Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Culture Talk

    Uploaded by

    Suleiman Hodali
    13 views24 pages
    Culture Talk

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    Culture Talk

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    13 views24 pages

    Culture Talk

    Uploaded by

    Suleiman Hodali
    Culture Talk

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    of 24
    Goo Musuim, Bap Mustin tians or Jens oplitof from “bad ones. The presumption that there ‘out ova failure to are such cateories masks a zefusal to a rake political analysis of our times. My hopes tha his book will coaebate to such an analysis asa prelude t framing real choices 6 Chapter One CuLTURE TALK; or, How Not To Tax Apour IsLAM AND Povitics his moment in history afer the Cold Waris fered to as the ra of globalization and is marked by the ascendancy and rapid poiticizng ofa single erm culture. During the Cold Wa we discussed sociosconomie or political development, such a8 pporerty and wealth, democfacy and dietatorship, as mainly oct rents. This new understanding of clare les social than polit cal ied less tothe realities of patiula counties than to global politcal events ike che tearing down ofthe Berlin Wall ora. Unlike the cultare studied by athropologits—face-10-face in mate local, and lved—the talk of eahze is highly politicized and comes in large geo package. CCluce Tall ossumes tac every culture has tangible essence thae defines ig and it then explains plies as consequence of thae esence, Cleure Talk after gl, far example, qualified! and explained the practice of tezoiam” ae Islamic.” Islamic teot- 0 Goon Musiim, Bao Musuim ism is thus offered as both description and explanation of the ‘rents ofr Itai longer the matket capitalism), nor che sate (densoceney), but culture (modernity) thatissid co be the dividing, Tine benweenthove in favor of «peaceful ci existence and those inclined to teror: ei sid that our word is divided between those who ate modem and thove who are premedern. The moderns make culate and ate its masters the premodezns ae sid robe but conduits. But tis tre that premodera clare no move shan rucimentary tvich, then surely premodeen peoples may not be held esporibl for ther actions. This point of view demands that they be cestained, collectively if no individual —if necessary, he captive, even unconditionally forthe goodof civilization In pose cy Cultute Talk focuses on Islam and -Masims who presumably made cultore only atthe begioning of creation, as some extraordinary, prophetic act. After that, it seems ‘Muslims just conformed to culture, According to some, our eu tue seems to have no history, no pits, and no debates, so that all Muslims are jst pain sd, According co others, there is his rosy poliie ven debates, and thee are good Maslims nd bad Masts. In both versions, history seems to ave pettifd into @ lifles custom ofan antique people who inhabit antique lads, OF Jee Am could tbe that culture here stands for hab, for some kindof in stinctve activity with euls tha are inscribed in exely founding tents, usally cligious and muminsifed ia ealy artifacts? ‘We need to distinguish between two contrasting narratives of {Galt Talk. One thinks of premadetn peoples as those who ate not yet modern, who ar either Inggng behind or have yet co em bark on the road to modernity The other depicts the premodern eas the former conception encour bao the antimodern, Wh tages relations based an philanthropy, the later notion is produc tiveof fear and preemptive police of military action. The difference is clear if we contrast eadier depictions of 8 Calter Tale Afticans with conterporaey tlk about Muslims, Duc the Cok Wr, Aicans were stigmatized 2s che prime example of peoples not capable of modernity With the ci ofthe Cold War, Isla and the Middle Eas have dlsplaced Africa athe hatd premodern core in a rapidly globaliing wold, The diference in the conten porary perception of black Aftiea and Middle Eastern Islam is this: whereas Afica is seen a8 incapable of modernity hard-core Islam seen as not only incapable of but alo resistant ro moder: nity Whereas Aticans are said to vctmitethemelies hard-core Muslims re said to be prone to raking other along to the world beyond. Thete is a interesting parallel between the pre-isx de bate onrerrorism in Afica andthe post-rdebte on global ter rorism, Asin che cutrene global debate, Afican discussions, 00, looked matnly or exclusively for internal explanations forthe spread of tertor In a ave bat signifeane example that lumped Atican “tribalists™ and Muslim “fundamentalist” together a8 the enemy, Aryeh Neier, former president of Human Rights Watch and now presiden ofthe George Soro-funded Open SoieryIn- stitute, argued in an op-ed piece inthe Washington Post that dhe problem is larger than Ila: ites with baits and fundamen taliss, contemporary countesparts of Nari, who have ideatied smodetnism asthe enemy. Premodem peoples are sud tohave no creative bility and ant- modern fondamentalists are said to havea profound ability to be destructive, The destruction is taken as proof sha they have no Appreciation for human life, including thei own, This i autely why Cultuee Tallhas become the tuff offeont-page ews storie. (Calture is now said to bea matter of life snd death, This kind of thinking is deeply reminisce of tracts from the history of ‘modein colonization. Ths history stigmaties those shut out of| ‘modernity as antimodern because they resist beng shut ou. eas sumes cha peoples public behavior, partially thee political 9 Goon Mustim, Bap Musi bhavion canbe read fom their abite and customs, whether el ious oF traditional. Bu could itbe that a person who takes his or her religion iteally is « potential terots? And that someone wha chinks ofa religious text as metaphorical or figurative is ber- ter sited to cv life and the tolerance alle for? Hows one may tsk, does the Hera reading of sacred texts transac into hijack ing, murdes, and terocis? Two Versions of Culture Talk Contemporary Caste Talk dates from the end ofthe Cold War and comes in gwo versions, claims to interpret polities fom cul ‘re inthe present and throughout history, but neither version of (Galtuze Tallis substantially the work ofa historian. If there isa founding father of contemporary Cakure ‘Talk itis Bernard Lewis, the wel known Orienalst at Pinceton who has been an advises to the US, policy establishment, The celebrated phraze of contemporary Culize Talk—"s dash of civilizations” is taken from the tle of the losing section of Lewis's 1990 article “The Roots of Mslim Rage-” Lewis text provided the inspiration for sssecond and ctuder version, writen by Samuel Huntington, apo involvement withthe US. policy Tica scientist at Harvard, whose etablshment dates from the era of the Viensen We, Whereas ‘Lewis confine his cess to historical relations beeween two civil rations he cll “slamic™ ae “Jceo-Chritian,” Huntngron’s reach was far more ambitious he broadened Lewis's thesis 0 cover the entice world “Itis my hypothesis,” Aled "The Clash of Civilinstons?™ (299) in Foreig Afrs, ington proclaimed in an article thac the fundamental source of conic inthe new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. Culture Talk The geat divisions among hunankind and the domin Ing source of confit willbe cultural, Naton-tates wl remain the most poweeful actors in wold affais, but the principal confets of global politics will scar between nations and groups of differen civilizations The dash of civilizations will dominate global pois. The faut lines between civizations willbe the bt lines ofthe fut, Hatingco’sargament ws bil coud to eas tha teed of the Cold Wat “thei replaced by a“velver curtain of eltue,” and that the velvet cu tain ad been drawn across “the bloody hordes of Islam.” Hunt ington cas Islam in the role of an enemy civilization From thi point of view, Masti could be only bad “Huntington was nt alone Several others joined in translating his point of view into a vision broadly shared in hawkish cites of the policy and intellectual establishment. The thrust of the new vision was that the ideological wse we have came to know as the Cold War was but a parochial cuttin-aiser for a traly lobal conflict for which “the West" will ned to marshal the entre range of is cultural eésoures, For William Lind, the Cold ‘War was the asin series of "Western civil wars” that stated in sevententh-ceatury Europes withthe end of the Cold Wat, he argued the lines of global conic become east in culewal ms Régie Debra, himself an ative participant in the ideolo cal strugales ofthe Cold War, saw the new ea as sharply defined by a ‘Green Peril" the color green presumably standing for Islam-far more dangerous than the red scaces of yesteryears because i lacks rational slfsesrsint: "Broadly speaking, green thas replaced red athe rising force... . The naceat and rational "North deters the nuclear and rational North, uot the conventional and mystical South.” Goon Mustim, Bap Mustim ing trough hisory ke armed bation either igi ‘cei! des opin cpr ben oy Siete, Eagar Sith le Plein ery shale iowa Uniersty Profesor at Coan, rfl aged for tnoehioreal and kas punching of cre, oe ferme by teenth dah so inside clone than ‘between them: "To Huntingron, wha he calls ‘csilizational ide tity’ iva stable and undisturbed thing, like a room fl of furitore inthe back of your house, kis Bernas Lewis who has provided the more durable version ‘of Culture Talk, Lewis both gestures coyatd history and acknowl 1h within civilizations, Rather than cai an ahistorical ¢lobal vision of coming Armageddon, Lewis thinks of hitory as the movement of lage eukaral bloc ealled cvliztions. Bu Levi wets of Islamic civilization as if ic were vence with its essence an unchanging doctrine in which Muslims are said vo ake here i omething inthe religious cub refuge in times of exis ture of llaro,” Lowi noted in "The Roots of Muslim Ra which inspired, in even the humblese peasant or pele, 4 dignity and s courtesy toward others never exceeded and rarely equaled in other civilisations, And yet, in mo- mente of upheaval and disruption, when the deeper pas: sions ae stired, this dignity and courtesy coward others can give way to a explosive mintuee of rage and hated ‘which impels ese the government of an ancient and eivi- lived counteyeven the spokesman ofa great and ethical sclgion-to espouse kidnapping and atsasination, and ‘ty € Bind in the life of thee Prophet, approral and ia- eed precedent for uch ations. Culture Tate Lows elaborated his notion of the dati core of slam in book that “was alten in page proofs” by scx but was published S000 afer provocatively tiled Wht Went Wrong? Paraphrasing "Hegel old claim chat freedom isthe distinctive attribute of Wes. mn civilization, Lewis wrote: “To a Western obseeet, schooled in ‘the theory and practie of Western freedom, tis precisely the lack of fcedom. . hat undedie so many of the roubles of the Mis Jin word.” To this he added the absence of secs asthe se ‘ond explanation forthe yawning gap between contemporsey Ila sand modernity: unt the influence of French revolutionary ideas began percolating into the Middle Bae inthe nineteenth center, Levis argued, “the notion of a non-cligious society as something Adesrableor even permissible ws totally alien co Isam Ikis Bernard Lewis, not Samuel Huntington, who provides the inzllectual support for the notion that chete are good” a3 op posed to “bad” Muslims, an idea that has become the driving force ‘9f American focegn policy Keen a deaw an unambiguous conch sion for the policy establishment, Lewis begins by recognizing th fundamentalism is not the only Islamic tadiion” and that “sere are others” and tha "before this tse is decided there wil bea hard struggle.” Warning che policy estslishinen that inthis stcuggle “we ofthe West can do ile ar nothing... for these are issues that Muslims must decd among themsches," he counsls ‘hat “in the meantime”that i, while Muslin stl thence. nal accounts—the West nods “to avoid the danger of anew ea of| religions wars.” Wheieas Huntington had issued a clarion cl oe the West to yet realy for a cach of civilisations, Lewis has di ferent points the West must remain a bystander while Moslins faht their inteanal war, pitting good against bad Muslims. In spite ‘ofthis difference, one cannar help but nate shat both stands rep reseneatives ofthe ffl *Wes.” 33 Goon Musuim, Ban Mustia. 1 Rernatd Lewis provides itllectusl support for the Bush ‘dministeation’spost-gf poliy che return ca roughshod, Cold ‘Way foc on “rolling back” history is po line with Huntington. Rather than wait far “good” Mislime to tsiumph over “bad” Mosims, as Lewis counsels, the Bush aduin- ‘station isdetermined to hasten such cil war, f necessary. an Iragy i s prepared to invade and bring about 4 regime change incended to iberste “good” Musins from the political yoke of “bad” ones (Caltae Talla also wired religion iat apolitical eatery Deeocracy lg in the Muslin world, coneides «Freedoms House seody of political systems nthe non-Western world. Asif aking a ‘ue from Bernat Lee, Stephon Schwarz, dicetor ofthe lla and Democracy Project forthe Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, claims thatthe roots of terrorism realy ie na sec- tarian branch of Islam, the Wahhabi, ven the pages of the New York Times now ince replat account distinguishing good from bad Muslims: good Muslims are modeen, secular, and West cened, but bad Maslin ae doctsnal,antimedern, and vieulent “The sel-appointed leaders of “the West” George W Bush and Bish prime minister Tony Bai, have visibly stepped back from 4 Huntington style embrace of a war betwen civilization Lewiestyle caution apainst taking on an entire cvilization. Afr ‘Bushs early public firtation with the idea ofan ani-Muslim erie side, both hea Bla have taken to warning audience about the eed to ditnguish “good” Moslins fom “bad” Muslims. Theim- plication is unmistakable and ndiguised: whether in Afghani stan, Palestine, of Pakistan, Mam must be quarantined and the evil exotcized from it by» Muslim itil war Lewis opens Wat Went Wrong? with reductive discussion of the thirteen hundred years since the bith of Slam in the seventh 4 Culture Tale century: "theft thousand years so afte the advent of Islam” were followed by “the Tong stale forthe reconques,” which “opened che way toa Chistian invasion of Affica ad Asi.” In ‘the begining, there was "conquest" and then followed "eon quest." The conquest vas Islamic, the rconguest Christian, No period in history fits this model of *Chrsians” confronting "Muslns” beter han the time of the Causades ‘Oncof the bes studies of the Crusades ie by the Slovenian his torian Toma Mastnak, who points out that it yas at that moment in history thatthe Muslim became the enemy. When “Chesian| society became conscious of itself through mobilization for holy war «am essential moment inthe atealation of selEawareness ofthe Chistian commonwealth ws the constuetion ofthe Mus fmm ene," Mastnak is careful to point ove that his was nt rue of easier centacies “When, wit the Arab expansion i the sy tenth and eighth centuries, the Muslims reached the Earopean peninsala, they became inthe Latin Christians eyes one among, those pagan, o€ infidel, barbarians. Among the host of Chistian enemies, they were atsigned no privileged place.” Miliane Christian animosity was initially simed at all non= ‘Christians only late did it become focused on Muslin: “Ie was with the crusade that Palestine ceased to be the Promised Land (tes repromissions of the Od Testament and became the Holy Land tere sancta.” Only with te Crusades di Christendom de- fine 4 usrersal enemy and dedlare a “state of permanent wae against the athen.” No longer just another earthly enemy, the Crusades demonized the Muslim a ei incarnate, “he person ‘ation ofthe very religion ofthe Antihris.” Thee why the poi of the Crusades was not to convert Muslims bit to exterminate ‘hem: "The Muslims, che infidels, id no have freedom of cho they could nor choose berwen conversion and death because they a5 Goon Mustim, Ban Musiin were seen at inconverible.” Their exterination “was preached ‘oki bythe Popes” and aio by St. Bernard, who "declared that 2 infidel was not homicide but “malicide’anniilation of evil and that a pagan’s death was a Christian’s glory becouse, in it (Chae as glorified Bernard Lewis tests what is actualy a seis of diferent hs torical encountersthe Craiades, 482, Bacopean colonization 26 i they were hallmatks of a single clash of civilizations ot fourteen hundred yeas, Rather than recognize tha each encounter wat faeled bya specific politcal projet—ehe making of a polit cal entity called "Cheistendom,” the Catlin mnonarcly's desire 10 build nation-t of neighboring tericris, modein Baropean imperial expansion, and so on-—Lews claims that these “lashes” were driven by ine called Spain following its con compatible civilizations. And he assumes that the dashes take place between fixed tettril nits char sepresent discrete cv zations ove the fo political agenda chat deve such civilizational histories, we should weston the presumed identity between cultural and politcal history To avoid Lewit's distortions, ane needs moce details a key points, Can one, for example, speak of Judeo (Chvstian Gilzation over two millenia as does Bernard Levis? storie The Israel cultural histovian Gil Anide eminds us hat Jewish culture in Spaia is beter chowght of a8 "Arab Jewish”—rather than Judeo-Christian—and that the separation of "Jews from Arabs" did not occur until 142. Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) wrote The Guide of the Peplesed, “the most important work of Jewish philosophy ove wri possibly writen in He brew sript, but speaking’ to us in Arabic andlor Judco-Arabic' Jnal-Andalus. And i was the lous of al-Andalus in r4ga that ro 26 Culture Tale duced the major text of Jewish mysticism, the Zohar and also marked the beginning ofthe second Jewish diaspora, Te does not make sense to think of cule in politcal—and therefore ceritovial—terms, States are teritoral cule isnot. Doct it make sense to wits politcal histories of Ilam that sead like histories of places ie the Middle East? Or to write political histories of states inthe Middle East asf these were no more than political histories of Islam there? We net to think of cult in terms that ate both historia! and nontrivial, Otherwise, one {is harnessing culkural resources for vty specific national and in pedal poical projet. Modernity and the Politicization of Culture Culture Tal doesnot spring from the tation of history writing but tather from tha of the policy sciences that regularly service po lca establishment: Bernatd Lewis is an Orientals and Samuel Huntington a politcal scents, Oriaalie histories of Islam and the Middle Fase have been consistently challenged since the 19605 bya diverse group of such intellectual a Matshall Hodgson and Edward Sad, Cheikh Anta Diop and Martin Bernal, Sami Arn and Abdallah Larou. These thinkers came out of the ranks ofthe antivar and anec-iperialst movenents of the 1960s, and they were followed by a whole gencration of historians Bu even if dis credited as an iotllectal anachronism by ewo generations of scholarship, the Orientals histories have managed to rebound. Thekey reason ies inthe elation between history wetng and foxms of power, and there are two broad oem of history writing: nationalist and metanationalist. If nationalist history writing has ‘been mainly about giving che nation porary politcal subject—an identifiable and often glovios pas avery modern ao 27 Goon Mustin, Ban Mustim metanationalst writings have given us eal glorified civliza- tional histories, locating the nation in elobal context ‘When the sineconth-eaturyIaian missionary Meteo Rice brought a European map of the workd—showing the new disor ‘exes in Ameriea—to China, he was surprised to find thatthe Chi- nese were offeaded by it. The map put Europe inthe cewer of ‘the word and split che Pei, which meant that China appeared at the right-hand edge of the map. But the Chinese had slays thought of China a lierally the "Middle Kingda," which obvi ‘ously should have been inthe center of the map. To please his hosts, Rieci produced another map, one that epic the Atlantic, ‘making China seem more ceael. In China, maps at sll draw thar way but Barope as hi 10 the fstype of map. The most commonly used map in North Amerie shows the United Statesat the center of the wot, sometinses even eplitngthe Asian conti- nent in two, Today the most widely used world aap has westen Europe it its centr. Based on the Mercator projection i system tically distorts out inage of the worlds eventhough Rurope haa appsoximately the same area a each ofthe other two peninsulas of Asia—preprtition India and Southeast Asia Eutope scaled ‘continent, wheseas India is but a subcontinent, and Southeast, Asia is not even accorded that satus atthe same time, the acca ‘most deasticaly reduce inthe Mereator pioiection is Aftca The civitstional history of the West” came toa teiumphane climax inthe nineteenth cencary along with Batopean imperial ism. Witten fom che vantage point of « mdern power that had global dominance in che entre following the Re- naissance, civilizational history gave “the West” an identity that he West” occupied the center of the global sage and “the Orient” ‘was ts periphery Not surpsingl inital eri of Eu history came ftom scholars whote main focus was the “on exploded in marched through time unscathed, From this point of view Culture Talk Inthe traditional story a eecounted by the University of ago historian Marshall Hodgson, “history began in the Bas "and “the torch wasthen passed successively wo Greece and Rome and firally co Christians of northwestern Europe, whete medieval and modern life developed,” Hodgson should have added that the division of the wodd into "he West” and “the East," “Europe and Asia" lfc out a think part—in the words of che Yale historian Christopher Milles, a lank darkness"—that was sid to lack history or civilization be ‘cause laced either great texts or gree alongments, This blank darkness comprised Aftics, the pre-Columbian Ameen, and the lands of the Paci, excepting, of cours, Eeype and Ethiopia Which for this purpase were classified as belonging to Asa. fa ‘other words, the notion of “the West went alongside tw periph ties: whereas “the Oriene” was vile, Alia and the others were simply blanked out int a hsesial darkness, Marshall Hodgson made i lifelong projet to count the ‘Westcentered studies of Islam. He began hisclasi three-volume sud, The Venture of Islam, by showing how throughout history, the notion of “the West" had changed atleast thee times. "The West” referred “originally and propel tothe western of Latin. using half of che Roman empie; that i tothe west Mediterranean la” Aft the first change, the tee cate ro refe to “the west European lands generally" Bu this was nota simple extension for it excluded "those west Meiteranean lnde which turned Mus lim.” The second shife was from West European lands to people, ‘thus incorporating their overseas seeements, The, there was the hid shift as the definition of “the West” was further steeched 9 indude “al Ewopean Christendom.” Whereas the second shift 1 feted oa global westem Europe the third extension refered toa slobal Europe, westeen aad ester, Thus dd the notion of “the ‘West develop fom a geographical location ta racialzednovion| 9 Goon Musiia, BAD Musine sefering tll peoples of Baropean origin, no mater where they liv ad fo Can there bea sel contained history of Western civilization? how long, Historians have been chipping away at chis dam in a number of Sel, ranging fom the development of science to that of society. Hodgson had earlier remarked thatthe equation of “the We with “science” had given sse roan absuedity whereby it was pr. the classical age of Islam sumed that Araic-witing sien i were simply masking time: Rather than making any original con sbution to scence, they were peesumed simply to be holding up the torch forcenturies—untl it soul be passed on o “the West. “Te notion chat the main cole of Aabic-wriing sient was to preserve classical Greek science and pas i onto Rematsance Fs rope was fosied by ‘Thomas Kuhn's caim that Renaissance si ence represented a paradigmati beak with medieval since and = Kuhn aso sisted the paradigmatic break withthe work of Copernicus, 1 cent works in the hstory-of science challenge cis presumption. With the advantage of accumulated Gndings, Otto Newgebauee and Noe! Swerdon, to dstingsished historians of plored the influence af “astronomers associated with the observa tory of Marigha in northwesters Ian,” whose work, writen in yin paticula, in ce ifteenthcen- eck imermeivis." They concluded in a teconuection with the scence of antiquity Wher Aeabic, “reached Europe, tary through Byzantine their now-cassc 1984 work on the mathematical astronomy of Copernicus: "Ina very eal ease, Copernicus canbe looked upoa asi tthe las, surely the most noted follower ofthe Marga Schoo.’ * The contemporacy history of science shots similar re thinking in other Gels, och a anatomy (he planar cecal tion of blood) and mathematics (decimal factions."The lace in the history of scence points co lege historical gap the place of| 0 Culture Tale Andalusia—Acabic-weting Spain—in the histonical study ofthe Renaissance, We have seen hat Eurocentric history consrcted «wo pe "ipheris: one visible, the othe invisible. Pae of the invisible pe riphery was Africa, The same polities! projet that praduced a setttanding history of the West also preuced a seltstaning his tory of Alia. Like the notion of "she West,” that of Africa was also tutnedincoaracialized object. The difference was that Africa was dcbase rather shan exaed, redefined asthe land south ofthe Saha, coterminous with that pat of the continent ravaged de ing the slave cade. The scholars who questioned the ccialzed Aegiadation of Avia atthe same time further eroded the produc sion of Bacocenti history. The reconsideration of African histouy beyan with the Sene- glee savant, Chih Anta Diop, who wrote his major work, The African Origin of Civilization, inthe 29608. Diop questioned the racist tendency to dislocate the history of pharaonic Egypt—in ‘which oughly one quater af the African population ofthe time ived—from its surcoundings, particulary Nubia to the south, thereby denying the Aftcan historical idenety of ancent Egy. Diop targeted the cherished heart ofthe Enrocentic tadition the lasses, which not only cast Gree and Rome as eternal com ponents of “the West" but also stripped Egypt of is historical Identity. nthe sud of cassie, Egypt faced a daublelose es com- nection with Grace in ancient times was seduce o being exter- ‘nal and incidental, and its location in Afcea was denied hstosical significance, Diop’ work provided the foundation on which the British scholar Martin Benal based his monumental two-volume work, Black Athena: Affoasatc Roots of Classical Civilization. Bee ral showed the ways in which the main tradition of Egyptology ar Goo Musuint, Bap Musiim had been shaped by a metanationalist Western way of thinking rooted in the ninetenth-century impecal, particulary, German, imagination. Bernal conteased thie innpesil imagiation wich what Greek had to say abou themselves, partieaasy abou their tet historical and civilizational debe to pharaonic Egypt. In pariculas, he showed how the Greek” image of themueres as the product ofan invasion from Egypt in th south was reversed inthe European impesial imagination to portay classical Greece as the product of an Aryan invasion fom the north. Bernall also made it clear that Greece, orginally a colony of Pgypt, wis an amalgam of diverse inflences, initially Afican, Phoea cian, and Jewish, later norteen European If early classical Egypt ie beter thought of as an Aftian civilization, dasscal Grose is beter thought of a8 a Mediteeanean-—rather than Buropean civilization dad Ssid summed up “the principal dogmas of Oriental ism in his mejesceil study thatthe same Orientals histories that portray “the West” a8 “ra tional developed, humane (and supecor,” caricature “the Orit” a5 “abettant undeveloped fan] inferior.” Another dogina is that “the Orient lives according to st rales inscribed in acted texts, ‘notin response ro che changing demands of life. The third dogma preter “that che Orient is tena, aniform, and incapable of efi ieelftherefore ite assumed tata highly generalized and systematic voeabulay for deserting the Oxient from a Western standpoint is inevitable and scienically “objective” And the final dogma ie “thatthe Oren is atthe bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Pri the Mongol hordes, the brown do minions) ort be controlled (by pacfatin, research and devel ‘pment outright occupation whenever possible.” these nae, The fist dogma is Theres reason tobe hugely skeptical of cams that describe 3 Culture Talk iuilcations discretely and identify civliratonil histories with pat ticular geographies and polities. One has to distinguish between

    You might also like