Marcos vs. Manglapus, [G.R.

# 88211 September 15, 1989 ]

Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile.
Corazon Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as
by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the
dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return
of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the
Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their
return to the Philippines.

Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the
Philippines. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a
clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements of due
process been complied with in the making of the finding?

HELD: Petition Dismissed.

The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions,
it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise
of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.

It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments,
and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and
respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision.
Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the
ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao,
Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate
the situation in the country.

Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only
now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy
attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still
here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has
barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth
stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M.

ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E.
MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively,
respondents.

RESOLUTION
EN BANC:

In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7),
dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at
the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and
welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former
President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the
remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such time
as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise
decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following
major arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny
them not only the inherent right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the
protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the
Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus,
petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the
necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M.
Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the Philippines,
and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the
remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion
for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts
that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return',
including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to destabilize
the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at
destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be
denied for lack of merit.

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the
movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the
decision of the Court.

2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the
Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to
warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.

The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed
the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the
destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the
basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming
that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and
declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p. 1;
Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]

3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive
power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986
to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those
relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power.

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing
new. This is recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the
distribution of governmental powers among three (3) separate branches.

Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement
cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in
[sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article
II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he
[article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as intended
merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the
rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of
the Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding
that the federal executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not
enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional text: the executive power was
given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as
appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The
language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent
power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all
powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so
that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless
there or elsewhere expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159
(1978).]

And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or
residual powers is tantamount to setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite
petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution
should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to
legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6 which provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency
or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular
National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his
judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the
necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the
land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987
Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to
Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express grant of power. It is not
implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of
legislation.

4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her)
oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to
bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present
time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence
of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in
arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

[G.R. No. 157684. April 27, 2005]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, petitioner, vs. PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L.

PEREZ, and IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the
disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its
face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions.
While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or
group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered
and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the
bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure
is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March
19, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 67720. The challenged
Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
CSC are hereby SET ASIDE.

The Department of Health is hereby ordered to:

1) Reinstate petitioners without loss of seniority rights but without prejudice to an

administrative investigation that may be undertaken against them by the DOH should the
evidence warrant; and
2) Pay petitioners their back salaries from the time their preventive suspension expired.
Mandatory leave credits shall not be charged against their leave credits.[3]

The Facts

The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:

[Respondents] are former employees of the Department of HealthNational Capital Region

(hereinafter DOH-NCR). They held various positions as follows: [Respondent] Priscilla B.
Camposano (hereinafter Camposano) was the Finance and Management Officer II,
[Respondent] Imelda Q. Agusin (hereinafter Agustin) was an Accountant I, and [Respondent]
Enrique L. Perez (hereinafter Perez) was the Acting Supply Officer III.

On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH
Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis (hereinafter the Resident Ombudsman) against Dir. IV
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents],
arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate
250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth P330,000.00 from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

On August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the

Secretary of Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty
and Grave Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-respondents.

On August 8, 1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the [respondents]
and their co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On
October 25, 1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No.
298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case
filed against the DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on October 26, 1996. The same
reads:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information and guidance, a certified copy of
Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996 entitled CREATING AN AD HOC
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST NCR HEALTH
DIRECTOR ROSALINDA U. MAJARAIS AND OTHER OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.

On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the
investigation, it issued a resolution on January 23, 1998 disposing [respondents] case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais,

Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting
Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply
Officer III, all of the Department of Health National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged
and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal
from the government service be imposed thereon.

SO ORDERED.

On April 20, 1998, President Ramos issued [Administrative Order No. 390 (hereinafter AO 390)]
that reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty
as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption, is meted the Penalty of dismissal from the service. The records of the case with
respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica,
Department of Health for appropriate action.

Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case
against [respondents] and [Horacio Cabrera]. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission Against

Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) dated 23 January 1998 on the above-captioned case,
respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting
Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply
Officer III, all of the Department of Health NCR are hereby DISMISSED from the service.

SO ORDERED.

On May 28, 1998 [respondents] filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. The
Secretary of Health denied the same on June 5, 1998. Thus, [respondents] filed a Notice of
Appeal on June 29, 1998.

On July 17, 1998, [respondents] filed their appeal with the CSC. The appeal was denied by the
CSC on May 21, 1999. Horacio Cabrera filed a separate appeal with the CSC which was denied
on August 17, 1999. [Respondents] motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30,
1999. While Cabreras motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000.
[Respondents], however, received the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on
November 2001. Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to [the CA] the CSCs resolutions
ahead of [respondents]. The petition of Cabrera was granted [by the CA] in a decision dated
October 15, 2001 with a dispositive portion which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission are hereby SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Horacio D. Cabrera is exonerated of the administrative charges against him. The
Civil Service Commission is hereby ORDERED[:]

(1) To reinstate petitioner immediately, without loss of seniority rights; and

(2) To pay petitioners back salaries from the time his preventive suspension expired.
Mandatory leave credits shall not be charged against his leave credits.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC (Civil Service Commission) of their appeal,
respondents brought the matter to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

While the herein assailed Decision made no reference to the separate appeal of Horacio
Cabrera, the CA nonetheless used the same legal bases for annulling the CSCs Resolution
against respondents.[5]

The appellate court held that the PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained
only to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the
charges against respondents.[6] Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGCs
findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative due process.[7]
Hence, this Petition.[8]

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following grounds for our consideration:

The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC) did not have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction
involving respondents.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to investigate and decide was
relinquished by the Secretary of Health and that the Secretary of Health merely performed a
mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of respondents from government service.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that an exhaustive investigation was already
conducted by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) which
resulted in the finding that the anomalous contract for the purchase of medicines without the
required public bidding is patently illegal.[9]

The second and the third grounds will be discussed together, as they are necessarily
intertwined.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Jurisdiction to Investigate

Executive Order (EO) No. 151[10] granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate
administrative complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and
corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is evident that EO 151 authorizes the
PCAGC to investigate charges against presidential, not non-presidential, appointees. In its
Preamble, specifically in its Whereas clauses, the EO specifically tasked [the PCAGC] to x x x
investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption x x x. More pointedly,
Section 3 states that the Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints
involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees x x
x. We quote the pertinent provisions below:

Section 3. Jurisdiction. The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative
complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential
appointees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations. (emphasis
supplied)

Section 4. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Commission shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(a) Investigation The Commission shall have the power to investigate administrative
complaints against presidential appointees in the executive department of the government,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, charged with graft and
corruption. In the exercise thereof, the Commission is (1) authorized to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, or take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation by subpoena ad
testificandum and subpoena duces tecum, and do such other acts necessary and incidental to
the discharge of its function and duty to investigate the said administrative complaints; and
(2) empowered to call upon and secure the assistance of any department, bureau, office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

The Commission shall confine itself to cases of graft and corruption involving one or a
combination of the following criteria:

1. Presidential appointees with the rank equivalent to or higher than an Assistant Regional
Director;

2. The amount involved is at least Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00);

3. Those which threaten grievous harm or injury to the national interest; and

4. Those which may be assigned to it by the President.[11]

The Commission may refer to the Office of the Ombudsman, when warranted and necessary,
any case calling for the investigation and/or prosecution of the party or parties concerned for
violation of anti-graft and corruption laws.

Administrative investigation of complaints against presidential appointees currently

undertaken by various presidential committees or government agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations shall continue notwithstanding the creation and
organization of the Commission. This, however, shall be without prejudice to the Commission,
in its discretion, taking over the investigation if the matter under investigation is within its
jurisdiction.

(b) Coordination The Commission shall coordinate with different government agencies for the
purpose of eradicating opportunities and the climate favorable to the commission of graft and
corruption. x x x.[12] (emphasis supplied)

On the basis of the foregoing verba legis approach, respondents claim that the PCAGC did not
have jurisdiction over them, because they were not presidential appointees.

The Court notes, however, that respondents were not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The
investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996,
which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the administrative charges filed against
Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin
and Enrique L. Perez.

The Investigating Committee was composed of all the members of the PCAGC: Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo, Commissioner Dario C. Rama and Commissioner Jaime L. Guerrero. The
Committee was directed by AO 298 to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40
of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), as amended. It was tasked to forward to the Disciplining
Authority the entire records of the case, together with its findings and recommendations, as
well as the draft decision for the approval of the President.

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law.[13] With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team
and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard to cases involving non-
presidential appointees was rectified in Executive Order No. 12,[14] which created the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). Non-presidential appointees who may have acted
in conspiracy, or who may have been involved with a presidential appointee, may now be
investigated by the PAGC.[15]

Second and Third Issues:

Validity of Health Secretarys Decision

The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under
the formers jurisdiction.[16] Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over
respondents.

Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of
the President, in line with the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint.[17] While the Chief Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless
recognized the health secretarys disciplinary authority over respondents when he remanded
the PCAGCs findings against them for the secretarys appropriate action.[18]

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to

investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based.[19] In the present case,
the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC.

Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO
298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited
to conducting investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to
impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior
to imposing penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal
principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones
case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be
substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving
at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of
the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the
decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and
the various issues involved.[20]

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present
factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health
secretarys Order dismissing the respondents thus:

ORDER
This refers to the Resolution of the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAG[C]) on the above captioned case dated January 23, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais,

Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, [Horacio] D. Cabrera, Acting Supply
Officer III, all of the Department of HealthNational Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged
and so recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal
from the government be imposed thereon.

Acting on the aforequoted resolution of the PCAGC[,] His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 390 dated [A]pril 20, 1998, resolving thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty
as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption, is meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. The records of the case with
respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica,
Department of Health for appropriate action.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission Against

Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) dated January 23, 1998 on the above captioned case,
respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II; Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting
Administrative Officer V; Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I; and Enrique G. Perez, Acting Supply
Officer III; all of the Department of HealthNCR, are hereby DISMISSED from the service.[21]

Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action
should be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and
investigated. However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authoritys prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this
requirement results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and
solely rely on an investigators recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the
evidence gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation,
and the livelihood of the person administratively charged.

In the present case, the health secretarys two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in
comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his
seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctors case. He
even noted a violation that had not been considered by the PCAGC.[22] On the other hand,
Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of
the Commissions Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the
recommendation with regard to Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.

The Order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration also failed to
correct the deficiency in the initial Order.[23] She improperly relied on the Presidents findings
in AO 390 which, however, pertained only to the administrative charge against Dr. Majarais,
not against respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive recognized that the disciplinary
jurisdiction over respondents belonged to the health secretary,[24] who should have followed
the manner in which the President had rendered his action on the recommendation.

The Presidents endorsement of the records of the case for the appropriate action of the health
secretary[25] did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. Like
that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual
finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for
their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.
To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents.[26]
However, this case merely authorized the delegation of the power to investigate, but not the
authority to impose sanctions. Verily, in requiring the disciplining authority to exercise its own
judgment and discretion in deciding a case, American Tobacco supports the present
respondents cause. In that case, the petitioners objected to the appointment of hearing
officers and sought the personal hearing of their case by the disciplining authority.[27] The
Court, however, sustained the right to delegate the power to investigate, as long as the
adjudication would be made by the deciding authority.

By the same token, the Constitution[28] grants the Supreme Court disciplinary authority over
all lower court justices and judges, as well as judicial employees and lawyers. While the
investigation of administrative complaints is delegated usually to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),[29] the Court nonetheless
makes its own judgments of the cases when sanctions are imposed. It does not merely adopt
or solely rely on the recommendations of the OCA or the IBP.

Inasmuch as the health secretarys twin Orders were patently void for want of due process, the
CA did not err in refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGCs (or the Ad Hoc Committees)
recommendations. Such a discussion should have been made by the health secretary before it
could be passed upon by the CA.

In representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that respondents are
guilty of the charges and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to
stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of respondents, but solely due process.

In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end does not justify the
means. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed.
This is the essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED in the sense that the authority of the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under
Administrative Order 298 is SUSTAINED. Being violative of administrative due process, the May
8, 1998 and the June 5, 1998 Orders of the health secretary are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let
the records of this case be REMANDED to the Department of Health, so that proper steps can
be taken to correct the due-process errors pointed out in this Decision.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
CARIO vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991

FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged
failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in
staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable
assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within
24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90
days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers
staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually,
Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of
Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue
of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually
elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass
actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with
it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this,
CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due
process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the
Commission is empowered to investigate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such
as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was
not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country,
or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law.
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH

Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the
Philippine blood banking system entitled Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood
Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were
supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-
based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks ; showing that the
Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. It was further found, among other
things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to
have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely,
malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those
donated to PNRC.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was then enacted into law on
April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. One of the provisions
of the said act was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from its
effectivity.

Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of
Blood Banks assail the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others that it is an
improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act
was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard
to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners
also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of
Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act
constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF

LEGISLATIVE POWER

Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not,
it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it
left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative
body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that
may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete
and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to
it.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is
clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the
health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these
is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a
definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that
is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through
voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the
Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to
execute the provisions of said Act. Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9
provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall be extended for another
two years until May 28, 1998 based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood
supply and demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the existence of facts and
conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can
be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and
discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority
or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission onAudit (2011) [Vital Role of the Youth]Petition:
petition for prohibition with preliminaryinjunction and temporary restraining order

DOCTRINE:
An institution that molds and prepares the youth tobecome model citizens and outstanding
leaders of thecountry through lessons in patriotism, civicconsciousness and moral values,
ultimately redounds tothe benefit of public welfare and the state. Theaforementioned
functions are undeniably sovereignfunctions enshrined under the Art. II- Sec. 13 of the
Constitution

FACTS:
-The BSP is a public corporation created under Commonwealth Act No. 111 dated October 31,
1936,and whose functions relate to the fostering of publicvirtues of citizenship and patriotism
and the generalimprovement of the moral spirit and fiber of the youth.-On Aug 19, 1999, COA
issued Resolution No. 99-011"Defining the Commission's policy with respect to theaudit of the
Boy Scouts of the Philippines" whichprovides for the conduction of an annual financial auditof
the Boy Scouts of the Phil. and the expression of anopinion on the fairness of their financial
statements. TheBSP shall also be classified among the governmentcorporations belonging to
the Educational, Social,Scientific, Civic and Research Sector.- The COA resolution stated that
the BSP was createdas a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No.111 and is a
government-controlled corporation. TheCOA Resolution also cited its constitutional
mandateunder Section 2 (1), Article IX (D).-On Nov. 26, 1999, the BSP National President
Jejomar Binay sought reconsideration of the resolution statingthat the BSP is not subject to the
Commission's jurisdiction because it is not a unit of the government.Moreover, RA 7278
virtually eliminated the "substantialgovernment participation" in the National ExecutiveBoard
and that the BSP is not as a governmentinstrumentality under the 1987 Administrative
Codewhich provides that instrumentality refers to "any agencyof the National Government, not
integrated within thedepartment framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law.-On July 3, 2000, Director Sunico, Corporate AuditOfficer of the COA, furnished the BSP
with a copy of the Memorandum that opined that the substantialgovernment participation is
only one (1) of the three (3)grounds relied upon by the Court in the resolution of thecase.
Other considerations include the character of theBSP's purposes and functions which has a
public aspectand the statutory designation of the BSP as a "publiccorporation". On the
argument that BSP is not "agovernment instrumentality" and "agency" of thegovernment, the
Supreme Court has elucidated thismatter in the BSP vs NLRC case when it declared thatBSP is
both a "government-controlled corporation withan original charter" and as an "instrumentality"
of theGovernment.-Upon the BSP's request, the audit was deferred for thirty (30) days. The
BSP then filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order before the COA.

ISSUES:
W/N the BSP is a public corporation and is subject to COAs audit jurisdiction.

PROVISIONS:
-
Commonwealth Act No. 111 (Boy Scout Charter),
or An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be Known asthe Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and
to Define itsPowers and Purposes: Section 3.The purpose of thiscorporation shall be to
promote, through organization,and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boysto do
things for themselves and others, to train them in scoutcraft, and to teach them patriotism,
courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now in common use
by boy scouts.-
Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides that COA shall have the power, authority,
and duty toexamine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to therevenue and receipts of,
and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to,
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters-
ART II-

Section 13 of the Constitution

. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in
the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs.
Article 44 of the Civil Code:
The following are juridical persons:(1)The State and its political subdivisions;
(2)Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have beenconstituted according to law;
(3)Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law
grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member

RULING + RATIO:
Yes. BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction. The
BSP is a public corporation whose functions relate to the fostering of public virtues of
citizenship and patriotism and the general improvement of the moral spirit and fiber of the
youth. The functions of the BSP include, among others, the teaching to the youth of patriotism,
courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, are undeniably sovereign functions enshrined
under the Constitution. Any attempt to classify the BSP as a private corporation would be
incomprehensible since no less than the law which created it had designated it as a public
corporation and its statutory mandate embraces performance of sovereign functions. The
manner of creation and the purpose for which the BSP was created indubitably prove that it is
a government agency. Moreover, there are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of
the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278,
Falls under the second classification
.The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to
implement a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution. Evidently, the
BSP, which was created by a special lawto serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional
mandate, comes within the class of "public corporations defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of
the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it.
DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.