Put your heart, mind, and soul into even
your smallest acts. This is the secret of
success. -Swami Sivananda
POWER OF TAXATION
Pascual vs. Sec of Public Works and
Communication
FACTS: In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was
passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for
the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor
of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He
claimed that the appropriation was actually
going to be used for private use for the
terminals sought to be improved were part of
the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is
owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a
member of the same Senate that passed and
approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that
Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact
that he owns those terminals and that his
property would be unlawfully enriched at the
expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would
be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications
be restrained from releasing funds for such
purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps
as an afterthought, donated the said property
to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is
valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being
an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the
government to make the property public does
not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that
the law was passed when the said property was
still a private property cannot be ignored. In
accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public
purposes only, money raised by taxation
can be expanded only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private
individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which
the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
Punsalan VS. Municipal board of manila gr
4817
Facts: Municipal Board of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 3398 imposing municipal
occupation tax on persons exercising various
professions in the city and penalizing non-
payment of the same. Punsalan, et al paid the
same under protest and filed suit with the
court. Petitioners contend that the ordinance is
unjust and oppressive and amounts to double
taxation. The lower court upheld the validity of
the provision of law authorizing the enactment
of the ordinance but declared the ordinance
itself illegal and void on the ground that the
penalty there in provided for non-payment of
the tax was not legally authorized. Both parties
appealed the courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No 3398
constitute double taxation?
Decision: Decision reversed. The Legislature
may select what occupations shall be taxed,
and in the exercise of that discretion it may tax
all, or it may select for taxation certain classes
and leave the others untaxed. Manila offers a
more lucrative field for the practice of the
professions, so that it is but fair that the
professionals in Manila be made to pay a
higher occupation tax than their brethren in the
provinces. The ordinance imposes the tax upon
every person exercising or pursuing in
the City of Manila naturally any one of the
occupations named, but does not say that such
person must have his office in Manila. The
argument against double taxation may not be
invoked where one tax is imposed by the state
and the other is imposed by the city
LLadoc v. CIR (14 SCRA 292)
A gift tax is not a property tax, but an excise
tax imposed on the transfer of property by way
of gift inter vivos.
Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of
Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash
to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias,
Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr.
Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic
church in the locality. The donated amount was
spent for such purpose.
On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed
the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April
29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax
against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which
petitioner was the parish priest.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax
is valid despite the fact that the Constitution
provides an exemptions and that Fr. Lladoc was
not the Parish priest at the time of donation.
Held: Yes, the imposition of the gift tax was
valid. Section 22(3) Article VI of the
Constitution contemplates exemption only from
payment of taxes assessed on such properties
as Property taxes contra distinguished from
Excise taxes. The imposition of the gift tax on
the property used for religious purpose is not a
violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a
property by way of gift inter vivos, the
imposition of which on property used
exclusively for religious purposes, does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
As well observed by the learned respondent
Court, the phrase "exempt from taxation," as
employed in the Constitution (supra) should
not be interpreted to mean exemption from all
kinds of taxes. And there being no clear,
positive or express grant of such privilege by
law, in favor of petitioner, the exemption herein
must be denied.
Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-
39086)
FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation
and institution of higher learning duly
incorporated with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul
and declare void the Notice of Seizure and
the Notice of Sale of its lot and building
located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of
real estate taxes and penalties amounting to
P5,140.31. Said Notice of Seizure by
respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial
Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the
satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts
adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for
the government, holding that the second floor
of the building is being used by the director for
residential purposes and that the ground floor
used and rented by Northern Marketing
Corporation, a commercial establishment, and
thus the property is not being used exclusively
for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting
an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant
petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction before the Supreme
Court, by filing said petition on 17 August
1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are
used exclusively for educational purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of
the then 1935 Philippine Constitution,
expressly grants exemption from realty taxes
for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively
for religious, charitable or educational
purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always
been made that the exemption extends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. The use of the school building or lot
for commercial purposes is neither
contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In
the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of
the building to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the
purpose of education. The test of exemption
from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is
affirmed subject to the modification that half of
the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner.
The modification is derived from the fact that
the ground floor is being used for commercial
purposes (leased) and the second floor being
used as incidental to education (residence of
the director)
ARTICLE III THE BILL OF RIGHTS
PBM Employees vs PBM
Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the
employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners.
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are
officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they
decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police.
PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management. The Management,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel
manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the
union guaranteed by the Constitution but
emphasized that any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. Workers who
without previous leave of absence approved by
the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration,
who shall fail to report for work the following
morning shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and,
therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike. Because the petitioners and their
members numbering about 400 proceeded with
the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift
workers should not be required to participate in
the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for
the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
March 4, 1969, filed a charge against
petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, for a violation of
Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and
of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR
for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to
freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble
violated.
Held: Yes. A constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more
stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave
and immediate danger of a substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent.
This is not present in the case. It was to the
interest herein private respondent firm to rally
to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for,
its employees, so that they can report to work
free from harassment, vexation or peril and as
consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as
well as profits. Herein respondent employer did
not even offer to intercede for its employees
with the local police. In seeking sanctuary
behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom,
theemployees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded
them by the Constitution the untrammelled
enjoyment of their basic human rights.
The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence
of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning
to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights.
The employees' pathetic situation was a stark
reality abused, harassment and persecuted
as they believed they were by thepeace
officers of the municipality. As above intimated,
the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig,
was a matter that vitally affected their right to
individual existence as well as that of their
families. Material loss can be repaired or
adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in
morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be
fully evaluated in monetary terms. As
heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights
freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances over
property rights has been sustained.
To regard the demonstration against
policeofficers, not against the employer, as
evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining
and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the
demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective
bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral
as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of
the aspects of freedom of expression.
If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then
by that much the circulation of the Issue raised
by the demonstration is diminished. The more
the participants, the more persons can be
apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover,
the absence of one-third of their members will
be regarded as a substantial indication of
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
position and abet continued alleged police
persecution.
Held(2): The court held that the primacy of
human rights such as freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances over property rights has been
sustained. The obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm was for their mutual aid and
protection against alleged police abuses, denial
of which was interference with or restraint on
the right of the employees to engage in such
common action to better shield themselves
against such alleged police indignities. Apart
from violating the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and assembly as well as the right
to petition for redress of grievances of the
employees, the dismissal of the eight (8)
leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent
from work, constitutes a denial of social justice
likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees.
Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez
FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman
who entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then)
particularly in the retail business. For some
time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress
passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to
reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the
retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the
nullification of the said Act on the ground that
it contravened several treaties concluded by
the RP which, according to him, violates the
equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country
who helps in the income generation of the
country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or
supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a
generally accepted principle. In this case, there
is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180.
The equal protection of the law clause does
not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who
do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be
assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with
a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the
police power which, being inherent could not
be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no
longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.
**Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Co. v
Torres 231 SCRA 335 (1994)
Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc.
(PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment a petition for
certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, alleging that as a
supervisory union duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment it was
seeking to represent the supervisory
employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer
Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado
issued an order directing the holding of a
certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom
the superintendents and the professional and
technical employees. However, the PMPI filed
an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter
wherein it sought to represent not only the
supervisory employees of petitioner but also its
professional/technical and confidential
employees. The parties therein agreed to
submit their respective position papers and to
consider the amended petition submitted for
decision on the basis thereof and related
documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an
order granting the petition and directing the
holding of a certification election among the
"supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts,
mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives,
etc.), technical, and confidential employees.
PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary
of Labor and Employment who rendered a
decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS
moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied; hence, the instant petition alleging
denial of due process on the part of the DOLE
to which the mediator-arbiter was under.
Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due
process.
Held: There was no denial of due process. The
essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to
file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter
and to consider the case submitted for decision
on the basis of the position papers filed by the
parties, there was sufficient compliance with
the requirement of due process, as petitioner
was afforded reasonable opportunity to present
its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so
desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and
examine the witnesses of the other party. But it
did not; instead it opted to submit its position
paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides,
petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate
its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of
Labor.
Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate
Court
Police Power Not Validly Exercised
There had been an existing law which
prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO
626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO
626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the
movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in
violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be
heard or his right to due process. He said that
the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without
being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid
exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as
it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment
of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would
ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself
and explain why the carabaos are being
transferred before they can be confiscated. The
SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the
carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because
the owner of the property confiscated is denied
the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers. There is, finally, also an
invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted
unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.
BAYANI M. ALONTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings Waiver
of Right to Due Process
Facts: Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of
Bian, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alontes house. The case was brought before
the Regional Trial Court of Bian. The counsel
and the prosecutor later moved for a change of
venue due to alleged intimidation. While the
change of venue was pending, Juvie executed
an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor
continued on with the case and the change of
venue was done notwithstanding opposition
from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila
Regional Trial Court under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had
ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and
had attested the voluntariness of her
desistance the same being due to media
pressure and that they would rather establish
new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted
for decision and Savellano sentenced both
accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due
process when he did not cross examine Juvie
when clarificatory questions were raised about
the details of the rape and on the voluntariness
of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied
criminal due process.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano
should inhibit himself from further deciding on
the case due to animosity between him and the
parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived
his right. The standard of waiver requires that it
not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences. Mere silence of the
holder of the right should not be so construed
as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by
repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions
filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the
lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.

ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R.
NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized
national and local elections, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban,
promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,
carrying and transporting of firearm or other
deadly weapons on security personnel or
bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of
security agencies or police organizations, and
organization or maintenance of reaction forces
during the election period. COMELEC also
issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the
summary disqualification of candidates
engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting
of firearms, organizing special strike forces,
and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to
the Gun Ban, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant
at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote
petitioner for the return of the two firearms
issued to him by the House of Representatives.
Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano,
to pick up the firearms from petitioners house
and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a
checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano
approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched
the car and found the firearms. Arellano was
apprehended and detained. He then explained
the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained
that Arellano was only complying with the
firearms ban, and that he was not a security
officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued
Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of
information against petitioner and Arellano for
violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for
petitioner to show cause why he should not be
disqualified from running for an elective
position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He
argues that gunrunning, using or transporting
firearms or similar weapons and other acts
mentioned in the resolution are not within the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus,
according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is
unconstitutional. The issue on the
disqualification of petitioner from running in
the elections was rendered moot when he lost
his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly
prosecuted for instructing his driver to return
the firearms issued to him on the basis of the
evidence gathered from the warrant less
search of his car.
Held: A valid search must be authorized by a
search warrant issued by an appropriate
authority. However, a warrantless search is not
violative of the Constitution for as long as the
vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection
of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual
search. In the case at bar, the guns were not
tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his
reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases
and placed inside a bag at the back of the car.
Given these circumstances, the PNP could not
have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as
well as the package without violating the
constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying
circumstance specifically pointing to the
culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not have been valid.
Consequently, the firearms obtained from the
warrantless search cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown
in the facts that the PNP had not informed the
public of the purpose of setting up the
checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among
those charged by the PNP with violation of the
Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed
by the City Prosecutor that he was a
respondent in the preliminary investigation.
Such constituted a violation of his right to due
process. Hence, it cannot be contended that
petitioner was fully given the opportunity to
meet the accusation against him as he was not
informed that he was himself a respondent in
the case. Thus, the warrantless search
conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and
the firearms seized during the search cannot
be used as evidence in any proceeding against
the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is
unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS
A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul
and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National
Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for
services involving telecommunications.
Charging rates for certain specified lines that
were reduced by order of herein respondent
Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates
were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent
(15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which
granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said
order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514,
petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of
the then Public Service Commission, now
respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17,
1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is
unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public
Service Commission the Supreme Court said
that although the rule-making power and even
the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or
rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the Philippines-may
partake of a legislative character. Respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a
quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact
that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned
order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions. It, however, insists that notice and
hearing are not necessary since the assailed
order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and, therefore, temporary in
nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending
final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the
statutory procedural requirements of notice
and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that
with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no
authority to make such order without first
giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order
be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar
the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give
any notice to the petitioner.
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635
Facts: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber
slippers.
There was a shortage of leather soles, and it
was necessary to temporarily lay off members
of the National Labor Union.
According to the Union however, this was
merely a scheme to systematically terminate
the employees from work, and that the
shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that
Ang Tibay is guilty of ULP because the owner,
Teodoro, is discriminating against the National
Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National
Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly
sympathetic to the employer.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an
opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations and to the motion for new
trial of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.
Issue: What is the function of CIR as a special
court?
Held: To begin with the issue before us is to
realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a
special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation which is the
Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of
the government. Unlike a court of justice which
is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the CIR, as will appear from
perusal of its organic law is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any
question, matter controversy or disputes
arising between, and/ or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the
relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, but this not mean
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in
trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings
of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the
right to present ones cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
(3) The decision must have something to
support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the
evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the
parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should
be, and the same is hereby granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to
the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case
receive all such evidence as may be relevant,
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth.
Ateneo de Manila University vs Judge
Ignacio Capulong
222 SCRA 644 Political Law Constitutional
Law Academic Freedom Power of School to
Dismiss Erring Students
FACTS: On February 8, 9, and 10 of 1991, a
fraternity in Ateneo Law School named Aquila
Legis conducted its initiation rites upon
neophytes. Unfortunately, one neophyte died
as a result thereof and one was hospitalized
due to serious physical injuries. In a resolution
dated March 9, 1991, the Disciplinary Board
formed by Ateneo found seven students guilty
of violating Rule 3 of the Rules on Discipline. Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, then president of Ateneo, on
the basis of the findings, ordered the
expulsion of the seven students. However, on
May 17, 1991, Judge Ignacio Capulong of the
Makati RTC, upon the students petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,
ordered Ateneo to reverse its decision and
reinstate the said students.
Issue: Was there denial of due process against
the respondent students.
Held: There was no denial of due process,
more particularly procedural due process. Dean
of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students to submit their written
statement on the incident. Instead of filing a
reply, respondent students requested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature
and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is
the twin elements of notice and hearing.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are
not in a position to file the instant petition
under Rule 65 considering that they failed to
file a motion for reconsideration first before the
trial court, thereby by passing the latter and
the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal
doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case
involves a question of law, as in this case,
where the issue is whether or not respondent
students have been afforded procedural due
process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner
University.
Minimum standards to be satisfied in the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university
herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of
the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;
(2) that they shall have the right to answer the
charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired:
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them
(4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
G.R. No. 211362 Political Law
Constitutional Law Academic Freedom
FACTS: Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab Diwa
Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudias
class had a lesson examination in their
Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule
of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper,
Cudia made a query to their OR teacher. Said
teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia
complied and as a result, he was late for his
next class (English). Later, the English teacher
reported Cudia for being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was
late because his OR class was dismissed a bit
late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look
upon the matter concluded that Cudia lied
when he said that their OR class was dismissed
late because the OR teacher said she never
dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was
meted with demerits and touring hours
because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he
asked the TO about it. Not content with the
explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be
appealing the penalty he incurred to the senior
tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia
to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late
was out of his control because his OR class was
dismissed at 3pm while his English class
started at 3pm also. To that the TO replied: that
on record, and based on the interview with the
teachers concerned, the OR teacher did not
dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the
English class started at 3:05pm, not 3pm; that
besides, under PMA rules, once a student
submitted his examination paper, he is
dismissed from said class and may be excused
to leave the classroom, hence, Cudia was in
fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie
for Cudia to state that the class was dismissed
late because again, on that day in the OR class,
each student was dismissed as they submit
their examination, and were not dismissed as a
class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher
to stay, it was not because such transaction
was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was
initiated by Cudia (because of his query to the
teacher), although there were at least two
students with Cudia at that time querying the
teacher, the three of them cannot be
considered a class; Cudia could just have
stated all that instead of saying that his class
was dismissed a bit late, hence he lied. The
STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMAs
Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly violating
the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his
written appeal when he said his class was
dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late
for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMAs basis for the
minimum standard of behavior required of their
cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground
to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC.
Thereafter, the HC, which is composed of nine
(9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After
two hearings and after the parties involved
were heard and with their witnesses presented,
the HC reconvened and the members cast their
vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia
guilty and 1 acquitted Cudia. Under PMA rules
(Honor System), a dissenting vote means the
acquittal of Cudia. However, they also have a
practice of chambering where the members,
particularly the dissenter, are made to explain
their vote. This is to avoid the tyranny of the
minority. After the chambering, the dissenter
was convinced that his initial not guilty vote
was improper, hence he changed the same and
the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was
immediately placed inside PMAs holding
center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his
appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the
dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then
sent letters to various military officers
requesting for a re-investigation. It was their
claim that there were irregularities in the
investigation done by the HC. As a result of
such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred to
the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA
(CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudias family brought the case to
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) where
it was alleged that PMAs sham investigation
violated Cudias rights to due process,
education, and privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This
ruling was affirmed by the AFP Chief of Staff.
But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor
of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHRs findings are at best
recommendatory. Cudia filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before
the Supreme Court. PMA opposed the said
petition as it argued that the same is not
proper as a matter of policy and that the court
should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES: 2. Whether or not the PMA can validly
dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
On the civil liberties of PMA cadets
One of the arguments raised by PMA is that
cadets, when they enrolled in the PMA, have
surrendered parts of their civil and political
liberties. Hence, when they are disciplined and
punished by the PMA, said cadets cannot
question the same, much less, question it in
the courts. in short, they cannot raise due
process.
On this, the SC held that such argument is
wrong. It is true that a PMA cadet, by enrolling
at PMA, must be prepared to subordinate his
private interests for the proper functioning of
the educational institution he attends to, one
that is with a greater degree than a student at
a civilian public school. However, a cadet
facing dismissal from PMA, whose private
interests are at stake (life, liberty, property)
which includes his honor, good name, and
integrity, is entitled to due process. No one can
be deprived of such without due process of law
and the PMA, even as a military academy, is
not exempt from such strictures. Thus, when
Cudia questioned in court the manner upon
which he was dismissed from the PMA, such
controversy may be inquired upon by the
courts.
(Authors note: PMA, in essence, raised that
due process, as contemplated by the
Constitution, is not needed in dismissing a
cadet yet, as can be seen in the below
discussion, PMA presented evidence that due
process was, in fact, complied with.)
II. Yes. It is within PMAs right to academic
freedom to decide whether or not a cadet is
still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus,
PMA did not act with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was
accorded due process. In this case, the
investigation of Cudias Honor Code violation
followed the prescribed procedure and existing
practices in the PMA. He was notified of the
Honor Report submitted by his TO. He was then
given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his options
and the entire process that the case would
undergo. The preliminary investigation
immediately followed after he replied and
submitted a written explanation. Upon its
completion, the investigating team submitted a
written report together with its
recommendation to the HC Chairman. The HC
thereafter reviewed the findings and
recommendations. When the honor case was
submitted for formal investigation, a new team
was assigned to conduct the hearing. During
the formal investigation/hearing, he was
informed of the charge against him and given
the right to enter his plea. He had the chance
to explain his side, confront the witnesses
against him, and present evidence in his
behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC
voting members, he was found to have violated
the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict
underwent the review process at the Academy
level from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff
Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of
Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent. A
separate investigation was also conducted by
the HTG (Headquarters Tactics Group). Then,
upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-
General Headquarters) to reinvestigate the
case, a review was conducted by the CRAB.
Further, a Fact-Finding Board/Investigation
Body composed of the CRAB members and the
PMA senior officers was constituted to conduct
a deliberate investigation of the case. Finally,
he had the opportunity to appeal to the
President. Sadly for him, all had issued
unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for
the SC to disturb the findings of facts by these
bodies.
Academic freedom of the PMA
Cudia would argue that there is no law
providing that a guilty finding by the HC may
be used by the PMA to dismiss or recommend
the dismissal of a cadet from the PMA; that
Honor Code violation is not among those listed
as justifications for the attrition of cadets
considering that the Honor Code and the Honor
System (manner which PMA conducts
investigation of Honor Code violations) do not
state that a guilty cadet is automatically
terminated or dismissed from service.
Such argument is not valid. Even without
express provision of a law, the PMA has
regulatory authority to administratively dismiss
erring cadets. Further, there is a law
(Commonwealth Act No. 1) authorizing the
President to dismiss cadets. Such power by the
President may be delegated to the PMA
Superintendent, who may exercise direct
supervision and control over the cadets.
Further, as stated earlier, such power by the
PMA is well within its academic freedom.
Academic freedom or, to be precise, the
institutional autonomy of universities and
institutions of higher learning has been
enshrined in the Constitution.
The essential freedoms of academic freedom
on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted
to study.
The Honor Code is just but one way for the PMA
to exercise its academic freedom. If it
determines that a cadet violates it, then it has
the right to dismiss said cadet. In this case,
based on its findings, Cudia lied which is a
violation of the Honor Code.
But Cudias lie is not even that big; is dismissal
from the PMA really warranted?
The PMA Honor Code does not distinguish
between a big lie and a minor lie. It punishes
any form of lying. It does not have a gradation
of penalties. In fact, it is the discretion of the
PMA as to what penalty may be imposed. When
Cudia enrolled at PMA, he agreed to abide by
the Honor Code and the Honor System. Thus,
while the punishment may be severe, it is
nevertheless reasonable and not arbitrary, and,
therefore, not in violation of due process -also
considering that Cudia, as a cadet, must have
known all of these.
You are always a student, never a
master. You have to KEEP MOVING
FORWARD. -Conrad Hall
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
PEOPLE v. VERA
FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial
court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
which was elevated to the SC and the SC
remanded the appeal to the lower court for a
new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed
for probation alleging that the he is innocent of
the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of
the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the
Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by petitioner allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered
alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in
violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting
provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is
only indicated therein that only provinces are
covered. And even if Manila is covered by the
law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of
the Constitution provides equal protection of
laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the islands. The said law
provides absolute discretion to provincial
boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in
pardon.
ISSUE: contends that Act No. 4221 of the
Philippine Legislature providing for a system of
probation for persons eighteen years of age or
over who are convicted of crime, is
unconstitutional because it is violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III, of the
Constitution of the Philippines
Held: Act No. 4221 is hereby declared
unconstitutional and void and the writ of
prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without
any pronouncement regarding costs. So
ordered.
Ratio: The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is
challenged on three principal grounds: (1) That
said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power
of the Executive; (2) that it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power; and (3)
that it denies the equal protection of the laws.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer's
case is not terminated by the mere fact that he
is placed on probation. Section 4 of the Act
provides that the probation may be definitely
terminated and the probationer finally
discharged from supervision only after the
period of probation shall have been terminated
and the probation officer shall have submitted
a report, and the court shall have found that
the probationer has complied with the
conditions of probation. The probationer, then,
during the period of probation, remains in legal
custody subject to the control of the
probation officer and of the court; and, he may
be rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the
conditions of probation and, when rearrested,
may be committed to prison to serve the
sentence originally imposed upon him.
A 'pardon' is an act of grace, proceeding
from the power intrusted with the execution of
the laws which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment the
law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a
remission of guilt or a forgiveness of the
offense. 'Commutation' is a remission of a part
of the punishment; a substitution of a less
penalty for the one originally imposed. A
'reprieve' or 'respite' is the withholding of a basis for reasonable classification in the
sentence for an interval of time, a exercise of police power.
postponement of execution, a temporary
suspension of execution.

We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
Probation Act is unconstitutional and void
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance
because it is also repugnant to the equal-
prohibiting aliens from being employed or
protection clause of our Constitution. Section
engage or participate in any position or
11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional
occupation or business enumerated therein,
and void for the reasons already stated, the
whether permanent, temporary or casual,
next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act
without first securing an employment permit
should be avoided. It is also contended that the
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the
Probation Act violates the provision of our Bill
permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu
of Rights which prohibits the denial to any
Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in
person of the equal protection of the laws. We
Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement
conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221
of such ordinance as well as to declare the
constitutes an improper and unlawful
same null and void. Trial court rendered
delegation of legislative authority to the
judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this
provincial boards and is, for this reason,
case.
unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due

ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
process of law and equal protection rule of the
101 PHIL 115 Constitution.

FACTS: Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien

residents corporations and partnerships,
brought this action to obtain a judicial
declaration that RA 1180 is unconstitutional.
Petitioner contends, among others, that said
act violate the equal protection of laws and
that it violates the treaty of the Philippines with
China. Solicitor General contends that the act
was a valid exercise of the police power and
that not a single treaty was infringed by said
act.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 1180 violates the
equal protection of laws
HELD: The equal protection of the law clause is
against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination on
oppression of inequality. The real question at
hand is whether or not the exclusion in the
future aliens for the retail trade unreasonable.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by
a specified class if it applies to all persons
within such class and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not. Aliens
are under no special constitutional protection
which forbids a classification otherwise justified
simply because the limitation of the class falls
along the lines of nationality. The difference in
status between citizens and aliens constitute a
HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in
question violates the due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed
to get a permit from the City Mayor who may
withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
While it is true that the Philippines as a State is
not obliged to admit aliens within its territory,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
The shelter of protection under the due process
and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.
Patricio Dumlao vs Commission on
Elections
95 SCRA 392 Political Law Constitutional
Law Equal Protection Eligibility to Office
after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
FACTS: Patricio Dumlao was the former
governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already
retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same
office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52
was enacted. This law provides, among others,
that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed
the law averring that it is class legislation
hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao
invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and
Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit
assailing the other provisions of BP 52
regarding the term of office of the elected
officials, the length of the campaign, and the
provision which bars persons charged for
crimes from running for public office as well as
the provision that provides that the mere filing
of complaints against them after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them
from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and
Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court pointed out the
procedural lapses of this case for the latter
should have never been merged. Dumlao's
issue is different from Igot and Salapantan.
They have different issues. Further, this case
does not meet all requisites to be eligible for
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order
to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision
barring persons charged for crimes may not
run for public office and that the filing of
complaints against them after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them
from office as null and void.
No violation of equal protection. It is
subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from the others. Here,
persons over 65 are classified differently from
younger employees to promote emergence of
younger blood. Persons similarly situated are
similarly treated. It does not forbid all legal
classification, what is prohibited is a
classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is
not violated by a reasonable classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and applies
to all those belonging to the same class.
** Philippine Asso. of Service Exporters v
Drilon 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service
Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and
female of overseas employment. It challenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing
the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of
Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It
claims that such order is a discrimination
against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar
skills, and that it is in violation of the right to
travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3
of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter
the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the
State and informed the court that the
respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing
mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards
to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid
classification in the challenged Department
Order No. 1.
Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that
there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a
class by themselves, because of the special
risk to which their class was exposed. There is
no question that Order No.1 applies only to
female contract workers but it does not thereby
make an undue discrimination between sexes.
It is well settled hat equality before the law
under the constitution does not import a
perfect identity of rights among all men and
women. It admits of classification, provided
that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial
distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the
law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the
same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made,
rest on substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to
travel. The consequence of the deployment
ban has on the right to travel does not impair
the right, as the right to travel is subjects
among other things, to the requirements of
public safety as may be provided by law.
Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a
valid exercise of police power. Police power has
been defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote general
welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention
that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an
invalid exercise of legislative power as the
labor code vest the DOLE with rule making
powers.
Himagan vs. People
FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in
Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged
for the murder of and attempted murder.
Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was
placed into suspension pending the murder
case. The law provides that Upon the filing of
a complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance against a member of the PNP for
grave felonies where the penalty imposed by
law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more,
the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is
terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused. Himagan assailed the suspension
averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil
Service Decree, that his suspension should be
limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90
days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and
would be a violation of his constitutional right
to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975
violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
HELD: No. The reason why members of the
PNP are treated differently from the other
classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of
the rule on preventive suspension is concerned
is that policemen carry weapons and the badge
of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as
succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman
criminally charged with a serious offense is
reinstated to his post while his case is pending,
his victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and thus
easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that
the accused is in uniform and armed. The
imposition of preventive suspension for over 90
days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate
the suspended policemans constitutional right
to equal protection of the laws.
QUINTO versus COMELEC (G.R. No.
189698)
Facts: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino
A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a
resolution declaring appointive officials who
filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their government offices
because at such time they are not yet treated
by the law as candidates. They should be
considered resigned from their respective
offices only at the start of the campaign period
when they are, by law, already considered
candidates.
In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only
copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
Issue: Whether or not the said COMELEC
resolution was valid.
Held: NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners
challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec.
66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for
giving undue benefit to elective officials in
comparison with appointive officials.
Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial
distinctions between the two and pronounced
that there was no violation of the equal
protection clause. However, in the present
case, the Court held that the discussion on the
equal protection clause was an obiter dictum
since the issue raised therein was against the
repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge
Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated

appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4
requisites of a valid classification, the proviso
does not comply with the second requirement
that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law.

The obvious reason for the challenged

provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or
coercive influence of the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public
service by eliminating the danger that the
discharge of official duty would be motivated
by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electorate arena, while still
in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency
in the performance of duty because they would
be attending to their campaign rather than to
their office work.