Professional Documents
Culture Documents
License agreements arenot contracts within the purview of the due process and
thenon-impairment of contracts clauses enshrined in theConstitution.A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the dueprocess clauseit is only a
license or a privilege, which can bevalidly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or publicwelfare.
Republic v. Pagadian
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, through the DENR, executed an Industrial Forest
Management Agreement (IFMA), with Pagadian City Timber, for the former to develop,
utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays
Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the
production of timber and other forest products subject to a production-sharing scheme. The
Pagadians required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) was
approved by the DENR. But, the Subanen Tribe complained that respondents failed to
implement the CDMP, disrespected their rights as indigenous people and employed armed
men. This prompted DENR to issue an order creating a regional team to evaluate and assess
the IFMA. The DENR requested for a representative of Pagadian to appear before them, upon
compliance with which, a conference was held between the parties and they found
inventoried various equipment, seedlings, infrastructures, etc. and found that the area
covered was beyond that stipulated in the IFMA. An evaluation team was dispatched to the
area concerned for inspection and assessment, in the presence of the IFMA holder,
representatives, laborers and other personnel on the area. In the conduct of the same, the
team found that the mango seedlings are not satisfactory and they had failed to develop the
area. Finally, the team conducted an exit conference with the CENR Officer, and the IFMA
holder where the tentative and general findings of the evaluation and assessment was laid-
out and presented to the body. On the basis of their findings, the team required Pagadian to
explain why they failed to comply with the CDMP. But, because of the influx of more
complaints from the locals, DENR issued notice of cancellation to Pagadian because of their
failure to comply with the agreement. This was objected to by respondent and appeal was
made to the Office of the President. The order of cancellation was affirmed by the OP, but
was reversed by the CA.
Issues: W/N the IFMA is a privilege granted by the State, which may be revoked without
violating the non-impairment clause.
Held: Yes. The IFMA is a timber license, and as such, the non-impairment clause may not be
invoked in the present case. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause. Even assuming arguendo that an IFMA
can be considered a contract or an agreement, we agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that the alleged property rights that may have arisen from it are not absolute. All
Filipino citizens are entitled, by right, to a balanced and healthful ecology as declared under
Section 16,[29] Article II of the Constitution. This right carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment, particularly our diminishing forest resources. To
uphold and protect this right is an express policy of the State.The DENR is the
instrumentality of the State mandated to actualize this policy. It is "the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Thus,
private rights must yield when they come in conflict with this public policy and common
interest. They must give way to the police or regulatory power of the State, in this case
through the DENR, to ensure that the terms and conditions of existing laws, rules and
regulations, and the IFMA itself are strictly and faithfully complied with. The CA decision is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of the Office of the President is reinstated.
October 8, 2008
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes, respondents-claimants Mayor . Yap, Jr., and others filed a petition
for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proc. No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They
declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay
since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for
tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them. Respondents-claimants posited that
Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond
the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, they
had the right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation
of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the OSG, opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended. The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title
was governed by Public Land Act and Revised Forestry Code, as amended. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. The Republic then
appealed to the CA. On In 2004, the appellate court affirmed in totothe RTC
decision. Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence,
the present petition under Rule 45.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency the petition in the trial court, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island
partly reserved forest land (protection purposes) and partly agricultural land
(alienable and disposable).
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions
ISSUE: the main issue is whether private claimants have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay.
HELD: petitions DENIED. The CA decision is reversed.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land
of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines apublic forest
as a mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the
present system of classification for the determination of which lands are needed for
forest purpose and which are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands,
including those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber, such classification modified by the 1973 Constitution. The 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks. Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.Prior to
Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly
and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island
as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done
in Proclamation No. 1801.
NOTES:
2. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard
for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the
lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a
particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a
matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact
to be settled by the proof in each particular case
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.The discussion in Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may
also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature
or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or
timber land as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our
statutes. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal
status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to
determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and
other commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from
public forest to alienable agricultural land.
3. All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to
apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141,
as amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential,
commercial, and other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither
will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For
another, they may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title,
such as by homestead or sales patent, subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the
present land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the House of
Representatives.
Facts: An Igorot applied for the registration of a certain land. He and his ancestors
had held the land as owners for more than 50 years, which he inherited under Igorot
customs. There was no document of title issued for the land when he applied for
registration. The government contends that the land in question belonged to the
state. Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those
with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown.
Issue: WON the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the Regalian
Doctrine.
Held: No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his
land.
The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:
It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony or
memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
FACTS:This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title
thereto, pursuant to hismiscellaneous sales application. After approval of his
application, the Director of Lands issued an orderof award and issuance of sales
patent, covering said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds
thenissued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time, Lee Hong Kok
did not oppose nor fileany adverse claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant.
HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary
of Agriculture andNatural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate
of title issued pursuant to a void patent.This was not done by said officers but by
private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that thepatent and title issued
for the land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof
norhad they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings after claiming it
as their private property.The fact that the grant was made by the government is
undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformitywith the law or not is a question
which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the governmentand set
aside, the defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question
between the granteeand the government. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolutionof March 14, 1969 are affirmed.
Jun 8, 2008
Only the government can question a void certificate of title issued pursuant to
a government grant.
FACTS:
This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto,
pursuant to his miscellaneous salesapplication. After approval of his application, the
Director of Lands issued an order of award and issuance of sales patent, covering
said lot by virtue of which the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent. The Register of Deeds then issued an
original certificate of title to David.
During all this time, Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor file any adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant
HELD:
The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the
grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may
raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant cannot
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the
government.
FACTS:
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a Sales Patent issued by the
Bureau of Lands over two parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The
Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the ground that the lots were forest
lands and therefore inalienable.
ISSUE:
HELD:
The SC affirmed.
Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral
lands to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from
the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government. Even rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any
validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent is part of the
public forest.
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc.,
Etc.
PONENTE: J. Narvasa
FACTS:
The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela ordering the
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land
measuring 481, 390 sqm., acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial,
on October 29, 1962. This was accordingly only registered on July 17, 1982 long
after the aegis of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome (114 SRC 799)
should be overturned in light of jurisprudence.
Whether or not the provision barring private companies and associations from
purchasing public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is applicable retroactively.
RULING:
HELD. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Govt, to Susi v.
Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned the decision on Meralco v. Castro-
Bartolome, stating that a possession is said to be prescriptively acquired by the
operation of the Public Lands Act, upon conclusively presumed fulfillment of all the
necessary conditions for a Government Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively
ceased to be of the public domain and was therefore classified as private property
at the moment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged possession of
the bona fide right to ownership from Meralcos predecessors-interest. There being
no law prohibiting the sale of private lands to privately held corporations, the court
thus overturned the decision.
HELD. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the land held by the
Infiels since time immemorial was effectively deemed as private land, by the
operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the sale, ACME Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased private property. There being no ruling in
the 1935 Constitution prohibiting this sale, this was held to be valid.
NO. Acme had already obtained vested rights under the 1935 Constitution when it
purchased the land from the Infiels. The provision in the 1973 Constitution
prohibiting the purchase of alienable public lands by private corporations or
associations cannot be retroactively applied.
Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City
Regalian Doctrine
FACTS:
Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land, by virtue of which he was issued
an OCT.
Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question was no longer within the
unclassified public forest land because by the approval of his application for Free
Patent by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and disposable public
agricultural land. He also claimed that the land was a small portion of Lot 5139, an
area which had been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise clearly appearing to be
privately-owned are presumed to belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or
timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless
they under the Constitution become private properties. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition.
The task of administering and disposing lands of the public domain belongs to the
Director of Lands, and ultimately the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority
to do so.
In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear, positive and absolute
evidence to overcome said presumption and to support his claim.
Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land is of no moment,
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title issued under the Torrens System. The
indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured the
same by means of fraud. Fraud here means actual and extrinsic -- an intentional
omission of fact required by law.
Petitioner committed fraud by his failure to state that the land sought to be
registered still formed part of the unclassifiedforest lands.
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing
that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Basilan province, and
dismissing petitioner's complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of a
parcel of land with the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper
Baas, municipality of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 7.1248
hectares.
On October 17, 1986, petitioner acquired by purchase from the heirs of Pedro Mana-
ay a parcel of land located at Baas, Lantawan, Basilan Province, with an area of
6.0000 hectares, more or less, more particularly described as follows:
"A parcel of land, situated at Baas, Lantawan Basilan. Bounded on the North by
property of Alejandro Marso; on the East by property of Ramon Bacor; on the South
by property of Atty. Ricardo G. Mon and on the West by property of Librada
Guerrero. Containing an area of 6.0000 hectares, more or less."
On October 11, 1989, the Regional Director issued an order declaring that
respondent had waived his right of repurchase, and rejected his application for free
patent for lack of interest, and allowed petitioner to file a public land application for
the subject land.
On May 8, 1990, the Regional Director ordered respondent to vacate the land in
question, but respondent refused.
On July 24, 1990, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, a
complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with preliminary injunction of
the subject parcel of land.
In answer to the complaint, respondent alleged that the land occupied by him
belonged to the Republic of the Philippines, and that he had introduced
improvements thereon such as coconut and other fruit trees.
After trial on the merits, on March 20, 1993, the trial court rendered decision
declaring petitioner the owner and possessor of the subject parcel of land with all
the improvements existing thereon, situated at Barangay Upper Baas, municipality
of Lantawan, province of Basilan, with an area of 3.1248 hectares, and ordering
respondent to vacate the land in question, to pay petitioner the amount of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fee, the amount of five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, and three hundred pesos (P300.00) as judicial
cost.
In due time, petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals.
On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered decision reversing the
appealed decision, and entering a new judgment dismissing petitioner's complaint
without prejudice to any action that petitioner may take if the subject land was
declassified from forest land to alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the trial court's
decision in his favor and dismissing the complaint because when the Director of
Lands allowed petitioner to file a public land application for said property, it was
equivalent to a declaration that said land was no longer part of the public domain.
We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that "the evidence is
unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map
No. 1557 certified on August 13, 1951."[1] and, hence, not capable of private
appropriation and occupation.[2]
In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that "Forest lands, like mineral
or timber lands which are public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless
they under the Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and
rendered open to disposition.[3]
In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we said: Thus, before
any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from
the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain."[4]
Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[5]
And the rule is Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.[6]
What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner of the land in question
by free patent or other ways of acquisition of public land. Consequently, he can not
lawfully claim to be the owner of the land in question.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 42306, dismissing the complaint of petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court, Basilan province, in Civil Case No. 441-63.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner acquired by purchase a 6-hectare land located at Baas, Lantawan,
Basilan Province on October 17, 1986. However, said lot was applied with the
Bureau of Lands by respondent for a free patent. The same was dismissed by the
Regional Director of Lands for failure to exercise the right to repurchase and allowed
petitioner to file a public land application for the subject land. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession against respondent. The
trial court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner who was declared the owner and
possessor of the subject land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
appealed decision in finding that the land is within the forest reserve area, hence,
not capable of private appropriation and occupation. Hence, this recourse,
petitioner by claiming that allowance of the Director of lands to file a public land
application for said property is equivalent to a declaration that said land was no
longer part of the public domain.
Lands within the forest reserve are not capable of private appropriation and
occupation; that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest
land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes; and that
possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PUBLIC LAND ACT; LANDS WITHIN FOREST RESERVE, NOT CAPABLE
OF PRIVATE APPROPRIATION AND OCCUPATION. The Court of Appeals correctly
held that the evidence is unrebutted that the subject land is within the Forest
Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557 certified on August 13, 1951.1 and, hence,
not capable of private appropriation and occupation. In Republic vs. Register of
Deeds of Quezon, we held that Forest lands, like mineral or timber lands which are
public lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they under the
Constitution, become private properties. In the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause.
Facts:
PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement
(TLA) No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for
Mandamus
against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and
execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as thelatter has complied with all the legal
requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, asamended, into
an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for
Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969
Document signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated
Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP.
Issue:
Held:
NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract
within the purviewof the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus berevoked or rescinded by executive action.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protected bythe due process clause
of the Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No lawimpairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be
invoked.The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as
a contractual undertaking assuringPICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of
its concession areas. Such an interpretation wouldresult in the complete abdication
by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control andsupervise
the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources in the area
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence
and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner
also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of
the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the
Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.
Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic
repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and
simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution.
And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the
sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid
of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of
the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to
execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for purpose.
The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist
from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and
instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.
According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second
paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive
command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in
question.
The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the
equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of
national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of
foreigners.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be
interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it
does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to
foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is
estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew
the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
PALOMO v. CA
FACTS:
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.
Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the
defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act.
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate
taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of
P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
ISSUE:
HELD:
PONENTE: J. Aquino
FACTS:
The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an assessed value
of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, who had
consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3rd of July 1947, the original
owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for the confirmation of
title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The
Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the following contentions:
The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing spouses
for more than thirty years had essentially been converted to private land by virtue
of acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional prohibition banning a private
corporation from acquiring alienable public land is not applicable.
It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the Piguing
spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their
imperfect title to the land
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply for a judicial
confirmation of an imperfect/incomplete title.
Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private property is
contingent on the judicial confirmation of title.
RULING:
NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as a juridical person,
is disqualified from applying for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution
prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, not to exceed 1000 hectares in area. In fine, only natural persons and
citizens of the Philippines are allowed to apply for confirmation under the PLA.
NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private property is
contingent upon (1) fulfilling the necessary condition of possession by the
predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2) the judicial
confirmation of the title by the Court of First Instance. C.J. Fernando concurred with
the decision, but accepted that a conversion indeed took place.
HELD. This was maintained in the ruling of J. Aquino. C.J. Fernando, J. Abad Santos
and J. De Castro, concurred accordingly. J. Teehankee dissented and traced the line
of jurisprudence from Carino to Susi to Herico which maintained that the conversion
or acquisition effectively happens by the operation of law, ipso jure, as soon as it
can be conclusively presumed, juris et de jure, that all the conditions for the
confirmation of the grant have been met. According to his reasoning, upon the
fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions, the confirmation of an imperfect title is
only a formality.
Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986)
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and AcerInfiel, members of the Dumagat tribe
5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized
by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; GR No. 113472, December
20, 1994
(Land Titles and Deeds Aliens disqualified from acquiring public and private lands)
Issue: WON an alien may acquire lands in the Philippines by virtue of a Deed of Sale.
Held: No. Whether or not said deed of sale is genuine, the Constitution provides that
aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring
public lands, hence disqualified also in acquiring private lands.
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the public
domain.
EN BANC
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed
of donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino
citizen, conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2,
block 48-D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered
religious organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of
Chinese nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese
nationality, founder and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in
behalf of the latter and its trustees.
The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consultato the IVth Branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the
Rizal Register of Deeds, saying:
The question raised by the Register of Deeds in the above transcribed consulta is
whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious
organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens should
be registered or not.
It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a religious
organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are all Chinese
citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the provisions of the
sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines limiting the
acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which is owned by such citizens
adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of Deeds of Manila, the deed of
donation in question should not be admitted for admitted for registration. (Printed
Rec. App. pp 17-18).
Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy
Siu Si Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the
land in question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271
of the old Philippine Commission, providing as follows:
SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the
name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App. p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion
clause of our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].
We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the
absolute terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No.
271 of the old Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the
Constitution was enacted, in so far as incompatible therewith. In providing that,
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not
suffice to escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members
are of foreign nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is
obviously to ensure that corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural
land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of
the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the
freedom of religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means
convinced (nor has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession or worship; or that one may not
worship the Deity according to the dictates of his own conscience unless upon land
held in fee simple.
1967 SEPTEMBER 12
FACTS:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenza were the owners in common
of a piece of land in Manila.
The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese, lived with his
family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the
property, having a monthly rental of P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as
her sister died with no other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the
time 90 years old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative
to live with, but she was taken cared of by Wong.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the Lessee to her," Justina
Santos executed on November 15, 1957, a contract of lease in favor of Wong,
covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion fronting
Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the lessee was given
the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the monthly rental was
P3,120. Ten days later (November 25), the contract was amended so as to make it
cover the entire property, including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos
stood, at an additional monthly rental of P360.
On December 21 she executed contract giving Wong the option to buy the leased
premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000.
The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship,a petition for
which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one extending the term
of the lease to 99 years, and another fixing the term of the option at 50 years. Both
contracts are written in Tagalog. In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959,
she bade her legatees to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but
in a codicil of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of
heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of
machinations and inducements practised by him, she now directed her executor to
secure the annulment of the contracts.
Both parties however died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on
December 28, 1964. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant
in this case, While Justina Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking
Corporation. Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the Philippine Banking
Corporation that the lease contract should have been annulled along with the
four other contracts because it lacks mutuality, among others
Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw
from this agreement." It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the
Civil Code which provides that "the contract must bind both contracting parties; its
validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them."
ISSUES:
2. (RELATED, but Consitutional Issue) Was the contract between Wong (Lui She) and
Justina Santos (Phil. Banking) enforceable?
RULING:
1. Yes. In the early case of Taylor vs. Uy Tiong Piao, the Supreme Court said:
Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment
to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition
permitting the cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation,
as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the
contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of
cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall
exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any
other act which may have been the subject of agreement. Indeed, the cancellation
of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand is fulfillment
Further, in the case at bar, the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to
terminate it was so circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said
that the continuance of the lease depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term
had been fixed in the agreement, this case would at most justify the fixing of a
period but not the annulment of the contract.
But if an alien was given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of
land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his
property, this to last for 50 years, then it became clear that the arrangement was a
virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divested himself in stages not only
of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus
abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponendi) rights the sum
total of which make up ownership. It was just as if today the possession is
transferred, tomorrow, the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until
ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien.
And yet this was just exactly what the parties in this case did within this pace of one
year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a
hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien
landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
The contracts in question are annulled and set aside; the land subject-matter of the
contracts was ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by
the Philippine Banking Corporation.