Aftaab Grewal

Student # 43247155
Prof. Paul Russell

TA: Joe Wong

April 6 2016
Philosophy Essay #2 Question 2

In response to the following question:

Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.
Is this principle a sound basis for a theory of justice?

Before we can begin to weigh the given principle in its due context, Id like to first

consider some of the more pragmatic complications of the question itself, especially in

clarifying the possible interpretations of some of its terms.

For example, I assume the theory of justice in question refers to any likewise

theory, perhaps one especially analogous to Rawls, but not his necessarily.

Consequently, Ill examine the principle in regards to both some general hypothetical

theory of justice, and Rawls Justice as Fairness specifically. Similarly, the use of the

word basis also warrants two answers. The question may be inquiring the validity of

using the principle as the sole foundation for a theory, from which more derivative

principles can be inferred, or it can be suggesting the principle as one of many basis

on which the theory stands, of which it may not even necessarily be the most important

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one. Lastly, Im going to be engaging the question supposing the soundness of the

basis to mean to examine, not only whether or not the principle is of true, valid, and

logically following premises, but whether it's a basis distinctly superior to most if not all

alternatives; that is, whether it's a good basis to choose over all others.

Now then, having clarified the angles my response will take, Ill begin by saying,

in most configurations of the possible interpretations of the question, I disagree that

such a statement can be a sound basis for a theory of justice. In general, assuming the

given principle is the key, first-priority basis of the theory, one would hope a theory of

justice seeks to define what is just, and not simply what is not unjust. That is to say, to

begin a theory of justice on the basis of a principle that only defines injustice is to

clumsily promote a false dichotomy between justice and injustice and wrongfully set the

absence of one as the standard for determining the necessary presence of the other.

For example, how would we define the case of a hypothetical inequality that somehow

strips everyone of some small basic liberty, but still benefits everyone in some other,

still-meaningful way? Perhaps we can find such a situation in Thomas Hobbes

Leviathan, where he describes the need for peace to be so great that even to be under

the rule of a dictator-sovereign who strips the populace of some liberty is better than to

let everyone run rampant in a state of unordered nature. Taking the given principle

alone, we know that such a case is not injust because there are no inequalities that are

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not to the benefit to all. The sovereign is clearly given privilege over his subjects, but

this unequal distribution serves all some benefit. Despite knowing that this society is not,

by the strictest definition provided, unjust though, we still need further principles of

justice for further grounds of justice-qualification. The exception would be if the strict

definitions of justice and injustice in some particular theory bolster exactly such a

necessary dichotomy in which the lack of injustice alone warrants justice, which is not

something that can be logically inferred from the given principle alone if it were the

fundamental basis of a theory. In this way, it'd be incorrect to call this principle a sound

basis if it were the basis for a theory of injustice.

However, as one can guess, I do feel the principle can be a sound basis for a

theory of justice, if, just as was described in the preceding exception, it is paired with a

more fundamental qualification of justice that the principle can follow from. To

summarize what we have so far, the given principle, if it were the basis of the theory,

would not be a sound basis in any theory of justice without some contrived semantic

scheme to justify it, but, if it were one of several basis the theory works off of, can be

sound. From here, we can finally begin to work out if it is sound, in as definitive an

answer as the question demands, first in the context of Rawls's work, and then in

regards to my own convictions and persuasions.

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 In the case of Rawls's theory, the principle is indeed preceded by a qualification

of justice that necessitates injustice if not met, but the given principle is more of a logical

consequence of his liberty and difference principles than a heavily-weighted basis.

Rawls does not present the statement as a major foundation for his work, but rather as

an elaboration of what hes said of justice. Nonetheless, we can quickly humor the

thought of finding a case in which the dichotomy is not upheld and in which the

fundamental principles of justice are not met but the principle of injustice isn't either. If

such a case exists, then his scheme fails and the injustice principle proves itself an

unsound basis for his theory. If it does not, then the theory proves sound. So, examining

first what we know, in addition to the injustice principle weve been given, we have from

Rawls the liberty principle, the idea that each person is entitled to the most liberty

possible compatible with a similar liberty for others, and the difference principle, the idea

that societal inequalities are only permissible if they are to everyones advantage. That

injustice", then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all, though at first

glance may seem an oversimplification of his theory, then does indeed logically follow at

least the second principle without exception. One can argue, however, that the

statement does not cover negligence with the liberty principle in the same way as with

the difference principle, because, though to strip the rights and essential liberties of only

a select few members of society can be passed for an inequality, to deprive the whole of

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a society in an equal way is an injustice of the first principle that is not covered by the

given injustice principle. Specifically, this would be a case of an equality that is not to

the benefit of all, and, furthermore, its actually a breach of their entitlements and

essential liberties, and thus a disadvantage to all. I wouldn't place this discrepancy in

the definition of injustice as a very important fault of Rawls work - it was intended to do

little more than extend his previous, bigger ideas further- but, even so, it does appear

that the given principle is not a sound basis for his theory of justice.

Finally, in terms of my own persuasions, the given principle yet again seems to

prove itself an unsound basis for a theory of justice, though I'm admittedly less sure of

my standings here then in the other arguments. The already voiced complicative

misapplication of using a standard of injustice to characterize justice aside, the very

premise of the quote seems uncalculated and pre-suppositive. To examine the

soundness of whether or not injustice is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of

all demands that we also study the principles of justice, the liberty principle and the

difference principle, that the statement comes from and presupposes, because one of

its most blatant faults is that it ignores some of these forms of justice that logically follow

for it to regard. In my opinion, the liberty principle is the most immediately persuasive

standard of justice, which may come from a conflation of the justice of individuals on a

smaller scale with the macro justice subjecting society as a whole that Rawls is

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describing. That there should be a set standard of rights and freedoms a person is

entitled to is not unlike a humanitarian basic standard of living, and seems to translate

well from an intuitive, smaller scale justice to general societal structure. The difference

principle, however, more concerns the distribution of, as Rawls describes them, the

social primary goods -the rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, etc.- of

individuals across society. It seems reasonable that, should there be any equality, it

must be because it is for the greater good of all, but I struggle to see why it would be

against this principle that the given principle of injustice sets itself against. Rawls

himself presents the two justice principles in order of priority, and I fail to see how it

wouldn't simplify his scheme to define injustice as the disregard or absence of the first

principle, the liberty principle, and simply include in the list of entitlements each

individual possesses the right to an equal distribution of the social primary goods,

unless an inequality in the distribution, as the difference principle holds, is

advantageous to all. In this way, though the given principle in question isn't necessarily

a brutally flawed statement, we've already found a better, more sound basis for justice

theory. Furthermore, I suspect a similar disposition can be reached in another way also.

In the hypothetical original state, Rawls describes a veil of ignorance of ones own

social standings to structure and make decisions for society. According to him, the

principles outputted from this process must be just because it depends on everyone, for

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their own self-interest, to come up with the most equal laws. It follows then, that what

wouldn't be outputted from this process is not just, and therefore either unjust or neither.

That is to say, what a group of people in such a situation might consider and then refuse

to establish can be used as a standard for injustice almost just as powerfully as it is for

justice, perhaps with the exception of tossed aside principles that are neutral to the

matter. Thus, though one would indeed meet the what given principle describes as

injust, there's several other statements one could reach. It seems then, that, in

comparing these last two ways to criticize the given injustice principle, we can find a

recurring fault in the exclusivity in its definition of injustice to only including an antithesis

of the difference principle alone, and no other, only further establishing it, yet again, as

an unsound basis for a theory of justice.

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 Works Cited

Perry, John, Michael Bratman, and John M. Fischer. Introduction to Philosophy:

Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press,

2010. Print.