The PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY b A. P. USHENKO Associate Professor of Phalosophy, The University of Machagan LONDON GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD MUSEUM STREETFIRST PUBLISHED IN 1937 All nights reserved PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY UNWIN BROTHERS LTD , WOKINGPREFACE Tms book is primarily for philosophers. The philosopher cannot tell whether the spectacular metaphors in populér accOunts of Relativity are sufficiently reliable to form a basis for conjectures about nature unless he is able to compare them with the original mathematical papers. But he seldom has the necessary technical equipment. Chapters II and VI‘will help him to overcome this embarrassment, giving a step-by-step deduction of the main equations of Relativity without involving advanced mathematics. To the physicist, who is already familiar with the Theory of Relativity in a much more complete form, this treatise must be of iitarest as an interpretation of the equations of physics which differs from the interpretations of his fellow- physicists both in method and in results. I reject the arti- ficial procedure in which one exerts ingenuity in trying to translate the equations of physics into the language of sensory-experience. This method may be satisfactory to a physicist who is uncritical in bis acceptance of the basic formulae and data of physics, but it is not of much worth to a philosopher. In my method two main moves are made. First, the development, of the implications of the fact that events, which are agents of the physical world, are described by dispositional characteristics, ie. by characteristics which are not manifested unless an observer is present; which implications are summed up in the assertion that an event must have (in order to exist in its own right) an essence which is distinct from its dispositional properties, and that this essence is a fusion of space with time because the various specifications in perceptual perspectives of the event’s date and size would be impossible if its nature did not partake of both space and time (the argument is given in full in Chapter D)?Secondly, a survey of the physical theory which is given in order to indicate that its interpretation in terms of the8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY results of the first step is feasible. Thus the method which I use is not meant to prove the proposed philosophy of natute by means of the formulae of Relativity, but tochow that the former is a possible interpretation of the latter. Whether or not a better interpretation is available is left for others to decide. The use of the above method forces me to take an attitude which is antagonistic to the new positivistic tendencies. Although I am ready to agree that events and processes given in experience form a touchstone of reality, I am sure that the various acts of experience, in so far as they all belong to the same world, must enter into a system of correlations which obviously transcends experience and therefore is a type of reality which cannot be directly tested by the senses. To give one example, the fac‘ that “Newton died before Einstein was born” cannot be perceived, although its acceptance shows that it i a presentation of reality. Chapter IX is meant to establish that the space-time of Relativity has the reality and the nature of facts. One is assisted to an understanding of the contrast between facts and events which is necessary for the explanation of the relation between space-time and perceptual events by pre- discussions of the theories of perception in Chapters IV and VIII, and of the perceptual events in Chapter V. The attribution of physical reality to space-time is supported in Chapter III by an explanation of the Paradoxes of the Theory of Relativity directed against the critics who find contra- diction in these Paradoxes. But let me warn the reader. When I say that the space-time of Relativity is real, I mean the space-time which the Theory of Relativity tries to describe, and not the actual description embodied in its equations whichemay be, for all I know, defective. And this distinction between the objective of a description and the description of it is the background of my disagreement withPREFACE gf this linguistic interpretation will be found in Chapter X and in the Note “Propositions about space-time” of the Appendix. The Appendix contains Notes and Essays which age explanatory of and pertinent to the text, but which, if included there, might obscure the main line of argument&- ion. “Relativity and Substance” must be read in connec- tion with Chapter I. ““Zeno’s Paradoxes and Relativity” is a counter-dose to Chapter IIT. “Identification of matter with curvature” gives the mathematical foundation to Chapter VI. The other Notes are concerned in one way or another with the question of the physical reality of space-time. The metaphysics of events, which has inspired the develop- ment of ideas in this book, will be objectionable to many. But, forlowing Some of the outstanding contemporary philosophers, IMhave stated my reasons for rejecting physical substance as an alternative category of natural philosophy. Also, I have argued in defence of events against a few points of adVverse criticism. Of course, I know that many more difficulties in the concept of event have been singled out by various critics, and that a number of these difficulties are very real. But to take them up in a systematic examin- ation would mean writing another book. Besides, I doubt very much whether we can have at the present stage of philosophy and knowledge ideas which ,would be sufficiently illumi- nating in dealing with the obscure problem of time; the concept of event appears to me to be in this respect better than any other idea. Nor do I expect that we shall ever attain an unquestionable philosophy of process and immuta- bility, for I believe that we all are, to quote a Russian poet, “lost for ever in the blind passages of space and time.””CONTENTS CHAPTER, PREFACE 8 ‘THE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY RELATIVITY OF SIMULTANIETY PHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE EVENT AND CHANGE ‘THE GEOMETRICAL PICTURE OF NATURE MEASUREMENT PERSPECTIVES AND SPACE-TIME TRE yeraPHysics oF SPACE-TIME wR A dg ec 2B . THE CATEGORY OF SPACE-TIME APPENDIX I, RELATIVITY AND SUBSTANCE M1, ZENO’S PARADOXES AND RELATIVITY UI, IDENTIFICATION OF MATER WITH CURVATURE IV. REDUCTION OF SPACE TO TIME V. PROPOSITIONS ABOUT SPAGE-TRME CONSPECTUS INDEX PeoE 13 32 77 93 110 126 137 156 172 175 177 IQI 193 199 206THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY CHAPTER I THE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY Narurar Philosophy is concerned with the categories of the physical world. The categories, thing, event, charac- teristic, relation, fact, and the like, are used in scientific descriptions to stand for the basic factors"of physical process in all the variations of its modes. The choice of categories in describing nature depends, of course, on the type of scientific descfiption and therefore varies with the develop- ment of science. For example, nineteenth-century physics with its conception of a ngaterial atom as the ultimate physical agent is based on the category of material thing or substance, while the physics of to-day in which the atom is resolved into “electrical waves introduces the category of event. Itis one essential task of philosophy to catalogue the categories of contemporary science and to explain how they are interrelated. For centuries this was an easy task because the gradwal progress in the theory of physics did not urge a re-examination of categories. But a revolution came with the Theory of Relativity ; the framework of the categories of classical physi¢s collapsed ; and it is necessary for philosophy to build up a frame which is appropriate to the new picture of the physical world. The cateforial scheme of classical physics, called the mechanistic theory, is so familiar that a mere reminding him of its main features is likely to be all the reader needs. It is the theory of material particles or substances moving against their common background of space and time, this moffon and the resulting configuration of particles being the‘14 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY which they exert on one another. The notion of physical substance defined in the mechanistic scheme as a material hody which remains the same through the ¢hange that it undergoes can be criticized, independently of any progress in science, as incompatible with the truism that a thing which really changes cannot remain the same, and so in so far as it remains the same it does not change. But the physi- cists of the nineteenth century had an answer to this criti- cism. According to this answer there may be two kinds of change—one which affects the inner constitution of particles, and one which is merely a change in their external relations to one another, which is the outcome of their reciprocal displacements in space and time. Admitting that change of the first kind would destroy the notion of substance, the classical physicists insisted that ultimately all change can be shown to be of the second kind, and that therefore it is obvious that a material thing might remain the same in the sense of retaining its constitution and yet change in the sense of altering its position in space and its date,in time. This conception of particles-substances which remain the same in spite of change, because change is confined to the external relationships of space and time, presupposes a common background of space and time which offers to particles places, the occupation of which does not affect their nature, But besides having a theoretical answer to the critics of substance the physicists of the nineteenth century had in reserve positive evidence for their belief in the existence of substance-particles. If the common background of space and time is granted, then there is an absolute distinction between. rest as the state of a particle which occupies thé same place through an interval of time and motion as the state of dis- placement; furthermore, motion itself is of two kinds, rectilinear uniform and accelerated. The state of being at rest or in a uniform rectilinear motion must be considered as‘THE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 15 other particle is responsible. If the existence of another particle causes acceleration, then conversely the fact that there exists rest or uniform rectilinear motion is equivalent, to the fact that there happens to be no other particle in the vicinity to cause a change in the state of rest or motion. lif other*words, a continuation in the same state means the presence of a single particle which remains the same through the change of time while it rests or through the change of position while it moves with unaccelerated motion along a straight line. In this manner the states of rest and uniform motion are interpreted as evidence for, the existence of physical substances. Obviously such an interpretation is plausible only if the beliefs of the mechanistic scheme, that there is an intrinsic difference between rest, uniform motion, and acceleratién, and that these differences are exhibited against a common background of space and time, are left unchallenged. ‘Under the “attack of the relativists all these presupposi- tions have crumbled. The Theory of Relativity demonstrates that there is no absolute distinction between motion and rést because there are alternative systems of space and time, and a particle at rest in one of them may be moving in the others; that the difference between unaccelerated and accelerated motion is, likewise, relative to the system of reference. These statements make ambiguous the very notion of a substance as a particle continuing to be in the same state of rét or uniform motion. The new physics does not allow for change in the state of a particle to be caused by contemporary agents elsewhere, because it does not recog- nize physica? interaction at a distance between contem- poraries. The space and time which form the mediym of classical physics where material particles move to and fro, are replaced in the Theory of Relativity by space-time com- bined, in which there is no migration from one position to16 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY ment. Displacement of physical agents is rejected for the simple reason that it requires time to move from one place -to another, but there is no time left over andbabove the one which is already distributed among the places of the com- ‘ined space-time. The motion of bodies if it is a picture of their change of positions is merely a “motion picture” ; the underlying reality can be properly described only in the language of space-time. Such a description can be easily , given in terms of events, for an event is essentially a space- time entity, being specified and distinguished from other \events by its position together with its date. When we pic- ture a body moving, we observe a set of successive states each of which is a position at a corresponding moment. We are quick to infer that these successive states belong to the same body, but this is an illegitimate inferente, for so far as observation goes we do not have any data over and above the successive states themselvas which are events. Hence we might account for motion without reference t@ substance by saying that it is a series of successive events each of which represents a successive position at a successive moment. The concept of event is thesbasic category which the Theory of Relativity has introduced to replace the obsolete notion of substance. Of course, the word event has a common usage, so that through it physical theory has some contact with ordinary discourse. But it would be a mistake to conclude that physi- cists have merely borrowed from ordinary language a term which, although better adjustable than other common ideas to the highly technical conceptions of physics, is among them, as it were, a “poor relation.” The fact is that the concept of event is essentially and intimately connected with the technical terms of Relativity. It is the main topic of the present chapter to show that a close examination of the concept of event leads to an anticipation of the other cate- eories of contemporary physics.THE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 17 unity of just one act. In non-technical language a whole group of acts is often called an event. We speak of the murder of Rasputin as if it were one happening, but we know that i was the display of a very intricate plot. The term “event” would be correctly used only when it denoted some singfe phast of such a plot; for an event is a happening which cannot be resolved into a series of shorter occurrences. A blink is an event and sois a step in dancing, and any specious present is an event although of a psychical kind. The defini- tion of an event as a single act is incompatible with calling a physical transaction an event, if transaction is understood as an overlapping of several acts of different agents, as the simultaneous exchange of blows by two fighters. Of course, a single clash may be the result of two blows, but as a single event it is not‘resolvable into two distinct blows because it is a manifestation of their point of coincidence, i.e. of their merging into unity. The intespretation of transaction which is more that coincidence as an event is faulty because it presupposes the existence of two or more substance-agents together with the transaction which is the meeting-place of their acts. But we do not want to use the notion of physical substance because we want to confine our discussion to the field of sensory observation in which we do not find any- thing except events. Hence we reject not only the transaction of distinct acts but the acts themselves if they are states attributed to substances-agents. If an agent be necessary for an act, then afi event must be taken as an agent-act, i.e. as an occurrence which enacts itself and is not owned by any other actor. And the only meaning of physical transaction consistent with this conception of an event is coincidence. A coincidence, unlike the interaction of several agents, is a single happening, but it is correctly described as a trans- action because it exemplifies a complex character which, under different circumstances, might be split into several sets Of characteristics, each set residing in a separate occur-18 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY ‘The last consideration introduces the distinction within an event between the act exemplifying a character (i.e. a set gf characteristics) and the character thus exemplified. Although an event is never a bare act but an act showing ifs characteristics, the distinction is important because it discloses a difficulty in the above definition of an event as a single act. For whether or not an event is a single occurrence, its character may recur in different regions, like the pattern which is found on every three cent stamp. A character may not be a universal in the sense of subsisting independently of any event, but it certainly is not confined to a single occur- rence. The recurrence of a character is not of itself a source of ambiguity in describing an event provided the descrip- tion is supplemented by the specification of its date and place. The difficulty endangering the definition of an event as a single act arises from the fact that there are alternative sets of characteristics attributeble to the same event and that the choice of the alternative set depends upon the selection ofa point of view. For example, in accordance with the distance, thunder may be either deafening or hardly audible. This variation ofceffect would be harmless enough if all the alternative sets of properties were associated with the same date and place, but each set is connected with a different date and place. It is difficult to see whaé is left of uniqueness in an event if it can be described by means of alternative sets of date and place. The difficulty will be best understood by an illustration. Suppose an observer on the earth registers the emergence of a sun-spot at noon by his watch. Since it takes about eight minutes for the sun’s rays to reach him, he considers that the original evént occurred earlier than its registration, viz. it occurred at eight minutes to twelve. The, astronomer also makes allowance for the distance and calculates how much larger the spot at the sun is than its appearance through the telescope. The corrected. data gives, in the astronomer’s opinion, “the exact siz&and‘THE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 19 the size of the event. It is a commonplace that size is a relative property, varying with the distance from which it is determined? The event has many sizes relatively to the corresponding standpoints, and if one of them should be selected as the real size, this would be an arbitrary favouri€. ism toward one of the many standpoints. Observing next that an imaginary astronomer at the sun, an astronomer on the earth, and observers on other planets would register the emergence of the spot each at a different time, an analogous argument can be used to the effect that the same event has many dates (relatively to different standpoints) as well as many sizes. All these alternative pairs of size and date are equally at the event in the sense that the event is just when and where thgy are; ie. the event is present wherever the alternative set of its characteristics is presented for observa- tion. If this statement were true without qualification an event could not be a single aet, since each alternative mani- festation of characteristics counts as one act and there are many such manifestations. The event of which various manifestations are observed would seem to consist of as many acts as there are observations. The astronomer might try to defend his position by resorting to the convention that all dates and sizes are to be disregard@d with the exception of those which are obtain- able in the immediate neighbourhood of the event con- cerned. The emergence of the spot is to be described in terms of the data which a hypothetical observer at the sun would get by means of measurement. The preference is given to the data obtainable in the neighbourhood of the event because all its shapes and dates which appear from a distance depend on the existence of distant observers, whereas an event as a determinate entity must own at least some characteristics which determine its nature indepen- dently of any obsegver, and these are presumably the date and size specifiable in its immediate proximity. It is true20 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY ceiver, but, whether or not besides characteristics which are relative there are intrinsic properties, it seems obvious that neither size nor date, which are variously determined by different observers, should be taken as such intrinsic pro- perties. Moreover, the condition of manifestation of any characteristic (whether intrinsic or relative) is not the proximity of a would-be observer but his existence. A characteristic, unless perceived or experienced, does not appear cither in the neighbourhood of an event or from a distance, because in order to appear at all it must appear to somebody. One will recall James’s instance of a tree which makes no noise in falling if there is no one in the forest to hear it. What struck the first readers of James as a paradox is a truism now that we know how a radig changes any room into a concert-hall. And, of course, just as there are no sounds without a listener there is no odour if no one detects any smells and, in general, there is no property of any kind if it is not experienced or registered in some way. It follows that a characteristic does not belong to an event dyadically and simphciter, but with reference to the condition of its manifestation and is theréfore properly expressed by condi- tional statements in which the words “if—then” are used. This being the status of a characteristic prior to its mani- festation to an observer it must be said that such anfunactual- ized characteristic is a conditional fact. When one says that a glass is breakable one means some such fact as is expressed by the conditional proposition: “If we throw a glass on the floor, we shall observe its breaking apart.” Applying this treatment of unmanifested characteristics to the emergence of the sun-spot, we can say, of course, that this € emergence is associated with the conditional fact that if there were an observer on the sun he would witness the appearance of the spot, which is the earliest and the largest of all alternative appearances. But the existence of such an observer is doubt- ful, and in his absence there is no manifestation of the spot’s shape and date from a standpoint at the sun. Hence theTHE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY ar astronomer’s convention, involving reference to such a manifestation, fails because it refers to nothing. This refutation of the astronomer’s attempt considerably aggravates the situation. The difficulty of an event seeming to consist of as many acts as it has appearances from differefit standpoints remains unresolved. In addition there is the new consideration that characteristics are not manifested in the absence of an observer from outside, and therefore an unobserved event is neither one act nor many, being merely a collection of conditional facts, each of which is the “pro- mise” of a manifestation of some characteristic only if the corresponding percipient happens to show up. The new difficulty will be more evident on a closer examination of James’s noiseless falling tree. If it is taken for granted that there is no noise it would nevertheless commonly be sug- gested that there are certain physical counterparts of the noise, disturbances in the ais which are waves of a certain length and ffequency. But not much reflection is needed to convince one that this length and frequency “sink” in the same boat with the noise, because unless they are mani- fested to some observer or registered otherwise they are merely conditional facts like the fact that with a measuring appliance the length of an air-wave can be recorded for observatien. It would seem, then, that unobserved air-waves .or any unobserved events are not single entities but just names for certain collections of conditional facts. This, indeed, would*be the conclusion if it were not for the exis- tence of intrinsic properties which are owned by events independently of observers from the outside. It is only by postulating*an intrinsic non-relative property that we can conceive an event according to its definition as a single act. Hence we must accept the existence of the following entities in nature: events which are single acts, alternative sets of manifested characteristics of an event, conditional facts*or unmanifested characteristics of an event, intrinsic properties which save an unobserved event from being22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY resolved without remainder into a collection of conditional facts. « The postulation of intrinsic properties must be justified, and it can be made plausible, but when this is done it Becomes clear that from the standpoint of science intrinsic properties are not sufficient to secure events as single phYsical acts. For intrinsic properties are characteristics which are manifested by the agent to itself, and because of this they are not amenable to measurement; they are, therefore, of no use for specifying events in physics. This requires some explana- tion. Let me begin by reiterating that no characteristic whether intrinsic or relative is actual unless experienced in some way. When there is no outsider observer the mtrinsic properties must be experienced by the event itself. There is no difficulty here so far as the event is mental or of some kind of consciousness. But when it comes to physical pro- cesses which are presumably lacking consciousness, the description of an event as experiencing itself needs some evidence. Perhaps it would be sufficient to show that there exist feelings which are unconscious, because once this is admitted it will be not unconvincing to account for such physical processes as the attraction of a piece of iron by a magnet by saying that the iron must unconsciously feel or else it would be insusceptible to the influence of th> magnet. As to the unconscious feeling or experience itself I think we all have it in our feeling of bodily well-being in which we cease to be aware of our own bodies. But this very illus- tration of one phase of the experience of health is evidence for the fact that self-experience has no value for the deter- mination of events in physics. In order to understand this it must be observed that whereas the feeling of bodily peace amounts to the,unconsciousness of one’s body, it is an ail- ment, or at least some internal or external pressure which arouses one’s awareness of the body. Unless such a pressure is exerted the body is notself-conscious, because it does not feel itself bounded (pressure being always an infringement ofTHE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 23 its boundaries), and it may even cease to feel itself bounded when the pressure continues to be applied without change in intensity. Tht healthy feeling of being unbounded may be somewhat metaphorically described as a sense of being ready for transaction with the outside world which is the very opposite of the sense of being closed to such influences. Hence the experience of bodily well-being cannot be an experience of a determinate size, shape, or date, which would be barriers incompatible with its openness to influ- ences from outside. Arguing by analogy, we come to the conclusion that no physical event which is self-experienced can experience its own boundaries, for this would be a dis- crimination between itself and the external world which would require consciousness. While to an outsider an event occupies a finite area, to itself it “feels” spatially unbounded. It is even easier to understand that there is no self-experience of limits of duration, because no event outlives itself, and it is only throfigh self-surviving that it could comprehend its boundaries of time. Since there is no experiencing of the beginning and of the end of an experience, an event “feels” immortal. But an experience of being unbounded in its very nature excludes measurement; it may be the essence of a physical event but it is its metaphysical essence. Thereteems to be a dilemma. An event as self-experienced is a single agent-act. But in this private aspect it is un- bounded and so is not a concern of physics which in its procedure of “assigning measures must deal with delimited sizes, shapes, and durations. If, however, an event is taken asa bearer of such finite properties, it ceases to be a single entity, because there are many sets of size, shape, and date which it furnishes relatively to different standpoints of observation. These alternative sets would be, in fact, so many independent entities which would render any physical description of a particular event hopelessly ambiguous, unless there were some ground for referring them to the same agent-act. Such a ground must be conceived of as a24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY “property” of a unique kind which would function as a mediation between the intrinsic but boundless self-experi- ence and the bounded but relative data of obfervation. The conditions which this mediating function must satisfy can Be stated a prori. It must be non-relative, since it is the relativity of properties which is responsible for the multi- plicity of alternative determinations of an event. But in so far as this non-relative function ties together all the relative sets, it must be in some sense common to and yet neutral to them. This peculiar relation between the a priori non- relative and the cprresponding relative properties is likely to be better understood if it is compared to the relation between a poem and its translations into the prose of different languages. Each of the translations loses something of the original poetic quality and yet gives in its own way the original content; they may be said to represent the poem in partial modes. Analogously the diverse specifications ot space and time relatively to the corresponfling station- points of observation may be explained as,partial repre- sentatives of the mediating non-relative feature of an event. This feature which allows for alternative representations must form, in its capacity of being thus variously divided into space and time, a blend of the two, and as a space- time determination can be contrasted with the éonfigura- tions of separated space and time which are given in per- spectives, ie. from various standpoints. When time is incorporated into a space-time determinatfon, the latter must be timeless and so, being a feature of permanence, it is a reflection of the “immortality” or boundlessness of the corresponding event as self-experienced. Yet, though rooted in the private (unbounded) nature of the event, the space- time determination must define a bounded region of space- time, for if it did not it could not be represented by sets of finite data of space and time. Hence a space-time feature is beyond any experience: it is distinct from self-experience, and it cannot be experienced by others because it is non-‘THE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 25 relative and thus not confined to their perspectives. Its nature is rather similar to the nature of conditional facts, i.e. to the status 6f relative properties in the absence of a pero cipient. But there is an important difference. The relative properties need not remain in the status of conditional fact; they “may become actual properties given to experience, whereas a space-time determination is doomed to be a fact in the sense that it can never be completely manifested, being realized ‘only partially in each of the perspective specifi- cations of space and time. Nevertheless, a fact of space- timeis also conditional. Its constituent condition is experience of data in at least one of the perspectives. For if there were no actual splitting of space-time into at least one specifica~ tion of space and time, there would be no sense in saying that there is’ the possibility of alternative specifications. Space-time, like anything else, in order to be real at all, must be implicated in actuality, even though it need not be actual itself. The footing space-time has in actual experience is just the fact that no experience can exhaust reality, but that there is always room for alternative perspectives in which experience would take other aspects. The data within each of these alternative perspectives are, of course, conditional facts convertible into actual properties. Hence a fact of sysace-time may be defined as a coordination of all such conditional facts or, to put it differently, as a co- ordination of all perspective appearances, of which the source is one Single act of self-experience. Of course, the category of space-time, as introduced here, is barely sketched ; its explication is in the technical exposition of the Theory of Relativity. The term conditional fact is used in this discussion instead of what is commonly called “potentiality” for two reasons. First, the adjective “potential” is misleading. It suggests the dyadic form of a pyoperty residing in an event in disregard of the reference to the sufficient condition on which the realization depends. To give an example, it makes one treat26 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY “breakable” in “the glass is breakable” on a par with “broken” in “the glass is broken,” whereas what the first sadjective really means is “would be broken“under certain circumstances.” Secondly, potentiality is used in contrast With actuality. But a conditioned property given by a fact may be partially actualized. A case in point is the funda- mental fact which was introduced as the space-time feature of an event. It may be partially actualized as a sjze and a date in the perspective of some observer while affording only the potentiality of representation in those perspectives which are not opgn because of the absence of percipients. Its actualization may vary in degree, though it must be partially manifested in at least one perspective, for space- time is not merely a scheme of possibilities byt a medium of actual experience. But while implicated in the concern of actuality facts are not reducible to actual events of experience. I may feel happy and the description of my feeling is the description of an event, but I may add to it that my mood would be spoiled should someone not respond. The addition, though true, does not express an“event; it conveys a fact which is relevant to the event. Again, suppose a man who is rightly called a coward is at this moment reading a book. There is nothing cowardly in the occupation. Therefore 4f the act were the complete expression of the man, to accuse him of timidity would be abusive. If he is a coward, it is because he is something more than his actual occupation shows ; he also involves the fact that he is susceptible to fear when threat- ened. Granting that actuality is exhausted by events we must take issue with those who say that actuality coincides with reality. Besides actuality there are facts. Events and facts are two different ways of being ; they are two languages of nature which are untranslatable into one another because the syntax of one of them fits in with an aspect of reality which does not correspond to the syntax of the other. Facts are contrasted with events because they introduce poten-‘THE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY a7 tiality into the world. This basic difference is connected with a number of others. A fact, unlike an event, cannot be experienced unlesse experience is taken in the wide sense which includes under- standing. Facts, of course, can be understood; they att intelligible entities, but they cannot be pictured or imaged. However, since facts are implicated in events, their “foot- ing” in actuality is subject to a peculiar experience, which will be treated in a later chapter as “blurredness” or inde- terminacy in perception. An event is irrepeatable and irretrievable. The so-called reproductions of an original event are numerically distinct from it no matter how similar they are in character. On the other hand, a,fact as an intelligible entity may be grasped by many acts of comprehension at different dates and places. An event as a single act isconfined to the present. There is no acting in the past or future, the past being already enacted, the fugure, on the contrary, being too indeterminate for action. Hence an event being only a link in the order of time cannot show this order. But a fact, transcending any date or place, is a proper way of expressing the structure of time. For example, a fact discloses that Caesar died before this chapter was written. An event, regardless of its complexity, has the organic unity of an act. A fact shows the analytic unity of a struc- ture; its constifuents are correlated in a way which demands agreement. Such an agreement is realized in asserting a true proposition. The last comment is relevant to the consideration of the verbal modes by means of which the expressions of facts and events are recognized. An event is either indicated by a single demonstrative symbol like “this” or else it is repre- sented by a definite description like “the event of my birth.”* * Cf my articles “The Defimte Description,” The Philosophical Revo, September 1934, and “Fact and Event,” The Momst, July 1932.28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY A fact is directly expressed only in the structure of a propo- sition. . Physical facts are conveyed by conditiona{ propositions. The condition is not always explicitly stated, but it is present in the records of observation or experiment in so far as they involve reference to the coordinate system and the méasur- ing appliances of an observer. As the reader will understand later, even statements about the order of events in space and time, such as the assertion of the simultaneity of two events, are conditioned by the specification of standpoint Only facts exhibiting the ontological nature and the physical structure of the invariant space-time are categorical, but even their categorical status is not without certain qualifications. For, as already mentioned, any fact of space-time presupposes, and consequently is conditioned by, at least one “trans- formation” into an actual experience in which separation between space and time takeseplace.* The conditional nature of physical facts may induce some confusion between the concepts of fact and of a law of * Perceptual judgments such as “this is black,” in which a simple characteristic 18 attributed to a’particular, appear to form an exception to the statement that facts are conditional in structure. In reality, however, the judgment “this is black” does not denote a fact that tas 1s black, but 1s true because of the occurrence of an eyent, which as a black spot. The event does not require a fact, mediating between stself and a judgment, in order to validate the latter. But perceptual judgments are essentially different from communicable propositions. ‘On the other hand, there exists a tendency among ozrtain logicians to see within a proposition too many conditions and restrictions I think that the followers of G. E. Moore are wrong when they take proposi- tions about the past to be always referring to the speaker’s present. They would say that “Caesar died before this paper wa written” 1 a complicated conjunction to the effect that both Caesar’s death and the writing of this paper occurred before the present occasion of speaking about them, but that the first event is, with respect to this occasion, removed further towards the past than the second. I should think, however, that the reference to the speaker’s occasion 18 unnecessary when the structure of space-time is taken into account. For the enginal statement can be generalized. “Relatively to any present the death of Caesar occurred before the writing of this paper.”THE GATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 29 nature, for a law being of the form “If something of a certain kind happens, then something else of the same or of another kind Also happens,” is likewise conditional. A lawe differs from a fact in that it is concerned with kinds of happenings, while facts are correlations of the particuldr events themselves. Laws, unlike facts, do not specify the course of nature, but show the modes which this course might take under different conditions. It is left to the facts to establish (relatively to the system of observation) which of these conditions are realized. The difference between a fact and a law is expressed in their verbal,forms. While the former is always given in terms of descriptions which have fixed meanings, the latter is a formula involving variables. The statement of the law that “Acceleration A varies inversely as the square of the distance D,” is a reading of the equation “A= 7,” Obviougly this equation does not tell, one way or another, whether a variation of acceleration in conformity with the law will take place at a given moment in the course of nature. But when through observation and measurement the distance of thé fall of some body is re- corded, and when this record is assigned to the variable D as its value, a fact about the acceleration of the body can be established. For example, if the distance is five, then the acceleration of the body is x The italicized sentence is a con- ditional fact about the course of nature. A fact, then, can be an outcome of the procedure which is called the “applica- tion of a lay of nature,” the procedure, that is, of replacing the variables of the equation of the law by values which are numbers obtained by measurement or calculation. The difference between a law and a fact does not prevent one from realizing that essentially, as a conditional structure, a law has a factual status. And this truth is important as explanatory of the success which laws have in scientific predictions about the course of nature. Obviously a fact30 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY cannot go wrong, and the validity of a law merely reflects its “participation” in the nature of facts. On the other hand, a scientific prediction is fallible to the extent to which the complete specification of conditions which allow for the “application of the law” is not obtainable. A simple illus- tration, which is more than an analogy, is the use Of the proposition that “the shortest distance between any two points on the surface of a sphere is the segment of, the great circle on which the points are situated” as a “law” for calculating the shortest route between two given landmarks on the surface of the earth. If the landmarks are separated by mountains, the shortest route between them cannot be determined by the above “law,” because it is some irregular curve and not a segment of a great circle. The “law” does not fail, but the facts which specify a locality may not fulfil the conditions of its application. What this illustration suggests is that the success of a law varies with the range of its application. As an extreme a law can be deVised the con- ditions of which are never specified by the facts. In science such a law would be dismissed as unpractical. It is a difficult problem to find the criteria for ascertaining whether a law has a foothold in fact, although there is no doubt that reference to “causation” must enter in the formulation of these criteria. I do not propose an examination of “causa- tion,” which is one of the most perplexing conceptions in philosophy, but to mention its major part in the establish- ment of scientific laws serves my purpose Sf showing the dependence of laws on facts, because this much should be clear—that “causation” can be explained only in the lan- guage of facts. The ordinary treatment of “causation” as an interaction between physical substances won’t do for the invincible reason that there are no such things as physical substances. We also know that events as such do not interact, and therefore have no causal influence,(in the sense of an outcome of interaction) on one another. This means that if reality were co-extensive with actuality, if there wereTHE CATEGORIES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 3r nothing but events in the world, there would be no room for “causation.” But besides actuality there is factuality. Hence “causality” cam have denotation, and if it has, whatever else it may be, it must be realized within facts, which are con- nections between events, as one mode of their connectiomCHAPTER II THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY A xaw of nature is a constant correlation between two physical conditions, each of which may be either a single quantity or a pattern (a relationship) of different quan- tities. Accordingly, “a law of nature resolves itSelf into a constant relation, or even an identity, of the two world- conditions to which the different classes of observed quan- tities forming the’ two sides of the equation are traceable.”* The mathematical form of a law of nature is usually some differential equation. The application of such a mathematical fofm to an actual situation consists of the specification of the dates and places and of the obtainment of meagures which can be assigned as values to the variables of the equation. But,*of course, the dates and places are always specified from some arbitrarily chosen station-point, which is another way of saying that the values of the variables are determined by the system of coordinates used The simplest kind of a coordinate-system is the Cartesian frame of reference in which, at any given moment, a point in space is identified with respect to three rectilinear axes intersecting at right angles to one another at an arbitrary point O, which ‘is called the origin of the system (cf. Fig. 1). Thus the position of a point Q is deter- mined by its distances from the axes, x, y, z, which are called the coordinates of the point. It is obvious that the position of Q would be determined differently if another system of coordinate-axes x’, y’, z’, in motion with respect to the first system, were used; and if some physical process takes places at Q, the observer using one of the systems might describe it in terms of the quantities T and R and of the duration #, whereas the observer of the other”: ‘system * A. Eddington, The Mathematical Theory of Relatwity, p. 50.THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY 33 would obtain different measures 7’, R’, and #. In this manner a choice between systems of coordinate-axes in relative moti is, in effect, a choice of the perspective view: which conditions the descriptions of physical processes. But in so far as such a description varies with the change of tte perspective it may be said to be a distorted account of nature. A correct expression of a law of nature should not be subject to possible distortions of perspective, because the significarice of the law must lie in disclosing the correlations between physical conditions themselves and not between their various appearances to different observers. A law of nature is a structure which remains the same for all actual or possible systems of coordinates ; the measures may change under the transformations of coordinates, but their correla- tion must renfiain invariant, This definition gives the main condition for the correct formulation of a law of nature: a correct formulation is an equation which is invariant in form for atty transformation of coordinates. Take any equation correlating the world-conditions T and R at Q during the interval ¢ in measures of a coordinate system. which is at rest (ie. which has the velocity 7= 0) with respect to the physical phenomenon concerned and bring all these measures to the left-hand side of the equation which wil give the form “f(7,R,Q,t,0) = 0,” where f is the function which is the correlation between the data. Suppose that by using a different coordinate system the corresponding equation describing the same phenomenon is “f(T R'Q,,t',0") = 0.” The description is invariant in form and therefore expresses a law of nature if and only iff, is the same function as f. The function is the same when the substitution of the primed values for the corresponding undashed quantities in the first form reguces it to the second form.* The elements of sameness in the invariant form are the logical constants, the mathematical opera- tions,*the number and character of the quantities involved, CE. W. E, Johnson, Logi, vol. ii, p. 48 £ a34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY and, of course, the numerical value of the function which is zer0. = The success of physics depends on its recording the laws of nature or, in the ght of the preceding consideration, on Gscovering invariant functional correlations of physical quantities. Classical physics is credited with success in the field of mechanics because its descriptions of mechanical processes are equations invariant in form with respect to all systems of coordinates in uniform rectilinear motion rela- x « tively to one another. For any two such systems the rules of transformation of coordinates can be easily derived with reference to Fig. 1. 7 Let the dashed system move along the x-axis of the un- dashed system in the direction of the arrow with the velocity ». Suppose the origin, 0’, of the dashed system “coincided with and passed by O at the time zero. The distance 00’ covered by O’ after a certain interval of time ¢ elapsed is determined by means of the formula @) a= she which defines the uniform velocity of a body as the ratio of the distance which it covers to the time spent to cover that distance. Since s is the distance OO’ in Fig. 1, it follows that 00'= ut.THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY 35 Consider some point P fixed to the x/-axis. Fig. 1 shows that its. coordinate distance x’ is shorter than its coordinate distance x by the amount 00’. Hence (2) x aaet Jay, Cae tat Thése are the rules of transformation of classical physics. The last of these equations merely expresses the assumption that the duration of time is an invariant entity, ie. the choice of the coordinate system does not affect the descrip- tion of the flow of time. A glance at equations (2) shows that the difference be- tween the coordinates of two systems is given in terms of o which is their relative velocity. This means that equations in which velocity is one of the correlated quantities cannot re- main invariant in form under the transformations of coordi- nates from theundashed to the primed system. And if classical physics is successful in descsibing the laws of mechanical processes, it® is because the fundamental equation of mechanics, thg so-called Newton’s Second Law of Motion (3) FanG defines the force F applied to a moving body as proportional not to theyvelocity of its motion but to the change of velocity or acceleration, the factor of proportionality m being called the mass of thg body. It is true that the symbol & which denotes the time-rate change of the body’s velocity a, refers to the latter, but the reference does not involve a dependence of the form’ of the equation on 2, since, obviously, bodies might move with various speeds and yet have the same rate of changing speed. Being thus not dependent on velocity, the form of Newton’s Second Law of Motion remains the same for the transformation of coordinates according to rules (2), with the result that the whole science of mechanics, which is a development of equation (3), consists of invariant36 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY equations and so may be taken, with certain qualifications, as an expression of the laws of nature. This achievement of classical physics is enunciated in the mechanidal Principle of Relativity according to which all systems of coordinates siioving with respect to one another with a uniform recti- linear velocity are equivalent for the description of me¢hani- cal processes. The shortcomings of classical physics become .apparent when from the processes of mechanics one turns to those of electrodynamics and optics. The equations describing them involve in their form the velocity of light or of electric dis- turbances and therefore cannot be invariant in form for the transformation of coordinates according to equation (2). Take, for example, the formula of classical physics of the propagation of light in the stagnant ether (4) PLP + 2 cP=O, where ¢ denotes the constant velocity of light in all directions with respect to the axes x, y, and z, which are assumed to be stationary in the ether, viz, 180,000 miles per second. Fig. 1 readily shows the derivation of this equation. Let the dis- tance OQ represent the distance covered by the light ray sent from the source O during the interval #. According to O equation (1), ¢= & hence 0Q = ct and OQ? = cM, If 02 lay in the x-y-plane, it would follow from the theorem of Pythagoras that OQ?=x?+ y*. For the space of three dimensions there exists an analogous theorem according to which the square of the distance 0Q is equal t6 the sum of the squares of its coordinates, x, y, and z. And this obviously establishes the ¢ruth of equation (4). But the translation of equation (4) into the “language” of the primed coordinate system (moving .with respect to the undashed system of the ether with some velocity »), according to the rules (2), results in a change in the form of the equa-THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY 37 tion, since x"? + 9? + 2% — ct differs from x?+ p29 ° 22 — o¢ by 0% + 22'ot so that 6) G++ 2-e8= 0) 4 Wy Zt 20), However, this inequality would mean that the form of the equafion of the propagation of light is not invariant only if the velocity of hght ¢ were invariant under the transforma- tion from the coordinate system of the ether to the primed system. Classical physics is based on the assumption that the velocity of light varies from one system of coordinates to another when they are in relative motion. But if classical physics were right, it should be possible to determine, by calculating the difference between the two sides of in- equality (5), the velocity » with which any given system of dashed coordinates moves relatively to the undashed system, in which the velocity of light is c. But very carefully devised experiments, of which Michelson-Morley’s are the most famous, havé proved beyond any convincing doubt that the velocity of light remains ¢ no matter how the system of coordinates in which it is computed moves.* And the in- variance of the velocity of light being thus experiment- ally demonstrated, inequality (5) must be accepted as a fact unless the classical rules of transformation (2) are faulty. Einstein had the genius to question the classical rules of transformation. He was convinced that the laws of optics and electrody:famics, if they really are laws of nature, must be invariant in form. But inequalty (5) was in the way of his conviction and yet this inequality must hold if the ‘These experiments do not form a rigorous proof that the velocity of light is invariant because their results may be variously interpreted, but all other interpretations are dismissed because of being extremely far-fetched. However, 1f one does not accept the invariant velocity of light as a fact, one might accept it as a basic postulate justified by the requirements of measufement. Measurement presupposes the invariance of its standards, and the velocity of light is naturally fit to play the part of such a standard.38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY velocity of light is invariant and if the classical rules of transformation are correct. Thus the only course open for the repudiation of inequality (5) was, in view of the result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, the course taken by Einstein in which the classical rules were replaced by a new set of equations of transformation. Einstein’s rejection of inequality (5) follows from his Special Principle of Relativity, which is to the effect that physical processes of any kind, and not only mechanical phenomena, must be described in equations which have the same form under the transformation from one system of co- ordinates to another (provided they are in relative uniform and rectilinear motion), in conjunction with the fact that the velocity of light is invariant. The problem, which Einstein solved, was to replace the classical rules (2) by new equations of transformation which, instead of inequality (5), allow for the equality . (6) BH htt a’ + yt Et OD, In solving this problem, Einstein submitted that the rate of time varies with different coordinate systems so that ¢ + ¢’, The derivation of the new equations of transformation becomes then a matter of straightforward though somewhat dull algebra. A more interesting way of obtaining these equations is given below, not as a rigorous demonstration, but for the sake of introducing Minkovsky’s space-time in terms of which equation (6) finds a geometrical interpreta- tion. This procedure is an application of the Method of Geometrical Representation of physics. We begin by observing, with reference to Fig. 1, that according to the theorem of Pythagoras, OQ? = x7 + »%, and that although rotation of the axes through some angle ¢ would result in replacing the pair x, » by some new pair a, b, it would still be true that OQ? is equa] to the sum of the squares of its coordinates, ic. OQ? = a* + 5%. Thus in a plane a straight line, like OQ, is associated with the in-THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY 39 variant sum 7 + y* as its geometrical representation. ‘An easy extension of the theorem of Pythagoras to space gives a geometrical representation of x* + y*+ 2? by the straight line OQ; x, y, 2 being the space-coordinates of the point Q. Now an imaginative extension to a medium of four dimeh- sions’suggests a four-dimensional line OQ as a geometrical representation of the sum of the squares of the four coordin- ates of Q, 42+? + z* + w*, which is invariant for any orien- tation of the coordinate axes of the same origin O. We turn next to the quantity 22 + y? + 2? — o%, which according to equation (6) is invariant and by giving it,the form (7) Pt etatot where w= —I ct, we find that it can be represented geometrically as a straight line in a four-dimensional medium, which is properly called space-time because it gives a correlation df the space-coordinates, x, y, z, with the co- ordinate w, which involves time. But while in a plane or in space a straight line does not represent motion, both the propagation of light and the uniferm rectilinear motion of a body may be pictured by a straight line in a four-fold medium, since the points of such a line would then be correlating successive positions with successive moments owing to the fact that three axes of the medium are spatial and one is temporal. Not all lines of such a medium, in thus plotting co-vatfations of space and time coordinates, need be interpreted as uniform motion, however. Some of them, correlating a set of successive time-coordinates with the same space-coordinate, picture a thing at rest. And then there are lines which are not straight; these representing accelerated motion. The various lines of space-time,,whatever they represent, are called world-lines and their intersections are known as world-points. A world-point, being a corre- lation‘of a position with a moment, corresponds to an event and is specified by four numbers, three of which are the40 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY values of the space-coordinates and the fourth of the time- coordinate. . This scheme of space-time may be visualized by disregard- ing two of its spatial dimensions y and z and using Fig. 2 as the diagram of a plane of which one dimension is spatial and the other is the product of time and V—1 c. iP i? x! i Fro. 2. Let the line OT represent the quantity «* — c% which, if the spatial dimensions y and z are disregarded, is the quan- tity (7) associated with a moving body. Its velocity will be shown by the orientation of OT with respect to the axes, because different orientations correspond to different co- relations of space and time and therefore, according to equation (1), to different velocities. The orientation of OT is determined cither by the cos ¢ or by the cos (90° + 4), which is equal to (— sin ¢). Using the diagram it will be found that (8) cos $ = 99 = Vaz oF -sing = OT = oem *, oF ~ “OT” t OF In order to introduce into these equations the velocity 2, of the moving body observe, first, that 2 =3 and, second,THE §PECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY 4 that «* — of = OT? may be rewritten as (o* — c#)@ = OT, from which it follows that va1_ (9) + 608 $ =; sing = Y=? 2 Vg is Given the left-hand sides of these equations, each of them is sufficient for the calculation of the velocity, v. To illus- trate this on a particularly important case, consider the dashed systerns of coordinates (Fig. 2) in which the world- line OT coincides with the axis involving time. In this case cos ¢ = cosO=1= zp which gives 0 = 0. Thus the 3 body is at rest when its world-line coincides (or is parallel to) the axis of time, i.e. when it is referred to its own coordinate system, while it is moving with respect to any other co- ordinate system. Now letsa body be at rest in the dashed system. It has then a fixed place on the axis x’, but is moving with a velocity 7 with respect to the axis x. It follows that the axis x’ (to which the body is fixed) must be moving itself with a velocity » with respect to the axis x. But the relation between these two axes in space-time is given in Fig. 2 as a rotation of x through thé angle ¢. Thus a transformation from one spatial coordinate system to another which is moving rela- tively to the first along the common x-digection with a uniform rectilinear velocity 2, is the same thing as a rotation of a coordinate system through an angle ¢ in a space-time plane. °Accordingly, the rules of transformation, for which we are in search, are given by the formulae for rotation of42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY axes in a plane. Let us derive these formulae with the help of Fig. 2. Take a point P, of which the coordinates are x’, V—1 cf and x, V—1ct in the dashed and in the un- dashed systems, respectively. Then: OM = ON — MN = ON— QM’; MP = MQ+ QP = NM’ + QP. Since OM = x, MP = V—1 ct, ON = #' cos $, QM’ = V—1 of sing, NM’ =2' sing and QP = V=1 del cos4, these equations may be put down as (10) x= *' cosop—V—ret'sing; . Va1ct=* sing + V—1e cosd Substituting for cos ¢ and sin ¢ their values ba equations (9), we have (11) a8 ye The same calculations may be used in figuring out the rules of transformation from the undashed to the dashed system with the only difference being that » must be re- placed by (— 9), since if the dashed system és moving with a velocity o in relation to the undashed system, the latter must be moving with respect to the former with a velocity (— 2). This consideration gives the equations atte, (12) which are known as the Lorentz-transformation equations.THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY 43 They are qualified to replace equations (2), since, unlike the latter, they leave the form of equation (4) invariant. On the other hand, for a very small velocity 7, equations (12) are practically indistinguishable from equations (2), which accounts for the success of classical physics in the field of mechanics, where all familiar velocities are very small, at least as compared with ¢. Thus the means are obtained to give an invariant form to the equations of optics and electrodynamics. At the same time interesting features of physical nature are revealed. There is no essential difference between motion as the change of spatial position and pure change as the flow of time at the same place. For motion is relative: a body which merely grows older in its own reference system is in motion relatively to another system of coordinates, while irrespective of reference to a system of coordinates pure change and motion are identifiable in the sense that both consist of evénts occurring along a static world-line. This means that kinematics, or the description of motion, is equivalent to the description of lines in a four-fold geometry. The Special Theory of Relativity is the first step in the direction of a geometrical representation of nature.CHAPTER III RELATIVITY OF SIMULTANEITY No physical propagation has a greater velocity than the velocity of light, as may be seen from the first of the Lorentz transformation-equations, according to which o cannot be greater than ¢ because, if it were, [1 —%, and therefore the distance x, would be imaginary quantities, a result that does not make much sense. Since at the same time the unsurpassable velocity of light is finite, it follows that there is no instantaneous physical transaction between distant agents, that the transmission of physical influence always takes some time. Accordingly, contemporary agents may be defined as events physically-independent of one another, which raises a question regarding the sense in which they are said to occur at the same time. The answer to this is difficult because simultaneity is relative, if equations (12) are correct. . Lét two events, E, and £,, have, respectively, the co- ordinates x1, 91, 23, f, and %5, ye, Za, 2, in the undashed system of reference. Then in the dashed system, according to the equations of transformation, the first event occurs at #{ and the second at #, where # (4-8) a= 2 The events may occur at the same time but at different places with respect to the undashed system, so that #, = ty and x, = %,, In this event, however, ¢’, — #’;, which is the interval between the events as determined by using the primed system, is not zero, which means that they are not simultaneous. If two systems of reference are in uniform (13) 4=RELATIVITY OF SIMULTANEITY 45 rectilinear motion with respect to one another, two events which are simultaneous in one of them are successive in the other. This relativity of simultaneity was given a simple illus- tration by Einstein himself, of which the slightly modified version, devised in order to avoid certain misunderstandings of the original version, is given with reference to Fig. 3. A train, 7’ is moving in the direction of the arrow rela- tively to the embankment and to the stationary train T. The passenger P in the latter reported that, as the passen- ger P’ passed by him, two lightning bolts hit the ground at mG. 3 . the points A ‘and B which are equidistant from him. He was sure that the two events were simultaneous, because he saw both flashes at the same time, but he added that P’ must have seen the flash B before the flash A because the train T’ was moving towards B and away from A. The passenger P’ saw the flashes in succession, just as P said, but knowing the principle of the invariant velocity of light ,he argued that the motion of his train should make no difference and, therefore, if the events at A and B were simultaneous h@ should have seen them at the same time, since he is midway between the points A’ and B’ which are the spots on the train damaged by the lightning bolts at A and B. But He saw the flash from the direction of the engine before he saw the other one; therefore, he concluded, the first occurred before the second. As a relativist he would understand that there is no real disagreement between himself and the statipnary observer. The two events, though simultaneous with respect to the latter, were in succession relatively to him.46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY The relativity of simultaneity is, nevertheless, not readily accepted. It is often said that at any given moment the whole world does not converge on the observer's spot and therefore there must be contemporaneous events elsewhere. The set of all these events constitutes an instantaneous cross- section of the whole of the physical world, and this‘cross- section would seem to represent absolute simultaneity. The answer to this objection is that relativity of simultaneity does not mean the denial of such a cross-section through the world of space-time, but it means that with reference to a given region at a given date there is an indefinite number of such cross-sections of which no one is any more real than the others. Different cross-sections being different selections of contemporaries, correspond to different ways of motion through the region at a given date; but since motion is relative, there is no reason why any one of them should determine absolute simultaneity. But there is a reason, is the rejoinder: the cross-section which consists “of all events co-existent with the present experience of the observer, is privileged. This assertion takes for granted that existence determines a non-relative order in which all the predecessors of the present event are non-existent absolutely and not simply past in relation to a standpoint; so that no magic, even if it be a mathematical trick, can bring to Hfe what is past. With this the relativist would agree provided the events concerned, like the successive happenings in the body of some person, occur at the same place. If they do not, the situation is rather ambiguous. For example, the assertion that there is no standpoint “now” with respect to which Napoleon is still alive is ambiguous. It would be unques- tionably true if “now” meant the same thing elsewhere as it means on the earth; but it does not, as Fig. 2 will easily show. Let the axis x’ of Fig. 2 represent the cross-section through space-time which is the presept moment from the standpoint of the earth at M’. Accordingly, the inhabitants of the earth will consider the observer at O to be their con-RELATIVITY OF SIMULTANEITY 47 temporary and the event W, Napoleon’s death, to be in their past. But if we let OW be the time-axis of the observer O, he will judge WV to be simultaneous with himself. Thus simultaneity is a non-transitive relation ; though WN is simul- taneous with O and 0 is simultaneous with the present inhabitants of the earth, Wis earlier than these mhabitants. This is not a paradox, precisely because the first simul- taneity does not mean the same thing as the second, each being a different cross-section through space-time. There would be a paradox if, in saying that “when” the inhabitant of the earth judges WV to be in the past and the observer at 0 judges it to be in the present, we were implying that the word “when” denotes absolute simultaneity. But we do not, because we realize that the observer at O has his own “when” at which he judges WV to be contemporaneous and assigns us to his future. But, it might be still objected, there remains this dilemma that regardless ofthe difference in the opinions of observers ix? relative motion about simultaneity, either 0 actually co-exists with us, the present inhabitants of the earth, or not; and if he does, his opinion is wrong, while if he does not, our opinion is wrong. It follows from this dilemma that the opinion which is right corresponds to absolute simultaneity. This conclusion, it will be noted, is based on the assumption that co-existence determines an absolute order of events, just as existence does when it is referred to successive events which happen at the same place. But the refativist has the right to question this assump- tion because, as it will be presently shown, existence and co-existence are concepts of different kinds. To say that a thing exists if saying that a description of that thing is not fictitious but is exemplified in actuality, and since actuality consists of acts or events, it is equivalent to saying that the description concerned, being a set of characteristics, applies to, or is exemplified i in, or describes, an event. For example, the sentence “The perfect understanding of Relativity exists” means that the descriptive phrase “the perfect48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY understanding of Relativity” is exemplified in some act of insight.* The act exemplifying a description is, of course, an experience which, “‘while” it is being enacted, is the present actuality in the non-relative sense. But it must not be over- Jooked that the “while” which determines the non-relative present of an act may not be capable of extension,” except relatively to a standpoint, beyond the region of the act, and it is this restriction of the present existence toa definite locality that makes co-existence entirely different from existence. For co-existence, unlike existence, is concerned with several exemplifications, each corresponding to a distinct description of a different event, and, unless absolute simultaneity of certain events is already assumed, there is no unambiguous meaning in the assertion that these exempli- fications belong to the same moment, unless they all belong to the same act at the same region. If several descriptions are jointly realized in the same act, then, of course, co- existence happens to be just as absolute as“ existence. For example, when two bodies collide they cozexist absolutely, co-existence being in this case coincidence. But the rela- tion of co-existence often holds between distant events, which means that their descriptions are not exemplified in the same physical act, so that there is no physical inter- action involved, and the events themselves are independent of one another. Such isolated agents, exerting no reciprocal influence either directly or indirectly, can only be credited with relative co-existence, either in the sense of belonging to * The interpretation of existence as application of description to an act or a processis due to Bertrand Russell. So far as the act (exemplifying the description) is concerned it may be said to exist fn a trivial sense in which everything, including dreams and hallucinations, easts, or in the sense that the relationships of space-time have application among other things, tothe act concerned. Thus existence of a thing, when not used in a trivial sense, is analysed in terms of application or exemphfi- cation regardless whether existence 1s referred to the act itselt or to the description exemplified by the act. For reasons, made frmilar by Russell, it would seem to be more proper to use existence in connection with descrptions alone.RELATIVITY OF SIMULTANEITY 49 the same world, because of their influence on a common suceessor, or in the sense of being referred to a standpoint from which they are determined to be contemporaries. Thus the above dilemma is not destructive of relativity of simul- taneity because its alternatives are not co-exclusive owing to thé fact that co-existence of distant events is just as relative as simultaneity, because the relativity of either is a consequence of physical independence between distant events.* The inhabitants of the earth and the observer at O may both be right because their disagreement is not about the existence of WV, which is absolute, hut about the co- existence of distant and independent events, which is relative, Relativity of simultaneity is a prerequisite for a proper understanding’ of the relativity of the rate of the flow of time, which likewise follows from equations (13), if the events Z, and £, occur at. the same place, so that x; = 5. Under these circumstances — ¢{ 84. which means ata that the intervatef-ihil Seiten the two events is longer in * The assertion that there 1s no physical interaction between distant events must not shut the door on the possibilty of metaphysical in- stantancous “transactions at a distance. Even the ordinary funchons within a single organism, the organic relationships, might easily happen to be on a level which 1s to a certan extent free from purely phyncal restrictions. For ig seems to be a fact that the whole volume of one’s body may be sensed at the same instant; and one may speculate whether this togetherness of all parts within an organism is capable of extension to its environment, as, for example, when a fencer learns to feel with the trp of his apier. Also there are believers in telepathy and in the instantaneous propagation of emotional influences. All such opinions could be allowed for, 1f one conceives the world as a hierarchy of ontological levels, of which the physical level gives the basic framework of temporally unrelated events (contemporaries) as a field of poten- tuality for their various interrelations on the higher levels, the organac transaction being, perhaps, the simplest mode of such an interrelation, beyond which there may be other as yet unexplored modes. This is a fertile source for metaphysical conjectures. D50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY the primed than in the undashed system, since the quan- tity /1 —§ is smaller than unity. The Iongér the intervals between events are, the slower is the flow of time, and so an ebserver in the undashed system, taking himself to be at rest, finds that all his processes, whether physical, Physio- logical, or psychical, are going on faster than the correspond- ing processes in a system moving relatively to him. Time Jags behind in a moving body. This relativity of ‘time-rates to the frames of reference must not be attributed to the measures of time-rate; it belongs to the time-rate itself as will be shown in an imaginary example, the story of the travelling twin, the striking point of which is that even the processes of ageing are relative. The story goes that one of the twins embarked on a projectile which was shot from the earth to distant Sirius and thence back to the earth with a speed almost as great as the velocity of light. As he landed on the earth he expected to see his brother welcoming him back. Instgad he was met by complete strangers of a different generation, from whom he found out that many-years had passed since his twin brother died of old age. Since the traveller was still a youth, the phenomenon gives the moral to the story: the secret of youth is travelling; the travelling twin remaimed young because his ageing in the rapidly moving projectile was a slower process than the ageing of his brother on the sta- tionary earth. The first objection which will, probably, occur to the reader is that, according to the Theory of Relativity, it would seem that the ageing of each brother should be at once slower and faster than the ageing of the other. For their motion being reciprocal, the man in the projectile may consider himself at rest and his twin brother moving with the earth away from, and then towards,,the projectile, and, in consequence of this, growing older at a slower rate. The ‘usual answer to this objection is that the motion of the twinsRELATIVITY OF SIMULTANEITY 5r is not entirely reciprocal because the traveller, unlike the stationary twin, changes his position with respect to the stars and experiences acceleration at the start and at the end of the trip, which may have something to do with his ageing. But the critics of Relativity cannot help but feel that this answer is merely a dodging of the difficulty and that it ought to be possible to alter the story so as to have the non-reciprocal acceleration eliminated, while retaining the paradox of both twins being at once older and younger than one another. For example, suppose the projectile was not shot from the earth but merely passed by it, and at the moment when both virtually coincided a man A was born on the earth and another A’ in the projectile, after which the projectile raced away without ever returning. Even with the story so modified, it would seem to be true that both 4 and 4’ are at once ageing faster and slower than one another, ive. though A finds that wheneone of his seconds has elapsed only a fractioh of a second should have passed at 4’, A’ finds the reverse. Now there would, no doubt, be a paradox if, in saying that “when” A finds something 4’ finds the reverse, the “when” of their findings meant “at the same time,” but a relativist could not accept such an interpretation since it implies absolute simultaneity. His interpretation would be that at awertain time, two o'clock say, by 4’s watch he finds out that the receding A’ must become younger than himself, while at two o’clock by 4s watch 4’ finds out that he must be older than the receding A; nevertheless, A and A’ do not contradict one another because two o’clock by 4’s watch does not mean the same thing as two o'clock by A”s watch. ‘The paradox disappears when one realizes that without the assumption of absolute simultaneity there can be no common time correlating the systems of time which are in relative motion. The time of one system can be translated, by means of equations (12), in terms of the time of the other and vice versa, but there are no neutral and absolute measures of time with which both may be compared, and owing to52 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY this the processes within systems in relative motion seem to be incommensurable. If the critic of Relativity wishes to continue the argument he must at least specify the condi- tions under which the durations of bodies in relative motion could be brought to direct comparison. Perhaps he might attempt this by giving a still different version of the story of the travelling twin, for instance, the following: “Both twins boarded two exactly similar projectiles which were shot at the same moment with the same explosive force in two diametrically opposite directions. Each projectile after having covered the same distance as the other landed at a star which happened to be on its way, whence it was shot back to the earth, so that both twins returned at the same time. Under these circumstances their motion was entirely reciprocal and each underwent the same accelera- tion as the other, and therefore on meeting each other the twins should find that they were still of the same age, even though each expected the other to be youngef.”” The outcome of this story, according to the anti-relativist, is that relative motion does not really affect such physical processes as ageing, the appearance to the contrary being.the result of the indirect measurements and calculations to which one must resort when the moving bodies are not brought together for direct comparison. It must be conceded to the critic of relativity that the twins lived through a “common duration” during their journeys, since the journeys started and tefminated at the same time and at the same place, but the significance of this “common duration” is not so easy to determine as it may seem, because two durations which begin and end at the same time need not contain the same amount of time, but one may be longer than the other if it comprises more events or if its events last longer. Two paths in space, inter- secting at both their end-points, need pot be, of course, of the same length, and in this respect they are exactly analo- gous to a couple of durations which, as world-lines, areRELATIVITY OF SIMULTANEITY 53 also paths only in space-time. Between the world-points where two wapld-lines meet and terminate there are events along each of the world-lines, and the events of one of these world-lines cannot be said to be contemporaneous or even compared in duration with the events of the other unless there ‘were a unique and invariant one-one correlation of simultaneity between the members of the two sets of events. But there,are different correlations because each world-line determines its own system of coordinates to which corre- sponds a different way of setting its events in a one-one correlation of simultaneity with the events,of another world- line. Accordingly the twins in relative motion would disagree as to what happenings in their biographies are simultaneous, and it is obvious that since there is no arbiter to whom they could appeal for a decision they are equally right and so cannot contradict one another. The sense in which their lives are contemporaneous is not the sense in which the events forming their biographies could be set in a unique correspondence,of simultaneity, and therefore it is not the sense in which the durations of their experiences would be the same, but it is merely the factethat their biographies are enframed within the same dates. But at this point another doubt might be urged: though the mere fact that two bodies begin and end their motions at the same time is insufficient to establish that they undergo the same process of ageing, this fact can be used in refutation of relativity of simultaneity prévided the bodies in motion were not merely sets of events along two world-lines but had the lasting self- identity of substances. It is at this phase of the discussion that the clafm of the Theory of Relativity that a substance in motion can be completely resolved into a series of world- points along a world-line acquires a crucial importance. For if a substance cannot be so resolved, if it is a thing which remains the same through and in spite of its change, then two substances would be in the state of absolute simul- taneity if they had the same limits of time. For example, on54 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY thé assumption that two persons are substances they must co-exist in a non-relative sense between the hand-shakes of their separation and of their next meeting. Whether or not a person is a substance is not a matter for the Theory of Relativity to decide upon, since its rejection of substances is concerned with physical bodies and the implied derfial of absolute simultaneity pertains to physical events alone. Accordingly, the question of whether there are substances is to be asked here in a restricted sense, as the question of whether physical substances exist. There is no doubt that all descriptions of physical nature can be carried out in terms of events or processes without using the notion of substance, but this is not exactly equivalent to the non-existence of substances. However, the Theory of Relativity furnishes evidence which has more weight in the repudiation of physical substances than the mere fact of dispensing with its notion. Thus an easy derivation from the Lorentz equations of tranformation shows that size, shape, and nfass, the three properties the invariance of which would. condition the sameness of substances, are relative properties, which means that they vary with the change of perspectives and therefore cannot determine unambiguously the identity of a physical substance. And in the absence of any identifying property there is no ground for the belief that there are physical bodies which can retain their identity through change. It should also be observed that, in any event, one cannot use the argument from the existence of physical sustances against relativity of simultaneity because one might as well use this relativity as an evidence against the reality of substances. For a substance as a physical body presupposes the spatial togetherness of all its parts, which cannot be granted without qualification once absolute simultaneity and therefore ' instantaneous interaction between the parts within a spatial ' whole is denied. But the opponent of relative simultaneity, even "if con- vinced that physical substance is resolvable into a series ofRELATIVITY OF SIMULTANEITY 55 successive events, might still use the last version of the story about the twips in his persistence that some events even on two different world-lines are contemporaneous in a non- relative sense. He might argue that the complete symmetry of the two journeys with respect to the earth implies that both had the same duration in the sense of the same number n of units of time, say of seconds, and therefore the ageing of both twips was the same. But this observation implicitly identifies the standpoint of the earth with respect to which both trips are symmetrical with the standpoint of an arbiter, overlooking the fact that the earth itself iy moving relatively to other bodies from the standpoints of which the paths of the twins would not appear symmetrical. Furthermore, the anti-relativist version of the story is at fault in assuming that either of the twins can consider himself at rest; this assump- tion is a mistake because both twins undergoing acceleration should know that they are both moving. Let us, however, for the sake Of argument, ignore these important points, and let us suppose jhat on the meeting of the twins they both agree that their trips lasted n seconds and that, because of the same beginning and end of the trips, their seconds were of the same duration and so the two sets of seconds taken in the order of chronological sequence could be set in one-one correlation of absolute simultaneity. Even on this supposi- tion, while it is true that with respect to a standpoint which is possible on the completion of a journey the duration of time-units is tRe same for both travellers, it may be no less true that while the journey was in progress the duration was not the same. Two telegraph poles if brought together to the same place would be the same in length, but as they stood apart in the street they were at once larger and smaller than one another as witnessed by two observers of whom each was standing by one of the poles. Being used to rela- tivity of length, we, easily understand that it is incorrect to say that the poles are really equal in length even while distant from one another, and we recognize that both56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY observers were right. It is the same kind of understanding that is required of the opponent of the Theory of Relativity in order to have him converted. The source of reluctance to be converted into a relativist is the belief that there is an essential distinction between the measure of a duration and the duration as it is in itself. And in a sense there is, but not in the sense which is constitutive of an objective non-relative order of events in time, since a duration in itself is an act of self-experience which, being the private aspect of an event, is incommensurable with any other event. In so far as events can be compared in duration or put in an order of simultaneity and succession, this must be done from the station-point of an outsider-percipient and is based on measurement, since it is the outsider-percipient who supplies the standards of comparison and arrangement. Or, to put it in other words, as long as an event is taken as having a definite size in space and time, its size is equivalent to its measures of space and time. Those wHo oppose the identification of duration with its measure are likely to be misled by a belief in the reality of time as a uniform flow of moments which is different from the succession of events. On the basis of this belief it is only natural to contrast a non-relative process as a definite amount of the flow of time with the measures of this process which are contingent on the choice of a unit-duration. But natural as it is, this con- trasting is really incorrect, for if the process to be measured is non-relative so is the duration chosen asthe nit of measure- ment, and therefore regardless of the contingency in the choice of the unit the operation of measurement must lead to a result in which the measure discloses the feal amount of time. However, this point need not be pressed because the belief that the flow of time is distinct from the corre- sponding train of events is untenable: apart from happenings there is no time, and to speak of a certain amount of time is the same as speaking of the corresponding number of hap- penings, which is relative to the frame of reference just asRELATIVITY OF SIMULTANEITY 57 the duration of a happening is. At first it would seem that the number of happenings cannot be relative, and one is ready to assert that “if” a certain number of events hap- pened it must have happened with respect to any standpoint. But this assertion is not true because its “if” is used in the sense of the temporal “when,” which again involves the fallacy of extending a local date to regions elsewhere, thereby invoking absolute simultaneity. If, on the other hand, relativity of simultaneity and of duration is accepted, the number of happenings must be relative also, since the extent of any duration depends on the number of happen- ings in it. For example, the duration of a second is relative and this means that while an observer in the undashed system registers one tick of his watch, he will judge that a single tick of 2 watch in the primed system is not yet com- pleted. Relativity of simultaneity wjll hardly provoke any further protest if one*realizes, as it is explained in the next chapter, that simultaneity is equivalent to physical space and that physical space must be distinguished from perceptual space precisely because it is relative to the observer's state of motion.CHAPTER IV PHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE Tux interval of time and the distance between two events E, and £, are not invariant with respect to observers in relative motion, but the square of the space-time interval (or of the separation) given by (14) f=—24 eA, remains the same quantity under the transformations of coordinates. Accordingly the separation s may be repre- sented by a straight line in a plane of space-time.* The representation may be visualized as a spatial straight line when one of the axes of the plane symbolizes imaginary time, but this procedure is misleading because the separa- tion s which corresponds to a body in unifofm motion is, unlike a straight line in space, the longest line between the world-points at which E, and EF, occur. In order to understand this peculiarity of the world-line of a body in uniform rectilinear motion, suppose this line to be divided into a number of equal segments of separation A\5, while its components x and ¢ are likewise divided into the same number of equal elements of distance A x and of equal time-element At. In other words, for any given element A of the separation s in the equatiofi A s* = — A x* +A, the elements As, Ax, and At have the same values as for any other element As. Let any other world- line s’ between E, and Ey be also subdivided into the same number of separation elements A s’. The world-line s’ does not represent ~niform-rectilinear motion, but since it has * The form of equation (14) is often preferable to the form “<8 == x8 — c%2,” because the s* of the latter” 1s negative if 2% (the square of the distance between two events) is smaller than cif? (the distance traversed meanwhile by light), which is usually the case.PHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 59 the same end-points £, and E, as s, there is no reason why it should not have the same time-component ¢ as the latter and be divided into the same number of equal time-intervals At. On the other hand the space-component of s’ is not a straight line like x, but must be some longer route betweerr the places where E, and E, occur. Hence at least some distance-elements A x’ will be greater than A x, and there- fore, as the comparison of As*=— Ax#+A# with As*=—Ax*+ cA shows, at least some values of As’ must be smaller than A s. Since s is the sum of all the As and s is the sum of all the As’, it, follows that the straight world-line s is longer than any world-line s’ between the same end-points. Russell remarked that this fact may be an instance of the Principle of Cosmic Boredom, Perhaps to call it an instance of the Principle of Self-assertion, according to which every- thing extends or expresses itself to the utmost within the given limits, Would be more adequate. But whether or not the fact that a sfraight line has different properties in space and in space-time is an instance of some Ontological Prin- ciple, it is certainly significant ag indicating that even the Theory of Relativity recognizes the difference between space and time. This difference is, of course, traceable back to the form s* = x* — c*# as the difference in the signs of the spatial and the temporal components of the separation s. Nevertheless, as a closer examination of this equation shows, the contrast between space and time is not so radical as one might at first expect; in fact, in accounting for different | kinds of values which the separation s can take, the extent to which space and time are convertible into one another can be specified. There are three kinds of values of a space- time separation, negative, positive, and zeros First, there is the time-like interval, when s* is negative and therefore «*<$#. This inequality means that o?c##, the separation s is positive and is called space-like. Since the velocity 2 of a material body cannot exceed c, the world-line satisfying this inequality cannot represent the motion of a material hody and, like- wise, cannot be taken as a time-axis; it may be used only as a space-axis. If it is used as the x-axis of the undashed reference systems, any two events E, and £, on it are simul- taneous there and the distance from one event to the other is smaller than it would be in another (dashed) system where they would not be simultaneous. For according to equation (13) when the time-interval in the dashed system is zero, it is greater than zero in the undashed system and the differ- ence must be compensated by an increase of the spatial distance between the events in the undashed system or else the right-hand side of the equation would not be equal to zero. Under these conditions space may be said to diminish at the expense of time. The third kind of interval, corresponding to the propa- gation of light, gives world-lines which satisfy the condition that «* = c¥## and therefore s* = 0. Since the velocity of light is invariant, the equality x*= c% holds for every reference system if it holds in at least one system. The trans- * This may be shown by using, first, the reference system of the body where the world-line coincides with the time-axis. In sfiy other (dashed) system, moving relatively to the first with the velocity », x = of, and since o is smaller than ¢, x” < ct’ICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 61 formation of toordinates in this case does not convert space into time, or wice versa. The upshot of this is that space and time are convertible into one another, first, in so far as world-lines represent motion or purely temporal change, and, second, in so far as W Fis, 4 world-lines picture simultaneity, which may be transformed into succession, together with alteration of distance. The difference in kind between space and time cannot be erased altogether because the world-lines of the propagation of light can never be anything else, and the world-lines of space cannot be interpreted as either motion or pure change. Since world-lines fall into groups of different significance, the plane of space-time is divided with respect to any62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY observer at the world-point O by two intersecting world- lines of light LL, and LL, into four exclusive regions, two of which consist of time-like and the other two of space-like world-lines, as illustrated in Fig. 4.* ~ This figure has the following interpretation. The world- point O is the origin of the various systems of coordinates under consideration; it represents the present moment of all observers who happen to meet there regardless of their motion relative to one another. Let them all agree, then, that at O the time ¢ is equal to zero. Among the observers one will use the coordinate-axes ct and x, i.e. the observer S does not move along the space-axis x and his world-line coincides with his time-axis. If OA represents a unit of space-time interval (along the world-line of §), then at = 1 according to S's time his space-time location will be at A. A unit of space-time interval, OB, along the x-axis repre- sents, of course, a unit of length in Ss estimation. Let two light-signals be sent at = O from Q, one in the direction of the arrow, the other in the opposite direction. The world- lines of these signals are, respectively, OL, and OL (taking OA to be an interval of one second and OB a length of 186,000 miles). Since nothing can surpass the velocity of light, the world-lines of observers or bodies moving from O in either direction must be traced within the seetion LOL,. This means that no act from O can exert physical influence on anything beyond that section. Analogously, nothing outside the section L,OL, could have physfcal influence on the observers at O. Thus the two sections L,0L, and LOL, are physically independent of 0; they are the loci of space- like intervals. The physical independence of these regions explains the fact of their indeterminate temporal relation to O, which is equivalent to the fact of the relativity of * The space-time plane of this figure, of which the axis ct represents real time, must be distinguished from the space-time of Fig®2. But as 1m that representation, the space-axes x and y are omitted for the sake of simplification.(CAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 63 simultaneity. Whatever happens within L,OL, can affect 0, and therefore is definitely in O’s past. These two sections are the loci of time-like intervals. But the happenings in the other two sections will be dated by different observers variously depending on their states of relative motion. § will assigur t= 0 ‘to every event along the x-axis. But an observer S’ passing by O with some velocity 9 will have some different locus of simultaneity Ox’. The world-line of S’ coincides with his time-axis cf’ at a right angle to x’ in the semi- Euclidean space-time (the angle x’Oct’ cannot be properly represented in the Euclidean plane of Fig, 4). The deter- mination of events at unit-intervals for various observers at O is given by the locus of world-points satisfying the equation of a space-time interval of a unit length «* — c= + 1. If space-time were Euclidean, points distant a unit-interval would lie on a circle with O as its centre, but owing to the sign-difference of the spatial aed the temporal components the geometry éf space-time is semi-Euclidean and the world- points at an interval of one unit from O lie on a rectangular hyperbola g of which one branch is given by g = 1 and the other by g= — 1. Thus 4’, whick is the meeting-point of the world-line of the observer s’ with the upper branch of the hyperbola is an event which is one second later than O in the estimation of S’. The world-lnes of the light-rays LL, and LL, are the asymptotes of the rectangular hyperbola g and as such they do not meet it, or, if one prefers, they meet it at infinity. Thérefore any space-time distance such as OP, where P is not infinitely distant, falls short not only of a ‘unit-interval but of any finite space-time magnitude. This is another way of saying that the space-time intervals along a world-line of light are equal to zero, although, of course, in the reference-systems of S or S’ light-messages take a finite time to cover a finite distance. Fig. 4 may be used, for the explanation of the distinction between physical and perceptual space. Physical space as contrasted with time can be defined as all events in nature64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY at any given moment ¢. When # = 0, physica: space consists of events simultaneous with O. But this definition is ambi- guous because of relativity of simultaneity. Observers at O in relative motion have different determinations of simul- ‘taneity and so have, each, a different physical space. For example, the physical space of S is given by all eventé on his s-axis, while the physical space of S’ coincides with the x-axis. Thus there are many physical spaces; nevertheless, they all have one feature in common, they consist of events which are physically independent of any observer at O. Perceptual space, on the other hand, consists of all events instantaneously given in the act of perception, and to that extent dependent on the percipient. The question whether the perceived events are identical with the events of physical space obviously depends on the question whether or not the fact that contemporary events are physically independent of the percipient precludes: the latter from seeing them directly. Different answers to this question are given by the three major theories of perception, the representative, the presentative, and the compromise theory. As it is well known, the principle of the representative theory to the effect that we perceive only pictures of external events is in direct opposition to the assertion of the presentative theory that the external world is given directly in the original; the compromise theory makes allowance for direct presen- tation of certain factors of the physical world and for perception by representation of others. The following exposition of these theories is given from the point of view of their bearing on the distinction between physical and perceptual space. The extent to which they conform to the theory of relativity is the basis of criticism of them. In the representative theory of perception the visual data are taken to be the reactions of the percipient (of his eye or brain) stimulated by physical processes transmitted by light-rays from distant events. These events must be distin- guished from the visual data as the sender of a message isPHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 65 distinguished rom the message. But the sources of the visual data arg not in the physical space of the observer; the more distant they are the longer it takes a light-carrier to bring the report about them to the percipient and therefore the more removed to the past with respect to his physical spacesthey are. Suppose the observer at O in Fig 4 is an astronomer on the earth who is witnessing the emergence of a sun-spot. He is looking in the direction of the arrow and he might think that he sees T;, as the position of the sun-spot. But if what he sees is a report transmitted by the light-rays from the sun, he is being informed about a happening T which is already eight minutes past, sinte it takes about eight minutes for light to travel from the sun to the earth; and so he would err if he thought that he was informed about anything at 7, which is the actual position of the sun at the moment of observation. This illustration shows that the sources of what the percipient sees are not contem- poraneous with him but are located along the routes OL, and OL;. And if it is granted that visual data are reports about their soufces, the perceptual space of vision may be said to represent events, like the world-point J, along the world-lines OL, and OL,. It follows that the perceptual + space of observers at O is, unlike their physical space, not relative to, their systems of coordinates, for regardless of their state of motion the world-lines of light are for all of them the same routes OL, and OL,. But although the per- ceptual space of vision being a representation of the world- lines of light is mvariant, as a complex of visual data which is not located at its source it must be distinguished from these world-lines in the same way in which a picture is distinguished from its original. To the question where perceptual space is, the correct answer would be where the perceptual data are and the latter are where the percipient 18; in the above illustration they are at 0. Of course, there is a difficalty in saying that the whole space of vision is at a single world-point 0, but it is not so much the exact location z66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY | of perceptual data as their not being at the orjginal sources which the representative theory is anxious to, establish. So far as the exact location is concerned, some adherents of the theory refer to the percipient’s body or, more specifically, to the retina of his eye, but others would welcome the idea of referring perceptual data to a single physical world-point as supporting their belief that the whole expanse of vision is mental in its nature.* Whether mental or not, perceptual space of the repre- sentative theory is distinguished in its location from the space of its physical sources, and this distinction allows for the possibility that perceptual space may be Euclidean even if the interrelated physical events of the external world should have a non-Euclidean structure. And because of the witnessing of intuition that space is Euclidean it is important to have this possibility open. The evidence of intuition is often too easily dismissed on the ground of the existence of occasions in which our geometrical intuition-és misled by faulty drawings into “proofs” of absurd “theorems.” It must not be overlooked that intuition expiates its occasional errors by detecting inaccuracies of misleading drawings and correcting them, and its standards of correction are, of course, the exact figures of Euchdean geometry. At most the existence of errors shows that intuition is not so much actual exercise in apprehending Euclidean patterns as the capacity for such exercise. This may be better understood by analogy * Identity in structure of the space of dreams and fancies with the space of perception 1s evidence in favour of the mental status of the latter, granted that the former 1s mental For it would seem that the two lands of space differ only in ther pragmatic sign*fcance, while there is no physical counterpart to the figures of dreams or imagina~ tions, there 1s a defimte correlation between perceptual data and physical occurrenge according to which images at close range indicate ammunent happenings and the morease of perceptual distance shows the growing difficulty of access to the corresponding physical processes. ‘Thus space of perception, though a repository of messages from the physical past, 1s in effect a map of eventualities which aré physical comcidences of the future.PHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 67 with logical jptuition, which is also capable of straightening itself after having been caught unawares in a logical trap of some argument The possibility of doing justice to the intuition of space in the representative theory can be used as a vindication of Kant’s belief in the a priori Euclidean form *of experience, since the space of experience is per- ceptual space. Physical space-time may well be non-Eucli- dean, but then it is beyond the scope of experience. Thus the representative theory gives the maximum distinction between physical and perceptual space and takes contemporaries to be independent physically as well as inaccessible to one another perceptually, The presenta- tive theory is at one with the representative theory in up- holding complete independence among contemporary ex- ternal events, but it excludes the possibility of perceptual space having a structure different from the structure of physical space. For according to the presentative theory, although the contemporary events along the x-axis cannot be perceived by an observer S at O, the events which can be perceived are seen in the original and therefore are seen as an exhibition of the actual structure of the external world. The events which are perceivable at O are therefore not mere images representing whatever happens along the world-lineg L,0 and L,0; they are these happenings them- selves. But, of course, when the act of observation takes place, all these events are in the past. And this would seem to be a real difficulty confronting the presentative theory. If past events can be perceived in the original at the present moment, it would seem that these events are capable of accomplishfug the impossible feat of being at once past and present. In order to meet this difficulty without abandoning the premises of the theory, certain refined distinctions have been introduced into the theory by McGilvary.* His basic distinction is drawn between the physical (and physiological) *E 3 McGilvary, “Perceptual and Memory Peaspectives,” The Fournal of Phalosophy, 1983, PP- 309-330-68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY conditions of a visual perspective and the conditioned com- plex which consists of the perceptual-data, antl the point he wishes to make is that the structure of the latter need not be a replica or even have a remote resemblance to the structure of the former. For example, among the physical conditions which determine the astronomer’s observation of the sun-spot there is the condition that the light-rays from the spot must reach his observation-post; nevertheless, the spot as seen by him is where the sun is and not at the obser- vation-post. The position of the visual datum is different from the position of the physical stimulus, even though the appearance of the datum is conditioned by the occurrence of the stimulus. Analogous reasoning leads -McGilvary to a justification of the thesis that a past event can be directly perceived. The arrival of the light- ray which is the physical condition of sighting the emergence of the sun-spot has a later date than the actual emergence, since it takes about eight minutes for the light-ray to travel‘rom the sun to the earth, but because the date of what js seen need not be a replica or even have remote proximity to the date of its physical condition, the astronomer is capable of seeing the original emergence at its original time. As McGilvary puts it: “On the arrival of the light at the earth what is included in the perspective is physically past.” Ths perspec- tive-data are visually simultaneous with the percipient act even when they are physically in the past. In using Fig. 4 to illustrate this conclusion of McGilvary one*would have to say that the observer at O can see the original event T on LL, in spite of the fact that the time-interval 0,0 must have elapsed before the act of seeing T from O could'take place. And this is equivalent to saying that once the act of seeing is stimulated, it conditions a “timeless grasp” on all events of the past along the route OZ,. Now, if this “timeless grasp” were taken to be conditioned by an instantaneous physical propagation of the act of seeing, it should be rejécted as incompatible with the Theory of Relativity. But the TheoryPHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 69 of Relativity itself might suggest a different interpretation of the vision’s field of “timeless grasp” which would make the latter a legitimate notion. For while a light-ray has a finite velocity the separation between the events on its world-line is zero, and this implies that in its own reference- systemn there is no time separation either. The “timeless grasp of all events along OL” might be taken as just another way of expressing this fact. Of course, such a “timeless grasp” cannot be an accomplishment of a physical process. But the act of seeing may not suffer from the limitations of a material process. And ifit does not, then while the astronomer registers T at a later time than the time of the occurrence of T because relatively to his frame of reference the motion of the light-ray takes the physical time 0,0, the astronomer’s act of visioning has the frame of reference of the light-ray and therefore in the perspective conditioned by the act of visioning the event at O and the event at T are not tem- porally sepafated. It might seer that the apparent difficulty of the presenta- tive theory is thus turned to its advantage by giving a con- crete interpretation to the otherwise puzzling zero-intervals of a world-line of the propagation of light. Nevertheless, I think the identification of the reference-system of vision with the referemtce-system of light is, if anything, a weak spot in the presentative theory for at least two reasons. In the first place, the nature of the propagation of light is itself too obscure to be ved for clarifying other obscurities.* Secondly, if no objection is raised against exempting vision from the restrictions imposed on the processes of matter, there would seem to be opened an even more attractive prospect of lifting all physical restrictions on vision, in which case the observer S at O might be capable of seeing the simultaneous * For example, Russell has pomted out the difficulty that there must be temporal order of events along a world-line of light even though their temporal separation is zero Cf. Analysis of Matter, p. 70. Similar difficulties are discussed in White’s The Critique of Phystcs.70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY events along the x-axis even though physigally he were independent of these happenings. But the defect in question is far from being decisive in giving preference to the repre- sentative theory. For the latter also makes a point which is offered as a feature of agreement with the Theory of Rela- tivity, but which on closer examination is shown to have rather the opposite effect. The point in question is concerned with “self-transcendence” in perception. It has often been remarked that the observable events required by the Theory of Relativity can be reduced to observations of coincidence, like the coincidence of the pointer with some graduation on the scale or the dial of a measuring instrument, i.e. to “pointer-readings” which are events that do not occur beyond the immediate neighbourhood of observers. What- ever transcends such immediate observations can be treated as a logical construction which is a system of correlation of these observations. Now the representative theory takes this to be in accord with its own restriction of perceptual data to the location of percipients. The adherents of the representa- tive theory accuse the presentative theory of the “fallacy of self-transcendence,” of which the perception in the present of a past event is a special instance. In general terms “self- transcendence” in perception is the alleged capacity of a percipient to possess at his own location percetual data which are said to take place elsewhere. An assertion of “self-transcendence” might appear to be a a fallacy if it is taken to mean the percipient’s capacity to bé at once where he is and also, within the range of his vision, where he is not. It has already been admitted that this criticism is well founded so far as a present act is supposed to transcend itself in coming in touch with the past. And it must be further granted that as a principle without qualifications “self- transcendence” is certainly inadmissible. Nevertheless, when properly qualified it must be recogrized as constitutive of the very meaning of perceptual perspective regardless of one’s theory of perception. Thus even the representativePHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 7 theory implieg “self-transcendence” by making a distinction between the observer's station-point and the perceptual data in thé perspective determined by his station-point. The perspective-data have a certain expanse, ie. many points, and so cannot be located at the single station-point of the percipient; which means that from the percipient’s standpoint other points than it are given to it, which surely is a case of the standpoint’s “self-transcendence.” The physical station-point must be itself a single point and not an expanse of points, for if it were an expanse it would be a simultaneous cooperation of the points within the expanse in determining the corresponding perspective. But such a cooperation of simultaneous points is excluded by the Theory of Relativity._Even if it could be granted that the station- point is an expanse, the representative theory cannot identify this expanse with the expanse of the field of per- ception so long as perceptuab space is said to be mental or, at least, different in structure from physical space of which the expanse of she station-point is presumably one region.* “Self-transcendence” takes place in any perceptual perspec- tive, whether mental or physical, representative or direct, because in any such perspective there is the distinction between the observer’s station from which the survey proceeds and the perspective-data thus surveyed. Explicit recognition of “self-transcendence” by the presentative theory is a merit, for it provides a means for envisaging external event? as unified in a single physical world at least to the extent to which they are capable of being unified in a * It 1s sofftetimes argued that the expanse of the perceptual. field comcides with some region of physical space, for example with the retina of the percipient’s eye Even so the expanse of the perceptual field would not be the same as the expanse of the Station-pomnt. Thus im monocular vision the expanse of the station-pomt, which is the expanse of the eye’s lens, since it 1s the lens which collects the light- rays from the source-évents and refracts them towards the retina, is different from the expanse of the retina, which 18 supposed to be the screen for the data of sight.72 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY single act of perception. On the contrary, the pepresentative theory, in holding that the range of perception does not transcend the region of the percipient and in accepting the fact that this region is physically independent of other contemporary regions, is at a loss in the face of the unity of the physical world, and would rather describe nature as a collection of disconnected island regions.* But just as the advantage of the representative theory (in avoiding the difficulty of the notion of perception of the past) was held to be not decisive in the choice between the rivalling theories of perception, so- now its disadvantage cannot be given enough weight for proclaiming the presentative theory definitely superior. For although the presentative theory connects the past with the present through perception, it leaves the simultaneous events of the external world just as disconnected as they are according to the representative theory. If the disconnecteditess of contemporaries were absolute, one would be inclined to agree with Russell that “spatial distance does not directly represent any physical fact, but is a rather complicated way of speaking about the possibility of a common causal ancestry or posterity.” If one wishes to argue against the “degradation” of physical space into a “complicated way of speaking,” one would welcome a theory of perception which mékes allow- ance at least for seeing the regions of physical space. So far as I know the only theory satisfying this requirement has been worked out by Whitehead and is not so much a varia- tion of the presentative theory as a compromise between the two rivalling theories. The essential point of the compromise theory is this: while the contemporary regions of space are given to the percipient in the original, the physical processes * This difficulty has led many physicists who are adherents of the representative theory (Eddington, Jeans, Weyl, and others) to con- ceive of the connection between regions of space-time as being’a mental construction. The ensuing idealism 1s in danger of degenerating into solipsism,PHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 3 going on in these regions are given by representation and at a later date. Any contemporary event has a physical aspect which cannot be directly perceived and a regional or posi- tional aspect which is subject to immediate inspection. Perception of the physical aspect which depends on processes of causal delivery is Whitehead’s “perception in the mode of causal efficacy”; immediate presentation of the regional aspect is his “perception in the mode of presentational immediacy.” The interplay between these two modes of perception is described, omitting subtleties of detail, as going through two stages; first, processes of physical and physio- logical causation bring forth to the percipient sense-data which merely represent the distant source-events of the past; next, the percipient’s act of vision “precipitates” these representations onto the regions of his contemporary space. Thus the astronomer at O, while seeing only an image of the sun-spot which originally emenged at T, does not see it at T but at 7;, wilich is in his physical space an exact replica of the spatial positign T. But in seeing the position T, filled up ‘with images of the past the astronomer cannot see, owing to the physical independence of cottemporaries, the actual happenings at T, which are screened by his images. For instance, a spectator who watches an aeroplane over the spire of a church‘five miles away is actually seeing the spot there, five miles away, though the real aeroplane is not there at the moment of observation but is somewhat shifted along the direction of its fight. The compromise theory of Whitehead retains the advan- tages of both the presentative and the representative theories without shafing i in their respective weaknesses. It even goes further than the presentative theory in asserting the unity of the physical world as disclosed in perceptions Yet it escapes the paradox of the past as directly perceived in the present.* * Takethe case of an astronomer’s recording of the explosion of a distant star, which 1s a recording in the present of an event that hap- pened centuries ago. The presentative theory is in the predicament of4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY Also, by distinguishing between regional properties directly given to perception and physical properties represented by images, the compromise theory has the merit, this time n common with the representative theory, of allowing per- septual space to differ in structure from physical space. But, the reader must be warned, Whitehead parts company with the Theory of Relativity when the latter leaves behind the Special Theory and opens the chapter of the General Theory. For the thesis of the General Theory can be put negatively as the abolishing of distinctions between physical and regional properties. The following considerations, which have already been touched on in the first chapter, form the sketch of a new version of the presentative theory, profiting from Whitehead’s accomplishment and at the same time adapting itself to the doctrines of the General Theory of Relativity In giving this version I shall use again the illustration of the astronomer registering the emergence of the sun-spot. The size of the sun-spot varies with the distance from which it 1s observed. ‘The largest size A would be observable in the neighbourhood of the sun. The size B, observable from the earth, is much smaller; a still smaller size C would appear to an observer on Neptune; and so on. A, B, C, and any other observable size of the spot are, according to the presentative theory, actually at the sun relatively, each, to the corresponding station-point of observation. When the station-point 1s the earth the size is B, which does not maké the other sizes unreal. Nevertheless, they are not apparent to the astrono- mer on the earth and their reality would seem to be their potentiality of appearing when and if the stdtion-point is asserting that although the star exploded long ago and therefore does not exist now, fs explosion takes place now in the perspective of perception. The representative theory 1s content to hold that the astronomer registers the present 1mage of a past event ‘The compromise theory explains that the astronomer perceives the actual region of the explosion, although the explosion is merely an illustration of that region which screens the actual processes gong on there.PHYSICAL AND PERCEPTUAL SPACE 15 shifted from the earth to other planets. Each size of the sun-spot is associated with a different date. Thus if B is registered by the astronomer at noon, A could be seen in the neighbourhood of the spot at eight minutes to twelve, and C would, be seen from Neptune sometime in the early after” noon. Now just as we have referred the location of the different sizes A, B, C, etc., to the same event at the sun, that 1s to the emergence of the sun-spot, let us now refer their various associated dates to that same event. We shall say the date of the emergence of the sun-spot of the size 4 is eight to twelve relatively to its neighbourhood, but the same spot has another date, twelve o'clock, associated with another size relatively to the earth. Taking the astronomer’s standpoint, all she dates except twelve o’clock must be pro- nounced merely potential. Conversely, at the place where an event occurs, its occurrence has a single actual date and a number of later potential dates*which are referred to various distant standpoints of observation. We are in a position now to answer the question where and when the event which the astronomer sees takes place. It takes place at the emergence of the sun-spot when the latter emerges. Thus it is not a representative, but an original, aspect of the original emer- gence. Nor is it a mysteriously resurrected past. For the appearance B which the astronomer sees at noon has not and could not be seen before from anywhere. Of course, the sun-spot could be seen before in its neighbourhood, but only in a different aspect A which could not be registered either then or later from a distant standpoint This theory can be summed up by saying that an event has many dates in the same sense in which it has many sizes and many shapes, i.e. relatively to different standpoints. It is a version of the presentative theory because it uses te principle of the relativity of characteristics of an event by including dates im the range oftits application. The theory of multiple dates is promising as a means of solving the paradox of the past. It is a mere truism that a76 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY past event is past and therefore does not exist. On the other hand, if only the present were real, then the space-time of Relativity would be a myth. The solution lies in the idea that the date which is actual in the neighbourhood of an event never recurs elsewhere, so that in this sense the event passes away irretrievably; in another sense it never dies because it has an inexhaustible store of dates to be actualized in the future from some distant point of observation. But this will be better understood after the forthcoming dis- cussion of change. Also the adaptation of the proposed version of the presentative theory to the requirements of the General Theory of Relativity can be profitably discussed only after the exposition of the latter.CHAPTER V EVENT AND CHANGE ‘Tae space-time of Relativity consists of world-points which in some way represent actual events in the physical world. It is tempting to say that the world-points are events, but in order to justify identification there are at least two diffi- culties to be overcome. A world-point as an extensionless entity which differs from an ordinary point only in having a fourth coordinate ¢ besides the three spatial coordinates, x, J, % is a conception to which nothing actual corresponds. On the contrary, an event as a manifestation of actuality must have a finite extension in order to be capable of show- ing its physical characteristics to a percipient. Again, while a world-point as a term of the system of unalterable relation- ships of spacetime is itself timeless, an event as perceived from a given standpoint exists only in the present, while the act of perception fasts, and disappears with the emergence of a successor. The first difficulty would be eliminated if world-points were reinterpreted in terms of actuality in a way which would allow,for the association of a set of four coordinates with each point, as well as for the application of the theorems of four-fold geometry. This has been done by Whitehead, who defines a world-point to be not a single event, but a class of correlated events, or rather a construction, of which the terms are actual events, and he arrives at his definition by using the so-@alled Method of Extensive Abstraction.* But an * The interpretation of a world-pomnt 1s achieved by applying the ‘Method twice, the first application results in definin8 a moment as a set of durations satisfying the conditions (a) that every duration of the set encloses some other duration of the set, and (6) that there 1s no last duratign in the set; the second application gives the definition of a pomt at a moment, Le. of a world-point, as a set of certain volumes withm the moment satisfying analogous conditions. One of such sets78 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY exammation of this Method will show that, although suc- cessful in translating the language of extensionless entities into the language of extended events, it is worked out in disregard of the other difficulty of explaining world-points in terms of events, which arises from the contrast between the timelessness of world-points and the transience oftevents. For one of the assumptions of the Method is that there exists a set comprising events connected by the relation of extend- ing over, like the set of which the members are: a given day, an hour within that day, a minute within the hour, a second within the minute, etc. This assumption does not fit in with facts; no such Set can exist because its members cannot co-exist; for example, if the percipient’s present is within a given second there is no member which is the hour extending over the second, because no actual event éan spread itself beyond the present into the past or future. In other words, Whitehead’s set of events are objectionable because their members would be, in part, past events andefuture events, whereas in fact events as actual happenings are always in the present. But a proper estimation of this objection must be preceded by a demonstration together with an explana- tion of the assertion that there are no actual events except in the present. Of course, the definition of an event as gn agent-act implies that the event must be present since there is no acting in the past or in the future. But if a formal proof is required, it is found in McTaggart’s famows argument that time is unreal in so far as this argument does not go astray. McTaggart starts from two fundamental premises; the first a of volumes 1s what would be usually called a set of concentric spheres. ‘Thus a world-pomnt is shown to be neither a sumple nor a single entity, but a highly complex set of sets the ultumate members of which are events. The reader interested m a more satisfactory account than this footnote 1s referred to the popular expositions by Whitehead (The Concept of Nature), © D Broad (The Saentyice Thought), S. L Stebbing (4 Modern Introduction to Logic), and to Whitehead’s technical version an The Prinaples of Natural Knowledge,EVENT AND CHANGE 79 is the proposition that if time is real it must involve change, the second defines change as the fact that the same event is, m turn, future, present, and past. Then he argues that since the mcompatible characteristics of being future, present, and past cannot belong to the same entity at once, the notions of event, change, and time involve impossibility and thus are pure fictions. It is true that the incompatible temporal characteristics do not belong to the same event simul- taneously, but this does not weaken McTaggart’s argument because to say that they characterize an event in succession is saying that they characterize 1t with respect to different moments, and this merely removes the impossible feat of having at once three incompatible characteristics from events to moments each of which, like events, must be future, present, ‘and past. Besides, the distinction between having characteristics at once and in succession presupposes the reality of time and so canngt be relied on in refuting an argument agamst its reality. There is no doubt that McTag- eae own conclusion that time 1s a fiction cannot be ac- ted, and since it follows from his premises a fault must be found in the latter And since change is obviously essential to time, it is the other premise which is false. Thus it is false that an event should have more than one of the three incom- patible chargcteristics of being past, present, and future. Hence there are no events except in the present, since it is a fact that there are events in the present. Our mourning for the dead is incontrovertible evidence of emotional experience in support of the conclusion. But whether or not this conclusion should be directed against the Method of Extensive Abstraction depends on its interpretation. In the first place, in saying that all events are in the present one must mean all events on the same body, for example, on the earth, since according to the Theory of Relativity there are many events elsewhere which have no 4bsolute or unambiguous temporal relations to the local events. Then there is a more fundamental restriction80 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY concerning the sense in which the term event is used. The possibility was already mentioned that an aspect of an event may have a perspective-date which is different from the date of the source-event. It is obvious that in confining the event to the present all its perspective-dates are dis- regarded so that it is present at the date of the tource- event. But the source-event is the act as it is experienced by itself (in the sense of experience which does not imply con- sciousness), in other words, it is the event in its private aspect. And an event in its private aspect is not an experience of a bounded entity, since an event cannot survive itself in order to become cognizant of its own beginning and end. Accordingly, in the sense in which an event is strictly in the present, no question concerning its size should arise at all because size has meaning only when referred to a bounded entity. This consideration is important as a vindication of Whitehead’s method. The fact that events in their private aspects are always in the present is not detrimental to the method because the latter is concerned with events in their public aspect, since in using the relation of extending over it presupposes a comparison of events with respect to size. ‘The size of an event is one of its public achievements because it is shown to and measured by outsiders. And in being thus measured the size is recorded and the record-can be used for comparison with records of other events quite inde- pendently of whether or not their sources are still in exis- tence. Thus Whitehead’s definitions may ‘be made entirely unobjectionable by means of a slight reformulation; instead of saying that a moment is a set of events satisfying certain conditions of extending over each other we shall say that a moment is a set of recorded sizes or measures of events satisfying the same conditions.* * In hus Process and Reality Whitehead arrives at the definition of a point by a new version of the Method of Extensive Abstraction which as in terms of regions of events and not in terms of events themselves and therefore does not suffer from the difficulty of the orginalEVENT AND CHANGE 81 In reconciling Whitehead’s method with facts, the obser- vation was made that the size of an event is a perspective property. One might think that this observation interferes with any definite statement about the size of events because the same event has different sizes in different perspectives, But the difficulty is spurious: there are many general pro- positions about the size of an event which are true from any standpoint and therefore can be stated with complete disregard of the specific considerations of perspectives. The most general statement is to the effect that the size of an event must be sufficient for the exhibition of its charac- teristics. It is for this reason that one musf reject the notion of extensionless instantaneous actual events. No character- istic can appear at a single point or at a single moment, for any “show” réquires a stage with an expanse in space or time. For example, a colour necessarily occupies a region of some finite size. But the fact that an event must have a size which allowsfor the manifestation of its properties does not mean that it is the minimum size for such a manifestation, since the same e¥ent has different sizes in different perspec- tives.* Nevertheless, it is true that a single event is never very large; at least so far as its duration is concerned, it is short-lived, so that any long duration is a process and not a . version The new version 1s developed as a postulational system in which the postulates determine a non-metrical continuum with un- differentiated of space and tume * The reader may be reminded again that in discussing size of events we are concerned with perceptual events, 1 ¢. with the happenings which take place in the perspective of a percipient Besides “(perceptual size” there 18 “foug-dimensional size” of a physical event, but the latter cannot be experienced at all and 1s to be figured out as an invariant magnitude correlating different perspective sizes. If, owing to the plurality of perspective sizes, the question 1s presseq which of them is to be selected for discussion, the answer 1s that it is entirely a matter of convention. For the purposes of measurement it 1 the maximum size which 1s usually selected, 1.¢. the size which is determined in the ammediat® neighbourhood of the measured body and by using the coordinate-system of the latter. F82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY single event. The distinction between a process and an event must, however, be explained with greater precision. An event does not undergo change; it comes into being, lasts for a while, disappears, but while it lasts its nature remains the same. If this were not so, an event would be indistinguishable from a substance, since it would be an entity which remains the same through alteration. An event is a “quantum of time”; its beginning and end must appear at once together with its whole content, for if they should occur as successive phases, there would be not one event but as many events as there were phases. It is for this reason that a perceptual event does not last long; the act of perceiving, subject to physiological weaknesses, introduces alteration when prolonged beyond certain limits, that is, the replacement of one perceptual event by another. When- ever such an alteration, no matter how slight, takes place, there is process and not a single event. For example, in glancing at a coloured spot you will see a sense-datum or a perceptual event, but if you continue looking at the same spot your attention invariably weakens, which brings forth some alteration in the sense-datum, and this is equivalent to saying that there is more than one perceptual event and therefore there is a process. But suppose that instead of trying to prolong the same act of perception yau continue to see the same coloured spot through a rapid succession of several acts of perception, the question is whether in this case, owing to the persistence of the perceptual content, there is an extension of the same event rather than a process. Now this case might, perhaps, be dismissed as a fiction, because it is likely that as one act of perceptron replaces another some alteration in the datum is inevitable. But if, for the sake of the argument, we grant the supposition, we can still show that it involves a process. Let us call the unchanging perceptual datum A and the successive acts of perceiving it a1, ag, a3, 24, etc. Now suppose we omit all acts with even subscripts, then a,, ag, etc., separated by gaps,EVENT AND CHANGE 83 certainly would be directed each to a distant event, Again, suppose that it is the acts with odd subscripts which are omitted; then a, a, etc., are seen to be apprehending dis- tinct events separated by gaps. But the original case of perception without gaps contains nothing except what the acts With either odd or even subscripts contain and therefore must likewise involve a plurality of distinct events. This illustration, even if it is fictitious, shows that a process need not undergo perceptible alteration, although as a general rule processes do display some change in the per- ceptual datum. What distinguishes a process from a single event is then the fact that the latter cannot be a function of more than one act of apprehension.* But while a single event must not therefore exceed in duration the act of per- ception there remains the question as to whether or not their durations coincide. This question leads to the problem of temporal change because if perceptual events had shorter spans of tite than the corresponding acts of perception, there would be gbservable change within a single act. I shall define change as replacement of one event by another, the events concerned taking place on the same body and referred to a percipient at rest with respect to that body, preferably in its neighbourhood. This definition is in terms of perceptual events and is more ultimate than the definitions in terms of processes or propositions or characteristics, in the sense that these are entirely resolvable into, and at tRe same time cannot be understood without the help of, some version of the former. That change appro- priate to processes 1s less ultimate than change as replace- * In determining the duration of a perceptual event as a function of the percipient-act there might be danger of neglecting the co- ordmation of the perceptual event with its physicaPsource if the latter were more lasting than the pereipient-act. This danger turns out to be neghgible because elementary events of physics are found to be shorter 12 duration théfn their physiological or psychical counterparts For example, a great number of air vibrations correspond to a single sensation of sound.84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY ment of events follows immediately from the fact that processes are resolvable into events without remainder, but for this very reason when processes are not thus resolved change is attributed to them in a different sense.* We can speak about the internal change in a process or say that there is alteration within a process without admitting that a single event undergoes change precisely because the expression “internal change in a process” is translatable without any loss of meaning into the expression “replace- ment of one unchanging event by others within the duration of a process.” An attempt to define change as a relation between certain propositions is found in Russell’s theory that change is the fact that there are propositions which are trye at one time but not true at another. For example, the proposition “I am at home” is true when I am in, but it is not true whenever I am out, and this fact, according to Russell, is expressed by saying that some temporal change is going ‘On. To this McTaggart objected by producing examples of propositions each of which is likewise true and not true and yet does not involve any temporal charige. Thus if I have two houses it may be at once (i.e. without change in time) true that “I am at home” with respect to one of the houses and not true with respect to the other. McTaggart pointe out that Russell’s examples do not differ in kind from his except in so far as they already presuppose temporal change, since the distinction between “being true and not tre at different dates” and “being true and not true at once” would be * The language in terms of events 18 different from the language in terms of processes for the same reason for which it is different from the language in terms of substances processes like substances are resolvable mto events. The “lingustic” differences between substances and events have been often observed. For example, it 1s possible to sit down on a chair, but one does not sit down on a group of events into which the chair is resolvable. This example is one illustration of the more fundamental difference, viz. while substances interact, irfieraction an terms of events 1s an event which does not belong to any other agent than itself, though it is causally connected with other agents.EVENT AND CHANGE 85, umintelligible without the assumption of temporal change. McTaggart’s criticism may be expressed with greater pre- cision by observing that expressions like “I am at home” are not propositions at all but propositional functions of the form “I am at home at the place x at the date ?’ which, after'the place is specified, gives either true or false proposi- tions depending on the values given to ¢ and these values are different because of change in time. The resulting propositions once true are always true, and once false are always false. This endorsement of McTaggart versus Russell would lead to McTaggart’s conclusion that change is unreal, if all propositions were timelessly true or false. The fact is, however, that there are judgments which, although they are never false, do not remain true. These are perceptual judgments involving events among their constituents which cease to be true as soon as they cease to exist along with the disappearance of their constituient-events. Thus while vindi- cating the cBncept of change such judgments also show that replacement of gvents is the ultimate meaning of change. To illustrate, if the truth of “this is blue” does not last, its cessation merely reflects the fact that the event designated by “this” is replaced by another. Change in the sense appropriate to characteristics is subject to wnalogous considerations, which is perhaps best shown by means of an example. Consider a screen on which the projection of a spot undergoes gradual change of colour through all hus of the spectrum. Although change of shades in this case is temporal it cannot be taken as constitutive of change in time, because the same continuous transition from one fiue of a spectrum to another may be perceived at once, ie. in space and not in time, as, for instance, in glancing at a rainbow. What distinguishestthe exhibition of a spectrum in time from its exhibition in space must be again the fact that, replacement of events takes place in the former but not in the latter exhibition. At first one might think that the analysis of a continuous alteration of charac-86 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY teristics in time into umt-events abruptly replacing one another is artificial and arbitrary and that ontologically nothing short of the whole process of exhibiting the spectrum should be called a unit of time. But one is likely to change his mind if he considers that when a process does not show temporal change at all the persistence of the exhibited characteristics is no less continuous than the change of hue in the spectrum, and yet continuity of persistence did not prevent us from regarding the “persistent” process as resolvable into a number of discrete events. There 1s, how- ever, a difference hetween a process of continuous persistence and a process of continuous change which raises a serious difficulty. The resolution of a “persistent” process mto a number of events does not contaminate any, of them with internal change, but regardless of how short are the events into which a process showing continuous change is resolved it would seem that they all mast display within themselves a gradual alteration of one characteristic into another. The unqualified acceptance of this seeming difference between “persistent” and continuous change not only would render alteration of characteristits more basic than change as replacement of events, but would endanger the conception of events as unchanging units of time. There is no doubt that perception of continuous change exists and wofld involve the above difficulty unless given a special interpretation. Such an interpretation is the theory that to say that one perceives continuous change is, in reality, saying that one does not perceive discontinuity of change. And then the failure of perceiving discontinuity may be explained either by the “blurredness” of the data of perception “or by the replacement of perceptual events within a single act of perception. Which explanation is to be accepted depends on one’s choice of the theory of perception. On the premises of the representative. theory, perception of any change, whether continuous or discontinuous, within one percipient-act is inadmissible because it would meanEVENT AND CHANGE 87 splitting the single act into many. Suppose, first, that by an act of perception we could grasp two or more perceptual events in abrupt succession: let the act A perceive two successive events a, and ay. Since according to the represen- tative theory 4, a, and a, are at the same place, simul- taneity must have the same meaning for all of them, so that if A is contemporaneous with a, and a, (which it is by hypothesis), then a, and a, must also be contemporaneous. But this result contradicts the hypothesis that a, succeeds a, and therefore the hypothesis must be rejected as self-contra- dictory. Another way of arriving at the same conclusion is by observing that A would have to be partly non-existent, since while ay exists a, is already out of existence: to say that A exists and yet is partly non-existent is a self-contra- diction. For similar reasons, a single act cannot be a per- ception of a continuous change of characteristics. Such a change would necessarilysshow different phases which cannot exist at the same time, and therefore if they were grasped within a single act, the latter would have to be again, in part, non-existent. In view of these considerations no other course is open to the representative theory but the assertion that perception of a continuous change is an illusion in the sense that it is an interpretation of certain perceptual*data which do not show, in fact, any temporal change.* Let us try to explain this illusion (without leaving the grounds of the representative theory) by taking the case of perceptual appearance of a body in continuous motion. The recognition that only one changeless phase of motion may * This 1s not the sense in which Russell calls continuous motion a perceptual illusion. He means to contrast physica] motion as a series of discreet events (a flickering process) with its continuous or flowing appearance im perception. It would be a mustake, of which Russell himself 1s perhaps guyty, to interpret this contrast as a refutation of the existence of continuous change; it 1s, m fact, a recognition of the reality of continuous change within the field of perception, since within this field there 1s no distinction between appearance and reality.88 . THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY be given at a time to perception does not interfere with the fact that memory-images of preceding phases almost in- variably accompany it. The extent of difference in the content between the perceptual event and the accompanying memory-images determines the interpretation which one gives to his perception. When the difference is so striking that the memory-images positively do not fit in with the perceptual data, they are removed to the past as recollec- tions; but the discrepancy may be so slight that, although preventing complete identification with the present, it does not call forth reference to the past and then the memory- images are interpreted as the earlier phases of the same perceptual data It may even happen, when the discrepancy is exceedingly small, that perception of continuous change is intermittent with perception of a “persistent” process. For example, in watching a smoothly retreating automobile, without taking note of how ies position changes relatively to the surroundings, one might for a while see the auto- mobile as if it were at a standstill. Of course, so long as the automobile appears thus motionless, there is no perception of continuous motion; the iatter arises as soon as one begins to sense some difference in the automobile’s appearance and yet cannot be sure about it. Negatively perception of con- tinuous motion stands for failure to perceive distontinuity; its positive content is associated with the feeling of hesita- tion aroused by the difference between percepts and memory- images, which is sufficient to prevent their identification and yet is too slight for keeping them apart without confusion. Thus the proposed explanation of the “perception” of con- tinuous motion is the hypothesis that there is failure to observe discontinuity which results from a confusion be- tween a percept ‘and a memory-image. Now such confusion is possible only if the percepts and memory-images are data which allow for a degree of obscurity or-indeterminateness. A simple experiment would seem to be in favour of the existence of indeterminate perception. Move your fingerEVENT AND CHANGE 89 quickly before your eyes. What you will see is not a succes- sion of clear-cut finger-images along the path of motion; it will be the path occupied by what may be called the spread of the finger, i.e. the moving finger will appear as a “splash,” as a blurred image. This explanation of “perception of continuous change” in terms of blurred percepts will arouse strong opposition, for it is commonly believed that the data of perception are always specific and that such adjectives as “blurred,” “indeterminate,” or “vague” must not be applied to them in a literal sense. For example, to say that a city in a fog presents a vague image is merely an indirect way of inti- mating that on a clear day there is more to see, the outlines are more intense, and the colours are brighter. That there is no perception of vagueness in such an example is demon- strated by the successful artist who portrays the foggy view by means of perfectly specific drawings and colours. Again, the impression of vagueness is often created by the baffling complexity of the perceptual data which, however, are specifiable in every detail. This last situation, however, is no evidence against perceptual Yagueness, since the acts of specifying the details are subsequent to the original act of perceiving the whole and the impression from the whole is id@ntical with the act of perceiving the whole. Besides, although there are examples showing how to explain away vagueness of perception, there are examples of another kind. For instance, in a ring, the surface of which is divided into three contiguous segments a, 4, c, each showing a different shade of the same colour, the shades may be arranged in n such a way that while one cannot tell the shade of a from that of 4 or the shade of 4 from that of ¢, the difference between the shades of a and ¢ canbe detected. It would seem that this inability to tell the difference between a and 5 or b and ¢ does not mean complete failure of per- ceiving difference, for there must be some transition in the field of perception from a through b to ¢, or else there wouldgo THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY be no difference between a and c, and whatever transition takes place in the field of perception must be in some sense perceptible. If this consideration were correct, the inability to tell the difference between the shades might be naturally sexplained as an indeterminate perception of their difference. An examination of data within the space of vision furnishes an argument which is even more striking and yet is extremely simple. A visual datum, to be entirely specific, must be specifiable with respect to its characteristics at every point of its surface, but this is impossible since no characteristic can be manifested at a single point and therefore a specific datum of vision is impossible. In speaking of specifiable characteristics at a point we need not mean an ideal point but any area which although visible is too small for showing such characteristics as colour or shape.* And the con- clusion is that if the small areas within the surface are indeterminate in their perceptual nature, the whole surface is an integration of these and so must itself suffer from indeterminacy. The fact that the whole field of visual per- ception is not completely determinate may be observed directly in the appearatice of its fringes which have no clear-cut boundaries but sink gradually into what has been aptly called the twilight-zone of perception. Indeterminacy and change are frequently asSociated. But while the usual attitude towards change makes it the source of indeterminacy, the foregoing argument is an attempt to explain perception of change as a misrepresentation of the more ultimate feature of indeterminacy. A rejection of this argument would be a good reason for giving preference to * In this connection one may recall indeterminacy of the ultra- microscopic phenomena expressed in the Quantum Theory by the proposition that tfie properties of position and momentum of a particle are specifiable at the expense of one another. + An interesting example of perceptual indeterminacy, dealing with the apprehension of numbers, 1s the situation in which one'wees a large crowd and therefore perceives a number of people without being able to specify what this number is.+ EVENT AND CHANGE gr the presentative theory of perception which allows for the possibility. of perceiving change within one act of perception by the recognition that the percipients’ station is at a dis- tance from the perceptual manifestations. Suppose that two physical events E, and E, succeed one another at the same place P and that their perceptual manifestations ¢, and ¢, respectively, are seen from a distant station of a single percipient-act A. Though ¢, visibly replaces ¢,, if their durations are shorter than that of A they will both fall within the span of the latter without rendering A partly non-existent. For the dates of perceptual data are identical with the date of the percipient-act; hence even if perceptual events show the order of replacement of their physical counterparts they do not reproduce the difference in the dates of the latter. One might think, at first, that a change in perceptual content is bound to split the act of perception into a number of “sub-acts,” but this need not be so if one accepts the principle of the presentative theory that there is no correspondence between the structures of the perspective- conditions and of the conditioned-complex, ie. of the perspective data. In accordance ‘with this principle, per- ceptual change (being the conditioned complex) and the percipient-act (being a condition) may be so different in structure that while the former is a plurality the latter is a single entity. The possibility of several perceptual events falling within a single percipient-act, being an explanation of perception of change, is not a sufficient account of the perception of continuous change. But, of course, in order to complete the account om may again refer to the failure of perceiving discontinuity. If, however, one feels uneasy about a negative explanation and at the same time does not*wish to invoke indeterminacy of perception, one might hold that the con- tinuity of transition.of characteristics of perceptual events succeeding one another is of a non-temporal kind, like the continuous transition of hues in a rainbow. It is clear that92 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY although such an attitude is not a solution of difficulties involved in the conception of continuous transition, it emphasizes the important point that these difficulties are shared by both space and time and therefore cannot form a edistinguishing characteristic of the latter. And since this chapter is confined to the distinguishing features of temporal change, the difficulties in question may be disregarded. In conclusion I wish to touch on my reasons for rejecting two spurious solutions of the problem of continuous change. It is often asserted that events in succession are contiguous and not continugus, presumably the closing boundary of an earlier event being in contact with the beginning of its successor. But since every single event is an indivisible quantum of time, it occurs at once, including both its boun- daries. Hence if two events “rub shoulders,” no matter how slightly, they must be given together at once and cannot succeed one another. The other explanation admits abrupt replacement of one event by another, but finds continuity in the relationship between the spatio-temporal regions in which these events occur. This view, in which a line of demarcation is drawn between the regions of events and the events themselves, fits in with the compromise theory of perception and seems to agree with the Special Theory of Relativity. But no more attention will be given%o it, because in turning to the General Theory of Relativity we come across the identification between the physical events and their regions, which may be taken as justifying the belief that where nothing happens there is absolutely nothing.CHAPTER VI THE GEOMETRICAL PICTURE OF NATURE ‘Tum Principle of the Special Theory of Relativity is that the laws of physics must be expressed in equations which are invariant in form under the transformation from one system of coordinates to another when the two systems are in a relative rectilinear uniform motion But the restriction to frameworks in rectilinear uniform motion, has no logical justification, for the form of a law must be independent of the choice of a coordinate system regardless of how the latter moves. The restriction is removed in the General Theory of Relativity by the postulate that the laws of physics have the same form with respect to any coordinate system in arbitrary motion. 4 This postul&ite, allowing for accelerated frames of refer- ence, does not reqpire the existence of a flat space-time. In the Special Theory of Relativity the flat four-fold contmuum is a background against which curvilinear world-lines are distinguished from straight world-lines, the former being representations of accelerated motion and the latter of uniform motion along rectilinear paths. But the property of being rectilinear ceases to be an intrinsic property of a path with the admission of arbitrary systems of reference. In the transformation ftom systems of coordinates in relative rectilinear and uniform motion to an accelerated framework of reference, straight lines appear curvilinear and others straight. T@ understand this, let the reader perform the following experiment. Let him draw a line along the edge of a uler with uniform motion of the pencil. The drawing is a straight line if it was traced on a fixed sheet of paper; it is a curve if the sheet was rotated while the line was drawn. Thus two diffefent lines represent the same physical motion of the pencil along the edge of the ruler. The difference is the94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY result of using two different frames of reference, the fixed and the rotating. It follows that the corresponding difference between the uniform and the accelerated motion is also relative to the frames of reference. Because of this relativity there is no more need for a flat space-time which is a back- ground against which rectilinear paths, as intrinsically distinct from others, can be traced. This removes an impedi- ment to the theory that space-time is curved. Positive evi- dence in favour of this theory is given by an extension of the application of the Method of Geometrical Representation of physical entities. But in order to make this clear some explanation of the meaning of curved space-time is necessary. The curvature of a surface in space may be directly given to perception. Thus we see the difference between the surface of a sphere and of the plane tangent to it, and we say that the former is curved, meaning that it deviates from the two dimensions of the plane towards the direction of the third dimension. But curvature in this scnse might be ascertained without the direct evidence of perception. Imagine the existence of two-dimensional geometers whose range of perception is cenfined to the surface of the sphere which they inhabit. Although these geometers could not perceive the curvature of their world, they might determine it by taking measures of geometrical figures éraced on the surface of the sphere and observing the discrepancy between these measures and the measures which should be obtained if the figures were drawn on a plane It is well known, to take one example, that on a plane the ratio of the diameter of a circle to its circumference is equal to 7 = 3-14. But a two-dimensional geometer would find a srmaller ratio, because the quasi-diameter of the circle drawn on his sur- face would bernot a straight line but a curve between two points of the circumference. And the difference between 7 and his ratio would convince him that he was on a sphere. ‘This illustrates the method of determining curvatifre regard- less of whether or not recourse to perception is possible:THE GEOMETRICAL PICTURE OF NATURE 95 curvature is determined by means of the discrepancy between the properties of geometrical figures which are known to belong to them on a plane and the properties which are actually found by measurement. There is, how- ever, an important complication in the use of this method. The same discrepancy between the actual measures and the theoretical plane-properties might have resulted even if the figures were drawn on a plane if the measuring-rods “mis- FIG. 5 behave,” for example, expand or contract in being moved about And if the two-dimensional inhabitants of the plane were unaware of the queer behaviour of their measuring- rods, they would,falsely believe that they inhabit a curved surface. Fig. 5 will make clear the possibility of such an error. The circlg represents the sphere of the two-dimensional geometers, but the assumption is made that they never go beyond the lower hemisphere which is made of a transparent material and lit up from within so that the shadows of the opaque figures of the geometers and of their measuring-rods are cast ow the tangerft plane P. Let us endow these shadows of the geometers with consciousness together with the wronggo sense of having an independent existence. Under these cir- cumstances whatever is enacted on the plane would be a replica of what takes place on the sphere, and therefore the operations of measurement performed by the geometers on the sphere would be duplicated, with the same numerical “results on the plane by the shadows. And since the shadows do not recognize that they are mere shadows they might conclude interpreting the results of their measurements that they inhabit the surface of a sphere but are unable to per- ceive the curvature because of being two-dimensional. Suppose a three-dimensional observer should try to convince the shadows that they are wrong. He would show them Fig. 5 and would say: “You are unaware of your error, because you do not notice your own expansion in moving from the tangent-point in the direction of the arrow and you imagine that the shadow-rod at 4 is congruent with the shadow-rod at B, just as the geometers on the sphere take it that the corresponding rods a and 4 are congruent.” The observer might then moralize to the effect that the method of determining curvature by means of measurement is unreliable. The difficulty of the method, he would say, is that it is based on the arbitrary assumption that the measur- ing-rod remains invariant in length through displacement. But the shadow-inhabitants on the plane might not accept this criticism of their method; they might point out that the observer is relying on his perceptual data which areas likely as not to be illusions. “Furthermore,” they would argue, “we know that we are independent beings and not mere shadows. Hence if the observer were right with regard to our expansion, this expansion cannot be an optical effect but must be the result of the operation of some physical force, which like the force of gravitation varies with the position of bodies, no matter what their physical properties are. But why bring m such a universal force when it would be much simpler to suppose that the geometers who are said to be on the sphere are in reality our shadows on a plane?”THE GEOMETRICAL PICTURE OF NATURE 97 The shadows’ retort to the observer suggests that measure- ment is as good a means as any in determining the structure of one’s ‘world and that when the results of measuring a curved surface are the same as the results which would be obtained on a plane under the influence of some universal force,sone merely has a choice between two different ways of expressing the same thing: the existence of a certain complexity. It may then be proposed to define curvature as the existence of such a complexity. The reasoning of the imaginary two-dimensional beings may be extended to our own case of inhabiting a world in space or space-time. We cannot perceive ‘the curvature of three- or four-dimensional manifolds, but we should be able to establish it by measurement: there is curvature if there is complexity, f.c. deviation from the properties which are known to characterize a flat mamfold. And in accordance with the argument of the “shadows” we are entitled to believe in the existence of curvature, for we are confronted with the presence of the universal force of gravitation. This is the idea which inspired the General Theory of Relativity, the development of which consists pf further extension of the application of the Method of Geometrical Representation of nature. The Methgd of Geometrical Representation has successful but restricted use m the Special Theory of Relativity. The flat space-time of the Special Theory allows for the distinc- tion between stmight and curvilmear world-lines, and the most is made of this distinction by identifying it with the distinction between unaccelerated and accelerated motion. But a flat gpace-time lacks the complexity of structure which would permit of geometrical representation of other basic physical quantities besides motion. And yet ance motion has found a picture, it would seem that there should be a way of representing the other quantities by certain configurations of space-ttme, since th the equations of physics these quan- tities are internally correlated with motion. If one of the c98 ‘THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELATIVITY terms of these equations, motion, is identified with a feature of space-time, the homogeneity of this term with the others, which is expressed in their internal correlations, requires that the other terms, denoting other quantities of physics, should also be identifiable with certain features of space- time. The correlation of motion with such fundafnental physical quantities as force and mass is given in Newton’s Second Law of Motion. Hence this Law is made use of in the procedure of representing geometrically the basic rela- tionships between physical quantities But since flat space- time has no complexity of structure corresponding to the complexity of these relationships, any further achievement in diagramming the quantities of physics requires a space- time which shows a complex structure, i.e. curved space- time. This conclusion appears even more obvious when the fact that the relationships of basic quantities involves force as one of them is taken in the light of the foregoing explana- tion of curvature as being equivalent to the» presence of force. . The identification of the basic relationships of physical quantities with certain structural patterns of space-time needs a special language, as may be understood from the following. The basic relationships of physics, entering into the laws of nature, must be expressible in a farm which is independent of the systems of coordinates and therefore invariant under their transformation This invariance must hold under transformations from any arbitrary coordinate system to any other and not only within the group of recti- linear systems of coordinates.* On the other hand, to identify an invariant form with a certain structues of space- tume presupposes that one arbitrarily choose a reference- system, because without such a system one would not know how to begin a specific description of spatio-temporal * This point acquires a particular mportance now that the intro- duction of a curved medium renders the very meaning of a straight Ime questionable,THE GEOMETRICAL PICTURE OF NATURE 99 relationships. Thus a language is required to express physical structures in such a way as to keep the expressions from being affected by coordinates that happen to be used in them. This language is found in the calculus of tensors. A tensor 1s an expression of a certain kind given in terms of some toordinate system, but without being dependent on the latter because it is given together with the rule showing how to translate it into any other coordinate system. Tensors are independent of the reference-system in which they may be expressed in this respect, that two tensors which are given as equal are equal for any reference-system. * With the help of the language of tensors the Method of Geometrical Repre- sentation is a procedure involving three major steps. First, the fundamental relationships of physical quantities are embodied in a tensor; next, the structure of space-time is described by a tensor; and finally, fulfilling the expectation that the presence of physica] agents is equivalent to the space-time curvature, the two tensors are found to be equal. The reader who is willing to follow this procedure in detail will find it explained in the Appendix; only the outcome of these calculations will be discussed here; but neither the procedure itself nor the significance of its outcome can be undertsood even approximately without some explanation concerning she nature of tensors, beginning with the mtro- duction of vectors, which may be considered as tensors of the simplest kind. A vector is defined as any physical quantity (like force, velocity, etc.) which can be represented by an arrow, i.e. by a directed segment of a straight lme, while the components of the vegtor are the projections of the segment upon the axes of coordinates. Although the vector as embodied in a segment is an invariant quantity, its components change according to a definite rule with the change of the systems * Tt follows from this propontion that a tensor which is equal to zero m one system of coordinates, vanishes in any other system,