The Great Illusion A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage By Norman Angell Sane > AMM G. P. Putnam’s Sons New York and London The Knickerbocker Press 1910 Kcd NORMAN ANGELL 4187137 ‘Che Rnicherbocker Press, Rew HockPREFACE present volume is the outcome of a large pamphlet published in Europe at the end of last year entitled Europe's Optical Illusion. The interest that the pamphlet created and the character of the discussion provoked throughout Europe persuaded me that its subject-matter was worth fuller and more detailed treatment than then given it. Herewith the result of that conviction. The thesis on its economic side is discussed in the terms of the gravest problem which now faces European statesmanship, but these terms are also the living symbols of a principle of universal application, as true with reference to American conditions as to European. If I have not “‘local- ized” the discussion by using illustrations drawn from purely American cases, it is because these problems have not at present in the United States reached the acute stage that they have in Europe, and illustrations drawn from the conditions of an actual and pressing problem give to any discussion a reality which to some extent it might lose if discussed on the basis of more suppositious cases. It so happens, however, that in the more abstract iiiiv Preface section of the discussion embraced in the second part, which I have termed the ‘‘ Human Nature of the Case," I have gone mainly to American au- thors for the statement of cases based on those illusions with which the book deals. To the hurried reader (the vanity of authorship would like to believe that he is non-existent) I ay hint that the “‘key’’ chapter of the first part is Chapter_III; of the second part, Chapter II; of the third part, Chapter IT. Though this method of treatment—the summarization within one chapter of the whole scope of the argument dealt with in the section—involves some small repetition of fact and illustration, such repetition is trifling in bulk (it does not amount in all to the value of two pages) and I have been more concerned to make the matter in hand clear to the reader than to observe all the literary canons. I may add that apart from this the process of condensation has been carried to its extreme limit in view of the character of the data dealt with, and that those who desire to understand thoroughly the significance of the thesis with which the book deals—it is worth understanding—had really better read every line of it. One personal word may perhaps be excused as explaining certain phraseology which would seem to indicate that the author is of English nationality. He happens to be of English birth, but to have passed his youth and early manhood in the UnitedPreface v States, having acquired American citizenship there. This I hope entitles him to use the col- lective ‘‘we’"’ on both sides of the Atlantic. Imay add that the last twelve years have been passed mainly in Europe studying at first hand the problems here dealt with. N. A Panis, August, 1910.SYNOPSIS , We are the 6 al motives prompting interna- tional rivalry in armaments, particularly Anglo-German rivalry? Each nation pleads 4 that its armaments are purely for defence, but such plea necessarily implies that other nations have some interest in attack. What is this interest or supposed interest? ‘ The supposed interest has its origin in the uni- ly accepted theory that mili gin ns political power give a nation commercial and social advan- tages, that the wealth and prosperity of the defence- = less nation are at the mercy of stronger nations, who may be tempted by such defencelessness to commit aggression, so that each nation is compelled to pro- tect itself against the possible cupidity of neighbours. /, The author boldly challenges this universal theory, and uy) a@ pure ical i - lusi le sets out ‘pr ‘ane J political power give a nation no commercial advan- tage; that it is an economic impossibility for one nation to seize or destroy the wealth of another, or for one nation to enrich itself by subjecting another. He establishes this apparent paradox b’ by showing that wealth in the economically civilized world is founded upon credit and commercial contract. If these are tampered with in an attempt at confiscation by a conqueror, the credit-dependent wealth not only vanishes, thus giving the conqueror nothing for his conquest, but in its collapse involves the conqueror; so that if conquest is not to injure the conqueror, viivii. Synopsis he must scrupulously respect the enemy's property, in which case conquest becomes economically futile. Thus it comes that the credit of the small and virtually unprotected States stands higher than that of the Great Powers of Europe, Belgian three per cents standing at 96 and German at 82; Norwegian three and a half per cents at 102; and Russian three and a half per cents at 81. For allied reasons the idea that addition of terri- tory adds to a nation’s wealth is an optical illusion of like nature, since the wealth of conquered territory remains in the hands of the population of such territory. For a modern nation to add to its territory no more adds to the wealth of the people of such nation than it would add to the wealth of Londoners if the City of London were to annex the county of Hert- ford. It is a change of administration which may be good or bad; but as tribute has become under modern economic conditions impossible (which means that taxes collected from a given territory must directly or indirectly be spent on that territory), the fiscal posi the people concerned is unchanged by mques' i "Germany annexed Alsace, no individual German secured a single mark’s worth of Alsatian property as the spoils of war. ‘he author also shows that international finance has become so independent and so interwoven with trade and industry that the intangibility of an enemy’s property extends to his trade. It results that political and military power can in reality do nothing for trade, since the individual merchants and manufacturers of small nations exercising no such wer compete successfully with those of the great. Swiss and Belgian merchants are driving English from the Canadian market; Norway has, relatively to population, a much greater mercantile marine than Great Britain. «Synopsis ix The author urges that these little-recognized facts, mainly the outcome of purely modern conditions (rapidity of communication creating a greater_com- plication and delicacy of the credit system), have rendered the problems of modern international politics profoundly and essentially different from the ancient; yet our ideas are still dominated by the principles and axioms and phraseology of the old. In the second part—‘The Human Nature of the Case’’—the author asks, What is the basis, the scientific justification of the plea that man’s natural pugnacity will indefinitely stand in the way of inter- national agreement? It is based on the alleged un- changeability of human nature, on the plea that the warlike nations inherit the earth that warlike quali- ties alone can give the virile energy necessary for nations to win in the struggle for life. The aythor shows that human natureis not un= changingtthat the warlike nations do not inherit the earth; that warfare does not make for the survival of the fittest or virile; that the struggle between. nations is no part of the evolutionary ‘aw of man’s advance,qand that that idea resides on a profound misreading of the biological law that physical force is a constantly diminishing factor in human affairs, and that this diminution. sere with it profound psychological modifications}*hat society is classify- ing itself by interests rather than by State divisions; that the modern State is losing its homogeneity; and that all these multiple factors are making rapidly for the disappearances of State rivalries. He shows how these tendencies—which, like the economic facts dealt with in the first part, are very largely of recent, growth—may be utilized for the solution of the armament difficulty on at present untried lines. /,CONTENTS rae PART I THB ECONOMICS OF THB CASB CHAPTER I STATEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR WAR ‘Where can the Anglo-German rivalry of armaments end?— Why peace advocacy fails—Why it deserves to fail— The attitude of the peace advocate—The presumption that the prosperity of nations depends upon their poli- tical power, and consequent necessity of protection against aggression of other nations who would diminish our power to their advantage—These the universal axioms of international politis - - - 4 CHAPTER II ‘THE AXIOMS OF MODERN STATECRAFT Are the foregoing axioms unchallengeable?—Some typical statements of them—German dreams of conquest—Mr. Frederic Harrison on results of defeat of British arms and invasion of England—Forty millions starving 15-28 CHAPTER II THE GREAT ILLUSION ‘These views founded on a gross and dangerous misconcep- tion—What a German victory could and could not ac- aContents complish—What an English victory could and could not accomplish—The optical illusion of conquest—There can be no transfer of wealth—The prosperity of the little States in Europe—German Three per Cents at 82 and Belgian at 96—Russian Three and a half per Cents at 81, Norwegian at 102—What this really means— Why security of little States not due to treaty—Mili- tary conquest financially futile—If Germany annexed Holland, would any German benefit or any Hollander? PaoR 29-48 CHAPTER IV THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONFISCATION Our present vocabulary of international politics an historical survival—Why modern conditions differ from ancient— ‘The profound change effected by credit—The delicate interdependence of international finance—Attila and the Kaiser—What would happen if a German invader looted the Bank of England—German trade dependent upon English credit—Confiscation of an enemy's property an economic impossibility under modern conditions 49-62 CHAPTER V FOREIGN TRADE AND MILITARY POWER Why trade cannot be destroyed or captured by a military Power—What the processes of trade really are and how @ navy affects them—‘‘ Dreadnoughts” and business— While “‘Dreadnoughts” protect trade from hypotheti- cal German warships, the real German merchant] is carrying it off, or the Swiss or the Belgian—The ‘Com- mercial aggression” of Switzerland—What lies at the bottom of the futility of military conquest—Govern- ment brigandage becomes as profitless as private brig- andage—The real basis of commercial honesty on the part of government - = ee = 63-84Contents xiii CHAPTER VI THE INDEMNITY FUTILITY What is the real profit of a nation from indemnity?—How a person differs from a State—An old illusion as to gold and wealth—What happened in 1870—Germany and France in the decade 1870-1880—Bismarck’s testi- mony - - - - - - - 85-104 CHAPTER VII HOW COLONIES ARE OWNED ‘The vagueness of our conceptions of statecraft—How Eng- land “owns” Colonies—Some little-recognized facts— ‘Why foreigners could not fight England for her self-gov- erning Colonies—She does not “‘own" them, since they are masters of their own destiny—The paradox of con- quest: England in a worse position in regard to her own. Colonies than in regard to foreign nations—Her experi- ence as the oldest and most practised colonizer in history —Colonies not a source of fiscal profit—Could Germany hope to do better?—If not, inconceivable she should fight for sake of making hopeless experiment 105-129 PART II THE HUMAN NATURE OF THE CASE CHAPTER I THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE FOR WAR “You cannot leave human nature out of the account”: vanity, pride of place, pugnacity, the inherent hostility of nations—Nations too good to fight; also too bad—De- sire for mere material comfort not the main motive in many human activities—Military rivalry of nations needs long preparation—Such rivalry does not arise from “hot fit,” therefore, but actual conflict may be pre-xiv Contents Pon cipitated thereby —Scientific justification of inter- national pugnacity—Struggle between nations the law of survival—If a nation not pugnacious in some degree, it will be eliminated in favour of one that is—Pugnacity therefore a factor in the struggle of nations, and must necessarily persist - - - - - 133-158 CHAPTER II OUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CASE FOR PEACE The illusion on which conclusions of preceding chapter are based—A real law of man’s struggle: struggle with Nature, not with other men—Mankind is the organism struggling to adapt itself to its environment, the planet —Such struggle always involves greater complexity of organism, closer co-ordination of parts—Outline sketch of man’s advance and main operating factor therein— The progress towards elimination of physical force— Co-operation across frontiers and its psychological result —Impossible to fix limits of community—Such limits irresistibly expanding—Break-up of State homogeneity —State limits no longer ere with real conflicts between men - : 159-176 CHAPTER III en UNCHANGING HUMAN NATURE The progress from cannibalism to Herbert Spencer—The disappearance of religious oppression by government— Disappearance of the duel—The Crusaders and the Holy Sepulchre+-The wail of militarist writers at man's drift away from militancy - “~- - - 177-200 CHAPTER IV DO THE WARLIKE NATIONS INHERIT THE EARTH? a The confident dogmatism of militarist writers on this subject —The facts—The lessons of Spanish-America—HowContents xv PagR conquest makes for the survival of the unfit —Spanish method and English method in the New World—The virtues of military training—The Dreyfus case—The threatened Germanization of England - 201-241 CHAPTER V ‘THE DIMINISHING FACTOR OF PHYSICAL FORCE: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESULTS Diminishing factor of physical force—Though diminishing, physical force has always been important in human affairs—What is underlying principle, determining ad- vantageous and disadvantageous use of physical force? —Force that aids co-operation in accord with law of man’s advance; force that is exercised for parasitism in conflict with such law and disadvantageous for both parties—Historical process of the abandonment of phy- , sical force—The Kahn and the London tradeaman— Ancient Rome and modern Britain—The sentimental defence of war as the purifier of human life—The facts —The redirection of human pugnacity - 242-278 CHAPTER VI THE STATE AS A PERSON: A FALSE ANALOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES Why aggression upon a State does not correspond to aggres- sion upon an individual—Our changing conception of collective responsibility—Psychological progress in this connection—The factors breaking down the homoge- neous personality of States are of very recent growth 279-313xvi Contents PART III THE PRACTICAL OUTCOME CHAPTER I ARMAMENTS, BUT NOT ALONE ARMAMENTS Why we cannot abandon armament irrespective of others— The human nature of this part of the problen—Why armaments alone are likely to lead to war—Why agree- ments between governments are likely to fail, and must in any case be of limited effect - - 317-335 CHAPTER II THE RELATION OF DEFENCE TO AGGRESSION” Root of the whole problem is the force of the motive for aggression—Without such motive the necessity for de- fence disappears—Simultaneity of progress towards tationalism on both sides of the fence - - 336-348 CHAPTER II METHODS The hypnotism of the royal road and the short cut—General rationalism the only hope—Opinions are the facts—Is England tolead the way? = - == == = 349-374, APPENDIX oe 8 ee es 375-383The Great IllusionPART I The Economics of the CaseThe Great Illusion CHAPTER I STATEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR WAR Where can the Anglo-German rivalry of armaments end?— Why peace advocacy fails—Why it deserves to fail— The attitude of the peace advocate—The presumption that the prosperity of nations depends upon their political power, and consequent necessity of protection against aggression of other nations who would diminish our power to their advantage—These the universal axioms of inter- T is pretty generally admitted that the present” tivalry in armaments with Germany cannot go on in its present form indefinitely. The net result of each side meeting the efforts of the other with similar effort is that at the end of a given period the relative position of both is what it was originally, and the enormous sacri- fices of both have gone for nothing. If it is claimed that England is in a position to maintain the lead because she has the money, Germany 3