The Ideology of The Text

The Ideology of The Text
Author(s): FREDRIC JAMESON

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Salmagundi, No. 31/32, 10th ANNIVERSARY ISSUE (Fall 1975-Winter 1976), pp. 204-246
Published by: Skidmore College
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The Ideologyof
The Text
BY FREDRIC JAMESON
All thestrawsin thewindseemto confirm thewide-spread feeling

that,as Roman Guarini to
used putit, "modern timesarenowover,"
and thatsomefundamental divide,somebasiccoupureorqualitative
leap,now us
separates decisively fromwhatusedto bethenewworldof
theearlyor mid-twentieth century, oftriumphant modernism andthe
revoltagainstpositivism and Victorian or ThirdRepublicbourgeois
culture. MacLuhanism, theories ofthesocitde consommation andof
post-industrial society,post-modernism in literatureand the
art, shift
fromphysicsto biologyas theprototype of thehardsciences,the
influence ofthecomputer andinformation theory, theendoftheCold
War and the ratification of a Soviet-American worldsystemof
"peaceful coexistence," the New Leftand the counterculturalinstinctual
politics, the primacy of the linguisticmodel with its ideological
expressionin Structuralism as a new movement- all of these
phenomena testify to someirrevocable distancefromtheimmediate
past(itselfreconfirmed bythesurgeofThirties and Fortiesnostalgia
everywhere intheadvancedcountries) atthesametimethateachoffers
something likean apologetics foritsownversion ofthetransformation:
so theawareness thata changehastakenplaceissubtly converted intoa
prophetic affirmation thatthechangeis good,or,intheterminology we
willfollowin thepresentessay,thetheory ofthechangebecomesat
length, through a processofinnermomentum, thelatter's
ideology.It
willbe ourcontention thatthisapparently unavoidable slippagefrom
whatareessentially historical perceptionsintotheideologizing ofthose
perceptions is a function of an incomplete historicalviewand ofthe
failuretomakeconnections andon-going concrete modificationsofthe
socialorderas a whole,thefailure,-indeed, theunwillingness, toputall
oftheseobservations together and seethemintermsofthelong-range

TheIdeologyof The Text 205
destinyof our particular socio-economic system, or in otherwords,
monopoly capitalism.
Eveninthelocalregions enumerated above,however, thisparticular
"great transformation"- grasped idealistically in terms of
transformations in ourmodesofthinking rather thaninthoseofmore
concretestructures or situations-has rarelybeen the objectof a
systematicanatomy.Rather, the new conceptuality has been
enthusiastically developed and applied, in the absence of a measured
anddiagnostic investigation ofwhatCollingwood wouldhavecalledits
"absolutepresuppositions" orwhatmorerecent historians ofideashave
calleditsbasicparadigms (Kuhn)oritsunderlying epistm (Foucault).
Thelatter is an operation whichseemsbestrealized inindividual probes
rather thanbywayofsomeinconceivable globalsystem; suchis atany
ratethestrategy ofthefollowing pages,in whicha fewrecent critical
workshaveprovided theoccasion for more general reflexions on oneof
themorefundamental ofthenewconceptual categories,namely idea
the
oftextuality.
Textuality mayrapidly be described as a methodological hypothesis
whereby theobjectsofstudy ofthe human sciences (butnotonlyofthe
humanones:witnessthegenetic"code"of DNA!) are considered to
constituteso many texts which we decipher and interpret, as
distinguished from the older views of those objects as realities or
existants or substances whichwe in one wayor anotherattempt to
The
know. advantages of such a model are perhaps most clearly visible
inthenon-literary disciplines, whereitseemsto afford a moreadequate
"solution" tothedilemmas ofpositivism thanthemoreprovisory oneof
phenomenological bracketting. The latter merely suspends the
ontologicalproblem and postpones the ultimate epistemological
decisions, whileinsomewaysactually reinforcing theoldsubject /object
dichotomy which was at the root of the contradictions of classical
epistemology. The notion of textuality, whateverfundamental
objections may be made to it,hasat least the advantage as a strategy, of
cutting acrossbothepistemology and thesubject/ object antithesis in
sucha wayas to neutralize of
both,and focussing theattention ofthe
analyston his own positionas a readerand on his own mental
operations as interpretation. Atonce,then,hefindshimself obligedto
givean accountof thenature ofhis of
object study qua text: he isthusno
longertempted to view itas some kind of empirically existing realityin
for
itsownright(think, instance, of the falseproblems to which the
opticalillusionofSociety,orevenofthevarioussocial"institutions,"
hasgivenrise),necessarily reconstituting itinsucha wayas toresolve his

206 FREDRIC JAMESON
"facts"backintosemanticor syntactic components of thetexthe is

about to decipher.In fieldslike anthropology or sociology, in the
lingering atmosphere of an olderreferential or "realistic"positivism,
thisrequirement to"textualize" dataservesthefunction ofrestoring the
concrete contexts inwhichtheso-calleddatawasgathered, atthesame
timethatitextends theinterpretive situationtothetotality ofsociallife
itself:thisis thespiritin whichtheethnomethodologists replacethe
eventsof sociallifewithour accountsand interpretations of those
events,and in whichthe neweranthropology seeksto dissolvethe
practices, habitsand ritualswhichusedto be thought ofas so many
"institutions" and to graspthem,in a newtransparency, as so many
types of discourse a social group holds about itself.1Meanwhile, in
linguistics the
itself, concept of the textprovides the means of breaking
outoftheartificial confinement ofsmallerand moreabstract unitsof
study like thesentence and evolving in the directionof pragmatics and
textgrammars whichtryto reincorporate theconcrete contextand
positions oftheparticipants backintowhatis otherwise a hypostasis of
language - intopurelyverbalphenomena.
Itis possible,ofcourse,toseethenewtextualmodelas a reflex ofthe
changeswrought bythemedia,andtheinformation in
explosion, our
experienceof societyand of the world:it is tempting, indeed,to
associatethe illusionsof a traditional Aristotelian realism(reality
existing calmly"outthere,"truthnothing buttheadequationof the
ideas in our head withthethingsthemselves of whichtheyare the
pictures) witha worldpoorin messages, inwhichtheshimmering heat
wavesofa swarmofsignsandcodesarenotpresent toblurourlimpid
gazeacrossthedistance thatseparates usfromtherealmofthings. And
itis certain thatthesensitivity ofrecent timesforproblems oflanguage,
models,communication and the like, is closelylinkedwiththe
emergence ofthesephenomena as relativelyautonomous and opaque
objects in their own in
right the new distribution mechanisms of
industrialcapitalism.Still, such a pictureof history,such a
periodization, is in manywayswhatwe willseekto criticize in the
1 "The centralrecommendation [ofethnomethodological study]is thattheactivities
whereby members [ofa givensocialgroup]produceandmanagesettings oforganized
everyday affairsare identicalwithmembers' procedures formakingthosesettings
'account-able'.
. .1 meanobservable-and-reportable, i.e., availableto members as
situated practices of looking-and-telling." Harold Garfinkel,Studies in
Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.,1967),p. 1."To treatthecockfight as a
textis tobringouta featureofit. . .thattreating
itas a riteora pastime,thetwomost
obviousalternatives, wouldtendto obscure:itsuse ofemotionforcognitive ends."
Clifford Geertz,TheInterpretation of Cultures(NewYork,1973),p. 449.

presentessay,so thatforthemoment weoffer itmoreas a wayofraising
problems than of solving them.
At any rate,it would seemthatthe relevanceof theconceptof
textualityismostproblematic there, paradoxically, whereitwouldseem
theleastmetaphorical, namely intherealmofliterary studyitself.The
paradox indeed is simply this: why and how the analysis of literary
workscanbetransformed bya reminder ofwhatitmusthaveknownall
along,namely thatitsobjectsofstudyare"nothing but"verbaltexts.A
treatment
full-dress oftheissuewouldobviously involve a history ofthe
termitself, whichis traditional in theFrencheducationalsystem and
thussomewhat lessredolent ofjargonthaninEnglish; anditwouldwant
to takenoteofthemostelaboratetheories oftextuality, themassively
architectoniconeofYuriiLotman,inhisStructure oftheArtistic Text
(1970),as wellas the moremodishversionof the Tel Quel group,
developedprimarily byJuliaKristeva, and insisting on theTextas a
processof production in whichsomedeep underlying genotext(its
operations ultimately grounded either inthestructure oflanguage itself,
orinthatoftheepistme ordominant thought-form, ifindeedonecan
distinguish between thesetwoinstances) generates a surface phenotext
intheformoftheindividual workitself withitsuniquesentences. For
themoment, suffice itto underscore theprofound antagonism between
theviewoftheliterary objectas text,orin otherwordsas a perpetual
production ofsentences, andthemoretraditional onewhichvalorizes
theformal completeness oftheliterary masterwork, inwhicheverything
contributes to someorganicwhole.Itis precisely becauseitsverymode
ofpresentation dramatizes thisopposition thatRolandBarthes' S/Z2-
a lengthy line-by-line commentary on a known
little and romantically
melodramatic novellaof Balzac,"Sarrasine"- seemspreeminently
symptomatic forourpresent purposes, whichinvolvetheassessment of
theresults oftextuality as a framework forliterary analysis justas much
as an accountoftheideologicalserviceintowhichit maybe pressed.
I.
S/Z is also symptomatic of the intellectual itinerary of Roland
Barthes himself, ofallthe/axes ofmodern criticism (Lukcsmaybesaid
in retrospectto havebeenthelatter' s moststubborn hedgehog) surely
themostexemplary. Like Lukcs,indeed,hadhe neverexistedinthe
firstplace,someonelikeBarthes wouldhavehadtohavebeeninvented,
2 Page referencesthroughoutto the Englishtranslationby RichardMiller(New York,
1974),withfrequentmodifications: not
thissometimeselegantversionis unfortunately
very trustworthy, to the point of occasionally invertingan already complex
terminology,as when,e.g., p. 17, the word "signifie"is translatedsignifier.

208 FREDRIC JAMESON
forhisvirtuoso practice ofcriticalmethods wascontemporaneous with

a methodological explosionin the humansciences,and what is
generalizable abouthisworkis precisely hissolution tothedilemma of
methodological proliferation, whichmaybe characterized, following
Adorno'sterminology in the Philosophyof New Music, as the
valorization ofpastiche.For thecrisisin moderncriticism is surely
closelylinkedto thatmorefundamental crisisinmodern literature and
art whichis the proliferation of stylesand privatelanguages;and
Adornohad argued,in theStravinsky sectionof hisbook,thatthe
Russiancomposer'scomposition of musicabout othermusicwas a
characteristicandvirtually text-book illustrationofoneofthetwobasic
strategiesofmodern artists,facedwitha crushing accumulation ofdead
stylesina situation inwhichitseemsunjustifiable to invent stillnewer
ones.(Thehedgehog panelofAdorno's diptych wasthenrepresented by
ArnoldSchoenberg, whoeschewed pastiche infavorofa relentless and
sometimes forbiddingly inhumantotalization - a strategy whichno
doubthas itsequivalent in modernliterary criticism as well.)
Ofthefirst, eclectic,parody-or pastiche-oriented strategy (ofwhich
he himself offered the defensein his pamphlet, Critiqueet vrit),
Barthes'workis themonument, constituting a veritable fever-chart of
allthesignificantintellectual andcritical tendencies sinceWorldWarII:
Bachelardianphenomenology (in his book on Michelet),Sartrean
Marxism(in Writing DegreeZero),Hjelmslevian linguistics, butalso
BrechteanVerfremdung (in Mythologies), orthodox Freudianism (in
On Racine),hard-core semiotics (in Systemede la mode),Tel Quel
textualproductivity, as wellas Lacanianpsychoanalysis (inS/Z itself),
post-Structuralism (in Le Plaisirdu texte), andfinally, a return, inthat
ultimatesquaringof the circlewhichis his recentcommentary on
himself {Roland Barthes to
par lui-mme), origins, this most recent
production, as hehimself observes, reminding oneofnothing quiteso
muchas thesubjectofhisownfirst published essay,namely the Journals
ofAndreGide.Sucha trajectory suggests thatit is lessproductive to
read Barthesas a theoristthan as the intuitive and idiosyncratic
practitioner of a hostof different methods, whoseperspicacity, shot
through withsuddenfitsofboredom, makestheultimate yieldofsuch
methodsclearerthananytheoretical disquisition. Whathappenedto
Bartheswas,I think, thathe becametoo consciousofwhathe himself
callsthepre-critical or pre-systematic natureofhisownobservations,
toolucidabouttheprocessofformation ofhisownsentences: thisisthe
ultimate implication ofhisnotionofthescriptible - sentences whose
gestusarousesthedesireto emulate it,sentences whichmakeyouwant

to writesentences of yourown. (Meanwhile,the emphasison the
and
expressive gestural capacitiesoftheindividual sentencetendswith
timeto resultin a virtualcanonization of the fragment, although
Barthes'increasing predilection forbriefnotesand glossesis perhaps
evident in S/Z, whereitis motivated and"covered"bythetraditional
requirements oftheexegesisor line-by-line commentary.)
Still,itis evidentlyonlya self-conscious sentence whichcanprovoke
suchemulation, and thisaccountsforBarthes' need,in S/Z,to devise
another category, namely thelisibleorlegible, todesignate thedulland
rusty lackoffinish ofthe* so-called realistic
orrepresentational kind.For
S/Z is also, as we shall see, somethinglike a replayof the
realism/ modernism controversy, although itsforcecertainly springsin
partfromBarthes'own ambivalence in thematter:"ThingsI Like:
lettuce, cinnamon, cheese,spices,frangipan, newlymownhay(I'd like
some 'taster'to make a scentout of it), roses,peonies,lavender,
champagne, politicaldsinvolture, GlennGould,ice-coldbeer,flat
pillows,toast, Havana cigars,Handel,measuredwalks,pears,white
peaches,cherries, colors,pocketwatches, ball-point pens,quillpens,
maincourses,coarsesalt,realistic novels,thepiano,coffee, Pollock,
Twombly, romantic music,"etc.3
Itshouldbeadded,however, thattheviewof"realism" whichemerges
fromS/Z is generally implied rather than directly stated,in a study
whoseobject,an earlyworkofBalzacand a throwback, likeso much
high-Romantic storytelling, to theolderRenaissance-type novella,is
distantenoughfromBalzacian realism,let alone the triumphant
realistic discourseof thenineteenth century novelat itsapogee.The
essentials ofBarthes' conception ofrealism aremoresuccinctly exposed
ina shortessay,"L'Effet de rel,"inwhich, as thetitlesuggests,realistic
narrative is definedlessas a structure ofdiscourse initsownright than
as a kindofopticalillusion, theproduction ofa so-called"reality-effect"
bymeansofa certain number ofkeydetailswhichfunction as signals.So
it is withMichelet's observation that,whenCharlotte Corday'sfinal
portrait was beingpaintedinherdeathcell,"after an houranda half,
someonetappedsoftly at a littledoorbehindher":thedetailiswithout
anygenuine function, inthesensethatitmight easilyhavebeenomitted
without damageto thenarrative. Whatis moreimportant is thatinthe
strictsenseithasno meaning - incontrast, letussay,totheexpressivity
ofa "timorous" knockona doorora "feeble" rapping ona wall,which
wouldhaveconverted this"sign"intoa genuinesymbol.Thuswecan
saythatforBarthes thevehicle ofa reality-effectisrelatively
indifferent;
3 Barthespar lui-meme(Paris, 1975),p. 120.

210 FREDRIC JAMESON
anynumber ofother, analogousdetailswouldhavedonejustas well;or

in otherwords,unlikethe canonicaltheorists of realism,Barthes'
analysis suggests that the content
latter's is whatis leastimportant init,
serving merely as a kind of pro forma credentials for the accreditation of
the"referential illusion"onwhichsuchdiscourse depends. "The truthof
thisillusionis as follows:suppressed fromrealistic enunciation qua
denotative signified, the'real' returns to inhabitit as a signified of
connotation; forintheverymoment inwhichthesedetailsaresupposed
todenotereality directly, theydo littleelse- without sayingso - than
tosignify it:Flaubert's barometer, Michelet's little
reardoorfinally have
nothing tosaybutthis:wearethereal;itisthecategory ofthe'real'itself
(and notits contingent content)whichis thereby signified; in other
words,itistheverydeficiency ofsignified as opposedtoreferent which
becomesitself thesignified ofrealism: a 'reality-effect'is produced, the
basisofthatunspoken category ofverisimilitude whichmakesup the
aesthetic ofall ofthestandard worksofmoderntimes."4
It wouldbe wrong, however, toconcludethatthisanalysis, whichso
radically devaluestheimportance ofcontent inrealistic discourse,isfor
all thatan exampleofsomeincorrigibly formalistic practice either:for
the "reality-effect" would appear to be somethingmore closely
resembling a by-product of realisticdiscoursethan a markof its
fundamental linguistic structure.AndwhileBarthesdoesnotgo so far
as to saythatanytypeof discoursecan on occasion,and as itwere
laterally,inpassing, generate the"effet derel,"itwouldseemimplicit in
his description thatwhat has hitherto passed underthe name of
"realisticnarrative" is at leasta mirage tothedegreethatithasnothing
structurally to distinguish it fromnarrative discoursein general.
A keytermin thepassagequotedabovesuggests thespecificity of
Barthes'approachhereand explainshow it can do the seemingly
impossible and avoidcategorization in eithertheformalistic campor
thatofcontent-oriented analyses: this is the word "connotation," which
may be said to designate the fundamental method of the earlyBarthes,
one whichpersists on intomorerecentbookslikeS/Z, where,as we
shallsee,it coexistsuneasilywiththelatermethodology ofsemiotics
proper. Theconnotative method, indeed - derived fromtheworkofthe
Danishlinguist Hjelmslev andmostfully codified byBarthes himselfin
thelongtheoretical conclusion tohisMythologies - differs from current
semiotic practice inthat,wherethelatter takesas itsobjectofstudythe
mechanismsby which signs function,the formeris resolutely
semioclastic(Barthes' own term) and finds its vocation in a
4 "L'Effetde reel",Communications11 (1968), p. 88.

denunciation oftheideological usesofsignswhichisirreconcilable with
the"scientific" character of semiotics itself.Thustheanalysisof the
"reality-effect"outlinedabove is precisely an ideologicalone in its
exposure of the illusion the realistic detail is designed to produce(the
ideologicalpurpose of suchan illusion - the propagation ofa beliefin
the"referent" or in nature- we willdealwithlateron inthepresent
essay).Thetranscendence offormandcontent bothcanmeanwhile be
explained by a brief account of what Hjelmslev meant by connotation in
thefirstplace: to follow Barthes' helpfulsimplification, itis a kind of
second-degree construction in whicha completeprevioussign(the
combination signifier/ signified)is pressed intoservice intheedification
ofa newandmorecomplexsignofwhichitbecomesitself thesignifier.
Thus the wordsof an individualsentencebear theirown intrinsic
meaning within the"frame" whichis proper tothem(denotation), while
at thesametimethesentence as a completesignin itsownright (the
wordsplusthemeaning, orthesignifier the
plus signified) may be used
to conveya supplementary meaningof a morestylistic type,suchas
eleganceor socialdistinction, in a dialogueforinstance, or a valueof
somekind,as whenthesentences ofa Flaubertor a Joyceproclaim,
aboveand beyondtheirowndenotative content, "I am Literature".
The dissatisfaction oforthodoxsemiotics withthisconception ofa
supplementary meaningor messagewhichis theidea ofconnotation
maybe accounted forbytheglobalcharacter ofthedesignation, which
does not seemto allow muchroomforthemoreminuteworkof
syntacticorsemantic dissection: ineffect, theconnotative method seizes
on the entiresentenceor the entiresign as the vehiclefor a
supplementary meaning,thus virtuallycuttingitselfofffromthe
offurther
possibility analysis. Thesemiotic abandonment oftheconcept
however has thesignaldisadvantage (it is ofcoursea positivebenefit
fora disciplinewhichwishestofleethepolitical intoanuntroubled realm
of scientific research)of shutting down one of the fewpowerful
instruments availableto register theideological.I wouldarguethat
thereis a profoundincompatibility betweena "scientific" method,
whichseeksto restrict itsworktopurepositivities, anda dialectical one,
which,thrusting itshandsintothestrange and paradoxicalelement of
thenegative, is alonecapableofdoingjusticeto "mixed"phenomena
suchas ideology, falseconsciousness, repression, andin alllikelihood,
connotation itself: oneofthesecondary interests of5/Z,indeed, willbe
precisely this tension between the two approaches which runs
throughout the work. In the present instance, the
however, relatively
spatialcharacter ofBarthes'objectsofstudyin Mythologies (images,

212 FREDRIC JAMESON
photographs, relativelyvisualoppositions, facesandsoforth) suggests a

meansofcorrecting theimbalancenotedabove,whichwouldinvolve
the temporalization of the concept of connotationand the
reintroduction intoitofprocessandofreading time.Suchanapproach
wouldentitle ustospeaknowofa connotation-effect, whichisproduced
at a particular moment in thereception of a sign,and whichcan be
describedas a kind of ninety-degree rotationin whichformis
momentarily transformed intoa new typeofcontent initsownright,
without losingitsolderproperties; so,notthedetailitself, notthelittle
reardoor,butrather theveryform ofthenarrative sentence itself
atthat
point suddenlybegins to emit a secondarymessage about
historiographie discoursein general:and such a view, linking
autoreferentialityand connotation, by makingof thelattera textual
eventinitsownright, wouldthenpermit thismethod to be reabsorbed
intoa morecomplex,yetstillideology-oriented, investigation ofthe
textin question.
At anyrate,thetensionbetween semiotic and semioclastic aimsin
S/Z reappears ina somewhat different registeras a tension between text
and form,or moreprecisely, betweenmodernism and realism,in
Barthes'viewoftheBalzaciannovellaitself. Sucha coexistence between
thetwomodesis ofcourseitselfa feature ofthetheory:
"Thusthetheory ofthetexttendsto favormodernistic texts(from
Lautramont to PhilippeSollers)fora two-fold reason:suchtextsare
exemplary becausetheymanifest (to a degreehitherto unattained) 'the
operationof semiosisin languageand withthesubject,'and because
theyconstitute a de facto protestagainstthe constraints of the
traditionalideologyofmeaning. . . Yet,byvirtueoftheveryfactthat
textsare massive(ratherthan cumulative), and thattheydo not
necessarilycoincidewiththeworksthemselves, itis possibletodiscover
textuality [du texte],althoughto a lesserdegree,even in older
productions; a classicalwork(Flaubert, Proust, whynotevenBossuet?)
may wellinclude or
layers fragments of criture . . ."5
Therewith the fundamental purpose S/Z is set: to trackand
of
uncover "dutexte"inBalzac,toexposelayersandtracesoftextuality in
whatseemsotherwise a traditional or evenrelatively conventional
5 "Texte",articleon thetheoryof,in Encyclopaediauniversalis, vol. XV (1973),p. 1016.
(The wordsemiosis,derivedfromPeirce,designatesthatprocessoftheinterpretation
ofsignswhereby,in a properlyinfinite series,a newsignis profferedas an explanation,
or translation,
interpretation, oftheolderone. For an approachto semioticsbased on
thisnotion,one whichsuccessfullysurmounts thestricturesmadeon classicalsemiotics
in the presentessay, see UmbertoEco's Introductionto Semiotics[Bloomington,
Indiana, 1975].)And see,foran earlierstatement ofBartheson thenatureoftextuality,
"De l'oeuvreau texte",Revue d'esthtique,XXIV, 3 (1971), pp. 225-232.

narrative. Thisiswhyitwouldbeunwise toexpectthekindofsystematic
attention to theplotof"Sarrasine" whichwehavelearnedfromother
typesof narrative analysis, suchas thoseofLvi-Strauss, Proppand
Greimas, whoseeffort isdirected towards thereading oftheevents ofthe
plot as a completemessage of some kind; or traditional Anglo-
American studiesoffiction, whichremainstubbornly committed tothe
principle that all of the elements of a masterowrk - style,images,
episodes,etc. - coherein some harmonoius ethicalor thematic
statement whichit is thebusinessofthecriticto recover. Thelatteris
indeedgenerally stigmatized bythetheorists ofthetextas interpretation
inthebad sense,whileeventherelatively "value-free" decipherment of
theformer remains holisticanddemandsa kindofdistance, a kindof
speculative leap in thegrasping andpositing ofnarrative holes,which
theminute andmicroscopic focusofBarthes' commentary canscarcely
accommodate. Thisalsoresults, itshouldbe observed inpassing, inthe
repression of one wholearea of historical reality, namelythatofthe
evolution ofnarrative formitself: for,ironically, theBarthes ofS/Zis in
noposition toconvey thepurely formal connotations whichresult from
Balzac's adaptationof olderstorytelling conventions to the newer
reifiedandquantified narrative andsocialmaterials ofhisowntime,a
perspective to which we will return at the end of this essay.
Still,it wouldbe a mistaketo thinksuchconsiderations havebeen
completely eliminated from Barthes' commentary:fact,S/Z,likethe
in
novellaofwhichitis a study, may saidto be verymucha mixedor
be
hybrid and
object, just as "Sarrasine" willincludeelements oftextuality
within an older"classical"ortraditional form, so we maysuggest that
S/Z itself combines both realisticand modernistic features. For within
the"modernistic" text-oriented structure ofthecommentary form, we
may also from time to time detectelements of some older or
"realistic"
critical
"representational" essay on Balzac, to which an earlierBarthes,
onelessaddicted tothefragment, might wellhavelentthelapidary and
ellipticalformfamiliar to readersof Writing DegreeZero or of his
CollectedEssays.Thismoreconventional studymight thenhavebeen
resumedas a thesisabout the relationship betweencastration and
artisticproduction in Balzac'stale (whichinvolvesthepassionof a
sculptor fora castrato), an anecdote thentransformed bythe"frame" of
thenovellaintoan exchangeable commodity insucha wayas tomakea
statement about the relationship betweenclassicalstorytelling and
capitalism. Having dealt with this "realistic kernel" of S/Z elsewhere,6
6 "Balzac's novellaspeaksto us at once of itselfand of its subject-matter, of artand of
desire,bothofwhichare present, withreversedemphasis,intheframeand intheactual
tale alike. In the frame,the narratortellsa tale in orderto seduce his listener;while

214 FREDRIC JAMESON
however, I willherelimitmyself to thein anycase farmorecentral

"modernistic" focusofits"textualization" ofBalzac.
It is, of course,Barthes'disentanglement ofthecodesofSarrasine
whichis triemostdramatic embodiment ofthenewtextualmethods,
rewriting the structure of narrativity in termswhichwill not be
unfamiliar tothereaderofPound:"Thetext,initsmass,is comparable
to a skyat once flatand smooth,deep,withoutedgesand without
landmarks; likethesoothsayer drawing onitwiththetipofhisstaff an
imaginary rectangle wherein to consult, accordingto certainprinciples,
theflight ofbirds, thecommentator tracesthrough thetextcertainzones
ofreading, in orderto observetherein themigration ofmeanings, the
outcroppings of codes, thepassage of citations."
(14) The notionof the
musicalscore,whichwillnotbe longinfollowing thisone,introduces,
however, as we shallsee,thephenomenon oftemporal successioninto
thissplendidly spatialimage,whosecounterpart maybe foundinthe
veryetymology oftextitself,literallya tissuewoventogether bythose
fundamental molecular components ofnarrativitywhichareforBarthes
thecodes:"In theirinterweaving, thesevoices(whoseoriginis 'lost'in
thevastperspective ofthealready-written) de-originatetheutterance:
the convergence of the voices (of the codes) becomeswriting, a
stereographic spacewherethefivecodes,thefivevoices,intersect: the
VoiceofEmpirical Realities
(theproairetisms), theVoiceofthePerson
(thesemes),theVoiceofKnowledge (thecultural codes),theVoiceof
Truth(thehermeneutic codes),theVoiceoftheSymbol."(21)
Whatis tempting forthatpartofourmindswhichis stillunderthe
spellofan opticalillusionofscientific rigor,whatmaybetermed a kind
ofCartesian idolinitsownright, is thenotionthatthetextmaythereby
be brokenup intoits minimalunitiesand thelattercarefully and in
business-like scientific
fashionanalyzedonebyone:fromthispointof
view,ofcourse,all interpretation oftheothertypedescribed aboveis
inadmissible preciselybecause itis holisticand and
speculative, seems to
graspintuitively at wholes which are but
nothing imaginary objects
withinthetaleitselfan artistis destroyedbyhisdesire,leavingonlyitsrepresentation -
a statueand a portraitof Zambinella - behindin the catastrophe.This passion is
narcissismand castration:the infatuatedartistin realitysees his own image in the
castratowithwhomhe fallsin love,so thatthegestureofsymboliccastrationor sexual
renunciation is heregivento be theverysourceofartisticproductivity, just as itturns
elsewherein the storyto be the verysourceof the Lantyfamily'smysterious fortune
(Zambinellaas primadonna). The fablethushas somethingto sayabouttheoriginsof
classicalartand theoriginsofcapitalismand theirrelationship to each other;yetitdoes
not leave the framewithinwhichit is told intact.Rather,it contaminatestellerand
listeneralike, who separate at its close, in the desexualized and desexualizing
atmosphere,withouthavingconsummatedtheirdesire." F. Jameson,The Prison-
House of Language (Princeton,1972), p. 148.

from thepointofviewofthepatient andminute ofthetextby
dissection
itspainstakingly scientificanalyst.Unfortunately, perception doesnot
workin thisadditivefashion, neither in storytellingnorin thevisual
arts,wherethe Gestaltrefutations of the notionof someatomistic
combination of smallsensations intounifiedperceptions is themost
strikingreply totheCartesian procedure. Hencetheveryrealdangers of
thecommentary formas practiced here,whichencourages a laborious
enumeration ofdetailthrough whichtheessentials tendtoslip(Barthes
himself,inanother context, mentioned thatgamedescribed ina novelof
in
AgathaChristie whichthemoreexperienced playerchooses a place
namethatmarches so boldly across the -
map e.g., E U R O P E - the
otherparticipants do noteven notice it).
Barthes'fivecodesfallintotwogroups,and thedistinction is not
its
without symptomatic value. The first group - those of the semes
(Code ofthePerson),ofculturalcommonplaces (Knowledge), and of
theSymbol, - areessentially batchesofwhatheelsewhere callsindices,
thatis,short-hand supplementary orparametrical messages whichare
drawnfromsomemorebasicpool ofsharedculturalattitudes which
us to
permit decipher them (so,in a well-known example, Barthes reads
thefourtelephones on JamesBond'sdeskas an indexof"advanced
bureaucratic technology": heretheindexmightbe seenas something
likea non-ideological connotation). This is perhapsthemomentto
remind thereader thattheterm "code,"drawnfrom information theory,
haslittlemorethanmetaphorical valuewhenapplied,nottofirst-degree
communications, but ratherto those"secondary modelingsystems"
whichare verbalrepresentations. There are, it would seem,two
relativelydistinct uses ofthetermwhichare usefulin articulating or
underscoring linguisticrealitiesthat might otherwisepassunnoticed. In
thefirstusethewordcode,inthesingular, iscoupledwiththenotionofa
message, so thatthetermforcestheanalystto workmorediligently at
defining the structuralaffinities between thetype of message emitted
andthesignsystem orcodethrough whichitis conveyed. Theotheruse
is howeverratherdifferent fromthis,inasmuchas it stressesthe
multiplicity of different codes, or sub-codes,at workin a given
communicational act:thus,I convey a verbalstatement, butaccompany
it by facialexpressions whichderivefroman organizedexpressive
system oftheirown,as wellas gestures ofthehandandshoulder which
stempossibly froma different signsystem (as whenI imitatethegestural
signsystemof Europeanspeakers).In thisusage,theemphasishas
shiftedtothecontradictions, oratleastimbalances, ofthevariouscodes
amongeachother;anditisinthissensethat,characterizing thecultural

216 FREDRIC JAMESON
situationofthemodern Gesellschaft, wespeakoftheproliferation orthe

explosion of codes as a symptom ofthe breakdown ofthe older social
groups which were relatively unified linguistically as well as
institutionally.In this sense, our own use of the term "code," drawn
froma relatively technical andspecialized discipline andappliedtothe
quiteunrelatedone of literary study,is itselfan exampleof code-
switching. Still,onewouldthinkthatthesetwoapproaches requireof
theanalyst either, forthefirst, thatheshowtheunityofthesignsystem
or code utilizedin thetransmission of a givenmessage,or, forthe
second,thathe revealthecontradictions and inconsistencies between
themultiple codesin sucha wayas to makethosecontradictions and
thatmultiplicity availableto usas a phenomenon foranalysis initsown
right.7Butessentially Barthesdoesneither ofthesethings, anditisfor
thisreasonthatoneso oftenhasthefeeling thatthecommentary form,
orthefragmented discourse, ofS/Z tendstosuggest thatproblems have
beensolvedat theverymoment inwhichtheyarebecoming interesting.
Thus,to takeup Barthes'"semes"or Code ofthePerson,one can
certainly,as he does,makean inventory ofthevariousindiceswhicha
writermarshalsas a kindof characterological shorthand (thus,the
description ofSarrasine's peremptory entry intoBouchardon's studio,
besidesconveying a factwhichaccounts forhissubsequent development
as a painter,functions as a manifestation ofthatunderlying character
traitwhichis"Obstinacy"). Yetsuchan inventory wouldseemtohavea
merely lexicalinterest, evenwhencertain "semes"areisolatedwhichare
culturallyidiosyncratic (onlya 19thcentury Frenchman wouldtakethis
gestureas a sign of thisattribute), or personally and stylistically
determined (onlyBalzac wouldhave triedto conveythisparticular
naturethrough thiskindof action).The largerissueat stakehereis
raisedonlyincidentally when,inoneofthosesplendid asideswhichare,
ofcourse,thewholereasonforbeingofS/Z, Barthespassesfromthe
semesor indicesof theindividual character to thatwhichholdsthe
entirecharacter together as a substantive unity, namely theproper name
itself:"To call characters, as Furetiredoes, Javotte,Nicodme,
Belastreis (withoutkeepingcompletely aloof froma certainhalf-
bourgeois, half-classicist to
code) emphasize thestructural function of
theName,to stateitsarbitrary nature,todepersonalize it,toacceptthe
currency oftheNameas pureconvention. To saySarrasine, Rochefide,
Lanty,Zambinella (notto mention Bouchardon, whoreallyexisted)is
to maintain thatthepatronymic substituteinfilledwitha person(civic,
7 See my"Ideology of Form: PartialSystemsin La VieilleFille",Sub-stance,Winter,
1975.

national, social), itis to insistthat appellative be in
currency gold(and
not leftto be decidedarbitrarily). All subversion, or all novelistic
submission, thusbeginswiththe ProperName."(95) Withsuchan
observation (echoingtheclassicchapteron namingsystems in Lvi-
Strauss;Savage Mind), we are on the thresholdof one of the
fundamental problems of narrative analysis,namelytherelationship
between thecategory ofa "character" andthecognitive content (traits,
ideas,symbolism) whichmakesa givencharacter up. The structural
analysisof narrative has developedout of a refusalof thesurface
phenomena ofnarrative itself,substitutingforthemitsownterminology
inmuchthesamewaythatchemistry orphysics substitutesthelanguage
and categories of atomicparticles forthecommon-sense experiential
dataofphysical substances likemud,rust,stones, woodorthelike.Yet
theconceptofcharacter alonehas provedrecalcitrant to thiskindof
analytictranslation, anditis hardto seehowthestructural analysisof
narrative can makeanyfurther theoreticalprogress without attacking
this particularproblem,whichmay be describedas that of the
stubbornly anthropomorphic natureof our presentcategoriesof
character. Atthispoint,clearly, theproblem intersects withthevaster
philosophicone of the historicalnatureof the Subjectitself:but
characteristically, Barthestakeshis ownobservation as a vehiclefor
sounding hisownfundamental themeofnaturalisation (e.g.,theproper
namegivesa naturalappearanceto whatis essentially a historical
determination oftheperson)to whichwe willreturn later.
Thecultural codeissomething likea storehouse ofproverbial wisdom
orcommonplace knowledge about acts,events, lifeingeneral,
and and
willbe articulated whenever a givendetailneedsmotivation: ina sense,
therefore, thiscodeisthelocusofideology, albeitofa relativelyinactive,
non-functional type: one is tempted, indeed,to seeit,notso muchas a
system initsownright, as anylivingideology might be supposedtobe,
butrather as a kindofstorehouse ofolderideological fragments which
can be appealedto now and thenfora digression or an acceptable
justification forsomenecessary movein narrative strategy. Thebasic
objectofstudyherewouldtherefore be thevariousformsofwhatthe
RussianFormalists called"motiviation," thatis to say,whathasto be
pressedintoserviceto makea givendetailpass unquestioned bythe
reader,or,to usewhatwillpresently becomean ideologically charged
term,to seemnaturalto him.Indeed,in an interesting article,Gerard
Genettehas suggested thatverisimilitude - "le vraisemblable" - is

218 FREDRIC JAMESON
itself
nothing butthedegreezeroofjustsuchmotivation, something like
a culturalcodewhichis able to dispensewithitscontent.8
Theseconsiderations, ofcourse,leaddirectly backtoliterary history
insofaras a textof Balzac is a good deal moreself-indulgent in this
respectthanwouldbeanypost-Flaubertian narrative: indeed, oneofthe
newand self-imposed constraints ofthelatteris precisely to reinvent
something likeGenette's notionofthe"vraisemblable" byeliminating
all recourseto such culturalcodes and motivations whichare so
common toBalzac.Atthesametime, itshouldbeobserved thatBarthes'
Cartesianmethod,his pursuitof nothingbut the minimalunities,
obscuresanotherfundamental roleplayedbyjustsuchcultural codes,
namelytheoverallorganization of narrative ironies,as when,in the
cumulative disastersof somenaturalist novel,we sensetheactivein-
forming of
presence a commonplace of the proverbial type(e.g.,waste
notwantnot,orpridegoethbefore a fall,etc.).Therelationship between
the global structure of a long narrativeand such ideationalor
conceptual elementshas neverbeenadequately studied,andthisis all
themoresurprising inviewofthefactthatoneofthedeepestvocations
ofthetwentieth centurynovelhasbeenitsattempt toexpunge justsuch
elementswhichare rightly feltto be vestigesof olderand more
superstitious thought-ways: we shallreturn to thisproblem shortly in
connection withanotherofBarthes'codes.
Theenigmatically designated CodeoftheSymbolprovestodesignate
bodilyand sexualrealities in a fashionpreeminently characteristic of
Barthes,whohasalwaysinsisted onthebodyas thelocusofa particular
kindofnon-uni versalizableprivate dimension oflanguage. Andas inhis
own work,the materialsof thiscode rangefromthe Bachelardian
psychoanalysis oftheelements totheLacanianmotifs ofcastration and
phallicsignifiers.Paradoxically, it is in thisprivateand relatively
ahistorical
realmmorethanelsewhere thatthelackofgenuine historical
referenceproveslimiting: for one would want to findthese observations
grounded insomesenseoftheincomparably poorphysiological reality
ofBalzac'sstylewhencomparedto thelaterinstrumental registers of
Flaubertor ofZola.
On thewhole,however, itwouldseemclearthatthepurposeofthese
three("reversible")codesis to probefortherootsof theintelligible
detail(the"seme")on the one handin thesociallyconventional or
ideological(theCodeofKnowledge) andontheotherinpsychoanalytic
(thatoftheSymbol).Here,then,concealedbeneatha schemeofcode
8 See "Vraisemblanceet motivation,"Communications11 (1968), pp. 5-21.

classifications,we once againtouchon thatfundamental optionof
contemporary criticism (sociology versus psychoanalysis), whichis
itself
a primesymptom ofthefundamental splitinmodern life between
thepublicand theprivate, thepoliticaland thesexual,betweenthe
untotalizably collective andthealienatedexperience oftheindividual.
Wemaywonder, however, whether the of
procedure assigning eachof
thesedimensions to a different codereallyhelpstoclarify thisdilemma
(infact,itwouldseemto presuppose thateachdimension ofbeinghad
foundadequateexpression ina fullcodeorsign-system ofitsown),or
whether theconceptofvariouscodesheremerely forestalls theproblem
andprevents itfrombeingadequately explored. Certainly,thecaseof
in
theideological materials, itisclearthatBarthes isconcerned, inhislater,
semiotic period, to defuse this materialand to reduce itto data as inert
andmalleableas possible(andwehaveseenhowtheconceptualization
of ideologyas mereculturaland proverbialknowledgeachieves
preciselythisaim).
Theothertwocodesareclearly, andbyBarthes' ownadmission, ofa
quitedifferentstructure, inasmuch as,inhisterm "irreversible," theyare
formsintime,andthus,passingnowintomusicalfigures, farmoreakin
tomelodicstructures thantotheharmonies oftheprevious "reversible"
types:"Thereaderly textisa tonaltext(forwhichhabitcreates a reading
processjust as conditioned as our hearing:one mightsay thereis a
readingeyejustas thereis a tonalear,so thatto unlearnthereaderly
wouldbethesameas tounlearn thetonal),anditstonalunity isbasically
dependent ontwosequential codes:therevelation oftruth [hermeneutic
code]andthecoordination oftheactionsrepresented [proairetic code]:
thereis thesameconstraint inthegradualorderofmelodyandinthe
equallygradualorderof the narrative sequence. . . The fivecodes
mentioned, frequently heardsimultaneously, infactendowthetextwith
a kindofpluralquality(thetextis actuallypolyphonic), butofthefive
codes,onlythreeestablish permutable, reversibleconnections, outside
theconstraint oftime(thesemic, andsymbolic
cultural codes);theother
two impose theirtermsaccordingto an irreversible order(the
hermeneutic and proaireticcodes)."(30) It should be observed,
however, thatto namea thingdoesnotalwayssuffice to explainit:in
particular, in the structural analysis of narrative from Propp'son,
Morphology oftheFolktale,an unjustifiable usehasbeenmadeofthe
term"irreversibility", as thoughit did anymorethanto designate the
basicproblemto be accountedfor,namelythatof thediachrony or
sequentialityof narrative discourse.
Inmanyways,itistheproairetic code- thatofempirical or
realities,

220 FREDRIC JAMESON
oftheordinary gestural and circumstantial unitiesofeveryday life-

whichraisesthemostinteresting issuesforfuture study. What Barthes
describes hereis something likea dialectic
ofnames,andoftherealities
- he callsthemthe"folds"- designated bythosenames:"Whatis a
seriesofactions:theunfolding ofa name.To enter!I canunfolditinto
'toappear'and'tocomeinside.' To leave!I canunfolditinto'towant
to,' 'to breakoff,' 'to go on myway.' To give!: 'to presentthe
opportunity,' 'to handover,''toaccept.' Inversely, to establishthe
sequenceistofindthename:thesequenceisthecurrency, theexchange
valueofthename.Bywhatdivisions is thisexchange established? What
is therein'Farewell,"'Door,' 'Gift'?Whatsubsequent, constitutive
actions?Alongwhatfoldscanweclosethefanofthesequence? . . . The
proairetic sequenceis indeeda series,i.e.,'a multiplicity possessing a
ruleoforder'(Leibnitz), buttheruleoforderhereis cultural (habit,in
short), andlinguistic (thepossiblity oftheword,thewordpregnant with
itspossibilities). . . Thusto read... is to proceedfromnametoname,
from foldtofold;itistofoldthetextaccording toonenameandthento
unfold italongthenewfoldsofthisname.Thisisproairetism: anartifice
(orart)ofreading thatseeksoutnames,thattendstowards them:anact
oflexicaltranscendence, a laborofclassificaiton carried outonthebasis
oftheclassification oflanguage."(82-83)
At this point,indeed,we may glimpsean explorationof the
"proairetic" codewhichleadsina different direction thanthatexplored
byBarthes, and whichwouldbe comparable to hisobservations here
onlyas a kind of x-rayof the molecularstructure of the textual
substancemightbe juxtaposedwithsomething on the orderof a
psychology ofperception in whichtheactivity ofreading, likethatof
visualperception, is seenas theconstruction ofmeaningful wholesor
Gestalts outoftheinitialrawmaterial ofverbalstimuli. Herethemost
suggestive methodological discussionisfurnished byGombrich's classic
Art and Illusion(1960),which,drawingindependently on Roman
Jakobson's viewsoflanguage,hasproto-structuralist credentials ofits
own,andwhosemoreorthodox accountofthenatureandfunction of
an artistic codehasinteresting andquitedifferent implications forthe
wholerealism /modernism controversy thanthoseimpliedbyBarthes
himself.
Gombrich is ofcoursearguing/or representationality justas strongly
as Barthesis arguingagainstit: yethisapologiaoftherealistic mode
doesnottakethepathofthemoretraditional valorization oftheobject
- of "reality," historical, social or natural- againstmereartistic
formalisms. It is notan apologiabasedon mimesis, butrather seeksto

The Ideologyof The Text 221
insert between subject and object that third and more properly
structuralist realm of artisticand perceptual codes which are the
painter's essential medium:thusthelatterdoes notpaintimageswhich
look likethings,butratherworksoutand sharpensa setofrelationships
(the classic binaryoppositions,in this instancebetweenfigureand
ground,lightand shade,and thelike(whichmaythenbe perceivedto be
analogous to the relationshipswhichmake up our perceptionof the
object. It is the binary pairs which are matched, not the objects
themselves;theparole of the various visual styles,of thelanguagesof
paintingitself,whichis then- sometimesnaivelyand unconsciously-
read as being an artisticequivalentfor a complex of non-linguistic
perceptions.9
It is not, however, this aspect of Gombrich's account of the
psychologyofartisticperceptionwhichis comparableto Barthes'codes,
forthe latteris not reallyinterestedin the binaryoppositionswhich
organizenarrativeperception,and we wouldhaveto go to Levi-Strauss'
studiesof mythforsomethinganalogous in theliteraryrealm.It is at a
somewhatlaterstepin hisreasoningthatGombrichwillhavesomething
suggestive to tellus about theproblemsraisedbyS/Z. The arthistorian
is indeedinvolvedin a battleon twofronts:on theone hand,throughhis
assertionofan intermediary realm- thatoftheartisticcode - between
thesubjectand hisobjectintherealworld,he seeksto dispeltheillusions
of a naive realism,and in particularwhatmightbe called theWhorfian
hypothesisabout the relationshipbetweenartisticsytleand actual
perception.Whorfs name is of courseassociatedwiththeidea thatthe
structure and innerlimitsofa givenlanguagemaybe at once translated
into propositionsabout the structureand innerlimitsof its speaker's
thinking:applied to the languages of art, this suggeststhat readers
whose minds have been enlarged by the complex perspectivesof
narrativerealismas Auerbachshowedthelatterto havebeendeveloped
over a numberof centurieswill necessarilyhave a more adequate
instrument at theirdisposalfordeciphering externalrealitythanwould
have been the case for earlier generations.We will returnto this
hypothesislater;sufficeit to say thatGombrich'sattemptradicallyto
dissociatestyleand perception - based on thereductioad absurdamof
a view which would finally suggest that only post-Renaissance
Europeans have ever seen a three-dimensionalworld! - is not
altogethersatisfying either.
Buthisotherconceptualadversaryis somethinglikethereverseofthis
one,and is constituted bytheverypsychologistswhoseworkGombrich
9 See Art and Illusion(Princeton,1960), ChapterI, pp. 33-62.

222 FREDRIC JAMESON
hadseemedto drawin making hisfirst point:herethetarget iswhathe

considers to be theimaginary entity ofthoseatomistic "sensations" on
which,according to thepsychologists, perception is itself constructed:
the meaningless data of the variousvisualstimuliwhichare then
ultimately, throughsome mysterious process of transformation,
metamorphosed intothe recognizable objectsof a familiar external
world.For Gombriach, indeed,theexistential reality ofsucha fictive
entityas thevisualsensationis simplythepaintedcanvasitself, as,
particularly sinceimpressionism, ithasseemedtooffer theevidence ofa
host of unrelatedand fragmented colorsand brushstrokeswhich
magically, as we stepaway from it,reorganize themselves into,say,the
MontSainteVictoire. Still,theexistence ofphenomena likecaricature
- a fewbarelineswhichcannotbereadinanyotherwaythanas some
well-known face- suggests whatwillbeGombrich's basichypothesis in
thisarea,namelythatthevisualrawmaterials are reordered intoa
meaningful paroleorartistic perception through theintervening agency
ofwhathecallsschemata - a storehouse ofideasofthings whichtrigger
ourrecognition oftheminthelanguageofart- orinotherwordsvery
preciselywhatBarthes meansbyproairetisms orthecodeof"empirical
realities"
("la Voixde l'Empirie").
TheGombrich versionofthisconceptstrikes meas moresuggestive
thanthatofBarthes, however, precisely becauseitseemsto openup a
wholerealmof conceptualcategories to ourexploration, a realmin
principleextending all thewayfromtheisolatedindividual gesture to
thatofsomeoverallgeneric comprehension itself.
To be sure,forboth
theimmediate
writers, examplestendto be relatively localones:thus,
forGombrich, thevariousrecognizable natural phenomena whichmake
up a Constablelandscape,and,forBarthes, thevariousacts(coming
andgoing), thevariousemotions (angerorsadness), thevariousgestures
(a curiousglance,a suddenlookofbewilderment), whoseconventional
names provideour means of organizingthe necessarily sketchy
indications furnished bythenarrative sentences themselves. Andtobe
sure,theproofa contrario - thevariousexamplesofa pre-Brechtian
estrangement-effect ofwhich, forinstance, wefindso manyinTristram
Shandy, thoselengthy anatomies ofa givenphysical gesture whichforce
ustosearchfortheidentifying namewhichhasbeenwithheld - hasalso
tendedto finditsprivileged objectsinthesmaller unities ofgesture and
individual act. Yet I wouldsuggestthatsuchschematahavea much
vasterfunctional role,particularly in moretraditional narratives, one
customarily assimilated to an illicitdidacticism andmoralism andwhich
the presentviewforthefirsttimeputsus in a positionto explore

properly.This is the whole area of a kind of conventionalized
identificationof humanexperience itself,one whichfindslinguistic
codification notso muchin names- theexperiences are a littletoo
complex for that - as m proverbs and conventionalized poetic"ironies"
ofall kinds.Theproverbial wisdom, however - "pridegoethbefore a
fall"- is notso mucha lessonto be taughtbytheeventsofa given
narrativeas itis ratherthenameofa recognizable destiny andofa single
overallmeaningful unityof human experience, and the reader usesitas a
schemainprecisely Gombrich's a of
sense, way organizing various,the
stillfragmented eventsfurnished bythenarrative intoa Gestaltwhose
formis its meaning.This is the way in whichsomething like a
psychology of perception mightbe developedfornarrative analysis
yetitis conceivable
itself: onlyatthepriceofbreaking withthekindof
Cartesianattachment to visibleanalyticminimalunitieswhichis
reinforced by Barthes'commentary methodin S/Z: for the most
interestingnarrative schemata lieon themostdistant circumference of
thehermeneutic circle,and,likethedistance whichalonepermits usto
identifytheobjectin a landscapeof Cezanne,are neverpresentas
at anymoment
positivities ofthetextitself, theirexistence deducible
onlybyinference, fromtheforms intowhichitseventsslowlyarrange
themselves.
Suchan approachwouldthenallowsomething likean inventory of
thevariousconventional conceptsofhumanexperience operative at a
givenhistoricalmoment,in a givensocial formation and in the
narratives
whichfindcurrency within it.Whatis moreinteresting inthe
presentcontextis thatit is precisely as a breakwithsuchnarrative
schemata thatliterary modernism can be understood, and hereagain,
theanalogywiththehistory ofpainting is a revealing one.For surely
nothinghas beenfeltas quiteso illicitandunjustifiable bymodernist
aesthetics
thantheoperation ofjustsuchtacitand subterranean, even
messagesofthetypedescribed
ideological, above:modernliterature's
breakwithplotis in reality farbetter understood as a breakwiththe
oldernarrative schemata, which arefelt - -
rightly tobeindefensible
conventional presuppositions about the nature oflifeandexperience.
Thedilemmaoftheplotlessnovelthenonlyemerges whenitbecomes
cleartowhatdegreeplotisitself structurally inseparable from justsuch
conventionalized schemata, whichalonepermit thereaderto graspa
longseriesofeventsand pagesin theunityofsomelargerform.
Whathappenedinpainting mayserveas a dramatic objectlessonin
sucha process,wheredescription fatallyoverturns intoprescription,
and thenew"scientific" descriptions oftheprocessofperception are
themselves transformed into a programfor the productionof a

aboutthenatureoftimeandevents, theroleoforigins, therelationship
ofpasttopresent, andso forth.Ithasbecomeconventional toassociate
thesepresuppositions withtheso-called"closedform" ofthetraditional
novellaor storytelling plot,and Sartreis no doubtperfectly justified
in suggesting, in Whatis Literature!, thattheframenovella,withits
comfortable afterdinner audiencetaking inananecdote alongwiththeir
cigarsandbrandy, projectshuman action as "a briefdisorder whichis
suppressed . . . told from thepoint of view of order. Order triumphs,
orderiseverywhere, andcontemplates an ancient abolisheddisorder as
though the motionless waterofa summer the
daypreserved ripples that
oncecrossedit."Whatis newinBarthes' denunciation ofsuchclassical
the
plots(besides relationship he established in this particular one
between castration, and
storytelling, the commodity) istheassimilation
of the classicalreader'sdesirefor plot resolutionto that more
fundamental commitment of bourgeoisideologyto a conception of
objectivity and absolutetruthwhich had already been theobject ofthe
critiqueof the Tel Quel group.The solutionto theenigmasofplot,
indeed,thekindof readingwhichattachesitselfto finding out how
everything turnsout in theend,thusbecomeprofoundly ideological
activitiesintheirownright, andsomething liketheaesthetic equivalent
of thequasi-theological needforcertainty of bourgeoisthinking in
general. Herealso,onewouldliketodistinguish between thepractice of
something likean empty form- those"irreversible" sequences opened
and closedbytheso-calledhermeneutic code(themysterious wizened
figure oftheopening pages,whoseidentity is revealed intheconcluding
ones) - and thesupplementary ideologicalmessageforwhichthis
particular formisthenused:anditis clearthathere,onceagain,wefind
ourselves inthepresence ofthatpeculiaroperatory overdetermination
forwhichearlyBarthesreserved thetermconnotation.
Still,theissueis a gooddealbroaderthanthatofmelodrama andof
thecodewithwhichBarthesassociatesit:in itsmoregeneralform, it
concerns a literary -
phenomenon irony(now understood in a more
local and stylistic sensethanwe used thetermabove) - in which
Balzac'stextis relatively poor;beforeevaluating theultimate premises
ofS/Z,ittherefore seemsworthwhile toturntoanother recent workin
thistradition, namelyJonathanCuller'sstudyof Flaubert(Ithaca,
1974),whosetitle,TheUsesofUncertainty, suggests itsaffinity withthe
Frenchpositions, theneedfor"certainty" in thiscontextdesignating
something verymuchlikethatmirageofabsolutetruth denounced by
Tel Quel and trackedby Barthesintothe mostminutefoldsand
articulations ofthe"hermeneutic" code.

226 FREDRIC JAMESON
II.
Flaubert is inanycasethehistorical fountainhead ofan aesthetics of

and,
textuality, unlike the Balzac ofBarthes, may be said for Culler to
representthefirstgenuinely scriptibienovelistin termsofwhichthe
older "legible"and traditionalones are explicitlyor implicitly
comdemned. ButCuller'sbookis notonlya studyofFlaubert, itis a
studyof Flaubert's as
interpreterswell, and where Barthes, faced with
theapparent formal unity of the older novella,set out to pulverize the
textandtoshatter itintoitsmultiple codes,Culler's "metacommentary"
makesitspointbya seriesofsnapshots gleefully arresting thevarious
Flaubertians in theact ofdesperately trying to puttheirmasterback
together again.
So Cullerhasa fielddaydetecting thenostalgia formeaning ina host
ofFlaubert commentaries, beginning withCharlesBovary's hideouscap
andall oftheattempts uncomfortable critics
havemadetotransform it
intoa symbolof one kindor another,thatis to say,intoa fully
meaningful literary orverbalobject.Yetthecap solicits interpretation:
"itsmuteugliness hasthedepths ofexpressiveness ofanimbecile's face";
thecriticshavedone no morethanto riseto theoccasion,and the
resultantreadings,whichrangefromthe psychological (Charles'
personality) to the social and historical(the layerson the cap
representing the strataof Frenchsociety),become,in the present
context,and likeanyone'scomments in frontof thepaintings in a
museum, so manycandidates foran enlarged sottisier. Thisis nodoubt
appropriate forthosewithtemerity enoughtopronounce themselves in
publicabouta writer whosefondest hope,incollecting hisfileofclichs,
wastomakepeopleafraidtoopentheirmouths inthefirst placeforfear
ofuttering oneofthem.Thepointis,ofcourse, thatFlaubert's terrorism
aimsnotonlyat stupidremarks butalso,andaboveall,at intelligent
ones and at thesecretly imbecilic faceof all sentences whichaim at
or,as Mr.Cullerwouldputit,at certainty
finality, ("Therearea whole
crowdofsuchtopics,"Flaubertconfided ina letter, "whichannoyme
justas muchwhatever waytheyareapproached . . . Whether onespeak
goodorillofthemI amequallyirritated. Mostofthetimeconclusions
seemtomeactsofstupidity.") So thecriticofFlaubert's criticsplaysfair
andchoosesas histargets nottheworstofthelatterbutthebest:still,it
remainsan open questionwhether theycouldhavedone otherwise,
facedwitha textwhichdemandsinterpretation at thesametimethatit
undermines it:"Itis as iftheexuberant narrator, stillcharacterized as a
in
youthengaged mocking the new boy, had set out to reveal 'depthsof

expressiveness' and beendefeated byhisrun-away prose,andthecritic
who seeks the comfort of a world in which everything signifies must
his
avert eyes from thisdefeat and treatthe as
object signa whose signifie
is Charles."(93)
Butis notthissimply tosaythatFlaubert- orhisputative narrator
inthispassage- writes badlyi We have of course long seen Flaubert's
revolution intermsofa destruction ofrhetoric inthenameofstyle(see
Barthes,Writing DegreeZero)',what can this mean but thatthe
systematic machinery oftherhetorical conventions, variously pressed
intotheserviceoforatorical endsor ofsuchlateeffects as thatofthe
"sublime", are herethoroughly subverted? For Culler,however, the
resultant is
"style" onlyincidentally, in Barthes' sense, a vehicle for
privatephysiological the
expression; principal function of such "bad
writing" is rather thediscrediting oftheprevious reading norms, anda
straydescription of Yonville, in Madame Bovary, allows us to witness
theremarkable processwhereby description oftheolderrhetorical type
(ekphrasis in theterminology oftheancients) undergoes a sea-change
intowhatcanhenceforth onlybeknown as a "text":"Itisnotsimply that
eachsentence appearstofritter itselfaway,as itrunsdowntowards the
minute andtrivial; thatis almosta by-product ofthespectacle mounted
bya prosestyledetermined toshowhowgrammatical devicesenableit
to linktogether a setofdisparate andtrivial facts. . . Theparticularity
suggests a singlescene,butthemodeis oneofgeneralization; andthe
resultis simply thatwe do notknowwhospeaksor fromwhere.The
narrator is depersonalized, inthatwecannotgivehima character which
wouldexplainandholdtogether themoments ofhisdiscourse. Wehave,
in short, a written text,whichstandsbefore uscutofffroma speaker."
(76-77)
Thus the textis organizedneitherobjectively (accordingto the
proportions of its object,whichits variousclausesand sub-clauses
mightimitate in someharmonious way),norsubjectively (through the
consecutive experiences of a viewerwhichit might"render"), butis
rathersimplyheldtogether by "grammatical devices."The materials
themselves are inert and fragmented, but it is as thoughthewriter had
discovered some new principle of order in the processby which the
sentences aremadeto succeedeachotheracrossthepage,theobjectof
thegamenowbeingto marshal alltheresources ofsyntax toprevent the
readerfromnoticing howillogicalissucha succession onthelevelofthe
content.(MallarmwillthennotlongafterthiserectSyntaxitself into
theverynarrative substanceofhispoems.)
Thekindofcoherent meaning thereby discredited onthelevelofthe

228 FREDRIC JAMESON
sentences is nowshownby Cullerto be analogousto thatsoughtby

criticson theleveloftheplotitself:heretheprincipal exhibitis that
climaticfinal meetingbetweenFredericand Mme. Arnoux,in
L'ducation sentimentale, whose "irony" is for him as self-
contradictory as the clauses in thosehumbledescriptive sentences in
MadameBovaryto whichwehavealreadyalluded:"Flaubertmustbe
eitherdeflating, withconsummate irony,theillusions ofthecharacters
and revealing theirsupposedlove as falseposturing or he mustbe
defending, in a deeplytouchingscene, the ideal nature of this
transcending love." (152) The fact that neither of these mutually
exclusivealternatives worksmay be taken as a symptom of the
beginningcrisisin the relationship betweennarrativeand those
proairetisms or schemata ofwhich wespokeintheprevious section:the
latterare beginning to becomeunstuck, to wobble,theyno longer
functionunequivocally as meansoforganizing narrative perception, yet
thereaderstillgropesblindly forthem, nowapplying thelensoftheone,
nowtheother,withimperfect and unsatisfactory results.
Underthoseconditions, it is thecharacters themselves whomust
attempt toreorder theirpasts:"sinceFlaubert willnotobligetheymust
attempt forthemselves to organizetheirlivesas a nineteenth-century
noveltoldfromthepointofviewoforder";buttheirown,preeminently
romantic reading is patently unsatisfactory: Ifweacceptthisreading of
thepenultimate scene[in otherwords,thatdevisedby Fredericand
MadameArnouxthemselves] we findwe havemadenonsenseofour
earlierperceptions andindeedoftheexplicit contrasts interms ofwhich
therestof thebook appearsto be constructed . . . Thispenultimate
scene,whichovercomes oppositions and producesa fragile romantic
triumph, seemsto stepoutsidethelineofdevelopment adumbrated by
earlierscenes.It is not,thatis to say,thelogicalculmination of an
experience, whichenablesusto seewhatFrederic learnedaboutlove;it
an affirmation
is rather thatwhilelifemustbe livedandwhilethiswill
entaildisappointment andfailure, neverthelessonecan,ifoneproceeds
withcare,createa purified fiction whichremains disconnected from
one'sexperience. Insteadofconferring meaning on earlierepisodesand
pointing to their lesson, it seems to empty thesentimental education,
whichis theostensible subject, of the book, of the content whichit
appearedto have."(155)
Such a reading,or an anti-reading, suggeststhat Mr. Culler's
principaltheoretical adversary - althoughhe is nowhere mentioned
hereis WayneBooth,whoseown workhas beenconcernedto
denounceprecisely such"irresponsible ironies"as are hereoffered as

textualmodels.A carefulrereading oftheRhetoric ofFictionshows
thatthe"immorality" and lack of narrative perspective of a Celine
merely provides Boothwitha particularly striking scapegoat;thereal
villain,as itshouldbe,although withonlythegreatest
identified oftact,
is evidently Flauberthimself: "HenryJamestalksof Flaubert's'two
refuges' fromtheneedtolookathumanity squarely. Onewastheexotic,
as in Salammband The Temptation ofSaintAnthony, the'getting
awayfromthehuman'altogether.11 Theotherwasirony, whichenabled
himto dealwiththehumanwithout havingtocommit himself aboutit
directly.But,Jamesasks,'whenall wassaidanddonewasheabsolutely
andexclusively condemned toirony?Mighthe'notafter allhavefought
out hiscase a littlemoreon thespot?ComingfromJames,thisis a
powerful question.One cannothelpfeeling, as onereadsmanyofthe
'objective' yetcorrosive portraits thathave been givenus sinceJames,
thattheauthoris usingironytoprotect himself rather thantorevealhis
subject. If theauthor's characters reveal themselves as foolsandknaves
whenwecasta coldeyeuponthem, howabouttheauthorhimself? How
wouldhelookifhistrueopinions wereservedupcold?Ordoeshehave
no opinions?"
In reality, Boothand Cullerhavesurprisingly similarviewson the
"meaninglessness" of Flaubertian narrative; only what theonerejoices
in,theotherrepudiates; anditisuseful, indrawing theconsequences of
an "ideology ofthetext,"tojuxtaposea critic whoseattachment tothe
formalcompleteness oftheindividual workandthecoherent message
whichmasterwork willconveyhas led himto drawthefinallogical
conclusions ofhisownpostion, whether thesebeofanunpopular orold-
fashioned moralizing kind,or,as inhisnewbook,A Rhetoric ofIrony, a
pleafora restriction oftheplayofliterary meanings to whathecalls
"stableironies," thatis,thosewhichpermit coherent interpretations, or
in otherwords,whatMr.Cullerwouldcall"certainties": "Theserious
loss comes whenreaders,barragedwithcriticaltalk hailingthe
discovery of ambiguities as a majorachievement, learnto livewith
blurredsensesand dulledattention, and deprivethemselves of the
delightsofprecise andsubtlecommunication thatskillful stableironists
provide".12 Anditis certain thatwhatBoothcalls 'irresponsible irony,"
thatis,an ironywhichtakesitsownironiesironically, engagesmeina
processofinfinite regression to whichI mustultimately putan endby
confessing thatI no longer know what is meant by the term ironyinthe
firstplace.Clearly, then, it is for readerslike myself that Booth's new
11 The Rhetoricof Fiction (Chicago, 1961), p. 85; and see, for furtherstrictureson
Flaubert,note 27, p. 373.
12 A Rhetoricof Irony(Chicago, 1974), p. 172.

230 FREDRIC JAMESON
bookisintended, suggesting as itdoesthatthetermcanonlyrecover its

function whenrestricted to itsnarrowest andmostmanageable sense:
unfortunately, I do notreallyknowwhattodo withthisrecommenda-
tioneither, sincethetextsinquestion already existinhistoryandcannot
be wishedoutofbeingagain.
So it wouldseemthatCullerhas thelastword,inasmuchas the
climactic interview betweenFredericand MadameArnouxexistsin
writing, as a text,in spiteofits"theoretical (152) and
impossibility"
againstall attempts to assignita coherent meaning. Nothing isindeed
moreirresponsible, fromBooth'spointofview,thana scenelikethis,
whichcannotbe madetotellussomething unambiguous aboutlife;and
Culler'sexamination ofsuchself-unravelling mechanisms goesa long
waytowards explaining whythisnovelisoneofthemostfascinating|and
exasperating ofworldliterature, at one and thesametimetherichest
andtheemptiest ofbooks,oneimmense failureandatoneandthesame
time- perhapsprecisely becauseweareneverabletomakefinalsense
ofit- oneoftherarenovelstowhichonecanreturn endlesslywithout
exhausting it, a veritable summa of an
sentences, encyclopedia of
it is
everything interesting to see narrative language do.
Still,we musttakeintoaccountthepossibility thatMr. Culler's
victory may be a Pyrrhic one: for we cannot the
accept implication that
Flaubertis a kind of proto-existentialist, inventingdiabolically
meaningless objectswhich,likeDonald Barthelme's immense balloon
whichone day sags down upon Manhattan,or theindecipherable
sentient ocean of StanislawLem's Solaris,have as theirultimate
purposethetherapeutic humiliation ofthepretensions ofthehuman
mindtounderstanding. Clearly, Charles'capis notyetan objectofthis
kind,and indeed,Cullerdistanceshimselffromsuch an extreme
position, testily characterizing as "arrantnonsense" thedescription by
NathalieSarrauteofFlaubert's worksas "booksaboutnothing, almost
devoidofsubject,ridofcharacters, plotsand all theold,accessories."
(134)
Yettosayso putshisdenunciation ofFlaubertian "interpretation" in
a somewhat different light:so itdoes not seem to
quiteright dismiss, as
hedoes,VictorBrombert's readingofthelandscapeinFontainebleau,
throughwhichFrede'ricand Rosanettewanderduringthe June
massacre of1848("Thereis ironyinthosetreeswhich, ontheonehand,
join each other highup in the air likeimmense triumphalarches,andon
theotherseemto be 'fallingcolumns'. . . The politicalrevolution is
measured againstthegeological 'revolutions'.The'immobilized Titans'
remindus, in theirangrypose, of the revolutionary fervour," etc.

[quoted,Culler,p. 101]).To be sure,oncethedrivetointerpret getsout
ofhand,andwetransform all ofthesenaturalobjectsintosymbols of
history or natureor whatever, thenall of Culler'sstrictures become
applicable:yet Culler's own observationswould themselvesbe
impossible werewe notprecisely tempted byjust sucha longingfor
completemeaning.So, quotingotherremarksby Brombert on the
"feeling ofnumbness andtorpor" arousedby this scenein L'ducation
sentimentale,Cullergoeson to say:"It is as ifhehadresponded tothe
in
scene ways which seem whollyappropriate but had no other critical
proceduresfor dealing with the text except those of symbolic
interpretation.Butitis notdifficult toshowthatitis precisely through
itsresistanceto thecriticaloperations Brombert appliesthatthetext
producestheeffects whichhe discerns." Resistance, yetinvitation as
well:forif,persuaded by Culler's reasoning, we decide to read Flaubert
without anyinterpretive efforts whatsoever, thestuffing goesoutofthe
novelin a different, but equallyirremediable way. seemsmore
It
to
adequate say thatsuch passages are haunted bya symbolic meaning
whichnevercompletely cohereswiththem;and thatour practiceof
Flaubert'stext- whichcan be neither interpretationitselfnorsome
outright indifferenceto the interpretive -
process verymucha matter
is
oftransgression intheself-contradictory senseinwhichBatailleapplied
thattermto a certainkindofsexualgratification, whichmustreaffirm
thenormin whoseinfraction it findsitsownpleasure.
To put it thisway,however, is to wishto reexamine theunique
structure oftheFlaubertian text,andindeedthemoregeneral theory of
theTextwhichemerges fromit,in termsoftheircontradictions and
within a framework whichCullerdoesnotreallysupply, namely thatof
history yetitisappropriate,
itself; before doingso,toglanceatthetwist-
endingwith whichhe transforms his formalobservationsinto
considerations aboutthedeepercontent oftheseworks.Themechanism
is indeedthatofRussianFormalism, inwhichcontent is atlength seen
as theprojection of sheertechnique; and Culler'saccountofthetwo
majorthemes ofFlaubert, hisragebeforethebourgeois "stupidity" of
thepresent and hisnostalgiafora Sacredforthemostpartprojected
intothedistantpast (theexceptionis Felicite'sparrotin Un coeur
simple),ingeniously converts bothintothematisations ofthepeculiar
typeof readingdemandedby thetext.Thus,stupidity becomes"the
operation whichreduces[theworld]to surfacea and makes ita seriesof
signswithout meaning [thereby the
leaving] subject freebefore it."(179)
Andifstupidity thereby stands as the condition of possiblity thetext
of
as such,thesacredis thenseenas thehypostasis ofsomeultimate, yet

232 FREDRIC JAMESON
impossible"parole pleine"or fullinterpretive certainty: "The Zaimph

[theenigmatic sacred veil of Tanit in Salammb] remains a symbolfora
possible narrative integration which the text denies us"13.
It is to designatethisprocessof autoreferentiality thatCullerthen
usefully revives theterm allegory, now used in a hermeneutic ratherthan
a pejorativesense.For to saythatsuchsymbolicor meaning-^projective
elementsof a textare to be graspedas allegoriesofthereadingprocess
itself,or in otherwordsfiguresfortheveryattemptto interpret and to
assign textual meanings, is, it seems to me, quite a differenttype of
hypothesis fromtheratherstaticand now somewhatconventionalized
allegoricalinterpretations of theDerrida school,which,e.g., byseeing
Charles' cap as a figureof critureand textualproductivity, resultin
"certainties" no less unjustifiable and peremptory thantheotherkinds
of interpretations Culler denounces.14The advantage of his own
approach is not onlyto make visiblea whole rangeof autoreferential
phenomenaofthiskindintraditional literature (one might,forinstance,
wishto see thepreoccupationofa Proustor a Thackeraywithmemory
as justsucha disguisedcommentary on thesheerdurationofthereader's
reception of their own pages), but also to makepossiblea dialoguewith
that quite different,phenomenologicallyoriented, "hermeneutic"
school of criticismreferred to above,whosemethodshavenothitherto
seemedcompatiblewiththoseoftheFrenchor structuralizing tendency.
And it is certain that we need a more adequate account of
autoreferentiality in literaryhistorythananywhichhas previously been
given:yet as Culler's demonstration of it in Flaubert alone suggests,
withoutsome more adequate historicalframework,this particular
phenomenon- withitssuggestionofa kindofself-consciousness ofthe
textabout itselfis onlytoo easilypressedback intotheserviceofthe
old modernism/realism antinomy,to whichwe therefore returnin our
conclusion.
III.
So it is thatwe turnour attentionto thekindofhistoryprojectedby

theideologyof thetext,and theoppositionsflexedand articulatedby
thecriticalworkswe have mentioned- legiblevs. scriptible,
certainvs.
uncertain - all ultimatelyfall into place in terms of the old
modernism/ realismdispute,of whichthe "ideologyof the text"now
13 VeronicaForrest-Thomson, "The Ritual of ReadingSalammb", ModernLanguage
Review LXVII, 4 (1972), quoted by Culler,p. 223. And see, fora relatedstudy,her
"Levels in Poetic Convention",Journalof European Studies, II, 1971.
14 See Prison-House, pp. 177-183.

becomesa contemporary replay.Indeed,thenew terminology maybe
understoodas theresultofa Frenchsituationinwhich- paradoxically
enoughfortheplace in whichit originated- modernismhas borneno
particularnameas such (thewordmodernit, traditionallyused in the
senseof "moderntimes"in general,is onlynow comingto takeon this
meaning).I wantto suggestthatthisoppositionis an unsatisfactory one,
froma historicalpointof view,and thattheprematureideologicalbut
also ethicaljudgementswhichare made in its name mustbe seen as
compensationsforits structuralincapacityto do justiceto diachronic
phenomena.
But of course,fromanotherpointof view,the realism/ modernism
oppostionis usefulpreciselyin thekindofcovertdiachronicor genetic
thinkingit enables withoutdeclaringitselfas such. Thus, we may
observethatthedivisionofliterature intothesetwo starklyantithetical
tendencies (form-orientedvs. content-oriented,artistic play vs.
imitationof thereal,etc.) is dictatedby theattemptto deal adequately
withmodernism,ratherthan the otherway round(in thissense,even
Lukacs' accounts of realism are defensive,and reflecthis own
"conversion"to theearlierartisticstyle).The conceptofrealismwhich
thereby emergesis alwaysthatwithwhichmodernismhas had to break,
thatnormfromwhichmodernism is thedeviation,and so forth.It is as
though,in spiteofeverything, onlya historicaland geneticapproachto
modernism, whichleans fullyas muchon thestoryoftheemergenceof
thenewphenomenon,as on someahistoricalor synchronie description
could providetheproperaccount,forwhich,therefore,
of itsstructure,
the strawman of "realism"was formallynecessary.
The proofof this assertionmay be foundin the peculiarfactthat
wheneveryou searchfor"realism"somewhereit vanishes,forit was
nothingbut punctuation,a meremarkeror a "before"whichpermitted
thephenomenonofmodernismto comeintofocusproperly.So, as long
as the latterholds the centerof the fieldof vision,and the so-called
traditionalnovel
234 FREDRIC JAMESON
surprising to findGenette,in thearticlereferredto above, fallvictimto

thisopticalillusion:"Thusthepredominance ofthestorytellingfunction
itselfprovesto be, ifnotchallenged,at leastmenaced,in a workwhich
howeverpasses fortheveryepitomeofthe'traditionalnovel'.Another
step,and the dramaticaction will pass into the background,and the
storyline primacyto thediscourseitself:ina preludeto
lose itssignifying
thedissolutionof thenovelisticformand theemergenceofliterature in
themodernsenseof theword.FromBalzac to Proustforinstance,itis
notso faras one mightthink",etc.15Barthescannothimself go quitethis
far,sincehe pickedBalzac as an exampleofthe"traditional"inthefirst
place; yethis anatomymakes it clearjust how much of the modern
"text"is alreadyfleshand bone oftheoldernovella,and on thepointof
separatingitselffromit. It is withthe modernists, indeed,a littlelike
Goeringand theJews:theyare theones who decidewhatis modernand
whatis not,and theprivativetermofrealismis reservedforbooks they
do not happen to be interestedin at that moment(the minutethey
become interested, the modernity of thewriterin questionwillnot be
long in disclosingitself).The reasonforthisis not hardto determine:
likeso manyoppositionsofthiskind,to thenegativeor strawtermhas
been attributedeverything whichis error,illusion,and the like. The
"realists"in otherwordsare supposedto believein representationality
and thelike,itbeingunderstoodthatsucha beliefis itselfa superstition;
thus, it can be attributedto them only if, like the primitivesof
participationmystique,one does not reallybelievein theirexistence,
and as longas theyare heldto be,simply,theOther.Whentheybeginto
affirmthemselvesas our equals, thencategoriesof othernessare no
longeradequate.
It is thereforeessential to remove the ethical contentfromthis
opposition,and insofaras thehumanmindseemsparticularly inclined
- in spite of itself- to invest binaryoppositions with a moral
evaluation,this can oftenbest be done, and the binaryopposition
historicized,by adding a thirdterm,and restoringthe apparently
exclusive alternativeof realismvs. modernismto a whole series of
historicaltermsand forms.Everything changes,indeed,themomentwe
envisage a "before" to realismitself:
indeed,we havealreadysuggested
that "Sarrasine" cannot be fullyevaluated formallywithoutsome
feelingfor its value as a kind of pastiche or revival of the older
Florentineor Renaissancenovella-form (a practiceofthe"art-novella"
whichwillthenbe extensively developedthroughthenineteenth century
up to Chekhov'sdecisivebreakwithit). Ifto thiswe add a perspective in
15 "Vraisemblanceet motivation," p. 13.

whichthe storytelling formsof thefeudalage come into view,not to
speak ofthoseofprimitive ortribalsocieties,thenitbecomesdifficult to
thinkofnineteenth centuryrealism as anythingbut a uniquelyhistorical
product,one unthinkable at anyothermomentinhumanhistory;butby
the same token,this particularexpressionof a historicalbourgeoisie
forfeitsits apparent claim to some permanentfulfillment of the
of
categories bourgeoisthinking.
I would want,however,to distinguish thisviewfromthetraditional
of
antiquariantype literaryhistory: fora Marxisthistoricism, indeed,
the presuppositionis that none of these formsof the past are of
antiquarian interestalone, and that theiractualityfor us may be
demonstrated - indeed,can onlybe demonstrated- byan analysis
which juxtaposes the limits and the potentialitiesof our own
socioeconomicmomentwiththoserealizedorimposedbythesystemsof
the past. Each momentof the past (or of othercultures)has a very
special sentenceor judgmentto pass on the uniquelyreifiedworldin
whichwe ourselveslive: and the privilegeof artisticexperienceis to
furnishsomethinglike an immediatechannelthroughwhichwe may
experiencesuch implicitjudgments,and attain a fleetingglimpseof
othermodes of life.
What would such a new historicalperspectivenow do to the
ideologicaljudgmentsthe theoristsof the textfeltable to pass on the
oldertypeof"realistic"narrative?For one thing,itallows us to observe
suchjudgmentsa littlemoreclearlyat workin thelightof day, and to
distinguish betweengenuineanalysisand a kindofkneejerkapplication
of ready-madecategories.One of the most frequentof the latteris
indeedthe notionof the open work,to whichcorrespondsa similarly
moralizingvalorizationof criticalpluralism["Let us firstposit the
image of a triumphantplural, unimpoverishedby any constraintof
representation (of imitation).In thisideal text,thenetworksare many
and interact, withoutanyone ofthembeingable to surpasstherest;this
text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structureof signifieds;it has no
beginning; reversible; gainaccess to itbyseveralentrances,
itis we none
of whichcan be authoritatively declared to be the main one", etc.,
Barthes,p. 5]. Such pluralismis at best a refusalto go about the
principalcriticalbusiness of our time,which is to forgea kind of
methodologicalsynthesisfromthe multiplicityof criticalcodes; at
worst,it is just one more veiled assault on the non-pluralistic (read,
totalitarian)criticalsystems,e.g., Marxism.
As far as the work itselfis concerned,it should be observedthat
UmbertoEco's classic studyof the subject16exploredopen formas a
16 L'Oeuvre ouverte(Paris, 1965).

236 FREDRIC JAMESON
tendency towards indeterminacy intheartsas a wholeinmodern times,

without attaching anyparticular ethicalorideological superiority toits
appearance. Weneednowtoreassesssucha trendinterms ofthesocial
situationof whichit is the symptom: an atomizedsociety,whose
fragmented sub-groups andtheresultant multiplicity of"codes"inflect
itsartgradually inthedirection ofjustsuchmultipurpose objects, which
maybe translated intoa wholeseriesofdifferent private languages in
succession. Seeninthisway,therenolongerseemstobeanyparticular
motiveforideologicalpraiseor blame:rather, thisparticular formal
tendencyof modernart amountsto something like its biological
adaptation tothatnewandparticularly unfavorable environment which
is contemporary society(thisis not,however, tosaythattheconceptof
the"openform" couldnotbecomean ideological motif initsownright:
indeed,it is one of thepurposesof thepresent essayto suggestthe
contextin whichit has becomejustthat).
The principal ideologicaljudgments passedbythe"ideologyofthe
text"on its counterpart the "ideologyof realism"are, however,
elsewhere, and proveonceagainto reflect twoseparatethemesand
preoccupations of Barthes'ownwork,olderand newermotifs which
coexistinS/Z. Thefirst ofthese,whichfinds itsfullest expression inthe
Brechteanestrangement-effects of Mythologies,is what in a
characteristic neologismBarthes will denounce as naturality,
associating it with one of the mostcharacteristic strategies of the
bourgeois thought processand of thewhole bourgeois of
way rewriting
the world afterits own social and politicalvictory.Hjelmslev's
connotative methodprovesan apt instrument to detectthetendency
in
everywhere bourgeoissociety, from itsads to itsworksof art,to
transform cultureinto nature,to naturalizehistoryand social
phenomena: "The (ideological)goal ofthistechnique is to naturalize
meaning andthusto givecredence tothereality ofthestory: for(inthe
West)meaning(system), we are told,is antipathetic to natureand
Thisnaturalization
reality. is possibleonlybecausethesignificant data
released- or summoned - in a homeopathic rhythm, are carried,
borne along, by a purportedly'natural' medium,language:
paradoxically, language, theintegral system ofmeaning, isemployed to
systematize thesecondary meanings, tonaturalize theirproduction and
to authenticate thestory."(23) We havealreadyseen,above,howthe
namingsystem oflanguagefunctions precisely as justsuchan illusion
thatsocial realitiesare "natural"ones (propernamesbeingin this
respect as "natural"a taxonomicsystem as thewordsforthevarious
species). Where Barthes goes much further in his dmystification,

furnishing us therebywithan objectofstudywhichwe havenotyetseen
in quite thislightbefore,is in his account of thesentenceitselfas the
primaryvehicle for just such a profoundlyideological process of
naturalization:"thereis a forcein the sentence(linguisticentity)that
domesticatesthe artificeof the narrative,a meaningthat denies the
meaning.We mightcall thisdiacriticalelement(sinceit overhangsthe
articulationof the narrativeunits):sentencing.To put it stillanother
way:thesentenceis a naturewhosefunction- or scope - is tojustify
thecultureof thenarrative.Superimposedon thenarrativestructure,
forming it,guidingit,regulating itsrhythm, imposingon itmorphemes
of a purelygrammaticallogic,the sentenceservesas evidenceforthe
narrative. For language(inthiscase, French),bythewayitis learned(by
children),by its historicalweight,by the apparentuniversality of its
in its
conventions, short,by anteriority, seems to haveeveryright over a
contingent anecdote, one which has begunonly some twenty pages back
- whereaslanguagehas lasted forever,"
(127-128)
In manyways,however,thismissionto trackdownand to destroythe
traces of naturalityin our cultureis verymuch part of the private
thematicsof Bartheshimself("thewillto burdensignification withall
thejustification ofnatureitselfprovokesa kindofnausea,"hetellsus in
Mythologies11),and it is the other feature of the ideology of
representation - the statusof thesubject- whichhas been perhaps
more widelyexplored in recent French theory.The most graphic
dramatizationof theintimaterelationshipbetweenrepresentation and
theconceptofthesubjecthas indeedbeenmade by MichelFoucault,in
theopeningchapterof The Orderof Things,or ratherby his objectof
studyin thatchapter,Velasquez himself,in his paintingLas Meninas.
This work,bycommonagreementone ofthesummitsin themasteryof
thetechniquesof representation, is thusprofoundly exemplaryof such
representational discourse at the very moment when, transcending
itself,itbeginsto offeritsowndiagnosis:thevieweris indeedastonished
to findhimselfstandingin theplace oftheroyalsubject- PhilipIV and
his queen - whose reflections gaze back at us froma mirroron the
distantrearwallofthepaintedroom.Las Meninasthusbetraysa double
and constitutive absence: "thatof the painterand the spectatorwhen
theyare lookingat or composingthepicture.It maybe said thatin this
picture,as in all therepresentations ofwhichit maybe said to revealthe
fundamentalessence, the profoundinvisibilityof what one sees is
inseparablefromtheinvisibility ofthepersonseeing. . . Andindeed,[in
17 Mythologies(Paris, 1957),n. 7, p. 212; and comparehistriumphant descriptionofan
ideologicalanalysiscapable of"despatchingcodes, one byone, alongthestrandofthe
text,theirbetliesin the air." (100)

And one would be onlytoo inclinedto agreethatone of the
fundamental preconditions of some representational or "realistic"
narrative discourseis to be foundin thedeliberate effacement ofthe
tracesofproducer andconsumer, andthattheviewing eye,facedwith
representational discourse,has a vestedinterest in ignoring itsown
presence;yet in the polemicappropriation of thisinsightby the
realism/ modernism debate,a curiousreversal takesplaceinwhichitis
henceforth preciselyjust such a subversion of thesubjectwhichis
recommended. Hereis Barthes onwhatis exemplary, inthisrespect, in
Flaubert: "Flaubert, however . . . , working withan ironyimpregnated
withuncertainty, achievesa salutary discomfort inwriting: hedoesnot
stoptheplayofcodes(or stopsit onlypartially), so that(and thisis
indubitably themanner oproofo hiswriting) oneneverknowsifheis
responsible forwhathewrites (ifthereis a subjectbehindhis language);
forthevery beingofwriting (themeaning ofthelaborthatconstitutes it)
is to keepthequestionWhois speaking? fromeverbeinganswered."
(S/Z, 140)
Again,thecontradictions whicharisefromthestructuralist attackon
thesubjectseemto me resolvable iftheyare projectedontoa more
complicated schemeofperiodization andarticulated ina moreproperly
historical, rather than an ethical,perspective. The trouble is thatthe
attackon theold bourgeoissubjectcan taketwoforms:thatof the
attempt to dissolvethesubjectaltogether, andthatis,as weshallseein
thecase ofDeleuze,eitheran anarchist ora countercultural solution,
depending on whether "time'slividfinalflame"is conceived ofinterms
of a politicalapocalypseor a privatedrug-like fantasmagoria; or the
otherquitedifferent solutionwhichwouldconsistof renewing the
primacy of thegroup and of collective life over the bourgeoisoptical
illusionofindividual existence, andreturning toa viewoftheindividual
subjectas a functionofthecollective structure, a condition ofwhich,
the
perhaps, ethnographic descriptions of tribal existence giveus the
mostadequateglimpse.
Thesameadjustment mustbe madeintheearliermotif ofnaturality:
whatis ahistorical aboutBarthes' attackonthisparticular feature ofthe
bourgeoisWeltanschauung is theimplication thattheconceptofnature
is at all timesand everywhere inand ofitselfreactionary. Butclearly,
therehavebeenmoments - thepreparation ofthebourgeois revolution
itselfandtheattackonthe"artificiality" ofthefeudalorder- inwhich
theconcept ofnature hasbeena profoundly subversive andcontestatory
weapon;andclearly, theonlydialectical wayofevaluating sucha motif
isthrough analysisofitsfunction ina givenhistorical situation. Nothing

240 FREDRIC JAMESON
is, indeed,moreidealisticthanthenotionthata giventhought-form

(representationality, forinstance, or thebeliefin thesubjectorinthe
is
referent) always and under all circumstances "bourgeois"and
ideological, for such a position- which seems to me thatoftheTelQuel
group,among others - tendsprecisely to isolate the form ofthought (or
its equivalent, theformof discourse)fromthatpracticalcontextin
whichaloneitsresults can be measured. Ideologies cantherefore never
be evaluatedindependently of theirfunctionin a givenhistorical
situation: witness, fora dramaticexampleof thisassertion, Koyre's
demonstration oftheprogressive character of Galileo'sPlatonism, as
opposedto the apparently farmorerealisticand evenmaterialistic
Aristotelianism ofhiscontemporaries and immediate predecessors.20
A Marxistframework, to be sure,substitutes, forthestructuralist
oppositionbetweennatureand culture,the more dialecticaland
diachronic one ofan opposition between natureandhistory, yeteven
heretheideological character of"nature" isbynomeansunequivocal, as
maybe observedin theworksoftheverywriter fromwhomBarthes
himself firstdrewhis suspicionof naturality, as wellas theliterary
instruments bywhichtodenounce it,namely Brecht himself.Forevenin
theBrechtian canon,thereisa decidedalternation between playswhich,
likeMann ist Mann or The Good Womanof Sezuan,unmaskthe
historicaland constructed originsofseemingly naturalattributes like
aggressivity oracquisitiveness, andtheemphasis, inMotherCourage, of
theunnatural character oftheseemingly only-too-natural drivetomake
a profit(thisun-Brechtian reversal wouldthengo a longwaystowards
explaining thepeculiarand ambiguousstatusofthelatterplayinthe
writer'swork).Thereisindeeda powerful tradition ofwhatI willcallthe
naturistic strategy in Marxism itself, goingback as faras the
one
Economicand Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844,whichwiththeir
emphasis on a speciesbeing,argue, if not for a fixedand immutable
humannaturein the right-wing sense, then certainlyforjudgments
basedon a notionofhumanpotential; ofwhichtheydemonstrate the
contemporary alienation; while a communist literatureno lesspowerful
thanthatof Brecht- I'm thinking of the novelsof Paul Nizan,
particularly Antoine Bloye- drawsitsforcefrom justsucha rhetoric of
thenaturaland theunnatural. Meanwhile, therearesigns,particularly
intheworkofHerbert Marcuse,thatinourownpeculiarly anti-natural
society,the conceptof naturemayonce again recoversomeof its
negative and criticalvirulence as an offensive weaponand a Utopian
standard.
20 See "Galileo and Plato," in A. Koyre,Metaphysicsand Measurement,(Cambridge,
1968).

But if the diagnoses whichtext-oriented criticshave made of the
ideology of realismas a discourse are thus open to criticismof a more
genuinely historical
kind, thesame must be said oftheirapologia forthe
othertermof the antithesis,or for that textualitywhichis only the
currentpost-modernist formof modernismitself.Mr. Culler'sversion
of the latter'semergenceis less apocalypticthan thatof Barthes,for
whomtheessenceofthescriptible(or fullymodernistic) textis precisely
thatone can no longersay anythingabout itat all, butmerelyproduce
one's own textin emulation,forwhomtherefore thecriticalact,notto
speak of the interpretive one, becomes superfluous,and withit, one
would think,any possibilityof literaryhistoryitself.Culler,however,
offersa historicalparadigmbased on theincreasingdoubtthroughout
thenineteenth centurywhichis cast on that"basic enablingconvention
of thenovelas genre"whichis the"confidencein thetransparency and
representative of
power language."(80) When a writer like Baudelaireor
Flaubertbecomes "self-conscious",or in otherwords,"aware of his
imagesas interpretations, ofhiswordsnotas thefurniture oftheworld
but as devices which, at least for the moment of this particular
perspective,are being used to communicateends", then the older
literary discourseentersa crisisofwhichmodernism can onlybe theend
result; and Culler'stransgressive Flaubert, undermining interpretation
evenas he solicitsit,maybe seenas a strategic half-way houseon sucha
path.
What troublesme about this particularview of the historyand
developmentof modernism- a viewwhichin one formor anotheris
very widelyshared - is that, by associating modernismand self-
consciousness(albeit of a dialecticaland Hegelian type),it tendsto
suggestthat the new developmentis merelythe functionof long
duration,of some excess of literature,some extremedead weightof
literarytextsand disabused sophisticationof literarypractice,which
ultimatelyresultin the reversalof a kind of comingto awarenessby
literatureof itself.It seemsto me,forexample,symptomatic thatMr.
Cullersystematically avoidsanyperspective whichwouldforcehiminto
a discussion of the relationshipbetween the new raw materialof
Flaubert'sidees reuesand the beginningsaturationof a commodity
societywithcommercialwritingand messagesof all kinds:to helphim
avoid suchan overtsociologicalperspective is indeedtheotherand less
admirablefunctionof his allegoricalreadingof thethemeof stupidity
(see above). Even morestriking is hischaracterization ofsomething like
a nascent sociological perceptionby Flaubert himselfas "Madame
Bovary? s greatestflaw.Ifthereis anything thatjustifiesour findingthe

242 FREDRIC JAMESON
novellimitedand tendentiousit is theseriousnesswithwhichEmma's

corruptionis attributed to novelsand romances.Ifthisis an attemptto
diagnose Emma's condition,to characterizeher alienation,and to
explainherfate,it is a singularly feebleone." (146) Cullertherebycuts
himselfofffromwhatwould seemthemostpromisingarea in whichto
linkwhatthe Russian Formalistscalled the"literarysystem"withthe
other,mostproximatesemi-autonomous "systems"ofdailylife,suchas
those- stillverbalones - ofwhatwewouldtodaycall popularculture
or the media.21
Realism and modernismmustfinallyeach be seen as specificand
determinatehistorical expressions of the type of socio-economic
structures to whichtheycorrespond,namelyclassical capitalismand
consumercapitalismrespectively. This is not the place to give a full
solution to the problem,from a point of view both Marxist and
historicist;yetit is certainlythe momentto square accountswiththe
ideologyof modernismwhichhas givenits titleto the presentessay.
That consumercapitalismshouldsecretemodernism as itsby-product is
in otherwordsa perfectly comprehensiblehistoricalphenomenonof
whichan analysiscan be madeinitsownright;whatdemandscorrection
are the claimsmade by theapologistsof modernismin behalfof their
product,and thesemaybe said to operateas a peculiarreversalofwhat
above we called theWhorfhypothesis, namelytheidea thatstylistic or
linguistic traits reflect epistemological or ideological ones. For
modernism- radical in its rejectionof realisticdiscourseand of the
bourgeoisworldto whichthelattercorresponds- imaginesthatifyou
alterthestructure of artisticdiscoursein a decisiveway,therealitiesto
whichit correspondswill findthemselvestherebysimilarlymodified.
Thus,ifseeingtheworldthroughtheold "bourgeois"categoriesis bad, a
changeinstylewillhelpus to see theworldina newwayand thusachieve
a kindof culturalor countercultural revolutionof its own. And to be
sure, if consumercapitalismwere a new and qualitativelydistinct
socioeconomic form in its own right,as many have maintained,
somethinglike this would presumablybe conceivable,and we would
expectthenew social formin timeto generateitsowndistinctive kinds
ofartisticdiscourse,and to leavetherealisticonesbehinditlikeso many
dead husks,as antiquatedand archaicas thechansonde geste,primitive
rituals, or Greek tragedy. But what is peculiar about consumer
capitalism is that it is merelya second-degreeconstructionupon
classical capitalism itself,the latter continuingin a paradoxical
coexistence with it, the fundamentallaws of classical capitialism
21 See Prison-House, pp. 93-95.

(codifiedbyMarx)operative froma globalperspective whileseemingly
invalidated and outmoded ifonelooksat themwithin thelimitsofthe
nationalexperience of a singleadvancedcountry.So it is thatwe
continue to walktheolderworldofeveryday lifeofclassicalcapitalism
while our heads move about in the apparentlyquite different
hallucinogenic atmosphere ofthemediaandthesupermarket/ suburb;
thefirstoftheserealities, notunliketheLacaniansignified, is repressed
as faras possibleunderthesecond,drivenunderthecrossbarofthe
semioticfraction,into somethingwhich is not altogetheran
unconscious. Thisis whyourart,thatofmodernism, is nota newthing
initself,butrather something likea cancelled realism, a realismdenied
and negatedand aufgehoben ingenuinely Hegelianfashion; what
and
wedo withtheworksthatshowthefunctioning ofallofthoserealities of
capitalism which - wage slavery,money,exploitation, profit the
motive- havenotchangedsubstantially sincethetimeofthegreat
naturalistsis - sincetheycannotbe saidtobeuntrue - todecreethat
are
they boring and old-fashioned. But hereboredom is thesignofwhat
is tobe repressed, andthisautomatic andindeedvisceral reaction tothe
older art formsbetraysthe origin of modernismitselfin an
aestheticizing reactionagainst the sordid realitiesof a business
civilization,aboutwhichwe wouldprefernot evento haveourart
remind us. So thedeathofthereferent hasbeengreatly exaggerated; at
best,it has onlygoneunderground.
Underthesecircumstances, thereare fewenoughversionsof the
modernist apologiaconsequent enoughto standthetest.Letus recall
Gombrich's lesson,as a wayofradicalizing theliterary versionofthis
particular dilemma:in thevisualarts,a kindofabsoluteor Zenonic
formulation of the problemwas reachedby askingwhetherthe
destruction ofperspective bymodern andtheirreturn
painters, totwo-
dimensionality, couldbe imaginedas affecting in anywaythethree-
dimensional experience of everyday lifeoftheircontemporaries. The
appealto livedperspective, liketheappealtothehardsciences, is tobe
surean apparently decisiveargument, comparableto Dr. Johnson's
appeal to the stone; and in the
literature, equivalent argument mayseem
less binding.For the literaryequivalentof the phenomenon of
perspective - we have implied as much these
throughout pages without
as yetsayingso outright - is surely narrative itself.Gombrich indeed
seesan intimate linkbetween thedevelopment ofnaturalistictechniques
in painting and therequirements ofstorytelling;whilethemodernist
attackon realismin literature was at onewithitsrepudiation ofplot,
and Barthes'fluoroscopy ofthetexthas beenusefulinimplying some

244 FREDRIC JAMESON
ofthereasons(operationofthe proairetic schemata,organization of
plot aroundenigmasand discoveries, naturality of the narrative
sentence,dependence ofnarrative discourse onsometypeofeffacement
ofthesubject)whythisshouldhavebeenso.
A fundamental workof thenewerphilology, indeed,confirms the
analogybetween narrative andperspective bysuggesting thatthevery
structure of languageitselfshowsa deep functional vocationfor
which
storytelling, must then be seen,not as some secondary pastime, to
bepursued aroundthefireside whenpraxisis over,butrather as a basic
and constitutive elementof humanlife.HaroldWeinrich's Tempus
(Stuttgart,1964)proposesa comprehensive resolution of thevexed
problem ofverbtensesthrough whichtheyaresystematically sortedout
intonarrative andwhathecalls"discussive" {besprechend) tenses,those
of storytelling (where events have become closed off and maybe
contemplated at a distance, in themselves) and those of an active
relationshipto the world in which we must ourselvesbe drawn into the
contextalongwithourlisteners andourreferents. Ifsucha picture of
language wins conviction, it can the
onlyintensify peculiarity a of
spectaclein which modernist writers seekto amputatelanguageofa
good halfofitsessentialorgans,to suppressone wholedimension of
and literary
linguistic experience.
Weinrich, likeGombrich, is resolutelyanti-Whorfian, andrepudiates
theidea thata changein language,anymorethana changein style,
resultsfrom- letalonecauses- a changein ourphenomenological
experience oftheexternal world.Thisskepticism tendstoforcebothof
thembackintoa relativley conservative viewofliterature, involving the
defenseof convention (of theschemata, ofthestructure ofnarrative
tenses)inandforitself, a roaddownwhichwewillnotfollowthem.We
arehowever fortunate inhavingat ourdisposition a counter-exhibit, a
ratherastonishing documentwhichpushesto itsultimate limitsthe
modernistic ortextualpositionwhichhas beenoutlined above.Thisis
theglorification ofschizophrenia (and of the schizophrenic as the"true
heroofdesire")to be foundin Deleuzeand Guattari's Anti-Oedipus:
Capitalismand Schizophrenia(Paris, 1972, Englishtranslation
forthcoming Winter, 1976),wherethefinalstepis takenanditis asked
oflifeitselfand oflivedexperience thatitconform to theaccountwe
havegivenof thetext.For Deleuzeand Guattariessentially follow
Lacan's description ofschizophrenia as a diseaseoflanguageinwhich
connections havebrokendown:continuity in speech,forLacan,is a
function ofwhathe callstheslippageofsignifieds ("le glissement des
orinotherwords,thatrelative
signifies"), semantic fluxwhichallowsus

to disconnecta meaningfromone word or signifier and attachitto its
synonym. For Lacan, indeed,theworldoftheschizophrenic is quitethe
oppositeof meaningless:ifanything, itis too meaningful; each instant,
like each signifier,is a closed and fullmeaningin itself,fromwhichit
becomesincreasingly difficultto laya bridgeto thesubsequentmoment
of time.So theschizophrenic's realitygraduallycomesto approximate
the Flaubertiantextas Mr. Cullerdescribesit,a formalor syntactical
succession throughtime which does not correspond to any real
progression or perspective at thelevelofitsmeaningsor signifieds. Here
also theultimateimplicationsof Barthes'critiqueoftheproaireticcode
are fulfilled:thereare no longerany names! and theold conventional
wordsand unitieshave beensweptawayina fluxofexperienceinwhich
everything is bydefinition alwaysnew.And no doubt,thereis a sensein
whichit can onlybe a reliefto findone's selfliberatedfromtheall-too-
familiar continuitiesof ordinary representationalor "realistic",
referentialliving:the analogous effectof drugsis in no smallmeasure
also linkedto just thisabolitionofthelogic oftimewhichreleaseseach
instant, and the object in it, to glow and radiate a kind of
undifferentiated and autonomousenergy.We shouldalso mentionthe
historicalcontextin whichDeleuze and Guattari'sbook became, in
France,a kind of manifesto:thatwidespreaddisillusionment withthe
CommunistPartyamong studentsand intellectualsafterthefailureof
May '68, which predictablydrove so many of them across the still
politicalpositionsofgauchismeor anarchismintowhatin thiscountry
we wouldcall a depoliticizedcounterculture, ofwhichtheAnti-Oedipus
is one ofthebasic texts.Still,as theSurrealistsdiscoveredina situation
whichbore some similarities to thisone, it is probablyeasierto praise
madnessthanto practiceit; and one does notbecomea schizophrenic,
no matterhow heroican act that would be, simplyby the takingof
thought.
Deleuze and Guattari'sposition,indeed,may be seen as the most
extremeworkingout ofthatCartesianmaximfromwhichall bourgeois
subjectivismmay be said to spring:"alwaysto seek to conquermyself
ratherthan fortune,to changemydesiresratherthan the established
order,and generallyto believe that nothingexcept our thoughtsis
whollyunderour control. . ."22The illusionof freedomand creativity
enjoyed by the earlymodernistswas a functionof theirtransitional
momentin socioeconomichistory,a momentin whichfeaturesof the
newconsumereconomy,theso-calledsecondindustrialrevolution, had
begun to supercedethose of older classical or Balzacian capitalism.
22 Descartes,Discourse on Method,Part III (New York, 1960),p. 20.

246 FREDRIC JAMESON
Today,however,whenmodernism nolongerrepresentsthisconquestof
new material,but has ratherintegrated itselfinto an economy
functionally
dependent on itforitsindispensable
fashionchangesand
fortheperpetual
resupplyingofa media artists
culture, andwriterswho
wantto changetheirstyles
may well onceagaincome to the conclusion
thattheymustfirstchangetheworld.


The Ideology of The Text

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The Ideology of The Text

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The Ideology of The Text

Author(s): FREDRIC JAMESON

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All thestrawsin thewindseemto confirm thewide-spread feeling

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"facts"backintosemanticor syntactic components of thetexthe is

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forhisvirtuoso practice ofcriticalmethods wascontemporaneous with

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anynumber ofother, analogousdetailswouldhavedonejustas well;or

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photographs, relativelyvisualoppositions, facesandsoforth) suggests a

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however, I willherelimitmyself to thein anycase farmorecentral

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situationofthemodern Gesellschaft, wespeakoftheproliferation orthe

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oftheordinary gestural and circumstantial unitiesofeveryday life-

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hadseemedto drawin making hisfirst point:herethetarget iswhathe

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Flaubert is inanycasethehistorical fountainhead ofan aesthetics of

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sentences is nowshownby Cullerto be analogousto thatsoughtby

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bookisintended, suggesting as itdoesthatthetermcanonlyrecover its

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impossible"parole pleine"or fullinterpretive certainty: "The Zaimph

So it is thatwe turnour attentionto thekindofhistoryprojectedby

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surprising to findGenette,in thearticlereferredto above, fallvictimto

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tendency towards indeterminacy intheartsas a wholeinmodern times,

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is, indeed,moreidealisticthanthenotionthata giventhought-form

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novellimitedand tendentiousit is theseriousnesswithwhichEmma's

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