Jennifer Delaney Final MADMS Thesis Aug 2009

The Unlikely Partnership: The State of the U.S.
-Saudi Relationship
Jennifer S. Delaney
Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies
Summer 2009
ii
We Certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, it is satisfactory in scope
and quality for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies.
Committee
Approved: Grace Cheng, Ph.D.,
Primary Reader 7/17/09
Approved: George Satterfield, Ph.D.,
Secondary Reader: 7/18/09

iii
Abstract
Until the 1990s most Americans were hard pressed to find Saudi Arabia on a
map of the world. The Gulf War propelled this Middle East nation onto American
television sets and into their homes. Books and magazine articles about the culture and
society lined book store shelves and documentaries found their way onto weekly
television line-ups. Saudis, for the first time, were introduced to mass American media
and the isolated bubble that they had created for themselves was suddenly burst as
hundreds of foreign soldiers flooded the country to halt Saddam Husseins advances.
Despite huge cultural and political differences both nations worked together and were
successful in pushing back Saddam Hussain. For a time, differences between the two
nations were put aside and Saudi Arabia was thought of as a solid American ally.
The events of September 11th 2001 shocked the world and brought the entire
U.S.-Saudi alliance into the spotlight. The fact that Osama bin Laden and the majority of
the hijackers were Saudi citizens made the public, the press and the government really
examine this relationship. What many Americans and Saudis were not aware of was the
history of the relationship or the extent of the alliance. This paper takes a closer look at
how the events of 9/11 affected this long time relationship. It identifies key elements,
which over the past 70 years have been the cornerstones of the relationship, to see
whether or not they have been changed by 9/11 and its aftermath. Hopefully, the paper
will give the reader a better understanding of the history of the U.S.-Saudi relationship
as well as the current status of the relationship.

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Table of Contents
Abstract iii
Table of Contents iv
Introduction 1
Part I: The Origins of a Friendship_____ 19
Chapter One: Introduction to the U.S.-Saudi Relationship 19
Part II: The Special Relationship 43
Chapter Two: Foreign Policy U.S.- Saudi Policy Objectives 43
Chapter Three: The Importance of Oil__________________________________________69
Chapter Four: The Need for Security__________________________________________89
Chapter Five: The Struggle Over Modernization_________________________________110
Part III: The State of a Partnership ______ 126
Conclusions: The Current State of the U.S.- Saudi Relationship ______ 126
Bibliography ________________________________________________________135
1
Introduction
Since 1943 I have considered the interests of my country and community to be the
same as those of the United States we differ in nothing basicafter Allah we trust in
America.
HRH King Faisal ibn Saud to Ambassador Hart in 1962.1
Given the events of the last decade the irony of this statement is not lost on most
people. These basic interests that King Faisal seemed to believe united America and
Saudi Arabia are not apparent to everyone. The differences between the two countries
and their cultures are enormous. Whole books have been written on the differences that
divide the United States and Saudi Arabia and just how dangerous these differences
are to the national security of both nations. To simply list a few: one country is
democratic and secular while the other is a theocratic monarchy. One prides itself on
the freedom of speech and press and the ability to criticize ones government, while the
other prides itself on following the guidance of religious leaders and a royal family.
Criticism is not something that is taken lightly in Saudi Arabia. As explained in the
Donald Carpenter book 101 Reasons Not to Murder the Entire Saudi Royal Family, The
masses in Saudi Arabia are not very open to freedom of speech of the type that we
have here in America. They probably would not be very open to allowing any sentiments
that opposed their religious tenets, or even to allowing for open criticism of the Saudi
Royal Family.2 One country supports Israel while the other is at pains to recognize its
existence. One supports the growing rights of women in politics and the business world,
1
(Posner 2005) (Stegner 2007) (Unger 2004) Hart, Parker T. Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of
a Security Partnership. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998.), pxvii.
2
Carpenter, Donald H. 101 Reasons Not to Murder the Entire Saudi Royal Family. (Xlibris Corporation,
2003.), 37.
2
while the other struggles with the idea that there is a role for women outside the home
and family. One champions human rights, while the international community has found
the others human rights record questionable. So what are these basic interests to
which King Faisal was referring? Are these countries which appear diametrically
opposed on paper really more similar than the average person would recognize at first
glance?
The remarkable alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is often referred to
as the U.S.-Saudi, special relationship. It has allowed Saudi Arabias ambassadors
unprecedented access to U.S. presidents and caused special offices in the United
States bureaucracy to be created. One such example is, Inside the Treasury
Department, to accommodate Saudi needs, the Office of Saudi Arabian Affairs was
established, the only such office for any foreign country.3
The attacks on September 11, 2001 brought into question the close nature of the
Saudi- U.S. relationship like no other event has. Twelve of the fifteen 9/11 hijackers
were Saudi citizens a fact that cannot be easily ignored or explained away. It has forced
the governments and citizens of both nations to take a closer look at their strategic
alliance and their close economic and political relationship and examine if it is still
mutually beneficial or if the differences between these two countries finally overshadow
any basic interests that they previously shared.
3
Posner, Gerald, Secrets of the Kingdom: Inside the Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection. (Random
House, 2005.), 67.
3
The most common explanation for the close special relationship between the
United States and Saudi Arabia is oil-for-security. The United States needs a
dependable supply of oil at stable prices and Saudi Arabia wants assurance that the
United States will guarantee Saudi territorial integrity. In order to achieve these goals
the two nations were forced to work together in ways neither could have imagined. First
through the oil companies and later the Joint Economic Commission Office Riyadh
(JECOR), the United States has played an integral part in the structuring of modern
Saudi Arabia. Everything from national parks to national banks has been influenced by
the United States. The need to effectively get oil out of the ground and to market in a
country that in the early days had virtually no modern infrastructure created the need for
the private and government sectors to cooperate. As anthropologist Carleton Coon
predicted, Aramcos partnership with Arabia, will go on record as one of the

4
outstanding jobs of social engineering in this phase of the history of the world.
The Saudis began to develop their oil fields and play a greater role in world
politics at a time when fear of the spread of communism dominated the foreign policy of
most western nations. Because communisms anti-religious nature and political
structure contradicted many of the Saudis core values, the Saudis chose to join the
anti-communist bloc. Saudi Arabia campaigned against Nassers Arab nationalism and
took part in many of the United States covert actions to halt the spread of communism
during the 1970s and 1980s. Saudi Arabia was involved in actions in Afghanistan,
Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua. Despite oil embargos, different policies towards
4
Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. (California: Selwa Press, 2007. ), xxxiv.
4
Palestine and regional instability the two countries have consistently found ways to work
together to further their strategic interests.
The need for economic prosperity and national security are basic to any nation
and touch almost all aspects of a society. A stable oil supply at reasonable prices
means more than just plenty of gas at filling stations it affects food prices, job markets,
and global financial stability. In order to ensure that oil keeps flowing, stability and
security in the oil producing state is imperative. In the mid twentieth century the United
States and Saudi Arabia intertwined their economies and foreign policies, rejecting the
colonial model and creating a model designed for their mutual benefit. This partnership
allowed the Kingdom to develop without direct foreign aid but still receive the benefits of
Western assistance. It gave the United States a steady supply of inexpensive oil and an
ally in the Middle East without the burden of supporting a colony.
However the relationship between countries, no matter how intertwined, is
constantly changing. Has the tension between these two strategic allies caused by 9/11
and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) broken this special relationship? By analyzing
key elements of their relationship pre-September 11th and post September 11th this
paper hopes to better understand the current status of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.
The general discussion surrounding the U.S.-Saudi relationship has
acknowledged the unique balance of power struggle used by the House of Saud to
manage the conflict between modernization needed for the Kingdoms prosperity and
the strict Wahabi Islamic beliefs upon which the country was founded and the Royal
Familys legitimacy is based. Donald Carpenter noted, [the Saudi Royal Family] are
5
walking that very thin line between holding on to their power and control and wealth,
and loosing it to the religious fanatics within their own country. So if the vox populi says
hate the Christians, theyll hate the Christians.In a way, they are the puppets of their
own puppets. 5
Over the last decade the rise of Islamic extremism has tipped the balance of
power away from the Royal Family towards the radical clerics. Most of the literature
focuses on the worrisome change in this power struggle either as a failure of the Saudi
Royal Family to control its own religious leaders, the failure of the United States and the
West to address the issue of radical Islam and in some cases even to support it, or
simply, as a clash between two societies that do not understand each other. However,
often the literature does not pay enough attention to the extensive role that the United
States has played in the development of Saudi Arabia. As Thomas Lippman points out
in his book, Inside the Mirage: Americas Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia, They
brought the country industrialization, electricity, and telephones, modern medicine,
mechanized agriculture, air conditioning, and jet aviation. One way or another,
Americans have had a formative influence on almost every aspect of contemporary
Saudi life except religion.6 Like it or not, the United States has left a deep imprint on
the fabric of Saudi Arabia. This is not to say that these two countries do not have huge
cultural differences or that the path has been trouble free but that the developmental
experiment entered into between Saudi Arabias founding king, Abdul Aziz, and the U.S.
5
Carpenter, Donald H. 101 Reasons Not to Murder the Entire Saudi Royal Family. (Xlibris Corporation,
2003.), 31.
6
Lippman, Thomas W. Inside the Mirage: Americas Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia. (Westview
Press, 2004.), 5.
6
is unique and has not been given enough attention. The unique manner in which the
Saudi Royal Family chose to develop their country has created enough of a foundation
between these two very different societies so that while the effects of 9/11 clearly
strained the alliance it has not been broken. Rather, in many ways, the alliance has
been strengthened.
There are a few limitations which have affected the research and writing of this
paper. I dont speak Arabic so all documents from the Arab side came from official
translations or pieces written by Saudis in English. This bias did not significantly affect
the outcome of the paper because it has been identified but also because the nature of
the study lends itself to information that has been published for mass consumption.
While it would be informative to read Arabic, I am not searching for classified or hidden
motives that could only be found in Arabic writings. The search for classified, hidden
motives of either government is not the objective of this paper but rather how each
governments actions and statements have been perceived by the other country and
how those perceptions have affected the relationship between the two countries pre and
post 9/11.
Another bias that has the potential to affect the paper is a personal one. I spent
many years living in Saudi Arabia and developed specific opinions on the nature of the
Saudi U.S. relationship. This makes the study of a more personal nature for me than
to most. This said, hopefully the presentation of my analyses will justify this papers
argument: that the unique manner in which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and King
Abdul Aziz chose to develop his nation played a much bigger role in the special
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relationship than is commonly acknowledged. The imprint left on both nations after so
many years of cultural and industrial exchange has created a bond greater than just oil-
for-security and can explain the way these countries have reacted to crises in the
political, cultural and economic arenas.
The paper is organized into three parts. Part One describes the foundation for
the paper and consists of the introduction, literature review, methodology and short
description and background of Saudi Arabia that will give the readers a context in which
to place the papers analysis. The second part of the paper will discuss in depth the key
elements of the relationship pre and post 9/11. The third part of the paper will conclude
and give final thoughts on the analyses.
Literature Review
The literature surrounding the subject of U.S.-Saudi relations can be divided into
two sides, those who favor a continued close relationship and those who believe the
relationship is more harmful than it is beneficial. Like any debate there are various
reasons to support either side of the argument.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 articles began to fill
newspapers and books began to line store shelves revealing scandalous details about
the Saudi Royal Familys connection to the 9/11 events and the Saudis close
relationship with Washington. Books like House of Bush House of Saud by Craig Unger
discussed in depth how the close personal and financial relationship between the two
families jeopardized American security. Never before had a president of the United
Statesmuch less, two presidents from the same family had such close personal and
8
financial ties to the ruling family of another foreign power.7 He argues that these close
relations between the two leading families led to poor decision making by America. Most
notably the decision to quietly remove members of the bin Laden family and Saudi elites
from the United States in the forty-eight hours following the attacks when all other air
travel had been suspended, Thousands of people had just been killed by Osama bin
Laden. Didnt it make sense to at least interview his relatives and other Saudis who,
inadvertently or not, may have aided him?8
Other authors focused on the Saudi Royal Familys funding of terrorist activity.
Gerald Posners book Secrets of the Kingdom: Inside the U.S.-Saudi Connection
revealed an interesting theory that the funding of terrorism was not just being done by
low ranking princes or those angry with the House of Saud but rather was a problem
that could also be found among the Saudi ruling elite. He cites an interrogation done by
the CIA in which the CIA integrators pretended to be Saudis in the hope that the Saudi
reputation for painful interrogation methods would encourage their subject to speak.
Shockingly, the terrorist gave his interrogators personal telephone numbers of the
Kings nephew and a prominent Saudi officer, also a member of the Royal Family. The
numbers given to the CIA were accurate and most strangely both princes along with the
other person named by the terrorist died shortly after the incident.9 The speculation that
high royal officials were funding terrorism was not limited to the secret world of U.S.
7
Unger, Craig. House of Bush House of Saud. New York: Scribner, 2004.pg 15.
8
Ibid. Pg. 13.
9
Posner, Gerald, Secrets of the Kingdom: Inside the Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection. Random
House, 2005. Pg 5.
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intelligence agencies. The media alleged that Princess Haifa, wife of Prince Bandar the
Saudi Ambassador to the United States, helped to fund the September 11 th attacks. She
allegedly gave money to a Jordanian woman who then gave the money to al-Qaeda.
The Princess was the most notorious case but royal funding of terrorist organizations
was a complaint made by many in the press who believe close relations with Saudi
Arabia is contrary to Americas best interest.
Still others like Robert Baer in his book Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington
Sold our Soul for Saudi Crude mention the lax attitude that the Saudis displayed
towards helping fight the GWOT. Twelve of the fifteen hijackers were Saudi yet, A year
and a half later, there still hadnt been a single Saudi arrest that helped us get to the
bottom of September 11.10 September 11 is not the only terrorist act that the Saudis
have been reluctant to help the United States investigate. The bombing of the Khobar
Towers in 1996 killed 19 United States airmen and wounded five hundred Americans
and Saudis.11 Many, such as Richard Lowry in his article, A Cold Look at the Saudis
compared the cooperation the Saudis provided during the Khobar Towers investigation
to their reaction to 9/11. Saudi reaction to every terrorist attack against the U.S. to
which the Kingdom has had a connection in recent years had been a mixture of
avoidance, dishonesty, and passive aggression.12
10
Baer, Robert. Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold our Soul for Saudi Crude. New York:
Three Rivers Press, 2003. Pg. 22.
11
Simpson, William. The Prince: The Secret Story of the Worlds Most Intriguing Royal Prince Bandar bin
Sultan. New York: HarperCollins, 2006. Pg. 275.
12
Richard Lowry. Americas Un-special Relationship: A Cold Look at the Saudis. National Review,
February 25, 2002.
10
The authors mentioned above, who are critical of a continued close relationship,
are members of the media and independent authors. The second group, dominated by
government officials or spokesmen, does not see the U.S.- Saudi relationship as a
disastrous friendship for America and feels it is important to U.S. interests This group
feels that the media coverage after 9/11, and the national hysteria that it instigated,
were too quick to condemn the Saudis and the special relationship.
The 9/11 Commission Report represents the official U.S. report on the events
leading up to and during the September 11 attack. It cleared the Saudi government of
the majority of charges made by the media, Our own independent review of the Saudi
nationals involved confirms that no one with known links to terrorism departed on these
flights.13 The report also stated that, We found no evidence that the Saudi
government as an institution, or senior officials within the Saudi government, funded al-
Qaeda.14 Many felt the fact that twenty-five pages detailing Saudi Arabias involvement
were blanked out of the report caused the Commissions Report to lose some of its
credibility. Nevertheless, it is the official government position on the events. The U.S.
government was not the only organization to exonerate the Saudi government or to
acknowledge their efforts to address the problem of funding terrorism. An OECD
organization devoted to combating money laundering and terrorist financing, judged
13
The 9/11 Commission Report. Authorized Edition, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004. Pg. 329.
14
11
that the Kingdom was compliant or largely compliant with international standards in
almost every indicator of effectiveness. 15
The U.S. government was not the only one to respond to the medias harsh
criticism of the Saudi government. The Saudi Bashing that occurred after the events of
9/11 caused the Saudi government to produce a paper defending their efforts and
launch a public relations campaign throughout America. In the words of Prince Bandar,
I believe the Saudi relationship with America will fail or continue, based on how
successful we are to reach the Americans in their homes and villages.16 The Saudi
government used a variety of styles of communication in an effort to reach out to the
United States. In an address to the Council on Foreign Relations Prince Saud Al Faisal
talked about the damage the Saudi bashing was causing, A critical juncture has been
reached, and unless joint efforts are brought to bear to redress and rectify the
underlying causes, the damage may be grave.17 Addresses like the one Prince Saud
made attempted to explain Saudi Arabias actions from a Saudi perspective. The Saudi
government also published documents responding to what they perceived the medias
allegations against them to be. Such publications like the Initiatives and Actions Taken
By the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism published in March of 2004
address in detail the key points i.e., that fifteen of the hijackers were Saudi, Saudi
15
Bronson, Rachel, Thicker than Oil: Americas Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Oxford University
Press, 2006. Pg. 243.
16
17
HRH Prince Saud Al-Faisal. The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Relationship Threatened by
Misconception. Council on Foreign Relations. New York, New York. 27 April 2004.
12
Arabias social structure nurtures terrorism and extremism, Saudi Arabia has not done
enough to introduce fiscal regulations and monitor terrorist funds and Saudi Arabia is
not cooperating with the international community in the fight against terrorism. These
addresses and publications were an effort to counter the negative information flooding
the general public.
One more argument in the debate on how close the U.S.-Saudi relationship
should be takes a more theological approach. Scholars like Bernard Lewis, Edward
Said, Karen Armstrong and John Esposito link the nature of Islam and past colonial
oppression to the hostility the Middle East feels for the West and helps explain why they
have turned to extreme measures. Edward Saids book Orientalism, although written in
the 1970s, introduces the idea that many of the problems found in former colonies of
Western nations, in particular the Middle East and Africa, have to do with the
development of the Orientalist ideal. The West divided the world into us and them
and in order to justify the subjugation of the one side the West explained away the
capabilities of the colonized nation until it was generally believed by both sides that the
one was superior to the other. Edward Said argued that this division permanently
damaged the Arab psyche. As he expressed in his book, My argument takes it that the
Orientalist reality is both antihuman and persistent. Its scope, as much as its institutions
and all-pervasive influence, lasts up to the present.18 More importantly as Said
comments in the afterword of his book, Yet, Orientalism has in fact been read and
written about in the Arab world as a systematic defense of Islam and the Arabs, even
18
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. Pg 44.
13
though I say explicitly in the book that I have no interest in, much less capacity for
showing what the true Orient and Islam really are.19 His theory has been used by many
to explain away the problems of the Middle East and place the blame on the West. The
ideas expressed in Orientalism have become a mainstream sentiment throughout the
Middle East and even though Saudi Arabia was never officially colonized by a Western
power the feeling that they too have been purposefully held back and lead astray by
Western superpowers is a pervasive and a common belief. As Bernard Lewis explains
the phenomenon in his book The Crisis of Islam, As seen by many in the Middle East
and North Africa, both capitalism and socialism were tried and have failed; both
Western and Eastern models produced only poverty and tyranny. 20
To many in the Arab world the answer seemed simple, the Arabs needed to find
their own model and, Religious fundamentalism enjoys several advantages against
competing ideologies.21 The already strict religious nature of Saudi society and the
theocratic nature of the government make Saudi Arabia especially susceptible to the
religious fundamentalist ideologies. The worry among many now is how the Middle East
is going to combat the spread of this violent ideology. Some scholars like Robert
Spencer worry that, The general reluctance to criticize any non-Christian religion and
the almost universal public ignorance about Islam make for a lethal mix. 22 In other
19
Ibid. Pg. 331
20
Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: The Modern Library, 2003.
Pg. 132.
21
Ibid. Pg 133.
22
Spencer, Robert. Islam Unveiled. New York: Encounter Books, 2002. Pg. 175.
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words how can we combat our enemy if we refuse to understand their true motives?
Authors like Bernard Lewis and Robert Spencer worry that a, long and bitter struggle
lies ahead, and not only for America.23
The Western scholars are not the only group to be concerned about the
popularity of extremist ideas. It has become a goal of the Saudi government to show the
West that they are combating religious rhetoric at home. The Saudi government has
attempted to reign in their religious clerics and to examine their state educational
system. To this end they have published documents such as, Public Statements by
Senior Saudi Officials and Religious Scholars Condemning Extremism and Promoting
Modernization. 24 This is just one example of a published pamphlet listing speeches
and comments from government officials that condemn terrorist activity and militant
Islam. For this group, whether Arab or Western, continued close relations between
these two nations needs to be thoroughly thought out because the risks from extremist
groups, to either nation, cannot easily be overcome.
Methodology
As stated earlier the goal of this paper is to examine U.S.-Saudi relations pre and
post September 11th to determine what, if any, changes have taken place. In doing so
this paper hopes to shed light on the status of the special relationship enjoyed between
23
Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: The Modern Library, 2003.
Pg. 164.
24
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office. Public Statements by
Senior Saudi Officials and Religious Scholars Condemning Extremism and Promoting Moderation.
Washington D.C.: 2008.
15
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for the last seventy years. To accomplish this a method of
analysis must be established.
The U.S.-Saudi relationship is extremely intertwined and complex. If every event
that took place over the last seventy years were to be examined this paper would be
entirely too long and convoluted. To avoid this, key elements have been identified in
various areas of the U.S.-Saudi relationship which provide a framework for a method of
analysis for this paper. These key elements will be broad enough to cover most aspects
of the U.S.- Saudi relationship while still limiting the scope of the research to a
manageable level.
These key elements are a vital part of the analysis and were chosen on the basis
of three criteria. One, the element must have been present throughout the majority of
the U.S.-Saudi relationship. In order for the element to shed light on pre 9/11 and post
9/11 issues it needs to have played a role in the relationship for an extended period.
The longer the element has been an issue presumably the greater impact it has.
Two, the element must affect the relationship in either a negative or a positive
manner. An event may fill headlines for a short time but if there is no long lasting impact
on the relationship then the element is not truly relevant. For example, the Saudi boycott
on people of the Jewish faith working or visiting their country. A suit was brought to
court in the United States charging U.S. companies with prejudice because they did not
hire people to work inside the Kingdom if they were of the Jewish faith. After moving
through the judicial system, Congress eventually made it illegal for American
16
corporations to comply with the Arab boycott in any way. 25 In recent years deals have
been worked out and the boycott virtually lifted. This issue had no major impact on the
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Three, the element must have involved action by governments of both countries.
The public and the media are key actors in the U.S.-Saudi relationship because their
opinions influence the actions of the governments but until the government acts on a
particular issue the official alliance has not been altered.
These criteria were selected because they concisely cover all aspects of the
relationship and establish parameters that will be used to help determine the status of
the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Flaws within each criterion can be identified. Criterion One
states that the element must have been present throughout the course of the
relationship. While over the course of years many things have happened which have
had some kind of an impact such events do not negate the fact that most important
elements of the relationship have been present since it began. Criterion Two requires
that the element have a positive or negative effect on the relationship. It could be
argued that an event could have a significant impact on a relationship without being
labeled positive or negative. Without a lasting negative or positive effect change in the
relationship is hard to measure and change in the status of the relationship is what this
paper is interested in discovering. Finally, it could be argued that the actions of non-
25
Lippman, Thomas W. Inside the Mirage: Americas Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Westview
Press, 2004. Pg. 224.
Chapter 2:
17
governmental actors play a more important role in the relationship than these criteria
take into account, after all 9/11 was perpetrated by non-governmental actors. However,
parameters for analyzing the relationship must be set and ultimately it is not the
relationship between NGOs that is being examined but rather the relationship between
two sovereign states. The impact of NGOs will therefore be measured by how their
actions influence governments.
Based on these three criteria, key elements of the relationship have been
identified and will be used to conduct the analysis of the paper. The elements are:
foreign policy, oil, security, development and modernization. Each of these four
elements fit the established criteria. Together these key elements represent the bulk of
the interaction between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Closely examining each of these
elements, pre and post September 11, will reveal how it has been affected by the
attacks and give a good indication of the current status of the relationship.
There is one more aspect of this analysis that needs to be addressed in this
section and that is the weight given to each key element. The weight associated with
an element addresses how relevant that element is to the special relationship. If that
element were to be found irrevocably damaged could the relationship survive? Or
conversely, if an element where strengthened could it hold the relationship together?
This paper is not assuming that all these identified elements are weighted equally but
rather how these elements are weighted define the status of the relationship. The
common assumption is that of these key elements; foreign policy, oil, security and
development, oil carries the most weight followed by security, foreign policy and then
18
development. Given this papers premise, that the unique method of Saudi development
played and continues to play a more important role in the relationship than commonly
acknowledged, development is going to be given the greatest weight. For this paper the
presentation of these elements in order of importance will be development, oil, security
and foreign policy. It is left to the body of the paper to justify these assumptions.
19
Chapter One: Origins of the U.S.-Saudi Relationship

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is a desert country comprised of 865, 000 square miles of the most
barren land on earth. Traditionally the area is broken into four geographical regions. The
Hijaz and Asir which border the Red Sea, the Najd which makes up most of the heart of
the Arabian Peninsula and the Eastern Providence of Al-Hasa which stretches along
the Arabian Gulf. At the beginning of World War I the Arabian Peninsula was run by
warring tribal leaders under the sphere of influence of the ailing Ottoman Empire. To an
outsider it appeared that life had changed very little since Biblical times but by the end
of the war nothing would be the same again.
The story of modern Saudi Arabia begins with a man named, Abd al-Aziz bin Abd
al-Rahman Al Saud (Ibn Saud) whose desire to regain control of and unite his familys
ancient tribal territory led to the creation of a new kingdom. For centuries two tribes, the
Al-Rashid and the House of Saud had been in a continual battle for dominance of this
desert peninsula. Then on the night of January 15, 1902, as if in a tale right out of the
Arabian Nights, a small band of twenty-three men led by Ibn Saud captured Riyadh, the
Sauds ancient capital which they had lost to the Rashids before Ibn Sauds birth.
Ibn Saud caught the fleeing Amir from behind as he bent to

pass through the wicket and wrestled him to the ground.
Desperately, the fallen man lashed out with a kick that caught
Ibn Saud in the groin doubling him in pain. Thus freed, Ajlan
again ran to the wicket. As he bent low to go through it Ibn
Jiluwi threw his spear with tremendous force, but missedAll
pursued the fugitives most of whom sought refuge in the guard
20
room not far from the gate. Ibn Jiluwi caught up with Ajlan and
cut him down. 26
The Al-Sauds and the Al-Rashids had been fighting for dominance in the
Peninsula for centuries. For years the Al-Sauds were plagued with internal tribal rivalry.
The Al-Rashids seized the opportunity created by this weakness within the Al- Sauds to
conquer their territory so that by the time of Ibn Sauds childhood nothing remained of
the ancestral Saud family empire. Ibn Saud spent his childhood with his family in exile
in Kuwait which was under the suzerainty of the Turks. During his youth in Kuwait the
future king dreamed of uniting the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and restoring the
Sauds ancestral empire, the empire that his great grandfather, along with the religious
reformer Mohammed ibn Adbul-Wahhab, had founded.
The taking of Riyadh was the first of many battles that spanned the next thirty
years as Ibn Saud re-conquered the territory that is now Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud lost no
time in consolidating his control of Riyadh and the surrounding villages. Now he needed
to extend his control to the entire region. In1912 Ibn Saud was surrounded by enemies;
to the north the Al-Rashid, to the east the Turks, to the West the Sharif of Mecca. In his
favor, he had the support of the ulema, the powerful and influential clerics of the
Peninsula. It was the ulema who organized the Bedu into religious warriors, the Ikhwan,
who would be instrumental in helping Ibn Saud conquer the Peninsula.
By the end of 1912 Ibn Saud had consolidated his power in the Najd and looked
East towards the towns of Hofuf and Damman, both under Turkish patronage, for new
26
Nestor, Sander. Ibn Saud King by Conquest. Hats Off Books, 2001. Pg 11.
21
territorial gains. In May of 1913 Ibn Saud invaded the Eastern Province and pushed his
territory all the way to the Arabian Gulf. His territory was now large enough that he felt
he needed backing from a major power. Without the backing of a world power Ibn Saud
knew he would have neither a supply of weapons nor a steady income and probably
would not be able to hold on to his new territory. His first choice was Great Britain but
attempts to secure British protection proved fruitless. He knew that without British
protection he risked a backlash from the Turkish Empire and the tribes which it
supported. So, in an attempt to avoid retaliation he sent several messages to the Turks
expressing his subservience and loyalty at the same time pointing out that he had only
retaken what was originally his families27
Ibn Saud made a deal with the Turks. He was named Wali, or ruler, of the Najd
and given military aid and Turkish weapons. In exchange Ibn Saud agreed not to
conduct foreign affairs or grant concessions to any third party. He also pledged to
provide troops should the Ottoman Empire come under attack. Essentially, he had
become a vassal of the Ottoman Empire.
Then the world was embroiled in World War I and Great Britain declared war on
the Ottoman Empire. With England no longer worried about honoring the Ottomans
sphere of influence, Ibn Saud finally found a willing ally in the great European power.
On December 16, 1915 Ibn Saud signed the Anglo-Saudi Treaty which recognized him
as the ruler of the Najd and Al-Hasa including all their dependencies and he received
money and weapons. In exchange Ibn Saud agreed to halt aggression towards other
27
Ibid, pg 29.
22
English protectorates and not to enter into another treaty with a foreign power. He was
now on the side of the Allies in the Great War, he had abandoned his former protector.
The Treaty with the British served Ibn Saud well throughout the war and kept a
steady flow of wealth coming into his small territory. But after the war Britain began to
lose interest in the desert nations and their warring tribal ways. Soon the brief unity
between the warring desert tribes established during World War I dissolved and they
went back to their centuries old tradition of fighting one another.
By this time internal struggle within the Al-Rashids had made the family weak.
This gave Ibn Saud the opportunity he needed to expand his territory into the Hail
region of the peninsula. By conquering the Hail and demanding allegiance from the Al-
Rashids he would effectively dominate his old enemy and restore his ancestral empire.
So in August of 1921 Ibn Sauds soldiers laid siege to the Al-Rashids last strong hold.
On 1 November they surrendered and swore allegiance to Ibn Saud.28 Ibn Saud now
controlled the Hail, the Najd and the Al-Hasa regions of the peninsula. His territories
now bordered Kuwait, Iraq and Trans-Jordan, all British protectorates, forcing that great
colonial power to take note. They were forced to recognize his control of the peninsula
and they sent a delegation to determine borders between the Britain protectorates of
Kuwait and Iraq and Ibn Sauds territory. These borders are still in place today.
By 1924 World War I was long over and Britain decided to no longer subsidize
Ibn Saud which meant he urgently needed to find new sources of revenue. He began
looking at the Hejaz. The Hejaz was one of the most important areas of the desert
28
Al-Racheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pg 43.
23
because the ruler of the Hejaz controlled both Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities
of the Muslim faith. This territory was owned by the Sharif of Mecca. Saud knew that if
he could control this region he would be at the center of Islam and he, Ibn Saud, would
be in charge of guarding Islams two holiest sites with all the status and power that
entailed. He would not only have the prestige of controlling the two holy cities of Mecca
and Medina but the income derived from the pilgrims visiting the holy cities would
provide a steady source of revenue. Finally, after two years of bloody battles and long
sieges, in January of 1926 the Sharif was forced to flee the Arabian Peninsula. Ibn Saud
now added the Hejaz to his territorial holdings.
By 1927 Ibn Saud controlled almost the entire Arabian Peninsula and Great
Britain recognized Ibn Saud as ruler of the territory. The two nations signed the Treaty
of Jeddah which was to be, valid for seven years, the treaty recognized the complete
independence of the Saudi State and formally accepted the frontier lately established
through protocol and negotiation.29 Ibn Saud had not only united his ancestral lands,
he had assured their independence from foreign colonial rule.
For the next few years, the threat to Ibn Sauds reign would come from within the
Kingdom. His religious warriors, the Ikhwan, had been brutal and effective conquerors
of new territory but they were reluctant to respect the international treaties Ibn Saud had
negotiated. They began criticizing the King. The most important criticism centered on
his relations with Britain, the nature of the Kingship, the Islamic legitimacy of Ibn Sauds
29
Nestor, Sander. Ibn Saud King by Conquest. Hats Off Books, 2001. Pg 54.
24
taxes and his personal conductIbn Saud was also criticized for limiting the prospects
of jihad against a whole range of groups, such as tribes in Iraq.30
In 1928 when things looked like they were spinning out of control, Ibn Saud
gathered the ulema together and gave a famous speech in which he asked the ulema to
define the relationship between the ruler and the clergy. In this meeting he and the
leading religious leaders defined the hierarchical structure of his new nation. The clerics
were to be religious advisers to the king and would not set policy. From now on, they
[the ulema] were confined to giving their opinions regarding matters of Islamic ritual and
technological innovation of which the country would have no shortage in the coming
years. 31 The Ikhwan warriors would not be as easy to control; and force would
ultimately have to be used.
In March of 1929 during the battle of Sibila, Ibn Saud launched an offensive
attack against the rebellious Ikhwan. Many were forced to flee to neighboring Kuwait
and Bahrain, both British protectorates. The British were afraid the presence of the
Ikhwan would incite rebellion within their protectorates and so they deployed the Royal
Air Force to help combat the rebellion. The last Ikhwan leaders surrendered to the
British in Kuwait in 1930. This rebellion was the last serious challenge to Ibn Sauds rule
in Saudi Arabia.
By 1930 there was only one small part of the Arabian Peninsula that did not
belong to Ibn Saud; the Asir. The Asir was still claimed by the Sheik of Yemen and in
30
31
Ibid, pg. 68.
25
1934 Ibn Saud annexed it. In three weeks of battle Ibn Sauds soldiers had conquered
land all the way to the town of Hodeida, well within the territory of Yemen. The size of
the territory and ease with which Ibn Sauds forces spread across Yemen quickly got
the attention of Yemens British protectorate. Not wanting to challenge a European
power, a cease fire was called and formal boundaries between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen were established. The territory of modern Saudi Arabia was complete. Ibn Saud
had accomplished what many thought impossible, he had once more united the land of
his ancestors and established an independent nation in the age of colonialism. Now all
he had to do was build a modern state with a modern infrastructure out of warring tribes
and in a barren desert. No small task.
The nation over which Ibn Saud now reigned was in want of most of the
trappings of modernity. Unlike most nations in this situation at the time, it would not
become a colony nor would it depend on foreign aid but instead it would buy its way into
the modern world. In 1930 Saudi Arabia was without an infrastructure. There were no
modern roads, telephones or electric grid and no government bureaucracy. To put it
plainly, Saudi Arabia had nothing. The very notion of what it took to make a modern
nation was foreign to the Bedu way of life. The people over whom he reigned were
hostile to innovation and largely opposed any foreign presence [.] 32 It would be up to
Ibn Saud and his sons to find a way to make Bedu traditions work in a twentieth century
world. But how and where would he learn all he had to know to make a modern
country?
32
Press, 2004. Pg 15.
26
In order to do the things necessary to build his nation he needed to find some
country or company willing to help him without trying to control his country at the same
time. Ibn Saud also knew he needed money and a steady source of it. Oil had been
found in the neighboring country of Bahrain and the Saudi Arabian Eastern Province
had similar geological features. Ibn Saud hoped U.S. oil and mining companies would
be interested in developing any natural resources they might find in the Kingdom,
providing a much needed source of revenue. Even though the United States was in the
midst of the Great Depression, Standard Oil of California accepted the challenge to look
for oil. Soon oil was discovered and the impoverished, barren country would be richer
than anyone could have imagined.
The United States
Since September 19, 1796 when George Washington declared that, It is our true
policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. the
United States had basically pursued a policy of isolationism. But in the twentieth
century the U.S. found it increasingly hard to remain isolated. On April 6, 1917
Congress declared war on Germany and the U.S. entered World War I. The U.S.
involvement in World War I was largely financial and concentrated on the European
Front. To U.S. policy makers the Eastern Front and the Middle East were Britains
problem. However, even at the height of Middle Eastern colonization, Britain found
nothing of great value in the Arab Peninsula and after the war let Ibn Saud rebuild his
ancestral empire with little to no intervention. As a result the Arabian peninsula

27
remained virtually untouched, and American interests in that area were all but
nonexistent.33
On September 28, 1928 the Saudi Foreign Ministry let it be known that they
wanted to pursue obtaining diplomatic relations with the United States but the Coolidge
administration replied back, that the time was not right for giving an affirmative reply. 34
It would take until May of 1931 for the United States to fully recognize Ibn Sauds
Kingdom. Even so, the United States did not assign Saudi Arabia its own foreign
representative until 1940. Until that time the U.S. Legation in Cairo, Egypt handled all
communication between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Alternatively,
communication was handled through the California Arabian Oil Company (CASCO),
which had owned a concession in Saudi Arabia since 1933. Thus, [t]he arrival of the
first American minister to Saudi Arabia lagged behind the start of American commercial
ties with that country by almost ten years.35
When the economic depression of the 1930s cut into Saudi Arabias main
economic means of support, the Muslims annual pilgrimage to Mecca, Ibn Sauds good
friend and advisor Karl Twitchell convinced the King that companies in the U.S. might
be able to find valuable minerals or oil inside his Kingdom. So with Ibn Sauds
permission Twitchell approached U.S. based oil companies about prospecting for oil
inside the Kingdom. Despite the depression Standard Oil of California took up the
33
Chai, Winberg, ed. Saudi Arabia: A Modern Reader. Univercity of Indianpolis Press, 2005. Pg 13.
34
Ibid. Pg 15.
35
Ibid. Pg. 18.
28
challenge and sent their representative, Lloyd Hamilton, to Saudi Arabia to sign a
concession agreement and he was armed with a new philosophy for industrialization.
He was the spokesperson for a new kind of foreign

development prepared to operate strictly as a business, and
that in its self was revolutionary. ..Absent also was the imperial
conviction that commerce was possible in undeveloped
countries only when tied to colonial administration. The United
States government was so far from being involved in Hamiltons
business that it didnt even have a representative in Saudi
Arabia.36
In 1938 CASCO found huge quantities of oil inside the Kingdom but Ibn Sauds
money problems were not over. Before CASCO could build a solid infrastructure to get
the oil out of the ground and to the world market, World War II broke out. The war
stopped the shipment of vital building supplies and commercial shipping to the Kingdom
was interrupted squelching progress in the fledging enterprise. Saud tried to keep the
expansion going by declaring neutrality but America considered ensuring the support of
the Middle East Britains job and did not want to get involved in what was still
considered the British sphere. The United States denied the requests of both Ibn Saud
and CASCO for monetary assistance to keep the country and the oil company afloat as
late as 1941. But as the war progressed Franklin Roosevelt and his administration
began to take a greater interest in this oil rich nation and cared less for the potential
diplomatic issues pursuing a relationship with the Kingdom might cause with Britain. In
1942 Roosevelt felt it was time for the United States to set up a permanent legation in
Saudi Arabia and in 1943 increased interest in using Saudi air space persuaded him to
36
Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. California: Selwa Press, 2007. Pg 4-5.
Chapter 3
29
declare Saudi Arabia vital to U.S. national security and therefore eligible to receive
Lend-Lease funds. Gone were the days of U.S. governmental indifference to Saudi
Arabia.
World War II paved the way for the U.S.Saudi close special relationship. The
United States realized that Saudi Arabia could provide a valuable commodity and be an
ally in the region. In exchange Ibn Saud realized that U.S. oil companies could provide
the assistance that he would need to build his nation without trying to control his
country. With concession agreements he could stipulate exactly how the companies
were to be operated in his nation. It looked to both as, the beginning of a beautiful
friendship.
30
Foreign Policy: U.S-Saudi Policy Objectives
A shared or similar foreign policy objective can unite two countries and open the
door for communication and cooperation in a wide variety of areas. Or, as the world has
so often seen, failed foreign policies can lead to miscommunication and ultimately war.
Over the last seventy years the United States and Saudi Arabia have established a
good record of working through their misunderstandings and on many occasions have
worked together to accomplish common foreign policy goals. This section of the paper
will take a close look at some highlights of the U.S.-Saudi special relationship.
As previously mentioned the U.S. government had little interest in Saudi Arabia
until the height of World War II. After the Lend-lease money was awarded to Saudi
Arabia the U.S. actively pursued a policy, of preserving the independence and territorial
37
integrity of Saudi Arabia as a vital interest to the United States and its allies. As a
way of insuring that neighboring countries and foreign enemies would think twice about
attacking Saudi Arabia and to provide the U.S. a valuable ally within the Middle East,
Washington asked Ibn Saud for permission to build an airfield in Dhahran. After much
deliberation Ibn Saud agreed. He knew that the Saudi population would be uneasy with
allowing foreign military personnel inside the Kingdom. But, for the first time a very
strong ally and investor was taking interest in the security of his Kingdom. He wanted to
insure their interest was sustained.
37
Hart, Parker T. Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership. Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1998. Pg Xviii.
31
The war ended in 1945 before the Dhahran Airfield was completed. The
justification for building a multi-million dollar base lost its appeal to both sides. Ibn
Sauds moral justification for having foreigners stationed in the country, the threat to
territorial integrity caused by the global war, was gone. And the U.S. military no longer
needed to spend millions on an obscure airfield to obtain important air routes. But the
U.S. State Department felt that a base in the Middle East would be essential to forging
new alliances in that region. As the former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker Hart
noted in his book Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership,
the airbase came to represent more than a military installation the airfield, more than
any other tangible achievement in U.S.-Saudi relations was, and remained for fifteen
years, a touchstone of the quality and durability of the U.S. connectiona concrete
38
symbol of official U.S. interest in Saudi security.
After the war America emerged as the dominant Western power and felt the need
to ensure that Europe could recover as a democracy after the devastation of the war.
Before World War ll Europe had extensive colonies all over the world which they neither
had the will nor the means to maintain after the war. In the 1950s the fear of communist
expansion dominated foreign policy. A great fear was that the communist Soviet Union
would gain control of Western Europe and their old colonies, threatening democracy.
Containing communism became the policy of the Eisenhower Administration and
included ensuring that former European colonies did not ally with the Soviets.
38
Ibid. pg 21.
32
The decolonization process had left many Arabs displeased and resentful of their
former colonizers and the governments they left behind. The U.S. State Department
hoped their already established good relations with Saudi Arabia and reputation for
conducting fair negotiations would demonstrate to other Arab nations that the U.S was a
new kind of Western power, one willing to deal fairly with the Arab world. They hoped
this would discourage them from aligning with the Soviets. To this end, a memo written
by Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Truman in 1951 declared, that Ibn
Saud was the best friend the United States has in the Middle East.39
While the spread of communism was not Ibn Sauds first concern he was
decidedly anti-communist. At the time however, he was consumed by the potential
threat from the former tribal leaders he had subdued in order to create his nation. In
particular, he worried about the Hashemite leaders that controlled Iraq and Transjordan.
In the 1950s the most consistent element in Saudi foreign policy was the obsession that
the two Hashemite monarchies, which had been created by the British, would try and
reclaim their old territory which was now part of Saudi Arabia. Even the question of
Palestine which dominated Arab concerns became secondary to Saud as it had been
for his father. 40
Ibn Saud died in 1953 and was succeeded by his eldest living son, Saud. Saud
was ill suited for command of the nation. Indecisive and extravagant, he would lead the
39
Ibid. pg. 50.
40
33
Kingdom into bankruptcy which left U.S. diplomats uneasy about the future of Saudi
Arabia.
In 1955 the Prime Minister of Egypt Kamel Adbul-Nasser (Nasser) accepted
weapons and aid from the Soviet Union. The Korean conflict had made the U.S. all too
aware of the very real possibility of being drawn into military conflicts because of the
USSRs desire to gain territory and spread the communist ideology throughout the
world. Now, the Middle East was entangled in its own Cold War between Nassers
Pan-Arab movement and other Arab nations. Saudi Arabia and Egypt were soon fully
engaged in what has been called the Arab Cold War, a bruising battle that pitted
Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and others against Egypt, the most influential and powerful Arab
state, and its supporters. Saudi Arabia for its part began organizing opposition to
Nasser in the Muslim world along religious lines. 41
Egypt and Saudi Arabia entered a war of ideologies. Nassers movement spoke
out against Arab monarchies and their connection to Western-leaning regimes,
accusing them of perpetrating colonialism by their close ties to imperialist powers. 42 At
the time Saud came to the throne the Saudi government was in a crucial developmental
process. It was transforming its tribal governmental system into a modern day absolute
monarchy. Nassers open opposition to Arab monarchies threatened the House of
Saud and was causing Saudi citizens to question King Sauds legitimacy.
41
Press, 2006. Pg 70.
42
Ibid. 70.
34
Nasser and the Pan-Arabists believed all Arabs were united through language
and culture and are part of a single Arab nation. They wanted to create a single Arab
state that would minimize the influence of Western colonialism on the Arab world. They
spoke out against tribal divisions and the newly forming national identities.
The Eisenhower Administration, in particular Secretary of State Dulles, was not
an admirer of Colonel Nasser and sought regime change within Egypt. He strengthened
U.S. allied governments in the region and, sought to promote King Saud as an Islamic
pope who would supersede Nasser as the Arabs leader.43 Wishful thinking on the part
of U.S. diplomats assumed that Saud would be as charismatic and as popular a leader
as his father had been. Saud was reluctant to choose sides. Saudi domestic pressure
was divided with the religious clerics wanting to stay close to the West to fight off the
socialist and atheist infidels while pan-Arabists wanted to move closer to Egypt. In the
end, Saud decided to rely on Washington. However, as fate would have it, both
administrations would soon back Nasser in the crisis over the Suez Canal.
By 1956 Nasser had, in the eyes of the Western nations, moved dangerously
close to the Soviet Bloc. He entered into a military agreement with the U.S.S.R. in 1955
and in 1956 they recognized the new Communist China. As a sign of their
dissatisfaction with Egypt the United States decided to withdraw its funding for the
construction of the Aswan Dam. Nassers response was to nationalize the Suez Canal,
still owned by Egypts former colonizers Britain and France. The British, French and
43
Oren, Michael B. Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present. New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. Pg. 515.
35
Israelis were worried about their reputation and investments in the region and decided
to retaliate. On October 29, 1956 the three powers invaded Egypt in an attempt to
reclaim the Canal. Despite all the anti-west and anti-Saudi rhetoric coming from
Nassers Egypt both the United States and Saudi Arabia decided to support Egypt. For
the United States failure to support Egypt would have meant insuring the loss of
Western/American influence in the Middle East. How [can] we possibly support Britain
and France if in doing so we lose the whole Arab world. 44 King Saud decided to back
Nasser because it would have meant suicide for Riyadh if he had chosen to support two
former colonial powers over an Arab state. 45 In November Saudi Arabia announced an
oil embargo on all shipments to the United Kingdom and France. As traditional allies of
the United States they called on the United States to make up for the loss by supplying
them with oil from the U.S. but Eisenhower took no action, Those who began this
operation should be left to work out their own oil problemsto boil in their own oil, so to
speak.46
The 1950s were dominated by the division of the world into Cold War camps.
Saudi Arabias own struggle against Nassers Pan-Arab movement and its distrust of
communism put it decidedly in the Western camp and paved the way for the two nations
to work together in later years. The 1950s also saw the end of the colonial era. From
now on the old European influence over the region was gone. The region was full of
44
Press, 2006. Pg. 71.
45
Ibid. Pg 71.
46
Ibid. Pg. 72.
36
newly independent nations trying to create their own national identity. It would become
the goal of Saudi Arabia and the United States to maintain stability within the region and
keep the new countries from falling to communism.
Internal rivalry between Crown Price Faisal and King Saud had been festering
since the mid-1950s. By the early 1960s the Royal Family was divided into three blocs.
One bloc supported Faisal another supported Saud and a third group supported Prince
Talal (one of Ibn Sauds younger sons) who proposed a constitutional monarchy. Talal
was removed from government in 1961 and Saud was forced to abdicate his throne to
Faisal in 1964.
As the world entered a new decade the relationship between Saudi Arabia and
the United States faced new challenges. There were two new leaders in charge
Kennedy and Faisal and the themes of human rights, student rights and peace
dominated western public opinion. Cultural differences would come to the forefront of
the foreign policy of each country. Kennedy entered office with a new policy towards the
Middle East based on the new belief of the State Department and the National Security
Council, that conservative monarchies that only slowly embraced change, such as
Saudi Arabia, invited domestic unrest and Soviet penetrationThis new approach
produced a pro-Egypt tilt.47 Saudi Arabia fit the State Departments definition of a
conservative monarchy and States goal was to encourage modernization within the
Kingdom. They also wanted to try to align themselves with more modernized Middle
East nations, primarily Egypt. King Faisal seemed willing to support Kennedys call for
47
Ibid. Pg. 80
37
modernization within his Kingdom, three days after Faisal became king he announced
domestic reform that included the abolition of slavery, something he promised when he
met with Kennedy earlier that year.48
The Defense Department and executives of the oil companies working in Saudi
Arabia worried that this new approach to Saudi foreign policy would hurt U.S. oil
interests in the region. In 1962 a crisis in Yemen would test the resolve of Kennedys
new policy. In September 1962 Egyptian backed Yemeni Republican soldiers overthrew
the Yemeni Royal Family and a civil war broke out between the republicans and the
monarchists. The crisis did not just involve Yemen but soon caused a proxy war
between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, each supporting their own side of the conflict with
Saudi Arabia supporting the monarchy. When Kennedys Administration recognized the
new Yemeni state Faisal became worried about the U.Ss determination to maintain the
territorial integrity of the nations on the Arabian Peninsula. All Washington seemed to be
concerned with was modernization. In November Saudi Arabia reported that an
Egyptian aircraft had bombed areas inside Saudi Arabian territory in retaliation for Saudi
support of the Yemeni monarchists. Washington had an important decision to make,
either to uphold its new anti-monarch policy and let Saudi Arabia stand on its own or to
support Egypt hoping to encourage it to become more pro-Western. Kennedy chose to
abandon his desire to concentrate on supporting more modern Middle Eastern states
and sent U.S. military aid to Saudi Arabia proving the United States commitment to the
Kingdoms territorial integrity. Seven months after the coup in Yemen, Kennedys new
48
Press, 2004. Pg. 113.
38
policy of modernization in the Middle East was in tatters. Trying to work more closely
49
with Egypt provided no appreciable political benefit but carried a considerable cost.
Once Kennedys Middle East modernization policy crumbled his Administration
never adopted a solid new policy before his assassination in 1963 and, In fact, the
whole of the Middle East assumed a relatively low priority for the Johnson
Administration.50 However, the special relationship continued to strengthen due to
Faisals pro-active foreign policy. He was convinced that the United States was the
country that could keep the region from falling under Soviet control. Faysal drew closer
to the United States in an effort to strengthen his country against the threats of Arab
nationalism and socialism.51 He launched a policy to use Islam as a theological
counter to communism and pan-Arabism while simultaneously limiting the ulemas
strength within the nation. The United States did not concern itself with Faisals decision
to actively export the Islamic faith. As long as the country was actively combating
communism they did not care.
The 1960s ended with yet another crisis between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
In the 1967 War the Israelis yet again emerged victorious and an oil embargo was
placed on Western supporters of Israel by the oil producing Arab states. In this crisis
Saudi Arabia and the United States would be on opposite sides when the Kingdom
joined the Arab embargo. With the Arab defeat, the regional balance of power began
49
Press, 2006. Pg 88.
50
Ibid. Pg.91.
51
Al-Racheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pg. 120.
39
migrating across the Red Sea from Egypt to Saudi Arabia.52 Egypt was no longer the
undisputed Arab leader it had been; in fact, it was now dependent on Saudi financial
assistance. After the War of 1967 U.S.-Saudi relations settled into a period where the
status quo seemed to dominate. It would take another Arab-Israeli war and oil embargo
to alter the relationship.
That crisis was the 1973 Israeli-Arab war and the devastating oil embargo the
newly formed Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) placed on Israels
supporters. The oil embargo hit the U.S. hard economically and politically and it
revealed to the U.S. just how strategically important Saudi Arabia had become to U.S.
national security.
When the embargo ended petro dollars from the higher gas prices began to fill
Saudi coffers. The United States wanted to find a way to use Saudi Arabias new wealth
to help fund their mutual objective of stopping the spread of communism. Soon Saudi
money began to fund covert operations run by the United States as well as operations,
particularly in Africa, that were independent of the United States. In Africa Saudi Arabia
saw an opportunity to assist fellow Muslims at the same time they spread the influence
of their Wahabi brand of Islam throughout the region. The balance between the House
of Saud and the Wahabi clerics had been an issue for the Saudi Royal Family since the
Kingdoms creation. In Africa they found a way to appease the Wahabis and
demonstrate their commitment to Islam without the risk of aggravating the West. Along
52
Press, 2006. Pg 103.
40
with anti-communist support the Saudis also began to fund the building of Wahabi
madrassas all over the African continent which they saw as a means of unifying
Muslims.
By the late 1970s, Washington began relying increasingly on Saudi Arabia and
Iran to provide regional stability and stem the Soviet tide.53 But 1979 would change the
regional balance of power forever and destroy Washingtons plans to insure regional
stability. In November of 1979 Iranian students, in support of the Islamic Revolution,
toppled the Shah, an ally of the United States and took over the U.S. Embassy in Iran
taking 52 Americans hostage. By December Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the
Revolution, was declared the Supreme Leader of Iran. Washington had arguably lost its
strongest ally in the region and one of the major stabilizing nations in the Middle East.
President Carter was beside himself, there was no clear good way to handle the
crisis. Not sending aid to the Shah would send the message to the Middle East and
Saudi Arabia in particular, that U.S. assurances of security were meaningless. But
sending in military support might interrupt the vital Strategic Arms Limitation
Agreements (SALT) then being conducted with the USSR. Washington decided the
SALT discussions were too valuable to risk and did not send aid to the Shah of Iran.
Instead they would resort to back door dealings such as the Iran-Contra Affair to try and
get the U.S. hostages released. The Administration, in an attempt to release the
hostages taken during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, allowed Israel to sell weapons to
Iranian organizations that pledged to fight against the Ayatollah. The United States then
53
Ibid. Pg. 110.
41
reimbursed the Israelis for the weapons. Some of this reimbursement money was then
directed to the Contra Rebels fighting in Nicaragua to topple the existing government.
Saudi Arabia saw Carters non-response as a worrying trend. The United States
had failed to come to the rescue of one of its closest Middle East allies. The Iranian
Revolution risked spreading throughout the region and challenged Saudi Arabias
position within the Muslim community as Keeper of the Two Holiest Cities. The King
questioned the United States willingness to back his monarchy. If U.S. dependence on
oil, the challenge to regional stability and the taking of U.S .hostages had not been
enough to provoke Washington to retaliate to support an ally, what would?
The rise of extremist groups was not isolated to Iran. In 1979 the Kingdom was
still recovering from King Faisals assassination by a discontented member of the Saudi
Royal Family. His half brother, Khalid , had been placed on the throne. Khalid had little
interest in the duties of a King so the day-to-day operation of the Kingdom was left to
the Crown Prince, Fahd. In December of 1979, only a month after the U.S Embassy
take over in Iran, some Saudi radicals claiming to be the Mahdi took over the Grand
Mosque in Mecca.54 The aim of the group was to reverse, the flow of world history,
sparking a global war that would finally lead to Islams total victory and to a destruction
of arrogant Christians and Jews.55 The Kingdom, indeed the world, was shocked. The
54
The Mahdi or Guided One is a belief among some Muslims that before the fated Day of Judgment a guided one
will appear and rid the world of injustice, terror, and tyranny. The group that took over the Mosque claimed that
one of its members was the Mahdi.
55
Trofimov, Yaroslav, The Siege of Mecca. New York: Doubleday, 2007. Pg. 2.
42
House of Saud had not experienced anything like this since the Ikhwan rebellion back in
the late 1920s.
To make matters worse the Saudis were under the impression that it would be
relatively painless to liberate the hostages inside the Mosque and end the crisis but
things did not go according to plan. The death toll on each side began to rise. It was
clear that this was not a quick and easy fix. No regular sermon from the Grand Mosque
on Friday proved that the Saudi Government has lied and things where not under
control. The governments credibility was shot. After a week of horrendously bloody
combat, it was clear: the Saudi military needed help from abroad.56 They got that help
first from the CIA and then from the French special forces. Once the perpetrators had
been executed and order restored the Royal Family believed their problems to be over.
They began a new effort to consolidate their power and insure that the event would
never be repeated. .
The bloody battle that took place to free the Holy Mosque caused irreparable
damage to the legitimacy of the House of Saud. The clerics had issued a fatwa allowing
fighting to take place within the Holy City but it came at a price, the modernization done
by Faisal and that Fahd wanted to continue would have to be halted. As some of the
Saudi princes described it later, the ulema essentially asked the ruling family to adopt
Juhaymans agenda in exchange for their help in getting rid of Juhayman ( the leader of
the terrorist group) himself.57 These demands would limit the Kings ability to openly
56
Ibid. Pg. 142.
57
Ibid. Pg. 100.
43
support the United States and to comply with the Wests demands for the state to
modernize.
The first example of this was in 1979 when Fahd chose to boycott Egypt after the
bilateral peace agreement Egypt signed with Israel, which was considered one of the
great diplomatic feats of the decade. Initially Fahd had expressed his willingness to
support the treaty, however, by the end of 1979 his country was in domestic turmoil, the
U.S had not stood by Iran and had taken little to no action against the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. As Fahd expressed to Ambassador West, The Soviets with their
support for Khomeini and mischief from Ethiopia to Afghanistan, were making a push for
controlling the Persian Gulf, while America manifested, seeming indifference or
impotence. 58 The Saudi-U.S. relationship was at an all time low.
At the State of the Union Address in 1980, President Carter announced the
Carter Doctrine in which he pledged U.S military aid to Middle East nations, Any
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded
as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault
will be repelled by any means necessary, 59 The Carter Doctrine eased tension and
paved the way for unprecedented U.S.-Saudi cooperation throughout the 1980s.
Congress began cutting back on expensive anti-communist campaigns during
the 1980s. The Vietnam War had left the American people with little taste for distant
58
Indiana University Press, 1998. Pg. 60.
59
44
military operations that might cost American lives. So, both the Regan and George H.
W. Bush Administrations chose covert operations to continue the fight against the
Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia had lots of cash and was looking to invest it. They preferred
doing things quietly so funding U.S. operations allowed them to achieve their foreign
policy objectives discretely. Saudi Arabia was involved in operations in Angola,
Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Ethiopia and was considered high on Washingtons, friend
list, despite any negative press the country received. The almost masochistic delight
that the U.S. media exhibited during the Iran-Contra hearings did little to tarnish Saudi
Arabias standing in the political eye. Seeing the situation for what it was, Washington
recognized that when the United States President had asked for help, it was Saudi
Arabia that had come to his aid in the fight against communism.60
One covert operation, Afghanistan, would have longer lasting effects on the U.S.-
Saudi relationship than any other. Riyadh interpreted Moscows Afghanistan adventure
as part of a Soviet directed campaign to encircle the Arabian Peninsula with radical
regimes and subvert the oil-rich monarchies.61 The United States was also aware of the
dangers of an advancing Soviet Union. The CIA was directed to support local resistance
organizations.
The euphoria surrounding the Afghan victory over the Soviet Union was short
lived. As the Soviets withdrew, the many unintended consequences of the war became
60
61
Press, 2006. Pg. 154.
45
increasingly apparent. The arms pipeline set up by the CIA had unwittingly become a
drug pipeline as well. 62 This meant that the new battle hardened, unemployed rebels
had an independent means of funding. They were no longer beholden to the Saudi
Royal Family or the CIA. It would not take long for these warriors to turn on their former
backers, arguing that they were no better than the Soviet infidels. Within Saudi Arabia
Afghanistan would, alter Saudi society by bringing to the surface and encouraging the
most ascetic and fundamentalist religious interpretation.63
Covert operations were not the only foreign policy objectives on which the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia worked closely during the 1980s. They also worked closely on the
danger to regional stability caused by the Ayatollah Khomeinis takeover of Iran. By
creating a nation based on radical Islam the Ayatollah shifted the dynamics of the
region. Iran was no longer a stabilizing factor but the cause of regional instability.
Saddam Hussein, who had just staged his own Baathist coup in Irans
neighboring country of Iraq, took it upon himself to stop the threat from Iran and hoped
to gain oil rich territory in Iran Since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution Iran and
Iraq had disputed the vital Shatt al-Arab water way. In September 1980 Iraq invaded
Iran and the dispute escalated. America began loosening its weapons restrictions
regarding the re-selling of U.S. weapons and supplying Saddam with intelligence. Even
though Congress would never have approved arms transfers to Iraq, the Reagan
62
Unger, Craig. House of Bush House of Saud. New York: Scribner, 2004. Pg. 107.
63
Press, 2006. Pg. 170.
46
administration secretly began allowing Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt to transfer U.S.
weapons, including howitzers, helicopters, and bombs, to Iraq. 64
France and the Soviet Union became Iraqs major military suppliers and various
Arab States loaned millions to their neighbor. The world seemed to be obsessed with
ensuring that Iran was stopped and overlooked the reports of war crimes perpetrated by
Saddam. As Prince Bandar described it:
I think that if Khomeini had not threatened to export the

Islamic revolution to the Gulf countries and had not taken an
anti-Saudi/Arab/Gulf countries attitude in his sermons and
language, then, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries would
not have supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. It was in
our national best interest to stop Iran on the Iraqi borders,
rather than to fight them at our own borders. 65
Saudi Arabia was quickly emerging as the United States prime stable ally in the Middle
East. This caused the United States to take more interest in what worried the Saudis
and what they considered a danger to their national security and internal stability.
While the 1980s saw unprecedented collaboration between the foreign policies of
Saudi Arabia and the United States, the decade was not without its controversy. In the
late 1980s the price of oil plummeted by almost ten dollars a barrel. This would put a
strain on Saudi foreign expenditures on which the United States had come to rely. Also
the Congress rejected what Saudi Arabia saw as a reasonable and essential arms sale.
After being rejected by the U.S., the Saudis turned to China and purchased nuclear
64
65
47
capable long range missiles from a member of the communist bloc. This demonstrated
to the United States that while Saudi Arabia may prefer to give their money to the
States, if they were denied what they wanted they were willing to get their weapons
elsewhere. Despite the tension both of these events might have caused, the bilateral
relationship remained strong as both countries dealt with issues on a crisis by crisis
basis.
By the end of the Iran-Iraq war Iraq was heavily in debt. Its infrastructure was in
ruins and it had no real territorial gain to show for its nine year struggle and it had a
dictator, Saddam Hussein, who was determined to prove his regional dominance. He
began threatening his neighbor state, Kuwait. He accused Kuwait of corrupt oil drilling
practices and brought up old Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. No negotiations would
please Saddam and on August 2, 1990, 700 Iraqi tanks rolled across the Kuwait border.
Kuwait crumbled in days.
Saddam then set his sights on Saudi Arabia and began mobilizing along the
Saudi border. Suddenly, the man once seen as the inhibiter of expansive regimes was
embarking on an expansion policy of his own. The stability of the whole Middle East
was in jeopardy. If Iraq was able to annex Saudi Arabia then Saddam would be in
charge of one third of the worlds known oil supply giving him unprecedented power.
The White House was not willing to allow that. The House of Saud was facing the
biggest challenge to its territorial integrity since the creation of the Kingdom. For the
first time in decades the House of Saud was wondering if they were going to be able to
hang on to their Kingdom.

48
The big question in the United States was what should be done? How should this
threat be handled? Should the United States intervene militarily? The famous American
rallying cry freedom did not apply to the theocratic monarchy of Kuwait, for which
American soldiers would be giving their lives. And since most Americans thought oil
was not a good enough reason to go to war, both Bush and Baker foundered for a
rationale to put soldiers in harms way. The fight isnt about oil, Bush asserted. The
fight is about naked aggression that will not stand.66 For the Saudis the situation was
just as delicate. The Royal Family wondered if the military they had spent millions
building could hold up against an Iraqi invasion. Would the United States honor its
commitment to defend Saudi Arabian territorial integrity, they had let Iran fall? The
Saudis got their answer quickly when Dick Cheney was sent to Saudi Arabia to deliver a
promise of military support to King Fahd, We are prepared to deploy these forces to
defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. If you ask us, we will come. We will seek no
permanent bases. And when you ask us to go home, we will leave. 67 The King is said
to have simply turned to Cheney and General Schwarzkopf and replied, Okay. The
decision had been made in what was record time for a nation where deliberation and
consensus are art forms.
The Kings decision was bold. The House of Saud was in fact divided over
whether or not to accept Americas offer and let infidel troops defend the home of Islam.
Foreign troops on Saudi soil had been a matter of contention between the two nations
66
67
49
since the establishment of the Dhahran Airfield in 1947 and eventually led to its closing
in 1962. Some leading royal brothers, including the current ruler, King Abdullah, worried
that the size and scale of the operation would cause too much domestic unrest and
jeopardize the familys legitimacy.
Their worries were not unfounded. For the first time in Saudi history the Islamic
clerics did not unite and stand behind the House of Saud. Instead conflicting fatwas,
some opposing and some supporting the decision, were issued. The respected Mufti
Sheik Abdul Aziz bin Baz issued fatwas allowing non-Muslims to be stationed in Saudi
Arabia after Iraqs invasion of Kuwait and approving of the Gulf War and Muslim
aggression towards another Muslim country with the aid of infidels. This official fatwa
legitimized King Fahds decision but it did not silence other leading clerics who felt bin
Bazs fatwa was not justified. Clerics such as Sulieman Alwan Ali Khodeir and Hamand
bin Oqla al Shuaibi were eventually imprisoned for their attacks on the Saudi Royal
Family. Respected clerics were not the only ones to speak out against the King.
Extremist religious organizations also spoke out against the presence of non-Muslims
on Saudi soil, most notably Osama bin Laden and his extremist Mujahedeen.
The war itself marked a high point in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The two nations
worked closer together than ever before. Their policy goals were identical: to protect
Saudi Arabia from invasion and to kick Iraq out of Kuwait. In the first major crisis since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. asked for and received an agreement of
support to go to war from the UN in the form of a Coalition of Nations. The future
seemed optimistic.
50
World unity was short lived. Soon the Coalition of Nations began to weaken as
each nations opinion on how to handle Iraq was debated. Saudi Arabia and the United
States also began to differ on how to handle Saddam Hussein. President Bush did not
feel the Coalition would stay united if American troops invaded Iraq and ousted
Saddam. However, Riyadh urged Washington not to end war prematurely, even if
that meant allying with Shia and Kurdish forces inside Iraq, groups with which Saudis
68
had been reluctant to engage traditionally. Fahd felt that Saddams actions could not
be predicted and therefore he would only add to the regions instability. Washington
either disagreed or felt it was beyond their power, trying to eliminate Saddamwould
have incurred incalculable human and political costs. 69 Differing opinions concerning
Iraq combined with increased anti-Western, anti-House of Saud rhetoric from inside
Saudi Arabia began to wear on the U.S.- Saudi relationship and effect Saudi Arabias
policy decisions.
The Gulf War changed the U.S.-Saudi relationship in a subtle but profound way,
for the first time the relationship was open to the public scrutiny of both nations. From
the beginning the intricacies of the friendship had managed to stay out of the publics
eye and under the media radar. This was no longer possible. Technology was making it
harder and harder for the Saudi government to censor what its population had access to
and in the United States coverage of the Kingdom filled the media. Perhaps because no
one really knew the history of the relationship the American media was not impressed
68
Press, 2006. Pg. 201.
69
51
with the Kingdom. As Time magazine expressed it, the absence of democracy,
freedom of speech, womens equality, and religious diversity in the Kingdom dont
endear it to Americans as a loveable ally.70 The terrorist actions of the late 1990s did
little to alter American perceptions.
As the Clinton Administration replaced Bush no great strategy had been put in
place to deal with Saddam Hussein or devise a long range plan for stability in the Middle
East. So once again maintaining the status quo was adopted in Washington.
Unfortunately, maintaining the status quo became a policy of indecision that resulted in
the use of ineffectual sanctions and precision bombing to try and control Saddam and
contain him within the borders of Iraq. Saudi Arabia despised this policy, 1994 was
the last year of smooth relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. After that
year Americans and Saudis struggled to develop a consensus on how to deal with the
Iraqi regional threat, and Saudi leaders lost confidence in American military planning. 71
The United States policy of strategic, pinprick bombing combined with
sanctions was producing no results, if anything, it was helping Saddams cause. The
world watched as the Iraqi people began to starve and living conditions deteriorated
because of the shortages caused by the sanctions. Could a man whose reputation for
torture and corruption was world renowned really be relied on to provide for this people
under the best of circumstances, let alone while living under the severe sanctions
70
71
Press, 2006. Pg. 218.
52
imposed by the International Community? During the 1990s, in order to try and control
circumstances, America supported sanctions on Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya and
the Sudan with little or no effect. As Prince Bandar expressed it, For Gods sake , you
cannot run a foreign policy based on sanctioning people right and left, then basically
waiting to see how things work out. You have to engage people, thats the whole
concept of what a foreign policy is.72
As for the pinprick bombing, Saudi Arabia did not support it either in 1996 when
Saddam violated the no fly zone or in 1998 during Operation Desert Fox. 73 Saudi
leaders opposed the operation [Operation Desert Fox], which they thought would only
antagonize their wounded but still dangerous neighbor. Saudi Arabias preferred plan,
(to help plan and sponsor) a coup led by Iraqi Sunni Baathists, did not inspire
confidence within the American establishment given that a number of coup attempts
already had been tried but had failed.74
Over the course of the late 1990s the world saw an increase in terrorist attacks
aimed at the United States. Saudi Arabia found the U.S. failure to respond decisively to
these attacks frustrating. When the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were
72
73
The Iraqi no fly zones are two distinct areas of air space designated by the United States, Great Britain, and
France in which Iraqi planes could not fly. The zones were established in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War to ensure
humanitarian aid from, brought in from aid organizations outside of Iraq, reached the northern and southern ends
of the country. Operation Desert Fox took place in December 1998, and consisted of four days of strategic
bombing inside Iraq in response to Saddams failure to comply with U.N. resolutions and weapons inspectors.
74
Press, 2006. Pg. 220.
53
bombed simultaneously Clinton responded by bombing Afghanistan, the country
suspected of harboring the terrorists who committed the crime. Americas actions
seemed only to provoke bin Laden and, as far as the Saudi leadership could tell, stir
regional sympathies [for Saddam]. For Saudi Arabia, limited action was worse than no
action.75
The most significant terrorist attack of the 1990s was the June 1996 bombing of
the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The attack killed 19 U.S. Airmen
and one Saudi citizen. Clinton immediately condemned the actions saying, The
cowards who committed this murderous act must not go unpunished. Let me say again:
we will pursue this. America takes care of its own. 76 Clinton dispatched Louis Freeh,
Director of the FBI, to oversee the Khobar Tower investigations. Once again news of
events taking place in Saudi Arabia filled the American press and neither the press nor
the White House was happy with the aid the Saudis were providing in the investigation.
The American media lashed out against the Kingdoms handling of the bombing, as the
National Review stated, Saudi reaction to every terrorist attack against the U.S.to
which the Kingdom has had a connection in recent years had been a mixture of
avoidance, dishonesty, and passive aggression. 77
75
Ibid. Pg. 226.
76
Lowry, Rich. Clinton and Khobar. National Review Online 03 Nov. 2003
<http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/lowry200311030753.asp>.
77
54
The Iranian backed organization Saudi Hezbollah was soon implicated as the
major financier of the attack. When this was discovered the situation soon became more
political than just tracking down murderers. The information about Iranian involvement
came at a time when the Clinton administration was seeking to normalize relations with
Iran. Three different political agendas began to control the investigation, What resulted
from this determined beginning was a vicious three-way battle among Saudi Arabia, the
FBI, and the Clinton administration as politics, public relations, and foreign policy
converged to complicate what should have remained a simple matter of retribution and
justice.78
Saudi Arabia was worried about U.S. reaction to the news of Irans backing of the
Saudi Hezbollah bombing because Saudi Arabia would surely receive a backlash from
the Muslim community for whatever retaliation the U.S government took. Once again
they were not sure if they had the backing of Washington so they assisted the U.S.
investigation only to a point. They allowed U.S. investigators inside the Kingdom and
agreed to Rule 15 but asked that the U.S. make a formal request for the release of any
information the Saudi government had concerning Iranian involvement. Here Director
Freeh was unable to get the cooperation of the Clinton Administration. Washington was
not willing to make such a request presumably because if they received confirmation
that the Iranian government was involved they would be forced to take action. This was
78
Rule 15 is an American legal procedure whereby testimony and evidence from witnesses provided in Saudi
Arabia, in the presence of American prosecutors, the defendants attorney and a US magistrate, could be recorded
and taken back to the US and used as evidence in the American trial. Simpson, William Pg. 280.
55
in contrast to Washingtons goal of achieving more normal relations with Iran. Freeh felt
his hands were tied.
By 1997 the Saudis were increasingly convinced that the Clinton Administration
had deliberately set the Khobar investigation adrift as [Washington] concentrated its
efforts on cultivating its ties with a more moderate government in Iran,[.]79 This
theory was backed up by statements made by Clinton after the attacks that seemingly
contradicted his initial statements. Like this statement made in 1999,
I think it is important to recognize, however, that Iran,

because of its geopolitical importance over time has been
the subject of quite a lot of abuse from various Western
nations. And I think sometimes its quite important to tell
people look, you have a right to be angry at something my
country or my culture or other country that are generally
allied with us today did to you 50 or 60 or 100 or 150 years
ago. But that is different from saying I am outside the faith
and you are Gods chosen.80
To the Arab world, this statement was considered an apology by Clinton and the West.
Apologetic statements like this one sent mixed signals to Saudi Arabia and the world on
where exactly the United States stood on Islamic terrorist acts. Saudi Arabia was not
willing to accuse Iran of backing the Khobar attacks without complete knowledge of how
the United States intended to react to the information. The Royal Family felt they were
in no position to antagonize the religious opposition and especially without the full
backing of Washington. This led to misunderstanding between the two countries. The
79
Sultan. New York: HarperCollins, 2006. Pg 286.
80
Newspaper article internet.
56
United States felt Saudi Arabia was not cooperating with the investigation and Saudi
Arabia felt it could not trust the United States to back them up should they antagonize
Iran.
Administrations on both sides were concentrating on the greater political struggle
and not the increase in terrorist attacks or the sophistication and complexity of those
attacks. And probably the most important bit of evidence overlooked in the investigation
was that 13 Saudis were included in the indictment issued in June of 2001 for the
murder of the U.S. servicemen, a warning for what was to come later that year.
After the events of the Khobar Towers both nations seemed to be just floating
along neither one defining their policies nor agreeing with each other. Both failed to see
or address the problems that would become Islamic Terrorism. A decade with no clearly
outlined policy goals left the relationship dangling. The relationship simmered along for
another decade or so without a fundamental reassessment of either the ends or the
means of the two countries ties.81 The events on September 11th 2001 would give both
nations an unfortunate wake up call.
This paper has not previously discussed one key component of the U.S.-Saudi
relationship, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israel has been a point of disagreement
between Saudi Arabia and the United States since Israels creation in 1947. The issue
of Israel was first brought up by Ibn Saud during his historic meeting with President
Roosevelt aboard the U.S.S. Quincy in February of 1945. In their discussion Roosevelt
81
Press, 2006. Pg. 203.
57
pledged two things to Ibn Saud. One, as president he would not do anything that would
be hostile to the Arabs and two, that the U.S. government would not change their policy
on Palestine without first consulting both the Arabs and the Jews. Roosevelt died before
a Jewish state was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations and his
successor, Harry Truman, was not able to uphold Roosevelts promise. Ibn Saud would
always feel betrayed by the United States vote in support of the creation of an Israeli
state.
U.S backing of Israel would cause more than personal angst. American
support for Israel created problems for the King and limited the outward support he
would offer the United States. It gave ammunition to the Kings detractors at home and
abroad. They pointed out repeatedly that the Kings principle ally was also Israels. So
began a balancing act that both Saudi and American leaders would undertake for
decades.82
Until the late 1960s the United States had done well winning favor inside Saudi
Arabia. The United States sided against its most traditional allies and supported the
nationalization of the Suez Canal and in 1962 it had helped Saudi Arabia maintain its
territorial integrity against Yemen. In May 1967 things would change and Israel would
go from being a constant source of irritation to causing a true crisis.
On May 21, 1967 Egypt mobilized its armed forces and on the 22nd they
blockaded Israeli shipping. This was considered an act of war by Washington and
82
Ibid. Pg. 46.
58
Israel. So on June 5th Israel attacked Egypt, quickly gaining territory and destroying the
air forces of both Egypt and Jordan. Nasser falsely accused the United States of
providing airlift support to Israel and the Arabs rallied behind Nasser. Iraq, Kuwait and
Algeria all issued an embargo on oil to the United States and Great Britain. On June 7 th
Saudi Arabia ordered ARAMCO to join the embargo. Whether the Saudi leadership
agreed with the embargo or not, the risk of domestic unrest as a consequence of not
participating was huge. Even with Saudi support of the embargo, demonstrators began
harassing ARAMCO employees forcing the company to evacuate expatriate employees.
Unlike most Arab nations who severed relations with the U.S. during the embargo, King
Faisal refused to do so. He recognized that while civil unrest in his county was
dangerous so was alienating the consumers of the oil which his country needed
desperately to export. To this end he secretly allowed oil shipments to continue to be
sent to the United States military, In that way, remembered Ambassador Eilts, he was
assisting us. He recognized that, but he was not doing it in a visible fashion, which
might have stirred public opinion. 83
The outcome of the 1967 conflict would have two major impacts on the Middle
East. Israel gained territory and Egypt lost its status as the dominate power in the
region. At the Khartoum Summit, which ended the aggression, Israel was allowed to
keep the territory that it had seized. Saudi Arabia saw the United States backing of
Israel as a sign that the United States could not necessarily be relied on to secure Saudi
Arabias territorial integrity, its promises where hollow. But the balance of power had
83
Ibid. Pg. 101.
59
shifted away from Nassers Pan-Arabism. Egypt no longer represented a serious
socialist threat to the region and was now dependent on financial aid from Saudi Arabia.
Now that Egypt was on the Saudi payroll it began to stop its hostile rhetoric and
enthusiasm for the pan-Arab movement abated.
The region was stable for a few years but in 1973 the Arab nations would
organize another, and much more devastating, oil embargo against the West after Arab
nations attacked Israel in the hopes of regaining territory lost during the 1967 war. In
1972 U.S. oil companies within the United States began producing at full capacity
leaving no reserves with which to supply the market if there was ever a shortage in the
supply of oil. The West had in effect become dependent on Arab oil. This, combined
with the unity and severity of the embargo would make it hard felt at the pumps in the
United States.
Faisal had concerns about using oil as a weapon; he did not want to attack the
major purchasers of his oil. As the situation in the region became increasingly tense
throughout 1972 Faisal began issuing statements warning Washington that he would be
forced to take action if they supported Israel during a conflict. Washington paid little
attention in fact they had not made any major policy change towards the region since
the 1967 conflict.
On October 6, 1973 Syrian and Egyptian forces attacked Israel. The surprise
attack won the Arabs quick territorial gains but as the Israelis regrouped the Arab
situation turned grim. Saudi Arabia deployed a brigade of soldiers to the front but by the
time they made it to Syria the conflict was over. Saudi Arabia perceived President
60
Nixons request from Congress for an aid package for Israel as a slight to themselves
and the Arabs. The United States began airlifting supplies to Israel. King Faisal was
furious; The next day, Saudi Arabia and other Arab producers imposed a total
embargo on oil shipments to the United States. 84
Faisal was reliving the 1967 embargo. He called in Jungers, the CEO of
ARAMCO and ordered him to impose the embargo and for fear of not wanting to be
prematurely nationalized, ARAMCO agreed. But, as in 1967, Faisal allowed continued
shipment of oil to the United States military stating, God help you if you get caught, or if
it becomes a public issue.85 However, Secretary of State Kissinger had a decided
policy behind his support for Israel. He wanted Israel to understand that it still needed
the United States and therefore would be likely to listen to demands to negotiate and he
wanted to impress on the Arabs that the United States was more powerful as a backer
than the Soviets.86 On October 25 a cease fire was called but it was not enough to end
the oil embargo. And the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia
became strained, to the point where both countries were making veiled threats towards
the other.
84
Press, 2004. Pg. 156.
85
Press, 2006. Pg. 120.
86
Ibid. Pg 118.
There is evidence to suggest that Saudi Arabia has created a series of dirty bombs. These dirty bombs are made
from a variety of chemicals that can create a low-level radioactive blast that will contaminate the site of the
explosion for a decade. It is suspected that the Saudis have placed these bombs in strategic areas all over the oil
61
Ironically the embargo brought the two nations closer than they had ever been.
Money was flooding into Saudi Arabia from the escalating oil prices at a rate the Saudis
could not manage. The United States had the idea of enticing the Saudis to invest their
capital inside the United States, a plan that could benefit both nations and would cause
the intertwining of the two economies. The U.S. also renewed their interest in Saudi
security for they had just experienced the consequences of what unstable oil prices
could do to the world economy. Saudi Arabia has the unique ability to play the role of
the world oil price stabilizer and has been more than willing to adopt this role. It seemed
that the two countries had found a balanced relationship that suited them both.
Since the war of 1973 the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has done nothing but bring
instability to the region. It was used by Saddam Hussein as a rallying cry to try and
break up the U.N. Coalition and to some extent succeeded. He promised to leave
Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and West Bank, all territory
seized in the 1967 War. The United States disagreed with the mingling of the two issues
and King Fahd also had a very strong opposing opinion. He said, that is unacceptable
to us because what Saddam Hussein did was an aggression. We are not going to
reward that aggression with a benefit. We, the Saudis, are going to fight for the
Palestinian cause and peace in the Middle East.87 However, other Arab nations
choose to support Saddam. The most disappointing to Saudi Arabia was Jordans
field and refineries, and pipelines and in the case of an invasion or hostility the Saudis would destroy their own
infrastructure. This policy is called the Saudi scorched earth plan.
87
62
decision to side with Saddam Hussein. This caused Kind Fahd, under the guise of late
debt payments, to break off relations with Jordan in September of 1990, these relations
have since been restored.
What has all this told us about the U.S.-Saudi relationship? A few trends have
been discovered. One and most importantly, over the years the relationship has come
under severe strain and yet managed to pull through and in some cases has emerged
stronger on the other side of the conflict. Two, the circumstances surrounding the
closing of the U.S. airfield at Dhahran and Saudi public hostility towards foreign workers
during the 1967 oil embargo show us that skepticism about Western influence inside the
Kingdom has been an issue for U.S.-Saudi relations for decades. Three, the issue of
Israel has hindered Saudi public support of common policy issues for fear of appearing
to support the major ally of Israel but it has not stopped the relationship from moving
forward. And finally, that despite their very different cultures the two countries have
been able to work together successfully to accomplish common policy objectives, most
notably keeping Saddam from controlling the Middle East during the Gulf War and the
Soviets from occupying Afghanistan in the 1980s. The question that remains is, was
there any change in this pattern after the attacks of September 11th?
On January 20, 2001 President George W. Bush took over the White House,
Crown Prince Abdullah was the defacto ruler of Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian-Israeli
question was once again causing tension in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Crown
Prince was not happy with the new Presidents rhetoric concerning the crisis and
escalating violence in the region. Bush released statements calling for Yassar Arafat,
63
the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, to get better control of the
Palestinians. The Israelis will not negotiate under terrorist threat, simple as that; and if
the Palestinians are interested in a dialogue, then I strongly urge Mr. Arafat to put 100
percent effort intostopping the terrorist activity.88 In response to this statement
Abdullah sent a letter to President Bush indicating his displeasure with Washington,
We believe there has been a strategic decision by the United

States that its national interest in the Middle East is 100
percent based on [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon. This
is Americas right, but Saudi Arabia cannot accept the
decision. Starting from today, You [Americans] go your
way; I [Saudi Arabia] go my way. From now on, we will
protect our national interests, regardless of where Americas
interests lie in the region. 89
The letter was a harsh warning. Through oil embargos and Palestinian-Israeli wars the
Saudis had never broken relations. The President took the letter seriously and
responded with his own letter clarifying any misunderstanding the Crown Prince might
have had about the Presidents feelings towards the Palestinian people and his
willingness to address the Palestinian-Israeli situation during his presidency. The letter
did the trick and successfully smoothed over relations with the Kingdom, crisis averted.
Only days later the September 11th attacks would take place and the U.S.-Saudi
relationship would face its biggest crisis ever.
Almost immediately it was discovered that 15 of the 19 hijackers of the planes
that crashed into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon were Saudi citizens. Both nations
88
89
Ibid. Pg 309.
64
were shocked. The Saudis wondered how this could be and the Americans were hurt,
angry and more skeptical about the Kingdom than ever. The attacks spurred a series of
media backlashes and official statements questioning every move the Saudis made.
The Saudi government launched a huge public relations campaign throughout the
United States, something the countrys leadership had been reluctant to do before.
Scholars and analysts strove to figure out how the attacks could have occurred. The
Saudi policy which had been adopted in the 1980s of empowering its Wahabi clerics
and boosting funding for Islamic organizations with little oversight took the blame for the
spread of much of the terrorist ideology and for the financing of terrorist attacks. The
American public also became exposed to the Saudi public outcry against America and
all it stood for. These accusations on both sides only added to the tension in an already
fully charged situation, as HRH Prince Saud al-Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia
stated in an address to the Council on Foreign Relations,
Prior to 9/11, Saudi Arabia was the target of some criticism

in the United States and elsewhere but to what we have
faced since 9/11, these criticisms seem tame by comparison.
Since, then the attacks becameto my mind
irresponsibly vicious90
Public opinion was now affecting policy. In his address to the Council Saud al-
Faisal addressed the publics four major arguments against Saudi actions explaining the
Saudi side. He asked that this be taken into consideration and more importantly
acknowledged a willingness to mend the relationship, Sooner or later both of us will
90
U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Relationship Threatened By
Misconceptions address by Minister of Foreign Affairs HRH Prince Saud Al Faisal. April 27, 2004.
Washington, DC: Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, http://www.saudiembassy.net.
65
have to abandon recriminations and concentrate on what can be done to retrieve the
healthy relationship between our two countries.91 The two nations will have to work
past or around bad publicity if they are going to return to that, healthy relationship. The
American government cannot monitor the press or stop its public from getting caught up
in the anti-Saudi frenzy. But neither government will have the luxury of a disinterested or
uninformed population anymore, their concerns will have to be addressed.
Even as the American public was in an uproar over Saudi Arabia, the Bush
Administration was examining its policy toward its ally and friend, In response to
frustration around U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation, key members of the Bush
Administration met in December 2002 to overhaul Americas approach toward Saudi
Arabia. They assigned a high level official to oversee the U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism
portfolio. They recognized that at many times America failed to give accurate
intelligence to Saudi Arabia before demanding they take action. They discovered that
much of Saudi Arabias problems with fighting terrorism came from lack of training and
not their intentions.92 Washington was not looking to abolish its close relationship but to
re-evaluate that relationship to conform to post 9/11 necessities and work towards
building a more cohesive policy.
The two nations had hardly worked through the trauma done to their relationship
by 9/11 when the U.S. announced its intension to invade Iraq and remove Saddam
91
U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Relationship Threatened By
Misconceptions address by Minister of Foreign Affairs HRH Prince Saud Al Faisal. April 27, 2004.
Washington, DC: Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, http://www.saudiembassy.net.
92
Press, 2006. Pg. 244.
66
Hussein. Saudi Arabia was adamantly against such actions, even if the removal of
Saddam is what they had been pushing for throughout the 1990s. There were two
policy issues that guided their decision one, that the United States would leave behind
a disjointed and chaotic Iraq that would be run by the Shia and influenced by Iran. Two,
they adhered to the old Arab idea of not wanting to appear to be melding in another
Arab nations affairs. In addition, supporting an aggressive Western power against an
Arab brother would have been political suicide. However, true to form, despite their
public disapproval they quietly supported the United States. A Washington Post article
on February 26, 2003, quoted a U.S. official as saying that the United States and Saudi
Arabia had agreed on a broad array of military operations that Saudis would permit in
the event of armed hostilities with Iraq.93
Despite a rocky beginning to Operation Iraqi Freedom, once the deed was done
the Saudis and the United States seem once again to have a common objective, the
stability of the region. As evidenced by a statement made by the Saudi Foreign minister
Saud al-Faisal shortly after Iraqi elections in December of 2005, We must also work for
a stable and unified Iraq, at peace with itself and in harmony with its neighbors. We are
heartened by the electoral process, and results, in the country.94 While Saudi Arabia
has outwardly expressed its distaste for some of the decisions regarding the re-
construction of Iraq the overall objective of the policies of both nations is the same.
93
CRS Issue Brief for Congess. Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations by Alfred B. Prados.
August 4, 2003, http://www.crs.com.
94
United States Insititute of Peace . Saudi Arabia and Iraq Oil, Religion, and Enduring Rivalry by Joseph
McMillan. (Special Report, January 2006) Pg. 1.
67
Saudi Arabia is now more than ever concerned about the Palestinian question.
They consider the Palestinian issue to be the root of regional instability and the fuel for
terrorism. An interview in 2006 with Turki al-Faisal, the then Saudi Ambassador to the
United States, clearly expressed their concerns, I think the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is
the primary cause for most of the unrest and terrorism that takes place in the world
today. Just read the literature of all the terrorist organizations, and youll find that they
use this conflict as an excuse, not just to commit their acts, but also to recruit supporters
and support from all over the world.95 The difference of opinion on how to approach
the matter of Palestine and Israel has historically been a source of tension between
Saudi Arabia and the United States and has had an underlying role in most of the major
disputes between the countries. However, over their seventy year friendship they have
been able to rise above these differing opinions and continue to work together.
If we look back at the trends identified pre-September 11 we can see that in the
area of foreign policy no huge change has taken place. It goes without saying that 9/11
strained the special relationship and it has brought conflicting issues to the surface and
exposed them to public debate like never before. Despite passionate reactions from the
public the U.S. government continued to release positive statements about Saudi action
to combat terrorism and began to overhaul its policy towards Saudi Arabia making it
more amenable to cooperation post 9/11. Saudi Arabia did not alter its habit of publicly
95
Transcript of Prince Turki Al-Faisal interview with CNNs Jim Claney, CNNs Your World Today.
January 27. 2006, available at
http://www.saudiembassy.net/2006News/Statements/TransDetail.asp?cIndex=574.
Chapter 4
68
denouncing American actions while quietly backing the United States. It has not
abandoned its balancing act between its Western allies and local anti-Western anti-
American sentiments. And finally, after a decade without a common goal, the U.S.-
Saudi relationship, while differing on how to accomplish it, is once again united in their
foreign policy goals for the region.

69
Chapter Three: The Importance of Oil
Many theorists have considered oil to be the basis of the U.S.- Saudi
relationship. Saudi Arabia provided the oil to the U.S and the U.S. provided military
support to Saudi Arabia. The more dependent on oil the U.S became, the more
interested the United States became in the security of Saudi Arabia. But the influence
oil has had on the U.S.-Saudi relationship is not just a simple exchange of oil for
security.
As described earlier, once Ibn Saud secured the territory needed to create his
Kingdom and the assurances he needed that it would remain independent of European
colonialists, he needed an income that would sustain it. The traditional source of income
which was derived from the annual pilgrimage to Mecca varied each year and was not
going to be sufficient.
Ibn Saud had made some valuable Western friends during the 1920s. One was
Karl Twitchell an American philanthropist who would become an advisor to the new
king. Oil had been discovered by a British company in Bahrain, Saudi Arabias island
neighbor only a few miles off the coast of Saudi Arabias Eastern Province. The
geological makeup of Bahrain and the Eastern Province were very similar and Ibn Saud
wondered if his Kingdom might contain its own valuable minerals. Karl Twitchell agreed
to finance an excavation in the Kingdom looking for new sources of fresh water and the
geological possibility that Saudi Arabia contained oil. Twitchells report was
encouraging. Ibn Saud agreed to allow Twitchell to see if any American oil and mining
70
companies would be interested in an oil concession in Saudi Arabia. A branch of
Standard Oil of California, SoCal, accepted his offer and sent Lloyd Hamilton to Saudi
Arabia to negotiate the concession agreement.
It took three months for SoCal and the Saudis to reach a deal but on May 29,
1933 both parties signed the agreement. SoCal agreed to give the Saudi government
an initial loan of 30,000 and another loan of 20,000 after 18 months. They were also
to pay an annual rental fee of 5,000, the first of which was to be paid in gold. SoCal
was to begin exploring within three months and start drilling no later than three years
after the date of signing the concession agreement. They would continue to drill until the
company gave up the concession or found a commercial size well,2,000 tons of oil per
day. Once a commercial oil field was discovered SoCal would give the Saudi
government 50,000 a year. The agreement was good for 60 years and covered the
whole of the Eastern Province. Neither side fully understood the magnitude of the
agreement they had signed.
Within a month a team of four engineers and geologists were dispatched to
Saudi Arabia to begin surveying the countryside for possible drill sites. The team had
entered a barren desert with no accurate maps or geographical surveys to assist them
in their search. After five years of looking in various locations in the Eastern Provence
with little luck the company finally decided to make an attempt in the desert surrounding
the oasis town of Dammam. Dammam would turn out to be a jack pot! In 1938
Dammam Well Number 7 struck oil. The well began pumping out oil at the rate of over
2000 barrels a day. Within days of striking oil two other wells in Dammam 2 and 4 were
71
deepened to match the depth of Well Number 7 and the result was a gold mine. SoCal
had discovered Saudi Arabias first oil field.
The company made the official announcement to the King on October 16, 1938.
Soon, both Ibn Saud and SoCal, by now renamed the California Arabian Oil Company,
CASCO, realized just what a lucrative discovery they had made. CASCO began building
a pipeline to get the oil to market. In May of 1939 Ibn Saud opened the pipeline in a
grand ceremony. There was no U.S. representative present, only CASCO employees.
That very same month CASCO and Ibn Saud signed a supplemental oil agreement.
Once commercial oil was discovered other nations began offering the King
lucrative oil concessions, both the Germans and the Japanese offered appealing deals,
but the King decided, he wished to deal with no one but CASCO.96 Ibn Saud had
experience with CASCO and they had not interfered with the politics of his country.
Tribal unrest and hostile reaction to foreigners was a constant worry to Saud and
CASCO had proved they could work in harmony with Saudi Arabia. The supplemental
agreement signed in May 1939 reaffirmed the territory already granted to CASCO in the
1933 concession and expanded the territory in which CASCO could explore. This new
agreement gave them a 60 year right to an area of 49,000 square miles next to the
Jordanian and Iraqi borders and to an area of 66, 909 square miles in the Asir, next to
the Yemeni border. The agreement also gave the company access to the Kuwait
Neutral Zone and the Iraqi Neutral Zone. In exchange the company was to pay the
government a bonus of 140, 000 and an annual retainer of 20,000 after the first year.
96
Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. California: Selwa Press, 2007. Pg 139.
72
The company agreed to build a refinery and the Saudi government agreed not to seek
oil rights for five years.97
The sheer size and potential of the concession required CASCO to seek other
U.S. oil company partners. In total six oil companies came together to create the
Arabian American Oil Company, ARAMCO, which remains to this day the predominate
oil company in the Kingdom. In the next few years the company would serve as a life
line and advisor to the King. Madawi Al-Racheed stated, Aramco was the state
subcontractor. It provided vital services water and health provisions for the royal
household in addition to highly visible public projects, consolidating royal authority.98
The company soon realized that, whether they liked it or not, they were becoming an
integral part of the fabric of Saudi Arabia. They soon established their own relations
office to handle this new role as the defacto U.S. government representatives to Saudi
Arabia.
When the war [World War II] interfered they were on the verge of being one of
the major oil producers in the world99 But the heavy industrial supplies needed to
build the Saudi oil industry began to be diverted to the war cause, ARAMCO was forced
to come to a virtual halt. With little income coming from his newly discovered oil field
and with few pilgrims able to make the pilgrimage to Mecca Ibn Saud was quickly going
bankrupt. The prospects for both the Kingdom and the oil company did not look good,
97
Ibid. Pg. 141.
98
99
Ibid. Pg. 193.
73
ARAMCO turned to the U.S. Government. It would be ARAMCO that would lobby to
eventually insure that Saudi Arabia was granted Lend-Lease funds.
Before World War II Saudi Arabia had been primarily dealing with CASCO, an
independent company whose connection to the U.S. government had been relatively
minor but war would bring the U.S. government into the equation. Towards the end of
the war the U.S. began to realize the advantages of having an oil rich ally like Saudi
Arabia. They began investigating the feasibility of buying an interest in ARAMCOs
concession agreement, or at least the rights to ARAMCO oil. A committee that included
members of the State, War, Navy and Interior Departments was formed and created the
Petroleum Reserves Corporation which intended to buy or secure valuable oil reserves
for the U.S. The Corporation, however, was not successful in its efforts and by the end
of the war the government backed corporation did not bid against the American oil
companies but gave up, in part, because of the successful pressure mounted by the
American oil industry, which did not wish to see the government assume an operating
role. It was also a result of the feeling in Congress that such an expression of
government activity into what was normally handled by the private sector would be
unwise.100
The U.S. government would remain outside the Saudi oil concession and Saudi
Arabia would remain one of the few Middle East nations to deal solely with an
independent company. Iraq, Iran and Kuwait all had concession agreements with British
Petroleum or other European based oil companies who were partially state owned. In
100
Chai, Winberg ed., Saudi Arabia: A Modern Reader. University of Indianapolis Press, 2005. Pg. 38.
74
fact the majority of European oil companies did not start to privatize until the 1990s. The
lack of government oversight would allow the concession agreement with ARAMCO to
be conducted largely as a business and not through political negotiations between two
governments. This unique situation would eventually give the Kingdom greater leverage
over their oil and allow it to purchase the industrial hardware from ARAMCO over time
giving it the opportunity to wait until the late 1970s to finalize the purchase of ARAMCO,
which has been renamed Saudi ARAMCO. By this time the nation was industrially ready
and fully capable to take over the industry. It would also allow ARAMCO to operate
independently of U.S. governmental policy. For example, it allowed the Saudis to put
greater pressure on ARAMCO to comply with the Arab embargos against the United
States in 1967 and 1973. Because the U.S. was unable to involve itself in the oil
concession it found alternative methods to connect with the country, namely by offering
military assistance, and pledging to guarantee Saudi territorial integrity.
As the 1940s gave way to the 1950s, the United States State Department began
to worry about extravagant spending by the newly rich oil nations, including Saudi
Arabia, where much of the Royal Familys spending was considered wasteful and
extravagant and went to buying private pleasures . Nevertheless the State Department
decided it was essential to boost the revenue of Saudi Arabia. It did not want to see a
pro-Western nation crumble due to lack of funds. At the same time the Saudis felt that
there was an imbalance in the revenue coming from ARAMCO primarily because, the
U.S. Treasury received higher taxes from ARAMCOs income than Riyadh received in
75
total oil revenue.101 So the oil company and the Saudi government once again revised
their concession agreement creating what would come to be called the 50/50
Agreement. This agreement would give more oil revenue to the Saudi government
without costing the company anything, The trick was to increase payments to the
Saudis at a 5050 rate, but to call the royalty an income tax. Under the foreign tax
credit provisions of the U.S. Tax Code these payments could then be deducted from
income tax.102 However, the agreement was not well received inside the States and
helped create, deep and abiding American cynicism about both the oil industry and
Saudi Arabia, one that continues until today. 103
With this new found wealth, over the next decade Saudi Arabia would embark on
an unprecedented period of economic development and governmental restructuring and
the role of the U.S. government would take a back seat to ARAMCO as the U.S. oil
companies helped develop the infrastructure of a nation.
The official U.S. connection has been to play a vital role in

Saudi security; but a far greater, if less spectacular, role has
been chalked up by ARAMCO. It has been the economic
heart, the pump that drove the society and that made
possible a foreign policy independent of those collective
Arab pressures that might otherwise impede Saudi Arabias
101
Press, 2006. Pg. 55.
102
Press, 2004. Pg. 101.
103
Press, 2006. Pg. 56.
76
development as a modernizing but temperate Islamic

society. 104
As ARAMCO became more and more involved with the day to day activities of
the Kingdom, the company became more than just a company working to remove oil
from the ground. It would become the Kingdoms state contractor and advisor on
international affairs. The biggest demonstration of ARAMCOs ability to act as a liaison
between Saudi Arabia and foreign countries was the Burami Dispute. The border
between Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia had never been firmly
established. In 1951, after ARAMCO geologists surveyed the area and discovered that
the territory of Abu Dhabi might contain large quantities of oil Ibn Saud laid claim to that
land and started an international incident that only avoided conflict because Britain and
the United States stepped in and the nations agreed to an arbitration settlement in
1954. ARAMCO played a large role in preparing the Saudi case. As Malcolm Peck
explained in his book the United Arab Emirates A Venture in Unity, The impressive
scholarly resources of the research division of Aramco were devoted to developing the
case for Saudi Arabia, which rested primarily on establishing tribal loyalties as
demonstrated through payment of Islamic tax, zakat, to representatives of Saudi
Rulers.105 This event helped the two parties form a partnership and learn to work with
and trust each other, Indeed, by the early 1950s ARAMCO had become such an
influence on the development and economy of Saudi Arabia, and so critical to world
104
Indiana University Press, 1998. Pg. Xvii.
105
Peck, Malcolm C. The United Arab Emirates A Venture in Unity. Taylor & Francis Publisher, 1986. Pg
42.
77
energy supplies, that it became a policy issue for the State Department.106 It was this
early bond that would help the two countries to work through the hard political issues of
the 1960s and 1970s keeping oil flowing, revenue coming in and more importantly,
helping to establish Saudi Arabia as the regions stable oil producer. The U.S.- Saudi oil
relationship has served both nations well, however, it is during economic hardship and
when the oil market is extremely volatile that both nations need to reaffirm their position
in the relationship and clearly explain their objectives. Otherwise, as history has shown,
the relationship and the economies of both countries suffer.
The 1960s was the decade of great social change and for newly independent
countries in the region this revolution meant increased nationalization of their oil fields
and the oil companies which had been established by their former colonizers. This new
found independence also led to the need for the world oil exporting nations to work
together to maximize oil revenue and set stable oil prices rather than work to undercut
each other. In this spirit, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia met in Baghdad
in 1960 to create what was to become arguably the worlds most powerful cartel, The
Organization of Petroleum Export Countries. Through the 1960s and into the 1970s
OPEC continued to attract new oil exporting nations. Today the organization has twelve
members which in 2000 produced 40 percent of the worlds oil. Within this organization
Saudi Arabia emerged as a very influential member since by the 1970s it had become
the worlds largest oil exporting nation.
106
Press, 2004. Pg. 46.
78
It would not take long for OPEC to demonstrate to the world just how strong it
could be. As a reaction to Western support for Israel during the 1973 Yam Kippur War
Arab countries placed an oil embargo on its Western buyers. They reduced oil
production and increased prices. The result was one of the worst oil shocks the world
has witnessed. The price of oil nearly quadrupled to $11.50 a barrel by 1974.107 The
Arab states had learned how to use their oil commodity as a weapon. The embargo
caused Western nations to become concerned about the economic ramifications of
being dependent on foreign exports. This concern sparked a movement to reduce
Americas dependence on foreign oil and to conserve energy. Washington also adopted
a new policy. They began to encourage Saudi Arabian royals and businessmen to
invest their new petrodollar wealth in American industry. The new policy was a great
success. Saudi Arabia keeps possibly as much as a trillion dollars on deposit in U.S.
banksan agreement worked out in the early 1980s by the Reagan Administration.108
Western nations resolve to reduce their dependence on Gulf oil and conserve
energy succeeded, to a point. oil use rose more during the stagnant economy of the
1970s (13m b/d) than during the vibrant growth of the 1980-1998 (12m b/d).109 More
significantly, while the demand for more oil was decreasing in the West, it was rapidly
increasing in the newly industrialized nations of Asia.(9m b/d) This shift in oil imports
reduces dependency of Western nations on Gulf oil and raises it among Asian states.
107
Weber, Christopher. What is OPEC? CBS News 17 Jan 2001 <http://www.cbsnews.com>.
108
109
Yizraeli, Sarah. How Important is Saudi Oil? The Middle East Quarterly, March 2000
<http://www.meforum.org/article142 >.
79
This diversification over time will complicate the Gulf States ability to use oil as a
weapon for political gain.
The oil price crisis created a back lash throughout the 1980s and the price of oil
fell from 37.96 to 27.99 dollars a barrel between 1980 and 1985.110 The overflow of
money that those high gas prices had brought to Saudi Arabia during the 1970s began
to dry up. To combat this Saudi Arabia turned to OPEC, hoping that by setting regular
national quotas for oil production the cartel could more equitably manage the price of
oil. Attempting to stabilize oil prices, Saudi Arabia decreased oil output from 10-11
mbd to 2 mbd, and still prices fell as other OPEC members continued to produce above
their assigned quotas.111 As oil prices remained volatile throughout the 1980s and into
the 1990s Saudi Arabia began to act as a swing producer, constantly changing their
output to try and keep the supply of oil on the market stable which in turn would lead to
stable prices for that oil. They swung from producing 15 percent of world output in 1976,
to 16 percent in 1980, to 6 percent in 1985 and back up to 13 percent in 1996.112 While
this may have kept the prices stable, the income that the Kingdom derived from the sale
of oil fluctuated greatly which helped to instill a particular distaste for volatile oil prices
inside the Kingdom.
110
111
Press, 2006. Pg. 185.
112
<http://www.meforum.org/article142 >.
80
The 1990s started off in chaos as Iraq invaded Kuwait and for the first time in
decades the territorial integrity of the Saudi Kingdom was jeopardized. Saudi Arabia
would end up paying a hefty price for U.S. protection during the ensuing Gulf War. By
the Wars end, Saudi Arabias monetary contribution and outstanding commitments
would surpass 60 billion dollars. 113 An amount Saudi Arabia could ill afford to pay.
Washington was convinced that Saudi Arabia still had plenty of easily accessible cash
but this was just not the case. The oil price crash of the 1980s and continued
extravagant spending by the Royal Family to develop the country and increase their
personal wealth was quickly depleting Saudi Arabias coffers. Ambassador [ from
the United States to Saudi Arabia] Freeman worried that the exorbitant requests [from
Washington] would break the Kingdom, preventing it from supporting future American
foreign policy goals, limiting the House of Sauds ability to outspend the Kingdoms
ever-powerful religious establishment, and causing future resentment against the United
States.114
As it turns out the Ambassadors worries were not unfounded. As the decade
progressed the financial strain of continued low oil prices and the expense of the war
began to strain the Kingdom and to adversely affect the U.S.-Saudi relationship. In
1997-1998 the price of oil dropped to 12 dollars a barrel. For Crown Prince Abdullah,
Americas response was just as troubling as the loss of revenue. Washington reveled in
low energy prices which spurred consumption and economic growth. Little heed was
113
Press, 2006. Pg. 198.
114
Ibid. Pg. 198.
81
given to how the declining prices exacerbated domestic turmoil halfway across the
globe.115 To relieve Saudi economic tension Crown Prince Abdullah made an
uncharacteristic move by supporting his fellow OPEC members decision to increase oil
prices by reducing OPEC quotas, by 2000 oil prices rose to nearly $30 dollars a
barrelAbdullah appeared intent on fueling his countrys economic recovery rather than
underwriting the U.S.-Saudi partnership. ..Oil prices became another divisive issue in
the U.S.- Saudi relations116 Saudi Arabia demonstrated to the world that while they
preferred to play the stabilizer, it cannot play this role if its own economy is suffering.
And it has shown that if it has to it will raise oil prices to sustain itself.
The volatile oil market over the past few decades influenced and helped to define
Saudi oil policy and earn it a reputation for playing the worlds oil price stabilizer. As
explained by the Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Ali al-Naimi, there
are four cornerstones of Saudi oil policy, high reserves, low cost of production and
development coupled with unused production capacity; an economy closely linked to oil
production and price, and finally, a stable political system with a dynamic and moderate
economic policy.117 These four areas have been the backbone of Saudi oil policy since
the 1970s. The logic behind them can explain many decisions made by Saudi Arabia
and therefore deserve closer examination.
115
Ibid. Pg. 228.
116
Ibid. Pg 229.
117
Al-Naimi, Ali. Saudi Oil Policy: Stability with Strength. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. Houston,
Texas. 20 Oct 1999.
82
Saudi Arabias large oil reserves, the latest oil discoveries in the middle [of the
Kingdom] led to increasing the Kingdoms reserve of oil and gas, which is estimated to
be 25 percent of the worlds reserves.118 The largest amount held by a single nation.
This massive reserve gives Saudi Arabia the unique ability to influence the oil market
more than any other oil exporting nation. Saudi Arabia has taken this, immense gift
from God and chosen to act as the worlds oil stabilizer, flooding the market to bring
prices down or decreasing output to keep oil prices at a fair value.119
The massive amount of oil reserves combined with not operating at full capacity
on a daily basis gives them the leverage to nudge the oil market up or down when they
choose to. But, maintaining so much spare capacity requires Saudi Arabia to forego
production to the tune of millions of barrels a day, 2.3 mbd in 1997. And the cost of
keeping oil facilitates in a constant state of preparedness requires a further annual
expenditure of around $100 million.120 By flooding the market or reducing output Saudi
Arabia can help control the natural volatile state of the market but also can counteract
its OPEC partners should they want to inflate the price of oil. Saudi Arabias willingness
to bear these costs illustrates its strong commitment to the stability of the world oil
market.121
118
Chai, Winberg ed., Saudi Arabia: A Modern Reader. University of Indianapolis Press, 2005. Pg. 188.
119
Texas. 20 Oct 1999.
120
http://www.meforum.org/article142.
121
Texas. 20 Oct 1999.
83
The oil price hikes of the 1970s followed by the glut in the 1980s helped create
the economic recession of the 1980s. This recession showed Saudi Arabia how
economic turmoil in the United States could hurt the Saudi economy and make the
Middle East more vulnerable to Soviet advances. Controlling oil prices became crucial
to maintaining a stable oil market. We [Saudi Arabia] believe that oil price fluctuations
of more than ten percent are not a healthy sign.122 In many cases fear of creating
economic instability and in order to support the U.S.- Saudi special relationship, Saudi
Arabia has intervened to stabilize oil at the request of America. One such case was
during the 1979 oil crisis. By the middle of 1979 Americans were for the second time in
a decade standing in gas lines. President Carter, had Ambassador West deliver to the
Saudi princes a personal handwritten message asking for an increase in oil
productionThe Saudis complied, bolstering output to 9.5 from 8.5 million barrels a
123
day and ensuring that American gas lines disappeared.
As much as the West relies on oil to run its economy, Saudi Arabia depends on
the exportation of oil to drive its economy. Just as the United States began taking
measures to diversify its oil imports, the Saudis have begun to diversify their economy.
But, in 1999, oil share of our [Saudi Arabian] Gross Domestic Product is about 35
percent, and its share of the governments revenues is about 75 percent. Oils
contribution to the value of our exports is almost 80 percent.124 The sheer volume of
122
Ibid.
123
124
Texas. 20 Oct 1999.
84
income derived from exporting oil ties Saudi Arabian economic welfare to the oil market.
It is in Saudi Arabias as well as its allys interest to keep the price of oil reasonable and
stable.
Saudi Arabia could not act as oil stabilizer if it were not stable internally, a goal
Ibn Saud and his sons have fought to maintain at all costs. Since its founding almost
seventy years ago, Saudi Arabia has been one of the worlds most consistently
dependable countriesespecially so in the Middle East where we stand second to
none.125 After Iran fell to the Islamic Revolutionaries and Iraq was put at the top of the
list of the worlds most dangerous nations, Saudi Arabia emerged as the stable and
friendly oil rich Gulf State. This has only enhanced the U.S.Saudi Relationship and
ensured U.S support for a stable internal Saudi Arabia. The United States could afford
to pursue more aggressive policies towards rogue Gulf States because America knew
Saudi Arabia would work to counteract instability in the price of oil and deflect political
backlash. Successive administrations have shown a clear willingness to bear the costs
of poor relations with oil-rich states. (Libya, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq) Good U.S.-Saudi
relations have given Washingtons decision makers the latitude to curtail the production
of others.126 In return, Saudi Arabia was assured a steady oil income. More importantly
because Saudi Arabia was seen as the one nation who had the capability and
willingness to act to stabilize oil prices, America began to rely on it filling an important
125
Ibid.
126
Press, 2006. Pg. 22.
85
world role. In return America was willing to back Saudi Arabian territorial integrity and
the House of Sauds throne.
In summary, oil for security has been the main stay of U.S.-Saudi relations
throughout their seventy year friendship. Saudi Arabia provided reliable oil to the United
States allowing them to take a more aggressive approach toward unstable Gulf States.
It also drew the United States closer to Saudi Arabia giving it a vital interest in
maintaining Saudi stability. This gave the House of Saud backing from a Superpower
and a unique status among U.S. allies.
This policy has served both nations well for decades but would the extremely
destabilizing acts of 9/11 allow this relationship to continue? Or had Saudi Arabia now
become the destabilizing factor of the Middle East? By 2001 Saudi Arabia was no
longer the major exporter of oil to the United States. Formally the largest foreign oil
supplier of oil to the United States, Saudi Arabia has been exceeded in this role by
Venezuela/and or Canada during recent years. In 2001, 14 percent of U.S imports
came from Saudi Arabia and made up 8.46 percent of the United States total oil
consumption.127 While it may not be the U.S.s largest oil supplier, Saudi Arabias OPEC
quota is still double or triple that of the other OPEC members.
Immediately following the attacks of 9/11both nations were concerned that the
incident might cause an economic crisis spurred by an oil price shock. As stated by the
U.S. Congressional Service in August of 2003,
127
U.S. Congressional Research Service. Saudi Arabia:Current Issues and U.S. Relations (IB93113; Aug.
4, 2003). By Alfred B. Prados. <http://www.crs.com>
86
But, the price spike following 9/11 was brief, and it was too
short-lived to feed through to the overall economy. By
October 2001, the economy was having more effect on the
price of oilin terms of weakening oil demand reducing oil
pricesthan the price of oil was having on the economy.128
The worst did not occur and Saudi Arabias actions have done little to suggest that they
have decided to radically alter their oil policy.
Politically, Saudi Arabia was opposed to the United States invasion of Iraq,
fearing that if not handled just right the country and, by extension, the whole region
could be thrown into turmoil. However, their oil policy remained similar to pre-9/11
procedures.
Saudi Arabias response to the 2008 summer oil price shock and the economic
hardship it caused is another example of how ingrained the four cornerstones of the
Saudi oil policy are, Saudi Arabia has been pumping almost 10 % more than its OPEC
quota of 8.9 mbd.129 This is going against the wishes of many of OPECs major
contributors like Venezuela and Iran who did not want to see the price of oil drop below
$100 a barrel. Saudi Arabias economy still relies mainly on profits from its oil exports,
the lessons of the 1980s still haunt Saudi policy makers, We are concerned about the
permanent destruction of demand, says a Saudi Official. Those who buy hybrid
vehicles are not going back to SUVs. The Saudi Officials fears are well founded given
the revival of the, green movement occurring all over the United States.130
128
Ibid.
129
Reed, Stanely. The Saudis and OPEC:Behind the Flare-up. Business Week 6 Oct 08:045.
130
Ibid.
87
The attacks on September 11th did have a major effect in one area of the U.S.
Saudi oil relationship, it caused a crisis of confidence. For the first time in decades the
United States began to question the abilities and stability of its strongest Middle East
ally. Even if the Royal Family wanted to continue to follow a moderate policy, would
they be able to with increased pressure from radicals within their own country and
OPEC members wanting to pursue different pricing tactics? This, coupled with the
current high gas prices has renewed Americas resolve to reduce dependence on
foreign oil, conserve energy and find alternative means of energy. However, this has
been the reaction of the West to increases in the price of oil for decades and is not
unique to the post 9/11 period. What is new perhaps is the added pressure to save the
Earth and abandon fossil fuels as much as possible in favor of alternative energy
sources. Given the recent precipitous fall in oil prices following a summer of record high
prices at the gas pump, the U.S.- Saudi Relationship might be entering a new era as
Saudi Arabias traditional oil buyers find technologies that make alternative fuel more
feasible.
If we look at the past seventy years we can see that oil and oil prices have
become more and more important to the world economy. And, the U.S. economy [has
become] increasingly reliant on Saudi efforts to moderate oil prices. The economic
intertwining has made it almost impossible for either country to sever its relations with
the other in a pique.131
131
House, 2005. Pg. 79.
88
So what happened when the first major crisis of the 21st century occurred on
September 11, 2001? Relatively little, the long tried policies held up. The supply and
demand for oil remained remarkably steady. Both nations kept the question of oil prices
and the stability of the supply and demand of the oil market separate from the political
tension that occurred immediately following the attacks. The current economic situation
will no doubt affect the U.S.-Saudi oil relationship but since it has been seven years
since the 9/11 attacks it cannot be considered a direct result of the September attacks.
How the two countries choose to work through the current hard economic time will
reveal much about the current strength and longevity of the U.S. Saudi relationship.
Chapter 5
89
Chapter Four: The Need for Security
Equal to his concern over how to fund his new nation was Ibn Sauds concern for
its territorial integrity. He had finally united his kingdom but for as long as anyone could
remember the bedu tribes of the Arab peninsula had been in a constant state of conflict.
Everything about his background led him to believe that he or his sons would at some
point have to fight to maintain the territory just conquered. Traditionally Saudi Arabia,
which had no ability to manufacture military equipment, had relied on their patron nation
or colonial power to provide the bulk of their munitions as well as military training. The
money earned from the discovery of oil gave Saudi Arabia the ability to purchase an
arsenal of military hardware and maintain its own military independent of a protectorate.
Ibn Sauds need to secure his territory and the desire to create a modern military was to
lead to the U.S.- Saudi security relationship.
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Washington had been very limited leading
up to World War II. But as the war progressed the United States increasingly saw the
benefits of establishing close ties with the Arab nation. Of course oil needed to maintain
the war machine was the main draw but the possibility of building an American Army
airfield and being allowed to use Arabian air space would be valuable to the war
mission. After much discussion Roosevelt and the War Department identified specific air
routes over Saudi territory and requested that the Allies be given the right to use these
routes. Because many Arab countries favored the Axis powers rather than support their
former colonizers, many in Washington were skeptical about whether or not Ibn Saud
90
would grant such a request. However, in August of 1942 Ibn Saud approved Americas
request. Access to Saudi airspace was helpful in providing a direct route for aircraft
132
carrying much needed supplies to the Eastern Front
Ibn Sauds approval of Americas use of Saudi airspace did more than just assist
the Allied cause, it meant maintaining the integrity of Saudi territory vital to U.S.
interests and therefore Saudi Arabia was eligible for Lend- Lease funds and military
equipment. In 1943 Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote a memorandum stating
that, Ibn Sauds unswerving sympathy for and loyalty to the Allies cause had been of
inestimable value, and that the Kingdom needed to be added to the list of Lend-lease
countries. 133 Roosevelt agreed with Acheson and in early 1943 Saudi Arabia became
eligible for all the entitlements of the Lend-Lease act. Included in these entitlements was
the supply of military equipment. Ibn Saud wasted no time in requesting arms, The
acting [Saudi] Foreign Minister indicated that the Saudi government could use virtually
any quantity of material available, and that its goal was to equip a force of 100,000
men.134
The request was given much consideration by the War Department. A delegation
was formed to assess the Saudis need for military equipment. The delegation
concluded that military equipment given to Saudi Arabia be limited to equipment needed
to maintain law and order within the Kingdom, any more might risk inciting regional
132
Chai, Winberg ed., Saudi Arabia: A Modern Reader. University of Indianapolis Press, 2005. Pg25.
133
Ibid.
134
Chai, Winberg ed., Saudi Arabia: A Modern Reader. University of Indianapolis Press, 2005. Pg 28.
91
instability. In March 1944 some 1,600 rifles and 350,00 rounds of ammunition arrived
at the American legation in Jidda to be turned over to the Saudis, followed in April 1944
by a twelve man American Military Training Mission headed by Colonel Garret B.
Shomber:135 This first arms deal would launch a long and complicated U.S.- Saudi
military relationship that has culminated in Saudi Arabia becoming the largest purchaser
of American military equipment and the United States sending ground troops to the
country to stop an invasion by Saddam Hussain.
The Training Mission put in place during this first exchange of arms would
become a permanent fixture of the U.S.- Saudi military relationship. The twelve
members of the team would become advisers, trainers, and educators for members of
the Royal family and the Saudi military. With this first exchange Ibn Saud had found his
military backer. By the end of World War II he had found a steady and lucrative source
of national income and military backing from a powerful nation willing to supply him with
arms and munitions.
Even though the war ended before the base could be constructed, it was
completed as planned. The airfield, more than any other tangible achievement in US-
Saudi relations was a touchstone of the quality and durability of the US connectiona
concrete symbol of official U.S. interest in Saudi security.136 The airfield also put a
tangible face to the cultural and ideological differences between the two nations.
Negotiations over the airfield were riddled with difficulty and once constructed it created
135
Ibid. Pg. 30.
136
Indiana University Press, 1998. Pg 21.
92
tension in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Saudi government repeatedly tried to levy
fines on U.S. military personnel, no U.S. flag could be flown on the airfield, no church
services could be performed in a chapel, no chaplains could enter the country under
that name and no Jewish personnel could be stationed on the base.137 To the Saudis
the airfield became a symbol of Western style modernization that was believed to have
a negative influence on the Wahabi population. By 1962 the base was turned over
completely to the Saudis.
The relatively uneventful and non-hostile manner in which the airfield was turned
over to the Saudi government demonstrates that the United States and Saudi Arabia
had the capacity to work through tense situations to find a mutually beneficial solution.
Despite the Saudi skepticism surrounding the role of the American base, vital military
training, cross cultural education and development of Saudi infrastructure had been set
in motion during the 15 years of American operation which paved the way for decades
of joint military cooperation.
World War II Lend-Lease funds, military supplies and the Dhahran Airfield laid
the foundation for the U.S. Saudi oil for security partnership based on the premise that
Saudi Arabia would supply oil and the United States would guarantee the territorial
integrity of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdoms ability to put oil on the market quickly during
times of crisis is the most obvious benefit the United States gains from good relations.
In return for this, the United States extends to Saudi Arabias leadership a security
137
Ibid. Pg 84.
93
umbrella, including a commitment to its territorial integrity. 138 The Saudis frequently
question the resolve of the United States commitment to Saudi Arabia and have spent
millions to bolster their own military forces. As for the United States, throughout the 20 th
Century presidents including Eisenhower, Reagan, Carter and George W. H. Bush,
during the 1990 Gulf Crisis, reaffirmed their commitment to Saudi Arabia.
Unfortunately, when it comes to the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy has not
always been consistent. In the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars the United States
backed Israel. In 1978 the United States refused to sell advanced weaponry to the
Kingdom, largely because of the Jewish lobby in Washington and in 1979 the U.S. did
little to help the Shah of Iran, one of the United States closest Middle East allies when
he lost his country to the Ayatollah Khomeni. For these reasons the Saudis have always
had a doubt about U.S. political will. This combined with possible external threats
presented by Iran, Iraq and Israel, civil unrest in neighboring countries and possible
internal instability to Saudi leaders all represent very viable threats to Saudi security.
The Saudis understand their country will not be taken seriously in the world community
without the ability to defend itself; therefore Saudi Arabia has from the earliest days had
the goal of military independence.
The constant need for affirmation of the U.S. military commitment to Saudi Arabia
stems from the United States special relations with Israel, the perceived enemy of the
Arab world. The close ties the United States has with both Israel and Saudi Arabia has
often put Washington in the middle of the tension between the Jewish state and its Arab
138
Press, 2006. Pg 3.
94
neighbors. One notable area of tension is the sale of arms. In fact, the key to
understanding the recurring obstacles, objections, and rejections encountered in
attempting to sell advanced weapons to Saudi Arabia is the special relationship that
exists between the United States and Israel.139 Put simply, both nations feel they have
a vested interest to who the United States chooses to sell arms. Saudi Arabia fears
Israeli aggression and believes it has a right to defend itself with the best equipment
and training money can buy while Israel believes that if Saudi Arabia is allowed to
acquire advanced weapons then those systems will be used directly or indirectly against
Israel. The debate between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia over the sale of arms to Saudi
Arabia defined the US-Saudi military relationship during the 1970s and 1980s.
The petrodollars that filled the Saudi coffers during the 1970s for the first time
allowed Saudi Arabia to develop a modern and fully independent military. Saudi Arabia
had the cash to purchase all the modern equipment it needed but from whom? The
logical choice given the economic and military connection was the United States. In
addition, most of the military infrastructure inside the Kingdom was already configured
for U.S. standards. The challenge would be to convince Congress to allow the arms
sale to take place.
Impressed with King Khalid and Saudi Arabias prudent attitude towards peace in
the Middle East, in 1978 President Carter agreed to support the long standing request
from Saudi Arabia to purchase F-15 planes. One of the things that I wanted to do, as a
matter of fairness and as a matter of strategic importance to the United States, was to
139
95
help equip Saudi Arabia to defend itself.140 The possible arms sale would also mean
huge profits for U.S. businesses and provide jobs. The 1978 F-15 fighter plane sale
would produce a $5 billion contract and would give two hundred and fifty thousand
jobs.141
However, the proposed arms sale became an immediate cause for concern. The
American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was adamantly opposed to a sale of
arms to Saudi Arabia and put the full might of the Jewish lobby behind stopping the
proposed arms deal and submitted a resolution to Congress asking for their refusal. The
media was also against the sale arguing that Saudi Arabia would be willing to hold
America hostage and deploy the oil weapon should Saudi Arabia not get what they
wanted. Unfortunately, as the debate over the sale of weapons carried on throughout
the year the sale took on a much more symbolic meaning than an exchange of
equipment, as the Foreign minister of Saudi Arabia stated , the plane sale has
become symbolic in our minds. It is a symbol of whether or not the United States will
remain a dependable friend of the Saudis.142 AIPAC too, turned the arms sale into a
test of the United States allegiance to Israel. On May 16, 1978 the Senate voted 54-44
against the proposal to stop the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had won this
round.
140
141
Ibid. Pg 60.
142
Ibid. Pg 61.
96
The following year was one of revolution throughout the Middle East including
within Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia radical fundamentalists opposed to the Royal
Family stormed and occupied the Holy Mosque in Mecca. In Iran the U.S. chose not to
assist the Shah, a close ally to the U.S., during the fundamentalist led revolution which
led to his being deposed .These two events raised Saudi concerns about the stability of
the region and the resolve of their military backer to intervene if needed. The Saudi
government decided to approach the United States about the possibility of adding
certain advanced weapons systems to their 1978 sale. President Regan saw no reason
to deny the Saudi request and in December of 1980 a package was submitted to
Congress asking to sell the Saudis 5 AWACS aircraft, fuel tanks, multiple injection
racks, tankers for refueling in midair, and Sidewinder Air-to-Air missiles.143
Once again AIPAC took their concerns to Congress and put forth a proposal to
stop the sale and the debate began to gain international interest. Israeli Prime Minister
Mahakam Begin began speaking in anger against America for considering the sale. This
angered President Reagan and many statesmen in Washington as they felt Israel had
over stepped its bounds. Whereas the Saudis were seen to be working in a positive
manner with the U.S. administrationcirculating a Middle East peace plan and
providing more oilin contrast, an angry Prime Minister Begin went on the attack.144
The Israeli lobby was not alone, not everyone opposed to the deal was a friend of
Israel. Many just thought AWACS technology was too important to be under Saudi
143
Ibid. Pg 63.
144
Ibid. Pg 80.
97
ownership and control. 145 However, distain for how the Israelis handled the arms
situation did help the deal go through. These arms sales produced more than a lucrative
business deal and an exchange of military hardware. It also strengthened the
relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Symbolically Saudi Arabia
felt the United States had chosen to support its Arab allies over the Israelis.
Only a few years later, in 1985 Saudi Arabia requested more F-15s and this time
AIPAC was successful in its endeavor to stop the sale. What the U.S. did do, however,
was to facilitate a $400 million joint U.S. British arms deal with Saudi Arabia where the
British supplied the advanced technology and the United States brokered the deal.
America was also not willing to supply surface to surface missiles which Saudi Arabia
had requested as a deterrent to the growing threat of the new Iranian regime. When it
became apparent that the United States was not going to supply the missiles the Saudis
began shopping elsewhere.
Just as the success of the earlier arms sales had boosted Saudi confidence in
the reliability of their ally, the failure of the 1985 arms sale diminished it. The Saudis
were frustrated and as the former Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince
Bandar ibn Sultan stated, Please explain to me, maybe I am dense, how is Israel safer
by us going to Britain and buying one hundred twenty first-line-of-fire and strike air-
planes, instead of buying forty airplanes from you?146
145
House, 2005. Pg 107.
146
98
Saudi Arabia still wanted missiles and knew that America and its Western allies
were not willing to sell advanced missiles to the Kingdom so King Fahd decided to do
the unthinkable and approach China about purchasing some of their CSS-2 long range
ballistic missiles which normally contain nuclear warheads. Prince Bandar, while in
China on a joint U.S.-Saudi mission concerning weapon supplies to Iran, secretly
approached China about the sale. Bandars deal was successful. In 1988 half of the
missile order was inside the Kingdom when U.S intelligence spotted the missiles.
Believing that the missiles were regularly armed CSS-2 weapons the United States
went into a state of alert, worried that Saudi Arabia had acquired nuclear weapons. The
Chinese-Saudi missile deal stunned Washington which had naively thought that neither
Beijing nor Riyadh would alter the balance of power in the Middle East without checking
with the U.S.147 The U.S. was terrified that the nuclear weapons in the region would be
a threat to Middle East stability. Fifty U.S. senators and 187 members of the House
wrote a letter stating that, Our government must make unequivocal its absolute
opposition to the presence of Chinese missiles, which represents a new and grave
threat to the peace of the region.148 And the U.S. government demanded that, at the
very least, weapons inspectors be allowed to inspect the weapons to verify Saudis
claim that the missiles had been modified and were not nuclear. Riyadh refused arguing
that their country had the right to secure their own defense by any means necessary
147
148
99
since the United States was not willing to provide all the equipment Saudi Arabia felt
they needed.
U.S. fears of these weapons causing regional instability were not unreasonable.
A few days after the discovery of the Saudi CSS-2 missiles, Prime Minister Shamin of
Israel made a public announcement that expressed Israels concerns over Saudis new
weapons and that Israel was willing to take any means necessary to insure their
security even if that meant preemptive action. A few days later Saudi Arabian
intelligence reported that Israeli jets were flying near Aqaba in what could be
preparations for an attack on Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Bandar conveyed to the United
States that the missiles purchased by his government were for defensive purposes only
and would Washington please explain that to Israel. I can assure you that if we are
attacked by the Israelis Saudi Arabia will have no option but to retaliatecome what
may. My government would not survive an attack by Israel without retaliating. So, for
Gods sake, tell the Israelis that.149 Backed by U.S. intelligence the Israelis were
persuaded to back off and the situation was quickly diffused.
Going to China for weapons broke three unwritten rules in the Saudi- US
relationship. One, they had not informed the U.S. two, for the first time it looked as if
Saudi Arabia was interested in nuclear proliferation and three it seriously
engaged/discussed with a communist state.150 While the crisis was acute and quickly
diffused it changed the mentality in Washington. Gone was the naive belief that Saudi
149
Ibid.
150
Press, 2006. Pg 189.
100
Arabia would put aside their own self interest to please America. Further, they made it
very clear that while they had previously waited on America to sell them military
equipment from now on they were prepared to buy from any willing supplier if
necessary. However, the crisis does not seem to have caused any long lasting damage
to the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Within weeks of the crisis the Saudi Arabian government
signed the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, slowly concerns about Saudi s nuclear
ambitions subsided and the United States agreed to reconsider arms sales to the
Kingdom.
It would not take long for a major world crisis to occur requiring close military
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The 1990 Gulf War would be
the pinnacle of joint U.S.- Saudi cooperation. Operation Desert Storm was an
operational success but caused considerable political backlash from critics who
objected to letting foreigners inside the country to protect Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath
of the Gulf War arms deals worth billions of dollars were concluded between Saudi
Arabia and the United States. In1993 the U.S. agreed to sell 7 billion dollars of military
goods including the F-15XP jet fighter, a less advanced version of the U.S Air Forces F-
15E. At the time technology that advanced had never been sold to a foreign nation.
While the F-15XP will utilize the F-15Es airframe, the operational
capabilities of the plane are controlled through the type of hardware
placed on the aircraft and software modifications. We are not
providing the most advanced munitions carried by the U.S. Air Force
F-15Es.151
151
Ford, Carl Jr. Sale of F-15 Aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Part III. The Defense Institute of Security
Assistance Management Journal. Winter 1992/93 <
http://www.dsca.mil/pubs/Indexes/Vol%2015_2/Ford%20Jr.pdf.>
101
Like most other arms sales to the Kingdom the 1992-1993 arms deal caused
much debate in Washington. But unlike the 1978, 80 and 84 deals the question of
Israels security rated lower on the list of concerns even though the Madrid Conference
and the Oslo Peace talks were occurring simultaneously. These two conferences were
the first attempt by the international community to host Palestinian and Israeli peace
talks. The debate on the Hill focused on sustaining U.S. jobs in a weak economy and
concern that if not provided by the United States the Saudis would get what they
needed elsewhere.
Without the sale, production lines at the McDonnell Douglas

Corporation, which builds the aircraft, will begin closing, possibly as
soon as the summer say Pentagon officials who favor the sale.
McDonnell Douglas officials say as many as 7,000 workers most at a
plant in St. Louis could lose their jobs by 1994. By comparison the
Saudi dealcould keep the assembly lines open through 1997[.]
152
The aggressive job now campaign that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation launched
on the Hill during an election year made the issue of sustaining the U.S. industrial
infrastructure very influential during debate of the sale. Another consideration was the
Saudis determination to acquire the weapons they deemed necessary for their defense,
even if denied weapons from the U.S., as evidenced by their 1985 purchase of CSS-2
Chinese missiles.
152
Schmit, Eric. White House, Anxious Over Jobs, Weighs Sale of 72 f-15s to Saudis. The New York
Times 26 Feb. 1992 < http://www.nytimes.com.>
102
The Saudis make it quite clear that while they prefer American technology they
would, if necessary, meet their legitimate defense needs elsewhere. 153 Given the close
interaction the two militaries had during the Gulf War and the unstable atmosphere of
the region after Saddam had been allowed to remain in power, the situation in the
Middle East during 1992-1993 suggested that close military cooperation between the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia was going to continue for some years to come. If this was the
case, then having a Saudi military infrastructure capable of supporting advanced U.S.
equipment seemed to many on the Hill the logical course of action. The previous sale of
U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia had provided interoperability between the two armies that
had proved invaluable during the war. This was at risk of being lost if Saudi Arabia
bought weapons outside the United States at a time when the question of continued
U.S. presence in the country was still very much an option, Our success in Desert
Storm depended heavily on the availability of a first rate, American designed military
infrastructure, particularly with the Saudi F-15 air bases that were constructed with such
a contingency in mind.154 The weapons sale was approved and boosted Saudi Arabia
to the position of being the largest purchaser of U.S. military equipment.
The Saudi government has spent billions on the defense of its nation. From
1987-97 Saudi Arabia is estimated to have spent 262 billion constant 1997 dollars on its
military with its annual military expenditure equaling 18 % of GNP over the same
153
154
Ibid.
103
period.155 This expenditure does not seem to have done the job sufficiently, a criticism
many Saudi citizens as well as jihadists used against the Royal Family when the U.S.
military came to the aid of Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. People began to wonder
what the government was doing if after purchasing all these weapons they still could not
defend their own borders. Military experts concluded that regardless of the amount of
advanced technological equipment the size of the country compared to its population
makes it unlikely that they could defend themselves. The Chief of U.S. Naval
Intelligence has said that, regardless of long term plans to expand their military with the
purchase of equipmentit is doubtful that the Saudis would be able to counter threats
from Iran and Iraq completely. 156 This helps explain the overwhelming concern Saudi
Arabia has with its security and the continued emphasis its places on the security
relations it shares with the United States.
Indirect support through the sale of arms and direct support by sending U.S.
forces to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War are not the only methods the Saudis and the
Americans have used to build a strong military relationship; they have also
institutionalized joint training missions. The United States Military Training Mission
(USMTM) has been an integral part of the Saudi-U.S. military relationship. Formally
organized in 1953 as part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the
United States and Saudi Arabia, the training missions original objective was to
Assist and advise Saudi Arabias armed forces with respect to plans, organization,
155
Federation of American Scientists. U.S. Arms Client Profile- Saudi Arabia. 10 Nov. 2008
<http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm>.
156
Ibid.
104
administrative principles and training methods.157 The USMTM is made up of a small
team of U.S. military personal that have resided in the Kingdom since the mutual
agreement was signed, regardless of the movement of other U. S. military personnel.
The Mission has also provided training and support for the weapons purchased by the
Saudis from the United States over the years. The USMTM has maintained this strong
presence in the Kingdom by tailoring its mission to meet the needs of the changing
Saudi military.
The emphasis of the mission has shifted from procurement of weapons to
sustaining those weapons, to being able to operate the technology but the Missions
objectives have remained remarkably constant over its sixty years of operation. The
Mission has done more than just keep the two militaries in constant communication,
Since 1997 the USMTM plan has focused on synchronizing the six imperatives of
modernization doctrine; manning, force structure, training, leader development, and
logistics systems in order to assist the Saudi Arabia[n] armed forces in fully capitalizing
their long term defense investment. 158 The close cooperation afforded by the USMTM
also provides a primary outlet for constant communications at a personal and general
staff level creating a foundation for military cooperation during a crisis situation. Better
knowledge and understanding of a countrys military capabilities and their propensity to
act on those capabilities allows for better informed, sounder judgment calls when
157
Sharp, Travis and Mounts, Katie. As Substitute for Diplomacy, $20 Billion U.S. Arms Deal Falls
Short. Center For Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Jan. 2008 <
<http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/arms_deal_falls_short.pdf >.
158
Ibid.
105
advising policy makers and is one reason that the USMTM has remained in operation
for so many years.
The American promise to protect Saudi Arabias security goes back as far as
World War II and the U.S.s first dealings with the new Kingdom. Territorial security has
played a large part in Saudi Arabian regional politics. Saudis have never
underestimated the volatility of the region. Their attempt to buy AWACS, F-15, and
Chinese missiles all speak to their determination to protect themselves.159 The region
has proven to be a volatile area and the more the world relied on oil the more important
the stability of the worlds largest oil producer became. Both nations had something the
other needed and this mutual need bound the two countries together on the basis of oil-
for-security.
The Gulf War was the pinnacle of U.S.- Saudi military cooperation but the ease
and speed with which the U.S military was able to deploy and prepare for operations in
the area was made possible by bilateral military exchanges that had been in place for
years. By the time the events of September 11, 2001 came around the security
relationship had proved its resiliency. It had been tested politically through trying arms
sale negotiations and tactically through joint operations during Desert Storm. But these
challenges would prove to be fundamentally different than those presented by the para-
military attacks of 9/11. For the first time the aggression was not one nation against
another nation but from non-governmental actors attacking the United States. As it
turned out these non-government actors were predominately from Saudi Arabia. It was
159
106
important for the United States to determine to what extent the Saudi government was
willing to combat these non-governmental terrorist organizations. Without their support,
fighting such terrorist organizations as al-Qaeda would be much more difficult.
The attacks caused a national debate on just how important oil was to American
society and if insuring the supply of oil was worth American lives. This question was by
no means a new one and had filled hundreds of articles in the press and hours of air
time during Desert Storm but unlike in 1990 this time there was no traditional enemy.
The attacks, to the American mind, were senseless and perpetrated my citizens of a
nation which only ten years before America had gone to war to defend.
This debate has spurred a resurgence of the movement to rid America of its
dependence on foreign oil and oil in general; however we are not there yet. And stable
and inexpensive oil prices are still necessary to support the U.S. economy. Despite a
few tense years, the 9/11 attacks have not altered the roots of the oil for security
relationship. Saudi Arabia maintained its role as price stabilizer and the United States
has continued to supply the country weapons and improve military cooperation by the
continued presence of the USMTM.
In the summer of 2007 the Bush administration announced the possible sale of
20 billion dollars worth of high-tech weapons systems to Saudi Arabia and its fellow Gulf
Cooperation Council member states. The sale was to include upgrades to the Saudi
AWACS systems, the Saudi missile systems to include PAC-3 surface to-surface
missiles and upgrades to the Saudi Naval Eastern Fleet. The sale also proposed selling
the highly advanced satellite guided bomb technology JDAMS. The goal of this
107
proposed sale was, as Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns stated, to, enable these
countries to strengthen their defenses and therefore, to provide a deterrence against
Iranian expansion and Iranian aggression in the future.160
The announcement was met in the U.S. with some resistance. Congress had not
blocked an arms sale since 1991 but in August 2007 a bipartisan letter objecting to the
proposed sales was given to President Bush and in October the Representative from
New York and the Representative from Florida announced that they intended to
propose a bill blocking the sale of JDAM technology to Saudi Arabia. This was followed
in November by another letter objecting to the sale of equipment to Saudi Arabia. In
light of the number of signatures opposed to the sale, the Bush administration was
facing a possible block of the sale by Congress.
The letters questioned the reliability of Saudi Arabia as an ally and argued that
these weapons might be used on U.S. targets in the near future. Given the strict
opposition, the Bush administration decided to break the arms sale into smaller nation
by nation packages. Congress was given official notification of the sale of weapons to
Middle East countries including Saudi Arabia in January of 2008. The final proposed
package was worth 11 billion dollars and, the sale of advanced JDAM technology to
160
108
Saudi Arabia was conspicuously omitted[.]161 The package ultimately went through to
include 123 million dollars in JDAM equipment.162
Israel remained remarkably calm during the debate, In a break from historic
Israeli opposition to U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
saidhis country understands Washingtons plan to supply state-of-the-art weapons to
Riyadh as a counterweight to Iranian influence.163 However, the Bush administration
had already secured Israeli defenses by proposing a new package to Israel. The
proposed package comes with a serious sweetener for Israel; a 25 % increase in U.S.
military aid from an annual 2.4 billion at present to 3 billion a year and guaranteed for
ten years. 164 For the first time in arms sale history the Israeli opposition did not lead
the fight on the Hill to stop the sale of weapons.
September 11 has not fundamentally altered the U.S.- Saudi military relationship.
Both nations have continued to support the relationship, deciding that ultimately the
need for a stable supply of reasonably priced oil is balanced by the requirement to
support the Saudi military from all threats to its sovereignty, both from external and
home grown sources. The continued willingness of the United States to provide arms
161
Ibid.
162
Cordesman, Anthony. The Gulf Arms Sale: A Background Paper. Saudi- US Relations Information
Service. Feb 5 2008 < http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008.ioi.080205-cordesman-arms.html.>
163
Israel Signs off on U.S. Arms Sale to Saudis. Associated Press 29 July 2007
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/2003692.>
164
Ibid.
Chapter 6
109
and advanced technology demonstrates that despite tense political times the military
relationship remains secure.

110
Chapter Five: The Struggle Over Modernization
The interaction between Saudi Arabia and the United States is unique among
most of the relationships between Western countries and developing nations. From the
time that small groups of geologists arrived on the Eastern Coast of Saudi Arabia they
became unofficial ambassadors for America, American industry and American ideals
that would eventually play an integral role in the development and modernization of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia
was anything but a traditional foreign aid relationship because of ARAMCO. The unique
manner in which ARAMCO represented the United States in influencing and developing
Saudi Arabia demonstrates that with great patience on both sides, the partnership
system can work to the satisfaction of both parties.165
When we think back on the world of 1936, the year the first group of CASCO
geologists arrived in Saudi Arabia, it was the beginning of an era of amazing
development for the new country. Saudi Arabia, just recently unified from warring bedu
tribes, was poised to become a modern Kingdom. The desert on which CASCO
employees first stepped was little changed from the time of Mohamed but as Wallace
Stegner put it in his book Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil, Since 1950, when the
pipeline (tapline) was completed, the life of those northern deserts has changed more
than in the preceding thousand years.166
In 1936 Saudi Arabia was barely 10 years old and the foundations of a modern
165
Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. California: Selwa Press, 2007. Pg. pxxvii.
166
Ibid. Pg. xxii.
111
state government were rudimentary if they existed at all. In the 1920s and 1930s state
employees did not receive salaries; they were given annual gifts which left them totally
dependent on the generosity of the king. There were no schools, hospitals, roads,
banks, or government institutions. 167
In 1939 CASCO struck oil and Ibn Saud increased their concession which
allowed CASCO an even larger territory in which to explore. With the discovery of such
vast amounts of oil everyone knew that change was coming to the Kingdom. New towns
sprung up as the company began building the necessary infrastructure needed to get
the oil to market. For many Saudis these new towns were their first introduction to a
modern way of life. The towns, again in the words of Wallace Stegner in Discovery! The
Search for Arabian Oil, became an outpost for the West and America, a demonstration
not only of American skills but also of American culture. Even the most trivial contacts
and the most unthinking acts were significant, [.]168 All this change so close to the
consolidation of the Kingdom, and the bedus natural distaste for change, put stress on
both sides, the companys growing activity forced expansion of the government
bureaucracy to handle it. It was not merely that Saudi Arabia as a unified nation was
barely ten years old and still developing its agencies, problems utterly unknown up to
that time in the whole history of the Arabian Peninsula had to be met.169
167
168
Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. California: Selwa Press, 2007. Pg. xxiii.
169
Ibid. Pg 10.
112
The onset of World War II brought added stressors but it also introduced another
powerful actor to the situation, the U.S. government. Until that point the primary contact
between Saudi Arabians and Americans had been the oil contractors sent over by
CASCO. But a few years into the war CASCO found it increasingly difficult to continue
the development of the oil fields because they were not able to purchase the necessary
equipment and Ibn Sauds treasury was running dry. It was decided that CASCO would
approach the U.S government on behalf of Saudi Arabia to request their help. This was
the start of the military alliance but also of a more involved relationship between the two
governments. The aid given to the Saudi government allowed CASCO to survive the
war years and develop into ARAMCO. And ARAMCO would come to play an integral
part in the development of the Kingdom. By the late 1940s and into the 1950s,
ARAMCO was the state subcontractor.
ARAMCOs influence was not limited to the oil industry. They soon found their
experience was needed in a wide variety of areas. To accommodate these demands a
whole department was opened with this goal in mind. As exlplained by Wallace Stegner,
the Local Industrial Development Department (LIDD) whose goal was to

assist Arab enterprise The program had three stages: the employment
of Arabs, establishment of independent Arab contracting and
merchandising to serve the company, development of homegrown private
industry. LIDD led the Eastern Province into the American consumptive
pattern and the productive patterns that supply it: Think of this as good or
bad, as you will: it is what the Saudis themselves wanted what,
ultimately, they will not be denied. 170
170
Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. California: Selwa Press, 2007. Pg xxxiii.
113
Many of these young Saudis employed by ARAMCO would be sent abroad for
education and return to run the company one day.
The 1950s were a time of growth and change for Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom had
found a source of sustainable income and political power had been consolidated by the
House of Saud. Five new ministries were created, the Ministries of the Interior,
Communication, Agriculture and Water, Health and Education. It would take years for
these ministries to be truly functional but a modern bureaucracy was beginning to form.
In 1952 the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was created and designed by the
American contractors. This organization has remained the back bone of the Saudi
currency. It has helped to create fiscal stability inside the Kingdom, essential in
maintaining political stability during difficult times. The growth and change represented
by the creation of these ministries should not be overlooked. The mental adjustment
needed to accept modern economic practices from men who ten years earlier
considered a national treasury to be a chest filled with gold pieces and guarded by men
with swords is no small feat.
The key to sustaining the staggering level of growth and maintaining stability was
balance; a balance between the religious clerics, whose support was needed to validate
the legitimacy of the House of Saud, and the Western modernization and influence
brought by ARAMCO. Ibn Saud was able to create a balance between these two
groups by setting clear boundaries for both when he established the Kingdom. This
balance allowed the Kingdom to develop while at the same time adhering to the strict
114
Wahabi religion. Maintaining this balance would fall to his sons and become the lynch
pin in U.S.- Saudi relations.
If the1950s focused on industrial growth and the creation of basic ministries, the
1960s would focus on the operation of the newly created ministries and the introduction
of modern luxuries to the Saudi population. In 1962 King Faisal made a visit to the
United States to request assistance in creating a national television network in the
Kingdom. President Kennedy obliged and decided that the U.S. Corps of Engineers
would be sent to Saudi Arabia to help establish their television system. This agreement
began a new phase in the relations between Washington and Riyadh in which active-
duty U.S. government personnel, military and civilian, took an increasingly broad and
direct role in operations of the Saudi Arabian state.171 Until the 1960s the main
interaction between Saudis and Americans had been based on the oil industry. Even
the establishment of major ministries and industrial buildings had all been centered on
making the Kingdom able to independently sustain its oil business. But the television
agreement brought a cadre of Americans who were not involved in the oil business
or construction. They were the vanguard of what would become a substantial, more or
less permanent, American presence throughout the Kingdom.172
The Saudis were also discovering that a modern infrastructure was easier to
create than to run. To this end in 1963 Faisal went one step further and signed a
contract with the Ford Foundation to help the Saudis establish a functioning
171
Press, 2004. Pg 114.
172
Ibid. Pg 118.
115
bureaucracy. Thomas Lippman explains, Fords role was to provide assistance in,
training the personnel needed to properly staff the civil service, improving the
organization and procedures of existing governmental agencies; creating certain new
agencies and institutions; transferring functions between agencies; and finally helping to
develop the governments capacity to plan and implement programs and projects.173
The Ford Foundation stayed in the Kingdom for 15 years providing advice and
guidance but the Foundation was not completely happy with the Saudis reaction to their
advice and the Saudis were not happy with the degree of progress. Despite many
setbacks, in 1967 the Ford Foundation helped the Saudis create the Central Planning
Organization. Led by Hisham Nazer the country instituted five year plans to help give
some loose direction to the Kingdoms development. But the cooperation between the
Ford Foundation and the Saudi government ended in 1976 when the Saudis did not
renew their contract, because Saudi Arabia had imported a new and much larger
American organization to help them operate their government ministries and public
agencies; The United States Department of the Treasury.174 Both the Saudis and the
United States had entered a new stage of cooperation, one that would have an impact
beyond anything else. The Saudi government was no longer getting advice from
independent U.S. companies but directly from the U.S government. Failure and
successes would now be linked directly to the influences of the United States
government.
173
Ibid. Pg 142.
174
Ibid. Pg 152.
116
One other important change came with the decision to switch to the United
States Department of the Treasury. The new Saudi agencies would invariably be
created on an American model because that is what the Department of the Treasury
was familiar with and it had worked for the American civil system. The organization of a
country helps define the nations civil society. During the 1970 and 1980s the Saudi civil
society was in a very fluid state, the impact that these new bureaucracies would have
would run deeper than the simple reorganization of a nation.
From time to time the west has reorganized itself based on different philosophies
of governance; the way a country organizes itself reflects the basic philosophy of the
society. The creation of a system based on Western, and more specifically American,
principles in Saudi Arabia provided a constant American influence in the developing
nation. Whether it was provided by CASCO, ARAMCO, the Ford Foundation or the
Department of Treasury this created a deep bond between the two nations.
The name given to the Department of the Treasury Commission was the Joint
Economic Cooperation Commission. (JECOR) JECOR s mission was far more involved
than the Ford Foundations had been and went beyond simple training. The
Commissions objectives were to develop more than just Saudi bureaucracy but also to
encourage agriculture, trade, technology and science and manpower development.175
JECOR had the potential to entrench the U.S. deeply in the Kingdom, fortifying the
concept of mutual interdependence, which was exactly Washingtons goal. 176
175
Ibid. Pg 167.
176
Ibid. pg 159.
117
Like so much of Saudi-Western relations JECOR was unlike any other kind of
foreign aid, the Saudis paid for it. They simply bought U.S. knowledge with the goal of
tailoring it to fit themselves. Creating a sustainable Saudi bureaucracy was in fact one of
the goals of the Commission. By the late 1990s the Saudis had reached the point
where they no longer felt they needed the kind of assistance JECOR was providing.
They wanted to decide how to spend their own money. In Charles Schottas( Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and US Coordinator of the Commission) view, that
was a sign of mission accomplished: Our objective was to move Saudis to the point
where they didnt need this service.177 Since the public has begun to be better
educated about the U.S.- Saudi relationship people are beginning to question the U.S.
governments motives. As a result, JECOR has come under considerable scrutiny
recently. One concern is that JECOR was never a formal agreement and therefore did
not require Congressional approval or oversight. Given the depth of exchange between
the two nations, some question the motives of the government avoiding Congressional
input.
The transfer of knowledge and technology from west to east put great pressure
on the delicate balance between the conservative Ulema and the House of Saud.
Pressure to maintain this balance has dominated the relationship since the Kingdom
was established. By the 1960s and 1970s the life of an average Saudi citizen was being
impacted by western modernization and this sparked a Saudi national debate
177
Ibid. pg 177.
118
surrounding the issue. The backlash from this debate would eventually spill across the
Saudi border and morph into terrorist acts both inside and outside of the Kingdom.
As far back as the 1960s groups of Saudis began to question how western ideals
and technology fit into their Wahabi belief structure. Some that felt the country was
being held back by strict adherence to Wahabi ideals, others that western influence was
damaging to the very nature of Islam and the balance of the world. Many chose to give
voice to their opinions through violence.
The agreement between Kennedy and Faisal ushered in a new era of U.S.-
Saudi cooperation but the decision to introduce television to Saudi Arabia would end
with violence. In September 1965 Prince Khalid Ibn Musaid, a grandson of Ibn Saud,
would join with a group of extremists who believed modernization in Saudi Arabia had
gone too far. They attacked the new television station killing the Kings emissaries. King
Faisal had police storm the building and the young Prince was killed. The debate over
modernization had become violent.
Many looked at the television event as an anomaly but in 1979 the question of
modernization would again become the main issue of public debate when a small group
of extremists stormed the Holy Mosque in Mecca. This extremist group was a precursor
to todays Al-Qaeda organization. The events taken to end the siege would alter the
direction of Saudi Arabias modernization and ultimately tip the delicate balance of
power between the Ulema and the House of Saud. In order to end the siege the Ulema
issued fatwas to give the King permission to have his military and police shoot, even kill,
the terrorists in the mosque. The fatwas granted by the Ulema allowing killing within in
119
the walls of the mosque came at a costly price to the Royal Family. The Ulemas
conditions for sanctioning the attack allowed them to regain considerable influence over
future government behavior. [U]nlike their elders, the new generation of clerics did not
limit their sermons to religious topics, but rather publicly criticized the leaderships
(Royal Family) domestic and foreign policies.178
The violence has not always been perpetrated by those looking to halt
modernization. King Faisal, considered to be forward thinking, was assassinated by a
violent modernist who felt that Saudi Arabia was not developing fast enough. The man
who confessed to killing the King explained his reason as wanting to, end the rule of
Islam in Saudi Arabia , because it was standing in the way of development in the
country.179
Many Saudi reformists and Western leaning citizens hoped that the events
mentioned above would instigate reform within the country. Sadly, in many cases,
change occurred in the opposite direction than they had hoped. A good example is the
issue of women driving inside the Kingdom. On November 10, 1990 45 wealthy Saudi
women, many the wives of influential Saudi officials, held a public protest demanding
the right to drive, although they did not actually drive. The women did not receive the
overwhelming support from citizens they had expected. They were arrested and when
Prince Salaman ruled that the women, had not actually committed a crime, the public
178
Press, 2006. Pg. 212.
179
House, 2005. Pg. 73.
120
was outraged calling for stricter punishment for the women. The public outcry was so
strong against the protesters that family members ended up losing their jobs, their right
to travel and being placed under virtual house arrest until King Fahd acquitted them a
few years later. Events like this one show the influence the Wahabi clerics have over
the population. In actions like this that seem unfathomable to many Americans, it was
the general Saudi population, not the government which led to strict punishment of
these few Saudi women. The exchange of Western ideals and technology that came
with the discovery of oil has long driven this internal Saudi struggle over tradition and
modernity. It was this debate spilling over into violence outside the Kingdom that
brought the debate to the worlds attention.
As the past few stories indicate the attacks on 9/11 were by no means an
isolated incident. Saudi Arabias, and indeed the greater Middle Easts, struggle
between following traditional ideals and more modern ones has became the number
one issue on the world agenda. Saudi Arabias alliance with the U.S. also became an
issue that needed to be addressed for a number of reasons; appeasing a very upset
American public, national security and economic security to name a few.
Since September 11, 2001 the actions of the House of Saud have been under
intense scrutiny from the international community as well as from their own citizens.
The international community is demanding more modernization within the Kingdom
making the struggle between reformers and the conservatives more pressing than ever,
121
the September 11 attacks energized an ongoing debate within the Saudi Royal Family
and among the wider population about the Kingdoms future direction. 180
After 9/11 the international community, and in particular the American press, was
not pleased with the immediate progress made by Saudi Arabia in trying to combat
terrorism. The media focused on key themes: the number of Saudis involved in the
attacks, Saudi Arabias internal social and political system bred terrorism, Saudi Arabia
was not doing enough to combat terrorism and it was not cooperating with the requests
of the international community.181 The fix for these issues proposed by many Western
analysts is modernization. The creation of a more open, free state would in theory
relieve much of the civil unrest. As HRH Prince Saud Al Faisal stated in an address to
the U.S. Congress, The Saudi state, since the time of King Abdul Aziz, has been at
constant conflict with them [the religious zealots] 182 Following the 9/11 attacks the
House of Saud was concerned about the international response but they were more
concerned with how fast they could modernize to appease their Western allies without
pushing its population to the brink.
The Saudis have made a serious, even unprecedented, effort to make available
to the world the actions and progress they have made to combat terrorism and to
disprove the allegations made by the international community condemning the
180
Press, 2006. Pg. 241.
181
HRH Prince Saud Al-Faisal. The United States and Saudi Arabia: A Relationship Threatened by
Misconception. Council on Foreign Relations. New York, New York. 27 April 2004.
182
Carpenter, Donald H. 101 Reasons Not to Murder the Entire Saudi Royal Family. Xlibris Corporation,
2003. Pg. 109.
122
government for their complicity in terrorism. In March of 2004 the government published
a document listing all of these efforts. These included; the questioning of more than 600
individuals, dismantling Al-Qaeda cells, seizing large quantities of arms, extraditing
suspects and establishing joint task forces with the United States. The Saudi Arabian
government drafts reports every 90 days detailing their actions taken to combat
terrorism and, upon request, submits them to the United Nations Security Council. 183
Until 2003 much of the Saudi efforts were considered too little by the international
community, including the United States, and too much by the conservative element
inside Saudi Arabia. But,
What turned the tide in favor of the Royal Familys more pragmatic
elements was a series of terrorist attacks that took place inside the
Kingdom beginning in May 2003, when homegrown suicide bombers
simultaneously attacked three housing complexes in Riyadh.184
In those attacks more than just Americans were injured. Saudi citizens saw
firsthand the destruction caused by these mass attacks. The Saudis have enjoyed a
relatively peaceful existence since the countries founding, a peace that risked being
replaced by civil unrest. The violence throughout 2003 gave the government the support
they were looking for and needed. The general population began to realize how close
their nation was to falling into internal armed conflict.
Sure, the shoot-outs with militants go on, and the Saudis continue to
unearth scary arms caches, but the car bombings seem to have stopped.
183
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office. Initiatives and Actions
Taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism. Washington D.C.: 2004.
184
Press, 2006. Pg. 243.
123
More important, radical Wahabi clerics are taking back their calls for jihad,
and doing so on the front pages of Saudi newspapers and on TV. Finally,
the Royal Family might be getting the upper hand on the clergy. 185
The GWOT has also led to more candid talks by the Saudi leaders on delicate
subjects including womens rights. In 2004 a petition was submitted to the King to allow
women to drive cars but the 124 names on the petition were overshadowed by a
counter petition submitted to the King by 500 women arguing that a woman driving a car
was un-Islamic.186 Yet, progress continues to be made in the direction of modernity. In
2005 Crown Prince Abdullah, who had been running the day-to-day operation of the
Kingdom for several years, assumed the throne. Between 1995 and 2005 Saudi Arabia
was a monarchy without a functioning monarch. This slowed progress toward a political
change.187 Nothing demonstrates more the political changes that are occurring in the
Kingdom since his assumption to the throne than the recent shake-up in leading
government ministries. On February 14, 2009 the King dismissed conservative key
members of leading government offices to include the head of the religious police and a
Saudi senior judge. Much more revolutionary is that he also appointed the first female
minister in Saudi Arabia. The American educated woman will be the assistant Minister
of Education, a post that has the potential to impact the lives of many Saudi women.
185
186
Saudi Arabia- Adullah Ibn Adel Aziz Al-Saud. APS Review Oil Market Trends 24 Oct. 2005
<http://www.allbusiness.com >.
187
Press, 2006. Pg. 215.
124
After the initial shock and trauma subsided from the attacks of September 11th
Saudi Arabia has made some attempts at moving towards a more modern society.
Efforts have gone into controlling religious rhetoric, financial reform and even
government reform. This has helped improve the countrys worldwide image. The
United States has demanded much from its Saudi friends, requiring more accountability
and reform. The 9/11 attacks provided the catalyst the Saudi government needed to
begin moving the country away from the extremist hold. Never colonized or subjugated,
the Saudis enjoyor did enjoy until September 11, 2001a serene self-confidence
that theirs is the right way, at least for them.188
The shocking events of September 11th forced the American public to open its
eyes to the intricacies of a relationship that its government had nurtured and invested
millions in over a period of seventy years. For decades the Saudis had been dealing
with the conflicts within their society caused by rapid modernization, the accumulation of
incredible wealth, expanding power and interaction with the west in one direction and
the pull of religious traditionalists who wanted to resist modernization and return to the
past in the other. In a matter of one day this debate was no longer just a Saudi issue,
the terrorist attacks brought the American people into the middle of a debate they were
ill prepared to handle.
188
Press, 2004. Pg. 3.
Chapter 7
125
Since 9/11 many journalists and American citizens have become more educated
about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as with their governments dealings with
them. Many have found considerable fault with aspects of the U.S. governments
methods of conducting business and demand the U.S. re-evaluate its dealings with a
nation whose cultural practices clash with many of Americas espoused ideals. This
recognition will most certainly affect the way the two societies interact with each other in
the future. However, it does not erase the history that started seventy years ago with an
experiment in nation building that ultimately intertwined two culturally diverse peoples
and created a special relationship .

126
Chapter Six: Conclusions: The Current State of the U.S.- Saudi Relationship
Since 1943 I have considered the interests of my country and community to be
the same as those of the United States. We differ in nothing basicafter Allah we trust
in America. 189 In 1962 the late King Faisal made this statement to Parker Hart the then
United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Why would King Faisal say such a thing?
Using the key elements described in Chapter One, foreign policy, economy, military and
development, this paper has closely examined the U.S.-Saudi relationship pre-9/11 and
post 9/11 to determine how the relationship has weathered this world altering event.
Chapter Three revealed unexpected collaboration in foreign policy. The two
countries first aligned themselves during World War II against Fascist Germany. After
the war they continued their alliance in the fight to prevent fledgling Middle Eastern
countries from falling under the communist umbrella leading to political cooperation
throughout the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War the United States and Saudi
Arabia have been united in trying to maintain stability in the Middle East. The best
example of this was during the Gulf War of 1990 when they became open partners and
allies in the effort to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and secure Saudi Arabias
borders.
After the initial shock of 9/11 each country tried to assess and understand the
impact the attack would have on their respective governments and the world as a
189
Indiana University Press, 1998. Pg. xvii.
127
whole. After some initial tension Saudi Arabia and the United States have once again
found a common ground in their foreign policy objectives. One might argue that now
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States is more important than ever
simply because both governments individually and jointly have more to lose than during
previous eras. Militant Islam is proving much harder to contain than communism was
and much is riding on the success of their counter terrorism efforts. For Saudi Arabia its
stability within the Kingdom and the continuation of the House of Saud and for the
United States, its regional stability and the continued availability of oil for the world
market at stable prices.
Chapter Four focused on the economic relationship between Saudi Arabia and
the United States and showed this relationship is much more involved than the simple
buying and selling of oil. During the first thirty years of Saudi Arabias existence the
United States provided essential financial assistance to the Kingdom. It came first
through private oil company investment and then through development programs
sponsored by the federal government. This enabled Ibn Saud and his sons to begin
developing the oil industry and the countrys modern infrastructure.
By the mid 1970s Saudi Arabia had more oil revenue than they could manage
efficiently. As petrodollars flowed into Saudi Arabia the country was encouraged by the
U.S. Department of Treasury and private industry to recycle its billions of petrodollars
back into the United States. The nearly $7 billion Saudi Arabia had invested in
American government securities by 1979 was one of the most visible symbols of the
128
unique relationship between the two countries.190 Today the Kingdom is one of the
largest holders of the U.S. deficit.
Close financial ties increased the interest each nation had in the health of the
others economy. During the oil embargo of 1973 Saudi Arabia realized that inflated oil
prices only drove their Western buyers to look for alternative sources and reduce their
dependence on Middle East oil. The West may be dependent on the Middle East for oil
but Middle Eastern oil producers are just as dependent upon foreign markets. As the
worlds largest oil producer Saudi Arabia has the unique ability to flood the oil markets
on short notice. Applying downward pressure on the price of oil should it become
inflated and its buyers begin to feel too much economic strain from high oil prices. Since
the late 1970s Saudi Arabia has consistently adopted this role of price stabilizer. They
work within OPEC to try and keep the price of oil at a fair market value, even breaking
OPECs production quotas should they feel it justified. This is a tactic Saudi Arabia often
employs and traditionally it has worked well.
In the months following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 the price of oil
remained stable. Remarkably the tense political situation between Saudi Arabia and the
United States did not spill over into the oil market. When an oil crisis did come seven
years later in the summer of 2008, it had nothing to do with 9/11. The handling of this
crisis demonstrated that Saudi Arabia and the United States would fall back on
established patterns of behavior to try and ease the crisis. The United States did not
190
House, 2005. Pg. 90.
129
hesitate to ask the Saudis to use their influence to try and calm the economic situation.
Once again the Saudis agreed to assume the role of price stabilizer arguing inside
OPEC for a boost in production and a reduction of oil prices to try and ease the tension.
What has changed in the economic relationship is the level of transparency
concerning financial transactions. Until 2001 the United States was content to ask no
questions about where the money Saudi Arabia invested in the U.S. came from as long
as the cash arrived. Scandals linking Islamic charities raising money in the United
States to terrorist organizations forced the United States to demand a greater
transparency from Saudi banking partners and Saudi nationals. This violated long
standing agreements between many American based banks and their Saudi investors.
However, the confidence created by these new banking practices and the continued
role of Saudi Arabia as price stabilizer has appeased and in some cases renewed the
U.S. banking industrys faith in Saudi money.
Chapter Five discussed security and reveals how the relationship has grown from
the simple oil-for-security partnership of the 1940s to the complex relationship it is
today. The security relationship is divided into two parts. One is the sale of U.S. arms to
Saudi Arabia and the other is the exchange of military forces.
The relationship has been problematic from the beginning but essentially it has
not changed because of the events of September 11, 2001. From the time the first U.S.
troops landed on Saudi Arabian soil to construct the Dhahran Airfield in 19 47
controversy has been endemic to the relationship. This ultimately led to the closure of
the airfield in 1962 and the removal of most U.S. military personnel. In order to keep the
130
military connection alive the USMTM was created and has served as an advisory board
to Saudi Arabia ever since.
Since its creation, Saudi Arabia has depended on the United States for military
protection and feels free to invite the U.S. military into the Kingdom confident that they
will leave when asked. Military cooperation was at a high point during the Gulf War
when the U.S. deployed thousands of soldiers to the Kingdom. With Saddam Hussein
threatening his border, King Fahd felt it necessary to make a bold move and ask the
U.S. to help defend Saudi soil. But by the late 1990s the sense of urgency was gone,
the Saudi leadership ha[d] learned firsthand the peril of an overt American presence.
191
Because of political pressure in 2003, Crown Prince Abdullah asked the U.S. to
close its bases and remove the large number of troops stationed in his country. In 2003
as in 1962 the two countries have shown their willingness to work together when Saudi
Arabias sovereignty is threatened. And once again as the U.S. removed its regular
military the USMTM renewed its role as the prime link between the two militaries.
The sale of military equipment to the Kingdom has always caused debate within
Congress initiating heavy lobbying from both Israeli and Arab interests. This has not
changed since 9/11. On occasion Congress has even stopped the sale of certain arms
to the Kingdom. For example, in 1985 after successful lobbying by Israeli organizations
Congress refused to sell arms to the Kingdom. At that time the Saudis made it clear
that while they preferred U.S. equipment, Americas refusal to sell them arms did not
191
Press, 2006. Pg. 252.
131
mean that the Kingdom would not go to another nation to procure the weapons they felt
necessary for their defense. After 9/11 the U.S. has continued to sell arms to Saudi
Arabia and Congress has continued to debate over how advanced the weapons sold to
the Kingdom should be.
The discussion in Chapter Six clearly showed that culturally there is very little
that the two nations have in common. In fact the foundations of their societies are polar
opposites. One of the major tenets of the U.S. government is the division of church and
state while the House of Sauds very legitimacy is based on their ability to uphold the
tenets of Islam. Despite seventy years of close relations, the two peoples remain very
foreign to each other. Very few westerners really understand the Saudi mentality, and
very few Saudis become as western in thought as they do in manner.192
192
Press, 2004. Pg. 3.
Bronson, Rachel. Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Oxford University
Press, 2006.
Carpenter, Donald H. 101 Reasons Not to Murder the Entire Saudi Royal Family. Xlibris Corporation,
2003.
Lippman, Thomas W. Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Westview
Press, 2004.
T, Hart. Parker. Saudi Arabia and the United States:Birth of a Security Partnership. Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1998.
132
After 9/11 the American media was full of damming information about Saudi
Arabian society. Accounts of their human rights violations and corruption shocked
Americans and they began to put pressure on the government to re-evaluate the U.S.-
Saudi relationship, a relationship that many Americans had been oblivious to prior to the
events of 9/11.The House of Saud has been playing a difficult balancing game between
Saudi extremists and moderates since the Kingdoms founding. The attack on 9/11 gave
notice to the Saudis and the world that the balance had tipped in favor of the religious
extremists.
More than at any other time the cultural differences could have forced the two
governments to end their special relationship but they did not. And as this paper has
revealed little has changed in the fundamentals of the relationship since the attacks of
September 11th 2001. It is the premise of this paper that it is the unique agreements
entered into by Ibn Saud and SoCal then CASCO and finally ARAMCO which for
seventy years have allowed the peaceful transfer of knowledge, technology, business
practices, governmental structure and western ideals to Saudi Arabia and allowed the
remarkable intermingling of their economies and foreign policies which in turn has
made strong and enduring allies out of very disparate cultures.
The small team of geologists that landed in the Kingdom in 1934 was the
beginning of a truly unique cultural exchange. Saudi Arabia invited the United States
into their country in the guise of private oil companies to develop their oil industry. After
the discovery of oil and the need to rapidly become a modern country became apparent
Saudi Arabia asked the United States to assist them in developing and designing almost
133
all areas of their government. Every major department, agency and business has been
influenced by an American organization in some way. Two nations cannot work together
so intensively without a deep connection being formed.
Until 9/11 this connection was, by choice, one of the best kept secrets in
Washington and Riyadh. The American public did not care what was happening in
Saudi Arabia as long as they had jobs and oil was plentiful. Saudis continued to enjoy
the modernization and economic growth that such a close relationship with the
American government and industry provided. The 1990 Gulf War was a pivotal time in
the U.S.-Saudi relationship. For the first time the general populations of both countries
were openly exposed to the depth of the special relationship. The citizens of both
countries were shocked by the intimacy of U.S. - Saudi relations.
The events of 9/11 reintroduced Saudi Arabian society to Americans. This time
however the cultural differences were highlighted more than they had been during the
1990 Gulf War. This time there was no common enemy, just a group of 19 hijackers the
majority of whom were Saudi citizens. Public outrage and countless media exposs
centered on the shocking normative differences between the two countries. Yet, the
link that had been formed over the last seventy years allowed the turmoil surrounding
the Saudi role in the attacks to rage on and not affect the core elements discussed in
this paper.
The body of this paper demonstrates the depth of the exchange and cooperation
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. This unique relationship began with an
invitation to Socals geologists to explore for oil. It continued with the development of
134
ARAMCO which advised the King and brought American systems, business practices
and modernity to the Kingdom. Saudi Arabian development grew so fast that it invited
the U.S. government to assist in setting up a modern structure for the governance of the
country. During all this time the United States has committed to guaranteeing the
sovereignty of the Kingdom and in return the Kingdom has acted as a stable alley in
maintaining a secure supply of oil for the world market. This basic oil-for-security
arrangement has expanded over the years to include the reinvestment of petrodollars
back into the United States further aligning the two countries. While it has not always
been an easy or tension free relationship, seventy years of working through cultural
differences, struggles to modernize and many political crises has created a strong
foundation and developed the political and cultural tools that allowed them to work
through their greatest challenge to date, the terrorist attacks of September 11th.
The attacks on 9/11 have had surprisingly little effect on the overall U.S. Saudi
relationship and none of the key elements examined in this paper have changed
dramatically on either side of the alliance. It is clear that for the present the U.S.-Saudi
special relationship still serves a purpose and as the Saudis would say, In sh allah
(God willing) it will continue for another seventy years without experiencing another
such devastating test of friendship.

135
Bibliography
Books
Al-Racheed, Madawi. A History of Saudi Arabia. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Baer, Robert. Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold our Soul for Saudi Crude. New
York: Three Rivers Press, 2003.
Bronson, Rachel. Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia. Oxford
University Press, 2006.
Carpenter, Donald H. 101 Reasons Not to Murder the Entire Saudi Royal Family. Xlibris
Corporation, 2003.
Chai, Winberg ed., Saudi Arabia: A Modern Reader. University of Indianapolis Press, 2005.
Lewis, Bernard. The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: The Modern
Library, 2003.
Lippman, Thomas W. Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia.
Westview Press, 2004.
Nestor, Sander. Ibn Saud King by Conquest. Hats Off Books, 2001.
Oren, Michael B. Power, Faith and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to the Present.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. Pg. 515
Peck, Malcolm C. The United Arab Emirates A Venture in Unity. Taylor & Francis Publisher,
1986.
Posner, Gerald. Secrets of the Kingdom: Inside the Story of the Saudi-U.S. Connection.
Random House, 2005.
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
Simpson, William. The Prince: The Secrect Story of the World's Most Intriguing Royal Prince
Bandar bin Sultan. New York: Harper Collins, 2006.
Spencer, Robert. Islam Unveiled. New York: Encounter Books, 2002.
Stegner, Wallace. Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil. California: Selwa Press, 2007.
Trofimov, Yaroslav, The Siege of Mecca. New York: Doubleday, 2007.
Unger, Craig. House of Bush House of Saud. New York: Scribner, 2004.
Periodicals
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Cordesman, Anthony. The Gulf Arms Sale: A Background Paper. Saudi- US Relations
Information Service. Feb 5 2008 < http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008.ioi.080205-
cordesman-arms.html.>
Lowry, Richard. "America's Un-special Relationship: A Cold Look at the Saudis." National
Review, February 25, 2002.
Reed, Stanely. The Saudis and OPEC:Behind the Flare-up. Business Week 6 Oct 08:045.
Saudi Arabia- Adullah Ibn Adel Aziz Al-Saud. APS Review Oil Market Trends 24 Oct. 2005
<http://www.allbusiness.com >.
http://www.meforum.org/article142.
Pamphlets
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office. Initiatives and
Actions Taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism. Washington D.C.: 2004.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia Information Office. Public Statements
by Senior Saudi Officials and Religious Scholars Condemning Extremism and Promoting
Moderation. Washington D.C.: 2008.
Reports
CRS Issue Brief for Congess. Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations by Alfred B.
Prados. August 4, 2003, http://www.crs.com.
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<http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm>.
The 9/11 Commission Report. Authorized Edition, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004.
U.S. Congressional Research Service. Saudi Arabia:Current Issues and U.S. Relations
(IB93113; Aug. 4, 2003). By Alfred B. Prados. http://www.crs.com.
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Joseph McMillan. (Special Report, January 2006) Pg. 1.
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Newspaper Articles
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138

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The Unlikely Partnership: The State of the U.S.

Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies

Approved: Grace Cheng, Ph.D.,

Primary Reader 7/17/09

Approved: George Satterfield, Ph.D.,

Secondary Reader: 7/18/09

as well as the current status of the relationship.

Part I: The Origins of a Friendship_____ 19

Chapter One: Introduction to the U.S.-Saudi Relationship 19

Part II: The Special Relationship 43

Chapter Two: Foreign Policy U.S.- Saudi Policy Objectives 43

Chapter Three: The Importance of Oil__________________________________________69

Chapter Four: The Need for Security__________________________________________89

Chapter Five: The Struggle Over Modernization_________________________________110

Part III: The State of a Partnership ______ 126

HRH King Faisal ibn Saud to Ambassador Hart in 1962.1

as the U.S.-Saudi, special relationship. It has allowed Saudi Arabias ambassadors

established, the only such office for any foreign country.3

any basic interests that they previously shared.

the private and government sectors to cooperate. As anthropologist Carleton Coon

predicted, Aramcos partnership with Arabia, will go on record as one of the

most western nations. Because communisms anti-religious nature and political

together to further their strategic interests.

ally in the Middle East without the burden of supporting a colony.

However the relationship between countries, no matter how intertwined, is

The general discussion surrounding the U.S.-Saudi relationship has

brought the country industrialization, electricity, and telephones, modern medicine,

Americans have had a formative influence on almost every aspect of contemporary

political, cultural and economic arenas.

and give final thoughts on the analyses.

reasons to support either side of the argument.

inadvertently or not, may have aided him?8

Arabia is contrary to Americas best interest.

avoidance, dishonesty, and passive aggression.12

acknowledge their efforts to address the problem of funding terrorism. An OECD

organization devoted to combating money laundering and terrorist financing, judged

almost every indicator of effectiveness. 15

government used a variety of styles of communication in an effort to reach out to the

By the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism published in March of 2004

the general public.

and all-pervasive influence, lasts up to the present.18 More importantly as Said

ideas expressed in Orientalism have become a mainstream sentiment throughout the

Western superpowers is a pervasive and a common belief. As Bernard Lewis explains

Western and Eastern models produced only poverty and tyranny. 20

lies ahead, and not only for America.23

Modernization. 24 This is just one example of a published pamphlet listing speeches

groups, to either nation, cannot easily be overcome.

analysis must be established.

The U.S.-Saudi relationship is extremely intertwined and complex. If every event

relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

particular issue the official alliance has not been altered.

actions influence governments.

element were to be found irrevocably damaged could the relationship survive? Or

conversely, if an element where strengthened could it hold the relationship together?

presentation of these elements in order of importance will be development, oil, security

Chapter One: Origins of the U.S.-Saudi Relationship

of the war nothing would be the same again.

Ibn Saud caught the fleeing Amir from behind as he bent to

reformer Mohammed ibn Adbul-Wahhab, had founded.

who would be instrumental in helping Ibn Saud conquer the Peninsula.

retaken what was originally his families27

become a vassal of the Ottoman Empire.

went back to their centuries old tradition of fighting one another.

now added the Hejaz to his territorial holdings.