Prohibited Transactions

Prohibited Transactions
Author(s): ALVIN D. LURIE

Source: The Business Lawyer, Vol. 31, Proceedings: ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE: "Fiduciary
Responsibilities Under The Pension Reform Act, May 30-31, 1975" (October 1975), pp. 131-
141
Published by: American Bar Association
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Prohibited Transactions
By ALVIN D. LURIE*
This is for me a particularly delightful occasion, a special occasion I would

say. For me to come back to New York City is always a special occasion, and
to mark the occasion I will invoke a now-vanishing custom of delivering a
special piece, a special occasion piece, that I have composed for the occasion:
In New York's sunny clime, where I used to spend my time, mainly

in the practice of the law,
Prohibited transactions were occasional distractions from the daily
occupation of this lawyer.
It is not the same old story since I moved to Washington to become an
1RS Commissioner.
Yesterday's distraction has become the main attraction, as I cope with
this new law called ERISA.
For the month or two just past, if you could see my log,
it's the tail that has quite clearly wagged the dog.
It is difficult to say which of the provisions of ERISA has had the greatest
impact on employee benefit plans, but certainly none affects more the day-
to-day decisions than those relating to the so-called prohibited transactions,
and none has received more attention.
The new prohibited transaction rules have already precipitated a Congres-
sional hearing, just scarcely a month ago, and brought the first serious threat
of legislative overhaul of ERISA.
Provisions relating to self-dealing transactions appear in both Title I and
Title II, thus imposing corresponding and generally overlapping, but not
similar, responsibilities on both the Department of Labor and the Internal
Revenue Service. Probably no single set of provisions of ERISA has im-
posed a greater burden on either of these agencies than the prohibited transac-
tion rules. Certainly none has thrust the two agencies together into more
concerted action. Indeed, in development of interim interpretations and
exemptions, procedural regulations, and announcement for the Federal
Register, our two agencies have worked as one, in an unprecedented and, to
many, unbelievable fashion.
This partnership, I can assure you, will draw even closer in the coming
months.
What are these new provisions that are causing all the fuss? As I have
already noted, there are actually two different provisions, one appearing in
Assistant Commissioner (Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations), Internal

Revenue Service.
131
132 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 31, October 1975
Title I, where certain transactions are flat-out prohibited, with enforcement

duties devolving upon the Department of Labor, and with further sanctions
of civil liability at the suit of third parties.
The other appears in Title II, which amended the Internal Revenue Code
to replace the former sanction (which was tax disqualification of a retirement
trust which engaged in a prohibited transaction) with what we now have - a
two-level, nondeductible excise tax.
Statutorily identified categories of "disqualified persons" (which are for
all practical purposes, the same thing as "parties in interest" in Title I) are
the focal point of our Title II sanctions. A disqualified person who partici-
pates in any of a vastly expanded list of prohibited transactions is liable for
an initial, or first level, annual excise tax of 5 percent of the amount involved
in the transaction, in the year in which the transaction occurred and each year
thereafter that it is not corrected until the mailing of a notice of deficiency
at which time a second level tax of 100 percent is imposed, if the transaction
has not been corrected. Hardly a tax, you might say!
Thus section 4975 of the Internal Revenue Code places the onus for non-
compliance, that is, the liability for the excise tax, where it belongs: not on the
plan or its participants, but on the self-dealing trustee or other disqualified
persons.
The fiduciary liability rules of Title I of the Act also spare the plan and its
participants. Title I, however, imposes its sanctions against the trustee, not
the party in interest or disqualified person. As we have seen, of course, th
Labor sanctions do not involve excise taxes, but principally civil liabilities
for misfeasance by the trustee who acts knowingly, as well as other enforce-
ment remedies, including removal of the erring trustee.
It is readily apparent, let me say, that after only several months of opera-
tion, the prohibited transactions rules have had the effect of instilling
heightened awareness and a much greater sense of responsibility on those
persons who engage in business transactions with, and on behalf of, employee
benefit plans.
To put it quite plainly, the new rules have scared the living daylights out
of everyone caught in their net!
In the last days of December, 1974, there was sudden consternation among-
stock brokers, insurance agents and brokers, and pension consultants, that
they would be totally paralyzed as industries, come January 1, 1975, which
was the date the prohibited transaction rules of the new law took hold.
These people read the definitions of "party in interest," "disqualified per-
son," "fiduciary," and were justifiably fearful that their activities might fit
them into one or more, perhaps all, of these categories, with the result, for
example, in the case of insurance brokers, that their very right to receive
commissions on insurance sales to pension plans might be in jeopardy, or, at
least, that their advising employers with respect to the adoption of plans, or
their operation, might be proscribed.
Prohibited Transactions 133
It was even feared that their mere advising with respect to the different
insurance products available for the funding of the plans alone even without
the rendering of any other service or advice, might bar such broker's sales of
insurance to the plan, an odd result, of course.
Equally grave fears struck the hearts of the stock brokerage fraternity.
For them, the very real possibility existed that brokers who were dealers in
securities, trading as principals of a plan in transactions involving their own
portfolio securities, could no longer render investment advice or, perhaps,
even perform brokerage services to the plan, or, alternatively, they might
have to stop selling to the plans, and at least one major brokerage firm did
that for four unbelievable days in January.
Multi-employer plan administrators and trustees found themselves with
another set of quandries, and these, I must say, have been occupying great
chunks of time at Labor and 1RS these past several weeks, and, indeed, well
before that.
These multi-employer plans have been regularly engaged in certain activi-
ties that would appear to be prohibited; for example: deferred payment
arrangements for delinquent contributors, namely, the employers; construc-
tion loans to participating employers for the principal objective of creating
jobs for the very participants of these plans that the employer employed.
Let me say that Labor and we, this very morning, at 10:08 A.M. for those
of you who have an historical turn of mind, filed with the Federal Register
proposed exemptions to cover these and other transactions. These proposed
exemptions will, I expect, appear in the Federal Register Monday.
We have obviously been made very much aware of the legitimate concerns
caused by these new provisions. We have attempted to provide swift answers
where we could, although I fear, not swift enough to satisfy some of you.
In response to numerous inquiries from various sectors of industry, the
1RS and Labor, just before the new prohibited transaction rules became ef-
fective on January 1, issued a technical release outlining and clarifying the
scope of the statutory transitional rule which postpones until mid-1977 the
effective date of the provisions prohibiting the furnishing of services between
a disqualified person and an employee plan.
We announced that if certain statutory grandfather conditions of the Act
were met, the securities broker-dealer, for example, who renders investment
advice to a plan for a fee, thereby possibly becoming a fiduciary, may never-
theless continue to furnish other services to the plan, such as brokerage
services, and, what is obviously more important, receive compensation for
same.
Similarly, until June 30, 1977, a pension plan consultant wh

a fiduciary because of consultative and administrative services
plan, may receive brokerage commissions for insurance sold to
That is the so-called statutory transitional rule. But transitional
I think it will help if I place the new provisions in some historica
Many who have been stunned by their impact, who perhaps still do not know
what hit them, may at least get a better idea of where it came from.
Congress first took up the problems of prohibited transactions in 1950 in
regard to abuses involving educational, charitable, and other similar exempt
organizations. Its study of the operations of exempt charities and other
organizations revealed a number of cases where it appeared that donors of
trusts and foundations either had derived, or at least had the opportunity to
derive, substantial benefits from their dealings with charitable trusts or
foundations, at the expense of the foundations themselves and, of course, at
the expense of the public, who were the objects of bounty of these founda-
tions.
Instances included the sale of securities to or purchases of securities from
the trust or foundation at prices damaging to the foundation; also, borrowing
from the exempt organization with the payment of abnormally low interest
rates by the donor, or the assumption of abnormal risks by the exempt
organization (for example, inadequate security). Also, the payment of ex-
cessive salaries to the donor or a member of his family, as an official of the
trust or foundation, or rendering of services to the donor or his affiliates on a
preferential basis.
To check these abuses, Congress in 1950 denied tax exemptions to other-
wise exempt charitable organizations engaging in such prohibited transac-
tions.
Qualified employees' trusts, on the other hand, continued to be free of these
restraints. They could, for example, invest their funds to the extent per-
mitted by the trust instrument, consistent with local law, and all that was
required for qualification purposes in this respect was that investments not
be inconsistent with the exclusive benefit rule, which has been discussed many
times this morning, the rule, of course, that dictates an exempt employee
trust must be part of a plan for the exclusive benefit of employees.
The guide to qualification plans, Pub. 778, part 2(k) cautioned, for
example, that the primary purposes of benefiting employees or the bene-
ficiaries must be maintained with respect to the investment of the trust funds.
And for this purpose, the guide spelled out certain requisites relating to
cost, that is, a fair market value test, a fair return, sufficient liquidity, diver-
sity (here invoking a "prudent investor" test). But upon compliance with
these requisites, if the trust instrument and local law permitted, even invest-
ments in the stock or securities of the employer were permitted.
But there came to be known to the Congress many cases of abuse of trust
funds. For example, to stave off the bankruptcy of an insolvent employer, to
create an artificial market in company stock to the benefit of officers and
shareholders, to make a loan at a nominal rate of interest to the trustee share-
holder who, in turn, loaned the funds to the employer corporation at much
higher prevailing rates, pocketing the difference; to buy the company's cats
and dogs.
In an effort to curtail these activities, Congress acted in 1954, in the em-

ployee plan area, to restrict these investments of employee trusts, and to
otherwise circumscribe trustees' actions by extending to pension plans the
provisions of the 1939 Code which had previously, in 1950, denied exemp-
tion in case of prohibited transactions to certain exempt charitable and other
organizations.
Under the prohibited transaction rule that obtained until this past year end,
December 1974, a qualified employees' trust lost its exemption if it engaged
in any of six types of proscribed transactions with the employer, or related or
controlled interests consisting of - and I won't recite the full litany, since
this is prior law with which, I will assume, you are all completely familiar -
the loan of trust funds without the receipt of adequate security, payment of
compensation in excess of a reasonable allowance, making services available
on a preferential basis, and so on.
I might note in passing that these rules were partially ameliorated in 1958.
The rule, for example, requiring adequate security for loans from trust funds
was found to be too restrictive, and the 1958 Congress relaxed that some.
Now, on the surface, the investment restrictions would appear to have
taken care of improvident loans to trust funds, purchases of employer's
securities, and the other disadvantageous dealings with the employer or re-
lated controlled interests.
The penalty for engaging in the prohibited transaction, however, often
turned out to be punishment of the victim, that is, the employee participants,
rather than the perpetrator of a wrongful act. Indeed, the employer often
even obtained his deduction, since exemption usually was not lost until the
year after notice was issued by 1RS, and if a carry-over was available, it
could even be absorbed in a year in which the trust was not exempt.
On the other hand, loss of exemption deprived employees of this whole
galaxy of special tax advantages which have been identified as the "quintes-
sential tax shelter." The employee lost that tax shelter.
The conviction thus grew that the prohibited transaction rule did not fill
the bill. Other remedies against prohibited transactions were sought. Here
again, charitable exempt organizations led the way. In 1969 a series of excise
taxes had been imposed on private foundations, based upon investment in-
come, self-dealing, failure to pay out, excess business holdings, et cetera.
Of this group, the Chapter 42, excise taxes on private foundations, it is
the self-dealing excise tax that here commands my attention. The self-dealing
provisions which were applied to exempt organizations in 1969, while aimed
at similar kinds of prohibited transactions to those which had previously been
identified, were very different from the activities proscribed under prior law.
The old rule had involved mainly overreaching. Excess consideration paid,
inadequate consideration received, excess compensation, under-secured
loans, preferential services, et cetera.
The new rules adopted for private foundations, on the other hand, were
essentially no-fault, or at least no harm. Certain transactions were out-and-

out prohibited without reference to actual damage to the foundation. For
example, sales, leases, loans between a private foundation and its founder
were absolutely forbidden.
The explanation by the Joint Committee staff of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, particularly in respect of the self -dealing provisions, is very instructive,
and I quote loosely from that explanation. "The Act removes private
foundations" - these are direct quotes essentially - "The Act removes private
foundations from the present arm's length self-dealing requirements and, in
place of those limitations, prohibits self-dealing. . . . Arm's length standards
have proved to require disproportionately great enforcement efforts, result-
ing in sporadic and uncertain effectiveness of the provisions. On occasions
the sanctions are ineffective and tend to discourage the expenditure of en-
forcement effort.
"On the other hand, in many cases, the sanctions are so great in com-
parison to the offense involved, that they cause reluctance in enforcement."
Yes, indeed, tax examiners sometimes have a heart, as some of you may
have found. Going on with the quote "Also indeed, it required an element
of great subjectivity in applying arm's length standards. Where the Internal
Revenue Service does seek to apply sanctions in such circumstances, the same
factors encourage extensive litigation and noticeable reluctance by the courts
to uphold severe sanctions.
"... Congress concluded that compliance with arm's length standards
often does not, in itself, prevent the use of a private foundation to improperly
benefit those who control the foundation. ...
"To minimize the need to apply subjective arm's length standards, to
avoid the temptation to misuse private foundations for non-charitable pur-
poses, to provide a more rational relationship between sanctions and im-
proper act, and to make it more practical to properly enforce the law, the
Act," and I speak now of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 that related, re-
member, to private foundations, not to employee plans, "the Act generally
prohibits self-dealing transactions and provides a variety and graduation of
sanctions, such as were described in the Act.
"This was based on the belief by Congress," and here a direct quote, "that
the highest fiduciary standards require complete elimination of all self-
dealing, rather than arm's length standards."
Now, that brings us down to the hearings, the pension reform hearings
and the pension reform legislation that ultimately evolved into the enactment
of ERISA in 1975.
A simple approach would have been to extend the excise taxes for charita-
ble foundations to prohibited transactions intact where employees' trusts
were involved. However, in ERISA Congress went much further.
It first spelled out in Title I fiduciary responsibility rules, which lean
heavily, as you have heard and as you knew before you came here this
morning, on the common law prudent man rule, and then adopted but sub-
stantially expanded the prohibited transaction rules which had been applied
to exempt organizations under the enforcement jurisdiction, in the case of
Title I, of the Department of Labor which, of course, had no role in the
private foundation area. Concurrently, in Title II, Congress subjected es-
sentially the same prohibited transactions to excise taxes under the taxing
jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service.
The prohibited transaction provisions of both Title I and II have proved,
of course, to be the real attention getters of this Act, since these provisions
absolutely bar, in some cases, transactions that had customarily been engaged
in by retirement plans. These transactions are stopped without regard to
demonstrated loss, or even detriment to the plan, in the particular case.
Now, prohibited transactions are defined, both for Title I and Title II
purposes, in essentially the same manner; Title I being slightly broader, and
if time permits I will indicate some of that broader application of the defini-
tion in Title I, and four of the six prohibited transactions in Titles I and II
also match verbatim the prohibited transaction rules for exempt private
foundations, those that related to sale, exchange, or leasing of property be-
tween a plan and a disqualified person, the loan of money or other extension
of credit between the plan and disqualified persons, furnishing of goods,
services and facilities between the plan and disqualified persons, and the
transfer to, or use by or for benefit of, the disqualified persons of assets of the
plan.
Two new provisions, however, two new classifications of transactions,
were spelled out for the first time in ERISA, which cover cases where the
disqualified person is a fiduciary; namely, cases where the disqualified per-
son who is a fiduciary deals with the assets or income of a plan in his own
interests or for his own account - that was one. The other was the receipt of
any consideration for his own personal account by any disqualified person
who is a fiduciary from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a
transaction involving income or assets of the plan.
Now, Title I is slightly broader than these provisions which I have just
mentioned, which are the Title II provisions. It prohibits certain transac-
tions which are not, in fact, subject to tax under Title II. First, the general
category involving a person who is a fiduciary. It enjoins him from perform-
ing any actions on behalf of a party with adverse interests to those of the plan.
For example, it has been frequently asked by many of you whether a lawyer
for the employer, who is also a trustee of the employer's pension plan, would
be in this category if he is involved in dealings between the employer and the
plan, and I hope that I can tell you with confidence that some announcement
may be expected in this area very soon, by way of interpretive action.
There are also certain specific kinds of transactions which are expressly
barred under certain circumstances in Title I, but do not attract tax under
Title II, unless also falling into one of the expressly proscribed categories, and
here I have reference to the provisions of section 407 of the Act that bar
the purchase of so-called qualified employer securities or qualified employer
real estate, under certain tight constraints involving limitations on the amount
and, in some cases, on the kind of real estate that may be purchased. I will
say no more about that. There is enough else that I have to talk about in a
limited time.
The whole spectrum of prohibited transaction rules is essentially the same,
you can see, for private foundations and for pension plans, but with one quite
significant difference. There is nothing quite like the prohibitions involving
fiduciary transactions in the private f oundation area, nothing quite like that.
This set of fiduciary provisions concerning cases where the fiduciary deals
wjth the plan for his own benefit, for example, or receives consideration from
a third party dealing with the plan, significantly changed the reach and
texture of the new employee plan rules from the private foundation rules on
which they were modeled.
Quite apart from this, one must not be deceived by the apparent sim-
ilarity of the self-dealing rules for exempt oprganizations and the prohibited
transaction rules for employee plans. There is a very fundamental difference,
as you have all come to realize all too well, in the size of the universe that the
new rules reach.
The self -dealing rules for private foundations were essentially confined to
large contributors and foundation managers; that is, persons occupying a
control position with respect to the foundation; whereas the prohibited
transaction rules for employee plans are broad enough to reach persons with
only peripheral or tangential business contacts with the employee plan.
The classes of disqualified persons (or parties in interest under the Title I
designation) include, besides the kind of persons who stand in similar rela-
tionship to an employee plan that these control groups stand in in relation to
a private foundation - the new rules include, in addition, all persons who
exercise any discretionary role in the management of a plan or its assets, or
who exercise any discretion in the administration of a plan, or who give, or
just even have the authority to give, investment advice to the plan, whether
compensated directly or indirectly; and here's the real sleeper, those who
merely provide services to the plan.
Now, whom among your clients have I not just described? That gives you
some idea of the reach of the Statute, obviously. In the few remaining minutes,
I will discuss essentially the taxing rules of Title II, but it is useful first to
establish some of the differences between Titles I and II.
Under the Labor Title, as I indicated before, the fiduciary is the main focus
of the prohibited transaction rule. This corresponds to the traditional focus
of trust law, with its civil enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities through
the court. On the other hand, the tax provisions of Title II focus on the dis-
qualified person, which also corresponds to the present prohibited transac-
tion provisions relating to private foundations.
Now, essentially what this means is that whatever a fiduciary is barred

from doing under Title I brings a tax on the disqualified person who engages
in the transaction under Title II, and these are obviously not the same people,
except in those instances in which the fiduciary himself is engaging in the
transaction pro se, and then he becomes a disqualified person in his own
right, not merely by virtue of being a fiduciary, but by virtue of being a person
engaging in one of these proscribed categories of activities that make a person
a disqualified person.
Now, as we have seen, the prohibited transactions and the exceptions
therefrom are nearly identical in the Labor and Tax provisions. However,
the Labor and Tax provisions differ somewhat in establishing liability for the
violation.
Under the Labor provisions, a fiduciary will only be liable if he knew, or
should have known, that he engaged in a prohibited transaction. Such a
knowledge requirement, however, is not included in the Tax provisions, and
the disqualified person may indeed be subject to the tax irrespective of
whether he has knowledge that he is engaging in a transaction that might give
rise to such a tax.
The Labor prohibitions affect parties in interest. The Tax prohibitions
affect "disqualified persons." The two terms are substantially the same in
most respects, but again, the Labor term includes a somewhat broader range
of persons.
For example, only those employees who are highly compensated are to be
treated as disqualified persons under Title II, not all employees of the em-
ployer; on the other hand, in Title I, any employee of the employer is tech-
nically a disqualified person (or more accurately a party in interest), and
"highly compensated" for the Title II test is quite a highly compensated
individual in most instances, at least in the larger companies; namely, some-
one who earns 10 percent or more of the yearly payroll.
The full list of disqualified persons, for purposes of Title IPs excise tax,
includes a whole gamut of persons, most of whom you would expect to find
on that list. But two categories include some surprises, and they warrant
special note.
One, the fiduciary. Fiduciary means much more than the traditional named
fiduciary or named trustee of the plan. It is any person having discretion as
to plan management or administration, or as to the disposition of plan assets,
or who merely renders investment advice for a fee to the plan.
Two, it includes a person providing services to the plan.
Now, in view of this enormously broad reach of these prohibited transac-
tion provisions, not only in the kinds of transaction, but in the categories of
persons that peripherally or otherwise are brought into the reaches and
sweep and of these provisions, Congress obviously had to provide for some
exceptions or exemptions.
One such was a set of statutory exemptions, which were specifically carved
out in both Title I and II for certain transactions which had become common
practice, and which Congress believed would not jeopardize the plan. Among
these transactions, specifically noteworthy are loans to participants who are
disqualified persons, provided such loans are available on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis, are permitted by the plan, bear reasonable rate of interest, and
are adequately secured.
Another is, the providing of necessary services and office space by a dis-
qualified person, if no more than reasonable compensation is paid.
Another one is, where a bank or a similar financial institution is a fiduciary
of a plan. In this case, the performance by that institution of certain ancillary
services, under certain clearly defined guidelines and standards of conduct, on
an arm's length basis for the plan, is permitted as a specific statutory excep-
tion to the prohibited transaction rules.
There are several others, most notably the receipt by disqualified persons
of reasonable compensation for services in the performance of duties in the
plan.
The proper interpretation of these exemptions will provide grist for many
mills. The statutory exemptions are, in part, overlapping. There are hints in
the Conference Committee Report that some apply only to fiduciaries, while
others apply only to nonfiduciary disqualified persons, although clear statu-
tory language on this is not readily at hand.
For this reason, in many cases, administrative exemptions rather than
statutory ones, will have to be sought. Congress provided, in addition to the
statutory exemptions, for a mechanism whereby the 1RS and Labor could
grant exemptions by administrative action.
Let's talk briefly about the administrative exemptions, which are the sub-
ject of the next panel. This administrative exemption provision is quite a
novelty. It is different from anything that obtained in the private foundation
field. In that area the rules provided their prohibitions, and there was no
basis on which the administrator, the 1RS, could provide any form of admin-
istrative relief from these provisions.
However, in expanding the list of prohibited transactions, and in reaching
into employee plans that are part of the very fiber and texture of the entire
economy of the United States, Congress recognized that some individual
transactions, which would otherwise be prohibited, would disrupt estab-
lished business practices, and could provide, indeed, substantial benefits for
participants if they were allowed; and, therefore, the Secretary of the
Treasury, in conjunction with the Secretary of Labor, is authorized under
the new legislation to grant special exemptions, or variances, as they have
come to be called, from the restrictions of the statute, if the transaction satis-
fies certain very specific tests that the Statute imposes: One, it must be in the
interests of the fund and participants; two, it must be administratively feasi-
ble; and, three, the rights of participants must be protected. The variance
procedure will be examined very fully in the next part of the program, and so
I will not go into it any more at this point.
Let me just add one more point before closing, with respect to the pro-
hibited transaction rule, as to the effect of the old law and the new law on
certain plans and certain transactions caught in midstream. The new pro-
hibited transaction rules, with their effective date of January 1, 1975, cut
across many transactions that were either consummated before that date,
or were continuing past that date, but had been initiated before. Thus, in
addition to matters relating to proposed and consummated transactions
which clearly fall within the parameters of the new Code Section 4975, we
must be concerned, as you are concerned, with a number of cases of old law
prohibited transactions, that is, transactions which had been entered into in
years before 1975, as to which, under a savings provision of the new law, a
disqualified person may now elect to pay the excise tax for such prior year,
if the year is still open under the tax law, in lieu of the employee plan suffer-
ing what otherwise would have been the harsh consequence of revocation of
its tax exempt status.
We are now developing rules for accomplishing this election, and particu-
larly let me say - and this will come, I am sure, as welcome news to many
of you - for calculating the tax resulting from that election. I understand
that at this very moment there are people waiting in line to pay this tax, and
we have not yet been able to tell them just how much the tax is. I wish I could
say that the buck could be paid here; but since the very reason for Congress'
having created my office was to separate the 1RS tax-collecting functions from
those higher minded considerations underlying the tax exemption provisions,
I must resist the temptation. So I am afraid the buck cannot be paid here, but
we will be receiving your funds with welcome arms very shortly, I trust.

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Prohibited Transactions

Author(s): ALVIN D. LURIE

This is for me a particularly delightful occasion, a special occasion I would

In New York's sunny clime, where I used to spend my time, mainly

Assistant Commissioner (Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations), Internal

Title I, where certain transactions are flat-out prohibited, with enforcement

Similarly, until June 30, 1977, a pension plan consultant wh

In an effort to curtail these activities, Congress acted in 1954, in the em-

essentially no-fault, or at least no harm. Certain transactions were out-and-

Now, essentially what this means is that whatever a fiduciary is barred

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