Chapter 13 THE IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF RISK Introduction [IV PLANNING A VOYAGE here i always a host of potential risks fnvolved, some more remote than others but none should be excluded from consideration. The practice of seamanship ‘entails identification of the attendant risks and dhen assessing their relevance to the proposed voyage. Such an approach, however, is based upon an assumption that those entrusted with the performance ofthe enterprise, vz. the master, chief ceagineer and their subordinates, possess the requisite kil, judgement end experience to eope with the risks involved. Uniortunately, that isnotalways the eae. While from anacrow Jegal standpoint the possession of the appropriate certificate of ‘competence may be regarded by shipowner as suficent proof ‘of competence, recent experience, as some of the eases this book illustrate, demonstrate the fallacy of chat assumption. It ‘would be arrant nonsense to contend that a matter who had spent his whole career engeged in relatively simple voyages in areas largely fe from storm and fog on vessels of modest size should be entruxed with the command of one ofthe largest vessels trading in the Norch Atlantic, at least without some additional relevant experience and trining. ‘Hence tv wncuinbent upon a taponsible hips wnerto sake an effective and determined cffortto ensure that those ‘who are to be entrusted with the responsibilty for pursut ofa projected venture have the eapacity to undertake it ‘Vessel suitability Having done this, the shipowner should next make sure thatthe vessel he proposes to send on the voyage ts adequate for the service for which iis intended, This is not simply a {question of sing that the vestel uli the requirements of the classification society and the government whose flag she Mies. ‘The operational status of the radars should he seen to sinee ‘one ofthe most common and serious navigational risks is radar failure, as we saw in the case of Cristas Bitas. Having seem to the seaworthiness of the vessel, not just from a legal position, ‘but from a standpofnt of practicality and moral responsibility, the shipowner should then provide the master with support sn assessing the risks ofthe voyage Passage planning Tn planning a passage the master and those who asst him in this task would do well to consul the UK Department of ‘Transport publication, A Guide to the Planning and Conduct ‘fea Passages, or an equivalent document suchas The Neatical Institute Briefing on Passage Planning (see Chapter 3, ast section and Chapter 12), The Netherlands Maritime Insitute report, “Round the Horn or Through Megellan’, eould also provide valuable guidance, especially for voyages of a pasticularly dificult and unique character. Risk and advantage “At remarked earlier, the balancing of risk against advantage and rejecting the isk when not warranted by the advantage, is central to the practice of seamanship.’ The assessment of risk lies atthe eare of passage planning — or i¢ should. How risks are assessed, however, has largely been a somewhat haphazard affair, as we saw in Chapter 12, which is not to say that litle thought was given (othe risks invalved, but that there seemed tabe alackof systematic procedure in analysing and uncovering the risks involved. In the case of Antilles a thorough and ‘methodical investigation of the waters chrough which it was proposed to send her would have revealed that there was a 126 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE substantial risk that there might be an undiscovered rock or shoal between the lines of soundings taken many years before and on which the available charts ofthe aren were based and the court which pasted judgement on the stranding and loss of the vessel s9 held. There were diferent risks involved in the stranding of Metula and while these risks were recognise, the ‘measures needed to surmount the hazards ofthe passage were left almost entirely othe judgement ofthe master, which events proved was a singularly unfortunate decision, That casualty became the subject of exhaustive study by the Netherlands Maritime Insitute, which broke new ground in showing how the planning for such a voyage might be carried ont. ‘The planning of beth these illfated voyages wa, by the prevailing standards, probably at least equal to what one would expect on a vessel manned by experienced and competent masters employed by companies of long standing and high repute; yet it wae inadequate, The fact of the matter is that voyage planning ofthe extent needed in both these cases, and particularly in the later, lies beyond the scope of experience of most masters, and for that matter the same applies to many of thote to whom they answer. While both of these cases are ‘well worth the closest study, few masters will probably find themselves in auch a postion. What isnot uncommon, hawever, Is for a master to receive orders to embark upon a voyage to [port with which he is completely unfamiliar, which may also ‘be located ina portion of the globe which he has never visited Inthe companion to this book, Callsons and Thsir Causes, stated that collisions had only a single cause: allowing another vessel to get too close. The same may be said of stranding, ‘That i, ie ole cance fe allewing one's vesrl fo vente inte ‘waters where the draft exceeds the depth, Thete observations are so elementary that their expression might seem an affront tothe intelligence, atleast to those with a knowledge ofthe sea and ships. Yt because they are so elementary they sometimes tend to be overlooked or ignored. Tn planning a pastage both ofthese major sources of ship lisneters must always be taken into account in laying down the ppath the vessel will take in ordar to successfully complete its ‘passage. Too often te planning ofthe passageis based primarily ‘on how the voyage can be pursued most expeditiously, with risks being accorded only secondary consideration unless they are so substantial as to demand attention. Even here the risk ‘may be seen as more & challenge than a hazard, tempting 2 ‘mariner to display his navigational skills under the guise of expedition. I once served with a master of undeniable navigational skill, bt somewhat questionable judgement, of ‘whom a coast pilot, who had made many passages with him through the Cape Cod Canal, remarked that beam beatings of Block Island on this masters vessel tended tobe “traight up” ‘The pilot was celebrated for his wit, ut the master was noted for his proclivity to accept risks a8 a way of demonstrating his “superior sill” On one passage from St, Nazaire to London, ‘when the ship was behind schedule and hard pressed for time, hhe noted that the channel through the Passage de Fromveur inside Ushant had ample water and would save rome IL to 12 ‘miles over the accepted route outside. The fact that there was ‘a navigable width of only alittle over a mile in its narrowest [pact was pechaps an added attraction. The small scale chart of ‘he passage wat net aboard, though that deficiency was rectified fon the vessel's return to New York. On the next voyage the ship was taken through the Passage du Fromveur in the dead ‘of night with patchy visibility and tidal currents of up to eight knots, The passage is frequented by fishing vessels and some ‘coasters, but the look oa the faces ofthe fishermen on the decksof the boats passed close aboard in the narrow channel suggested that large seagoing vessels were not usually encountered inthe Passage.” ‘Once, while transiting the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, an ‘officer serving aboard my vessel remarked that he had made a transit several years earier through the mach narrower and ‘more diffieule passage hetween Perm Island and the mainland. ‘The master in question was characterised by some who ssiled ‘with him as a superlative shiphandler who often frightened them out of their wits by che chances he took. The distance saved was no more than « few miles. Another advaniage of that passage, the master might have reasoned, would be that he would be unlikely to encounter any talc Hore were two highly experienced and — by ordinary standards ~ capable shipmasicrs commanding vessels of reputable companies who regulanly took chances that would be regarded by most oftheir peers as unwarranted. Because i was not the policy of their employers to concern themselves with the details of their passages they felt fre to follow their reckless practices unchecked, Probably the most rudimentary aspect of passage planning and the only one that cannot be ignored by the mariner since it determines the courses to be steered in approaching and pasting headlands and shoals, isthe choice of how far off to pass sich dangers. In many places today the decision will be cireumscribed by Traffic Separation Schemes, bt there ae sill many such places where the mariner Is free to make that decision unhampered by any considerations other than his seamanship. This is also one of those areas where mariners, who by every other consideration would be regarded as excellent seaman, are tempted to rely on their navigational skills to pass closer to rocks and shoals than good seamanship ‘would allow, Such a risky course of action may stem from bravado, though in these days of tight schedules and expensive fuel the dese to make the most “economic” pastage exerts a powerful temptation to expose the vessel to substantial though perhaps remote risks for slight gains. Advice to masters ‘The general repugnance or reluctance of those to whom the master answers to give him any specific advice or instruction as to courses to take or clearances tb maintain off specie charted dangers, is rooted in both tradition and practicality. Many shipoveners in the past and even today would probably feel affronted at any suggestion that their masters needed any ‘instruction in such matters, On the other sie of the cain there {isthe consideration of involving oneself unnecessarily ina share ‘ofthe master’s responsibility: Iti a reflection ofthe same attude that has, atleast until the ease of the Marien, kept marine ruperintendents from taking any close interest in the care of charts. Its in many ways a laudable and justifiable attitude. It requires, however, very competent masters ta justify itand where ‘he owner takes no direct pride or interest in the calibre of those ‘who command his ships then this can be a very risky policy. But there are otber reasons for this reluctance to set restrain upon the master in respect tothe navigation of his vesel. Masters, ike those in most other walks of life, tend to be judged by results and the means by which they achieve them sre ordinarily ignored unless the results ase undesirable. cis the old question of ends justifying means, but the practices of ‘masters ze usually aot subject to direct scrutiny and criticism by those who could control them unless things “go wrong.” ‘The common criterion of a successful voyage is one made in the shortest porsble time without damage to the vessel or its ‘eargo. This was enshrined in tradition by the clipper ship masters, though it did not originate there and the reputations fofmasters were closely associated withthe rapidity with which they eflected their passages. Skills and risks With the advent of steam, the skill or seamanship, required to get the most out of a vessel became much Jess important though by no means negligible. The stress now shifted mote to ‘maintenance of schedule than speed per se, Maintenance af schedule, however, usually requires maintenance of speed, since commercial vessels rarely have any significant reserve power-* ‘The main impediment to maintensnce of speed is weather and while one cannot do much about wind and waves except try to avoid them, the other major risk from weather ~ restricted visibility — can he dealt wth im several ways, ‘The risk imposed by restricted visibility has two distinct aspects: risk of collision and that of stranding Since World War Trs number of electronie devices of which radar is pre-eminent, Ihave appeared to alleviate the risks of proceeding t speed in thick weather. Nevertheless those risks, particulary the former, hhave not been eliminated by technological advance and there is considerable evidence to suggest thatthe risk of collision may ‘even have been increased by encouraging the taking of risks in areas of congested shipping. Te was this turing of a blind eye Iby the overs to cis taking of this nanice that war belatedly addressed by the courts in the case of the Lady Gtvendolen® ‘The master of that vessel was well known for pressing onin poor visibility in order to keep to his schedule. When in purauit bf that hazardous practice he collided with and sank Frehfeld at anchor inthe river Mersey in Noveraber of 1961. When the ‘ase came to tial the owners of Lady Guendalyr sought to limit their liability, but the Court ruled that there was privity of fault ‘nthe part of the awners and denied their application. The marine superintendent claimed that he had personally warned all the company masters, including the offender, about the dangers of over-reliance on radar when navigating in fog, The raster of Lady Gwendolen denied receiving any such warning and the Court accepted his testimony." ‘When the case went to appeal, Lord Justice Wilmer suid in upholding the decision that *..» although all the ship's logs were regularly submited to him [the marine superintendent), hhe had signally failed to check the records contained therein ‘with a view to ascertaining how the Lady Gteendolen was being navigated in fog.” What emerged inthis precedent setting case ‘was the fixing of a clear responsibility on the shipowner to ‘ensure that masters commanding their vessels be given explicit instructions that mere use of radar alone could not justify fll speed in fog. The decision would also seem to require chat ‘owners check to see that this policy is followed, Te would seem, by logical extension, that ifthe owners can, bbe held responsible for seeing that their masters do not reeklessly navigate their vesslsin restricted visbltyas regards collision avoidance, then they would be equally responsible to see that they do not take inordinate vsks in their navigation in ‘general. Thisis certainly the view widely held in respect to the ‘operation of commercial aircraft. Admittedly the interests of the general public ere not as direcly affected by accidents to shipsin general, butthere is no dispute that reckless navigation ‘of many ships sailing the world's eceans today can be s matter ‘of intense publi concern. Tirrey Canyon was but the first in & ‘succession of casualties that emphasise that principe, ‘The principle seems to have been firmly established in the Lady Grsendelethat a vostel owner has an unavoidable duty to see that his vestls are safely and prudently navigated in fog, though that is qualified by a standard of reasonable care which somewhat mitigates the full harshness of the judgement fsuggested by that decision. The Court of Appeal in that case expressly rejecied an argument tha, asa matter of aw, certain duties of a shipowner could not be delegated with the consequence that any failure in the performance of such duties, at any level of a shipowner's organisation, would constitute ‘actual fault or privity -...°*In the case of Lady Giomndolen the STRANDINGS 127‘owners had done nothing to see that their vessels were navigated safely in fog. Nevertheless, Mr Justice Hewson in his judgement said: |i a see of ein {importance in the ‘oy easonable san a2 na collision im the vicinity of Fany Bank several years lacr, beuseen the Polish fteighier Zaglbie Dabrawst and the Liberian vessel Garden City the principle established ia. the Lady Grendben played a prominent pact. The wt was brought to establish the right ofthe owners othe Polish vessel (Poitear) {6 limit their liability and their operating procedures and policies were examined in great detal im order to determine the question of reasonable tare. Mr. Justice Staughton who presiced said: “What Lam concemed with in tis cave isthe Mandard of care and management which is required of « reasonable shipewner and whether Pisteam fll short of that standart! or attained st” He went om to aay that “Tt woul be ‘quite wrong for me assume that any shipowner who ell short of the standard of management shown by BLP. [British Peuroleum and Shell [lhe policies of these companies were offered as a standard for comparison] was necessarily guilty of etal fait of pity" He also pointed out that most owners likewise da not tain that standard” When he went on to examine the question of “Supervision ofnavigation and detcetion of fas” he observed ‘This would normally fall within the competence and, responsibilty ofthe marine superintendent or someone holding, ‘comparable positon. Aslong.asthe ovener makes a reasonable fattempe to insure that this individual is competent to perform this function and is aware of the implications of the ‘osponsibilty entrusted to him, the owner or corporation cannot be held to blame if he fails in that duty. It would seem reasonable, however, to expect the owner to make periodic attempts during the course of investigations into casualties to ascertain that the measures employed by the individual or {individuals responsible in this area are effective. In light ofthese decisions there can be no question of the ‘owner's responsibilty to see that those who command his vessels navigate them in accordance with those decisions. If that beso, then the owners should have an equally compelling responsibility to see that no unwarranted risks are taken inthe ‘management oftheir vesels that might lead to a stranding. Queen Elizabeth IT ‘On 7 August 1992 the last of the transatlantic paseenger ships, the 66,450 grt U.K. registered Queen Blicabeth 2 (QK2), ‘now used mainly’as a luxury crulse liner, ripped a large gash inher starboard side below the waterline while passing through Vineyard Sound north of Martha’s Vineyard. The event tracted widespread attention in the media along withthe usual lipshod speculation, but it was subject to more methodical and accurate investigation by bath the Marine Accident Investigation Branch ofthe Department of Transport in Britain and by the National Transportation Safety Board in the U.S." ‘On the bridge atthe time ofthe accident were the master, the frst olficer of the watch, the second officer ofthe watch, Massachusetts State pilot and two dock ratings. On 3 August (QB2had begun a cruise from New York o Bar Harbour, Maine, vin St John, Neve Brunswick and Halifax, Nova Scotia, She was on the las leg of that journey when the grounding took place. The liner had departed Halifax on the early evening of {5h August bound for New York. She passed east of Cape Cod 128 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE. and south and east of Nantucket Shoals before ariving about fivemiles west of Gay Head acihe western end of The Vineyard where a pilot was embarked.” QE2 had a draft of 31 feet 9 inches forward and 32 feet 4 inches aft on departure from “Halifax but her calculated arrival draft at The Vineyard was 32 feet 4 inches forward and 31 feet 4 inches aft.” That tes ‘was the result of the master’s nsiruetions as he said the ship handled better trimmed slightly by the head." [A revealing aspect of the incident chat was mentioned in the MAIB Report but which attracted no comment elsewhere ‘was the length of service with Cunard of the senior officers involved. The master had been in command of passenger vessels for 10 years, presumably Cunard ships. He had first joined the QP2as junior officer in 1968 and advanced through ‘the ranks util he was promoted to reliel master in November LIS7. He served as master on two other Cunard eruise liners before being promoted to permazent master ofthe QFZin 1989, ‘The senior officer ofthe watch first officer) had been a ea for 18 years “including five years experience as a walchkeeping chief officer in tankers before joining QE2 in May 1092." The second officer of the watch had served I7 years with the Royal Fleet Aualiary before joining QE2 in April 1991." Another ‘odd aspect of the manning arrangements on the ship was that both the helmsman and quartermaster on duty at the time were of Philippine nationality, having joined the vessel in Apel 1992 and Octaber 1991, When QE? went into service in 1969 it would have been unthinkable thatany ofthe licenced officers, let alone the senior officers, had been in the employ of another company longer ‘han they had been with Cunaed. Ia fact it would have been ‘unusual if they had served any significant time with any other company. The attractions of n seafaring career with even s0 prestigious a company as Cunard and on such a vessel asthe (QE2, have apparently changed so dramatially in the ensuing, 20-some years tha! seniaroficers are now often employed from thewlere. This s aot to suggest thatthe officers involved in this incident were not fully qualified, but it vivily illustrates fone of the most disturbing features of current seafaring: the shift from a long career service with asingle company to more casual employment. (One cannot of course accurately asses the effects of long standing associations within a group, but they almost undoubiedly foster a beneficial common outlook and perception. Thslessens the likelihood of misunderstanding and ‘mistakes and smoothes the development of bonds of loyalty and camaraderie so essential for efficient working relationships ‘Such harmony is not an inevitable product of long term close association, Personality clashes can of course cause friction, bbut the effortless efficiency found on the best ran ships is tulikely to be achieved where relationships are casual QE2 had arsived off Gay Head on the western tip of Martha's Vineyard at 1142 on August 7 where pilot embarked, ‘The vessel then proceeded up through Vineyard Sound toward ‘an anchorage olf Oak Blt, She arrived there around 1300 and anchored at 1317 with Bast Chop Point bearing 213° 076 iiles distane She was scheduled to remain there until 2000 that evening to allow the passengers (o visit ashore. The ‘departure war delayed by almost an hour due tothe tardiness ‘of some vessels returning to the ship. Anchor was weighed at 12050 and the master conned the ship out of the anchorage ‘using the ship’s engines and bow thrusters to turn her to the proper heading before turing the conn over ta the pilot QE2 left Oak Blue a slow speeds because of numerous small boats und ferries operating in the area. The master asked the pilotif there were any speed restrictions for Vineyard Sound land was tld tha there were none other than those dictated by traffic conditions, At approximately 2115 the vescel rounded ‘West Chop Point atthe northern entrance to Vineyard Sound land speed was increased from 15 t 18 knots on a course of287° per gyro compass. There was negligible gyro error After clearing the traffic and steadying on her course the ‘master asked the pilot fhe abjected to increasing the speed to about 24 knots so as to facilitate making the scheduled arsval at New York the next morning, The pilot had no objection and speed was according increased at 2124. The course the navigating officer had laid down on the chart used for the passage would have taken QE2 down the sound on ¢ course of 242%, rntil reaching 71° 00' W where course wonld be altered 10 267° passing about halfa-mile north of Brown's Ledge and lo the pilot disembarkation point beyond.” ‘At 2144 the QF2 passed just south of the “NA" buoy shout three miles north and shightly west of Gay Head and when beam ofthe buoy changed course to starboard to 2507." There had apparently been no discussion between the raster or other ship's officers regarding the courses the pl intended to take, This course change thus came as a surprise to the ship's personnel but it was not challenged at that ime After the ship had steadied on the new course the 2nd officer plotted a position on the chart and drew a new course of 255° ‘tom that position. The 2nd aficer noted that the new trackline passed over a shoal area showing & least depth of 34 feet about six miles southwest of Cutty Hunk Island. He dew this to the attention ofthe Ist officer who then infarmed the master, The ‘master told the Ist oicer to tell the pilot he preferred to pass further south of Sow and Pigs Reef and closer to the original lwackline ne marked oa the ship's chart, The pilot acknowledged that request and about 2154 he ordered course changed to 2402)" Aer plating the new course on the chart the 2nd officer noted that it passed over a six-and-«half fathom spot but said he was not concerned as the deep draft of QE2 was almost seven feet less, The 2nd officer was apparently unaware of, or ignored, the effects of squat on the ship's draft. in any event he suid nothing, Both the pilot and the master looked at the new toutes line bt apparonity failed ta nota that it panteel aver the 50 foot spot. Both the master and the pilot later testified that they did not consider passing over the 29 foot spot to be @ problem, although the pilot stated “that he was using 40 feet as minimum depth when navigating the QE2 through the area."2 At 2158 the OF2 began to experience severe vibrations ‘Those on the bridge later recalled two separate periods of shaking and rumbling. After the second period of vibrations the master ordered the engines stopped. At frst the master thought QE2 had struck a small craft or that there had been a ‘machinery malfunction, The master ealled the engine room and was told there was no problem withthe vessel's machinery ‘nd when he questioned the Ist officer about the possibility of ‘collision with a small raft he was told there were none in the area. Only the possibility of grounding nov remained and both the pilot and master wore forced to conclude that this was what ‘had happened. ‘The severe vibrations had brought the staf captain, the thief officer and the senior first officer racing to the bridge. ‘The chief officer was told to check all compartments for flooding, The staf eaptain next made an announeement over the public address system informing the passengers and crew thatthe ship had passed over a shoal spot and the vibration ‘was due to shallow-water effect. An engineering officer accompanied by a deck officer had meanvhile gone to the safety control room to check the remote gauges for the double bottom tanks, Another engineering officer went to the ‘emergency generator room to stand by there in case of need. ‘The ship's damage control officer reported tothe bridge along swith other of the ship's deck officer, ‘The engine room now reported that several previously ‘empty double-botiom tanks had been flooded and it was lator slscovered that the tanktop in number 3 cargo hold had been set up. A number of precautionary mensures were taken to reinforce the damaged areas, but twas soon apparent that che vessel was in no immediate danger: The accident was reported to the US. Coast Gua and the master was instructed to anchor and await x Cosst Guard boarding party. At 2332 the ship was ‘anchored in Rhode Island Sound approximately I1 miles west southwest af Gay Head, ‘The passengers were subsequently transferred ashore via several small local passenger ships and sent by train to New York. Two days later the Q#2 sailed for Boston, Massachuscts| where it entered dey-dock for survey and repairs. The cost of the casualty, including los of revenue while the sip was out of service, was estimated to be approximately $50,000,000, Although the conduct ofthe plot and the master and other bridge personnel on Q2 had been generally professional and beyond reproach, the falure of the master to discuss he passage plan before QE2 departed her anchorage led directly to the {grounding Bilots are notoriously independent minded and the course they choose to take in piloting vessels under their ‘control wil frequently differ from those laid down by ship's officers. In order to eliminate any possible confusion the master, fo his navigating olficer, should go over the charts prior o ‘embarking on a passage and agree on a passage plan. In this cease there was a significant divergence between the courses laid down and those the pilot intended to take, The courses laid down by the navigating officer were safe and proper sf followed and the master should have insisted on following those courses unless the pilot could give a convincing argument for ‘aking a different wack “The proposed route was nota usual one for vesels ofthis size, There was no compelling reason to take course that brought QE2in clare proximity to water close to her deepest draft. The courses laid down Kept the vessel well clear of the 10 fathom curve and should have been adhered to. The course chosen by the pilot was appsrently taken for no other reason than it would enable him to finish a few minutes earlier. Comment Whenever a vessel intends to embark on & passage that is ‘not normally attempted by vessel ofa particular size and class, the closes attntion should be given tothe planning and conduct of the passage. The stranding of the French passenger ship Antilles i. the passage nosth of Mastique in 1971 and that of Metulain the Strait of Magellan in 1974, described elsewhere in this book, provide elassic examples ofa breakdown in passage planning and should be studied by anyone planning such a venture, The effects of squat cannot be calculated precisely and the possiblity of an undiscovered isolated boulder or rack is always a possiblity. The navigator should make allowances for such uncertainties, Where itis necessary to proceed along a ‘passage where the underkeel clearance is marginal, the speed should be reduced to minimise the effects of squat. The prudent ‘mariner will always forgo the possibilty of saving a few minutes sf that saving measurably increases the rik. ‘Voyage planning The examples offered in this book seem to suggest that {inadequate voyage planning plays a very prominent pact in strandings and that the encouragement, if not the insistence, that formal voyage planning be followed on a routine basis ‘ould make a significant contribution to ship safety. There isa deeply entrenched reluctance by marine departments of shipping lines to set down guidelines or even offer advice to their mastersas to specific routes tobe followed, Iemight almost bbe said to form a part of seafaring tradition’ but itis not ‘unknowa. The Blue Funnel Line long specified tracks to be followed along their standard routes and atleast one ofthe large oil companies has recently adopted a policy of issuing instructions pertaining to clearances to be maintained off “grounding ines.” One of the American liner companies for some years s0 regulated the navigation of their vessels that some of those exposed to the systema regarded it as more of a STRANDINGS 129Iharard than a help. Ie would, peshaps, bea mistake to hamstring the master in the navigation of his vesse! by specifying routes to follow and actual tracks to take between points, bur there is much to be said for specifying minimum distances off hexdlands and hazards to navigation, Such advice is indeed often found in Sailing Directions, but because of the necessity to “cater” to a ‘wide lientle the sort of advice that might pertain to «particular type or clas of vessel in different circumstances sell nat be found there | Tn deciding what such minimum distances should be, ‘the masters employed by the company should first be consulted so thet they ate given the opportunity to voice any objections before the decision is implemented. I should be recognised that many to whom the master answers today lack the competence and experience and even the background, to advise on such a matter and in such ease such advice should be sought from a qualified source. In deciding on such distanees allowance should be made for the possible need io take avoiding action approaching such points $0 that should such necessity arise, masters must not hesitale to pass within the preseribed distances in order to avoid the development ofa close quarters situation. In seting forth such ‘minimum distances general instruetions should also be ‘promulgated pointing out that while such minimum distances are stipulated to forestall the taking of unwarranted risks, particular circumstances might necessitate passing inside the prescribed distances. In such case an explanation of those ‘ireumslances should be submitted to justify the deviation Without such guidelines some masters may be tempted to take illadvised short cuts. The establishment of minimum distances would work to remove that temptation. The route should be looked atin detail, examining each possible sk in Corder to asses what weight if should be assigned in artiving at fa “safe distance.” Until lacy recently « vessel heading for aropean ports via the English Channel coming from the west would make for a landfall off Bishop Rock. Indeed the recommended North Atlantic tracks end ata point less than five miles south of Bishop Rock. There was, of cours, a very good reason for making a landfall on Bishop Rock. It was Certainly highly desirable ~ if not essential —to establish one's position with certainty before proceeding farther to the east {and once that was done the natural course, at least for vessels raking for the Dover Strat, was to proceed up the English coast from headland to headland far enough off to maintain adequate sea room for manoeuvring for trafic. The, master would also allow an ; mar gi taal vearnahe tent of nec aie fea the el eee This last consideration, however, tended largely to be ‘guored on many vessels where a propulsion or steering failure was not only relatively rare but of short duration on those infrequent oceasions when it occurted. The competent shipmaster would, nonetheless, be careful to give lee shore ‘wide berth in heavy weather, but it was @ rare master who ‘would ever take a mid-Chanrtel course for the simple reason that navigational necessity and habit, even on vessels equipped ‘with Decea, dictated that the vessel Keep close enough inshore to use the major navigational light As long as ships had only Decca as a means of navigation in mid-channel, this reluctance to rely on it to the exclusion of all else was an understandable and justifiable atutude. Now that Navstar GPS (Global Positioning System) is widely available che need to “hug the coast” in the English Channel and elsewhere is harder to justify. Indeed, with the establishment of the mid-channel Trafic Separation Scheme "TSS) off Casque's itis hardly practical" 180 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE ‘Though the French philosophy of regarding Traffic Separation Schemes as a means not only of separating streams of trafic to forestall collisions, but to keep vessels as far as possible from thei shores has come in for much criticism and forthe most part with good reason. It isan undeniable fact that navigational considerations impose themselves on a TSS in ‘many situations, The “correct” atsiude here would seem to strike a balance between the risks of collision end stranding. While IMO and the intemational macitime community hhave made a determined effort to come to grips with the risks of collision by requiring vestels of aver 10,00M) gross tons to carry two radars and all new vessels of that size and existing vessels ofthat size shall be equipped with ARPAs (Automatic Radar Plotting Aids), they have been less eager to insist that vessels he equipped with modem electronic position fixing equipment. While radar does indeed do double duty, s0-to speak, in this respect i is ordinarily of litle use for precision fSxing at distances much over 15 miles Electronic position fixing ‘We have seen an impressive number ofinsances here where had the vessels involved had usable eleetranie postion fixing systems they wold most likely have avoided stranding. Had ‘Tarey Canyon, Argo Merchant, Bobara, Crises Bitas, Pioneer Mase, ‘St. Loui, Ste! Vendor and Tro (in a folowing chapter) been ‘equipped to & higher standard iis ikely, a least in most of those cases, that they would have avoided the fate they suffered would bea mistake, however to assume thatthe problem of keeping vessels off the rocks will yield wholly to a technological approach, at least for the foreseeable future, Failures of judgement rather than equipment or the lack of it were the deminant reason i all bat avery few ofthe casualties described in these pages. Nor will better training rectify that defect. Better equipment and training are litle more than palliatives, These “remedies” are most likely ta help those who rnoed least help. They can aid the sklfal mariner to operate ‘move effectively, but they canals serve as trap forthe unwary. ‘They can enable an incompetent matiner to attempt feats of navigation he would be incapable of essaying without. I, in the middle ofthat venture, the equipment failshe is reduced to reliance on meagre skills that may prove to be inadequate without the intervention of a large degree of luck While “radar assisted” collisions are a common feature of the disaster landscape, there are probebly’ as many instances of ships being wrecked through radar failure or ‘misinterpretation ata critical juncture. But that fat is rarely recorded unless the attention of the news mediais attracted by the circumstances sitending it, such as happened in the cases ‘of Cristes Bitas and Pacific Charger. ‘cis a deficiency in skill and judgement that sin the ‘inal analysis sesponsible for allbuta slim residue of marine sdaastes {As long a2 advised or irresponsible owners are allowed {ree reign t appoint incompetent masters and officers to navigate ‘hei hips we shouldbe prepared for a worsening of tis situation rather than an improvement through technological advance, Bat having made that grim forecast, it can be said with some confidence that there is still much that can be done to Aid seafarers to operate their vessels more safely. By making them more fully aware ofthe risks they face and by adopting policies and measures to deter them from unwittingly or ‘otherwise increasing thelr exposure to risk, considerable {improvement in safety can be achieved. ‘The responsible professional seaman can ordinarily be trusted to navigate the vessel on which he serves in a manner thac renders ditect surveillance or supervision unnecessary andl ‘even undesirable. But where mariners of suspect backgroundare entrusted with the navigation of ships, teat best imprudent to allow them the same freedom of action as their more trustworthy brethren. The aviation industry, where, to say the Jeast, @ high level of competence Is a practical necessity, has Jong aceepied the need for provision of records in the way Airraftare flows [the black box] so that not only ean the causes ‘of accidents usually be devermined but unsafe practices are unlikely to be indulged. The Channel Navigation Information Service station at St. Margarets Bay near Dover has for a ‘number of years male video recordings at one minute intervals ‘ofthe scopes oftheir surveillance radars which provide a record ‘of the tracks ofall tralfc trough the area of surveillance. It is ‘worth remarking that since this process has been in elect most recorded collisions have reportedly been settled out of eau If “recording radars” were required aboard ship by. {international convention we would mostikely witness a marked decrease in admiralty actions resulting from collisions, The savings in legal fees alone might well cover the cost of the ‘equipment such a device could also take the place of a course recorder), but the major benefit from sucha development would be the means it would offer to uncover reckless or incompetent management of vessels ~ hopefully hefore they were wrecked. should also be relatively simple to record VEIF transmissions and readings of electronic position fixing equipment at periodic intervals. The IMO's recent zequirement for vessels 10 carry voyage data recorders (VDRs) must therefore be weleomed as Avaliable adjunct to maritime safety: ‘With such equipment the master could monitor the way his vessel was being navigated when he was asleep. It would also allow marine superintendents to make spot checks on. ‘how vessels under their supervision were being managed ‘while underway. That might provoke howls of anguish fom many: ‘who might fel thet this would provide the front office with a made-to-order too} for “second _Biessing”. Bute competent maser shonlel object satiny of his performance and it could have a salutary effect on ‘eduction of unwarranted acceptance of risk. While it was ssid earlier that failures in judgement rather than equipment were the dominant causes of strandings, the prudent mariner will never ignore the possibilty of equipment for mechanical failure in restricted waters. While it would be injudicious, if not unwise, for a master to atiompt to instruct his chief engineer in procedures tobe followed to guard against ‘ propulsion or steering failure when in the vicinity of shoal water, he cannot remain indifferent to the measures adapted tralack of them. The easiest way ont ofthis dilemmas for the home office in consultation with shipboard personnel to hi ‘of potential wouble too d is the repair of defective equipment and In sospect to navigational equipment specific and ‘unequivocal instructions should be isued to master instructing. ‘them that repairs to such equipment be made at the frst ‘opportunity, and that once the vessel has arived in port following an equipment faluce the vessel should not leave untl itis paired or the master can justify postponement, which under ‘most circumstances would be difficult to do, In the matter of propulsion machinery defects the issue is less straightforward. ‘There can be litle doubt that Sted Vendor should not have sailed fiom Manila wth her boilers in such condition, In such situation an independent surveyor should have been called into oversee the repairs. But had she been bound for an open sea passage with no threat of adverse weather a differen atsitude might have been warranted, Given a competent engine room force, repairs ‘on board, where possible, are almost always preferable 1a calling jn an outside contractor. These things have to be played more orlessby esr. While the judgement ofa competent chief engincor will n most cases he sufficient he should never make a decision that might render the vessel immobile, even temporary, without consultation with the master, Only then can all the rsks involved adequately be assested. ‘The most effective way of achieving a reduction in ship casualties is chrough the reduction ofthe rsks to which mariners ace exposed. A dramatic and conelusive example of che «ruth ofthis proposition is before us in the results achieved by the introduction of traffic separation schemes; specifically that in the Dover Strait That scheme is arguably the most contribution to ship safety since the introduction of steam propulsion, The analysis of isk as an integral part of systematic ‘voyage planning can perhaps make a comparable contribution in reducing the risks of stranding, Appendix 1 ‘The identification and assessment of risk ‘Therisks attendant to any proposed pasage will ofcourse ‘vary at particular points upon the route. Ona voyage ay from New York toa destination in North Europe litle consideration need be given to navigtional dangers for most ofthe voyage after clearing Nantucket Shoals unless one chooses to proceed via Cape Race. In such case, the mariner should keep ell dleac of Sale Island as wellas the Virgin Rocks to the southeast of Cape Race. For the balance of the passage, until one approachesa lanl, the chief hazards tobe expected ae those astocinted with the weather though daring the ice season the danger from bergs and growers ean be considerable ‘As already noted one cannot alter the weather, 0 the only option so alter one's route in attempting to keep clear ofthe Worst areas of wind and rstited visit. The avoidance of turbulent seas in the North Arlande (and North Paci) has sven rise to weather routing services whose function isto [vide the mariner with information and advice as toa route tofollow inorder to avoid the worst weather without inordinate deviations. Equipment such as Weatherfax” that automatically ‘copies the latest weather maps enable the mariner to make his ‘wn assessment. Deviations of any magnitude to avoid fog are perhaps questionable on the open sea asthe intolligent ure of dar and ARPA should pose no problem in avoiding wale. the vesel isbound oa ponin Seandinavis, norhem Germany, or beyond, an aliemate route via the Pentland Firth or ort ofthe Orkaeys ‘could not only realize a substantial seving i distance, but a reduction of navigational rks, One of the hic sadvantages ‘ofthe Pentland Firth routes the substantial risk the vessel may be exposed to albeit fora very shor time ifthe erica pasage though the nasrowest part cincides with gale force winds ‘opposed to the tidal flow. IF that should also be attended by Anving rain and meeting or overtaking trafic near the eastern entrance where one must make a substantial course change, 2 very nasty and hazardous situation can aise. Fortunately the months where one can expect the highest incidence af fg 9 ‘he Channel ao corresponds with thelowestincidence of ales, so the Pentland Fith route ean provide a master with a real option since the erica stech of the Penlland Fath route wll fndinarity take les han an our to tavern. This provides a ‘lassie example of risk analysis im passage planning. On voyage from aportin the northeast ofthe United States or Canada to say Hamburg, the saving in distance can be something of the order of about 250 miles. This is clearly 4 ‘worthwhile saving, so the decision as to wither to take thi route is simply ane of assessing the risk involved and balancing hom against those ofthe more conventional route vahe English Channel and the Dover Sua The question of wheter tis isa reasonable and safe option should frst ofall be «policy decision ofthe owners and their relevant operasing staf They should prepare @ memorandum setting forth the advantages and STRANDINGS 131disadvantages ofthe two routes (the route through the Pentland Firth and that north of the Orkneys should be considered ‘together along with recommendations and guidelines pertaining toboih. The acm decision then as to which route to take should be left to the master. The memorandum should perhaps be prelueed with & proviso designed to remave any doubts, but tha the choice of route is his alone, eg. Masters are advised that the choice of route is theirs alone, and that choice should be governed primarily by considerations of safety. IF conditions appear to be favourable for a passage chrougl the Pentland Firth and that route is adopted, they must not hesitate to abandon that intention if, on approaching the Firth, conditions are such as to significandy increase the risks of a safe transit. In approaching from the wes, the dacision of whether to continue through the Firth or go north of the Orkneys ‘would ordinarily be made in the vicinity of Cape Wrath some 40 miles before entering the Firth proper. On. approaching from the east the decision should probably best bbemacde some 60 miles othe southeast off Kinnairds Head, unless a decision to go north of the Orkneys is made beforehand. Masters are further advised that if on approaching the Firth they ace not satisfied with the conditions obtaining they must not hesitate to opt for the longer route over the Orkneys, While one cannot remain entirely oblivious tothe economic advantages of this route, the primary consideration must be that of safe navigation, Negoviation of the passage through the Firth requires ial and attentive navigation, There isnot mich room for error once the vessel has been committed to the passage. But once clear, the navigation to the final destination 's, forthe most par, straightiorward, and the density of trafic ‘one can expect to encounter, as opposed tothe southern route through the English Channel and Dover Strait, should be appreciably lest. The major consideration in reaching a decision to proceed. via the Pentland Firth will initially be that of weather. Ordinarily, the more severe sea stated that ean be expected during the winter months on this route would offset the advantages it offers under expectation of more moderate ‘weather: Ifhowever, weather predictions are favourable, other factors must then he considered, Consultation with the chief engineer and his senior assistants should be undertaken to acquaint them with the critical nature of the passage through the Firth so that every precaution can be taken to ensure that ‘no human or foreseeable mechanical failure intervenes during the passage that might place the vessel in jeopardy. The master should also consult with the chief engineer several hours prior to the arrival off the Firth to make sure that no condition has arisen that might pose a problem and to inform him of the ‘expected time of transit so that he can put in hand the indicated precautionary measures. ‘Speed should also be adjusted if necessary so thatthe vessel will arrive off the entrance to the Firth for a daylight transit, preferably stemming the tide ust after itbas turned. The engines rust be put into a manoeuvring mode so that speed can be reduced if necessary. The means of fixing the vessel's position ‘during the approach and transit must be discusted with the officers involved and agreement reached on how that shall be done and by whom with provision for alternative methods in cate of sudden restriction of visibility or equipment failure Provision should be made for dual independent fixing of the vessels position as well asthe use of parallel indexing so the master can monitor the vettel’s progress. The following ‘guidelines are suggested: One officer assigned to traffic surveillance snd lookont who will ordinarily have no other responsibilities. I traffic 192 THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE islight, however, he may assist as needed, such as supplying: the navigating officer with radar ranges off navigational marks, long as this does not interfere with his primary duty. These incidental duties could inelude supervising the hhelmsman and passing engine room orders if necessary. The officer designated as principle navigaling officer should be responsible for taking visual bearings checked by radar ranges and soundings. The officer designated as navigator ‘number two should plot the bearings and ranges relayed to ‘him via walkie-talkie by the principle navigator and should also check these positions against GPS readings where practical The radio officer, if carried, should man the VHF Set and in coordination with the trafic surveillance officer attempt to identify and establish contact with approaching snd overtaking versels, He should also have the RDF tuned ‘up and ready for use should it be needed. He will also be ‘available to desl with a radar malfunction if necessary. A Tookout should be statoned onthe fo''sle head witha walkie talkie for reporting directly tothe trafic surveillance officer ‘on a different channel than that used by the navigators. A second lockout should be stationed on the bridge wing. ‘The principal navigator should be responsible for informing the master of coming course changes giving him the predicted time of the vessel reaching the “wheel over” point, and advising him when that point is reached. [Navigator number to should check this information ‘The master should assign the duties ofthe officers as described here according to his assessment of their capabilities. Ifhe feels that they are incapable of carrying out these assigned functions as a team to his entire satisfaction then he should instead take the route north of the Orkneys which doos not require as high a degree of skill or concentration. “While the passage will not ordinarily be unlercaker restricted visibility it is not possible to preclude that eventuality entirely. Precautions must be put in hand, therefore, to cope with that possibility. In such an eventuaiy the master must not hesitate to reduce speed or even stop the vessel if necestacy, which is why the passage should be planned for transit when the tide is most favourable, Le bither slack water or just taming against the direction of the vessel's motion. The passage should also not be attempted if the wind is anticipated to be greater than 20 knots atthe time of transit.” ‘While most ofthe planning should be within the eapacity ‘of the master and his licensed personnel there are some things ‘that would be better cartied out by shore staff. Ifthe vessel is ‘of substantial size more complete and precise data concerning ‘the path the vessel might be expected to follow during « tira ‘with various rudder angles and at various speeds and rates of ‘current set should be provided. The most up to date weather information as the vessel nears Pentland Firth would also be helpful and that could perhaps best be furnished by a weather service, The most valuable support that the shipowner can provide in this context, however, is to see that the master is provided with the tools to do the ob. The most important piece ‘of navigational equipment in ths ease is radar and the marine ‘superintendent’ staff should satisfy themselves that this ‘equipment sufficiently spphistcated to cope with the demands ‘made of it and reliable enough to be unlikely «a fail when needed most. A GPS should also be part of the navigational ‘outfit to provide a backup position fixing capability. Finally, the most worthwhile assistance that can be offered the master fs in convincing him that he must not risk a passage through the Pentland Firth if weather or other considerations become 80 unfavourable as to cause him any unease. He must feel ‘completely confident in approaching thetask or he may become ‘a substantial risk himeel.Appendix 2 ‘The company owning the vessel was an old and established firm with a reputation for operating vessels ata very high standard, They followed a policy of allowing their masters complet latinide in the routes they took in pursuit of their ‘voyages though there was a sign inthe wheelhouse of each of their vesels reading: “Maintenance of Schedule is Secondary to Safe Ship Keeping.” The primary puspose of the policy expressed by the sign was to deter masters from pushing their ‘vessels in heavy weather and so risk damage tothe vessels and their ergoes, but it applied to safe ship keepinggin all ts aspects know of ne singe instance where a master was criticised for boeing bend schedule though it wasot unknowa, i the winter months, for vessels take tviee the amount of time to cross the Alantie that would be required under normal conditions Endnotes 1 See Appenclix I: The Identification and Assessment of Rsk. 2 See Appendix I 3 Tn the ease referred to next, a Jeter from the marine tuperintendent concerning the Lady Giomdol’s master, tat _gentleman was described a a “capable ship's master and a ‘vod disciplinarian and held in high esteem by his fellow ‘musters,..." Buthe wenton to aay thathe “may-be inclined ta ‘take chances to maintain hie ship's schedule, chances thatthe other masters would avoid” LL, v2, 164,p. 107 4 Arrecent exception has arisen where vestels, particularly VLCCS, have taken to “love steaming” to save fuel. An addtional reason why operating staf prefer not to know Jhow a master gts his vessel from port to port is hat they ‘were aware ofthe risks taken to keep an estimated time of, arsval (ETA) they would be forced to do something about ie fand once that road was taken masters would be less willing (e shave comers in order to maintain schedule. 5 LILR, 1964, v2, p. 99, and v1, 1965, p. 335. 6 Ibid, v.2, 1964, p. 109, and v. 1, 1965, p. 338, 7 Ibid, p42. 8 LER, 1982, v.2,p. 399, 9 Thid, 1966, v.2,p. 102, 10 Page 388-89, 11 MAIB Report of the Investigation into the Grounding of the Passenger Vessel Queen Eliweth 2.0n 7 August 1992, and the NTSB Report NTSB/MAR.93/01 4 25 26 ISB Report, p10, MAIB, p. 5. NTSB, footnote f, p-5. MAIB, p. 3. Tid, p. 5 See Figure 2 ~ Passage Plan ~ at end of MAIB Report ‘The courte recorder trace indicated a course made good of 259°. NTSB, 6. Ibid, pp. 6, Page 7. CE Page 38 Page 37, Cf Ibid, p. 389; v. 2, 1964, p. 112; Capt. A. Wepster, The former Director of the Navigation Research Centre, Nethorlands Maritime Institute, challenged the validity of this view in his contribution to Fitness for Sea, “Ship “Managers Responsibility for Seaworthines" pp. 90-93. He remasked in that paper". more end more tend a distract, the present value of the 1th Century doctrine formulated ‘by my countryman ‘Hugo Grotus’ io his ‘Mare Liberun* ‘or freedom of the sea.” Capt. A. Wepster conducted a study into this matter a fw ‘years ago. See his, “The Influence of Navigational Aids on ‘Trafic Behaviour in Coaverging Areatin the Entrance/Exit cof the English Channel,” Proc. 2nd West European ‘Conference on Marine Technology, pp. 17178 Capt. A.N. Cockcroft has been one of the most persistent ‘and determined cries ofthove in both France and the United Kingdom who have insisted! on the pursit of legal niceties atthe expense of good seamanship. See A.N. Cockcroft, “Coastal policies cary risk of more colliions" Lloyd's List ‘April 13, 1983. See Cape ALN, Cockcroft “The Effectiveness of Ship Routing ‘off Northwest Burope,” Journal of Navigation, Sept. 1983; also “Routing in the English Channel," bi, Sept. 198 ‘There are several reasons for this. To begin with if it is necessary t slow the vessel markedly high winds will make ‘he ship dificult o steer and abject her excessive leeway. [the vessel should sufler a propulsion or steering failure at thispointthe current should be capable ofcarrying the vessel, clear of shoal water at long as she does not make toa much leeway while disabled,