The discussion about low-intensity conflict (LIC) continues apace. In this interpretative article, the author attempts to deal with impressions and generally “felt” notions, to include the main question of whether LIC is “war” or not. The Debate About Low-Intensity Conflict Lieutenant Colonel John S. Fulton, US ArmyThe views expressed mn this article are those of * the author and do not purport ro reflect the posi ‘ton of the Department of the Army, the Depart ‘ment of Defense or any other government office or agency. ~Edveor Tr subject of low-intensity conflict (LIC) is heating up as international violence increases around the world. Arti- cles on the definition and nature of LIC have appeared in many military journals, and interest at all levels has increased. A draft interim operational concept on LIC is being staffed by Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command ({TRADOC).' The concept contains a very generic definition of LIC which includes many types of military activities and operations which hitherto lacked clear iden- tity. In attempting to provide definitions and identity, however, the doctrine community may be creating a doctrinal foster home for orphaned warfare concepts, including counterinsurgency, antiterrorism, peace- keeping, contingency operations, rescue and foreign military assistance. LIC's definition is too broad, and the category is too large. TRADOC's interim concept re- flects our basic misunderstandings about the era of conflict we are living through, seizes upon our institutional bias for a pro-gramed approach to war, recognizes only the vaguest similarities between LIC and conventional war and ignores many fun- damental differences. A general impres- sionistic definition of LIC is offered as a point of departure: A conflict where there is significant cul- tural disparity between combatants and EE SR Treating LIC as a derivative of a larger phenomenon of war may be akin to diag- nosing and treating some new and viru- lent disease such as Acquired Immune De- ficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as a derivative of a more common disease like influenza. ey where the social, political, economic, reli- gious and perhaps even ecological aspects of the struggle are dominant. LIC experi- ence usually points to conflicts between well-developed or advanced societies and lesser developed or primitive societies where the means and ends of the opponents are significantly different and where the conflict's violence devolves to the lowest denominator against a background of a broader cultural struggle. The essence of our misunderstanding is that we cannot decide if LIC is really “war” or something vaguely resembling war. Fir: we call this shadowy realm of politico-mili tary activity “conflict."’ It does not deserve the fully sanctioned title “war.” Also, the secretary of defense recently prescribed six conditions for future US troop employ- ment, all of which are intended to preclude any shadow of a doubt about the United States’ resolve.’ In other words, he insists we must be at war, not just involved in a conflict, as a precondition for the deploy- ment of US military forces. General Paul F. Gorman advanced the thesis that LIC was “war turned upside down"—that fighting it required the employment of resources 62 generally in reverse order from the way we traditionally have fought wars, beginning with security assistance and intelligence, and holding firepower and maneuver for the later stages.? The Vietnam War was called the Viet- nam conflict until about 1969. Our aware- ness and acceptance of our involvement in Vietnam reflected our gradual understand- ing of the nature of the type of violence we were engaged in. And, finally, in Central America today, US agencies and Armed Forces have been employed for the pur: poses of economic and security assistance as well as furthering defense readiness through military exercises. We have reatricted ourselves to 55 military trainers in El Salvador but, next door in Honduras, there are thousands of US soldiers in tem- porary duty status or in exercises, ‘Alll of these factors of LIC pose questions as to its legitimacy as a form of war or its il- legitimacy as a distinct and separate phe- nomenon not fitting the general paradigm. ‘Treating LIC as a derivative of a larger phenomenon of war may be akin to diag- nosing and treating some new and virulent disease such as Acquired Immune Defi- ciency Syndrome (AIDS) ag a derivative of a more common disease like influenza. LIC stretches the basic concept too far. LIC is a totally new phenomenon which must be studied and treated with new ideas and resources. This is clearly a case in which recognizing the differences is more impor- tant than recognizing the similarities. To begin with, the causes of and reasons for LIC are often misunderstood. Reasons {the broad background explanations for a phenomenon), as distinguished from causes (the immediate circumstances that give rise to a particular set of events), are often confused in any large-scale, historically sig- nificant trend, In the case of LIC, we tend to attribute the reasons for its occurrence to a generalizéd state of world affairs, February 1986 * MILITARY REVIEWth American villagers. gapricks from soit The Western sense of urgency in solving problems is not a factor in much of the Third World. Things cannot get any worse for most people, so waiting for them to improve, even within an environment of violence, is an acceptable alternative. S Qverpopulation, the rise of militant ' regional powers, an East-West polarization of political power with significant ideolog- ical differences and a relative perceived deprivation of developing nations have all been considered in rationalizing the in- creased occurrence of LIC. The East-West polarization of world power thesis has been especially attractive for those who see a giant communist conspiracy capturing the world piece by piece through protracted, low-risk LIC. A world adversarial relation- ship with the Soviet Union is particularly suited to the American view of internation- al relations inherited from World War IT where there were clearly defined enemies and allies. ‘The truth of the matter, however, is that MILITARY REVIEW * February 1986 there seems to be no general pattern in - LIC. Each occurrence, when examined indi- vidually, has its own causes and effects. Coups, tribal hatred, land reform, sectarian violence, civil war, the re-establishment ‘o preservation of the old order, the nareotiet trade, and religious and racial strife have.** been the root causes of individual conflicts. This does not lend itself to a neat, Western strategy for dealing with this phenomenon except the somewhat stoical historjcal overview that the world is going through'a period of devolution of sorts, ultimately leading to a new feudal age of protective enclaves and piratical fiefdoms. In the meantime, those charged with the preservation of some form of world order must learn to deal with each circumstance ~ 83on its own merit. An approach to LIC would be to evaluate each case separately, with a view of establishing our interests and goals, and setting the risks and means for achieving control over the situation. To see all LICs as alike in their causes and treatment is to confuse the issue terribly. Soviet involvement notwithstanding, local circumstances and their specific meaning to the United States should prevail. Gen- eral economic development and nation- building can be vague constructs upon which to engage the human and material resources of our nation, especially with the military as the agents for those resources. We invite disaster again if we tilt at ideo- logical and historico-mythical windmills as we did in Vietnam. Each low-intensity situation is unique and must be dealt with on its turf. The next step in reordering our thoughts on LIC is to investigate the essential dif- ferences distinguishing it from what we normally think of as war, and here we can make some generalizations. One of the most obvious differences is the partici- pants. LICs tend to be engaged in by the lesser developed nations of the world. It has been described, along with its cousin, terrorism, as “war on the cheap.” This is because of its adaptability to the ways and means of underdeveloped societies lacking the industrial capacity to sustain the full- scale industrial production of weapons. This leads to a second differerce—the means of waging LIC. LICs tend to empha- size the human dimension over the material dimension. In lesser developed countries, the most usable commodity tends to be the people who are usually in abundance and often are a low priority for safeguarding. Materiel, on the other hand, and its means of production are scarce commodities which are employed cautiously. LIC tends to be protracted. Time is also an abundant commodity in lesser devel- 64 oped nations. Some lesser developed na- tions have been struggling for centuries, so waiting a few more decades is unimportant. The Western sense of urgency in solving problems is not a factor in much of the Third World. Things cannot get any worse for most people, so waiting for them to im- prove, even within an environment of violence, is an acceptable alternative. LIC assumes a people in arms. This may be a fact or simply the result of ideological rhetoric, but it differs from the Western concept of war in which the combatants are armed and trained specifically for combat. Tn LIC, on the other hand, the whole popu- lace is assumed to be involved in the con- flict, either as actual combatants or as the support base for operations. In the conventional Western concept of war, the combatants usually attempt to limit the damage inflicted on the civilian population. Setting aside Dresden, Lon- don, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the recent Western concept of war is that it should not unnecessarily involve the civilian popu- lace. Battles and campaigns are the dis- tinct purview of military forces attempting to settle strategic issues by setting up con- ditions for a favorably negotiated settle- ment by political representatives of the people of the involved nations. LIC stands this concept on its head by appearing to settle strategic issues with the direct involvement of everyone. This is what is implied by the official designation of their armed forces as_a “peoples’ army” or a “democratic peoples’ army.” War and politics are identical in LIC. In the West, we still tend to think of war and peace. Another distinction is in the area of objectives or final ends. In most cases where LIC has occurred, the objectives have been to achieve sweeping revolutionary changes in society, reorder the balance of power in a country or region, or radically change basic ‘institutions. The conflict February 1986 » MILITARY REVIEW