1. Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty Corp.
7160)
FACTS: Municipality filed a complaint for expropriation against VM Realty over two parcels of
land for providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. RTC issued
order, authorizing petitioner to take the possession of the subject after depositing 15% of the
market value. Soon after, respondent files answer containing affirmative defenses and
counter-claims:
a. Complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
resolution and not an ordinance as required by RA 7160;
b. The cause of action if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata.
ISSUE:Whether a Local Government Unit can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant
to a resolution by its law-making body.
HELD: Petition is not meritorious and is denied. Under Section 19, of the present Local
Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its
power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the
municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a
law-making body, and the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which
was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160
prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an
administrative rule that cannot amend the former.
An LGU cannot authorize on expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its
law-making body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance
or a local law for the purpose.
2. Masikip vs City of Pasig (G.R. No.136349)
Facts:
Petitioner owns a parcel of land in Pasig City. In 1994, the Municipality of Pasig sent her a
letter pursuant to an enacted ordinance intending to expropriate a portion of her property to
be used for sports and development and recreational activities of residents of Brgy.
Caniogan but petitioner refused contending that there was no genuine necessity for
expropriation of property.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a genuine necessity for expropriation.
Held:
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It
delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no
inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by
statute. Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No.
prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government
units and lays down the parameters for its exercise.
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is
so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law
prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one's property is
clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their
private property.
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern:
(a) the adequacy of the compensation
(b) the necessity of the taking, and
(c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.
The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character, must also
be shown to exist.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property. Our scrutiny of the
records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated
November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It
can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own
private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space
available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has
not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports
development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to
all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
3. Bardillon v Barangay Masili
FACTS: Two complaints for Eminent Domain were filed by Barangay Masili to Bardillon for
the purchase of Lot 4381-D at P200,000., to be turned into a multi-purpose hall. First
complaint was filed at the MTC and was dismissed due to lack of interest. The second
complaint was filed at the RTC, which Bardillon filed a motion to dismiss in pursuant to the
doctrine of res judicatas. The order was issued in favor of Barangay Masili and order of
issuance of the Writ of Possesion for Lot 4381-D. Court of Appeals rules that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse because the MTC really had no jurisdiction over the action, which
consequently doesnt bar the second complant from res judicata.
ISSUE # 1: Whether MTC had jurisdiction over first expropriation case:
No. Expropriation case does not involve sum of money. It is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and should be filed with the RTC (Section 19 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691). The
primary consideration of expropriation proceedings is whether the government has complied
with the requisites for the taking or property. An expropriation case is within the jurisdiction of
the RTC regardless of the value of the land.
ISSUE # 2: Whether the dismissal of the first complaint in the MTC amounts to res
judicata.
NO. The requisites for res judicata are:
1. Former judgment must be final.
2. Court who rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.
3. Judgment is on the merits.
4. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action in both actions.
Since MTC had no jurisdiction, there is no res judicata.
ISSUE # 3: Whether Court of Appeals erred when it ignored the RTC's issuance of a
writ of possession despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the ruling
dismissing the complaint.
NO. The requisites of immediate entry are:
1. Filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance
2. Deposit of amount equivalent to 15% of the property's fair market value based on its
current tax declaration.
And Masili complied with both requisites. The issue of necessity of the expropriation is a
matter that should be addressed by the RTC. If petitioner objects to the necessity, her
objection should be included in her Answer to the complaint.
ISSUE # 4: Whether or not Masili is guilty of forum shopping
NO. The test for determining forum shopping: whether the elements of litispendentia are
present in two or more cases, such that a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.The earlier case in the MTC had already been dismissed when the second
complaint was filed in the RTC. Even if the MTC case was still pending, it will make no
difference, because the MTC had no jurisdiction in the first place.
HELD: Petition has no merit and is denied
4. REPUBLIC v PLDT
Facts: PLDT is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise to install, operate
and maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and connection with other
countries. PLDT and RCA (an American corporation) entered into an agreement where US to
the Philippines phone calls and vice versa are made easier. After terminating the contract of
20 years, Bureau of Telecommunications set up their own telephone system for the
government (aided by PLDT). The bureau also enters into an agreement with RCA for a joint
overseas telephone service. PLDT complained that the bureau was violating the conditions
such that the bureau was also serving private persons/general public and not just the
government anymore. Bureau proposed an interconnecting agreement with PLDT, but the
latter refused. Republic sues PLDT complaining that PLDT should execute a contract with
them.
ISSUE: Whether PLDT should be compelled to sign the interconnecting agreement with
Republic.
HELD: Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state may not
require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is
paid.
Where the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic
may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT,
as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose
only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It
is unquestionable that the real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way. The use of the PLDT's lines and services to allow interservice
connection between both telephone systems is not much different. In either case private
property is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under Section 6, Article
XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to
public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may
not require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor.
5. ROXAS v CITY OF MANILA
FACTS: Carmen Roxas applied to the city engineer (Robert Dieck) for a license to construct a
terrace, starting from the main wall of her house to the edge of San Jacinto Canal, which she
exclusively owns. City Engineer refused to grant the license because it was intended to be
reserved for the establishment for public easement (discharging & landing goods, shelter for
fishermen and shipwrecked persons, among others). The Secretary of the Municipal Board
didnt recall ever hearing/seeing the said purpose, but believed that by leaving that strip, it
would be easier to prevent collisions and facilitate navigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not a mere act of obstruction in connection with building regulations
suppress the right of ownership without due process.
HELD: NO. According to Article 349 of the Civil Code: No one shall be deprived of his
property, except by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after
proper indemnity;
Section 5 of the act of Congress: No legislation shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;
City of Manila and Robert Dieck to immediately issue license in favor of the plaintiff herein,
Doa Carmen Ayala de Roxas to construct a terrace.
6. PEOPLE v FAJARDO
FACTS: The municipal council of baao, camarinessur stating among others that construction
of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be
destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to
their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the
national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied,
for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of
the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor
turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the
building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently
convicted. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency
is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents.
As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless
of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect,
be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is
best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give
appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
7. NAPOCOR v GUTIERREZ
FACTS: Plaintiff NAPOCOR is invested with the power of eminent domain for the purpose of
pursuing its objectives, which among others is the construction, operation and maintenance
of electric transmission lines throughout the Philippines. For the construction of its 230 KV
Mexico-Limay lines, it has to pass the lands belonging to defendant Gutierrez. NAPOCORs
unsuccessful negotiations for the acquisition of right of way easement prompts them to file
eminent domain proceedings. For determining the fair and just compensation due, the court
appointed three commissioners: one for the plaintiff, one for the defendant and one from the
court, who would conduct ocular inspection of the lots and prepare appraisals as to the fair
and just compensation. After careful consideration, the lower court decides to go for the
appraisal of the defendants commissioner of P10.00 pero square meter + P800.00 attorney
fees. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, and lower court amends the
compensation to P5.00 + P800.00. NAPOCOR isnt satisfied yet, and appeals, but the ruling
is sustained.
ISSUE 1: Whether petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full
compensation for the land traversed by its transmission lines.
ISSUE 2: Whether the acquisition of a mere right-of-way is an exercise of power of eminent
domain contemplated by law.
HELD: The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. P5.00/sqm + P800.00
Because of the high-tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life
and limbs that may be caused beneath the wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap
it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the
taxes due on the affected portion of the lot.
The easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of transmission lines, the limitation
imposed by NAPOCOR against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprived private
respondents of its ordinary use.
8. REPUBLIC v CASTELVI
FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered
into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding
against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings
for the land in question.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and
that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as
of that year.
The requisites for taking are:
1) The expropriator must enter a private property,
2) The entry must be for more than a momentary period,
3) It must be under warrant or color of authorities,
4) The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected
5) The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the
property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the
just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi
property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for
the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned
as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to
the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent
right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the
lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of
the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or
deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent
of contract.
9. CITY OF GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v ERICTA
FACTS: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF. The law provides that at least
six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at
least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. Quezon City
justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance in question isa valid exercise of police power.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery
for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. Police Power does not
involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is
a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting
the peace and order and of promoting general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article such as opium, firearms or a marijuana plantation.
10. REYES v NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
FACTS: Respondent NHA filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands owned by
Reyes. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarinas
Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the
Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of
these lots and the payment of just compensation. On April 28, 1992, petitioners filed a
complaint alleging that respondent NHA had not relocated squatters from the Metropolitan
Manila area on the expropriated lands in violation of the stated public purpose for
expropriation and had not paid the just compensation fixed by the court.
Ocular inspections were made and the trial court held that:
- Respondent NHA is not deemed to have abandoned the public purpose for which the
subject properties were expropriated because the relocation of squatters involves a
long and tedious process.
- There is no condition imposed in the expropriation judgment that the subject
properties shall revert back to its original owners in case the purpose of expropriation
is terminated or abandoned
- The payment of just compensation is independent of the obligation of herein
petitioners to pay capital gains tax
- In the payment of just compensation, the basis should be the value at the time the
property was taken.
ISSUE: Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the judgment of
expropriation forfeited in light of the failure respondent to use the expropriated property for
intended purpose but for a totally different purpose and partial payment of the just
compensation.
HELD: The decision appealed is MODIFIED. NHA should pay petitioners amount of
P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the
expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall have been fully paid
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
over the private properties upon payment of just compensation. Sec. 9, Article III states that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The
constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
The expropriation judgment declared that NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners properties
for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project.
The public use is synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and
public convenience. The act of NHA in entering a contract with a real estate developer for
the construction of low cost housing cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated
public purpose of their taking.
Expropriation of private lands for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies and other private concerns.
The expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the
marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article XIII
of the Constitution.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without
any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
11. Filstream International Inc. vs. CA
FACTS:Filstream International is the registered owner of parcels of land located in Antonio
Rivera St., Tondo II Manila. On January 7, 1993, it filed an ejectment suit against the
occupants (private respondents) of the said parcels of land on the grounds of termination of
the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. The ejectment suit became final and
executory as no further action was taken beyond the Court of Appeals.
During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private respondents filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Exchange against Filstream. The City of Manila came into the picture
when it approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo Lim to initiate acquisition
through legal means of certain parcels of land. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved
Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land which formed part
of the properties of Filstream. The said properties were sold and distributed to qualified
tenants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. The City of
Manila then filed a complaint for eminent domain seeking to expropriate lands in Antonio
Rivera St. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the City.
Filstream filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the writ of possession. The motion
to dismiss was premised on the following grounds: no valid cause of action; the petition does
not satisfy the requirements of public use and a mere clandestine maneuver to circumvent
the writ execution issued by the RTC of Manila in the ejectment suit; violation of the
constitutional guarantee against non-impairment of obligation and contract; price offered was
too low hence violative of the just compensation provision of the constitution.
The RTC denied the two motions. Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which
dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance, aside from the fact that
copies of the pleadings attached to the petition are blurred and unreadable.
ISSUE 1:Whether The City of Manila may exercise power of eminent domain despite the
existence of a final and executory judgment ordering private respondents to vacate the lots.
HELD 1:YES. There is no dispute as to the existence of a final and executory judgment in
favor of petitioner Filstream ordering the ejectment of private respondents from the properties
subject of this dispute. Thus, petitioner has every right to assert the execution of this decision
as it had already became final and executory.
However, it must also be conceded that the City of Manila has an undeniable right to exercise
its power of eminent domain within its jurisdiction. The right to expropriate private property for
public use is expressly granted to it under Sec 19 of the Local Government Code. Sec 100 of
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila further empowers the city government to
expropriate private property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing program. The
citys right to exercise these prerogatives notwithstanding the existence of a final and
executory judgment over the property to be expropriated had already been previously upheld
by the court in the case of Philippine Columbian Association vsPanis:
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants
or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.
ISSUE 2:Whetherexpropriations of Filstreams lots were legally and validly undertaken.
HELD 2: NO. We take judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a
paramount task in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas particularly in
Metro Manila. Nevertheless, despite the existence of a serious dilemma, local government
units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising their power of eminent domain in
pursuit of solutions to these problems. Constitutional provisions on due process and just
compensation for the expropriation of private property must be complied with. Other laws
have also set down specific rules in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, to wit:
Sec 19 of LGC provides that such exercise must be pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
Sec 9 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA) provides an order of
priority in the acquisition of land for socialized housing, with private lands listed as the last
option.
Sec 10 of UDHA provides that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition such as community mortgage, land swapping, donation to the government, etc.
have been exhausted, and, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted.
Compliance with the above legislated conditions are deemed mandatory because these are
the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to DUE PROCESS
when their property is expropriated for public use.
There is nothing in the records which would indicate that the City of Manila complied with the
above conditions. Filstreams properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in favor
of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under
Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstreams
right to due process.
12. MANOSCA v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Manosca inherited about 492 sqm of land located in Taguig, Metro Manila.
National Historical Institute supposedly claims this land to be the birth-site of Felix Manalo,
the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo and declares the land to be a national historical landmark. The
Republic soon files a complaint for expropriation in behalf of NHI. Petitioners move to dismiss
the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for the public
purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia Ni Cristo, a religious entity. After the
court denied numerous filings by the petitioner, the latter lodged a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals but only to be dismissed again. Petitioners also assert
that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by the Court:
a) The size of the land expropriated
b) The large number of people benefited
c) Extent of social and economic reform
ISSUE: Whether or not the public use requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the
attempted expropriation by the Repulic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by
the NHI as a national historical landmark.
HELD: Petition is DENIED. Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of
the right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the
whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member of
society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly affected by it;
if the objective is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is sufficient.
The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of
the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his
founding and leadership of the Iglesia Ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may
be derived by members of the Iglesia Ni Cristo than by most other could well be true but such
a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed,
that only a few would actually benefit from the propriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use.
13. NAPOCOR v CHIONG
FACTS:Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation, created and existing
pursuant to Republic Act No 6395. In order to carry out saide purposes, NPC is authorized to
exercise the power of Eminent Domain. NPC filed a complaint of eminent domain to acquire
an easement of right-of-way and certain portions of agricultural lands owned by Spouses
Chiong& heirs of Agrifina Angeles. NPC prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession and
an order of expropriation, the appointment of 3 commissioners to determine the just
compensation. The heirs of Agrifina Angeles did not dispute the purpose of NPC in instituting
the expropriation proceedings. However, they pointed out that NPC had already taken 4,000
sqm of their area and wanted to occupy another 4,000 sqm of the adjacent property. They
state that the fair market value for both properties was P1,100.00/sqm, or a total of
P8,800,000.00, and hope they get paid just that.
Atty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio market value = P500.00/sqm
Atty. Alog = P22.50/sqm(heirs of Angeles)
P15.75/sqm (Spouses Chiong)
Court ordered NPC to pay P500.00/sqm with an interest of 6% per annum from April 16,1998
until fully paid. NPC files certiorari but was dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE 1: Whether petitioner NAPOCOR was deprived of due process
ISSUE 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the Order of the RTC of Iba,
Zambales, dated June 7, 2000, by dismissing NPCs petition for certiorari.
HELD: Petition denied due to lack of merit. On record, the Court find that the majority report
of Commissioners Ragadio and Atty. Castillo was submitted to the trial court on March 9,
2000, while the minority report of Commissioner Atty. Alog, was submitted on May 5, 2000. It
is not disputed that petitioner was furnished copies of said reports. After petitioner NPC
obtained its copy of the majority report, it did nothing. As pointed out that the petitioner was
afforded this opportunity is beyond question. Having failed to make use of this opportunity, the
petitioner cannot justifiably claim now that its right to due process has been violated. From
March 9, 2000 to June 7, 2000, petitioner did not object to the majority report. Absent the
objections raised by the petitioner, it became the duty of the trial court to make a final order
and judgment in which the proper award will be made and thus end the controversy.
- Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment.
- Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion.
14. EPZA v DULAY
FACTS: The four parcels of land, which are the subject of this case, is where the Mactan
Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent
San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them
reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an
order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was
later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square
meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just
compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of
the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection
and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and
mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation
in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD
1533 is unconstitutional.
The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the
Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may
not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.
15. PEDRO M. BELEN vs.COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO JULIANO
NARVASA, J.:p
A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters, more or less, belonging to
the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. That piece of land is known as Lot
No. 10, Block 18 and is situated at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila. 1 On it stood a house built by
Belen.
Part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his family in the early part of
1978; Juliano bought a house standing thereon, not belonging to Belen, and moved in without
the latter's knowledge. 2 On learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, and they came to
an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on the land temporarily and would pay one-
half of the rental to Manotok Realty, Inc. Later a fire razed both Belen's and Juliano's houses
to the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build anything on the land any more. However, on
Juliano's pleas, Belen acceded to Juliano's continued stay on the land on the explicit
condition that his occupancy should not be longer than two and a half (2 1/2) years. 3 When
Juliano failed to leave the premises after the stipulated term despite demand, Belen brought
suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court sometime in September, 1982, 4and succeeded in
obtaining judgment dated September 5, 1984 5 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendant and all persons claiming rights and/or title under him
to vacate the subject lot he is presently occupying at 2805 Javier Street,
Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila, and to surrender possession thereof to herein
plaintiff,
2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P3,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.
Juliano appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila. That Court reversed the judgment of
the Metropolitan Trial Court. The decision rendered on June 26, 1985, 6 was made to rest on
the expropriation of the Manotok Estate effected by Presidential Decree No. 1670, and
declared that
PD No. 1670 . . . has expropriated real property along the Estero de Sunog-
Apog, Tondo, Manila . . . formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc. . . . The
decree was signed on January 28, 1980. The government has started to
implement the expropriation (See Exhibit "2," p. 7; 2, rec.). . . . Alfredo Juliano
is a prospective beneficiary of the Bliss Project being undertaken by the
National Housing Authority at the site in question (See Exhibits "2-B" and
"3"). Therefore, when the complaint in this case was filed on September 13,
1982, . . . Manotok Realty Services, Inc. was no longer the owner of the
premises in question and as correctly contended by defendants-appellants,
the relation between plaintiff-appellee and defendants-appellants were also
deemed terminated.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from was set aside and another entered "dismissing the
complaint filed in the court a quo . . . (without) pronouncement as to costs."
Belen seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the decision of the
Manila Regional Trial Court. His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06589 and after
due proceedings, resolved against him by Decision promulgated on October 2, 1986. 7 The
Appellate Court took account of Presidential Decree No. 1670 as the decisive factor in
determining the "pivotal and decisive issue whether Manotok Realty, Inc., petitioner's
lessor, has retained ownership of the lot in question, the expropriating law invoked by private
respondent (PD 1670) notwithstanding." The Court specifically adverted to Section 1 of the
decree, viz.:
Sec. 1. The real property along the Estero de Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila,
formerly consisting of Lots Nos. 55-A, 55-B and 55-C, Block 2918 of the
subdivision plan Psd-11746, covered by TCT Nos. 49286, 49287 and 49288,
respectively, of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, and formerly owned by the
Manotok Realty, Inc., with an area of 72,428.6 square meters, more or less,
is hereby declared expropriated. The National Housing Authority hereinafter
referred to as the "Authority" is designated administrator of the National
Government with authority to immediately take possession, control and
 disposition, with the power of demolition of the expropriated properties and
their improvements and shall evolve and implement a comprehensive
development plan for the condemned properties.
The decision declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the
owner of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the
possession, administration, control and disposition of the National Housing Authority (NHA);
its only right being to claim the just compensation thereof; that as a result, Manotok's lease
contract with Belen over the lot in question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease
between Belen and Juliano, since a sublease can never extend beyond the duration of the
sublessor's lease of the sublessor; that, consequently, neither Manotok Realty, Inc. nor Belen
could judicially eject Juliano from the disputed lot; and that under said P.D. 1670, the fate of
Juliano and the other actual occupants of the property was within the competence of the
National Housing Authority to determine; indeed, Juliano has been "duly certified by the
Project OIC of the Sunog-Apog Urban Bliss as among the structure owners per 1980 census
conducted by the NHA under its Zonal Improvement Program for Metro Manila . . . (and was
hence) a prospective beneficiary of said project."
Belen has perfected an appeal by certiorari to this Court and prays for reversal of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and the rendition of a new decision granting him the relief
originally prayed for in his complaint in the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court. He prays for
judgment on the following essential propositions:
1) PD 1670 notwithstanding, Manotok Realty Services, Inc. had not been divested of its title
as of August, 1983, it not having "received any money as payment for the subject property,"
and the NHA not having taken possession thereof in an appropriate action of eminent domain
(Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration etc., 49 SCRA 338);
2) in any event, it is Belen, not Juliano, who is entitled to be declared a rightful occupant of
the land and exercise the rights under PD 1670.
The petition will be granted and the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversed.
Presidential Decree No. 1670, together with a companion decree, numbered 1669 which
attempted to expropriate by similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called "Tambunting
Estate" was struck down by this Court as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void," on
May 21, 1987 in a joint judgment rendered in G.R. No. 55166 (Manotok, et al. v. National
Housing Authority, et al.) and G.R. No. 55167 (Tiongson, et al. v. National Housing Authority,
et al). 8 The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative of the petitioners' (owners')
right to due process of law," failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally, they
were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the determination of just compensation."
The Court said:
The decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or
procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of the
expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the just
compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, the Government should
have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
but it did not do so. Obviously, it did not deem it necessary because the
enactment of the questioned decrees which rendered, by their very passage,
any questions with regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot and
academic. In effect, the properties under the decrees were "automatically
expropriated." This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the Register
of Deeds and requested her to cancel the certificate of titles of the
petitioners, furnishing said Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees
to support its request.
This is hardly the due process of law which the state is expected to observe
when it exercises the power of eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
This Court further observed that contrary to Rule 67 and established precedents, the decrees
provided for the determination of just compensation at a time earlier than that "of the actual
taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by the court, whichever came first."
Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property was left by the decrees to the City
Assessor.
In P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 464, P.D. No. 794, and P.D. No. 1533, the basis for
determining just compensation was fixed at the market value declared by the
owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
P.D.s 1669 and 1670 go further. There is no mention of any market value
declared by the owner.Sections 6 of the two decrees peg just compensation
at the market value determined by the City Assessor. The City Assessor is
warned by the decrees to "consider existing conditions in the area notably
that no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is
squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the
expropriation costs."
In other cases involving expropriation under P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794, and
1533, this Court has decided to invalidate the mode of fixing just
compensation under said decrees. (See Export Processing Zone Authority
vs. Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay, et al., G.R. No. 59603) 9 With more reason
should the method in P.D.s 1669 and 1670 be declared infirm.
PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance therewith
must also be deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of the
property by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a
housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries thereof.
It appears that the National Housing Authority has since instituted an expropriation suit
involving the "Sunog-Apog" property in question, now pending in Branch XL of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, presided over by Honorable Felicidad Villalon; 10 and that petitioner
Pedro Belen continues to be recognized by the owner of the land, Manotok Services, Inc. as
a lessee of a part thereof, identified as Lot 10, Block 18. 11
The invalidation of P.D. 1670 removes the basis for the decisions of the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals, which are both contrary to the verdict of the Metropolitan Trial
Court. On the other hand, there is nothing in the record to demonstrate any error in the
factual and legal dispositions in the latter judgment, recognizing and vindicating the
petitioner's superior right of possession over the Lot 10, block 18 of the "Sunog-Apog Estate"
of the Manotok Services, Inc.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of October 2, 1986 and that of the
Regional Trial Court thereby affirmed, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch VII), Manila, rendered on September 5, 1984 in Civil
Case No. 078756-CV is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED, with costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
16. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, vs. THE HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA
Facts: For the purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to
Tower 220 at Pililla, Rizal, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) needed portions of the
land of Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista (simple fee
owners), consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite MERALCO's
offers to pay compensation and attempts to negotiate with Arayon, et. al., the parties failed to
reach an agreement. On 29 October 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by
MERALCO against 42 defendants (including Teofilo Arayon Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito
Santiago, and Teresa Bautista) with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. Despite the opposition of Arayon, et. al., the court
issued an Order dated 13 January 1975 authorizing MERALCO to take or enter upon the
possession of the property sought to be expropriated. On 13 July 1976, Arayon, et. al., filed a
motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at P40.00 per
square meter or an approximate sum of P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to
withdraw the sum of P71,771.50 from MERALCO's deposit-account with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Pasig Branch. However, Arayon, et. al.'s motion was denied in an order
dated 3 September 1976. Pursuant to a government policy, MERALCO on 30 October 1979
sold to the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) the power plants and transmission lines,
including the transmission lines traversing Arayon, et. al.'s property. On 11 February 1980, the
court issued an Order appointing the members of the
Board of Commissioners to make an appraisal of the properties. On 5 June 1980, MERALCO
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the
transmission lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to the NAPOCOR.
In view of this motion, the work of the Commissioners was suspended. On 9 June 1981,
Arayon, et. al. filed another motion for payment, but despite the opposition of MERALCO, the
court issued an order dated 4 December 1981 granting the motion for payment of Arayon, et.
al. (P20,400 or P3.00 per square meter without prejudice to the just compensation that may
be proved in the final adjudication of the case). On 15 December 1981, Arayon, et. al. filed an
Omnibus Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 39 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero)Motion praying that
they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum of P90,125.50 from MERALCO's deposit-
account with PNB. By order dated 21 December 1981, the court granted the Omnibus Motion.
Arayon, et. al. filed another motion dated 8 January 1982 praying that MERALCO be ordered
to pay the sum of P169,200.00. On 12 January 1982, MERALCO filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Orders and to declare Arayon, et. al. in contempt of court for forging or
causing to be forged the receiving stamp of MERALCO's counsel and falsifying or causing to
be falsified the signature of its receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion. On 9 February 1982,
the court denied MERALCO's motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt. In said
order, the Court adjudged in favor of Arayon, et. al. the fair market value of their property
taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for a total of P369.720.00; the amount to
bearing legal interest from 24 February 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages in
terms of attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00; all these sums to be paid by MERALCO
the former with costs of suit, minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by Arayon,
et. al. Furthermore, the court stressed in said order that "at this stage, the Court starts to
appoint commissioners to determine just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts
the testimony of a credible real estate broker, or the Judge himself would exercise his right to
formulate an opinion of his own as to the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he
formulates such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence." MERALCO filed a
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether the court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an
expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
Held: In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to
present evidence on the issue of just compensation. The appointment of at least 3 competent
persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property sought to be taken
is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the findings of
commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of the
value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied
illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286) Thus, trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no
reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be
disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that
may be gathered from the record. The "Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing
Projects" executed by ABA Homes and Arayon, et. al. relied upon by the judge, in the
absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine just
compensation. The judge's act of determining and ordering the payment of just compensation
without the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a flagrant violation of MERALCO's
constitutional right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule established
by the Revised Rules of Court.
17. REPUBLIC VS SANTOS
This is a 1969 expropriation case. It involves 66,096 square meters of land claimed by 44
persons, located in Paranaque and Muntinlupa, Rizal. The expropriation was necessary for
the widening of, and construction of interchanges in, the Manila South Diversion Road. The
only issue, and it had always been a troublesome issue,is as to the just compensation to be
paid by the Government.
The Appraisal Committee for the province of Rizal fixed at forty pesos (P40) per square
meter, or an aggregate amount of P2,641,190, the provisional value of the lands in its
Resolution No. 10, series of 1968. The Government deposited that amount with the provincial
treasurer who deposited it in the Philippine National Bank. Some respondents, including
Maura Santos, withdrew the amounts corresponding to them subject to the outcome of the
case.
The Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal in its order of June 19, 1969 granted the fiscal's
motion fixing the provisional value at P2,641,190. A writ of possession was issued to the
Republic of the Philippines (183 and 192 Record on Appeal). Fourteen (14) claimants
(including the Manila Electric Company) did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter.
They were paid the amounts due to them at that price (310-17, Record on Appeal).
Thus, this lands of Firestone Tire & Rubber Company, Concepcion Industries, Inc., ISC Realty
Development Corporation, Consolidated Mills, Inc., Pablo L. Espiritu and Victoria C.G. Ty with
areas of 3,751, 1,686, 1,500, 3,289, 1,041 and 998 square meters, respectively, were all sold
to the Republic at P40 a square meter (161-63; 178, 231-35, 244-46, 250-54 and 266-71,
Record on Appeal). The condemnation proceeding was terminated as to the said claimants.
Those sales were contemporaneous sales convincingly indicative of the fair market value of
the lands at the time of the expropriation in the later part of 1968 or early in 1969.
As to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trial court, pursuant to
section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three commissioners to determine the just
compensation: Benjamin Morales for the court as chairman; Pacifico Javier, the provincial
assessor, for the Republic, and Pacifico I. Guzman for the claimants (241, Record on Appeal:
See PD No. 1533 dated June 11, 1978 as to the determination of just compensation without
the need for appointing commissioners).
The commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970 recommended that the just
compensation for the lands should be P100 a square meter except the land of Maura Santos
with an area of 25,909 square meters (out of 147,609 square meters, 342, Record on Appeal)
which should be evaluated at P60 a square meter (327, Record on Appeal).
The trial court in its decision dated May 13, 1972 modified that recommendation. It fixed
P100 a square meter as the uniform price to be paid to the claimants (401, Record on
Appeal).
The Court of Appeals in its decision of June 29, 1981 in turn modified the trial court's decision
and adopted the commissioners' report. It added 6% legal rate of interest from February 7,
1969, the date of the filing of the complaint (p. 42, Rollo). The Republic appealed to this
Court.
The petitioner contends that the Appellate Court erred in not holding that the commissioners
should not have relied on the price of P100 for the land of Jose Alcaraz which was sold in
November, 1969 and on other irrelevant evidence.
It further argues that the Appellate Court erred in disregarding the fact that 14 out of the 44
claimants already sold their lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter.
Respondents Maura Santos, International Textile Mills, Inc. and American Wire & Cable Co.,
Inc. submitted appellees' briefs to justify the Appellate Court's decision.
We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in relying on the commissioners'
report whose recommendation was not substantiated by trustworthy evidence. As pointed out
by the Assistant Solicitor General, the appraisal of P100 a square meter for the land of
Alcaraz was made about eight months after the filing of the instant expropriation case. **
It may be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1533 provides that just compensation should be
the value of the land"prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government
office to acquire the property."
The statement in the 1970 report of the commissioners that according to the owners of
adjoining lots the prices per square meter ranged from P150 to P200 and that subdivision lots
in the vicinity were being sold at P85 to P120 a square meter was not based on any
documentary evidence. It is manifestly hearsay. Moreover, those prices refer to 1970 or more
than a year after the expropriation was effected.
In the case of Maura Santos, it should be noted that the expropriation undeniably increased
the value of the remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square meters (See Provincial
Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, 58 Phil. 308). She was already paid P1,036,360 for
her expropriated land.
Furthermore, the commissioners should not have glossed over the undisputed fact that 14
claimants out of 44 had winingly sold their lands to the Government at P40 a square meter as
fixed by the provincial Appraisal Committee of which the provincial assessor was a member.
Evidently, they were satisfied that that was a reasonable price.
According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may
make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation
for the property expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as
gathered from the record (Manila Railroad Company vs. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
As noted in the Velasquez case, the moment a parcel of land is sought to be condemned, the
price, for some occult reason, immediately soars far beyond what the owner would think of
asking or receiving in the open market. Owners ask fabulous prices for it and neighbors look
on with an indulgent smile or even persuade themselves that the land is worth the price for
which the owner holds out in view of the fact that it is wanted by an entity whose financial
resources are supposed to be inexhaustible (p. 313).
Consequently, the petitioner should pay only P40 per square meter for the expropriated
lands. CMC (CMS) Investments, Inc. was paid P35 a square meter for its 530 square meters
(58, Record on Appeal). It is entitled to a deficiency on which 6% legal rate of interest per
annum should be paid from the time the petitioner took possession of its land up to the date
of payment (Republic vs. Yaptinchay, 108 Phil. 1046,1053).
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed and set
aside. The just compensation for the lands described in paragraph 2 of petitioner's complaint
is forty pesos (P40) per square meter. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
18. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated petition of one seeking review of the decision of CA modifying the
decision of RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, and another for mandamus to compel the
RTC to issue a writ of execution and to direct Judge Caspillo to inhibit.
Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land. Wycoco voluntarily
offered to sell the land to the Department of Agrarian Reform for P14.9 million. DAR offered
P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road
located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just
compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP
to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by
DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
On April 13, 1993, Wycoco filed the instant case for determination of just compensation with
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City against DAR and LBP.
On March 9, 1994, the DARAB dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the
determination of just compensation by the RTC.
Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their respective answered that the valuation of Wycocos
property was in accordance with law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative
remedies by not participating in the summary administrative proceedings before the DARAB
which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation.
On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Wycoco. It ruled that
there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is of
public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in Licab, Nueva
Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice
thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00 per
hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized
profits plus legal interest.
The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of Appeals. The petition
brought by DAR on jurisdictional and procedural issues was dismissed. This prompted Wycoco
to file a petition for mandamus before this Court praying that the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City be executed, and that Judge Caspillo be compelled to inhibit himself
from hearing the case.
The petition brought by LBP on both substantive and procedural grounds was likewise
dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by
deducting from the compensation due to Wycoco the amount corresponding to the 3.3672
hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been previously sold by
Wycoco to the Republic.
LBP contended that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as Special
Agrarian Court.
2. Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, whether or not the compensation arrived at
supported by evidence.
3. Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.
4. Whether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is valid.
HELD:
1. Yes, the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, acquired jurisdiction of the case.
Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988)
provides:
Section 50.Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
 Section 57.Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act.
2. No, the compensation arrived is not supported by evidence. In arriving at the
valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market
value of agricultural lands without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice
thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 3. Judicial Notice. When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its
own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of
practically assuming a valuation without basis. Only the market value was taken into account
in determining the just compensation. Since other factors were not considered, the case was
remanded for determination of just compensation.
3. No, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily
offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR.
That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10
hectare portion of the entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no
justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.
4. Yes, Wycocos claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. The trust account
opened as the mode of payment of just compensation should be converted to a deposit
account. The conversion should be retroactive in application in order to rectify the error
committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits
concomitant to payment in cash or LBP bonds. Otherwise, petitioners right to payment of just
and valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated. The interest
earnings accruing on the deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them
pending payment of just compensation.
The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted because
Wycoco failed to show proof of loss.
Wycocos petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 was dismissed. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, acting as Special Agrarian Court cannot be
enforced because there is a need to remand the case to the trial court for determination of just
compensation. Likewise, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo was denied
for lack of basis.
19. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Facts: On 17 July 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of Presidential Decree (PD) 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. This was followed on 22 July
1987 by PD 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229,
providing the mechanics for its implementation. Subsequently, with its formal organization,
the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and
started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the
interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of
Republic Act (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, which President Aquino signed on 10 June 11988. This law, while considerably
changing RA 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code, 8 August 1963) and PD 27 (21 October
1972), nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., Juanito D. Gomez, Gerardo B.
Alarcio, Felife A. Guico, Jr., Bernardo M. Almonte, Canuto Ramir B. Cabrito, Isidro T. Guico,
Felisa I. Llamido, Fausto J. Salva, Reynaldo G. Estrada, Felisa C. Bautista, Esmenia J. Cabe,
Teodoro B. Madriaga, Aurea J. Prestosa, Emerenciana J. Isla, Felicisima C. Apresto,
Consuelo M. Morales, Benjamin R. Segismundo, Cirila A. Jose, and Napoleon S. Ferrer
invoke in their petition (GR 78742) the right of retention granted by PD 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate
the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants
who are actually cultivating such lands. They claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has
so far not issued the implementing rules required under PD 316, implementing PD 27. They
therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to
issue the said rules.
Issue: Whether just compensation should exclusively be made in money and not other things
of value.
Held: This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited
area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose. What is dealt with herein is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The Court assumes
that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when
they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of
the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in
full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. The court may therefore
assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by
the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with
money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical
agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated.
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the
assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the
content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude
of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator. Accepting the theory that payment
of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, the Court find
further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total
payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly
oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment
in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at
his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP
bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the
amount of just compensation. Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will
cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. However, this cannot be
avoided.
20. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. CA and Mangondato
FACTS: In 1978, National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), took possession of a 21,995
square meter land which is a portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-116159
situated in Marawi City, owned by Mangondato, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-378-A, under the mistaken belief that it forms part of the public land reserved for use by
NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes under Proclamation No. 1354 of the President
of the Philippines dated December 3, 1974.
NAPOCOR alleged that the subject land was until then possessed and administered by
Marawi City so that in exchange for the citys waiver and quitclaim of any right over the
property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a financial assistance of P40.00 per square meter.
In 1979, when NAPOCOR started building its Agus I HE (Hydroelectric Plant) Project,
Mangondato demanded compensation from NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate
insisting that the property is public land and that it had already paid financial assistance
to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property.
Mangondato claimed that the subject land is his duly registered private property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-378-A in his name, and that he is not privy to any agreement
between NAPOCOR and Marawi City and that any payment made to said city cannot be
considered as payment to him.
More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the fact that the property belongs to
Mangondato.
On July 7, 1992, Mangondato filed before the lower court Civil Case No. 605-92 against
NAPOCOR seeking to recover the possession of the property described in the complaint as
Lots 1 and 3 of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-116159 against NAPOCOR, the payment of a
monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 until the surrender of the property, attorneys fees and
costs, and the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to restrain NAPOCOR from proceeding with any construction and/or improvements
on Mangondatos land or from committing any act of dispossession.
ISSUE: Reckoning point of market value: Date of Taking or Date of Suit?
RULING: The general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value
of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, as follows:
Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to
defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x (Italics supplied).
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
Hence, many rulings of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the
property as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of the
Rules. So too, where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
21. CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA DEDAMO
FACTS:
On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against
respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein that
itneeded the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall
serveas an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue
and theback of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the
amount of justcompensation at P20,826,339.50.Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in
fixing the amount of just compensation atP20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be
based on the prevailing market price of theproperty at the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings.The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the lower courtsdecision in toto.
ISSUE:Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint.
HELD:NO. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for
thedetermination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly
provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.The
petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
.We did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of
the filing of the complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in
determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date
of the filing of thecomplaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value
of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings.
22. REPUBLIC vs. CA
FACTS: Petitioner (PIA) instituted expropriation proceedings covering a total of 544,980
square meters of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be
utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use ofradio transmitter facilities for the
Voice of the Philippines project.
Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the
reasonable value of the property. On 26 February 1979, or more than 9 years after the
institution of the expropriation proceedings, the trial court issued this order condemning the
property and ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendantsthe just compensation for the
property.
It would appear that the National Government failed to pay the respondents the just
compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The respondents then filed
a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property. In response, the
court issued a writ of execution for the implementation thereof.
Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22 transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated
land to the Bulacan State University.
Despite the courts order, the Santos heirs remained unpaid and no action was on their case
until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the
amount P4,664,000 by way of just compensation.
The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as
previously fixed to its current zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the return of the
expropriated property.
The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of the Santos heirs declaring its 26 February 1979Decision to
be unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the
1964/1997 ROC which states that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed
on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry. RTC denied petitioners Motion to Permit
Deposit and ordered the return of the expropriated property to the heirs of Santos.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner may appropriate the property
2. WON the respondents are entitled to the return of the property in question
HELD:
1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by
the Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence
and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of the
legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of police
power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public
use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held
under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume
the possession of the property whenever the public interest so requires it.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation
proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the
condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title
and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the property, not
to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the taking must be for public use,
and second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property. These
twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance
between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by
effectively restraining the former and affording protection to the latter. In determining public
use, two approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or theactual use by the
public, and the second is public advantage or benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as
being subject to constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its demands upon
the individual so increases, and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the
individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a
significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State
University and for the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the
requirements of public purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the utilization by
petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out that its present use differs from the
purpose originally contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The argument is of no
moment. The property has assumed a public character upon its expropriation. Surely,
petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its rights to alter
and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public use , which,
decidedly, it is.
2. NO. In insisting on the return of the expropriated property, respondents would exhort on the
pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. deVillaroya where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in question.
It might be borne in mind that thecase involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to
which the power ofeminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and of limited
application. The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under Republic
Act No. 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power
vested in the legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the
power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then,
this delegated power of eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only
of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real authority would want it to be.
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten
years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court ruled -
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what
amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of an
airport, and ordered sold to the government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the
judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which
are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the
fair market value of the same.
"Said relief may be granted under plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other remedies, which may be
deemed just and equitable under the premises'."
The Court proceeded to reiterate its pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City where the
recovery of possession of property taken for public use prayed for by the unpaid landowner
was denied even while no requisite expropriation proceedings were first instituted. The
landowner was merely given the relief of recovering compensation for his property computed
at its market value at the time it was taken and appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings
provides not only for the payment of just compensation to herein respondents but likewise
adjudges the property condemned in favor of petitioner over which parties, as well as their
privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and purposes,
exercised dominion over the propertypursuant to the judgment. The exercise of such rights
vested to it as the condemnee indeed has amounted to at least a partial compliance or
satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by prescription on
grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the return of their property on the basis of non-
payment, respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory authority is far from
that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps
apply. An in rem proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the
paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all
claimants to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for
securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents, in arguing laches against petitioner did not take into account that the same
argument could likewise apply against them. Respondents first instituted proceedings for
payment against petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five years after the 1979 judgment had
become final. The unusually long delay in bringing the action to compel payment against
herein petitioner would militate against them. Consistently with the rule that one should take
good care of his own concern, respondents should have commenced the proper action upon
the finality of the judgment which, indeed, resulted in a permanent deprivation of their
ownership and possession of the property.
The constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to
the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the
property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in
before the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal
value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation
proceedings and took the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the
amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an
effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant
fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. Article 1250 of the Civil Code,
providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the currency at the
time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no
agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations.
In other words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to
be taken into account to alter the value of the currency.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, vacating its
decision of 26 February 1979 has acted beyond its lawful cognizance, the only authority left
to it being to order its execution. Verily, private respondents, although not entitled to the return
of the expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet unpaid award of just
compensation already fixed by final judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at
P6.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the
date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have
been fully paid.
23. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al v. VICENTE G. LIM
While the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle
the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots however, in cases where
the government failed to pay just compensation within five years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to
recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year
period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in
keeping with justice and equity.

On September 5, 1938, Republic of the Philippines instituted an expropriation case for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered
in the name of GervasiaDenzon, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon. After
depositing P9,500.00 with thePhilippine National Bank, the Republic took possession of the
lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to
pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation. Anentry of judgment was made
on April 5, 1948. For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the
Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio
filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages against the
Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. In
the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935, with annotation subject to
the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and
939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value were issued inthe names of
Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively.
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio,
holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939
because of the Republics failure to pay the amount adjudged in the expropriation
proceedings.
However, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view of the
differences in money value from 1940 up to the present, the court adjusted the market value
at
P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the
expropriation proceedings, until full payment. After the denial of heir motion for
reconsideration, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed before CFI, which forwarded the case
before the Supreme Court, which held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered
owners lots there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. They
contend that although they are not entitled to recover possession based since the same are
condemned for public use they must be allowed to demand the fair market value of the same.
In the meantime, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged the property to Vicente Lim.
Having failed to pay, the property was foreclosed. Lim later filed an action to quiet title against
the Republic. RTC ruled in his favor, declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive
owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession.
Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the RTC. The Supreme Court initially denied the
petition for review, having seen no reversible error on the part of the CA. The petitioner
Republic however filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay
respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the
judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940
HELD: Petition is denied with finality. Court of Appeals decision affirmed in toto.
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Clearly, without full
payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the
expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republics acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon
the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover
possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, the
Court is aware of the doctrine that non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation
proceeding) does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated
lots. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first
was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven years have
passed since then. The Court cannot but construe the Republics failure to pay just
compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of
possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession
may be had when property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one
claiming to act under the power of eminent domain or where a rightful entry is made and the
party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed or agreed
upon or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith for mortgaging the property.
The Republic failed to perfect its title over Lot 932 by nonpayment just compensation. The
issue of bad faith would have assumed relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over
Lot 932. But assuming that the respondents did act in bad faith, Republic cannot be vested of
better title over the land since it has not title to speak of.
Assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the annotation, still nothing would have
prevented him from entering into a mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while the
expropriation proceeding was pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of an
expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing the
property in favor of the government. Here, the annotation merely served as a caveat that the
Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of a reasonable market
value. It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising their rights of ownership
including their right to mortgage or even to dispose of their property. It bears emphasis that
when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they were still the
owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never
did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in
Valdehueza that: It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not
having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government.
In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation
does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots however,
in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five years RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the
property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage
the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private
persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v.
Court of Appeals, the Court defined just compensation as not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a
reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just.
24. NPC VS CA and Antonino Pobre
Facts: Petitioner National Power Corporation is a public corporation created to generate
geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide.
NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain.
Private respondent Antonino Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land located in
Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The Property is covered by TCT No. 4067 and
Subdivision Plan 11-9709. In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-
subdivision, which he named as Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision. Commission on
Volcanology found the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and
potentially for commercial or industrial use.
On 1 September 1979, NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an
additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the
5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial courts issuance of a writ of possession to NPC. On 10
December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation.
Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property.
Issue:
Held: NPC as plaintiff had the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint. NPC
relies on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules then in effect. NPC argues
that the dismissal of the complaint should have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case
including Pobres counterclaim.
Even a timely opposition against Pobres claim for damages would not yield a favorable ruling
for NPC. It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case
but Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17
referred to dismissal of civil actions in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent
domain cases.
Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take private property
for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. The
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to the local governments, other public
entities and public utilities such as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right
of eminent domain. Eminent Domain was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of
Court. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, the prescribed
method of expropriation is still found in Rule 67, but its title is now Expropriation.
NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses
his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the
defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before
the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of the complaint. Pobres motion to
dismiss/answer, filed and served way ahead of NPCs motion to dismiss, takes the case out
of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same applies.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss the
complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start
of the taking. The plaintiffs right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always
been subject to court approval and to certain conditions.
25. MCIAA, vs. CA and CHIONGBIAN G.R. No. 139495 November 27, 2000
FACTS: On April 16, 1952, the Republic, represented by the CAA, filed an expropriation
proceeding to the CFI of Cebu on several parcels of land in Lahug, Cebu City, which
included Lot 941, for the expansion and improvement of Lahug Airport.
In 1953, appellee Chiongbian purchased Lot 941 from its original owner, the original
defendant in the expropriation case. Subsequently, a TCT was issued in her name
Then in 1961, judgment was rendered in the expropriation case in favor of the Republic which
was made to pay Chiongbian an amount for Lot 941. Chiongbian did not appeal
therefrom.Thereafter, absolute title to Lot 941 was transferred to the Republic under a TCT.
Then, in 1990, Republic Act No. 6958 was passed by Congress creating the Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) to which the assets of the Lahug Airport was
transferred. Lot 941 was then transferred in the name of MCIAA under a TCT.
In 1995, Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of Lot 941 with the RTC of Cebu,
alleging, that sometime in 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC) ventured to expand
the Cebu Lahug Airport. As a consequence, it sought to acquire by expropriation or
negotiated sale several parcels of lands adjoining the Lahug Airport, one of which was Lot
941 owned by Chiongbian. Since she and other landowners could not agree with the NACs
offer for the compensation of their lands, a suit for eminent domain was instituted, before the
then CFI of Cebu against 45 landowners, including Chiongbian, entitled Republic of the
Philippine vs. Damian Ouano, et al. It was finally decided in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Some of the defendants-landowners appealed the decision to the CA which rendered a
modified judgment allowing them to repurchase their expropriated properties. Chiongbian,
on the other hand, did not appeal and instead, accepted the compensation for Lot 941 upon
the assurance of the NAC that she or her heirs would be given the right of reconveyance for
the same price once the land would no longer be used as (sic) airport.[by an alleged written CHIONGBIAN had a right to repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was expropriated
agreement] is ended or abandoned or if the property was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.

Consequently, the TCT of Chiongbian was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of
the Republic. Then, with the creation of the MCIAA, it was cancelled and a TCT was issued
in its name.

However, no expansion of the Lahug Airport was undertaken by MCIAA and its predecessors-
in-interest. Thus, the purpose for which Lot 941 was taken ceased to exist.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the respondent Chiongbian and MCIAA was ordered
to restore to plaintiff the possession and ownership of the property denominated as Lot No.
941 upon reimbursement of the expropriation price paid to plaintiff. The RD is therefore
ordered to effect the Transfer of the Certificate Title from the defendant to the plaintiff.

MCIAA appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. MR was
denied hence this petition.

ISSUE: Petioner questions whether or not the abandonment of the public use for which Lot
No. 941 was expropriated entitles CHIONGBIAN to reacquire it.

HELD: The Decision of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
Chiongbian against the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority for reconveyance of Lot
No. 941 is DISMISSED.

The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the
expropriator which has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If,
for example, land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that
purpose is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the property so
expropriated If, upon the contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the
entity a fee simple title, then, of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the
non-user does not have the effect of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation
proceedings.

When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the
exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land,
and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without
any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.

In the present case, evidence reveals that Lot No. 941 was appropriated by the Republic of
the Philippines through expropriation proceedings. The terms of the judgment are clear and
unequivocal and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the Republic. There was no
condition imposed to the effect that the lot would return to CHIONGBIAN or that