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    Praxeology and Its Critics PDF

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    Hane Pe Ey 163 Praxeology and its critics: an appraisal Bruce 1. Caldwell 1. Inroducton: Methodological Diversity inthe “Austrian Camp ‘The Austrian approach to methodology has never been moddltic. Ho recent studies show that since Menger's tne Austians have dere, a times dramatically in thei views on methodology (White 1977; Hutchison 1961). This diversity continues tobe evidenced inthe wings of modern day Austins Praxeolgy is the dominant methodological approach in contemporary ‘Austrian economics. The most comprehensive statement ofthe praxeoog ‘eal postion is found in Ludwig vou Mises magnum opus, Human action «treatise an economics (1945). However, few modem Avsrians follow & [urs intereetation of Mise” thovgt in their wating on methodology. ‘Murray Rothbard and Israel Kirmer come closest to being tre Mise Sans, yet even those scholars have their diferences wi thei frer teacher For example, Rothbard contends thatthe fundamental axioms of human ation are “broaily empicial” (1976, 24-28). This is at variance with “Miss” assertion thatthe postlaes of his system ae Known tobe te Por. For his par, Its Kizner approaches methodological questions Father peagmaticaly. He isles interested in arguments about the gil Sus 6 axiom tan he isin the isihts tat can be derived about the ‘workings of an economy from viewing human action in individualist, sujecivistie, and purposive terms. ‘Other Austrians are even farther from Mises in ther methodological views. One is stuck by the paucity of references to Mises found in he ‘per on metbedoiogy in Gerald O'Driscoll and Mao Rizo new book, Knowledge and tine: oundaton of Asian-subjcts economics 1983). Instead of mouthing the tenets of praxeologs, O'Driscoll and Rizzo ofet a reconsriction of Avstan methodology that integrates tee themes: ‘thoroughgoing and dynamic sbjectivism, the concept of mind comer ‘crm aatns reno, Gass Nelo, ammic Uae of 363 364 History of Pottical Economy 16:3 (1984) (a theoretical device with antecedents inthe works of Max Weber, Alfred Schutz and Fritz Machlup) and an approach to institutional development that draws heavily upon ideas found in he writings of Ca Menger, Fred "ch von Hajek, and Ludwig Lachmann, Lachnaon’s bells om tho ‘logy have more in common withthe radical subjective of GL. 8, ‘Smickle than withthe spriorsm of Mises. Aad though Hayek opposes ‘scents’ wih the sine vebemence that Mises exhibited towands post tis,’ he never embeaces apse (Lachmann 1978, 1-18; Hayek 1982, 183) ‘To concloe, there exists no single Austin positon om mtodology. “The purpose ofthis ance isto assess some of the cnn that have been dicted apuinstpraeology and to offer some new ones. Althogh the praxeological approach is emphasized het, it shouldbe clear tha alerative formulations of wat it mean too" Averan economics are urea being advocated by ts practitioners 1. Aprirism and the Fundamental Posaate of "uron Action ‘The praxeologice! position ‘The fundamental postulate of human action stat al tin i ational Praxcoogists assert that his postulate i known to be tue with apodictic certainty dat i, ts apo trve, Mises argues that since attacks on he postulate gute purposeful human action, attempts to efit it neces Savolve an inconsistency ‘The scope of praxcology isthe expliaton ofthe category of human action, All thats needed To the deduction ofall praxeoogisl theo rems is knowledge af the essence of human action, Isa knowledge that sour own Because we ae mea; no being of hunan descent tht pathological conditions have not reduced t 4 merely vegetative ex Istence Ik it {199,68 "The fundamental logical relations are not subject proof or dis. pron. Every atlmpt to prove them must presuppose thei aii I {simposible wo explsin them toa Beng who would not posses thr ‘ou his own account... They are ultimate unaalyzableeaepoces, ‘The human mind is utely incapable of imagining logical categorie at variance with them [1949, 34). In addition tothe ation postulate, examples of raxeoogial axioms are ‘he categories of eawality and teleology. Related theorems sate that ction takes place though time and that the fare is uncertain (Mises 1949, 22- 23, 99-105). Some plosopias of science elim that statement tht area pio trae Caldvell + Praxeology and its erties 365 tue equivalent fo true analytic statements. According f0 this view, all ognivey significant satements must he eter synthetic hence concey- tly testable or aalytic and ue (ence dfn, bat empincaly ens). ‘This approach to the logical status of sentences originated with the logical positvss. Although i was retained in some form by ltr logical xpi ests, more recently philosophers have questioned it validity and useful sss In any ease, Mises rejects the anale-syetie distinction ad lop 4 neo-Kantan perspective by arguing thatthe axioms of praxcology ae ‘oth a prior tue and empirically meaningful Aprors reasoning is purely conceptual and deductive. I canna pro luce anything ese but tautlogien and analytic judgements Al is plications are logically derived from the premises and were already contained in them. Hence, according oa popular objecson, i annot ald anything to our knowledge ‘All geometrical theorems ae are implied in the axioms The concept ofa rectangular angle already implies the theorem of Py- thagores This theorem isa tautology its deduction ress in an ana- Inte judgement. Nonetbeless nobody would contend that geometry ‘i general and the theorem of Pythagoras in particular donot enlarge four knowledge... 1949, 38], “The theorems atained by correct praxcoogical reasoning are not only pete certain and incontestable, ike the eorret mathematical theorems. They refer, moreover, with the fll git of their apd tic certainty ad incontesability to the reaiy of action a8 appears in life and history, Praxcology conveys exact and precise knowledge of real things (1949, 39. Criticisms ofthe praxeoloscal postion: Aprovism is ‘ineligible ‘Among the eiicisms of the a pivst approach to the sts of the fundamental postulates of ura action, thee views ae recurrent. Fin “Apmis is unintelligible" Economists who have read Mises have ot always understod his positon on praxcology. The Misesan assertion tht ‘MT action i ational sone that certain ecowoists have found particularly puzzling. In his ly lecture, Lionel Robbins writes: cour explanations must to some extent be tellogcal, This snot fo aue with von Mises and some of his followers that we must regard human ation, if ot purely vegetative, as atl times rational inthe sense that, given belie in the range of tochnical knowledge ‘oilable to nv ofcalletons of individvals action mst he 2. Foca moe hgh anes te depen, Call 92, he 366 History of Political Economy 16:3 (1984) consistent. 1 oafess that Ihave never been able to understand this ontenton Lord Robbins” confusion is due to is aie to zecogize that Mises" inion of rationality dies signieanly from definonssvaly put forth by economists, For praxcologists, all action is atonal because al action i by definition puposefl (Mises 1989, 11,13, 19-20) Simply ut, raonl and action define each other, the apposite of rational behavior {Snot rain behavior but "a reactive response to stimuli on hepato bodily organs apd instincts which cant be comtolled by the volition of the person concerned” (p. 20) ‘Some might obec ht habitual behavior canot be rational. But since Iabiual Behavior Sil involves choice, ito is eational by debiton Is an individual whose choies diverge from his scale of relative valetons ‘national? Such a stuation cannot arise inthe prascologicl system, Be- cause the at of choice reveal preferences, choices that ae made cant ‘verge fom the chooser preferences. © If all action is rtional is error impossible? The answer is no. Action takes place in sme, and the fates meetin thas knowedge i incom plete (Mises 1949, 92-98, 99-103). Inadditon, the ating agent bases his "tions op his subjective perceptions of reality. Though athe sine of action ‘he ating agent tends to improve his positon, he may discover tht his ‘action didnot accomplish his purpose. Ths in the peateoogical sytem, for can occu, causing the actor to ster fue actions. By implication, ‘onsstency in choice ila Robins) is nr the way in which rationality i ‘Sefned inthe Misesian system. ‘One could goon and on. The point is that many ofthe Misesian meth ‘odological claims that may seem Tudieous inially become fa les cos troversial once propery understood, While his defnions of rationality tnd action may appear strange to some, Miss isnot gly of being un fneligible. This ericism of praxeology maybe reece. Criticism: Aprioriam is dogmatic Some economists assert that all aprodst approaches 1 the stay of| ‘economics shouldbe avoided Because such approaches lato dogmatism. 5 nai it ot ees oper reece ce Sea er eee ieee ‘acid on these pints, Lats ters especialy Kir, develop sed exgticate the Ausra Se See Sees Stine Caldvell + Praxeology and its erties 367 This theme emerges ina recent book by Terence Hutchison in which he methodological contribution af the Austrians ae evaluated What needs to be emphasized is the desirability of discarding the remaining residues ofthe a prion ‘Pretence of Knowledge which ‘etn down from Wiese, Mies, and Hayek Fr aims to exablish “apriort judgements of spodictic certainty” o beyond the possiblity Of dispuie, together with compeehensive denuncitions a -Postvs™ and “Enpiricist ofthe exten of testability and falsiiabiy, may Serve to support infalbalist, authoritarian, and ant-iberarian at {udes and to play into the hands ofthe enemies of redo Followers of Mises bristle atthe suggestion that his methodology might Teal to dogmatism or authoritarianism. They pont oat tat though ie impassioned wings led to his viral osiacism from the economics [rofesson, Mises was so dedicated a disciple of liberty tht he persisted. In his alvoeacy throughout hs ong eset. Is Hutchison’ charge an accurate one? The answer depends largely on how one defines “dogmatism.” If dogmatism is meant to imply stonely held belies, the Austrians are dogmatic (bat they certainly hold no m0” ‘nopoly on dogmatism within the profession). A more reasonable interpre {ation ofthe charge is that apirism does not conform tothe sandatd vision ofthe seieatfic method. Tre scientists subject thei hypotheses 10 testing and never elim to hive discovered hypesheses ha are way an cerinly ue. According tothe view, praxelogy is unscientific and hence Sopa ‘Mere will be said on this opie inthe nest section, bu i can be noted ‘ote hat tis crtism of Asian methodology is problematial, To ase that there is butane seine metho, and that any alysis which does not conform to itis meaningless or dogmatic, i elf a dogmtic ind unscientific (Hayek would term it scientist”) atitade, Those who ate ‘Skeptical ofthe vow tha atonal sientiic method contain dogmatic ements should consult the wings of philosopher Paal Feyerabend (1975, 1978), Although the abrogation of scenic feedom that dogmatism entails is a fighesing prospect ts noc ler that such a problem san be avoided by following any ene particular methodological approach Any view ean be held dogmatically and used in an autborsarian manner. Alea, the desire to protect Sclentiefeedom implet in the writings of Hutchison isa value that s met methodological: no paricular methodology can en. sure is continued existence. Like mos redoms, its pepetation cannot be guaranzed by following some simple formula 368 History of Political Economy 16:3 (1984) (Crticiom: Apriorum is unscientific ‘Though an aprioist approach to the stats ofthe Sst postulates of a Uheoreticalsysiem may be neither uninteligile nor (necessary) Jog mati, iti diferent from most saad textment of the topic. Within ‘weneth-century philosophy of science, logical postivists, lop emp ‘ess, and Popperian falsicatoiss all believe thatthe analyte synthetic

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