question does not come under this exception because it is
not intrinsically contrary to public policy, nor one where the illegality itself
consists in its opposition to public policy. It is illegal not because it is
against public policy but because it is against the Constitution. Nor may it
be contended that to apply the doctrine of pari delicto would be
tantamount to contravening the fundamental policy embodied in the
constitutional prohibition in that it would allow an alien to remain in the
illegal possession of the land, because in this case the remedy is lodged
elsewhere. To adopt the contrary view would be merely to benefit
petitioner and not to enhance public interest.
#69 Cabanatuan vs Uy Hoo
When both parties are guilty, neither of them can recover what he may
have given by virtue of the contract, nor enforce the performance of the
undertaking of the other party". We can, therefore, say that even if the
plaintiffs can still invoke the Constitution, or the doctrine in the Krivenko
case, to set aside the sale in question, they are now prevented from doing
so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily parted
with, because of their guilty knowledge that what they were doing was in
violation of the Constitution.
As this Court well said: "A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a
court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The law will not
aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them."
#70 Phil Banking Corporation vs Lui She
A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving
an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted
Philippine citizenship.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a
piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise
dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that
the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner
divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus
possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to
dispose of it (jus disponendi) - rights the sum total of which make up
ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow,
the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the
rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien.
The parties are in pari delicto they will be left where they are, without
relief. For one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a violation of
the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by
their administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt. As an
exception to the rule on pari delicto, that 'When the agreement, is not
illegal per se but is merely prohibited and the prohibition by law is
designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is
thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered."
The contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the land subject-
matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos
as represented by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
#71 Director of Lands vs CA and Bisnar
"The the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or
disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not the courts.
A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as forest
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral
court to register under the Torrens System. Section 48 (b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 applies exclusively to public agricultural land.
#72 Ramos vs Director of Lands
Under the doctrine of constructive possession, the general rule is that the
possession and cultivation of a PORTION of a tract under claim of
ownership of ALL is a constructive possession of ALL, if the remainder is
not in the adverse possession of another.
The claimant Ramos has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has
had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the
property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land
was for his enjoyment. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest
fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that the premises
consisted of agricultural public land.
When the claimant presents a title issued by the proper authority or
evidence of his right to the land showing that he complied with the
requirements of the law, the forest certificate does not affect him in the
least as such land should not be considered as a part of the public domain;
but when the alleged right is merely that of possession, then the public or
private character of the parcel is open to discussion.
Ramos has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked
registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of Section 54, of Act No.
926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and
the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and his possessory information.
#73 Director of Lands vs Funtilar
The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in 1940 of the land in
favor of the government. It would be rather absurd under the
circumstances of this case to rule that the government would order the
forfeiture of property for nonpayment of real estate taxes if the property is
forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida
Fernandez redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land of
the deceased in the possession of their family, thus continuing prior
possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more than the required
period.
The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact,
all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing
principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional
provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a
way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.
The land sought to be registered was declared alienable and disposable 33
years ago. It is not forest land. It has been possessed and cultivated by the
applicants and their predecessors for at least three generations.
#74 Laurel vs Garcia
The Roppongi Property is classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the
Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public
service (i.e., for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine
government). Accordingly, it is outside the commerce of man, and
therefore, cannot be alienated.
The fact that the Roppongi Property has not been used for a long time for
actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial
property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone especially if the
non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and
indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the
property. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on
correct legal premises.
Finally, under Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), conveyance of real property of the Government
must first be authorized by law. It is not for the President to convey
valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any
such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
#75 Tan vs Director of Forestry
Petitioner-appellant's timber license was signed and released without
authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is
therefore void ab initio. They had not acquired any legal right under such
void license.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still
respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license.
A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. A timber license is not a contract, within the purview of the
due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation". Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
#76 Yngson vs Secretary of Agriculture and NR
The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond
purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that all five
applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease
permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all five applicants filed
their applications.
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public
domain that until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and
alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has
authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond
leases, and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of
swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while
such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released
for fishery or other purposes.
#77 Big Wedge Mining Co. vs CA
The owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with
the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical
purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land
and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By
such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even
the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of
the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the
private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as
they did, to Benguet and Atok.
Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before
the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption.
Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of the
subject lot no matter how long did not confer upon him possessory rights
over the same.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in continuous and
exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral claim while private respondent's
possession started only sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house
thereon. Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private
respondent, Liwan Consi, the former being "the one longer in possession."
#79 Ankron v. Government of the Philippines
Act No. 926 only permits the registration of "public agricultural lands." It
must follow, therefore, that the moment that it appears that the land is not
agricultural, the petition for registration must be denied. If the evidence
shows that it is public forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for
registration must be denied.
The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it
is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other,
mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or
future value of the forestry and of the minerals. In order to be forestry or
mineral land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry
or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. The
courts, however, has the right to presume in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the
contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of
proof.
#80 Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila
Krivenko bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December
of 1941, the registration of w/c was interrupted by the war. In May 1945,
he sought to accomplish said registration but it was denied on the ground
that Krivenko is an alien. Krivenko then brought the case to the CFI of
Manila by means of a consulta. The court rendered judgment sustaining the
refusal.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands namely as agricultural, timber and
mineral since this was the basic classification existing in laws and
jurisprudence at that time. The phrase public agricultural lands includes
residential lot & their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. To construe
this phrase as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural,
the result would be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but also other forms of public
agricultural lands.
#81 Adez Realty, Inc vs CA
Finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. The decision therefore of the
Court of Appeals had attained finality, there being no appeal nor motion for
reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a
decision becomes final, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less
set aside the same.
Land registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam,
and therefore it is not necessary to give personal notice to the owners or
claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the courts
with power or authority over the res. Thus, while it may be true that no
notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial
reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to
a jurisdictional defect.
Petitioner's action to annul the order of the trial court allowing
reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said order,
which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court which reversal
became final and executory due to petitioner's failure to file an appeal
within the reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of
action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not
be twice litigated.
#82 Montano v Insular Govt
Government land and public domain are not synonymous items. The first
includes not only the second but also other lands of the government
already reserved or devoted to public use or subject to private right. The
government owns real estate which is part of the public lands and other
real estate which is not part thereof.
In order to avoid misapprehension, it was pointed out that public lands are
held to be equivalent to public domain, and does not by any means include
all lands of government ownership, but only so much of said lands as are
open to private appropriation and settlement by homestead and other like
general laws.
It was the object of the Congress not to work such a result but on the
contrary, in the furtherance of the purposes of the Treaty of Paris, to
recognize and safeguard such property. Therefore, Montano has acquired
the question lot on the strength of 10 years occupation based on Act 926 of
Philippine Commission.