of the stand ns of ences racti- vaand when liffer- aindialog alog (Bp. theoretical on, PA op. 277-208), “ultaral Seu 48), Maras pana: Unive in socal te inst mats WL. Mills, of guativaive ). New Yerk men's expen EThory, 10, fd ent que 34, (B32. Hosoi of difference Aih-ha, & © ion an com ‘nbrdge: NIT minism, post sibility Sion- Denzin, N. K. y Lincoin, Y. 8. (Eds.) (1994): Handbook of Qualitative Research. Newbury Park: Sage Competing Paradigms 6 in Qualitative Research EGON G. GUBA YVONNA S. LINCOLN IN this chapter we analyze four paradigms that ‘currently are competing, or have until recently com feted, for acceptance as the paradigm of choice in informing and guiding inquiry especially qualitaive inquiry: positivism, posipositivism, cttical theory and related ideological positions, ad construct ism, We acknowledge at once our own commitmes toconstructivism (which we cali called “natural- tic inquiry”; Lincoln & Guba, 1985); the reader ‘may wish to take that fact into account in judging the appropriateness and usefulness of our analysis, ‘Although the title of this volume, Handbook of Qualitative Research, implies thatthe term qualita: tive is an umbrella teem superior to the term para: align (and, indeed, that usage is not uncommon), {sour position that it is a term that ought to be reserved for adescription of types af methods. From ‘ur perspective, both qualitative and quantitative methods may be used appropriately with any search paradigm. Questions of method are sevo dary to questions of paradigm, whi the basic belief system or worldview that guides investigator, not only in choices of method but in ‘oniologicaly and epistemologically fundamental ways. Ieis certainly the case that interest in alternative paradigms has been stimulated by a prowing dissat- isfaction with the patent overemphusis on quantita tive methods, But as efforts were made to build a ase fora renewed interest in qualitative approaches, it became elear that the metaphysical assumptions lundergitding the conventional paradigm (ihe “re ‘ceived view") must be seriously questioned. Thus the emphasis of this chapter is on paradigms, thei assumptions, and the implications oF those ass tions for a variety of researc: issues, not on the relative utility of qualitative versus quantitative methods, Nevertheless, as discussions of para- dligmsdmethods over the past decade have often be: un with a consideration of problems associated ‘with overquantiication, we will also begin there, shifting only later 1 ou predominant interest. ‘The Quantitative/Qualit Distinction there has been a heavy emphasis ication in science, Mathematics is often termed the “queen of sciences,” and those sei- such as physics and chemistry, that lend ‘elves especially well to quantification are eenerally known as “hard.” Less quantifiable are has, such as biology (although that is rapidly changing) and particulary the social seiences, are AUTHORS’ NOTE: We ate grateful to Henry Giroux and Robert Stake for their very helpful extn of an earior ‘eat ofthis chapter 105106 referred to as “soft,” fess with pejorative intent than to signal their (putative) lack of dependability, Scientific com. monly believed to emerge as the degree of quan- lification found within a given field inereases That this is the ease és hardly surprising, The received view" of science (positivism, transformed ‘over the course of this century into postposit ism: see below) focuses on efforts to verify (posi tivism) oF falsify (postpositivism) a priori hy- potheses. most uscfully stated as mathematical (quantitative) propositions oF propositions t cean be easily converted into peceise m formulas expressing functional relationships. For- imulaic precision has enormous utility when the itn af science is the prediction and coniral of natural phenomena. Further, there is already aval: able powerful array of staistical and mathem cal models, Finally, there exists a widespr conviction that only quantitative data are ul mately valid, or of high quality (Sechrest, 1992). ‘olin Stuart Mill (1843/1906) is said 0 have been the first to urge social scientists to emulate thei older ins, promising that if his advice were followed, rapid maturation ofthese fields, as well as their emancipation from the philosophical and theological strictures that limited them, would follow. Social scientists took this counsel fo heart (probably to a degree that would greatly surprise Milli he were alive today) for other reasons as wel They were the “new kids on the block": if quantifi cation could lead tothe fulfillment of Mill's prom- ise, status and political leverage would acerue that would enormously profit the new practitioners, Imi- {ation might thus lead hoth to greater acceptance and to more valid knowledge, cri ques of the Received View Inrocent years, however, strong counterpressures against quantification have emerged. Two critiques, ‘one internal to the conventional paradigm (that is, n terms of those metaphysical assumptions that define the nature of positivist inquiry) and one ex: tema to it (that is, in terms of those assumptions defining alternative paradigms), have been mounted that seem not ony to ws the utility of qualitative data but to ques assumptions on which the putative st ‘quantification fas been based, Internat (Intrapar Jigm) Critiques A variety of implicit problems have surfaced to challenge conventional wisdom; several ofthese are described below. MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Context stripping. Precise quantitative approaches that focus on selected subsets of variables neces- saily “strip” from consideration, through appro- priate controls oF randomization, other variables that exist in the context that might, i allowed to exert their effects, greatly alter findings. Further such exclusionary designs, while increasing the theoretical rigor of a study. deteact from its rete vance. thats its applicability or generalizability, because their outcomes ean be properly applied comly in other similarly truncated or contextually stripped situations (another laboratory, for exam- ple). Qualitative data it is argued, can redress that Imbalance by providing contextual information, Exclusion of meaning and purpose. Human be- havior, unlike that of physical objects, eannot be understood without reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human actors to their activi: lies. Qualitative data, itis asserted, ean provide rich insight into human behavior Disjunction of grand theories with local con- texts: The eticlemic dilemma, The elie (outsider) theory brought to bear on an inquiry by an inves= ligator (ar the hypotheses proposed to be tested) may have little or no meaning within the emic (insider) view of studied individuals, groups, so- cites, or cultures. Qualitative data, itis affirmed, are useful for uncovering emic views: theories, to be valid, should be qualitatively grounded (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Such grounding is particularly erucial in view of the mounting criticism of social science as failing to provide adequate accounts of nonmainstream lives (ihe “other") or to provide the material for a criticism of our own Western culture (Marcus & Fischer, 1986), Inapplicability of general data to individual cases, This problem is sometimes described as the omothetic/idiographic disjunction, Generalizs tions, although perhaps statistically meaningtul, have no applicability in the individual case (the fact, say, that 80% of individuals presenting given symptoms have lung cancer is at best incomplete evidence that a particular patient presenting with such symptoms has lung cancer). Qualitative data, i is held, can help to avoid such ambiguities, Exclusion ofthe discovery dimension in inquiry. Conventional emphasis on the verification of spe- priori hypotheses glosses aver the source of those hypotheses, usually arived at by what is com- monly termed the discovery process. Inthe received view only empirical inquiry deserves to be called “seience.” Quantitative normative methodology is thus privileged over the insights of creative and divergent thinkers, The eall for qualitative inputs is expected to redress this imbalance, fee } | } |shes bles duo het, fidual vsth> aiza- ‘elu, (he sivea ipleie dats, quire fxg reef con ived called oay is ead inpucs Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research ternal (Extraparadigm) Critiques ‘The intraparadigi problems noted above offer a weighty challenge to conventional methodol ‘ogy, but could be eliminated, or at least amelio- rated, by greater use of qualitative data, Many tities of the received view are content to stop at that point; hence many ofthe calls for more quali- tative inputs have been limited to this methods level accommodation. Butan even weightier chal- lenge has been mounted by cities who have proposed alternative paradignes that involve not ‘only qualification of approaches but fundamental adjustments in the basic assumptions that guide inquiry altogether. Theie rejection of the received view can be justified on a number of grounds @Bernsicin, 1988; Guba, 1990; Hesse, 1980; Lin- coln & Guba, 1985; Reason & Rowan, 1981), but chief among them are the following." The theory-ladenness of facts. Conventional approaches to rescarch invoiving the verification fr falsification of hypotheses assume the inl pendence of theoretical and observational lan guages, Ian inquiry is tbe objective, hypotheses ‘must be stated in ways that are independent of the way in which the facts needed t0 test them are collected, But it now seems established beyond ob- jection that theories and facts are quite inerdepend- fent—that is, that facts are facts only within some ‘theoretical framework. Thus a fundamental assump: tion of the received view is exposed as dubious. IF potheses and observations are not independent, eis" can be viewed only through a theoretical indow” and objectivity is undermined. The underdetermination of theory. Jem is also kno Not only are facts determined by the theory win- ‘dow through which one looks for them, but dit ferent theory windows might be equally well sup: ported by the same set of “acts.” Although it may he possible, given a coherent theory, to devive by ‘deduction What facts ought to exist, itis never possible, given a coherent set of facts, to arrive hy induction at a single, ineluctable theory. tn deed, itis this difficulty that led philosophers such as Popper (1968) to reject the notion of Ueory verification in favor of the notion of theory falsification. Whereas 2 million white swns ea never establish, with complete confidence, the proposition that all swans ate white, ane black swan can completely falsify it, The historical po- sition of science that it can, by its methods. ulti- imately converge on the “teal” tat is thus brought sharply into question, The value-tadenness of facts. Just as theories and facts are not independent, neither are values fand facts. Indeed, it can be argued that theories 107 are themselves value statements. Thus putative facts” are viewed not only through a theory win: dow but through a value window as well. The value- five posture ofthe received view is compromised The interactive nature of the inquirer-inquired into dyad. The received view of science pictures the inquirer as standing behind a one-way mirror, viewing natural phenomena as they happen and recording them objectively. ‘The inquirer (when using proper methodology) sloes not influence the phenomena or vice versa, But evidence such as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Bohe complementarity principle have shattered that ideal inthe hard sciences (Lincoln & Guba, 1988); even, greater skepticism must exist for the social sci ies. Indeed, the notion that findings are ereated through the interaction of inquirer and phen ron (which, inthe social sciences, is ustally peo: ple) is often 2 more plausible description of the Inguiry process than is the notion tha Findings are discovered through objective observation “as they really are, and us they really work.” ‘The intraparadigm critiques, although expos ing many inherent problems in the received view tnd, indeed, proposing some useful responses to them, are nevertheless of much less interest—or \weight—than the extraparadigm critiques, which raise problems of such consequence that the re ceived view is being widely questioned, Several alternative paradigms have been proposed, some ‘of which rest on quite unconventional assump: tions, It is useful, therefore, to inquite about the nature of paradigms and what it is that distin. _Buishes one inquiry paradigin from another. ‘The Nature of Paradigms Paradigms as Basic Belief Systems Based! on Ontological, Epistemological, and Methodological Assumptions Apa dig may be views as a set of haste beliefs «or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates ‘or first principles. It represents a warldview that dletines, for its holder, the nature of the “world,” the individual's place in it, and the range of pos sible relationships to that world and its parts, as, for example, cosmologies and theologies do.? The beliefs are basie in the sense that they must be -cepted simply on faith (however well argued}; there is no way to establish their ultimate truth: fulness. If there were, the philosophical debates, reflected in these pages would have millennia ago.10x MAJOR PARADIGMS AND Inquiry paradignns define for inguirers what it is they ae about, and what falls within and out fide the limits of legitimate inquiry. The basic beliefs that define inguiry paradigms can be sum imatized by the responses given by proponents of fny given paradigm to three fundamental ques tions, which are interconnected in sich a way that the answer siv he question. taken in any fonder, constrains how the others may be answered We have selected an order that we believe reflects a logical (if not necessary) primacy: 1. The ontological question. What is the form and nature of reality and, therefore. what is there that ean be kaon shout? Por example, iff "real" world is assumed then what can be really ane an ‘Thon only those known about it is “how th how things really work. questions that relate to yatiers of “real” exist tence and “real” action are admissible; other ‘questions, sich a those concerning matters of aesthetic or moral significance. fall outside the realm of legitimate scientific inquiry 2. The epistemological question, What is the nature of the relationship between the know ‘or would-he knowwer and what ean be known? ‘The answer that ean be given to this ques tion is constrained by the answer already given tothe ontological question; that is, not just any relationship can now be postulated. So if, for example, a “real” reality is as feof the knower must freedomin onder tobe able to discover “how things really are” and “how things really work.” (Conversely, assumption of an ob- jectivist posture implies the existence of a real” world to be objective about.) 3. The methodological question. How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding ‘out whatever he or she believes ean be known? ‘Again, the answer that can be given to this ned by answers already no just sumed, then the post be one of objective detachment or {question is const given tothe first two question ‘any methodology is appropriate. Forexample, ‘a “real” reality pursued by an “objective” in- jer mandates control of possible confound ing factors, whether the methods are qualita- fe (say, observational) or quantitative (say. analysis of covariance). (Conversely, selection fof a manipulative methodology—the experi- tment, say implies the ability to he objective and a real world to be objective about.) The methodological question cannot be reduced 10 ERSPECTIVES thous: methods must be fit ethowology a question of 1 ted to 9 predetermined ‘These thrce questions serve as the major foci around which we will analyze each of the four paradigms to be considered. Paradigms as Haman Constructions We have already noted that paradigms, as sets tof hasie beliefs, are not open to proof in any Conventional sense; there is no way to elevate one fover another on the basis of ultimate, founda- tional eriteria, (We should note. however, that that state of affairs does not doom us to a radical aivist posture: see Guba, 1992.) In our opin jon, any kiven paradigm represents simply the fast informed and sophisticated view that its proponents have heen able to devise, given the ay they have chosen to respond to the three Uclining questions, And, we argue, the sets of fnswers given are in all cases iuuman consiruc- tions; that is they are all inventions ofthe human. tind and hence subject to human error. No con euetion is or can be incontrovertibly right; ad- Yoeates of any particular construction must rely ton persuasiveness and utility rather than proof in faving their position. ‘What is true of paradigms is true of our analyses as well. Everything that we shall say subsequently je also a human construction: ours. The reader can- hnat be compelled to accept our analyses, OF out nents. on the hasis of incontestable logic or innlispatabie evidence; we ean ony hope to be per ‘oasiveand todemonstrate the ullty of our position say, the publie policy arena (Guba & Lincola, 1989: House, 1977). We do ask the reader 0 sus- pend his or her disbelief until ovr argument is com- plete and can be judged as a whole. ‘The Basie Beliefs of Received and Alternative Inquiry Paradigms We begin our analysis with descriptions of the responses that we believe proponents of each faradigm would make tothe thrce questions out- Tined above. These responses (as constructed by tus) are displayed in Table 6.1, which consists of tiiree tows corresponding tothe ontological, epis- temological, and methodological questions, and four columns corresponding to the four paradigms to he discussed. The term positivism denotes the “received view" that has dominated the formal discourse in the physical and social sciences for ‘some 400 years, whereas postpositivism repre- | | |val Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research 09 TABLE 6.1 Basic Beliefs (Metaphysics) of Alternative Inquiry Paradigms em Positivism Poxtpesitivism Critical Theory etal. Constructivism Ontology naive realism— erica ealism— imperfectly and probabilistically apprehendable Fpistemolosy dualisVobjectvist; modified dualis! Findings tue findings probably bjectvit itil teaition/conmounitys historical realism— — fcativism—local and cal” reality bt only virtual eality shaped specific constructed by sovial, politcal, realities and gender values; erystalized transactional! bjectivist, value mediated findings findings transactional” subjectivist created Methodology experimental! modified exper ‘manipulative verification of hypotheses; chiefly falsification of ‘quantitative hypotheses: may stools include qualitative Jislogifdiatestical hermeneutic ‘mental/manipulative, critical multplism: sents efforts ofthe past few decades to respond in a limited way (that is, while remaining. within csseatially the same set of basic beliefs) 10 the ‘most problematic criticisms of positivism. The term critical theory is (for us) a blanket term denoting a set of several ve paradigms, including additionally ( sd 10) nea Marxism, feminism, participa tory inquiry. Indeed, critical theory may itse usefully be divided into three substrands: post slrueturalism, postmodernism, and a blending of ese two, Whatever their differences, the com: mon breakaway assumption of all these variants is that of the value-determined nature of inquiry — an epistemological difference, Our grouping of these positions into a single category is a judg. rent call; we will not try to do justice to the individual points of view. ‘The term constructi ium denotes an alternative paradigen whose break ‘away assumption is the move from ontological realism to ontological relativism. These positions will become clear in the subsequent expositio Two important caveats need to be mientios First, although we are inclined to believe that the paradigms we are about to describe ean have meaning even in the realm of the physical sci ences, we will not defend that heli here. Accor ingly, our subsequent comments should be under stood to be limited to the sacial sciences only Second, we note that except for positivism, the paradigms discussed areal sill in formative fo inal agreements ha as been reached even anny their proponents about their definitions, mean: ings, or implications. Thus our discussion should bbe considered tentative and subject to further ¢e- vision and reformulation, We will first look down the columns of Table 6.1 10 illusteate the positions of each paradigm with respect tothe three questions, following with, a look across rows to compa positions of the paradigms.‘ Lim make it impossible for us to develop our asser tions in any depth. The reader will be able to find other evidence, pro and con, in other chapters of this volume, particularly in Chapters 7-11 Intraparadi (Columns of 1 Column 1: Positivism Ontology: realism (commonly called “naive re lism"). An apprchendable reality is assumed to ‘exist driven by immutable natural laws and mecha hiss. Knowledge of the “way things ite” is com: ventionally summarized in the form of time: and context-free generalizations, some of which take the form of cause-efleet laws, Research ean, i Principle, converge on the "He" state of afar, The busi posture of the parilig is argued t be both eduetionisf and deteriinistic (Hesse, 1980),RE rc nc Ht ho MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES Epistemology: Duatistand ehyjectivist Toe inves: tigator and the investigated “ohjcet” are assumed to bye independent entities, and the investigator to he capable of studying the object without influencing it for being influenced hy it. When influence in either direction (heats to validity) is recognized, or even pected. various strategies are followed to reduce fr eliminate it. Inquiry takes place as through ‘one-way mirtor. Values and biases are prevented from influencing outcomes, so long as the pre: scribed procedures are rigorously followed. Repi ccable findings are, in fact, “true.” Methodology: Experimental and manipulative. Questions and/or hypotheses are stated in propo: sitional form and subjected to empirical test 10 verity them: possible confounding conditions must he carefully controlled (manipulated) to preven ‘outcomes from being improperly influenced, Column 2: Postpositivism Ontology: Critical atin, Reality is assumed 10 ‘oxist hut to be only imperfectly apprchendable he ‘cause of basically flawed human intellectual mecha nisms and the fundamentally intractable nature of phenomena, The ontology is labeled as critical real~ fsm (Cook & Campbell, 1979) because of the pos: tore of proponents that claims about reality must be shjected to the widest possible critical exarination, to facilitate apprehending reality as closely as pos- sible but never perfectly). Epistemology: Modified dualisvobjectivist. Dual- isms largely abandoned as not possible to mai tain, but objectivity remains a “regulatory ideal”: special emphasis is placed on external “guatdi- ans” of objectivity such as crtieal traditions (Do the findings “Fit” with preexisting knowledge”) and the critical community (such as editors, referees, And professional peers). Replicated findings are probably trae (hut always subject falsification) Methodology: Modified experimental/manipw: lative, Emphasis is placed on “ertical multipism’ (2 refurbished version of triangulation) as.a way of falsifying (rather than verifying) hypotheses. The methodology aims to redress some of the problems noted above (intraparadigm critiques) by doing inguity in more natural settings, collect ng mote situational information, and reintroduc- discovery as an element in inquiry. and, in the social sciences particularly, soliciting emic view points to assist in determining the meanings and purposes that people ascribe to their actions, as Well as to contribute to “grounded theory” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), All these aims are accomplished largely through the increased utilization of qualitative techniques. Column 3: Critical Theory and Related Ideological Positions Ontology: Historical realism. A reality is as- sumed to be apprehendable that was once plastic, bout that was, over time, shaped by a congeries of I, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender Factors, and then crystallized (reified) into 4 series of structures thal are now (inappropt: ately) taken as "veal," that is, natural and immu table, For all practical purposes the structures are “real,” a virtual or historical reality. Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist. The investigator and the investigated object are assumed to be interactively linked, with the val ves of the investigator (and of situated “others”) inevitably influencing the inquiry. Findings are therefore value mediated. Note that this posture effectively challenges the traditional distinction between ontology and epistemology: what ean be Known is inextricably intertwined with the inter- action between a particular investigator and a articular object or group. The dashed line sepa the ontological and epistemological rows ‘of Table 6.1 is intended to reflect this fusion Methodology: Dialogic and dialectical. The trans- actional nature of inquiry requires a dialogue be- tween the investigator and the subjects of the inquiry: that dialogue must be dialectical in nature to transform ignorance and misapprehensions (ac- cepting historically mediated structures as immu- table) into more informed consciousness (seeing how the structures mighi be changed and compre hending the actions required to effect change), or, as Giroux (1988) puts it, “as transformative intel- lectuals,... to uncover and excavate those forms ‘of historical and subjugated knowledges that point to experiences of suffering, conflict, and collec- tive struggle; ... to link the notion of histor ‘understanding to elements of critique and hope’ (p. 213). Transformational inquirers demonstrate “transformational leadership" (Burns, 1978), ore discussion of eritieal theory, see the jons in this volume by Olesen, Chapter afield, Chapter 10; and Kincheloe & MeLare Chapter 8.) Column 4: Constructivism Omology: Relativist. Realities are apprehend able in the form of multiple, constructions, socially and expe local and specific in nature (although elements are often shared among many individuals and even across cultures), and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or SISTER IRS RTareR em weEN METRE ENN ERNE TTT aa Con Brow but s ticate asso. ting Gee eral i Ep The i “findi tion ¢ tween in the Met The social struct tera respon terpret iques. ‘diate, a cons. and so structic (Fors Chapte Havie heats of the three to look Position Ontolog Movir noe the 1. pos whi 2. pos aseCompeting Paradigms in Qualitative Research groups holding the constructions. Constructions are not more of less “true,” in any absolute sense, but simply more or less informed and/or sophis- ticated. Constructions are alterable, as are theit associated “realities.” This position should be di tinguished from both nominalism and idealism (Gee Reese, 1980, for an explication ofthese sev- eral ideas). Epistemology: Transactional and subjectivist. ‘The investigator and the object of investigation are assumed to be interactively linked so that the “findings” ae literally created as the investiga- tion proceeds. The conventional distinction be- tween ontology and epistemology disappears, as in the case of critical theory. Again, the dashed line of Table 6.1 reflects this fact Methodology: Hermeneutical and dialectical ‘The variable and personal (intramental) nature of social constructions suggests that individual con structions can be elicited and refined only through interaction berween and among investigator and respondents. These varying constructions are i terpreted using conventional hermeneutical tech nigues, and are compared and contrasted through adialecticalimerchange. The final aim is distill ‘consensus construction that is more informed. and sophisticated than any of the predecessor constructions (including, of course, the etic con- struction ofthe investigator. (For more about constructivism, see also Schwandt, Chapter 7, this volume.) Cross-Paradigm Analyses (Rows of Table 6.1) Having noted briefly the positions that propo: nents of each paradigm might take with respect to the three paradigm-defining questions, itis useful tolook across rows to compare and contrast those positions among the several paradigms Ontology Moving from left to right across Table 6.1, we fate the move from 1, positivism’s position of naive realism, as- suming an objective external reality upo which inquiry can converge; to 2, postpositivism’s critical realism, which still assumes an objective reality but grants that 1m it can be apprehended only imperfectly and probabilistically; to 3. critical theory's historical realism, which assumes an apprehendable reality consist- ing of historically siwated structures that are, inthe absence of insight, as limiting and confining as if they were real; to 4. constructivism’ relativism, which assumes ‘multiple, apprehendable, and sometimes con- Aicting social realities that are the products ‘of human intellects, but that may change as their constructors become more informed and sophisticated, Is the ontological position that most differentiates ‘constructivism from the other theee paradigms, Epistemology We note the move from 1. positivism’s dualist, objectivist assumption that enables the investigator to deter “how things really are” and “how things really work” 2. postpositivism’s modified dualisvobjectivist assumption that itis possible o approximate (but never fully know) reality; 10 3. critical theory's transactional/subjectivist as- sumption that knowledge is value mediated and hence value dependent; 10 4. constructivism’'s somewhat similar but broader transactional/subjectivist assumption that sees knowledge as created in interaction among, investigator and respondents Itis theie epistemological positions that most dit fetentiate critical theory and constructivism from the other two paradign Methodology We note the move frown 1 positivis’s experimentalfmanipulaive met odology that focuses on verification of hy- potheses; to postpositivism's modified experimental’ ethodology invested in crtical n focusing on falsification of hy- potheses; to si ici | |m2 MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES TABLE 6.2 Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical Issues Teswe Positive Poupostivion Critical Theory etal. Constructivism Inguiey aim explanation: prediction and control ettique and rans: understanding formation; restitution reconstruction and emancipation Nature of verified hypotheses nonfatsiied Hypo tuealMistorical individ reconstruc knowledge established ae facts exes that are prohale insights coalescing around or hws facts or ws ensensus Knowledge accretion —"huiling clocks” aii historical revisionism; more informed and © of knowledge" generalizations generalization by sophisticated ceumatation “edi and eause-effect linkages Similarity reconstructions: carious experience Goodness or conventional henchnarks of rigor”: historia situatedness, ‘quality criteria internal and external validity, reliability, erosion of ignorance "authenticity and ohjectivity and misapprehensions; section stimulus Values ‘exclu influence denied included formative cextrnsis tlt toward deception intrinsic: mora it itsinsic: process tilt toward revelation toward revelation special problems Voice ‘isimerested scientist” as informer of “Wansformative ‘passionate participant decision makers, policy makers, and change inelletual” as facilitator of mul agents aulvocate and activist _ voice reconstruction Tring technical and technica: quantitative resocialization; qualitative and quantitative; ‘quantitative nd qualitative: history: values of altruism and empowerment substantive theories substantive theories commensurable Accommodation commensal lezemony in control of publication, foning sccking recognition and input Promotion ad ene implicitly oF explicitly, these positions have im. ant consequences forthe practieal eonduet of Stoutly bel cousiraetions tay quiry.as well 38 for the interpretation of find: sli ear anaes ings and policy choices. We have elected to dis 4. constretivis’s hermeneutiefdileeticmeth- cuss these consequences for ten salient issues. ‘odology aimed atthe reconsteuction of pre: “Tye enuries m-Fable 6. which consists of four ‘iously held constructions ‘columns cortesponding to the four paradigms and ten rows cortesponding tothe ten isues, sur fize our interpretation of the major implications The teader will note that the first four issues 3. critical theory's dialogic/dialectical meth: ‘odology aimed at the reconsteuction of pre- Implications of inquiry aim, nature of knowledge, knowledge Each Paradigm’s Position accumulation, and quality criteria) are among those on Selected Practical Issues deemed especially important by positivists and postpositivists; they ate therefore the issues on ‘which alternative paradigms are most frequently attacked. The fifth and sixth (values and ethics) cs in paradigm assumptions cannotbe are issues taken seriously by all paradigms, al- differences: though conventional and emergent responses are (Rows of Table 6.2) Ditfer dismissed as mete “philosophicalVES uct of finde o dis- four asand ledge those ts and uently sthics) as, ale Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research quite different, Finally, the last four issues (voice, traning, accommodation, and hegemony) are those ‘deemed especially important by alternative pro- ponents; they represent areas on which the re ‘ceived view is considered particularly vulnerable. ‘The entries in the table are based only in part on public positions, given that not all issues have been addressed by all paradigms" proponents. In some cases, therefore, we have supplied entries that we believe follow logically from the basic metaphysical (ontological, epistemological, and thodological) postures of the paradigms. To take one example, the issue of voice is rarely auiressed directly by positivists or postpositivist, but we believe the entry “disinterested scientist is one that would be given by those proponents were they to be challenged on this mater. ‘Animmediately apparent difference between Ta- be 6.1 and Table 6.2 is that whereas inthe former ‘easeitwas possible to make adistinet entry forevery cell in the case of Table 6.2 there is considerable ‘overlap within rows, particulaely for the positivist ‘and posipositvist columns. Indeed, even for those issues in which the entries in those two columns are different, the differences appear to be minor. In contrast, ne may note the major differences found between these two paradigms and the ertical theory and consiructivist paradigms, which tend also to differ among themselves, ‘We have formulated the issues as questions, which follow. Row 1: What is the aim or purpose of inquiry? Positivism and posipositivism. For both these paradigms the aim of inquiry is explanation (von Wright, 1971), ultimately enabling the prediction ‘and control of phenomena, whether physical or human, As Hesse (1980) has suggested, the ultimate criterion for progress in these paradigms is that the ‘capability of “scientists” to predict and control should improve over time. ‘The reductionism and determinism implied by this position should be noted, The inquirer is cast in the role of “expert,” & situation that seems to award special, perips even ‘unmeited, privilege to the investigator. Critical theory. The aim of ingu tique and transformation of the sox cultural, that constrain and exploit humankind, by enyaye: ‘ment in confrontation, even contlict. ‘The cf fion for progress is that over time, restitution and. emancipation should occur and persist. Advocacy and activism are key concepts. The ing inthe role of instigator and facilitator, implying that the inquieer understands a priori what tans formations are needed. But we should note that ry is the erie political 13 some of the more radical stances in the erticalist camp hold that judgment about needed transfor- mations should be reserved to those whose lives are most affected by transformations: the inquiry participants themselves (Lincoln, in press) Constructivism. The aim of inquiry is under- standing and reconstruction of the constructions that people (including the inquirer) initially hold, airaing foward consensus but still open to new interpreta- tions as information and sophistication improve. The Caiterion for progress is that over time, everyone formulates more informed and sophisticated con: structions and becomes more aware of the content ‘and meaning of competing constructions, Advocacy and activism are also key concepts is this view. The inguiteris east in the role of participant and facilitator in this process, a position that some critics have faulted on the grounds that it expands the inguirer’s role beyond reasonable expectations of expertise and mis, 1986). Row 2: What is the nature of knowledge? Positivism, Knowledge consists of verified hy- potheses that ean be accepted as facts or laws. Postpositivism. Knowledge consists of nonfal- sified hypotheses that can be regarded as probable facts oF laws, Critical theory. Knowledge consis of a series of stqucturalhistorical insights that will be trans- formed as time passes. Transformations occur ‘when ignorance and misapprehension give way to more informed insights by means of a dialec: tical interaction Constructivism. Knowledge consists of those constructions about which there is relative cor senists (oF al least some movement toward cor setts) among those competent (and, inthe ease of more afeante material, trusted) to interpret the substance of the construction. Multiple “know! edges" can coexist when equally competent (or trusted) interpreters disagree, and/or depending, ‘on social, pol subject to continuous revision, with chanyges most likely to oveur when relatively different canstiuetions are bronight into juxtaposition in a dialectical context, Row 3: How does knowledge accumulate? Positivism and posipositivism. Knowledge uc- cumulates by a process of accretion, with excha fact (oF probable fact) serving as a kind of build ing block that, when placed into its proper niche, adds to the growing “edifice of knowledge.” When the facts take the form of generalizations or cause effect linkages, they may be used most efficiently {or prediction and control, Generalizations may then he made, with predictable confidence, to a population of settings. Critical theory. Knowledge does not accumy- Inte in an absolute sense; rather, it grows and changes through a dialectical process of historieal revision that continuously erodes ignorance and misapprehensions and enkarges more informed insights. Generalization can aceur when the mix of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, fand gender circumstances and values is similae neross settings Constructivism. Knowledge accumulates only i a relative sense through the formation of ever more informed and sophisticated constructions via the hhermencuticaldialectical process, as varying con- structions are brought into juxtaposition, One im: portant mechanism for transfer of knowledge from, ‘one setting to another isthe provision of viearious ‘experience, often supplied by ease sty reports (see Stake, Chapter 14, this volume) Row 4: What criteria are propriate for judging the goodness or quality of an inguiry’? Positivism and postpositivism. The appropriate criteria ate the conventional benchmarks of "rigor internal validity (isomosphism of findings with realty), external validity (generalizability), reli- ability (in the sense of stability), and objectivity, (istanced and neutral observer). These criteria depend on the realist ontological position; with ‘out the assumption, isomorphism of findings with reality can have no meaning, strict generalizabil- ity to a parent population is impossible, stability cannot be assessed for inquiry into a phenomenon if the phenomenon itself can change, and objec tivity cannot be achieved because there is nothing from which one can be “distant.” Critical theory. The appropriate criteria are his torical situatedness of the inquiry (ie, that i takes account of the social, politcal, cultural, econom ‘ethnic, and gender antecedents of the studied sit ation), the extent ta which the inquiry acts to erode snoranice anil misapprchensions, and the extent to which it provides a stimulus to action, thats, to the transformation of the existing structure Constructivism. Two sets of criteria have been proposed: the trustworthiness criteria of eredibil MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES ity (paralleling internal validity), transferability (paralleling external validity), dependability (paral leling reliability), and confirmability (paralleling objectivity) (Guba, 1981; Lincoln & Guba, 1985); and the authenticity criteria of fairness, ontologi- cal authenticity (enlarges personal constructions), ‘educative authenticity (leads to improved under: standing of constructions of others),catalyti authen- ticity (stimulates to action), and tactical authenticity (empowers action) (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The former set represents an early effort to resolve the quality issue for constructivism; although these criteria have been well received, their parallelism to positivist criteria makes them suspect. The latter set overlaps to some extent those of critical theory but goes beyond them, particularly the (wo ‘of ontological authenticity and educative authen- ticity. The issue of quality criteria in consteuetiv- ism is nevertheless not well resolved, and further critique is needed Row 5: What is the role of values in inquiry? Positivism and posipositivism, in both these paradigms values are specifically excluded: i ced, the paraig is claimed to be “value fee hy virtue ofits epistemological postre. Values sen a confounding variables that cannot be Allowed a role ina putatively objective inquiry {even when objectivity is, in the case of posipo: sitivism, but a regulatory ideal) Critical theory and constructivism. In both these paradigms values have pride of place: they are seen as ineluctable in shaping (in the case of constructivism, creating) inquiry outcomes. Far- thermore, even if it were possible, excluding val tues would not be countenanced, To do so would be inimical to the interests of the powerless and of “at-risk” audiences, whose original (emic) con- structions deserve equal consideration with those of other, more powerful audiences and of the inguiter (etic). Constructivism, which sees the inguiter as orchestrator and facilitator of the in- uity process, is more likely to stress this point than is critical theory, which tends to cast the inquirer in a more authoritative role. Row 6: What is the place of ethics in inquiry? Positivism and postpositivism. tw both these paradigms ethics i an important consider land itis taken very seriously by inguiters, but it is extrinsic to the inquiry process itself. Hence ethical behavior is formally policed by external mechanisms, such as professional codes of con: | |ve tie these lism ~The fitical retwo athen- wetiv= unter Values not be guiry ‘sipo- behese ey are ‘ase of s. Fur ng vale would sss and e)con- hhthose of the es the the in- s point ast the h these eration, s, but it Hence ‘xternal of con- Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research {uct and human subjects committees. Further, the realist ontology undergirding these paradigms pro- vides tlt toward the use of deception, which, it is argued in certain cases, is warranted to deter- mine how “things really are and work” or for the sake of some “higher social good” or some “clearer teu” (Bok, 1978, 1982; Diener & Crandall, 1978). Critical theory. Ethics is more nearly intrinsic tothis paradigm, as implied by the intent to erode ignorance and misapprehensions, and to take Full account of values and historical situatedness in the inguiry process. Thus there is a moral tilt that the inquirer be revelatory (in the rigorous mean- ing of “fully informed consent”) rather than de- cxptive. OF course, these considerations do not prevent unethical behavior, but they do provide some process barriers that make it more difficult. Constructivism. Ethics is intrinsic to this para- digm also because of the inclusion of participant values in the inquiry (starting with respondents’ existing constructions and working toward in- creased information and sophistication in their cconsiuctions as well asin the inquirer’ construc tion), There is an incentive—u process tlt —for revelation; hiding the inquirer’s tive ofthe aim of uncovering ani 8 siruetions. In addition, the hermencutical/dialec~ tical methodology itself provides a strong but not infallible safeguard against deception. However, the close personal interactions required by the methodology may produce special and often sticky problems of confidentiality and anonymity, as Well as other interpersonal difficulties ( Lincoln, 1989), Row 7: What “voice” is mirrored inthe inguiter's activities, especially those directed at change? Positivism and postpositivism. The inguit voice is that of the “disinterested scientist” in- forming decision makers, policy makers, and change agents, who independently use this scientific in formation, atleast in part, to form, explain, and justify actions, policies, and change proposals, Critical heory. The inquirer’s voice is that of the “transformative intellectual” (Chisoux, 1988) who has position to contr sions. Change! ‘greater insight is (the nature and ext are stimulated 10 act on it Constructivism. The inquirer's voice ist the “passionate participant” (Lincoln, 1991) ae: 1s tively engaged in facilitating the “multivoice” reconstruction of his or her own construction as well as those ofall other participants. Change is facilitated as reconsteuctions are formed and in- dividuals are stimulated to act on them, Row 8: What are the implications of each paradigm for the training of novice inquirers? Positivism. Novices are trained primarily in technical knowledge about measurement, design, and quantitative methods, with less but substa tial emphasis on formal theories of the pheno cena in their substantive specialties, Postpositivism. Novices are trained in ways paralleling the positivist mode, but with the adi- tion of qualitative methods, often for the purpose of ameliorating the probl paragraphs of this ehapte Critical theory and constructivism. Novices must first be resocialized from their early and usually intense exposure to the received view of science ‘That resocialization cannot be accomplished without thorough schooling in the postures and techniques of positivism and postpositivism, Students must ‘come 10 appreciate paradigm diflerences (summa rized in Table 6.1) and, in that context, to master both qualitative and quantitative methods. The Former are essential because of their role in car- ryingout the dialogie/dialectical or hermeneutical! dialectical methodologies; the latler because they can lay auseful informational rolein all paraligms. They must aso he helped to understand the s political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender hi tory and structure that serve asthe surround for their ries, and to incorporate the values of altruism ipowerment in their work, Row 9: Are these paradigms necessarily in conltict? Is it possible to accommodate these several views within single conceptual framework? Positivism and postpasitivism. Proponents of these Iwo paradi orientation, take the position tha all cant be accommodated—that is, that there exist, or will be found to exist, some com be referred for resulution, The post tionist and assumes the possibility of point-by- Point comparisons (commensurability), an issite bout which there continues 10 be a geeat deal of tisagrecmtent bf difference ean116 Critical theory and constructivism. Proponents of these two paradigms join in affirming the basie incommensurability of the paradigms (although they would agree that positivism and postpositi ism are commensurable, and would probably agree that eritical theory and constructivism are com: rmensurable). The basic heliefs of the paradigms ce believed 10 be essentially conteadictory. For constructivist, either there is a “real” reality or there is not (although one might wish Co resolve this problem differently in considering the physi- cal versus the human realms), and thus construc livism and positivism/postpositivism eannot be logically accommodated anymore than, say, the ideas of flat versus round earth can be logically accommodated. For critical theorists and con siructivists, inquiry is either value fre or itis not Again, logical accommodation seems impossinie Realism and telativism, value freedom and value bhouidedness, cannot eacxist in any internally con: sistent metaphysical system, which condition of consistency, its stipalated, is essentially met by. cach of the candidate paradigms. Resolution of this dilemma will necessarily await the emer gence of a metaparadigm that renders the older accommodated paradigms not less true, but si ply irrelevant Row 10: Which of the paraidigins exercises hegemony over the others? That is, which is predominantly influential? Positivism and posipositivism. Proponents of positivism gaisied hegemony over the past several Centuries as earlier Aristotelian and theological paradigms were abandoned, But the mantle of hhegemony has in recent decades gradually fallen fon the shoulders of the postpositivists, the al” heirs of positivism. Postpositivists (and in- deed many residual potitivsts) tend to control publication outlets, funding sources, promotion and tenure mechanisms, dissertation committees, and other sources of power and influence. They were, at least until about 1980, the “in” group, and continue to represent the strongest voice in po: fessional decision making, Critical theory and constructivism, Proponents, of ertical theory and constructivism ace still seek ing recognition and avenues For input. Over the past decade, it has become more and more poss ble for them to achieve acceptance, as attested by increasing inclusion of relevant papers in journals, and professional meetings, the development of new journal outlets, the growing acceptability of “qualitative” dissertations, the inclusion of “quali= tafive” guidelines hy some funding agencies and programs, and the like, But inal likelihood, erti- MAJOR PARADIGMS AND PERSPECTIVES cal theory snd consteuetivism will continue to play secondary, although important and progres- sively more influential. rales in the near future. Conelu ‘The metaphor ofthe “paradigm wars” described by Gage (1989) is undoubtedly overdrawn, De- scribing the discussions and altercations of the past decade oF two as wars paints the matter as mote confrontational than necessary. A. resolu- tion of paradigm differences can occur only when a new paradigm emerges that is more informed and sophisticated than any existing one. That is inst likely to oceue if and when proponents of these several points of view come together to Uiscuss their differences, not to argue the sanctity fof their views. Continuing dialogue among para: ‘dig proponents ofall stripes will afford the best avenue for moving toward a responsive and con- genial relationship, We hope that in this chapter we have illustrated the need for such a discussion by clearly deline- ating the differences that currently exist, and by showing that those differences have significant implications at the practical level. Paradigm is- sues are enicial: no inquirer, we maintain, ought {o go about the business of inquiry without being lear about just what paradigm informs and guides his of her approach, Notes 1. Many ofthe objection sted here were frst enun- ciated by posiivsts themselves; indced, we might a fe thatthe postpostvist postion represents an attempt to teansform positivism in ways that take account of these same objections. The naive positivist postion of he sinteenth through the nineteenth centuries is m0 longer held hy anyone even casually acquainted with these problems, Although we would concede thatthe postpositivist positon, a enunciated, for example, by Denis Phillips (1987, 1990, 1990, repesents a co iderable improvement over classic positivism, it fais to make a clean break Ht represens a kindof "damage control” rather than a reformation of hase principles The notion that these problems required a paradigm shift was poorly recognized until the publication of Thomas Kuhn's landmark work, The Structure of Sei entific Revolutions (1962, 1970), and even then peo- ceeded but lowly, Nevertheless, the contributions of ‘¥e-Kuhnian rites should he recognized and applauded 2. Weare reminded by Robert Stake (peesonal com munication, 1993) thatthe view of paradigms that we present here should not “exclude a belief that there areIves sue to ogres- ure. cried 1. Dew of the ter as solu when ormed hat is nis of | rer to nctity para- ebest trated nd by ficaut ugh being ides. hae. temp im oF conf the lesby fails mage ples Sig on-of 18. ns of ded, Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research worlds within worlds, unending, each with its own paradigns,lainitesimals have their own cosmologies. 3. Tis unlikely that a practitioner of any paradigm ‘wold age that our summaries elosely describe what te of she thinks or does. Workaday scientists rarely have either the tie of the inclination to assess what they do in philosophical terms. We do contend, how. ‘ever, that these descriptions are apt as broad brush strokes, if not always atthe individual level References Bernstein, K. (1988). Beyond objectvis and elas fam, Philadelphia University of Penasylvania Press. Bok, $ (1978). Lis: Moral choice i publicand private lie. New York: Random House Bak, . (1982). Secrets: On the ethies of eonceulment and revelation, New York: Pantheon Bars, J. 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