OTH 94 458 UPDATE OF THE UKCS RISK OVERVIEW Prepared by DNV Technica Limited Palace House 3Cathedral Street London SEI 9DE HSE BOOKS Health and Safety Executive - Offshore Technology Report© Crown copyright 1995 Applications for reproduction should be made to HMSO First published 1995 ISBN 0-7176-1003-9 This reportis published by the Health and Safety Executive as part of a series of reports of work which has been supported by funds provided by the Executive. Neither the Executive, or the contrac- tors concerned assume any liability for the report nor do they necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Executive. Results, including detailed evaluation and, where relevant, recommendations stemming from their research projects are published in the OTH series of reports. "Background information and data arising from these research projects are published in the OTI series of reports.FOREWORD In 1986 the Deparment of Energy commissioned a project with the aim of gaining an overview of risk levels in the offshore industry on the U.K. Continental Shelf. In 1992 Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Sufety Executive considered it appropriate to commission a reassessment of this earlier overview, hereafter referred te as “the study’. The reasons fur ihe reassessment included: + Following the Piper Alpha disaster account needed to be taken of chunges in the design and layout of existing and new facilities. + There had been a significant change: in offshore activity in the interim. + Techniques applied in risk assessment studies had progressed significantly in the interim, ‘The purpose of the study was to provice an input into the development of Offshore Safety Division's risk based reseasch strategy. With tbis aim in anid te study approuch was targeted al a high level overview of hazards and risks on generic installation types, rather than in-depth analysis and assessment of specific facilities and operations. Jn this respect the approach was substantially simplified from that which would be appropriate in complying with the provisions of the Offshore Installations {Safety Case) Regulations 1992, The study specifically considered those hazards which appeared mast likely to initiate events and/or dominate risk levels based on historical experience on the UKCS and worldwide, The study did nothowever exclude potential major hazards on the UKCS ‘where historical data are lucking, Reflecting the Health and Safety Executive's mandate, most attention has been paid to the tisk of personnel, specifically from muajor hazards as defined in the Offshore Installations (Safery Case) Regulations 1992. The study however has also addressed occwpational and helicopter transportation accidents, Ln addition to evaluating risks to persons consideration has been given to the risk of material damage, the risk of production interruption and the risk of oil spills, all from major hazard accidents. “The study has specifically excluded the hazards and risks arising from: + Combined Operation . + Accident crew members on Supply Vesscls, Standby Vessels and Shuttle Tankers. + Onshore construction activities and tow-out of fixed instaliations + Onshore activities even whare they are related to offshore activities, ‘The study was completed in mid 1992, Since then there have becn a number of important events which it was felt should be included within an update of the study, for example the relevance of the effects of Hurricane Andrew and the damage caused to installations in the Gulf of Mexica. In addition some of the incident and accident databases used within the study have been the subject of further review and update. ‘The study was therefore updated in 1994 and it is the ‘updated study” which is presented in this report, ‘The data, models and assumptions which have been used throughout the work gre subject to uncertainty and the predicted risk levels, as with any risk analysis, are sensitive to the data utilised. A review of the uncertainty associated with the base case anulysis is dius included in the report.‘The basis for the updated stady is set out in a number of appendices where a significant quantity of incident and accident data ase presented and interpreted. ‘The data and the interpretation presented are appropriate fur the context of this particular piece of work. They will not necessarily he appropriate for detailed analyses of individual ions undertaken by dutyholders for presentation as part of specific regulatory sequirements. The report ix made aveitable by the Flealth and Safety Executive as part of a series of reports of work which have been supported by funds provided by the Executive. Neither the Executive, nor the contractors concerned asswne any liability for the report nor do they necessarily reflect the views or policy uf the Executive. Healih und Safety Executive Offshore Safety DivisionCONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background 1.2 Objectives 1.3. Study Scope 1.4 Report Steucture 2. STUDY METHODOLOGY 2.1 General Introduetion 2.2. Method Adopted in this Study 2.3. Installation Types 2.4 Hazards Identified 2.5 Frequency Estimation 2.6 Consequence Assessment 2.7 Risk Compilation and Assessment 3. RISK MEASURES AND RISK CRITERIA 3.1 Risk Measures 3.2. Risk Criteria 4, RESULTS 4.1 Hazards Assessed 4.2 Risk to Personnel 43. Risk of Material Damage 4.4 Risk of Production Loss 45 Risk of Environmental Pollution DISCUSSION 4.1, Comparison with Historical Experience 5.2. Sensitivity Analysis 5.3 Main Factors Influencing Risk 5.4 Comparison with Risk Criteria 4,3 Comparison with Last UKCS Overview (1986) 5.6 Comparison with Previous QRAS of Generic Platforms 5.7 Recent Developments and Future Trends 5.8 Further Work Page 19 19 19 19 21 2 2, 24 24 25 25 26 2 20 ea 3 31 3 50 50 33 53 53 56 60 6b 62 63 656, CONCLUSIONS 6.1 Risks to Personnel 6.2 Risks of Environmental Damage 6.3. Risks of Economic Toss 6.4 Uncertainties REFERENCES: APPENDICES APPENDIX REVIEW OF UKCS OFFSHORE FACILITIES APPENDIX I REVIEW OF ACCIDENT DATA SOURCES APPENDIX IT REVIEW OF ACCIDENTS IN UKCS APPENDIX IV RISK ANALYSIS OF EACH HAZARD APPENDIX V DESCRIPTIONS OF ACCIDENTS IN THE NORTA SEA. 69 vie 70 m 8 on 1 135 2sEXECUTIVE SUMMARY Background and Scope In 1986, Technica carried out a tisk overview of the offshore industry on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS), on behalf of the Department of nergy. Since that study there have been changes, both in the installations present on the UKCS, and in risk assessment techniques. In addition, Piper Alpha, the worst offshore accidont so far, occurred on the UKCS in 1988, ‘Thus, in 1992 the Offshore Safety Division of the. HSE considered thal it was appropriuie (o carry oul a reassessment of overall risk ievels. Revisions of the 1992 study have now been made to incorporate some new sources of dala. ‘The updated risk overview, presented in this report, is intended to act as one input into the development of the HSE’s research strategy on Offshora safety. ‘As with the 1986 risk overview, risks to personnel, equipment, production and the environment were all considered. Reflecting the HSE's mandate, however, most attention was paid to the risk to personnel. The long term effects on health were not studied. Unlike the original 1986 report, occupational accidents and helicopter crashes into the sea were considered as well as major accidents on installations. Study Approach Broadly speaking, the study used two complomentary approaches to arrive at risk estimates for the UKCS. A detailed review of incidents on the UKCS was carried aut, to provide information on the fatalities, the material damage, the production losses and the oil spills which have occurred in the last 10-20 years. However, basing present estimates and future predictions of risk only on past UKCS incidents, docs not provide a complete picture of all the possible ways in which incidents might occur, For example, there have been no structural failures leading Wo the total loss of afixed installation on the UKCS; it would, however, be wrong to infer that such an incident could never occur, Many of the hazards which were analysed are likely to give rise to low frequency, severe consequence events; these might not occur om the UKCS for long periods of time, To supplement the historical review, arisk assessment of each identified hazard was therefore carried out, For some hazards, where significant UKCS-specific data were available (e.g. occupational accidents), the assessment was heavily reliant on this data, For other hazards, where little orno UKCS data existed, worldwide data (suitably modified) were used. ‘This worldwide data included overall North Sea experience, such as the Alexander Kielland disaster, and Gulf of Mexico experience. When even worldwide data were sparse or inapproprinte, more theoretical methads had ta he used; these incorporated subjective judgement as well as past experience of offshore risk analysis. The significant uncertuintios which such judgements iniroduced were analyzed by means of sensitivity tests, It ig important fo distinguish between the approach adopted in this risk overview and the data and techniques which should be used in « Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of a specific installation. In a QRA of an individual installation, important detailed features (such as topsides layout, safety and cmcrgency systems, details of the structure, etc) should be taken into account, Numerous accident scenarios, tailored to the actnal installation, should be evaluated in.such an assessment,In this overview, only “broad-brush” risk assessment was practicable, The intention was (o estimate overall risks on the UKCS and average risks for instalation types ‘The results should therefore not be regarded as a substitute for a QRA of a specific installation, Hazards Assessed Besed on historical experience and previous risk analysis, the following hazards were identified as bving most likely to initiate events that would dominate overall risks: + Blowouts and weil control problems, + Riser and pipeline releases, + Process events - hydrocarbon leaks from topsides equipment, leading to fires of explosions, + Collisions between ships and installations. + Structural events (inciuding semi submersible instability problems). + Holicopter aceidents - mechanical failure or pilot ertor, + Diving accidents - equipment malfunction or diver exror. + Occupational accidents, + Storage and loading incidents, Risk Measures, ‘The following incasures of risk have been used in this study Risk to Personnel Risks to groups of personnel have been measured ia terms of F-N curves und Annual Fatality Rate (APR). Au F-N curve shows the estimated frequency, F, of N or more fatalities plotied against N. Thisis a usefu! means of shoving the relative frequency of low fatality events (@.g. those killing 1 or 2 people) to high fatality events (e.g. those killing 160 people or more), AER (also known as the expected raic of death or potential loss of life, PLL) is the long-term average sumniber of fatalities per year due to a particular cause, AFRs are useful in this risk assessment as they can be conveniently broken down by hazard type and by installation type to determine the major contributors to risk, Inaddition to group risks, individual risk has also been estinated for different categories of offshore workers. This is the probability of death per year for a person. The Faral Aceldent Rate (FAR) is alsa measure of individual visk, but expressed as the probability of desth per J0* hours offshore. Risk of Material Damage This has been assessed in terms of financial loss. Hrequencies of events (F) causing more than certain thresholds of macerial damage cost (C} have been estimated and presented as im F-C curve (the equivalent of the F-N curve above). In addition, « Jeng-term average financial loss por yea: through material damage has been derived.Risk of Production interruption/Loss ‘This has been assessed in terns of deferred production which can be converted into financial loss. ‘The frequencies of events per year (F) causing deferred production in excess of a given size D are shown as an F-D curve. Annual production loss has also been determined, RisktoEnvironment ‘The frequencies of spills per year (F) exceeding a given size S, are shown as an T-S curve, In acdition, average anual accidental release of oil is presented, Risk Results Risks to Personmel The best estimate of the current Annual Fatality Rate (AFR) for the UKCS is 20 per year, From a simple consideration of the most significant uncertainties, the actual ABR is predicted to lie in the range of R-40. ‘The predicted F-N curve for the UKCS is shown in, Figure 1,compared to the historical distribution (1977-1992). It is predicted that fatal events (those killing 1 or more persons) will occur about 6 tines u year un average. Events killing 10 or more pecple are predicted 10 occur about once every 4 years on average and events: killing 100 or mote persons every 20 years, There is the potential for an event causing several hundred deaths; this could arise from flotel capsize, or irom storms or earihyuakes aifecting several installations. The frequency of such events is very difficult to predict, and hence only a dotted line is used in Figure | to indicate the potential for very high fatality events, ‘The average individual risk for an offshore worker on the UKCS, arising from all hazards, is estimated a5 6.1 x 10 per year (FAR = 18). ‘The main contributors to the APR are predicted to be process events, occupational accidents, structural events and helicopter crashes, These account for almost 90% af the estimated fetality rate, Table 1 shows the AFR broken down by initfating hazard, Tho relative contributions are shown in the pie chart in Figure 2. The helicopter component has beon divided into fatalities due to mnectunicat failures and pilot error, Occupational and diving accidemts are removed in Figure 3 to illustrate the major hazard risks.FIGURE 1 ¥-N CURVE FOR UKCS OVERALL 10: ABA 49d SOMBIE FLOW] JO NI JO “baa 0.0: 1000 00 1 10 I Number of Fatalities (N)‘TABLE 1s UKCS FATALITY RATE BY INITIATING HAZARD HAZARD FATALITY, FATALITY RATE, RATE PER YEAR PERCENTAGE Blowout 03 15 Riser/Pipeline 02 12 Process 38 287 Collision 7 83 Structural aT 18.2 Helicopter 33 16.2 Occupational 50 245 Diving 0. 15 Storage/Louding 0 0 TOTAL 20.4 100 Inaddition to analysing the ATR in terais eFinitiating hazard, the proportion of people ‘Killed by the actual initiating event (c.g, fire or explosion), as opposed to those killed in the subsequent evacuation, eseape and rescue (FER), is also of intorost. Analysing the AFR in terms of the research eategories adopted by the HSB, it has been crudely estimateci that 75% of “isajor hazard” fatalities (ie. excluding occupational anc diving) are associated with EER, This cstimate is based on simple assumptions about the spilt between immediate fatalitiesund BBR fatalities; these assumptions are summarised in Table 2,FIGURE 2 PREDICTED FATALITY RATE RY INITIATING HAZARD Collision Structural 8.3% Helicopter (Pilot) 18.3% 3.7% Helicopter (Mech.) 124% Riser/Pipelines 1.2% Blowout 1.4% Occupational 24.5% Process. 28.7% Diving 15%FIGURE 3 PREDICTED FATALITY RATE BY MAJOR HAZARDS Collision Helicopter (Pilot) Structural Fixed 11.2% 5.0% 1.7% Helicopter (Mech) 16.8% Structural Mobile 7] Blowout we ~ 2.0% Riser/Pipeline 1.6% Process 38.8% ceeTABLE 2: ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT EER EATALITIES HAZARD PERCENTAGE PERCRNTAGE EER IMMEDIATE FATALITIES FATALITIES Blowout and Risers 50 50 Structural and Collision 10 90 Process xt 100-x * xis the percentage Killed by the initial fire or explosion and is inewdent specific ‘Table 3 shows the breakdown of AFR by HSE research categories, EER fatalities have been split between hydrocarbon events (blowonts, riser failuses and process events) and structural events/eollisions. TABLE 3: FATALITY RATE BY HSE CATEGORIES CATEGORY FATALITY FATALITY RATE PER RATE YEAR PERCENTAGE Well control 02 09 Pipelines Ol 07 Tises/Explosions 19 107 Collision U2 Lo ‘Structural Ol O4 Instability 03 17 Helideck 02 La Occupetional 5.0 288 Diving 03 17 EER, hydrocarbon 43 24.6" ER, struct /eollision 49 28.14 ‘TOTAL 174 100 » Based on assumptions in Table 2 The total fatality rate is less than that in Table 1, as helicopter crashes directly into the sca have been excluded. It should be noted that the estinmate of EER fatalities has been based on some very simple assumptions, and therefore has large uncertainties attached to it. [should also be realised that, for some: huzards, it may be much casior to reduce risk by limiting initiating events, rather than improving FER facilities. ‘This sould be borne in mind when using these figures as an input into prioritising research arens, 12Group and individual risks have teen estimated for a number of “representative” installations. Fixed installations on (he UKCS have been grouped into 5 categories: + Large, old-style (pre-|980) integrated platforms. + Large, modem integrated platforms, + Bridge-linkedi complexes, + Small, integrated platforms, + Unmanned platforms. In addition, mobile installations have been split into somi-submersible and jack-up drilling rigs and flotels. Table 4 shows the average numbers of people on board (POD) the representalive installations, the estimated faiality rate per installation year and average individual risks TABLE 4: RISKS ON REPRESENTATIVE INSTALLATIONS INSTALLATION POB AFR PER INDIVIDUAL | PAR INSTALLATION | RISK PER YEAR Lange, old, integrated 150 034 87%104 26 Laige, moclern integrated | 200 0.16 3.2 x 104 10 Bridge-tinked complex | 50 0.036 29x 104 9 Small integrated 45 0.046 3.9 x 104 12 Jack-up, drill 1 80 9.090 43x 104 13* Semi-sub, «brill rig 80 0.12 5.6.x 10% ype Flotel 340 oad 5.1 x 104 15* * These figures take no explicit account of combined operations Large, old-style platforms are predicted to have the highest group and individual risks, Thelarge number of people on flotels leads to high fatality estimates due to occupational, helicopter and structural accidents, The individual risks on the other installations are quite similar given the general uncertainties in the analysis. This similasily ig partly duc to the fact that helicopter and occupational risks averaged over the UKCS as a whole have been used [or each installation type. Tn reality, helicopter risks will be dependent on the numher and duration of flights that & person makes. Occupational risks can be expected to vary widely (between maintensnce activities and domestic work, for example), When helicopter and occupational risks are considered more realistically, the FAR is predicted to vary fiom 4-36 depending on platform type, Amount of helicopter travel and occupation. ‘The breakdown by installation type has been combined with the analysis of initiating hazards in Table 5, witich ranks important accident scenarios by fatality rate,TABLE 5: MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIOS SCENARIO FATALITY RATE PER YEAR Fire/Explosion on large, old integrated platform 5 Structural failure of semi-sub fiotel 18 ‘Structural failure of semi-snb crill sig 12 Collision with semi-sub drill rig 0.6 Collision with semi-sub flotel 0.6 Strectutal failure of jack-up drill sig os Collision with jack-up drill tig 03 “OVAL, 10.1 These particular scenarios are predicted to account for 70% af the total major hazard fatality rate, Process events, escalating to riser failures, on large, old, integrated platforms ate predictedto de the largest single contributor to the fatality rate; structural events and collisions with flotels and drilling rigs also make significant contributions. The structural failure of semi-submessible Motels and drilling rigs has been identified as an important are of uncertainty; if more pessimistic assumptions are used, the AFR due to this hazard shown in Table 5 could be considerably underestimated, Hrom consideration of total loss frequencies, crude estimetes for TR impaicment frequencies have been derived. These frequencies exceed |0-" per yeur for large, old integrated platforms and for mobile deilling rigs. ‘This indicates that these installation types inay have difficulty meeting the HSE eriterion fr impairment frequency, Risks of Material Damage Annual costs due to material damage in acciclents are estimated at about £80 million, The main contributors to this are process events, structural failures and blowouts: these three hazards are predicted 10 contribute over 86% to the overall damage costs. A curve showing the predicted frequency of events (F) causing more than C million pounds of damage, depicted in Figure 4, agrees well with the distribution of recorded historical eveats, Events causing more than £1 million of damage ate predicted 10 oceur approximately twice a year Events causing more than £10 million damage are. predicted us occurring less than once a yeas, and events ceusing more than £100 million damuge about every 10 years. 14FIGURE 4 F-C CURVE FOR UKCS, MATERIAL DAMAGE 100;- awoy 49g 180-9 Sutpasouy sueppsy ‘aay .01 0. 100 00 Damage Cost (million) 1 0.1 re}Risks of Deferred Production Figuro 5 is a F-D distribution showing the frequency of evemts per year (F) causing deferred production in excess of a given size D (measured in million barrels). ‘Lhe distribution has been based on historical records for the 16 year period 1976-91. The frequency of events causing more than 1 million baurels deferred production is about | per year. The frequency of evens causing more than 100 millicn barrels of deferred production is about 1 in 15 years. The average production delay during this period was 24.5 million barrels per year, of which 76% was altributable lo the Piper Alpha accident. Risks of Envirenmental Damage Figure 6 shows the frequency of spills per year (F) exceeding a given size S. This is based on a historical survey of UKCS experionce, supplemented by the results of a Quantified Risk Analysis (QRA} of blowouts. A spill of over 10 tounes is predicted to occur about twice a year and a spill of over 1006 tonnes about once every 5 years. The average mmber of spills during the 15 year period 1975-89 was 83 per year. The average total quantity spilled was 700 tonnes por year of which 28% came fiom the largest single incident, ‘The historical survey shows that process spills ae dominant overall; however, large releases are procluced more by spills of oil-based drilling mud, and spills from pipelines and oil storage, 16FIGURE 5 F-D CURVE FOR UKCS, DEFERRED PRODUCTION wag 42d ‘ord JC Suposoxg suds jo sbeag Deferred Production (million bbl) 7FIGURE 6 F-S CURVE FOR UKCS, OIL SPILLS (DEn STATISTICS) 4eax Jad azig Surpoooxg spuong “baag 000 Too00 100 1 Spill Size (omnes) 0 I 181 12 1.3 1. INTRODUCTION BACKGROUND Tn 1986, Technica carried out a sisk overview of the offshore industry on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) on behalf of the Department of Energy. Since that study, there have been changes both in the installations. present on the UKCS and in risk assessment techniques. In addition, Piper Alpha, the worst offshore accident so far, occurred on the UKCS in 1988. In 1992 the OffLore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) considered It appropriate to carry out a reassessment of averall risk levels, ‘This report contains the latest revisions to the 1992 study, incorporating some new sources of data OBJECTIVES “The main objectives of the study were: . ‘To estimate overall risk levels on the UKCS and to identify the main contributory factors. + Toaetas a usefitl input into the HSE’s development of research strategy for offshore safety. STUDY SCOPE This study covered the same four categories of risk as the 1986 report, namely: + Risk to personnel, + Risk of material damage - loss of, or damnage to, installations. + Risk to production - interruptions to production, major losses: of hydrocarbons. © Risk to environ rent = oil spills, Reflecting the HSE's mandaic, most attention was paid to the risk to personnel, Unlike the 1986 report, occupational accidents as well as major accidents were considered. However, the long-term healih effects were excluded, as were routine discharges to the environment. ‘The asseesment of offshore drilling and production activities included consideration of . ‘Fixed and mobile instaltations. + Diving activities. + Helicopter transport (unlike the 1986 report, the risks of flights from onshore bases out to the offshore fields were included). In such a wide-ranging study it was difficult to deoide where to draw the boundaries of the analysis, However, as in the last report, the following activities were excluded: 191.4 * All onshore construction activities and tow-out of fixed platforms. + Onshore activities (c.2, dhiving to the hell-port) even though they ate associated with offshore operations, + Accidents.cn supply vessels, siand-by vessels und shuttle tankers (fatalities on an offshore installation caused by a ship collision were included however). Tn addition, the special hazarcs associated with combined operations were not modelled explicitly, REPORT STRUCTURE ‘The study methodology is described! in Section 2, and a review of zclevant risk criteria is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 the main results of the study are presented; these are further discussed in Section 5. The principal conclusions oF th risk assessment are detailed in Section 6, ‘Supporting information to the teport is included in appendices. Appendix Lhas A review of the installations at present based on the UKCS. Appendix IT reviews the sources of risk data which are most important to this study. A historical survey of incidents on the UKCS is prasented in Appendix I]. Appendix IV contains the dotailed risk calculations for each hazard. Appendix V describes 4 number of accidents which have occurred in the North Sea, to provide qualitative background to the quantitative analysis, 2024 2. STUDY METHODOLOGY GENERAL INTRODUCTION Broadly speaking, the study used two complementary approaches to arrive at tisk estimutes for the URCS. A detailed review of incidents on the UKCS was carried ont, lo provice information on the fatalities, the material damage, the production losses and the oil spilis which have occurred in the last 10-20 years: ‘This review is presented in Appendix TIT. However, basing present estimates and futwe predictions uf risk only on past UKCS incidents, ces not provide 3 complete picture of all the possible ways in which incidents might occur. For exemple, there have been no structural failures leading to the total loss af & fixed installation on the UKCS; it would however be wrong to infer thal such an incident could never occur. Many of the hazards which were analyzed are likely to give tise w low frequency, severe consequence events; these might not occur on the UKCS for long periods of time, ‘To supplement the historical review, a risk assessment of each identified hazarc ‘was carried oul fo evaluate risks to personnel and equipment, This work is presented in Appendix IY. For some hazards, where significant UKCS-specific data were available (¢.g. occupational accicients), the assessment was heavily reliant on these data. For other hazards, where little or no UKCS data exists, worldwide data (suitably modified) were used. This worldwide data included overall North Sea experience, such as the Alexander Kielland disaster, and Gulf of Mexico cxperience. When even worldwide dala were sparse or inappropriate, more theoretivul methods had to be used: these incorporated subjective judgement as well as past experience of oflshore tisk analyses. The mncertainlies which such judgements introduced are anslyzed in Section 5.2 through sensitivity testing of eritical assumptions, It is important to cistinguish between the epproach adopted in this risk overview and the data and techniques which should be used in a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of a specific installation. In a QRA of an individual installation, important detailed features (such as topsides layout, safety and emergency systems, details of the structure, etc.) should be taken into account, Namcrous accident scenarios, specific to the aclual installation, should be cvaluated in such an assessment, However, in this overview, only “broad- brush” risk assessment has been practicable. The intention was 10 estimate overall risks on the UKCS, and average risks for installation types; the resulis should not be regarded as a substitute for a QRA of a specitic installation. The risks of oil spills and the risk of production loss, however, were treated in a different way. Tt would have heen time-consuming and complicated to use risk assessment techniques to analyse production interruption/loss as there is frequently little correlation between the damage caused by the event and the resulting production loss. For example, a relatively minot fie on Comoran A in 1989 Jed to buge business interruption, due to the critical position of this installation in the distrihution network, Conversely, s major event on a platform at the end of a pipeline link would only affect that platform's production, the overall results might be quite limited, Given the time constraints of this stucty, predictions for production loss/intcrruption were therefore based on the histozival experienee so far, as described in Appendix ITI. 212.2 Similarly, the oil spills study caried out for the Dutch Government (Ref. ‘Technica, 1992), reveated that a sophisticated risk analysis is required to predict polluiion arising fiom individual cvents. Thus, for this overview study, the UKCS historicat experience was used to predict presont and future oil spill risks, However, to date there have been no instances of blowouts on the UKCS causing signévicant pollution, Therefore, the risk ussessment of the blowout hazard (Appendix TV, Section 1V.1) was added onto the historical data for oil spills, It should be noted that pollution arising trom a structural failure of « floating storage unst (HSU) wes not explicitly considered, Future trends may cause this to be a more significant hnzard (see Scction 5.7), METHOD ADOPTED IN THIS STUDY. ‘The risk assessment was carried out using the seven-step approach illustrated in igure 2.1. Step 1 - Review of UKCS Facilities Data ware gathered concerning the offshore installations and pipelines ut present iccated on the UKCS. The main source of data was “The North Sea Field Development Guide" (Ref. OPL, 1992), supplemented by industry periodicals, ‘These data are presented in Appendia J, end summarised in the formafadatabase al (he end of that appendix, Step 2 - Review of Accident Data Sources of accident data relevant lv offshore activities on the UKCS were reviewed (Appenclix IN, ‘These form the main basis for the estimation of accident frequencies and consequences used in this analysis. ” Step 3 - Hazard Identification Based om historical experience and previous offshore risk analyses, those hazards considered most likely 10 dominate overall risks were identified. These ave detailed in Section 2.4, Stop 4 - Frequency Estimation For cach of the identified hazards, the frequencies (ic. the likelihood per year) of events were estimated. This process is desexibed in Section 2.5. Stop 5 - Consequence Assessment Based on historical data and, where necessary, subjective judgement, arange of event consequences (outcomes) was determined for each major event. These outcomes were then grouped together into broad categories (described in Section 2.6). Step 6 - Risk Compilation ‘The frequency estimates were combined with the assessment of likely consequences to determine risk levels (the details of this arc included in Appendix TV}. 2FICURE 2.1 STUDY METHODOLOGY REVIEW OF UKCS FACILITIES REVIEW OF ACCIDENT DATA HAZARD IDENTIFICATION FREQUENCY ESTIMATION CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT RISK COMPILATION RISK ASSESSMENTStep 7 - Risk Assessment 2.3 24 ‘The main contributory factors to overall risks in terms of hazards and installation types were identified. In addition, risks were compared to risk criteria. INSTALLATION TYPES ‘Thore ere a variety of fixed! installations on the UKCS, In order to make the risk assessinent manageable, the 122 fixed installations on the UKCS (as at the end of 1991), were split into brosd groupings: + Large integrated platforms, installed pricr to 1980 when less consideration was giver to the safety implications of layout and where evacuation fucililies are not as developed. 22 platforms have been allocated to this category with an average number of people on board (POB) of 150. + Large integrated platforms, installed after 1980, which incorporae mure up-to-date thinking on platfoun layoul und evacuation facilities. 11 plulforms have been allocated to this pronping. with an average of 200 POR. + Bridge-linked complexes. On the UKCS these are mostly gas complexes, end 30 have been assigned to this group with an average of 50 POB.. + Small imegrated platforms and “others” (e.g. Floating Production Units ete.); 20 have been assigned to this category with 45 POB on average, * Unmanned installations. There are 39 such installations un the UKCS. ‘The assumption that all large platforms installed after 1980 were betier designed with respect to safely is retner simplistic. However, a more sophisticated ‘categorisation was beyond the capability of this ovorview. In addition to the fixed installations, the following snobile installations were alsu assumed (o be preset on the UKCS (based on activity in July 1992): + 26 sem:-submersible drilling rigs, average POB of 80, + 20 jack-up drilling rigs, average POB of $0, + 10 flotels, 8 somi-submersible (average POB of 400) and 2 jack-up (POB of 80). Other vessels related to offshore activities were also present (such as crane barges, pipelaying barges, support vessels etc,), but these were outside the scope of the present analysis, HAZARDS IDENTIFIED ‘Those hazurds considered to be most critical were: + Blowouts and well control problems. + Riser and pipeline. releases, + Process events - hydrocarbon leaks from topsides equipment, lending fires or explosions. 2425 2.6 + Collisions between ships and installations. + Stuetural events (including scmi-submersible instability problems). + Helicopter avcidents, + Diving accidenis, + Occupational accidents. + Storage and toading incidents. ‘This list of hazards is slightly different from that used in the previous risk overview (Ref. Technica, 1986), Structural failares within design conditions and structural failures due to extreme environmental conditions have been included in a single category in this report, Such faifures se sometimes due to a combination of these factors, and it is often difficult to determine the underlying causes from the data. “Dropped objects” was a separate category in the previons study, but is now implicitly covered in the hydrocarbon events. Similarly, failures of drill sigs in transit have deen included in the structural ovents category, ‘The HSE has a number of research categories for offshore safety and these closely match the list of hazards above. The main difference in the HSE categorisation is thatstructural events are partitioned beiween structural events involving fixed platforms and instability of semi-submersibles. In additien, helicopter accidents are fimitedl to those which oocur on the plaiform (heli- deck), Evacuation, escape and rescue (EER) is also given a spectal category, although clearly itis related 1o the hazacds listed above, which can be causes of subsequent EER. FREQUENCY ESTIMATION For some hazards, UKCS experience was the main data source, e.g, (he AME repart on riser/pipeline failures (Ref. AME, 1993), In other cases, there is 60 little UKCS data (e.g, blowouts and structural failures) that frequencies were based on wider samples of North Sea and Gulf cf Mexico data. Frequencies were estimated for the different types of installation (.e. fexed platforms, mobile rigs, flotels). Calculation details are presented in full in Appendix 1V. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT ina general study such as this, only the most important factors could be taken into account in determining consequences. As an example of this, a sample event tree taken from Appendix IV (Figure 2.2), ilustratcs the main factors which are likely to determine the consequences and impact of a riser failure, ‘The material in the riser, the ignition (or not or the release, and the presence (or not) of SSTVs, will ail he critical factors. ‘The probabilities attached to the event tree branches are explained in Appendix IV. Clearly these are additional factors (such as the orientation of the relecsc) which arc important, bat these ‘wore t00 detailed to model in this overall risk analysis, ‘Where possible, actual accidents were used to indicate the impact of events. For example, Piper Alpha indicated that a major, ignited failure of a gas riser (without SS1V) was likely to lead to a high proportion of fatalities on an “old- style” integrated platform, and to (otal loss of the platform, 25a7 ‘Thus, igure 2.2 shows a figure of 75% fatalitics and total loss (TO) fir (his outcome. Where no accident-types have actually occurred, subjective judgement was used Ww eslinate consequences. ‘As the modelling for this risk overview was necessarily crude, consequences and impacts wore defined in a coarse fashion. ‘The aumber of fatalities (N) arising from each hazard wesc allocated (o the following categories: N 2-10. N=10 100, N> 100. ‘Tho material damage euused by events was broadly categorised as: * Total Loss (TO, 100% of installation value). + Severe Damage (SE, 20% of installation value). + Moderate Damage (DA, 2% of instatlation value), + Minor Damage (MI, 0% of installation value). The following costs were used for typical installations: + Large integreted platform £1,000 million. + Small integrated platform £250 malllion, ‘+ Platform in a bridge complex + Unmanned platform + Flotel + Drill sig £40 million, Multiplying the damage percentages by these costs led to damage cost estimates, (C) waich were divided into the following groupings: * C £100 million. ‘The sizes of oil spills in the bloweut risk assessinent were similarly grouped into spills of I tonne, 10 cannes, 100 tonnes and 1000 tonnes RISK COMPILATION AND ASSESSMENT The outputs of the frequency estimation and consequence assessinent were brought together o estimate risk results, The risk measures used in this study are descrihed in Sectien 3.1 ‘Tho main purpose of this study was to identify higher risk areas that may requite particular attention from the HST. Thus, the assessment stage involved ranking the main risk contributors. In addition, the HSE guidelines on impairment frequencies and risk tclerability were used (o assess risks; these are discussed in Section 3.2. 2nva aOVANVO we >VFTAOYYI BUMS Y3siy id 30 ON “8 60 0 oN e070 aA a bo "at 9000 aA 40 20 oz0 ON go WSL ’ 00 ON 0 S3A 01 £0. pod Sa, Auniavaoud saunvava W1OL GaLud Ass éNOUINDI az0 3dAL 351d TAIYTIVA WASNI AO SAWOOLNO TIAISSOd 277 TUNDLT S a3.4 3. RISK MEASURES AND RISK CRITERIA RISK MEASURES The following measures of risk have been used in this study: Risk to Personnel Risks to groups of personnel have been measured in terms of F-V curves and Annual Fauality Rate (AFR). An F-N cuvve shows the estimated frequency of N of more fatalities plotted against N. This is @ useful means of showing the telative frequency of low fatality events (c.g. those killing J or 2 people) to high fatality events (0.g. those killing 100 pecple or more). AFR (also known as the expected rate of death or potential loss of life, PLL) is the long-term average number of fatalities per year, due to a particular cause, ARS are useful in this risk assessment as they can be conveniently broken down, by hazard type and by installation type, to determine the major contributors to tisk. In addition to group risks, indiviclued risk has also been estimated for diffarent categories of offshore workers. This is the probability of death per year for a person, The Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) is also a measure of individucl risk, bbut expressed as the probability of death per 108 hours offshore. of Material Damage ‘This hus been assessed in terms of financial loss. Frequencies of events (F) causing more than cestain thresholds of material damage eost (C) have been estimated and presented as an F-C curve, (tae equivalent of the F-N curve above). In addition, a long-term average financial loss per yeur through material dumage bas been derived Risk of Production Interrnption/Loss ‘This has been assescod in terms of deferred production which can be equaled to financial loss. The frequencies of events por year (F) causing deferred prexhiction in excess of a given size D wre shown asanother F-D curve. Annoal priduction Joss has also been determined. Risk to Environment The frequencies of spills per year (F) exceeding a given size S, are shown as an FS curve, In addition, average annual accidental release of oil is presented. 3.2 RISK CRITERIA 3.2.4 Impairment Frequency Criterion In fine with a recommendation of the Cullen report, the HSE issued guidance on Temporary Refuge (TR) impaisment frequency in ity Offshore Installations (Safely Caso) Roguiations (IESE, 1992). The HSE caiterivn applies to events where the TR and associuted Sucilities fail to maintain their integrity for the fall period assumed in the design,‘The endurance time, and the criteria which constitute loss of intepcity, should ‘be specified by the operator. The HSE states that the operator should show that the frequency is as low as is reasonahly practicable, and in any event no {greater than 1 in 1,000 per year. Crude estimates have been made of the frequencies of events likely to cause ‘TR impairment for representative installations, and compated to this criterion, 3.2.2 Individual Risk Criteria No individual risk criteria have been developed by the regulatory authority for oifshore activities, Rather, companies are being encouraged to set their own goals within the frantework set out by the HSE (Ref. HSE, 1992). Mos: individual sick criteria have boen applied to onshore industries, An individual risk of 10” per year, .¢. an TAR of about 52, isused by the UR T1SE as a Lolerable limit for workers in high risk groups (Ref. HSE, 1987), This is pased on the risks of deep sea fishing (he riskiest industrial activity), and therefore seams somewhat high. The HSE probably only accept this in combination with their requirement that risks should also be madc as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) on cost-benefit grounds, which ensues that few tisks actually approzch this value. HSE also state that this criterion should apply to workers in the riskiest geoups in the relevant industries (Ref, HSE 1987). The context is the very small nuinber of workers whe have received high doses of ionising radiation in nuclear power stations. This may therefore be too high to apply to average offshore workers. An individual risk of 10+ por year, ic. an FAR of about 5, is used by the TIST as a Wulerable limit fur members of the public must exposed Lo industrial risks from neighbouring plants (Ref. HSB, 1987). These onshore FAR criteria should be divided by 2 before being applied offshore as offshove workers spend approximately twice as much time at their “workplace” (exposed to risk” as onshore workers. Thus, to meet the same individual risk criteria, FAR criteria for offshore workers should be half that for onshore workers, 3.2.3 Group Risk Criteria At present, there is little use of group risk ctiteria in the offshore industry. ‘Yhis study provides rough estimates of Annual Fatality Rates forrepresentative installations which could be used to indicate ranges for suitable criteria.4. RESULTS 4.1 HAZARDS ASSESSED Por the fixed platforms, all te Lutzurds listed in Section 2.4 have been assessed, For arilling rigs (semi-submersibles and jack-ups), however, the hazards of Process events and riser failures are not applicable. Any major hydrocarbon event on a drilling rig ie ussumed to be associated with a blowout. For flotets, all hydrocarbon hazards from neighbouring pla(forms are assumed 10 be cgligible compared to the other hazards, This is an important simplification, Combined operations is a subject worthy of a separate study (see Section 5.8). 4.2 RISK TO PERSONNEL 4.2.1 Group Risks Overall UKCS Risks From the risk analysis of each hazard in Appendix 1V, the frequencies of N or more fatalities have been determined. They are shown in Table 4.1 for the entire UKCS broken down by hazard. Tn addition, the annual fatality rate (AFR) for each hazard is shown, TABLE 4.1; UKCS FATALITY RATE BY HAZARD HAZARD, FREQ. OF NOR MORE FATALITIES PER YEAR |PATALITY RATE PER Nel Ne2 N-10 | N=100 YEAR Blowout 0.1128 | 0.0444 | 0.0057 | 0.0000 03 Risev/Pipeline | 0.0136 | 0.0134 | 0.0034 | a.o01n 02 Process 0.1310 | 0.0952 | 0.0897 | 0.0380 58 Collision 0.0385 | 0.0353 | 0.0293 | 0.0030 17 Stmaetural 0.2108 | 0.2108 | 0.0414 | 0.0092 37 Holicopter 0.5200 | 0.4550 | 0.1300 | 0.0000 3. Occupational | 4.4000 | 0.3750 | 0.0000 | 0.0990 0 Diving 0.2000 | 6.0260 | 6.0000 | 0.0000 . Siorage/Loading] 0,0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 on TOTAL 57 13 030 0.051 20,4 Itis predicted that over a long-term period, approximately 20 people a year will be killed from all the hazards considered, ‘The F-N curve corresponding to the total frequencies in Table 4.1 is shown in Figue 4,1, [tis predicted that fatal events (those killing 1 or more persons) will occur ahout 6 times a year on average. Events killing 1U or more people are predicted to occur about once every 3-4 years on average and events killing 100 or more persons every 20 years. 31FIGURE 4.1 F-N CURVE FOR UKCS OVERALL 10: s 2s Ss Teak Jsg SOMITE aa0py 10 Ni Jo bar 1000 100 10 ‘Number of Fatalities (N) a2‘The maximum fatality event cousidered in this amalysis has been the capsize of a flote! killing 240 persons, However, other events could be postulated which might kill even moze people, Some flotels have the capacity to accommodate 800 people. It is theoretically possible that ihe capsize of a Hotel with this numbor of people on beard could Kill many more than 240 people, In addition, there are a limited number of hazards which might affect sevetal installations simultaneously. A major storm in the North Sea could affect a large aroa; several installations could be alfect with large loss of life. As is mentioned in Appendix 1.5.4 earthquakes could also cause high fatality (high N) events by affecting several platforms at once. Within the timescale of this study, no appropriate method has been devised for quantifying such events. Further work to investigate the possible frequency of “high-N” events would be desirable. Towever, the dotied line in Figure 4.1 is intended to indicate that thete is chance of an event killing several hundred people, even though the frequency is very difficult to estimate. From Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 it can be seen that at be Low fatality end of the ‘curve, occupational accidents dominate. At the high fatality end, hydrocarbon events (and (0 a lesser extent, collisions anc structural failures) dominate the tisk, The overall fatality rate is determined dy process events, occupational accidents, structural events and helicapter crashes, with collisions also making, a significant contribution. ‘The relative contributions of the initiating hazards othe overall fatality rate are shown in the pie chart in Figure 4.3, The helicopter component has been divided into fatalities due to mechanical Failures and pilot error (Appendix IV. 6.4). In orderta illustrate the contributions to major hazard tisk, Figure 4.4 shows the split ignoring cecupationel and diving accidents, ‘The fatality rate due fo structural failures is split between fined plaUforms and mobile installations. From the sproadsheet ia Appendix V.5, the annual fatality tate due to structural failures of semi-submersible drilling rigs and flotels ts 3.0, The dalx sources is Seotion LV. 5.3 estimate tha’ 17% of semi-submersible failures are due tn ballast sysiem faults; hence, the AFR duo to ballast system events is estimated as 0.5 or 3% of total major hazard AER. Hshould be noted that although an eveut may be initiated by a process leak (for example}, the probability of escalation and event severity may depend on the Jayoutand protection of wellheads and risers, 1s well as the structural design of the installation. ‘This highlights the limitation of categorising events by a single initiating hazard.Freq. of N or More Fatalities Per Year FIGURE 4.2 CONTRIBUTION BY HAZARD TO F-N CURVE 3aFIGURE 4.3 FATALITY RATE BY INITIATING HAZARD Collision Structural 8.3% — Helicopter (Pilot) 18.5% | ‘ 3.7% Helicopter (Mech.) 12.4% Riser/Pipelines_ Blowout 1.4% Occupational ° 24.5% = Process Diving 28.7% 15% 35FIGURE 4.4 MAJOR HAZARD FATALITY RATE. Collision Helicopter (Pilot) Structural Fixed 11.2% — 5.0% 1.7% Helicopter (Mech.) 16.8% Structurat Mobile Bi 23.0% owout 2.0% Riser/Pipeline” 1.6% Process 38.8%‘The HSE have a number of research categories for offshore safety which have considerable overlap with the hazards considered in this study. The list of categories is as follows: * Well control incidents. Pipelines. Fires/explosions. Collision. Structural faitures, Instability of semi-submersibles. Helideck incidents: ng. + Evacuation, escape and rescue (EER). In order to dorive fatality rates for cach of the IISE categoris, the following simple assumptions wete made to estimate EER fatalities: * All the predicted delayed fatalities (ic. those people not killed by the initial fire or explosion) from process events were considered as BER fatalities > 10% of the fatalities in structural and collision events were assumed to arise from failing inte the water; the remaining 90% were considered as EER fatalities, + It wasassumed that 50% of fatalities associated with blowouts and risers ‘wore inunediate und 50% BER fatalities, Given the small contribution of these hazards to predicted risks, this split has no significant effect on the overall breakdown, ‘Thesc assumptions are summarised below in Table 4.2, TABLE 4,2: ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT EER HAZARD PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE EER IMMEDIATE FATALITIES FATALINES: Blowout and Risers 50 50 Structural and Collision 10 90 Process xe 100-x * xis the percentage killed by the initial fire or explosion and is incident specific Tt should be noted that this crude categorisation provides only a very approximate estimate for BER fatality rate. In addition, to bring the study's categorisation into line with the HSE, structural failures fatalities were partitioned into those associated with fixed platforins and jack-ups (Structural) and those associated with seini-submersible rigs and Motels (lusiabilily), 37‘The HSE categorisation also concentrates on helicopter accidents on the heli- dock itself, and discounts crashes into the seu. Of the 78 deaths in helicopter crashes on the UKCS between 1980-1992, only 6 were associated with a crash ‘onto the heli-deck. Thus, the overall helicopter fatality rate has been factored by 6/78, After these modifications, the following fatality rates have been derived using the HSE categorisation (Table 4.3}. TABLE 43: FATALITY RATE BY HSE CATEGORIES HAZARD FATALITY RATE PER YBAR Well control Os Pipelines G12 Fires/Explosions 1.86 Collision G7 Structaral oor Instability 030 Helideck 0.25 Occupational 5.00 Diving 0,30 Evacuation, o2 TOTAL 114 ‘The total fetatity rate is fess than that in‘Table 4.1, as helicopter crashes directly into the sea have been excluded, ‘The relative contributions of the categories in Table 4.3 are illusirated in the pie chart in Figure 4.5. Fatalities during EER are spilt between the initiating categories, hydrocarbon events and structural’ collision events, EER fatalities are predicted to be ahout 50% of the total fatality rate, and 75% of “major hazard’ fatalities (i.e, excluding occupational and diving accidents). It should be noted that for some hazards it would be sauch easier to reduce risk by Limiting initiating events than by improving FER facilities. Tn some situations (¢.g. structural collapse in severe weather), even excellent EER facilities would no: prevent heavy loss of life. This should be borne in mind when using such figures as cn input into prioritising research arcas. A farther point of interest in this study is to see the breakdown of overall fatality rete by installation type. ‘This is shown in ‘Table 44. The helicopter and oceupational fatalities have been distributed amongst the installation types by making the simplistic assumption that aecidents in these categories will be proportional to the number of people on the installations. In reality, certain inslallatiors are more hazardous; for example occupational accidemts are more likely on drifting rigs than on flotels. Fatalities on large, old, integrated platforms and on fictels are the major contributors to the overall fatality rate (alnost 60%). However, these installations also accoramodate a largo proportion of the offshore population. Thus, one needs to consides the group risks associated with representative installations to obtain a clearer picture of risk levels. This is covered in the following section, 38FIGURE 4.5 FATALII'Y RATE BY HSE CATEGORIES Evacuation ({Structural/Collision) Evacuation (Hydrocarbon) eee a “ v4 Structural sia ae Pipelines Helideck- “Dining ~Fires/Explosions Well Control Collision Instability Occupational 39TABLE 4.4: UKCS FATALITIES BY INSTALLATION TYPE INSTALLATION FATALITY RATE PER YEAR Lange, old, integrated Ta ‘Large, modem integrated 18 Bridge-linked complex MW Smallinegrated 09 Iack-up 18 Semi-sub 3.0 Plotel 44 TOTAL 204 Representative Installations Table 4.5 shows fatelity rates per installation-year broken down by hazard, Farality rates on large, oll integrated platforins and flotels again stand out as being relatively large. For the former installation type the main contribution is from process events. Fatalities associated with flotels are dominated by helicopter travel and occupational accidonts; this is duc to the large number of people on flotels compared to athcr installations. For the other fixed installations, accnpational, helicopter and process are all significant contributors. ‘Vee dominance of process events over all the other major hazards for fixed platforms is very sensitive to escalation probabilities which have considerable uncertainties attached to them. ‘The resulls of sensitivity tests, carried out on the relative iraportance of process events, are presented in Section 5.2. For drilling rigs, collision, structural, helicopter and acenpational all make sigaificant contributions.TARLE4.5: FATALITY RATE PER INSTALLATION-YEAR HAZARD. Sea TER INSTALLATION. Yi) —__| Large, ald |Large, mod] Bridge | Small Semi= | Flotel integr, | integt. | complex | inteyr. ‘D sub Blowout 0.0007 | 0.0007 | 0.0007 | 0.0007 10,0032 6.0082 | a Riser(Pipoline | 0.0062 | 0.0028 | 0.0012 | 0.0015) 0 | o 0 Process 0.2323 | 0.0316 | 0.0037 |o.0131) 0 | 0 Collision 0.0043 | 0.0043 | 0.6009 | 0.0027 | 0.0152]0.0215 | 0.0605 Structural 0.9063 | 0,0063 | 0.0007 | 0.0017 | 0.0233 ]o.0448 | 0.1839 Helicopter 0.0330 | 0.0441 | 0.0119 | 0.0099 | 0.0176 ]0.0176 | 0.0749 Gcoupational | 0.9531 | 0.0708 | 0.017 | 0.0159 | 0.0283]0.9283 | 0.1203 Stomge/Loading} 0 0 0 0 o | 0 0 TOTAL, 0336 | 0.160 | 0,036 | 046 [0.090] 0.117 | 6.440 ‘The breakdown by installation type has been combined with the analysis of in Table 4.6. TABLE 4.6 MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIOS jating hazards to rank accident scenarios by fatality rate. ‘This is showa in SCENARIO FATALITY RATR PER YEAR Fire/Explosion on large, old integrated platform 3d Structural failure of somi- 18 12 Collision with semi-cub deill zig 06 Collision with somi-sub flotel 06 Structural failure of jack-up exill rig 05 Collision with jack-up drill rig 03 ‘TOTAL 10.1 ‘These particutar scenerios are precticted to account for'70% of the toial major hazard fatality rate. Process events escalating to riser failures on Jarge old integrated platforms are predicted to be the largest single contributor to the fatality rate. Structural events and collisions with flotels and drilling rigs also make significant contributions. ‘The capsize of semi-submersible (categorised a3 astructural event) has becn identified as an important area of uncertainty; based on pessimistic assumptions, this hazard could have a major effect on the overall AFR, Group risks for installations can also be shown as F-N curves. Figure 4.6 shows curves for: A large, old integrated platform. A jack-up drill rig. A.somi-submersible drill tig. ay A largo, modern integrated platform.‘These have been chosen to show the range of risks that exist om fixed platforms and the differences between fixed and mobile installations. ‘The low-fatality onds of these curves are dominated by occupational accidents, Between 10- 100 fwtalities, process dominates for large, eld platforms; helicopter accidents for large, modem platforms, and helicopter and collisions for jack-ups (the zmigximum aumber of fatalities on u drilling rig has been taken as Ne4Q), Above 100 fatalities, procoss events dominate for large, ld platforms and structural events dominate for large, modem platforms. The frequency of events killing, over 100 people is predicted to be almost two ordeys of magnitude lower for modern platiorms; the simple modelling used in this study may exaggerate the difference betweon old-style and modern large platforms. 4.2.2 Individual Risks Based on predicted AFR of 20.4 and an offshore workforce of 33,200 (Ref. DTI, 1992), an avorage individual risk of 6.1 x 10 per year is estimated. Assuming an average time offshore of 20 weeks per year, this corresponds to a Patal Accident Rate (PAR) of 18 per [0 hours offshore. Fxclucling occupational risks reduces this figure 0 4.5 x }0"‘per year (FAR = 13), and further excluding helicopter risks reduces this to 3.5 x 10° per year (FAR ~ 10), Around these average values, variations are to be-expected depending principally on typc of installation, length and number of helicopter journeys and occupation, ‘The variation due to instailation type is shown in Table 4.7. This shows individual risks (assuming an average of 20 weeks offshore a year) excluding helicopter and cccupational risks. The FARs range from 19 for large, old intograted plaiforms down to 2 for bridge-linked complexes. ‘The FARs for the other installations vary from 3-10. TABLE 4.7: INDIVIDUAL MAJOR HAZARD RISKS BY INSTALLATION ‘TYPE (EXCLUDING HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS) INSTALLATION, INDIVIDUAL RISKPER FAR YEAR Large, old, integrate ax 104 19 Large, medlem integrated ae 10° 3 Bridge-linked complex 56x 107 2 ‘Small integrated Vrxio+ 5 Jack-up 2a 6 Semi-sub acto 10 Fhotel 98 x 104 8 There is no up-to-date information on numbers of personnel in different occupations offshore, and thus if is not possible to make accurate calculations of PARS for cach occupation. Table 4.8 shows individual sisks for oceupational accidents, ussucning that higher risk occupations, such as maintenance and construction, have an FAR that is an order of magnitude higher than relatively, safe occupations such as domestic work, gDFreq. of N or More Fatalities Per Year FIGURE 4.6 F-N CURVES FOR REPRESENTATIVE INSTALLATIONS ol O.01y- 9,001 0.00014-~ 1E-05 1 10 100 1000 ‘Number of Fatalities (N) + Forindication of uncertaimyy bunds, sec Figure 5.3. reyTABLE 4.8: INDIVIDUAL RISKS, OCCUPATIONAL, OCCUPATION INDIVIDUAL RISK PER FAR YEAR Average 15x10 45 Tigh risk, c.g. maintenance 3x10 9 Low risk, e.g, domestic 03x 104 09 Tadle 4.9 presents estimates for helivopler-related individual risks assuming. didfereat ampunts of helicopter travel. By combining the estimates from Tables 47, 4.8 and 4.9, overall individual risk estimates can be made for different combinations ot platform type, occupation and helicopter travel, Table 4.10 tokes average values for oecupational and helicopter risks and combines these with major hazard risks. TABLE 4.9: INDIVIDUAL RISKS, HELICOPTER AMOUNT OF TRAVEL INDIVIDUAL RISK PER | FAR YEAR Average, 20 x 2-hour trips par year 9.0x108 25 High, as above plus daily in-field travel 2.6 x 10% 8 Low, 20 x ',-hour tips per year 0.27 x 104 0.8 TABLE 4.10; INDIVIDUAL RISKS, OVERALL INSTALLATION INDIVIDUAL | FAR RISK PER YEAR Large, old, integrated 8.7 x 10° 26, Large, modem integrated 32x 104 95 Bridge-linked complex 2.9 x 104 9 Srnall intagrated 3.9 x 104 12 Jack-up, drill rig AB x 104 13 Semi-sub, drill sig 5.6.x 104 (7 Flotel Six 104 1s ‘The following cxamples indicate the extremes of individual risk which might be anticipated, ‘+ Large, old platform, maintenance, high tavel 1.2 x 107 ye! {FAR = 36), + Gus complex, domestic, low travel 1.5.x 10 yet (FAR = 4), Although these have been presented as “extreme” estimates, it should he noted! that major hazard risks have been averaged over all installation personnel equally. In fact, some personnel, ¢.g. drillers and some operating personnel, will spend Jonger periods of time in vulnerable Locations, and thus have higher than aycrage major hazard individual tisks..3 Impairment Frequencies Inotder u obtain some indication of impairment frequencies, it has been assumed that the frequency of total losses is approximately the samc as the frequency of impairment of the TR. Clearly this may be rather oplitnistic. as less severe incidents may also cause impairment; however, in a coarse study such as this, more accurate modelling is impractical. The. frequencies are shown in Table 41. TABLE 4.11; TOTAL LOSSAMPAIRMENT FREQUENCIES, HAZARD TO'UAL LOSS FREQ, (PER INSTALLATION-YR} Large, old |Large, mod | Bridgo | smott | Jack | Somi- intepr integr, | complex | intoge. | up sub Blowout Laat | U70xt0* | 1,70x10"|1,20x104 f1.79x109 RiserPipaline | 4.52% 10° ° L57x10“[3,95x105 | 0 Process 172x108 o 1.05x10]2.10x10¢] 0 Collision 2.20x10° | 220<105 | 1.45410°]1. 58x10 | 3,8x104 Structural — | 2.30810" | 230x105 | 2,30x10°]2.30x105 | 3.5x10? TOTAL, 2.0810" | 220107 | 6.0x10* | 6ox10+ | 5,2x109 4.3 Althongh this should only be taken as a general overview, Tuble 4.11 docs indicate that large old imegrated platforms and mobile installations may have difficultics mecting the HSE's “10° per year” criterion, Figuie 4.7 siiows the impairment frequencies for cach installation (ype. In the case of the old integrated platforms, the process huzard is the biggest contribntor. For mobile drilling rigs, blowouts, collisions and structural failuces are all important contributors For a floiel (wheiher semi-submersible or jack-up) the blowout hazard cen be eliminated; however, structural cnd eollision hazards could still pose relatively high frequencics of impaisment. The uncertainties in these results are dealt within Section 5.2, Itshould be noted that the loss frequencies de to collisions, ae only averages; actual loss rate for a specific installation will be dependent ‘on ifs tocation relative to shipping lanes, RISK OF MATERIAL DAMAGE ‘The risks of material damage are presented in Table 4,12. An annual damage cost af £80 million pounds 1s predicted. About half of this is predictod te arise from process events, with structural events and blowouts also appearing as significant contribuzors. The relative contributions are shown in the pie chart in Figure 4.8. 45Total Loss Frequency Per Year FIGURE 4.7 TOTAL LOSS FREQUENCES 0.008 000: 0.007 TR Impairment Criterion 0.001 Old Modem “Complex Small Jack-up Semi-sub Installation Type Blowouts Collision Risers Structural BEES Process Structural failure rate for jack-ups may be artificially high (see Appendix 1N5.4.2),TABLE 4.12: UKCS MATERIAL DAMAGE BY HAZARD HAZARD. FREQ. OFC ORMORE£ MILL. DAMAGE (¥R-1) | DAMAGE COST (YR-1) © Cal co | cs100 £MILLION Blowout 1.139 0.365 0.148 0.029 113 Riser/Pipeline D086 0.017 0.012 0.007 20 Process 1575 0.103 0.095 0.048 410 Collision 9.749 0.163 0.150 0,030 86 Structural 2.246 1.004 0.295 0.009 15.6 Helicopter ° 0 0 0 0 Occupational © 0 0 0 0 Diving © 0 0 0 0 Storage/Loading | 0.300 0.230 0.150 ° 37 TOTAL 15.1 19 09 Ot 82.3 Figure 4.9 shows the T-C curve, the frequency (E) of events causing C or more damage. Events causing more than £1 million of damage are predicted about 2Gmesa year. Events causing more than £10 million damage are predicted as accurring less than once a year, and events causing more than £100 million damage about every 10 years. Although collisions are shown as a big contributor at the low end of the curve, many of ese may not even catise £0.1 million damage, i.e. they may cause negligible damage. Stmctural events make an important contritution at the lower end of the curve, and process events at C=£100 million or more, ‘Table 4.13 shows the damage cost broken down by, installation type. Process events on large, old, integrated platforms and structural failures of jack-ups contribute almost 60% of the overall annnal damage costs, ‘TABLE 4.13: ANNUAL DAMAGE COST BY INSTALLATION TYPE INSTALLATION DAMAGH COST PRR YEAR (£ MILLION) Large, old, integrated 445 Large, modern integrated 33 Bridge-linked complex 32 Small integrated ay Unmanned SA Jack-up 11.0 Semi-sub 57 Fletel 19 Load Buoy a7 ‘TOTAL 823 AT