Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Basics of Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
The Basics of Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
2
Why Use FMEA?
3
Course Objectives
4
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis
5
Failure Mode & Effect Analysis
6
Who uses FMEA?
Historically
Accident prevention has not been a
primary focus of hospital medicine
Misguided reliance on faultless
performance by healthcare
professionals
Hospital systems were not designed to
prevent or absorb errors; they just
reactively changed and were not
typically proactive
8
Rationale for FMEA in Healthcare
9
JCAHO Standard LD.5.2
Effective July 2001
10
Intent of LD.5.2
12
JCAHO Standard LD.5.2
13
JCAHO Standard LD.5.2
16
Healthcare FMEA Definitions
Hazard Analysis:
The process of collecting and evaluating
information on hazards associated with
the selected process. The purpose of
the hazard analysis is to develop a list
of hazards that are of such significance
that they are reasonably likely to cause
injury or illness if not effectively
controlled.
17
Healthcare FMEA Definitions
Failure Mode:
Different ways that a process or sub-
process can fail to provide the
anticipated result.
18
HFMEA and the RCA Process
Similarities Differences
Interdisciplinary Team Process vs. chronological
Develop Flow Diagram flow diagram
Prospective (what if)
Focus on systems issues
analysis
Actions and outcome Choose topic for
measures developed evaluation
Scoring matrix
(severity/probability) Include detectability
and criticality in
Use of Triage/Triggering evaluation
questions, cause & effect Emphasis on testing
diagram, brainstorming intervention
19
HFMEA Points Out
System/Process Vulnerabilities
A B C
Identified process
issue;
focus for intervention
20
Reasons Model of Accidents
Production
Pressures Attention
Lack of
Procedures Zero fault Distractions
tolerance
Mixed Deferred
Punitive Messages Sporadic Maintenance
policies Training Clumsy
Technology
Patient
DEFENSES c t al Accident
r oc l/ Pro n al m en
ol /P Po
ss io eam idu ron
A P M C
o f e T d iv nvi
VH VA Pr In E
21
Process Design & Organizational
Change
Process Re-Design Organizational
Redundancy Increase Constructive Feedback
Usability Testing and Direct Communication
Simplification Teamwork
Fail-safe designs Drive Out Fear
Reduce Reliance on Leadership Commitment
Memory & Vigilance
Simplify
Standardize
Checklists
Forcing Functions
Eliminate Look and Sound-
alikes
Simulate
Looser coupling of systems
22
The Healthcare Failure Modes
and Effects Process
STEP 1
24
Healthcare FMEA Process
STEP 2
25
Healthcare FMEA Process
26
Healthcare FMEA Process
27
Healthcare FMEA Process
28
Healthcare FMEA Process
29
Healthcare FMEA Process
30
Forms & Tools
Forms
Worksheets
Hazard Scoring Matrix
Decision Tree
31
Healthcare FMEA Process
32
Healthcare FMEA Process
2.__________________ 5.______________________
3.__________________ 6.______________________
Are different levels and types of knowledge represented on the team? YES / NO
33
HFMEA Worksheet
Responsible
Concurrence
Management
Existing Control
Failure Mode: Action
Person
Type
Single Point
First Evaluate failure
Detectability
Actions or Rationale
Weakness?
Probability
Haz Score
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
Measure ?
mode before
Proceed?
for Stopping
Severity
determining potential Accept,
causes Eliminate)
34
HFMEA Decision Tree
Does this hazard involve a sufficient
likelihood of occurrence and severity to
warrant that it be controlled?
Tree
NO
YES
YES
Does an Effective Control Measure exist for the
identified hazard? STOP
NO
NO
PROCEED TO HFMEA
STEP 5
35
HFMEA Decision Tree
YES NO
36
HFMEA Decision Tree
NO
YES
37
HFMEA Decision Tree
YES
NO
STOP
38
HFMEA Decision Tree
NO
STOP
PROCEED
39
Hazard Analysis
SEVERITY RATING:
40
Hazard Analysis
SEVERITY RATING:
Patient Outcome: Increased length of stay or Patients Outcome: No injury, nor increased
increased level of care for 1 or 2 patients length of stay nor increased level of care
Visitor Outcome: Evaluation and treatment for Visitor Outcome: Evaluated and no treatment
1 or 2 visitors (less than hospitalization) required or refused treatment
Staff Outcome: Medical expenses, lost time or Staff Outcome: First aid treatment only with no
restricted duty injuries or illness for 1 or 2 staff lost time, nor restricted duty injuries nor illnesses
Equipment or facility: **Damage more than Equipment or facility: **Damage less than
$10,000 but less than $100,000 $10,000 or loss of any utility without adverse
Fire: Incipient stage or smaller patient outcome (e.g. power, natural gas,
electricity, water, communications, transport,
heat/air conditioning).
Fire: Not Applicable See Moderate and
Catastrophic
41
Hazard Analysis
PROBABILITY RATING:
Frequent - Likely to occur immediately or within a short
period (may happen several times in one year)
Occasional - Probably will occur (may happen several
times in 1 to 2 years)
Uncommon - Possible to occur (may happen sometime
in 2 to 5 years)
Remote - Unlikely to occur (may happen sometime in 5 to
30 years)
42
HFMEA Hazard Scoring Matrix
Severity
Catastrophic Major Moderate Minor
Probability
Frequent 16 12 8 4
Occasional 12 9 6 3
Uncommon 8 6 4 2
Remote 4 3 2 1
43
Example - Driving to Work
44
Healthcare FMEA Process
45
Healthcare FMEA Process
2.__________________ 5.______________________
3.__________________ 6.______________________
Are different levels and types of knowledge represented on the team? YES / NO
46
Teaching Example
47
Teaching Example
48
Teaching Example
49
Teaching Example
1A. Hit snooze 2A. Get 3A. Find keys 4A. Coffee in
on alarm 5A. Notice 6A. Collect
coffee cupholder and take exit bag, coffee,
3B. Find
1B. Again, hit bagel
snooze on 2B. Take wallet 4B. Bagel on 5B.Negotiate
alarm shower seat turn 6B. Close
3C. Look for
1C. Get out of 2C. Find bag 4C. Listen to and lock
5C. Find spot
bed clean traffic report doors
3D. Look for 5D. Get car
1D. Find fuzzy clothes 6C. Begin
coffee 4D. Choose to turn off
slippers walking
2D. Find route
3E. Shovel
shoes 6D. Return
out car
for keys 50
Teaching Example
51
Teaching Example
Failure Modes
1A(1) Turn off
alarm
1A(2) Unplug
Alarm
1A(3) Break
alarm clock
52
HFMEA Worksheet, Step 4A
R e s p o n s ib le
C o n c u rre n c e
Managem ent
E xistin g C o n tro l
Failure Mode: Action
P e rs o n
Type
S in g le P o in t
First Evaluate failure
D etectab ility
Actions or Rationale
W eakn ess?
P ro b ab ility
H az S co re
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
M easu re ?
mode before
P ro ceed ?
for Stopping
S everity
determining potential Accept,
causes Eliminate)
53
HFMEA Worksheet
R e s p o n s ib le
C o n c u rre n c e
Managem ent
E xistin g C o n tro l
Failure Mode: Action
P e rs o n
First Evaluate failure Type
S in g le P o in t
D etectab ility
Actions or Rationale
W eakn ess?
P ro b ab ility
H az S co re
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
M easu re ?
mode before
P ro ceed ?
S everity for Stopping
determining potential Accept,
causes Eliminate)
54
Step 4: Hazard Analysis
Step 4B. Determine the Severity and Probability of each
potential cause. This will lead you to the Hazard Matrix Score.
SEVERITY RATING:
Catastrophic Event Major Event
(Traditional FMEA Rating of 10 - Failure could (Traditional FMEA Rating of 7 Failure causes a
cause death or injury) high degree of customer dissatisfaction.)
Patient Outcome:Death or major permanent Patient Outcome:Permanent lessening of bodily
loss of function (sensory, motor, physiologic, or functioning (sensory, motor, physiologic, or
intellectual), suicide, rape, hemolytic transfusion intellectual), disfigurement, surgical intervention
reaction, Surgery/procedure on the wrong patient required, increased length of stay for 3 or more
or wrong body part, infant abduction or infant patients, increased level of care for 3 or more
discharge to the wrong family patients
Visitor Outcome: Death; or hospitalization of 3 Visitor Outcome: Hospitalization of 1 or 2 visitors
or more. Staff Outcome: Hospitalization
Staff Outcome: * A death or hospitalization of 3 of 1 or 2 staff or 3 or more staff experiencing lost
or more staff time or restricted duty injuries or illnesses
Equipment or facility: **Damage equal to or Equipment or facility: **Damage equal to or
more than $250,000 more than $100,000
Fire: Any fire that grows larger than an incipient Fire: Not Applicable See Moderate and
Catastrophic
55
Step 4: Hazard Analysis
Step 4. Determine the Severity and Probability of each
potential cause. This will lead you to the Hazard Matrix Score.
PROBABILITY RATING:
56
HFMEA Hazard Scoring Matrix
Severity
Catastrophic Major Moderate Minor
Probability
Frequent 16 12 8 4
Occasional 12 9 6 3
Uncommon 8 6 4 2
Remote 4 3 2 1
57
Step 4: HFMEA Decision Tree
YES NO
58
Step 4: HFMEA Decision Tree
NO
YES
59
Step 4: HFMEA Decision Tree
YES
NO
STOP
60
Step 4: HFMEA Decision Tree
NO
STOP
PROCEED
61
HFMEA Worksheet, Steps 4B & 4C
Hit Snooze Button - 1A
HFMEA Step 4 - Hazard Analysis HFMEA Step 5 - Identify Actions and Outcomes
Scoring Decision Tree Analysis
R e s p o n s ib le
C o n c u rre n c e
Managem ent
E xistin g Co n tro l
Failure Mode: Action
P e rs o n
Type
S in g le P o in t
First Evaluate failure
Detectab ility
Actions or Rationale
W eakn ess?
P ro b ab ility
Haz S co re
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
M easu re ?
mode before
P ro ceed ?
for Stopping
S everity
determining potential Accept,
causes Eliminate)
9 ------> N N Y
62
HFMEA Worksheet, Step 5
R e s p o n s ib le
C o n c u rre n c e
Managem ent
E xistin g C o n tro l
Failure Mode: Action
P e rs o n
First Evaluate failure Type
S in g le P o in t
D etectab ility
Actions or Rationale
W eakn ess?
P ro b ab ility
H az S co re
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
M easu re ?
mode before
P ro ceed ?
for Stopping
S everity
determining potential Accept,
causes Eliminate)
alarm
m ajor
9 ------> N N Y
1A(1)a Missed snooze Eliminate Purchase new clock Purchase by certain YOU Yes
button date xx/xx/xx
oc c as ional
m ajor
9 ------> N N Y
63
HFMEA PSA Example
Process Step Process Step Process Step Process Step Process Step
64
HFMEA PSA Example
65
HFMEA PSA Example
66
HFMEA PSA Example
3G.
Enter in
CPRS
68
HFMEA PSA Example
Enter
result
Step 4A. Hazard Analysis: List potential failure (CPRS)
Failure Mode: Failure Mode: Failure Mode: Failure Mode: Failure Mode: Failure Mode:
1.Wrong test 1.Equip. broken 1.Instr not 1.QC results 1.Mechanical 1.Computer crash
ordered 2.Wrong speed calibrated unacceptable error 2.Result entered
2.Order not 3.Specimen not 2.Bad 2.Tech error for wrong pt.
received clotted calibration 3.Computer
4.No power stored transcription
5.Wrong test error
tube 4.Result not
entered
5.Result mis-
read by tech
69
HFMEA PSA Example
Step 4B,C, D. Determine hazard score and list all the potential
causes for each potential failure mode.
HFMEA Step 4 - Hazard Analysis HFMEA Step 5 - Identify Actions and Outcomes
Scoring Decision Tree Analysis
Responsible
Concurrence
Management
Existing Control
Failure Mode: Action
Person
Type
Single Point
First Evaluate failure
Detectability
Actions or Rationale
Weakness?
Probability
Haz Score
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
Measure ?
mode before
Proceed?
for Stopping
Severity
determining potential Accept,
causes Eliminate)
3F(1) Computer
Occasional
Crash
Major
9 ------> N N Y
software
Major
9 ------> N N Y
Remote
existing equipment
2 Y Y ------> N
6 Y Y ------> N
70
Step 4: HFMEA Decision Tree
YES NO
71
Step 4: HFMEA Decision Tree
NO
YES
72
Step 4: HFMEA Decision Tree
YES
NO
STOP
73
Step 4: HFMEA Decision Tree
NO
STOP
PROCEED
74
HFMEA PSA Example
Step 4B,C, D. Determine hazard score and list all the potential
causes for each potential failure mode.
HFMEA Step 4 - Hazard Analysis HFMEA Step 5 - Identify Actions and Outcomes
Scoring Decision Tree Analysis
Responsible
Concurrence
Management
Existing Control
Failure Mode: Action
Person
Type
Single Point
First Evaluate failure
Detectability
Actions or Rationale
Weakness?
Probability
Haz Score
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
Measure ?
mode before
Proceed?
for Stopping
Severity
determining potential Accept,
causes Eliminate)
3F(1) Computer
Occasional
Crash
Major
9 ------> N N Y
software
Major
9 ------> N N Y
Remote
existing equipment
2 Y Y ------> N
6 Y Y ------> N
75
HFMEA PSA Example
Report Result - 3F
HFMEA Step 4 - Hazard Analysis HFMEA Step 5 - Identify Actions and Outcomes
Scoring Decision Tree Analysis
Responsible
Concurrence
Management
Existing Control
Failure Mode: Action
Person
Type
Single Point
Detectability
First Evaluate failure Actions or Rationale
Weakness?
Probability
Haz Score
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
Measure ?
mode before
Proceed?
for Stopping
Severity
determining potential Accept,
causes Eliminate)
Moderate
reads results
frequent
8 ------> N N Y
frequent
frequent
8 ------> N N Y
remote
dectectable
2 N ------> Y N
frequent
PSA
8 ------> N N Y
instrument
76
Healthcare FMEA Process
Lets work on another example that takes place in a healthcare
setting using the Healthcare FMEA Process
77
HFMEA BCMA Example
78
HFMEA BCMA Example
79
HFMEA BCMA Example
80
HFMEA BCMA Example
Steps 3D. Identify all sub-processes under each
block. Consecutively letter these sub-steps.
Log Scan
onto Get med Scan patient Give
laptop cart meds band med
Update
record
83
HFMEA BCMA Example
Step 4. Hazard Analysis: List potential failure modes
for each process step.
Log
onto Get med Scan
laptop cart meds
Failure Modes:
Failure Modes: Failure Modes:
1.laptop missing 1.Med cart not there 1.medication missing from
cart
2.network down 2.Filled incorrectly
2.Scanner/laptop missing
3. No battery power 3.Expired meds
3.No power for laptop
4.CPRS not functioning 4.Wrong cart
4.Barcode label
5.forget password
missing
6.Pharmacy pkg down
5.Barcode label not
7.RF system not working
readable
8.Server off line/down
6.No power for scanner
84
HFMEA BCMA Example
Step 4. Hazard Analysis: List potential failure modes
for each process step.
Scan
patient Give Update
band med record
85
HFMEA BCMA Example
Step 4. Hazard Analysis: List potential failure modes
for each process step.
Log
onto Get med Scan
laptop cart meds
86
HFMEA BCMA Example
Step 4. List all the potential causes for each potential failure mode.
Log onto Laptop - 4A
HFMEA Step 4 - Hazard Analysis HFMEA Step 5 - Identify Actions and Outcomes
Scoring Decision Tree Analysis
R esponsible
C oncurrence
Management
Existing Control
Failure Mode: Action
Person
Type
Single Point
First Evaluate failure
Detectability
Actions or Rationale
Weakness?
Probability
Haz Score
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
M easure ?
mode before
Proceed?
for Stopping
determining potential Severity Accept,
causes Eliminate)
4A(1) Laptop
Occasional
M oderate
unavailable
6 Y N N Y
15 minutes
6 Y N N Y
4A(2)b Locked in an Control Call for IRM help Total downtime is Chief Y
office less than or equal to IRM
Occasional
M oderate
15 minutes
6 Y N N Y
87
HFMEA BCMA Example
Step 4. List all the potential causes for each potential failure mode.
R esponsible
C oncurrence
Management
E xisting Control
Failure Mode: Action
Person
Type
S ingle P oint
First Evaluate failure
Detectability
Actions or Rationale
Weakness?
P robability
Haz S core
Potential Causes (Control, Outcome Measure
M easure ?
mode before
P roceed?
for Stopping
determining potential S everity Accept,
causes Eliminate)
4A(2) No power
Oc casional
M oderate
6 Y N N Y
15 minutes
6 Y N N Y
4A(2)b Battery not Control Add 120v receptacles Power available Chief Y
charged up ENG
Occ asional
M oderate
6 Y N N Y
88
Summarize Todays Discussion
89