CR See corer neem FOR JU = zz BS EZ i be sk ot (ca os C- Seare = Dam esta)The Jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 1941-45 This book focuses on the British Commonwealth armies serving in SE Asia during the Second World War that, following the disastrous Malayan and Burma campaigns, had to hurriedly re-train, re-equip and re-organise their demoralised troops to fight a conventional jungle war against the Imperial Japanese Army. A range of formidable problems faced British forces in con- ducting operations across inaccessible, rugged and jungle-covered mountains on the borders of Burma. After a faltering start, however, they successfully adapted to the exigencies of conventional jungle warfare and later inflicted shattering defeats on the Japanese. This study traces how the military effectiveness of British and Indian troops in SE Asia was so dramatically transformed, with par- ticular attention to the two key factors of tactical doctrine and specialised training in jungle warfare. It closely examines how lessons were learnt and passed on between the British, Indian and Australian armies. Italso briefly looks at the various changes in military organisation, medical support and equipment introduced by the military authorities in India Command, and covers the techniques evolved to deliver effective air support to ground troops. To demonstrate the importance of these changes, the battlefield performance of Commonwealth troops in such contrasting operations as the First Arakan Campaign and the defeat of the ITA at Imphal and Kohima is discussed in detail. ‘T.R. Moreman is currently a freelance writer, who has previously held various appointments as Lecturer and Research Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London, including a period as Acting Resident Historian at the Staff College, Camberley. His research interests include the British-Indian Army 1815-1947, colonial small wars and the history of counterinsurgency.Cass Series: Military History and Policy Series Editors: John Gooch and Brian Holden Reid This series will publish studies on historical and contemporary aspects of land power, spanning the period from the eighteenth century to the present day, and will include national, international and comparative studies. From time to time, the series will publish edited collections of essays and ‘classics’. Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917-1919 Matthew Hughes Alfred von Schlieffen’s Military Writings Robert Foley, ed. and trans. ‘The British Defence of Egypt, 1935-1940 Conflict and crisis in the eastern Mediterranean Steven Morewood The Jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 1941-45 TR. Moreman ‘Training, Tacties and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee Seeds of failure Andrew Haughton ilitary Training in the British Army 1940-1944 From Dunkirk to D-Day Tim Harrison Place The Boer War Direction, experience and image John Gooch (ed.) Caporetto 1917 Victory or defeat? Mario Morselli Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS 1945-1952 A special type of warfare Tim Jones ‘The British General Staff Reform and innovation 1890-1939 Writing the Great War Sir James Edmonds and the official histories, 1915-1948 Andrew Green Command and Control in Military C1 Devious decisions Harald Hoiback Lloyd George and the Generals David Woodward Malta and British Strategic Policy, 1925-1943 Douglas Austin British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944 John Buckley Gallipoli Making History Jenny Macleod (ed) British and Japanese Military Leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1945 Brian Bond and Kyoichi Tachikawa (eds) ‘The Baghdad Pact Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East, 1950-59 Behcet Kemal Yesilbursa Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modern Age Matthew Hughes and Gaynor Johnson (eds) ‘The Evolution of Operational Art, 1740-1813 From Frederick the Great to Napoleon The Jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 1941-45 Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare T.R. Moreman FRANK CASS LONDON AND NEW YORKFirst published 2005 by Frank Cass 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN ultancously published in the USA and Canada by Frank Cass 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 TR. Moreman ‘Typeset in Times by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd, Pondicherry, India. Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Lid, Bodmin All rights reserved. No part ofthis book may be reprinted or reproduced ‘or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. “The publisher makes no representation, express or implied, with regard to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and cannot ‘accept any legal responsibility or liability for any errors or ‘omissions that may be made. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data ‘A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Dara A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-714-64970-8 To Susie, Sarah and my parents This book is also dedicated to the memory of Brigadier David Wilson and Lt.-Colonel Ray Scott, whose generous hospitality and kind assistance with this project were much appreciated.Contents List of Maps List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements Introduction 6 The Opening Rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 The Lessons of Defeat, February-October 1942 Forging the Weapon, May 1943-September 1944 ‘The Test of Battle: From Arakan to Imphal-Kohima, September 1943—June 1944 Learning the Lessons of Second Arakan and Imphal-Kohima, March-November 1944 From the Jungle to the Sea, November 1944-May 1945 Conelusion: Endgame in Burma, May~August 1945 Notes Bibliography Index viii ix xi W 46 1 109 143 174 204 219 249 264Maps 1 Burma and Malaya, 1941-42 2 The North-East frontier, 1942-43 3. India Command, 1942-45 4 The Arakan, 1942-43 5 Imphal, 1944 xiii xiv xv xvi xvii Abbreviations Adj.-Gen. AHQ Adjutant General Armoured Fighting Vehicle Army Headquarters Armour Piercing, Army Quarterly Brigadier Captain Chief of the General Staff Chief of the Imperial General Staff Commanding Officer Colonel Commander Royal Artillery Deputy Chief of the General Staff Directing Staff Director of Staff Duties General Officer Commanding Government of India General Staff Officer Grade 1 General Staff Officer Grade 2 High Explosive Indian Army Order Imperial Japanese Army Indian National Army Imperial War Museum Journal of the Royal United Service Institute Journal of the United Service Institution of India Military Department Papers, India Office Library and Records War Staff ‘WS’ Series files, India Office Library and Records Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London Light Machine Gun Lieutenant Lieutenant-Colonel Lieutenant-Generalx Abbreviations Maj. Maj.-Gen MGRA MMG MT NAM NCO NWEP OR PRO QMG RA RAF RUSI TEWT USAAF vco vep wic wo Major Major-General Major-General Royal Artillery Medium Machine Gun Motor Transport National Army Museum Non Commissioned Officer North-West Frontier Province Other Rank Public Record Office, Kew Quarter Master General Royal Artillery Royal Air Force Royal United Service Institution Tactical Exercise Without Troops Unites States Army Air Force Viceroys Commissioned Officer Visual Control Post War Information Circular War Office Acknowledgements My thanks are given to the staff of the following archives and libraries for their friendly assistance with my research: the Oriental and India Office Collection, London; the British Library, London; the Public Record Office, Kew; the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London; the National Army Museum, Chelsea; the Imperial War Museum, Lambeth; the Gurkha Museum, Winchester; the Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell, Uphaven; the Institute of Historical Research; the School of Oriental and African Studies and finally King’s College Library. Crown copyright is acknowledged for citations from records from the Public Record Office and Oriental and India Office Collection. I also wish to thank the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives for permission to quote from papers held in their collections, Lt.-Colonel Patric Emerson and the Indian Army Association once again has provided invaluable assistance with my research. John Nunneley of the Burma Campaign Fellowship has also been helpful in contacting his members. Dr Peter Stanley and the staff of the Australian War Memorial in Canberra have given valuable help in exploring the Australian dimension to this study. My thanks also go to the Australian Army History Research Grants Scheme for funding part of this project and to Paul and Sally Ellis, who very kindly afforded me great hospitality during a research trip to Canberra. My particular gratitude goes out to my friends and former colleagues in the Department of War Studies for their help, comments and friendly criticism over the years ~ Professor Brian Bond, Professor Michael Dockrill, Professor Brian Holden Reid and Professor Andrew Lambert. ‘My thanks also to Duncan Anderson at the RMA Sandhurst, Many former Indian Army officers have taken the time to assist this project either in the form of interviews or in personal comrespondence. My particular thanks go to the following for their assistance and hospitality: the late Lt.-Colonel Ray Scott, Brigadier David Wilson and Major-General James Lunt, Patric Davies, Captain Bruce Rochard, Cecil Hopkins-Husson, Captain Peter Gutteridge, Stanley Menezes, Major-General Ian Lyall Grant, Major-General A.K. Luthera, Brigadier M.J. Chatterjee, Major-General A.K. Luthera, Theon Wilkinson, Lt-Colonel Hugh Pettigrew, Bary Nicholas, Lt.-Colonel Archie Harrington, Captain John Tucker, Howell Parry, J.L. Bowen, Colonel M.C.R. Stevenson,xii Acknowledgements Ronnie McAlister, John Griffith, John Twells, Lt-Colonel T.G. Blackford, Lt-Colonel H.C. Gregory, D.G. Horsford, M.H. Magoris, Rodney Turk, Colonel Alan Watson, Peter Cashmore, Roger Neald, John Cross and Air Com- modore Geoffrey Bumstead. ‘My thanks also to Andrew Humphrys, the editor at Frank Cass, for all his forbearance of various missed deadlines that work/family commitments have caused. All errors of fact and interpretation are, of course, the responsibility of the author alone. Map 1 Burma and Malaya, 1941-42.Map 2 The North-East frontier, 1942-43.sg nme ‘Map 3 India Command, 1942-45.Map 4 The Arakan, 1942-43.‘Map 5 Imphal, 1944.Introduction ‘The binter fighting in the jungles of SE Asia between British Commonwealth troops and the Imperial Japanese Army (WA) was arguably amongst the most difficult ofthe Second World War. Following the Japanese invasion in December 1041, British, Indian and Australian troops fought a conventional war amidst the jungles, mangrove swamps and rubber plantations of Malaya. It quickly revealed that their combat effectiveness was shockingly low. In stark contrast, Japanese appeared well prepared for living, moving and fighting inthe jungle. Within 70 days Singapore Island fell into Japanese hands along with over 80.000 prisoners. ‘Although partially redeemed by the successful longest fighting retreat ever carried ‘out by British arms, the Japanese invasion of Burma again showed just how badly prepared troops of the Army in Burma were for fighting inthe jungles and then the more open terrain of central Burma, ‘The Indian subcontinent formed the base for all subsequent operations in SE Asia, a subsidiary theatre in the wider Pacific War, aiming primarily at the re-establishment of communications with Nationalist China. Throughout it primarily involved forces drawn from within the British Commonwealth British, Indian, Bast and West African, Burmese and other oops of assorted ethnic ‘numbers of Chinese and US troops committed to what the Americans termed the CChina-Burma-India theatre." Only the Australian Military Forces were marked by their absence out of those that had fought in Malaya with its main effort ‘concentrated in the SW Pacific, although a handful of soldiers, sailors and airmen served in the theatre? Throughout the war the main burden of the fighting was shouklered by officers and men of the British-Indian Army. It consisted of British officered units of all-arms recruited from the races of the Indian sube Gurkhas from Nepal organised, equipped and trained on the same lines of the British Army, By 1945 Indian troops constituted some 70 per cent of Ith Army with only two formations ~ the 2nd and 36th divisions ~ all British.’ Each Indian Division of course contained British officers and a leavening of British infantry anillery, engineers and other specialised units, while all senior officers were from the UK! ‘Those British Commonwealth units initially facing the IJA aeross the Indo: Burma frontier in 1941-42 faced a range of major problems in fitting themselves for war under tropical conditions.* Indeed, this area of precipitous mountainous as well as stall inent andIntroduction terrain, due to their unprecedented natural difficulties, distances involved lack of practicable communications, had hardly featured in pre-war planning. ‘Throughout the war the British Forces faced two implacable enemies: the jungle and the Japanese, To quote John Ellis: Jungle wa ‘whose ability to adapt to that environment, as well as their utterly foreign standards of ethics and chivalry, made them seem like men from another planet, In the Far East, men were not only es against bullets, shells and bunkers but were also obliged to try to overcome their fear of the terrain itself and adapt themselves toa completely new kind of warfare.® are. .as carried out in an alien environment, against an enemy In many ways, fighting in SE Asia and the SW Pacific was more of a campaign ‘against nature than enemy resistance, with a combination of terrain, climate and natural vegetation creating “fearsome obstacles’ to waging war, requiring major changes in organization, equipment, tactical doctrine and training.” ‘The sheer enormity of the rugged mountains running along the Indo-Burmese frontier, a physical barrier between Assam and Burma, caused immense tactical ‘and operational difficulties. With steep, jungle-covered mountains rising to heights of 12,000 feet in the Naga Hills, interspersed by deep valleys containing fast flowing rivers and streams, running north-south along the 900-mile length of the Indo-Burma frontier, movement was extremely difficult across the grain of the country. Although growing progressively lower towards the coastal strip inthe far south the hills in Arakan were sil 3,000-4.000 feet in height, fringed by beaches, mangrove swamps and paddy fields intersected by tidal erecks, th presented different albeit sill formidable challenges, especially when the surround ing lowlands flooded during the monsoon. This massive theatre of war, moreover nd the virtual absence of good communications through the jungle-covered ‘mountains ~ roads and tracks ~ made large-scale military operations exceptionally difficult, Apart from a few fair weather tracks practicable routes through the ‘mountains were marked by their absence, making road and bridge building a ‘massive engineering commitment, especially across rivers and streams thot dun periods of heavy rainfall were transformed into raging torrents that swept away the unwary. All fighting was conducted atthe end of lengthy, precarious lines of ‘communication severely complicating moving and administering troops in the forward areas? ‘The lush tropical and sub-tropical jungle cloaking the mountains and hills of the Indo-Burmese frontier, which Mourished as a result of the rich soil and wet ict problems for Commonwealth troops, A mixture of primary secondary and coastal jungle (a term having diverse meaning) of various types cloaked the hills often classified on military maps simply by density. It included areas of bamboo, peepul tres, dense scrub and comparatively open teak forest in the foothills interspersed with areas of more open terrain and some patches of cultivation in low lying areas." By far the greatest variation in vegetation related to altitude, being largely temperate at 4,000 feet and below 2,000 feet tropical. On climate, caused dist Introduction 3 the climb between Dimapur to Imphal, for example, the vegetation varied from sant bamboo to open grasslands and delphiniums around 4,000 Foot ‘and then downland, giving way to paddy fields in the valley of Salisbury Plain near Imphal."! This wide variety of plant life made i extremely Aitieut to aptly describe what constituted jungle. Lt-Colonel 0.G.W. White has offered one colourful alternative: Perhaps the best way is to compare the jungle toa very beautiful woman, the pin-up dream girl in full echnicolour, coo. alluring, beautiful and attractive in the heat to look at but, once approached and negotiated with, full of the ‘greatest possibilities of danger and death to the unwary. This simile is particu larly apt because ike the Figure ofthe pin-up gir the jungle is never fla. ‘Thorns and poisonous plants in themselves were a threat to life and fimb that menaced the unwary.!? ‘A wide variety of fauna and insect life inhabited the Burmese jungle. To new= ‘comers the sights and sounds generated by the teeming insects, animals, lizards 1g the depths of the jungle were confusing, frightening and disorientating. Big game ~ Tigers, Panthers and oceasionally rampaging wild elephants ~ sometimes interrupted operations in Assam and Arakan, with smaller barking deer and wild pigs more common. Venomous snakes ~ kraits, Russell's Vipers and Hamadryads ~ were sometimes encountered by troops. Few realised that most rapidly disappeared, however, a the frst sight or sound of human lie. ‘This wide variety of lying, crawling and biting insect life was both an everyday ‘annoyance and often a tangible direct threat to health asthe main vector for virulent tropical diseases. ‘The appalling climate in the greater part of Assam, Arakan and Burma itself Jmposed an immense strain on Commonvvealth troops, being as one British report described: “one of the most unhealthy in the world’. With Burma lying party within the tropics, the jungle-covered mountains and lowland areas were always, hot and humid with the temperature generally rising before the monsoon months nd reaching over 100°F on the central Burma Plain, Between October-Mareh the climate was generally quite equable, however, and facilitated military operations ‘The monsoon dominated the theatre of war with the NE monsoon running from November-February and the SW monsoon between mid-May-mid-October. Tt enveloped the whole of Assam and Burma with dense cloud and caused exceptionally heavy rainfall varying between 33-200 inches in different parts of Burma, with 500 inches recorded at several places in Assam. In Arakan, rainfall reached 200 inches, for example, with 15 inches of precipitation recorded on ‘one day."* It umed the normally hot and humid jungle into a dank, damp and permanently dripping wet environment, as well as transforming small streams and rivers imo raging torrents, the surrounding countryside into a muddy morass and mountain paths into plissades. Living conditions became difficult inthe extreme, with troops let permanently wet and their sodden equipment quickly becoming, mildewed and rotten. Leeches proliferated in the moist climate aggravating ev4° Introduction further the difficulties facing soldiers. Indeed, for most of the war the cumulative effect of monsoon conditions effectively closed down fighting until the weather improved. The monsoon was followed by periods of intense heat between April-May characterised by frequent thunderstorms and mid-day temperatures rising above 100 F on the Burma Plair Tropical disease and the injurious climate in the jungle was the last but by no means of the last factor affecting troops living, moving and fighting in the jungles. Individual soldiers had to quickly adapt and maintain a high standard of hygiene, sanitation and carefully adhere to stringent protective precautions to avoid its worse effects. The intense heat, wetness and physical exertion, moreover rapidly eroded troops’ resilience. Throughout the war malaria, amoebic dysentery, cholera, serub typhus, dengue fever, small pox and other assorted tropical diseases endemic in SE Asia inflicted far higher casualties than enemy action. Chronic skin complaints — prickly heat, tinea and crotch rot — abounded during the hot and humid monsoon months, Malaria proved a particular scourge with the main line of communication to Burma running through a hyperendemic malarial area. Indeed, it accounted for 0 per cent of all recorded sickness between 1942-44,'6 Indeed, the land war in Burma became as much a war against malaria and its main vector = the anopheles mosquito ~ than the ITA with the Commonwealth armies having to adapt, ion, equipment, training and whole culture of command to counter this deadly threat.'7 The cumulative physical difficulties, hardships and constant strain posed by living, moving and fighting under jungle conditions in the mountains of NE India and Burma upon all protagonists were immense, As George Forty has written: “The climate, the terrain, the flora and fauna, all seemed to be waging their own special war against the soldiers of both sides impersonally.’® Reactions displayed by Commonwealth troops to the jungle were mixed. Apart from accounts in books, glimpses of exotic animals in z00s or in Hollywood films few troops had any knowledge of the jungle and its flourishing plant, animal and insect life. To some officers, however, the lush sylvan jungle in Assam and Arakan was a land of wild and untrammeled beauty.'? Most British and Indian troops reacted very differently to the dark, brooding, hot and humid environment in which they lived, moved and fought.”” Ordinary day-to-day life under active service conditions ‘was intimidating, nerve wracking and debilitating making it a major severe test of mental and physical fitness, stamina and endurance. As Captain David Horner graphically described: ‘To anyone who hasn't soldiered in Assam, the physical hammering one takes is difficult to understand. The heat, the humidity, the altitude, and the slope of almost every foot of ground, combine to knock the hell out of the stoutest constitution.’?! It was often ‘bewildering, depressing and even frightening’, especially at night when it came alive with sounds — screaming monkeys, the incessant hum of insect life and the call of exotic birds — that both confused and disorientated newcomers. As one officer later observed: ‘One of my men, who did not take to grumbling, once said, “This ain’t fighting bloody Japs; it’s fighting bloody nature!” and expressed the feeling we all had, Somehow the actual battle with the enemy was only a small part of the difficulties we faced.’ Introduction 5 ‘The Commonwealth armies also had to adapt to waging war against a formidable, highly trained and often brutal opponent, whose professionalism, superb morale and fighting quality had been badly underrated by most western observers. An aura of invincibility quickly surrounded Japanese troops, moreover, following their early successes.’> A deep-seated perception that the JA was composed of fearsome, highly skilled jungle fighters quickly became entrenched in their opponents’ minds. This mindset was reinforced by the ferocious determination and fighting spirit — a product of its ferocious and highly effective training regime, culture and religious beliefs — displayed by Japanese troops. Such ‘fanaticism’ made them a formidable opponent. Indeed, the resilience of Japanese fighting ‘troops and unwillingness to surrender astounded their opponents and shaped British fighting methods and attitudes towards them. An increasingly brutal war of exter~ mination was fought by Commonwealth troops against the IJA to destroy them as a fighting force rather than just securing ground.?° The Necessity for Change ‘The distinctive military characteristics of the land war in Burma stood in marked contrast to that fought in North Africa or NW Europe. Indeed, initially the organ- isation, equipment, doctrine and training of the Commonwealth armies in the Far East were completely unsuited to this new tactical environment to which apparently no real thought had been paid. The fighting methods, tactical doctrine and training used by Commonwealth troops changed considerably as the war progressed to fit them to what was known alternatively as bush warfare, forest warfare and more popularly jungle warfare against a conventional opponent. The ultimate success with which the Commonwealth armies adapted and developed expertise in this highly specialised form of conventional war fighting was demonstrated in Arakan in February 1944 and during the decisive Imphal-Kohima ‘campaign later that year. By mid-1944 British and Indian troops were fully conversant with the jungle and possessed a high level of skill in specialised tactics of jungle warfare. As Raymond Callahan has observed: In the eighteen months between Burcorps withdrawal into Assam and the “Admin Box’ battle in Arakan in February 1944 one of the most remarkable transformations of the war took place, the reconstruction of the Indian Army to provide the units that were the core of Fourteenth Army that Slim led in victory in 1944/45 — outmaneuvering and outfighting a much larger Japanese force that was ever encountered by the Americans in the Pacific.” According to Field Marshal Lord Carver: ‘The transformation of Fourteenth Army from the force that had withdrawn from Burma and fought in the Arakan in 1942 was truly remarkable, and it is not easy to be confident in attributing credit for it fairly.’* Similarly in his study of Slim’s generalship, Duncan Anderson has also noted: ‘Many armies have risen, phoenix-like from the ashes of defeat — the6 Introduction Prussian Army after 1806, the US Army after 1861 — but none so spectacularly as, the Eastern Army in 1943.9 The development of fighting methods, a specific written tactical doctrine and training regimen upon which operations were based was a key part of this process of fitting Commonwealth troops to waging war in a jungle environment against the Japanese, Indeed, the question of tactical doctrine and training is one of such importance that it requires detailed consideration both in Malaya and then in Burma.” It, along with a number of factors — manpower, equipment, morale, administration and of course leadership — always plays an important part in building fighting power in any form of conflict.*! Following the first shock of defeat a major effort was put into analysing causes of early British failure and adapting established fighting methods to the jungle. Throughout the war fighting methods underwent continual development and were constantly carefully re-evaluated, revised, and updated in accordance with front line experience resulting in the dissemination of a detailed, coherent and explicitly articulated body of doctrine for jungle fighting, codified and disseminated in the form of successive editions of Military Training Pamphlets (MTPs), training instructions and letters. Along with first-hand advice from experienced officers it provided a valuable framework that showed units *how to tackle the “green hell” of the jungle with its bunkers, foxholes and other puzzling novelties’.*? Although there is a strong empi school of thought decrying the significance of written doctrine and arguing that the only effective training was combat itself, it was never a view shared by the military authorities, however, who firmly believed in the importance of written sources of tactical guidance for officers, NCOs and ORs and producing a common doctrine.*> Yet the process of developing new fighting methods, producing and seminating written doctrine upon which training was based that created this highly effective fighting machine has been strangely neglected. This is particularly sur- prising given that the significance of doctrine in improving military effectiveness in general has keenly interested a growing number of military historians. As Colin Melnnes and John Stone have noted: ‘Doctrine is now widely seen as critical for both the effective conduct of war and in preparation for war (particularly training, but also in guiding procurement).’“ In recent years numerous books, for example, have charted the transformation in military effectiveness of the British Expeditionary Force on the Western Front during the First World War.*> The role of military doctrine and training as a major determinant of improving combat effectiveness, moreover, has also been recognised by several military historians working on the war against Germany between 1939-45. It might be appropriate to establish what is doctrine? As John Gooch has written in the Preface of another volume in this series, doctrine plays a critical bridge between thought and practice: s- the articulating agent which ensures — or should ensure — that everyone knows the right thing to do and that they all do the same things in the same circumstances. In all armies and in every war, doctrine is the glue which ss Introduction 7 holds everything together, and training is the instrument through which it is imparted.2” In his recent study of the British Army training in the UK between 1940-44, Tim Harrison-Place has usefully defined doctrine as: “The officially sanctioned doctrine of the British Army as expressed in the many manuals and pamphlets published by the War Office and other military authorities.’** The development and dissemination of a battlefield tactical doctrine in the form of manuals, training pamphlets and other written sources, however, is insufficient just alone to ensure an improvement in combat effectiveness. In Brian Holden Reid’s words: ‘Publishing a doctrinal pamphlet or circulating a paper is no more proof of the acceptance of a doctrinal policy than shouting its conclusions from the roof of the old War Office. A doctrine needs to be accepted and its provisions enforced from the top down by means of training throughout the army.’*? This took two forms. A system of individual training is vitally required to ensure that it is successfully inculcated into the minds of officers, NCOs and other ranks and then by units and formations during collective training — driven by doctrine — before in turn it is put into practice on the battlefield. It is a vital part of the process of improving combat capability, with prior preparation and planning essential to accustom individuals, sub-units, units and formations to operate successfully together in any military environment. To many veterans of the campaign the importance of training to wage war in Burma was clear, given the special characteristics of jungle fighting that required training not just to fight but how to live and move. As Brigadier John Smyth has written: “Training, is a matter which is apt to be belittled by the uninitiated, But training for war is just as important as training for sport, and where the contestants are equal it may decide the issue." \¢ and training has otherwise received remarkably little attention in the extensive literature dealing with the war in Malaya or Burma until very recently. Most British and US military historians largely ignore the subject, preferring instead to focus on the fighting itself. The otherwise excellent British official histories, for example, pay it scant attention other than mentioning that major changes in military organisation occurred during the war.*" Similarly the joint Indian and Pakistani official historians dealing with Malaya and Burma have largely ignored training, and concentrated on describing what occurred on the battlefield.*? While some of the many studies of, the campaign in Malaya briefly discuss the apparent absence of jungle training before the outbreak of war, none adequately address why this vital part of instruction was largely ignored.** This is not an isolated phenomenon. It is largely disregarded in Louis Allen’s authoritative Burma: The Longest War, published in 1984, which still forms the single most important book on the campaign.“ Similarly numerous popular histories of the war in Burma concentrate primarily on military operations rather than the more mundane details of instruction before battle is joined.** Most other accounts are based on a comparatively narrow range of sources in any event, and overly rely on the official histories and Field Marshal8 Introduction Sir William Slim’s classic and highly influential account of the Burma campaign — Defeat into Victory - to the virtual exclusion of other sources of information. Indeed, received opinion largely credits Slim as being personally responsible for the development of doctrine and training that made 14th Army a war-winning weapon.‘® This virtually complete absence of detailed analyses means anyone interested in this topic is forced to refer to two rather dated studies written respectively by John Cross and Bryan Perrett, tracing the general evolution of jungle-fighting skills that only partially address the development of doctrine during the Second World War. Although a useful introduction to the subject however, is based, neither on extensive use of primary sources nor provides the last word on the topic.” As Raymond Callahan has speculated the reasons for this neglect of doctrine and training are perhaps even more straightforward: Training is a very dull subject— rather like the history of university organization and structure, important but not pulse-quickening. For that reason, military historians, professional and amateur, official and academic alike, get past it as quickly as they can... Yet training (and doctrine, which drives training) are powerful determinants of how any army fights ~ certainly as powerful as technology and institutional structure, perhaps as potent as societal and cultural factors." In part this dearth of interest may also be attributed to difficulties in obtaining access to primary evidence about training in the Far East and the fact the war in Burma was won first and foremost by troops of the Indian Army. Until very recently the Indian Army in general has not received the scholarly attention it merits. A new generation of scholars interested in the military in British India, however, has begun addressing important questions about its very distinctive organisation, equipment and training.’ The messy, bloody and unpleasant busi- ness of actual fighting and training to do so, however, has surprisingly largely been marked by its absence apart from my earlier book dealing with operations on the North-West Frontier of India.*° Two new studies have recently appeared, however, looking at the subject of jungle fighting. In a recent article Alan Jeffreys for example has made some tentative observations, while Daniel Marston has produced a groundbreaking study of the reform of the Indian Army during Second world war that partially covers the same ground, although from a very different perspective than this book.» This disinterest in doctrine and training displayed by British historians until very recently is not an isolated phenomenon. A similar gap exists in the literature, for example, regarding how the Australian Military Forces adapted to fighting in Malaya, New Guinea and the islands of the SW Pacific. As Peter Stanley has pointed out: ‘Despite its centrality to the Australian war effort in the South-West Pacific Area, jungle warfare has been inexplicably neglected.’*? Several recent Australian studies, however, provide a useful point of reference for this book (as the Australian Army was initially organised, equipped and trained on the same Introduction 9 lines as the rest of the Commonwealth armies). In an impressive undergraduate thesis Jon Moremon, for example, has tentatively described the Australian Army's doctrinal and training response for jungle warfare in Australia and New Guinea between 1941-43, while Mark Welburn and John Coates have thrown further light on the subject.* This book fills a gap still remaining in the existing literature by examining how the British Commonwealth armies adapted themselves to conventional jungle fighting against the IJA, in terms of devising appropriate fighting methods, disseminating from the top down officially sanctioned written tactical doctrine and devising a system of training accustoming troops to living, moving and fighting in the jungle based upon it. It should be noted at the outset that the emphasis on conventional jungle warfare — operations conducted by regular units intended to fight the main land battle — is very deliberate. A substantial force was raised and committed to battle in Burma, employing highly controversial irregular methods — Long Range Penetration (LRP) ~ developed by Major-General Orde Wingate in Palestine, Bast Africa and later refined in Burma. Dubbed the Chindits following Operation LONGCLOTH these units have generated a sizeable literature.** This deliberate exclusion of the Chindits will undoubtedly cause consternation i some quarters, Even a brief perusal-of the extensive training literature produced by General Head Quarters (GHQ) India, however, reveals surprisingly little reference to LRP methods, except in the most general terms. This was not a further manifest- ation of the jealousy and bloody-mindedness that David Rooney has speculated lay behind attempts to denigrate the Chindits’ contribution to final vietory in Burma.® A separate in-house training organization — Special Force Training and Experimental Wing (established in October 1943) — and the Chindits jealously guarded independence from GHQ India meant the hard-won lessons learnt by Special Force, largely ‘a law unto itself’, were not widely disseminated.*° This ‘closed shop’ mentality meant, it did not willingly share its idea or cooperate with the Directorate of Military Training (DMT). Instead, the highly specialized doctrine and fighting methods developed for LRP were kept strictly ‘in house’ in terms of training directives, memoranda and other guidance produced by Orde Wingate and the HQ of Special Force. In any event the principles and tactics of LRP were simply too specialised and largely irrelevant to regular troops that in the final analysis won the decisive battles that decided the fate of Burma. The ‘greatest contribution made by the Chindits, however, was moral and psychological following Operation LONGCLOTH that was deliberately blown out of all pro- portion as propaganda to salvage morale in India Command. Other than further refining existing air supply methods and indicating its practicalities in supporting large formations, Orde Wingate made little contribution to the development of doctrine for conventional jungle operations. Ironically only after Special Force Was disbanded and its officers transferred to regular units were its lasting lesson passed on to the Indian Army. ‘The Jungle the Japanese and the Commonwealth Armies at War throws light ‘on why the conventional British Commonwealth armies were so surprisingly ill-prepared for jungle fighting when the Japanese attacked in December 1941.10 Introduction It carefully examines the initially slow process of adaptation to the jungle and the Japanese from the fall of Malaya and Burma in 1942 culminating in the decisive battles of Imphal—Kohima and advance to Rangoon, It charts the steep learning curve of the Indian Army and how lessons were learnt and passed on to the rest of the military in India. It is not, however, an operational history although examples from particular engagements and particular campaigns have been described in depth to illustrate changes in fighting methods, Rather it focuses on how the military authorities in India went about learning, adapting and producing an appropriate doctrine and system of training laying down new fighting methods for jungle fig! 1 The Opening Rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 ‘The British Commonwealth armies paradoxically lacked any detailed written sources of tactical guidance during the inter-war period about jungle fighting against either a conventional or irregular opponent, Although regular troops had fought in tropical jungle terrain in Africa, NE India and Burma against a variety of opponents during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, few lessons had been recorded in terms of official doctrine. Indeed, during the inter-war period con- ventional British military wisdom paid little heed towards this subject, despite experience gained during the First World War in East and West Africa fighting and the occasional later involvement of British and Indian troops in ‘imperial policing’. Neither the War Office nor the local military authorities in the Far East, responsible for issuing guidance in accordance with Training and Manoeuvre Regulations, took any action.' A rapid return to pre-war orthodoxy and acceptance of anew edition of Field Service Regulations (FSR) as the ‘tactical bible’ meant no guidance appeared on the subject. Like its pre-war edition FSR stressed the applicability of the principles of war to all forms of conflict and only briefly discussed ‘bush fighting’ against Somali, Sudanese, Burmese and the tribes of the NE frontier of India. Later editions followed suit with the main focus on military thought and training in units, formations and at the Staff Colleges at Camberley ‘and Quetta remaining the lessons of the Western Front.” ‘This marked disinterest in jungle fighting can quite easily be explained, being primarily a product of the lack of an obvious potential military ‘threat’ involving fighting against a conventional opponent in tropical terrain. A fear of over- specialisation of also played a part, with widespread belief that the lesser was contained in the greater subject of conventional war fighting. The existence of a range of paramilitaries ~ such as the Burma Military Police, Assam Rifles and the West African Frontier Force — under civil control, who specialised in bush or jungle warfare as part of their policing duties, largely removed the need to do so. Whilst the responsible authorities produced their own manuals about fighting against both regular and irregular troops, intended for British officers and NCOs seconded for short tours of duty, elaborating upon FSR, they were not circulated to regular units.? In any event since most campaigns were fought against ‘savage’ opponents armed with primitive weapons, were of short duration and involved minimal loss of European life, there was little incentive to do so.12 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941—May 1942 Although occasionally British officers with recent practical experience of jungle fighting complained in the military service press about the dearth of guidance on the subject, no attempt was made to act on such suggestions. As a result regular officers involved in such operations as the 1930-32 Burma Rebellion were left largely to learn on the job.* The Defence of Malaya The likelihood that regular British troops might wage war in dense jungle engaged some officers’ attention in Malaya Command just before outbreak of the Second World War. A growing, perceived Japanese threat to the British naval base on Singapore Island — the pivot of British defence policy in the Far East — and recognition that the planned RN Main Fleet upon which its defence had always rested would be unavailable in the event of a European war gave the army and RAF an increasing role in local defence. Until the late 1930s conventional military wisdom was that the dense jungle cloaking Malaya was impassable to organised bodies of troops favoured the defence and that rivers were unfordable confining the role of the small garrison to the local defence of Singapore Island. A com- bination of road building, clearance of jungle for plantations and a reassessment of the impact of jungle, however, forced a reconsideration of these assumptions. Whilst the small garrison of Singapore Island conducted some useful exercises in Jahore in the late 1930s, illustrating the inherent problems of operating in a tropical environment, most training by the small garrison was confined to manning fixed defences on Singapore Island or followed orthodox lines as laid down in Field Service Regulations.> The landward defence of Malaya acutely concerned British planners as the war clouds gathered in Europe, mindful that Imperial Japan might exploit British weakness in the Far East. Shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War the garrison of Malaya was quickly augmented, In August-September 1939 12th Indian Infantry Brigade ~ ‘Force Emu’ — commanded by Brigadier Archie Paris landed on Singapore Island from India, providing Malaya Command for the first time with a mobile reserve capable of counterattacking a Japanese landing made within striking distance of Singapore Island. The 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was left largely to its own devices after it deployed, and as a result had time and opportunity to train to fit it for its new role. The enterprising CO of the 2nd Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, an officer keenly interested in training, led the way in examining the inherent problems involved in carrying out its assigned war role in Jahore. Whilst in temporary command and then as CO in February 1940, Lt.-Colonel Ian Stewart investigated the military characteristics and problems of fighting under tropical conditions. Like other units it had been told the Malayan jungle was impassable to organised bodies of troops. Although stationed on Singapore Island, this battalion went up-country in the jungles, rubber plantations and mangrove swamps of Jahore. No guidance was obtained from Malaya Command about appropriate instruction. In the words of David Wilson (a young subaltern): ‘No Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 13 on had any idea of how we were going to fight in the countryside of Malaya. There was talk of “impenetrable” jungle, “unfordable rivers” and the like, but in fact the countryside in which we were to operate was almost entirely cultivated plantations of rubber and palm with well developed roads and estate tracks.”® ‘Another officer wrote: ‘In Singapore jungle warfare had scarcely been thought of, as the troops on the island fought in beach defences. There was no common tactical doctrine and no one to give us any guidance.’” ‘The problems inherent in living, moving and fighting under tropical conditions were discovered by the Argylls during a series of exercises held in the Mersing— Endau area of Jahore in 1939-40. Many of its men, recruited from the cities and highlands of Scotland displayed considerable fear of this strange, disorientating new environment filled with completely unfamiliar sights, sounds and smells. ‘A combination of the eerie silence, limited vision and sense of isolation experienced, living in the half-darkness under a jungle canopy rapidly undermined morale, whilst high heat and high humidity quickly exhausted physically unfit men. ‘An exaggerated fear of jungle flora and fauna ~ snakes, monkeys, wild pigs, and the occasional tiger — undermined both confidence and, in turn, military effeet- iveness. Leeches and the insect life, moreover, made life highly unpleasant added to a sense of fear. Lastly, tropical disease quickly emerged as a major problem, with many men quickly becoming infected with dysentery, malaria, skin diseases and heat exhaustion. These exercises crucially revealed that whilst the military problems of living, moving and fighting were formidable, they were not as bad as Malaya Command portrayed and that the orthodox British view about the impassable jungle and that it favoured defence was unfounded. As Stewart later wrote: ‘As training in the jungle progressed, it gradually became evident that exactly the reverse was true.” Whilst impassable to wheeled or tracked vehicles it was another matter for trained lightly equipped infantry. Although the fringes of primary jungle appeared impassable from roads, a thick, tangled belt of trees and undergrowth often disguised a far more open interior where troops could move with relative ease, Secondary jungle — areas originally cleared for cultivation that then regrew with dense, tangled undergrowth — presented a far more formidable barrier to move- ‘ment, but even this was not insuperable. Mangrove swamps, however, were another matter through which progress slowed to a crawl. Areas cleared for rubber, coconut and pineapple plantations were a very different proposition, as were the tin mining areas, although visibility was limited to 300 yards. With requisite watermanship training, many rivers also regarded as formidable obstacles by Malaya command on closer acquaintance were easily crossed. ‘The jungle posed distinctive military problems. While dense tropical vegetation was certainly passable to determined infantry, movement was difficult and time- consuming with paths having to be laboriously hacked through thick foliage. Maintaining direction and navigating proved extremely difficult given restricted visibility, as few good landmarks were easily discernable under a jungle canopy away from the roads or rivers, Men easily became disorientated, lost and demoralised. Italso posed major difficulties in maintaining command and control above section14 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 level. Indeed, during the first few exercises the battalion quickly disintegrated after it took to the jungle, This restricted vision caused by dense jungle, however, made it an almost perfect medium for attack, rather than favouring the defence, since it offered an ideal covered approach for troops able to move undetected from ground and air, Flanks were always insecure as a result nor were lines of communication safe since any defensive position could be encircled around through jungle. The enthusiastic CO of the Argylls displayed considerable imagination in adapting to these novel conditions. The only solution to the psychological fear displayed by many men about living, moving and fighting in the jungle and physically acclimatising them was by holding frequent exercises under active service conditions. Only by this means could troops learn to dominate the jungle instead of being dominated by it. A lengthy period of acclimatisation was clearly required to introduce them to the physical strain of daily life in jungle and to the specialised arts of ‘jungle lore’. The latter involved identifying edible plants, finding potable water, making shelters from local materials, tracking and lastly manufacturing booby traps. By subsisting on iron rations and whatever foodstuffs could be foraged supply difficulties were alleviated. Route marches carrying heavy loads physically hardened men and helped improve the speed of movement through dense vegetation, An important element of such instruction was jungle navigation, involving skilful map reading and use of a compass. Tropical disease always posed a major threat to military efficiency about which no real solution, however, was available apart from careful man management, discipline and slavishly following pre-war strictures on malaria control, especially about employing mosquito nets and insect repellents. The infantry was the predominant fighting arm in the jungle, since, sufficiently well trained and lightly equipped, it possessed by far the greatest relative mobility and freedom of manoeuvre. In comparison, the supporting arms and services equipped with motor transport and heavy weapons were tied to the few roads and fields of fire were non-existent. Other technical difficulties also affected them. Artillery could not be easily deployed, for example, since few gun positions existed, a serious danger of rounds prematurely detonating in tree tops was always present and it was difficult to plot the fall of shot. The infantry faced par- ticular challenges needing overcoming. As a result of the dispersion and dif- ficulties exercising command and control inherent in jungle fighting, due to dense foliage and limited visibility, responsibility devolved down the chain of command and rested on the shoulders of company and platoon commanders and NCOs, as well as the ordinary infantryman who often fought out of sight and supervision of his immediate superiors. A premium was placed on individual iveness, mobility and personal skills and the proficiency of individuals and sub-units, rather than at battalion and brigade level. An extremely fit, highly trained and self-reliant infantryman, possessing considerable initiative, emerged a key requirement for victory given the prevalence of close quarter combat. As Stewart later wrote: ‘For in jungle it is the quality of the man far more than the quality and quantity of weapons that counts, his psychological, physical and Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941—May 1942 15 tactical training, his morale, his toughness, his discipline.’ A high standard of basic individual infantry skills — skill-at-arms, marksmanship (especially snap-shooting), field craft and physical fitness ~ far in excess of that required in other theatres of war — was deemed essential. Field craft and its local variant jungle craft formed an essential element of all training geared to the jungle, with attention paid to observation, concealment and silent movement. To develop it six months of hard, intensive and realistic training was judged the minimum in Stewart's view before any man was effective part of a unit. ‘The enclosed jungle terrain meant patrolling and minor tactics assumed crucial importance, especially given the prevalence of close quarter combat. Patrolling ‘was vital in all phases of jungle fighting, to seize the initiative, disorganise enemy encircling operations, gather information and lastly dominate the surrounding jungle. As Stewart explained: ‘In enclosed country war, the side which wins the patrol fighting wins the war.’ Stewart also developed the concept of small “Tiger” patrols. These small ~ 3-5 man — fighting patrols were intended to find and harass the enemy lines of communication and attack troops whenever encountered operating at depths of up to 20 miles behind enemy front lines. To be effective, however, they demanded intimate familiarity with jungle, ability to live off the land, skill with a map and compass or navigation by the stars to keep direction while moving through dense vegetation by day or night. Dense jungle cloaking terrain meant most tactical features — hills, ridges and rivers ~ lost their normal significance. Instead the control of roads represented therefore the key to his tactical approach to jungle fighting, especially since Commonwealth units were almost completely dependent upon them for supply, transport and maintaining command and control. As Stewart later wrote: “The Road is the Dominant Tactical Feature, for all control is from it. It is absolutely the nerve centre.’ A purely static defence based around orthodox linear positions spread over a wide front or astride a road was dismissed, since the jungle offered such a perfect medium for attack either by infiltration or encirclement. Two forms of defence were developed based on the premise that attack was the best form of defence and that the advantages its control gave were so great that any encircling attack made by the enemy through the jungle could be defeated relatively easily. The most effective way of defending a road Stewart believed was by employing fighting patrols operating from defended localities, acting as a base and pivot of manoeuvre, built in depth down a road to prevent enemy forces establishing a roadblock. Instead of passively awaiting attack patrols would screen their own positions, gather intelligence and disorganise an enemy advance whilst most Vulnerable using ambushes and hit-and-run attacks (o seize the initiative. To achieve this end his training methods emphasised speed, high morale and aggressiveness from section to battalion level. A series of immediate action drills — battle drills — Were developed for immediately counterattacking an enemy advance. As soon as an enemy attack was detected defensive localities on the road, moreover, would step back so that an enemy attacks would fall squarely onto the shoulder of the defences rather than deep in their rear. The battalion’s reserve platoon of four Lanchester and three Marmon-Herrington armoured cars and Bren Carrier platoon,16 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 equipped with fourteen tracked vehicles, moreover, provided means of blocking enemy attacks that reached the roads. : The attack in the jungle, however, posed in itself formidable difficulties requiring new minor tactics and jungle-trained troops with high morale. Two ways of attacking were developed based on the premise that control of roads and eliminating an opponent's means of command, and control and cutting his supply lines was the key to vietory. Both were based on the basic theme of “fix frontally — encircle’ that informed all tactics in the battalion down to ‘Tiger’ patrol level. An encircling attack through the jungle to seize a section of the enemy’s line of communication was regarded as by far the most effective. It was by far the most difficult to implement, however, requiring highly trained troops and no interference from the enemy during the approach march. When a blocking position was in place on a road in the enemy's rear he would then have no alternative other than withdraw or be forced into the jungle. A ‘filleting” attack, designed to seize the initiative and shatter enemy command and control, was far simpler to execute, especially by conventionally trained troops. It involved wifi, concentrated and aggressive frontal attack down the length of a road in depth, supported by massed artillery on the road or on its immediate flanks or tanks, aiming to split or fillet enemy forces like boning a fish. By forcing enemy troops into the surrounding jungle their command and control would be destroyed with a consequent loss of heavy equipment and vehicles as well as severing their own lines of communication.® ‘The 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders’ intensive training earned it a well- deserved reputation as being specialists in jungle fighting, but it was carried out largely without Malaya Command’s approval. As Major Angus Rose later noted: “In this respect we received very little encouragement from Malaya Command and they assured us that if we not drowned in the seasonal rains we should be decimated by malaria.” Apart from the rest of 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, however, none of its methods were adopted elsewhere in Malaya Command." This was partly due to the inadequate number of staff officers responsible for training, mostly poorly trained and overburdened by other duties, at Malaya Command who failed to study and pass on such knowledge. Undoubtedly it was also due in pat to Stewart’ often brash, overbearing and indeed patronising man- ner that led to him being dismissed as a ‘crank’ by senior staff officers."! In a characteristically robust letter written in November 1940, for example, Stewart complained bitterly about lack of modern pamphlets, too infrequent exercises and lastly no attention being paid to his training methods: Since October 1939, with the exception of the G.O.C. no General Staff Officer of Malaya Comd. has ever visited the Bn., or its Coys. or Training Cadres, when practising jungle tactics. The type of warfare under test was novel, and there had been many revolutionary lessons to learn. Yet the Comd, General Staff's study of jungle warfare appears to us to have been exclusively academic and at second hand.'? Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 17 A similarly blunt observation at a later staff conference about lack of training earned him a stern rebuke, with his ideas dismissed ‘as dangerous fanaticism, and totally irrelevant!’ The bulk of the Malayan garrison in 1939-40 still worked a normal peacetime routine and left to their own devices most concentrated on their static defensive duties. No attempt was made by overburdened higher authority to study jungle fighting or issue instructions about appropriate training.'' Most COs uncritically accepted Malaya Command's views about the impassable jungle and slavishly adhered to laid down in FSR and its wartime successors.'* The imminent arrival of large-scale reinforcements for Malaya Command in autumn of 1940, however, galvanised interest in providing some guidance since most were destined for northern Malaya, protecting RAF airfields. To fill this gap at the direction of Lieutenant-General Lionel Bond, GOC Malaya Command, the General Staff Malaya Command prepared a small pamphlet for issue to such units based upon lessons learnt during various exercises conducted in Jahore and Singapore Island in 1939-40.'¢ Tactical Notes for Malaya 1940 briefly described the country and climate of Malaya, before discussing how primary and secondary jungle, rubber plantations, paddy fields, mining areas and areas of pineapple cultivation affected operations and troops. Road communications in Malaya were classified as excellent, although it warned that all should be treated as defiles easily blocked by air attack or obstacles and rivers were also possible avenues of approach. It also contained a brief assessment of enemy characteristics reflected the locally generally low estimates of Japanese fighting prowess. A high standard of armament and technical training, great physical endurance, few bodily requirements, ruthlessness and a ‘genius’ for imitating European fighting methods were characterised as Japanese strengths, while an ill-deserved reputation for dash and self-sacrifice and being reliant on ‘weight of metal to get him forward, and shirks close fighting with a spirited opponent’ Were seen as weaknesses. Japanese minor tactics were assessed as ‘sticky’, junior leaders as lacking initiative, and they were weak in direct attack and careless about protection. Japanese troops, moreover, had no experience of air attack, fighting against opposition and lastly had little or any training in tropical country. Tactical Notes for Malaya stressed that infantry was the primary arm in Malaya with surprise and guerrilla tactics replacing supporting weapons, as artillery, Mortars, and Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFVs) were restricted to nearby roads. A small defending force, aided by demolitions and air support, could impose delay out of all proportion to its size. Moving troops by road and through rubber and jungle merited a short chapter. While acknowledging the importance of roads for large-scale troop movements, off-road infantry was the most mobile arm even though the progress of troops cutting a path through jungle only amounted to 1/2 to 1% miles per hour. A high degree of skill with compass and map was essential since troops ~ operating in small bodies up to two companies — would normally march on fixed bearings over carefully calculated distances. Various formations for moving through the jungle were outlined and officers were directed to seize18 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941—May 1942 every opportunity for training in movement through jungle given the immense difference in value between trained and untrained troops. Tactical Notes briefly dealt with protection at rest and advocated employment of perimeter camps providing all-round protection, in the jungle, with patrols and listening posts providing advance warning of attack. A ‘zareba’ made from saplings and other vegetation encompassing the encampment, trip wires, cut fire lanes and flattened undergrowth outside was recommended for local protection, with a reserve at hand immediately to counterattack any enemy who made it inside the defences. The conduct of a successful attack Tactical Notes stipulated depended much on surprise, boldness and resourceful leadership, rather than deliberate planning, since information was so hard to come by, supporting fire awkward to arrange and command and control difficult to maintain. To lower enemy morale continual harassment by guerrilla tactics was recommended. Tactical Notes stressed the effectiveness of flank attacks by small sub-units on enemy positions or lines of communication, although it warned careful coordination, timing and command and control was essential. Readers were explicitly informed that thick country did not favour static defence, since flanks could be easily found and turned and the restricted visibility severely limited fire plans using artillery and automatic weapons. Instead a defence in depth down the lines of communication along with offensive action whenever possible was recommended along with ambushes and ruses used to confuse and disorganise an opponent. Since enemy attacks would most likely fall on the flanks suitable obstacles needed to be found. The conduct of withdrawal was characterised as a simple problem in thick country providing routes were known and clearly marked out through the jungle. Attacks against lines of communication running along roads, however, was recognised as a major threat, Ruses and stratagems were also recommended to delay enemy attempts to follow up withdrawing troops. This small pamphlet concluded by discussing inter-communication and administration, highlighting its difficulties as well as. providing information about supplying detachments, and appropriate clothing and equipment. A brief section on health and hygiene recognised that disease posed a particular problem to troops, particularly malaria that could only be tackled by strict adherence to established precautions regarding mosquito nets and insect repellent cream. It also reassured troops about a particular bogey ~ snake bites — whose risks were judged as only slight.'7 Tactical Notes for Malaya 1940 clearly showed the influence of the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and the rest of 12th Indian Infantry Brigade. Although simplistic and harking back to the East African campaigns in places, it was the single most influential piece of training literature dealing with the conduct of operations in Malaya being issued to all incoming units. It was also studied elsewhere and was republished in New Delhi for the use of instructors in the Army in India preparing further units for despatch overseas to Malaya. The Indian military authorities also paid thought to fighting a modern opponent in forest terrain in 1940. It was by no means its first priority, however, as it Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 19 concentrated on organising, equipping and training formations for service in the Middle East and Persia or its insistent commitments of Internal Security (IS) duty and frontier warfare. As Charles Chevenix Trench has written: ‘Hardly a thought ‘was given to Burma and Malaya, except to sympathize with the poor buggers who were bogged down there, with no chance of seeing action.’ !® With large numbers of the rapidly expanding Army in India destined for Malaya a small pamphlet was prepared in 1940 at GHQ India dealing with operations in the tropical terrain against a ‘modern fully equipped enemy’, forming part of a wider series dealing with ‘extensive warfare’ as opposed to “intensive warfare’ in Western Europe.'? MTP No. 9 (India) Extensive Warfare: Notes on Forest Warfare characterised forest areas in Africa and Asia as lacking roads and railways; having limited visibility for both ground and air forces; offering obstructions to moving vehicles, some areas being short of water, inhabited by ‘unusual’ inhabitants and lastly being subject to tropical disease, It went on: ‘Its in the exploitation of the special features to our advantage that success in Forest Warfare lies.’ The vital importance of seizing the initiative and mobility was stressed at the beginning of this publication, especially off-road in the jungle that required intensive training in use of compass and other means, It also noted that strategic mobility depended on choosing the right medium of transport — motor, pack or porter — suited to the country. MTP No. 9 discussed the special conditions affecting all three arms of ser- vice, after noting that the infantry were the primary arm as it possessed the great- est mobility and freedom of manoeuvre, It also noted it needed special equipment for the task in hand with cutting tools and weapons suitable for close quarter combat, While stressing they should be sued to the fullest extent possible, it acknowledged AFVs and artillery would have a limited role since they were largely road-bound. Aircraft also needed to be used to the fullest extent possible, especially for providing heavy close support and the transport of supplies and information. MIP No. 9 followed normal British practice in describing the conduct of the attack, the defence, the withdrawal, and lastly minor tactics in the jungle. The attack was characterized as providing few difficulties given the cover provided by jungle, and advocated a turning movement combined with a holding attack on the main front as the most effective, although inter-communications and fire support might pose major problems. Patrolling was an essential part. An active and mobile defence was recommended as most effective in jungle, although a traditional all-round defensive layout was also stipulated, The danger posed by flanking attacks was emphasized, although patrols, large reserves and speedy counterattacks were recommended as a solution. The importance of minor tactics in forest warfare was emphasized, since it played such a key part in all combat. A section discussing appropriate training stressed it could only be carried out effectively in forest country, but that it was the easiest of all forms of training and since the bullet played such a small part realism could be easily obtained. Two-sided exercises were recommended with particular attention paid to patrolling since it formed such an important part in jungle fighting.”° The contents of MTP No 9: forest warfare had considerable relevance to troops serving in Malaya, with copies sent to Malaya Command during the autumn. Further20 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941—May 1942 guidance about jungle operations also appeared in other Indian publications. ‘A small section stressed that mobility was relative to infantry, with infantry being the most mobile arm in mountainous and forest country, for example, also appeared in Army in India Training Memoranda No. 6 War Series April 1941. It suggested that mobile infantry columns operating from well-defended, well-sited and well- supplied bases could strike anywhere and by taking offensive action can paralyse an enemy’s mobility. Such mobility could also be best assured by highly trained porters or air supply.2! With little extant evidence surviving it is difficult to prove, however, whether it and other Army in India Training Memorandum (AITM) were circulated to formations and units, actually read or put into practice during training. Most may well have suffered the fate of the pamphlets on anti-tank defence forwarded by the War Office that until too late were left locked in a cup- board at Fort Canning rather than being issued.” No other effort was made by the Malayan military authorities to assist training. Training centres or schools through which new units and individual replacements passed to receive an introduction to jungle fighting were marked by their absence. ‘The failure to insist on intensive realistic training based upon these written sources of guidance had considerable significance since all units joining Malaya Command in 1940-41 badly needed both intensive individual and collective training. Both British battalions and administrative units that arrived in August 1940, for example, were stale, lacked any experience of mobile operations and were short of equipment after being on garrison duty in Shanghai for a lengthy period of time. The Army in India provided the main source of reinforcements who arrived piecemeal during 1940-41. All the units of what later became 9th and 11th Indian Divisions - both British and Indian ~ were badly in need of as much assistance they could get as neither had done much training in general, and none for tropical warfare.”> Both divisions also lacked the normal third fade as well as supporting arms and services. Although impressive on paper, all units were products of the massive expansion of the pre-war Indian Army since 1940. This had been achieved by ‘milking’ every regular unit of its trained officers, NCOs and men who provided a nucleus around which a new unit was formed. In turn each newly formed unit was again ‘milked’ to satisfy the insatiable demand for new fighting and administrative units. As Major-General James Elliot, DMT in India 1942-43, later described: Once, twice, and perhaps three times they had been ‘milked’, as the saying went — ‘bled’ would be a better word — to find officers, V.C.O.s and N.C.O.8 for the new battalions being raised in India. A colonel might think himself lucky if he had two pre-war officers besides himself; and of the new entry one or two would still be wrestling with the language their men spoke; half the V.C.O.s and N.C.O.s would be recently promoted; and more than half the men would be recruits with less than a year’s service.”* When the 5/1 {th Sikh Regiment arrived in April 1941, for example, it contained 460 newly joined recruits and 6 British Emergency Commissioned Officers Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942, 21 (ECOs). Even so in October it lost another 30 picked officers, NCOs and men to form a new MG battalion.25 Although a fast means of producing new units on paper, as long as no fighting immediately took place, in the short term overall standards of training and fighting efficiency plummeted as each stage of expansion took place.” ‘The ultimate responsibility for overseeing training in 9th and 11th Indian Divisions rested in the hands of formation commanders and in turn unit COs. Most were completely unfamiliar with the jungle, local conditions and their likely opponent, leaving them heavily reliant on Tactical Notes for Malaya 1940. A period of hard training began for the new arrivals, including instruction in jungle fighting. A training instruction issued by 9th Indian Division’s HQ on 21st April 1941, for example, emphasised physical fitness, night operations and offensive patrolling in the jungle, especially since troops were still placing too much reliance on Motor Transport (MT).”7 Another training instruction directed: ‘The Division...is new to MALAYA. Few of the officers or men have had any previous experience of this type of country quite apart from operating in it in war. Moreover they will now be faced with the necessity for mastering a number of new weapons. ‘Whereas it is clear that a very considerable time would be required before troops could become expert at moving in MALAYA by day and night with absolute confidence it is equally certain that a very high degree of efficiency can be obtained in a short time provided really hard work is put in and practice is insisted upon as opposed to theory.”* Whilst some COs eagerly grasped the challenge, most did not. Without concrete ‘guidelines and instructions from higher authority to study jungle fighting, training unimaginatively largely followed conventional lines using MT.” ‘The progress made by Sth and 11th Indian Divisions in fitting their troops for living, moving and fighting in Malaya was retarded by various organisational problems and more immediate assigned tasks. All units needed a lengthy shake down to adjust to the loss of trained men, changes in organisation, equipment and weapons and the tropical climate and lastly devise a suitable training regime for Malaya.” The ongoing insidious effects ‘milking’, moreover, meant most Indian units concentrated upon elementary basic military skills ~ marksmanship, skill- at-arms and field craft - to bring raw recruits up to a sufficient standard. Similarly newly arrived ECOs, recently promoted NCOS and specialists required intensive instruction. This periodically forced commanders to start basic training afresh and seriously handicapped progressive instruction. As Lt-Colonel J.G. Frith, commanding 2nd Baluch Regiment, observed: ‘During the year nearly the whole equipment of the Bn altered, and drafts of experienced officers, N.C.O.s and men retumed to INDIA for the formation of yet more Bns. This made continuity difficult. Further the Bn was split into four parts — always bad for command, discipline and training.’*! Not all terrain was suitable for jungle training, moreover, and strict restrictions were placed for fear of damaging rubber plantations and to limit the22 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 spread of malaria.** Most seriously constructing fixed field defences in northern Malaya and Jahore, cut deeply into training, taking up to three-quarters of all available time given the lack of civilian manpower.* The higher collective training of formations making up III Indian Corps, com- manded by Lieutenant-General Lewis Heath, at brigade and divisional level, suffered badly, since units were widely deployed across northern Malaya protecting RAF airfields and changes were frequently made in the composition of formations. Few brigades had an opportunity to manoeuvre in the nearby jungle and that that was carried out lacked realism and was for a short period of time. Instruction also suffered due to the piecemeal arrival of Indian units and the late arrival of vital supporting and administrative units that would have transformed both Indian Divisions into effective fighting formations. Field artillery and AT regiments, for example, forming integral parts of both divisions did not arrive from the UK until late 1941 making combined arms training impossible. Lastly, lack of funds also precluded large-scale exercises before the outbreak of war.* ‘The critical factor explaining the widespread complacency displayed by British officers, the low tempo and lack of realism in training was the amazingly low British assessment in Malaya of Japanese military skill combined with an overest- imation of their own capabilities.’* Indeed, the JA was ranked by 11th Indian Division’s HQ as lying between the Italian and Afghan armies in military efficiency despite accurate contrary evidence distributed by the War Office.** Little realistic information reached regimental officers from the local Far East Combined Bureau and that that did was often misleading.*” Underestimation of the military effectiveness of the IJA crippled effective preparations for war by removing any incentive hard training. As John Ferris has noted: ‘Before reaching Malaya, many soldiers were warned that the 1.J.A. was a dangerous enemy which could only be matched through tough training; such views were driven from their minds by heat and hubris in Singapore.’** ‘The half-hearted, low tempo and still often-inappropriate training carried out by the vast majority of British and Indian units sharply contrasted with that given to 8th Australian Division. Like other troops it faced, in the words of Lionel Wigmore (the Australian official historian), ‘many problems of which the most important was training’ when it arrived in Malaya since it had been originally organised, equipped and highly trained in Australia for deployment in the Middle East? Early in February 1941 the GOC and advance party of 22nd Brigade arrived by air. While Major-General Gordon Bennett consulted with Malaya Command, Brigadier H.B. Taylor and his Brigade Major toured British and Indian units up-country to familiarise themselves with local tactical conditions and training methods, including Indian units undergoing instruction at Jitra, Sungei Patani, Penang and Kuala Lumpur. While valuable information was gathered, Taylor was sceptical about British training methods, concluding that most units, with the exception of the Argylls, were still living under peacetime conditions and were carrying out little realistic jungle training.*” ‘This fact-finding mission and further information gathered by Major-General Gordon Bennett from Malaya Command convinced both officers that radical changes Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 23 in training were required.*! A number of British and other sources of information upon which instruction was based were tapped. Like all Commonwealth units cach battalion received copies of Tactical Notes on Malaya 1940, when they landed (copies also republished in Melbourne for use by units proceeding overseas).* Since it was a separate national contingent jealous of its independence, moreover, the GOC enjoyed considerable latitude in laying down a training regime. With its units free from working on defences, moreover, it also had time and opportunity to intensively train in the jungles, plantations and swamps of Jahore. At a s of conferences with his staff and battalion commanders Taylor identified the key difficulties inherent in jungle fighting and devised appropriate individual and sub-unit training. Other sources of guidance were found from within Australian ranks. Major Charles Anderson, the 2i/c of the 2/19th Battalion, had fought for five years in the King’s African Rifles during the First World War and another officer’s brother, a resident of Malaya, provided advice about local conditions. On 25th February 1941 8th Australian Division’s HQ issued its own training instruction, stressing the importance of acclimatisation, highlighting the difficult problem of moving through and maintaining direction in jungle and directing that troops to become ‘jungle minded’. Unfortunately like others issued by the HQ of Malaya Command it badly underrated the IJA’s fighting ability.“* Training concentrating during their first week in the Port Dickson and Kuala Lumpur areas on acclimatising ‘men and practising moving sections and platoons through the jungle. Barly exercises revealed that much work was needed to accustom troops to working in close terrain very different from that they trained in South Australia.* As Gordon Bennett later observed: ‘They feared the eeriness, they dreaded the insects and snakes, they hated not being able to see the dangers. They imagined that death lurked behind every tree, they could not move forward or backward except with great difficulty and they felt glued to the spot, with threats all round them.*” In March, company and battalion level training was carried out in jungle areas and rubber plantations culminating in brigade level exercises.** Regularly, parties of troops were taken into the jungle and rubber plantations to learn from indigenous Sakai tribesmen and other Malays about living and moving under such conditions and some participated in an elephant hunt organised by the Sultan of Negri Sembilan.” Overall the result was that by July 1941, 22nd Australian Infantry Brigade largely accustomed as a result of careful thought and intensive realistic training to local conditions.” The Malayan garrison’s overall standard of training for war under tropical conditions had steadily improved by May 1941, although it still left much to be desired, especially regarding inter-arm co-operation and higher collective training. The appointment of Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival as GOC Malaya Command on 16th May 1941, however, gave an important fillip to instruction. As soon as he arrived he injected a vigour and ‘a new spirit entered every sphere of activity, including training’ *' Percival had considerable experience of modern training methods24 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 based on pre-war experience at Aldershot, six months in France with the BEF and command of a division in the UK following Dunkirk. A series of training directives were immediately issued by Malaya Command's HQ, amplifying principles set out in War Office publications with special reference to the IJA and Malayan conditions.** With field defences still awaiting completion Percival directed that concurrent attention be placed on building up a solid foundation of individual, sub-unit and unit tactical training which was carried out between July-November 1941 under the direction of unit and formation commanders. Following the completion of fixed defences vitally needed collective battalion, brigade and divisional got underway during the autumn. Several three-day exercises, for example, studied the withdrawal by III Indian Corps while the AIF held a large Toad movement exercise attended by the GOC.® Those later additions to Malaya Command that arrived during this period profited from practical experience Possessed by their predecessors and had more opportunity to train to live, move and fight in the Malayan jungle. When the 27th Australian Brigade arrived at Singapore on 27th August 1941, for example, it was issued with Tactical Notes on Malaya and was assisted by experienced officers from its sister formation and later enthusiastically followed its training regime.** Similarly when 28th Indian Infantry Brigade landed at Port Sweetenham in September 1941 it concentrated without interruption on familiarising its Gurkhas with local conditions, with its training based on Tactical Notes for Malaya and advice obtained from officers Whose units were constructing a defensive position at Jitra.5 The outbreak of war ‘The British garrison of Malaya, however, was still far from ready in December 1941 for war. It was still very far below from that are considered necessary by the British Chiefs of Staff in December 1941, despite pleas for reinforcements, with too few and inferior quality aircraft and just two RN capital ships instead of the fleet prescribed in pre-war strategy. Whilst the 80,000 strong garrison appeared impressive on paper it was short of 17 infantry battalions, four anti-aircraft regi- ‘ments, two tank regiments and 2-pounder anti-tank guns, No reserves were avail- able to replace wastage and essential equipment was in critically short supply. Overall the standard of conventional individual basic and specialised training of the army in jungle fighting still left much to be desired, despite Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival’s best efforts to improve standards. Indeed, only two brigades Were adequately fit, disciplined and trained for Malayan conditions, while the remainder needed considerable remedial work.°° The Imperial Japanese Army in contrast was well prepared, with the invasion of Malaya forming the centrepiece of Japanese strategy in SE Asia given the key import- ance of the Singapore Naval Base in British regional defence, Serious preparations began in autumn 1940 paying attention for the first time to waging war in equatorial tropical terrain as hitherto the IJA had primarily focused on fighting in open terrain against a Soviet opponent. Indeed, pre-war Japanese Field Service Regulations Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 25 contained only three pages covering operations in wooded terrain together with a discussion on operations in populated areas.*” A small planning staff unit — The Taiwan Army Research Section — headed by Lt-Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, however, started in January 1941 studying the problems of waging war under tropical con- ditions. It produced a widely distributed small manual — Read This Alone and the War Can be Won — to guide operations, develop an intensive training regiment and organise large-scale jungle warfare amphibious in Taiwan and Hainan Island and to prepare Japanese troops for the invasion, In many respects it had an easy task since basic Japanese military organisation’s, equipment and existing light infantry doctrine was easily adaptable to jungle fighting.** The final Japanese plan for invading Malaya was approved in November 1941, comprising an amphibious landing in southern Thailand, combined with a subsidiary assault on Kota Bharu in Malaya, aiming to quickly overwhelm the defenders of Singapore. The Twenty-Fifth Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Yamashita Tomoyuki, was tasked with conquering Malaya and was assigned three divisions ~ the veteran Sth, 18th and the untested Imperial Guards Division — with another in reserve to do so. The 3rd Tank Brigade, fielding 200 light and medium tanks, two heavy field artillery regiments and engineers and bridging units were also allocated. A regiment of 55th Division would cross the Kra Isthmus and occupy the airfield at Victoria Point in Burma. Over 600 aircraft were assigned from the veteran 3rd Air Group and 22nd Naval Air Flotilla specifically trained to deal with the RN, establish air superiority and provide battlefield support. A substan- tial ITN force covered the initial landings, consisting of two battleships, six heavy cruisers and various smaller craft from the Southern Fleet. The Japanese finally declared war against the British, the USA and the Dutch on 7th December 1941. Early on 8th December 1941 the Japanese 18th Division, commanded by Major-General Renya Mutuguchi, began landing at Kota Bharu, Takumi Force met fierce opposition from 8th Indian Infantry Brigade as its men struggled ashore through heavy surf. Although determined RAF attacks damaged troop transports lying offshore it failed to halt the landing. A counterattack failed to prevent the Japanese, moreover, whose leading elements quickly infiltrated through the broken ground behind the beaches. On 8-9th December Key disengaged and fell back through successive layback positions. The main Japanese invasion started later the same day when the mechanised Sth Division, commanded by Major-General Takuro Matsui, and the bulk of 18th Division landed unopposed at Singora and Patani in Thailand. Apart from token Thai resistance the leading Japanese troops raced southwards towards the Malayan border. A plan for Com- monwealth troops to occupy likely landing beaches at Singora in Thailand before the Japanese arrived — Operation Matador ~ proved stillborn, Heavy losses were suffered when the RAF attacked the beachhead, but many aircraft were later caught on the ground by Japanese bombers at airfields in northern Malaya. Forty aircrafts were destroyed and 20 seriously damaged. By 11th December the air battle over northern Malaya had been effectively won by the Japanese leaving British troops to fight under a sky dominated by Japanese aircraft. Elsewhere the26 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 situation went from bad to worse. On 10th December HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk by Japanese aircraft operating from Indo-China, also giving the Japanese the command of the sea. The 11th Indian Division itself became badly disorganised and its morale plummeted when suddenly ordered to abandon all offensive plans and amidst teeming rain occupy a defensive position at Jitra. This pre-prepared defensive position was not strong — stretching 12 miles in length from the jungle-covered hills east of the trunk road and running through paddy fields, swamps and rubber plantations to the sea — having a maximum depth of only 1% miles. Following conventional practice it consisted of widely separated and mutually supporting defensive localities that had to be hurriedly wired, cabled and new minefields, laid amidst heavy rain, To secure its rear further south, Krohcol raced into Thailand on 8th December after news of the Japanese landing to seize a strong defensive position ~ The Ledge — blocking the Patani-Kroh road. This was vital since it joined the main north-south trunk road in Malaya far to the south of Jitra and threatened the line of communication of all the Commonwealth forces in Kedah. A combination of Thai resistance, felled trees and rain meant the Japanese 42nd Regiment beat them to the punch. On 10th December Krohcol itself came under attack from Japanese tanks and infantry. The advance guard of the Japanese Sth Division achieved immediate success on 11th December when its light and medium tanks and lorried infantry overran two Indian battalions - the 1/14th Punjabis and 2/1st Gurkhas — attempting to delay it at Asun, Only 200 men escaped abandoning large quantities of vehicles, guns and equipment. At midnight on 11/12th December Saeki Detachment, two infantry battalions and a handful of tanks and guns, mounted an attack on the main British position afier patrols discovered gaps between defensive localities. By next morning a wedge had been driven into the right flank of the position. A counterattack fell apart in confusion, largely due to tiredness, inexperienced junior leaders and NCOs and ‘friendly fire’. News of the loss of Force Z and the obvious loss by the RAF of command of the air added to growing demoralisation. With all British reserves now committed the situation appeared critical, especially when further Japanese attacks penetrated into and infiltrated through the position and reached the Bata River. With Krohcol being beaten back further eastwards, the overall situation of troops in Kedah was desperate. With utter confusion reigning Major-General David Murray-Lyon ordered a withdrawal behind a tank obstacle before the Japanese launched a deliberate attack that in the ensuing con- fusion resulted in the loss of large amounts of vehicles, equipment, ammunition, guns and supplies. Many men scattered into the jungle in the darkness and later surrendered. A worse introduction to battle could have been imagined for 11th Indian Division’ s inexperienced troops — 15th Indian Infantry Brigade was reduced to a quarter and 6th Indian Infantry Brigade to about half their prior strengths. A single battalion of 28th Indian Infantry Brigade also lost heavily.” ‘This initial Japanese victory — the decisive land battle of the Malayan campaign — caused elation. With just two battalions and light tanks they had bounced 1th Indian Division with heavy losses out of a prepared defensive position that Malaya Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942, 27 Command had expected to hold for weeks. Indeed, it set the tone for the rest of the campaign and illustrated the basic problems confronting British commanders. The Japanese had quickly revealed themselves as being formidable opponents, enjoying the incalculable advantage of deploying well led, highly trained, disciplined and in most cases battle-tried divisions qualitatively far superior to their opponents. The highly skilled, brave and determined Japanese infantry, possessing by far the greatest relative mobility in jungle, swamps and plantations, formed the main strik- ing arm throughout the campaign. It achieved immediate results by applying light infantry fighting methods successfully developed in China to the jungle using troops who displayed little fear of their surroundings. As one British officer described: ‘They were bold, fearless, fanatical and highly skilled in jungle craft, made use of the tree tops for observation and field of fire and even perfected a sys- tem for climbing. They could maintain direction and always knew where they were.”°' A high tempo characterised all Japanese operations, with highly aggressive forward units demonstrating considerable enterprise, endurance and freedom from fixed lines of supply given their reliance on only machine guns, light mortars and manhandled battalion and regimental guns for fire support. Instead of relying on their few administrative units and fixed supply lines they subsisted on the limited supplies they carried, those transported by impressed civilian labour or else exploited their knowledge and ability to live off the country. The Japanese employed the same basic fighting methods throughout the campaign with deadly effect, skilfully exploiting the limited visibility, camouflage and covered approaches provided by the jungle. As an officer with the 1/8th Punjab Regiment described: “They struck me as being absolutely first-class. The speed with which they tumbled out of their lorries, and commenced an enveloping operation against us as incredible."“? Whenever a British position was encountered small parties of infantry, followed by columns up to a battalion in strength, immediately infiltrated through or carried out an encircling movement though seemingly ‘impassable’ jungle looking for an open flank, exploiting the fact that MT tied opposing units to the roads. This was not a revolutionary development in tactics. As Edward Drea has observed: ‘This was standard Japanese doctrine, and its successful execution gave rise to tall tales of Japanese jungle warfare.’°* Against static, linear and often very shallow British defensive positions, relying upon superior firepower for their defence despite virtually non-existent fields of fire, these tactics proved highly effective. The heavily defended roadblocks the Japanese built deep in the rear of British units, cutting their supply lines, normally compelled them either to fight their way clear or abandon wounded and escape through the jungle with the almost complete loss of vehicles, guns, equipment and supplies. Against poorly trained and unsure troops infiltration worked to perfection, moreover, and quickly undermined morale and paralysed command and control arrangements. Night attacks, for which they had intensively trained, proved a particular Japanese forte. To further confound defenders the JA deployed snipers firing from tree top positions and small parties to spread alarm, confusion and demoralisation amongst their opponents using ‘jitter’ tactics. Noisy firecrackers and shouting in pigeon English or Urdu by Japanese infiltrators proved highly28 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 effective in provoking wild unaimed fire that revealed positions, increased ammunition expenditure and undermined morale. The Japanese also revealed themselves highly skilled at mobile operations, exploiting the road network in Malaya, Whenever infiltration or encirclement was impossible the Japanese attacked straight down the roads in strength using tanks and lorried infantry — equipping Sth Division and the Imperial Guards Division - to bulldoze straight through British units lacking anti-tank weapons and training. They quickly and effectively followed up withdrawing Common- wealth units, moreover, who were seldom given a breathing space to think and recover, ‘The British Commonwealth forces paid a heavy penalty in northern Malaya for the limitations of their organisation and equipment and the failure of pre-war training to fit them for war in the jungle. The main reasons for British defeat at Jitra, however, stemmed from inexperience and poor pre-war preparation and planning and the disorganisation of 11th Indian Division before the fighting began. As Kirby has written: ‘The poor training of the un-blooded troops, the inexperience of the brigade, battalion and the junior commanders and the fact that division had never carried out combined training with all arms was undoubtedly the main cause.’ Whilst some British, Indian and Gurkha units performed creditably, most did not. This problem stemmed from several interrelated causes: lack of basic training, failure to adapt fighting methods and lastly the over mechanisation of Commonwealth units. British and Indian units, still laden with scales of vehicles, equipment, heavy weapons and operating on war establishments suited to warfare in NW Europe or the Western Desert, simply could not compete with their opponents in terms of mobility. Few British officers had made a sufficient mental leap between the disparate demands of jungle fighting and operations in open terrain, leaving them heavily reliant on MT and lavish scales of equipment and physically tied to the roads by what one senior officer termed ‘Rolls Royce’ habits.® It left them vulnerable to air attack and tactically sluggish. As Sir Shenton Thomas, the Governor of the Straits Settlement, wrote in his diary on Gth January 1942: ‘We... have gone in for mechanised transport to the nth degree. It is a fearfully cumbersome method. We have pinned our faith to the few roads but the enemy uses the tracks and paths, and gets round to our rear very much as he likes.’ ‘Fantastic’ losses of vehicles (and equipment carried) were suffered in northern Malaya ~ 1,000 1S ewe trucks alone — by the end of January that could not be made good, further dramatically undermining the efficiency of units dependent upon them for first and second line transport.“” Individually the situation was little better. Most Commonwealth troops were still festooned ‘like Christmas-trees’ with large quantities of heavy, outdated and superfluous equipment.® ‘The individual training of young and inexperienced Indian troops, making up the bulk of 1th Indian Division, still remained far below pre-war standards. The first shock of battle, combined with the dispersion and confusion inherent in jungle fighting, imposed a heavy strain, exposing serious weaknesses in young inexperi- enced subalterns and NCOs with few qualifications for promotion other than long Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 29 service. When the handful of trained and experienced officers — the framework of the ‘family’ atmosphere pervading Indian regiments and often the focus of individual loyalty — were killed, without good junior leaders providing effective command and stiffening morale cohesion was fragile at best.” Instead of counter- attacking or immediately trying to rejoin, many Indian units rapidly disintegrated and scattered into the jungle. Few of the young, immature and inexperienced individual soldiers were sufficiently resourceful, self-reliant or had the initiative to escape. A failure to adequately adapt tactical methods, acclimatise and lack of training about living, moving and fighting in northern Malaya compounded these problems. Far too little training had been carried out in accordance with Tactical Notes for Malaya 1940. Most units were still not physically or mentally acclimatised to jungle conditions and had not studied appropriate fighting methods. Senior commanders and staff officers were inexperienced in handling formations as a result of inadequate collective training. An alarming degree of ‘stickiness’ \was apparent and inter-arm co-operation was poor resulting in poor fire support and incidents of friendly fire. A heavy price was paid for the late arrival of 325-pounder field artillery regiments and 80th Anti Tank Regiment in November, whose men had not had time to acclimatise or adapt to Malaya. In particular, none of the infantry had more than a theoretical knowledge about using anti-tank artillery or of co-operation in the field resulting in enormous los Bt of guns, The first four days of the Malayan campaign had been disastrous for British forces on land, at sea and in the air, with Malaya Command forced to hurriedly rethink its defensive strategy. III Indian Corps now shouldered the burden of holding back the Japanese onslaught, by extensive demolitions and fighting delaying actions, for as long and as far away from Singapore Island as possible to protect RAF airfields and buy time for reinforcements to arrive, but on no account risk the loss of troops needed to fight the main battle in Jahore. With only one under strength, partially trained and inexperienced division — 11th Indian Division — available to mount a delaying action it was a tall order. As a result it always fought watching over its shoulder for Japanese encirclement, was unduly sensitive about its flanks and often retreated prematurely whenever its line of communication was threatened.” ‘The Japanese employed the same tactics time and time again against 1 [th Indian Division during mid-December, as it withdrew southwards in increasing disarray. Desperate attempts to halt the Japanese at Gurun on 14th December and the Muda River two days later were equally unsuccessful in face of infiltration, envelopment and boldly led tank assaults. Heavy pressure was also maintained down the Kroh-Patani Road in its rear and on 12-13th December 12th Indian Infantry Brigade was hurriedly deployed at Baling, occupying a blocking position, in support of Krohcol. What could be achieved by troops schooled in jungle tactics, however, was shown by a detached company of the 2nd Argylls on the Grik Road between 19-22nd December, and later with the 5/2nd Punjab Regiment and the rest of the brigade delaying a complete Japanese regiment.”? To most other British officers Japanese tactics appeared almost revolutionary. As the GOC Malaya observed on 20th December after visiting III Indian Corps: ‘We are involved in a type of warfare30 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 of which few of us have had any experience in the past.’”* A note on tactics was issued shortly after Percival returned to Fort Canning outlining Japanese fighting methods and means of countering them. It stressed the importance of rigid discipline and directed that Japanese infiltration and outflanking attacks must not automatically lead to a withdrawal. To counter them digging in on the main axis of communication with smaller forces deployed on either flank ready to attack as soon as the enemy made contact was recommended, Percival emphasised offensive methods must be employed whenever possible to beat the Japanese at their own game.” It was far too late in the day to effect a major change in British fighting methods, however, especially with III Indian Corps so closely engaged with the enemy. The 11th Indian Division was forced back behind the Krian River and then the fast flowing Perak River on 22/23rd December 1941 when enemy pressure down the Grik track finally became too great. By mid-December Japanese superiority at jungle fighting was all too apparent to senior officers. Writing on 23rd December Percival observed: “It was now clear that we were faced by an enemy who had made a special study of bush warfare on a grand scale and whose troops had been specially trained in those tactics.’”° Overall the tactical situation had now improved, however, since further broad outflanking movements by the Japanese on the right flank were now impossible since the road and railway ran close to the central mountain ridge. The L1th Indian Division, however, remained in a parlous state, with its two under-strength brigades were amalgamated to form a new 6/15th Infantry Brigade. A reshuffle of senior commanders led to the appointment of Major-General Archie Paris as GOC, while other combat proven officers assumed command of its subordinate formations.” An order issued to the division two days later directed that further withdrawals would be carefully organised and offensive tactics employed whenever possible with raids, ambushes, patrolling by armoured cars, and local counterattacks disconcerting the enemy. It went on: “The war of nerves has been too much on one side to-date. From the moment of contact the Japanese must never feel safe. He must be sniped, shot up, attacked with Armd Cars and “Tiger” patrols and generally harried by day and night."78 The 11th Indian Division had little time to carry out these orders before the next Japanese onslaught. On 26th December the Imperial Guards Division crossed the Perak River unopposed and attacked 12th Indian Brigade on the trunk road north of Ipoh that as planned withdrew towards Kampar. This naturally strong defensive position, held by 6/15th Brigade, was augmented with barbed wire, entrenchments and cleared fields of fire. Located ina tin-mining area where the trunk road and smaller Sahum road forked past the steep, jungle-covered 4,000 foot Bujang Maleka it dominated both routes. An expanse of open ground to the north and west also gave considerable scope for exploiting the full potential of numerically and qualitatively superior British artillery. While 28th Indian Infantry Brigade prevented any enemy outflanking movement via Sahum to the east, 12th Indian Infantry Brigade ~ ‘beaten to a frazzle’ — went into reserve.” It was also hoped Kampar would at last provide a firm base for large and small-scale Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942, 31 offensive operations.” An absence of jungle-trained mobile reserves capable of counterattacking meant this idea was stillborn in practise. The 6/15th Brigade offered stubborn resistance on Ist January 1942 when the Japanese 41st Infantry Regiment launched a frontal attack, while another unit tried outflanking it through a nearby swamp, The former failed to gain ground afier suffering heavy losses, however, while the swamp proved impassable even to Japanese troops.*! Further attacks gained toeholds in the position next day, but spirited counterattacks at the point of the bayonet by the 1/8th Punjabis prevented them gaining a secure foothold.*? This local success proved short-lived, however, when on Ist January the Japanese landed elements of 11th Regiment on the coast who were joined by 4th Guards that had travelled down the Perak River threaten- ing the rear of the Kampar position. The 6/15th Brigade, still under heavy pres- sure, had little alternative but withdrew after four days fighting which it did fully on the night of 2/3rd January towards an intermediate position on the Slim River as its line of communication was now threatened. The 1 1th Indian Division was still clearly being outfought by an enemy using apparently ‘revolutionary’ fighting methods. To provide guidance in a note on tactics issued on 6th January, addressed to the GOC III Indian Corps, 8th Australian Division and of the Singapore Fortress, Lieutenant-General Percival carefully took stock of Japanese fighting methods and means to counter them: The operations on land in MALAYA have developed in a way which prob- ably few of us anticipated to the full before the war started... The enemy is trying to dislodge us from our positions by flanking and encircling move- ments and by attacks on our communications. He has the advantage that he is, far less dependent on his communications than we are and also that, being rice-eaters, his soldiers are able to live off the country for longer periods than are ours. As I have said before, his Army is an Army of gangsters, relying for success more on weakening the morale of the troops than on any particular with his weapons We must play the enemy at his own game. It is developing into a guerilla war so let us also adopt guerilla tactics. Formations should reduce their transport as far as possible by sending all vehicles that are not immediately ‘wanted well to the rear.*? Issuing such guidance at such a late stage while fighting was in progress was a sad testament to pre-war preparations and was far too late to impact the fighting. As Stewart later wrote: ‘New techniques cannot be learnt in the middle of a battle.’** The British Commonwealth forces in Malaya had slowly learnt important lessons about living, moving and fighting in the jungle in the hard school of experience. It proved to be an all-too-steep learning curve, however, involving bitter defeat and heavy loss of life, arms and equipment. Such valuable experience had to be disseminated, especially to fresh units lacking any knowledge or experience of living, moving and fighting in the jungle. To assist them some written guidance32. Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 ‘was hurriedly prepared and issued by the British high command. Late in December, Colonel Francis Brink, a US observer attached to Malaya Command, wrote a small pamphlet about Japanese fighting methods and appropriate countermeasures. Based on the fighting in Kedah during December and intelligence summaries Brink stressed the speed with which lightly equipped Japanese troops moved through jungle and their skill at infiltration, envelopment and night operations. It also discussed the best means of countering Japanese tactics emphasising the importance of prior training in wooded areas. To counter Japanese attacks Brink recommended localities be organised in depth, patrolling by armoured cars and large reserves should be held in immediate readiness on either flank ready to counterattack enemy encirclement or incursions.* A small jungle warfare training team was also formed in mid-January, consisting of two experienced officers and two NCOs, to assist newly arrived units and formations.*° The Commonwealth troops tried making a further stand north of Kuala Lumpur although threatened by further landings on the coast near Kuala Selangor. On 3rd January an intermediate defensive position was occupied by 12th Indian Brigade at the Slim River, with the 28th Indian Brigade deployed in depth behind it. It had good defensive potential since the main trunk road and railway ran closely together and both were hemmed in by dense jungle allowing scope for British artillery, economy of troops and rapid counterattacks against Japanese encirclement by reserves.*’ Both brigades were by now mentally and physically exhausted, seriously under-strength and morale was flagging, however, as a result of earlier fighting, repeated withdrawals and hurried digging of field defences. On the night of 6/7th January the Japanese attacked with tanks and a lorried infantry battalion a series of defended localities, lacking adequate anti-tank defences, arranged in depth down the trunk road, The forward battalion was quickly over- run followed in quick succession by the remainder, whose survivors scattered into the surrounding jungle. Similarly three Gurkha battalions, forming 28th Indian Infantry Brigade, who had not been given advance waming or time to react, were overrun, including one caught still on line of march. Several artillery batteries were equally badly handled. By 9 a.m, the Slim River Bridge was in Japanese hands and the leading tanks advanced two further miles before being halted by a 4.5 howitzer firing at point blank range over open sights.** The “Slim River disaster’ put paid to any hopes of holding central Malaya. Both 12th and 28th Indian Infantry Brigades ceased to exist as fighting formations and when 11th Indian Division broke contact it had only 1,200 men left under ‘command. Over 2,000 exhausted, hungry and demoralised stragglers later surren- dered to the Japanese, who also captured large quantities of artillery pieces, AT guns and vehicles.® An inexcusable failure to prepare adequate anti-tank defences was largely at fault.” The Battle for Jahore ‘The badly depleted III Indian Corps successfully disengaged and passed through Westforve, commanded by Major-General Gordon Bennett, hurriedly formed in Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 33 northern Jahore where it had been hoped the ‘main battle’ would be fought on the mainland with fresh troops operating in more suitable terrain against an enemy operating at the end of a long line of communications. Its formations widely differed in military effectiveness. The fresh and highly trained Australian units had no experience of fighting the Japanese, but morale was high and they had had time to profit from lessons learnt in northern Malaya that had been circulated to units in training instructions and at conferences.’! The 9th Indian Division, although badly battered and bloodied in earlier fighting, was deployed in depth down the main trunk road, What Holmes has described as the ‘woefully inexperienced’ 45th Indian Brigade deployed on the left flank was a very differ- ent matter. Originally part of 17th Indian Division this formation had been organised, trained and equipped in India for desert warfare before being diverted to Malaya en route to Iraq where further training was planned, Its ranks were filled by very young, raw and largely untrained IORs woefully deficient of basic military skills.?? Wher isembarked, Brigadier H.C. Duncan was informed on 3rd January that: It is of the greatest importance that your Bde group should receive early instruction and, if time permits, training in the special conditions affecting the special operations in Malaya, Pamphlets and training memoranda dealing with this subject will be issued to you. In addition you should arrange for representatives of each unit to be attached immediately to units of 3 Ind Corps to gain practical experience which they can pass on to their own units.” After British resistance collapsed in central Malaya, however, it was deployed before jungle training, acclimatisation or familiarisation with local conditions was completed. The ‘main battle’ in northern Jahore began well on 14th January when the 2/ 30th Battalion ambushed the vanguard of the Japanese 5th Division at Gemas.* This successful action acted as a fillip to morale and clearly vindicated the prior training carried out by the Australians.°> The undaunted Japanese Sth Division quickly recovered and exerted heavy pressure down the trunk road. This was not the only Japanese axis of advance, however, as Bennett had erroneously assumed. On 16th January the Imperial Guards Division crossed the Muar River and attacked 45th Indian Infantry Brigade — spread out along 24 miles of its bank and with detachments also watching the coast. Unsurprisingly it suffered heavy losses in its first engagement, including the CO, 2 i/c and all company commanders of one battalion. As Percival described: “The young Indian recruits were helpless. They did not even know how to take cover and there were not enough officers to control them.’ A serious threat had clearly developed to the line of communi- cations of Westforce 70 miles to the north, whose flank had now been turned. Two Australian battalions were hurriedly redeployed at Bakri, while the exhausted II] Indian Corps was given responsibility for protecting Westforce’s lines of communication. Two newly landed battalions of the 53rd Brigade — part34 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 of 18th Division — were also flung into battle, despite lacking both experience and training in jungle fighting. The Japanese Sth Division’s attacks simultaneously intensified down the trunk road against 27th Australian Brigade north of Segamat, whilst other units attacked 22nd Indian Brigade at Jementah in its left rear. When the strength of the Japanese thrust became clear on 18th January, Percival ordered a withdrawal toa general line Kluang-Ayer Hitam-Yong Peng since Westforce's line of com- munication to the south was clearly threatened. It was not a moment too soon. When they withdrew towards Yong Peng on 18th January they discovered a series of Japanese roadblocks. Only 3 miles were covered by nightfall and Brigadier Duncan was killed while leading a counterattack. When it was discovered the following day that the Bukit Pelandok defile was held by the Japanese and tanks attacked the rear of the column, the situation became desperate, By 22nd January the situation was untenable and after destroying all heavy weapons, vehicles and ‘guns the remaining troops escaped across country. Only some 350 Australians and 400 Indians out of 4,000 troops eventually reached Yong Peng. This Japanese thrust deep into Westforce’s left flank left little alternative other than a further withdrawal. Westforce remained responsible for the defence of Kluang and Ayer Hitam blocking the main road and railway, 11th Indian Division ‘was deployed in the Batu Pahat area on west coast, while Eastforce held Jemalung and Kahang. Each position was interdependent and many secondary lines of advance existed, however, along which Japanese troops could threaten the exposed British Tine of communications. The Japanese capture of Batu Pahat on 25/26th January, however, effectively undermined these defences, forcing other formations to retreat to conform. Yet again parties of determined Japanese infantry quickly penetrated the defences. While withdrawing 6/15th Brigade, however, discovered a well-defended Japanese roadblock south of Senggarang which it could not dis- lodge. When 3rd Brigade’s attempts to extricate it from outside failed, it destroyed its heavy weapons, vehicles and equipment and escaped on foot. While some men reached safety overland and the Royal Naval evacuated another 2,000 men it was finished as a fighting formation. The 6/15th Brigade’ s loss opened the left flank of the defences in Jahore, while both the weak 53rd Brigade and 28th Indian Brigade were incapable of offering further serious resistance to the advancing enemy. As a result a final-phased retreat to Singapore Island was rescheduled for the night of 30/31st January 1942. A spirited counterattack by the 5/11th Sikh Regiment near Kluang and a devastating ambush of the Japanese 18th Division mounted by 2/18th Australian Battalion meant Eastforce successfully withdrew from eastern Jahore. Heavy fighting, however, occurred in western Jahore. While 27th Australian Brigade suecessfully withdrew down the trunk road a space opened up between Sth Indian Division’s two brigades, as they leapfrogged southwards down the railway A roadblock was quickly constructed by Japanese troops in this gap preventing 22nd Indian Brigade escaping. Its remnants finally moved into the jungle in an endeavour to escape, but it eventually disintegrated and only about 100 officers and men eventually reached Singapore Island. Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma; December 1941-May 1942 35 Endgame: The Battle for Singapore Island The seven-week long Malayan campaign had been disastrous. From the outset the Japanese had seized the initiative on ground, sea and in the air and displayed considerable military skill in the ‘revolutionary’ specialised tactics of jungle fighting. To many officers and men events on the mainland had appeared astounding, An incredulous Major-General Henry Gordon Bennett recorded in his diary on 31st January: “This retreat seems fantastic. Fancy 500 miles in 50 days — chased by a Jap army on stolen bikes without artillery.’” These badly mauled, demoralised and desperately tired defenders of Singapore Island had only a short period to recover. Most units and formations extricated from the mainland were far below normal combat effectiveness, with combat efficiency varying between 75 per cent and many less than 30 per cent effective. Some long-awaited reinforcements from India, Australia and units diverted from the Middle East had arrived, but only just sufficient to make up wastage. None were adequately trained or acclimatised, undermined unit effectiveness and ultimately only swelled the number that fell into Japanese captivity. The battle for Singapore Island proved short-lived. On 8th February two Japanese Divisions stormed ashore along its north-west coast after an intense artillery and aerial bombardment of the beach defences. The weak and over-extended 22nd Australian Brigade quickly lost cohesion and fell back to a covering line conceding a bridgehead to the Japanese before a counterattack could be organised. An early collapse followed as its remnants fell back to the Kranji—Jurong switch line while fresh Japanese troops swarmed ashore, Instead of counterattacking in strength, using units stripped from other sectors, Percival ordered this improvised line to be held. An unauthorised withdrawal by 27th Australian Brigade to conform handed over its sector to the Imperial Guards Division when it crossed the straits, of Jahore, although considerable losses were inflicted upon it by burning oil. A co-ordinated defence of Singapore quickly fell apart in confusion and in disarray, however, following the loss of the Kranj—Jurong line and due to a lack of a formed reserve. A failure to recapture the vital high ground near Bukit Timah, growing exhaustion and the imminent failure of the water supply meant prolonged resistance was impossible. On 15th February 1942 Percival recognised the inevitable and surrendered Singapore to the Japanese Army with the loss of some 100,000 Com- monwealth troops. After only 70 days of resistance the British succumbed to the outnumbered Japanese. The Retreat from Burma ‘The fall of Singapore on 15th February 1942 was a humiliating disaster for British arms. It appeared something was fundamentally wrong with the doctrine, training and combat effectiveness of Commonwealth troops, particularly for waging war under tropical conditions as well as showing that the ITA was a first-rate opponent, As General Henry Pownall wrote in his diary two days before: ‘We were frankly out-generalled, outwitted and outfought. It is a great disaster, one of the worst in36 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 our history, and a great blow to the honour and prestige of the Army. From the beginning to the end of this campaign we have been outmatched by better soldiers.°* Many British commanders were deeply shocked by the poor fighting quality of their own troops and Japanese prowess. Writing to the CIGS on 17th February Wavell wrote: The trouble goes a long way back, climate, the atmosphere of the country lack of vigour in our peace-time training, the cumbrousness of our tactic and equipment, and the very real difficulty of finding an answer to the very skilful and bold tactics of the Japanese in this jungle fighting. But the real trouble is that for the time being we have lost a good deal of our hardness and fighting spirit.” Otherwise the British high command had little time to dwell on the Malayan debacle. Elsewhere in the Far East the situation had rapidly deteriorated as the Japanese surged forwards through the NEI and Phillipine Islands and attacked Burma. ‘The Commonwealth forces facing the Japanese Fifteenth Army, as it concentrated across the jungle-covered mountainous border in Thailand, in December 1940, were more ill-prepared than those in Malaya. Since 1939 the Army in Burma underwent massive expansion hampered by shortages of weapons, equipment and trained manpower. With only a small cadre of trained officers and NCOs, however, the military effectiveness of its Burma Rifles battalions fell. Training had concentrated on the Western Desert and even the frontier warfare, despite the fact no units had been despatched overseas.'®” Watch and ward in the jungle- covered border areas against the refractory hill tribes remained the sole task of local paramilitaries despite the ideal opportunity it could have provided regular troops to learn about living, moving and fighting in jungle. In 1940 the Chin Hills battalion of the BFF, for example, mounted a punitive column in the Naga Hills. Although attracting considerable interest from the Army in Burma’s HQ, after hearing an account of fighting against tribesmen armed with bow and arrows the Commander-in-Chief abruptly concluded that it was: ‘All very interesting, No Military Lessons — none.’!°! The Japanese occupation of Indo-China and an emerging direct threat of invasion prompted the formation of Ist Burdiv, commanded by Major-General James Bruce Scott, in July 1941 consisting of the hastily improvised Ist and 2nd Burma Brigades along with 13th Indian Infantry Brigade. The latter, commanded by Brigadier Arthur Curtis, had landed in Rangoon in March/April 1941, but all its battalions had been heavily milked and lacked both equipment and experienced officers. With insufficient artillery, engineers, signals and transport and none of its brigades having carried out collective training Burdiv was a division in name only.!© Little was done to remedy these deficiencies or familiarise troops with jungle conditions. While copies of MTP No. 9: Forest Warfare were sent to Burma, little evidence exists that troops trained according to its guidelines. Yet again a deadly combination of lack of direction from GHQ in Burma, underestimation Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941—May 1942 37 of the IJA and still widespread belief that dense jungle made large-scale operations impossible meant that training priorities remained unchanged. In the words of Tim Carew: ‘In the summer of 1941 the jungle was not mentioned in polite military circles — it was a place for snakes, elephants and the more “jungly” forest assistants, of Steel brothers, for, as everyone knew, this war would be won in the North ‘African desert and eventually on the plains of North-west Europe."!®° Like in Malaya it was left to the discretion and initiative of individual unit COs as to whether any jungle training was attempted. Lt-Colonel Charles Bagot, for example, on his own initiative put his Ist Gloucestershire Regiment through intensive training partly in jungle near Rangoon, while in contrast the closest, the otherwise generally well-trained 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry ever got to jungle was exercising on the local golf course at Maymyo.' Later additions to the Army in Burma had no chance to train at all. On 1st December 1942, 16th Indian Infantry Brigade, organised, equipped and partially trained for mechanised open warfare, landed at Rangoon. All its Indian battalions, however, had also been heavily milked, contained a large proportion of inexperienced officers, NCOs and 300 recruits had joined shortly before leaving India. None had received any instruction in jungle warfare since it had never been stipulated as a training com- mitment for India Command. '°5 A six-week intermission between the Japanese invasion of Malaya and the beginning of the Japanese Fifteenth Army's offensive, led by Lieutenant-General Shojiro Iida, meant some of the worst deficiencies in Burma were remedied. On 12th December Burma came under Wavell’s direct control, moreover, and Lieutenant-General Tom Hutton was appointed Commander-in-Chief in Burma On 9th January the HQ and leading elements of 17th Indian Division, led by Major- General John Smyth, reached Rangoon, with 46th Indian Infantry Brigade and various supporting arms and services following later. As soon as the divisional HQ arrived it assumed command of the 2nd Burma Brigade in Tenasserim and the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade, but no vitally needed collective unit, brigade and divisional training was carried out, As Smyth later wrote: ‘This heterogeneous new 17th Division in Burma was a Division only in name.’!° Even so, it was given responsibility of defending Tenasserim, given the political and strategic importance of Rangoon, safeguarding the Burma Road and buying time until further Indian and Chinese reinforcements arrived. As a result 17th Indian Divi sion was spread over 400 miles of mountainous jungle country, with its widely dis- persed formations operating at the end of execrable lines of communication. To compound his problems Smyth quickly discovered that difficult jungle-clad ter~ tain, however, was not a defensive asset!” The long-awaited Japanese offensive began on 20th January when the under- strength and well-trained 55th Division — hurriedly reorganised on a pack transport basis with horses, elephants and oxen in Thailand — crossed the border with Moulmein as its immediate objective. Further north the highly trained and battle- tried 33rd Division began advancing along jungle tracks towards the River Salween. An early defeat was suffered by 16th Indian Infantry Brigade during an encounter battle with 55th Division at Kawkareik in the 2,400-3,500 feet high Dawna Hills,38 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 losing its mules, equipment and MT after Japanese troops infiltrated into its defences and enemy aircraft destroyed vital river ferries behind it. A disorganised retreat ensued further morale undermining, As James Lunt has written: It was a grim foretaste of things to come. It contained the ingredients of all that made the Japanese such formidable opponents. The speed with which they seized the fleeting chance; the exploitation of every weakness; the ruthlessness with which they drove forward across terrain considered impassable; the skilful handling of their mortars; their stamina and, let it be said, their courage.'°* A combination of widespread ignorance of the jungle, poor dispositions by the brigade commander, a high proportion of recruits — 50 per cent in the 1/9th Jat Regiment ~ and perhaps above all poor training played into Japanese hands.'” The urgent necessity of giving 17th Indian Division's uncommitted units and reinforcements guidance about the jungle and the Japanese was quickly appreciated. An Operation Instruction issued by the HQ of the Army in Burma early in January 1942 stressed the importance of offensive action — aggressive patrolling, mounting ambushes and also means of countering them — and went on: ‘Every effort will be made to accustom troops fresh from INDIA in fighting in the jungle."''” An attempt was made to improve morale and combat effectiveness by passing on lessons already learnt in Malaya in a stirring Order of the Day circulated on 27th January: It is the duty of the forces present in the front line to hold their ground without yielding, to halt the enemy and to drive him back. There must be no question of further withdrawal. Troops who cannot go forward must defend the posts entrusted to them to the last. It was thus in 1914 that the original British Expeditionary Force and Indian Expeditionary Force stopped the German advance and saved Europe. The Japanese have so far been allowed to win their successes too cheaply and easily by the method of sending quite small bodies round the flanks to spread confusion in the rear and give the impression of a much larger force. All troops must understand that they must on no account give ground because enemy parties have penetrated to their rear; these parties will be dealt with by other of our troops disposed in depth.'"! It was too late to have any immediate impact. Although some units fought well on 31st January Moulmein was captured by the Japanese after the 7th Burma Rifles disintegrated and large-scale desertions affected other units.!!? These early operations in Tenasserim generally followed the pattern established in Malaya, with unsuitably organised, badly equipped and poorly trained Bri Indian and Burmese units learning the hard way about the harsh realities of jungle fighting. While their opponents were mentally and physically tied to the roads by their MT and heavy equipment, the jungle provided the main medium of move- ment and attack by Japanese units. By living off the country and using pack Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 194239 transport, moreover, the Japanese enjoyed considerable freedom of manoeuvre. Yet again the tactics of infiltration, encirclement and building carefully positioned roadblocks in the rear of roadbound units worked to perfection. Either they stayed put and starved or else had to breakout abandoning wounded, MT, supporting ‘weapons and heavy equipment. Repeated withdrawals, caused by real or imagined encirclement, rapidly undermined discipline and morale, especially in poorly trained Burmese and Indian units that lacked junior officers and NCOs, training, and esprit de corps. Against increasingly demoralised troops night attacks and ‘jitter” tactics again worked to perfection. To compound difficulties Burma Rifle battalions became increasingly unreliable and quickly collapsed under Japanese pressure when used in a regular role for which they unsuited." The 17th Indian Division fell back behind the Salween River where it was reinforced by its 46th Indian Infantry Brigade. Its by no means fully trained battalions were composed of, inexperienced officers, NCOs and young recruits, however, whose instruction had been for desert warfare and which were equipped with large quantities of MT. An attempt was quickly made to pass on what lessons had been leat about jungle fighting by attaching advance parties to experienced units.!'* To counter Japanese infiltration, offensive patrolling on the eastern bank of the Salween was employed, to disorganise the Japanese and bolster British morale, after patrols from the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles successfully employed such tactics on 3rd February near Pa-an.''> An attempt was made by Smyth to improve the mobility and tactical training in a personal instruction issued on 6th February to his units stressing the importance of offensive tactics, intelligence gathering and of patrolling to establish control of no-man’s-land, provide valuable training and experience of jungle warfare and lastly overcome troops being too ‘MT minded’ .!'° Similarly an Operation Instruction issued on 10th February by the Army in Burma directed that ambushing and patrolling were the best means of combating infiltration, that any troops cut off should fight it out, that escaping from encirclement was easy through the jungle and lastly that tank obstacles should be constructed in depth down all roads,'"" ‘The Japanese Fifteenth Army, with both of its under-strength 55th and 33rd Divisions forward, did not find the River Salween a formidable obstacle. On 8th February the Japanese 143rd Regiment crossed the river, built a roadblock on the Martaban-Thaton road and next day captured Martaban. Further north the 33rd Division crossed unopposed near Pa-an and on 11/12th February attacked the unsupported 7/10th Baluch Regiment ~ a very young wartime battalion ~ at Kuzeik. Only a handful of survivors escaped after a pitched battle, but even so they had performed creditably.''* A counterattack against Japanese lodgements on the east bank of the Salween did not materialise and with 46th Indian Infantry Brigade’s left flank and line of communication threatened, on 14th February Smyth ordered a further immediate withdrawal. The 17th Indian Division turned to buy time and inflict casualties on the Japanese behind the River Bilin. This was an opportunity that the GOC had long sought of fighting a divisional battle in depth on ground of his own choosing that he also hoped would bolster morale."!? It was not a strong a defensive position, however,40 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 given the paucity of troops and the fact the river itself was little more than a dry ditch.!”° To fight this battle Smyth now had at his disposal 48th Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Noel Hugh-Jones, which had arrived in Burma on 3rd February. Unlike its predecessors it consisted of three well-trained pre-war Gurkha battalions, equipped on an experimental basis with mixed animal and motor transport (A&MT), whose previous service on the North-West frontier of India, it was hoped would help them perform well in Burma.'?! Last minute jungle training had been carried out, moreover, after it arrived at Rangoon and advance parties were attached to experienced units to gain knowledge of the jungle and the Japanese. '”? The leading elements of 33rd Japanese Division on the night of 14/15th February crossed the Bilin near Ahonwa, On 17th February the Japanese clashed with the 5/17th Dogra Regiment. This new unit, containing, a high proportion of young and untrained officers, NCOs and men, broke and fled in confusion, losing much of its equipment and taking the already shaken 8th Burma Rifles with it in retreat. 143rd Regiment, part of 55th Division, also advanced from Martaban astride the road and railway before crossing the River Bilin’s estuary by ferry and advancing northwards to outflank the main British defensive position. The reinforced 16th Indian Infantry Brigade counterattacked with some success and prevented its own encirclement, Heavy fighting occurred when a Japanese landing on the estuary at Zokali was discovered. On 18th February Smyth committed his divisional reserve to battle against enemy troops out- flanking 16th Indian Infantry Brigade from the north. With both flanks threatened and with no reserves left, a withdrawal was authorised at Smyth’s discretion. Even so the performance of Commonwealth troops in the first major battle of the campaign, with one exception, had been creditable in holding the Japanese for four days.'?3 The 17th Indian Division broke contact on the night of 19/20th February and withdrew down a single dusty rough track towards the River Sittang, although hampered by Japanese patrols, the poor road, widespread exhaustion and mistaken raids by British aircraft. A regiment of 33rd Division had, however, also begun forced marches through the jungle towards the same objective moving parallel to the British rearguard, The Japanese won the race and at dawn on 22nd February attacked the weak detachments guarding the bridgehead and quickly seized positions on Buddha Hill overlooking the railway bridge that determined counter- attacks failed to dislodge. With enemy pressure against the bridgehead steadily increasing and the outnumbered defenders appearing in imminent danger of being overrun, the bridge was destroyed at 5.30 a.m, on the morning of 23rd February to prevent it falling into Japanese hands. It left the main body of 17th Indian Division, however, trapped on the far side of the fast flowing quarter-mile wide tidal Sittang River. Those remaining had little alternative other than surrender or escaping across the river by swimming or aboard improvised rafts while others crossed further northwards. Only 3,500 officers and men, equipped with just small arms, made their escape, effectively finishing the division as a fighting force until reinforced and re-equipped.'* This decisive Japanese victory effectively decided the fate of Rangoon and Lower Burma. Although the remnants of 17th Indian Division reorganised and Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 41 re-equipped near Pegu, having lost the best part of two brigades, as an effective fighting force it had temporarily ceased to exist.'?* Although a considerable amount had already been learnt by its officers and men, in a memorandum to his troops Major-General Smyth urged careful study of Japanese tactics and appropriate countermeasures based on recent experience.” In a report on recent operations submitted on 26th February Smyth discussed Japanese tactics and the best means to counter them at length: There is no doubt that jungle warfare needs special training. Our tps had had no previous training or experience in this form of warfare and were naturally at a disadvantage compared to the Japanese who had specialised in it and were completely equipped in every detail to undertake it. A high standard of training in junior leadership is the chief essential. Any good Indian bn, such as the Gurkha bns of 48 Bde will acquit itself well in this form of warfare if its individual training is thoroughly sound. But in order to compete on equal terms with such specialists as the Japanese they must have special training and some special eqpt.... It is realised that the above measures will take time. In the meanwhile we should make use of all the assets we possess and fight the enemy in the open as much as possible until the standard of training of tps in jungle warfare has improved.'?” Already a sick man before the campaign began Smyth was summarily relieved of his command by Wavell on Ist March denying him a chance of leading his men in battle again. A ‘new’ 17th Indian Division, now led by Major-General David ‘Punch’ Cowan, was rebuilt with a hotchpotch of equipment in a remarkably short time covered by newly arrived British units. Even so as Hutton noted: ‘From this date forward none of the Inf Bdes concerned could be regarded as more than remnants, ready to defend themselves doggedly but otherwise unready for any of the normal operations of war.’!?8 When the IJA crossed the Sittang on 3rd March the newly landed veteran, 7th Armoured Brigade, fresh from the Western Desert, provided a valuable reserve of fast, mobile and flexible fire support. Its highly professional, confident and battle-hardened officers and men, commanded by Brigadier John Anstice, quickly adapted themselves to the new environment. Although unable to stop the Japanese advancing, however, its Stuart light tanks delayed it long enough for further troops and a new Commander-in-Chief to arrive from India, On Sth March Lieutenant- General the Hon. Sir Harold Alexander relieved Hutton, although the latter remained as his Chief of Staff, with orders to hold the port Alexander immediately ordered a counterattack at Pegu, without fully assessing the situation, using Ist Burma Division attacking from the north and 7th Armoured Brigade and the last fit brigade of 17th Indian Division attacking from the south supported by the last major reinforcement from India. The 63rd Indian Infantry Brigade had landed at Rangoon on Sth March along with Ist Indian Field Regiment equipped with 25-pdrs. Like those despatched to Malaya Command, however, the former was not really fitto fight having large numbers of new recruits, unfit mules, recently joined officers and completely new weapons and equipment.”42 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 The Army in Burma’s planned counterattack never stood a chance of success. Indeed, it very nearly led to disaster when the Japanese encircled Pegu and built a roadblock at Hlegu. Heavy fighting raged as 17th Indian Division struggled to breakthrough. The poorly trained 63rd Indian Infantry Brigade, moreover, was not given a chance to prove its mettle when an ambush on Sth March claimed nearly all its senior officers. When news of the strength of the Japanese attack reached Alexander ordered the evacuation of Rangoon. A Japanese roadblock barring the Prome road at Taukkyan, however, effectively trapped the escaping garrison. Following a series of failed attacks to clear the obstruction on 7th March Alexander was about to order his forces escape on foot through the jungle when early next morning it was discovered that the Japanese had gone, The main body of AHQ, the Rangoon Garrison and 17th Indian Division immediately escaped towards Tharrawaddy having narrowly escaped capture or destruction in detail.'*° The heavily outnumbered Army in Burma now had little alternative other than withdrawing northwards towards Prome, while Ist Burdiy covered the deployment of Chinese troops at Toungoo in the Sittang Valley. It was a wasting asset as apart from small quantities flown in no further reinforcements could be expected. In contrast, the Japanese Fifteenth Army was quickly reinforced by sea with two highly trained divisions and tanks, heavy artillery and engineers and aircraft transferred from Malaya and NEI. A newly arrived corps HQ, commanded by Lieutenant-General William Slim, assumed command of operations on 19th March, although lacking vitally needed staff officers, signals and corps troops. Its commander immediately made an appreciation of the best means of stopping a Japanese advance up the Irrawaddy and of countering Japanese fighting methods.'*! It was all too obvious to Slim that his troops were unfit for jungle fighting without having had an opportunity to organise, equip and train specifically for that role. As he later admitted: Training for jungle warfare was almost as difficult to improve as intelligence. The Japanese ability to move through jungle more freely than we could, added to our road-bound mechanical transport system gave them every advantage — advantages which they had earned and deserved. The remedies were for us to learn how to move on a light scale, to be accustomed to jungle, to do without so much transport, to improve our warnings of hostile movements, and above all to seize the initiative from the enemy.'*? ‘An opportunity to withdraw troops from the fighting line long enough to training intensively, however, was lacking, given the unrelenting Japanese pressure. Instead, the increasingly exhausted and demoralised troops of Burcorps had to make do and undergo on the job training. Burcorps’s main mission was now restricted to imposing maximum delay, ‘maintaining contact with the Chinese and tying down Japanese forces for as long as possible. To do so it planned to employ striking forces operating from well- defended localities. Whilst several little ‘affairs of arms’ provided encouragement, Alexander remained seriously concerned about the morale and discipline of his Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 43 Indian troops, whose mobility was limited."* To compound difficulties the destruction of Burwing on the ground at Magwe on 21/22nd March robbed Burcorps of any close air support and protection from Japanese aircraft, British defensive plans proved stillborn, however, after a counterattack by Burcorps against the advancing 33rd Division was ordered to relieve pressure on Chinese troops surrounded in Toungoo, It had little effect, however, other than increasing losses and gravely weakening and demoralising 17th Indian Division, Following the loss of this town the British had little altemative, however, other than withdrawing northwards to escape Japanese encirclement and conform with the retreating Chinese whose failure to blow up a bridge over the upper reaches of the River Sittang allowed the Japanese to quickly advance northwards into the Shan States. The planned defence of Prome-Alanmyo was now impossible and Burcorps withdrew northwards towards Yennangyang. The Japanese advance into the far more open terrain of the lrrawaddy Valley and later the dry belt of the central Burmese plain did not lead to any major changes in fighting methods." Whenever any ‘gaps were found in the of necessity over-extended British defences infiltration and encirclement was employed on a large scale, with darkness shielding Japanese infantry. To a limited extent the flat terrain in central Burma suited conventional British tactics and gave mechanised units far greater scope for manoeuvre. In particular, the Honey tanks of 7th Armoured Brigade exerted a powerful effect by providing a vital prop for weak and exhausted infantry units. 17th Indian Division tried forming a new defensive line on 3rd April, 50 miles northwards, covering the vital oil fields at Yenangyaung, alongside Burdiv, while maintaining contact with the Chinese Sth Army. It was too long a front, however, for the available troops and lacked any depth, On 10th April the Japanese 33rd Division advanced up both banks of the River Irrawaddy and threatened the oilfields by employing its tried and tested infiltration tactics over a wide front. Not all went in its favour. 48th Indian Infantry Brigade, inflicted heavy casualties on 215th Regiment at Kokkogwa between 11-13th April, however, as it infiltrated between 17th Indian Division and Ist Burdiv, that boosted morale. Ist Burma Division did not fair so well in the ensuing battle at Yenangyaung between 12-19th April, losing in the process artillery, mortars and nearly all its first line MT, after being encircled at Pin Chaung. Only after fierce fighting and with the assistance of the Chinese 38th Division did it escape destruction. The loss of Yenangyaung, the rapidly deteriorating supply situation (especially fuel) and repeated Chinese defeats made it clear that a defensive line across northern Burma could not be maintained indefinitely. Morale was on the decline, moreover, amongst troops who had been repeatedly surrounded, under sustained aerial attack and who were exhausted by extended combat. The initiative now lay entirely on Japanese hands, with the speed of their advance precluding a series of planned offensive operations. An ambitious counterattack at Yenangyaung and southwards from Pyinmana, for example, was scrapped due to rapid Japanese progress through the Shan States that threatened Mandalay, Lashio, Bhamo and. Myitkyina from the NE. A crippling shortage of supplies, fuel and the poor line of communications behind him into Assam convinced Alexander that a protracted44 Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 defence of Upper Burma was impossible, and on 25th April a withdrawal across the River Irrawaddy and onwards towards India was ordered, It was now a race against time to cross the wide virtually trackless tract of disease-ridden, jungle- swathed mountains that lay between the border of India and Burma with the monsoon fast approaching. By late April the fighting effectiveness of Burcorps, moreover, was declining. In a letter to Wavell written on 29th April Alexander identified the essential problem with his troops: Now a word or two about this Force. ..it is full of good fighting material if properly trained but, owing to exhaustion due to the results of the last four months...they are not up to much more, In fact it is not an exaggeration to say that as a fighting Force it has reached the end of its tether. When it can be done they must be relieved on the KALEWA front and rested, reorganized and equipped. And more important still ~ they must be trained. They DO NOT know their job as well as the Jap, and there’s the end to it.'55 The 17th Indian Division shouldered rearguard duties following the Battle of Yenangyaung while Ist Burma Division crossed the Irrawaddy and withdrew to Monywa on the River Chindwin. Further westwards 2nd Burma Brigade blocked Japanese progress up the Myittha Valley. On 28/29th April 48th Indian Infantry Brigade fought a successful action at Kyaukse that stopped the fresh Japanese 18th Division dead in its tracks. As a result the main body of Burcorps broke contact on 30th April and crossed the River Irrawaddy. The withdrawal to Assam nearly went badly awry on Ist May when the Japanese 33rd Division suddenly seized Monywa from where troops travelling upriver by boat could block Burcorps escape route at the Shwegyin-Kalewa crossing, over the River Chindwin Attempts to recapture the town failed. The Ist Burdiv successfully disengaged having fought the Japanese to a standstill, however, and withdrew northwards via Yeu to Shwegyin pursued by the Japanese 215th Regiment, Similarly under intermittent rainfall the remnants of Burcorps moved by road and rail to Shwebo and Kinu and then from Yeu eastwards along steep, narrow, twisting and water- less jungle tracks racing both the Japanese and the approaching monsoon. Its main body crossed the River Chindwin at Shwegyin using steamers. A Japanese force consisting of 213th Infantry Regiment, a mountain gun battalion and the HQ of 33rd Division moved up river using launches and landing craft and on 10th May attacked the outlying defences overlooking the crossing point. Fierce fighting occurred although the British rearguard later escaped upstream from where it were picked up from landing stages at Kaing. Burcorp had fought its last battle with its ragged, sick and exhausted survivors trudging on foot over the mountains and up the Kabaw Valley and then onwards to Manipur. It had left behind most of its arms, equipment and ammunition, as well as nearly all its remaining tanks, jeeps and lorries. The battered remnants of Burcorps arrived at the Imphal Plain in mid-May 1942 ending a nearly 1,000 mile long fighting retreat that had taxed its skill, endurance and courage to the full. It was only just in time as the first heavy rain of the monsoon fell on 12th May Opening rounds, Malaya and Burma: December 1941-May 1942 45 threatening to turn the escape routes into impassable quagmires and rivers into raging torrents, On 20th May Burcorps officially ceased to exist when the HQ of 4th Corps assumed operational control of all units in Manipur. Although defeated in battle, senior British commanders were otherwise justifiably proud of their men. As Slim later wrote: ‘On the last day of that nine-hundred-mile retreat I stood a bank beside the road and watched the rearguard march into India. All of them, British, Indian, and Gurkha, were gaunt and ragged as scarecrows. Yet, as they trudged behind their surviving officers in groups pitifully small, they stil carried their arms and kept their ranks they were still recognizable as fighting units.’ °° Similarly Major-General Punch Cowan proudly told the former Commander- in-Chief in Burma about his division on 31st May 1942; ‘It has come out as a first class fighting formation with 100 per cent morale, excellent spirit & a know- ledge gained by experience that they can put it across the Jap.’"” This hard-won knowledge urgently needed passing on to the rest of the Army in India.2 The Lessons of Defeat, February—October 1942 The fall of Singapore and the imminent loss of Burma suddenly transformed India Command from a sleepy backwater into a front line base of operations. Indeed, the defence of Ceylon, the NE frontier of India and its lengthy coastline from amphibious landings was thrown into doubt following the fall of Rangoon. The preparedness of the Army in India, now the only appreciable uncommitted reserve of British manpower east of Suez, left much to be desired. Little of the highly professional pre-war regular Indian Army remained. As fast as new formations had been organised, equipped and trained — 7 divisions — they had been sent to the Middle East and Malaya. Attempts to shore up the defence of Malaya and Burma meant that even partially trained and incomplete formations remaining had been sent overseas; whose limited battlefield effectiveness caused profound shock. As the Director of Staff Duties at GHQ India, candidly admitted in mid-January 1942: “The fighting value of Indian troops... has fallen very, very far below the standard of Sidi Barani and Keren. Events in Malaya, when they become to be known, will make very sad reading and the Indian Army will not feel very proud of itself when facts become known.’! By March 1942 the cupboard was nearly bare in terms of trained manpower. Only one trained British and six Indian formations still in the process of being formed remained at GHQ India’s immediate disposal, in addition to 150,000 men tied down on the North-West frontier and on Internal Security duties. Those Indian formations still in the subcontinent were the last products of the 1941 expansion programme and units of that for 1942 whose training was far worse than those earlier cobbled together. Most units, already depleted by milking and finding drafts for Malaya and Burma, primarily consisted of raw, inexperienced and partially trained officers and men badly needing basic instruction before embarking on more ambitious unit, brigade and divisional collective training.” Three divisions had only two brigades instead of the normal three and none were fully armed and equipped or complete with ancillary troops.’ As a result they were unfit to meet an invasion.’ A considerable amount of time and work was needed to prepare them for a very different war from that in the Middle East that had hitherto dictated the organisation, equipment and training of Indian units. In the dark days of early 1942 it was a resource that was in short supply. Further planned expansion of the Indian Army, moreover, was hamstrung Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 47 by acute shortages of equipment, technical specialists and sufficient trained officers. The urgency of filling the breech on the jungle-covered NE frontier of India, garrisoning Ceylon or securing the lengthy coastline of Bengal and southern India, however, accelerated the deployment of these ill-trained troops. In mid- March the Commander-in-Chief suddenly ordered the poorly prepared 1st Indian Infantry Brigade, for example, from the NWEP to Manipur. As Brigadier F.V. Wodehouse remonstrated on 27th March: ‘It must be remembered that both the battalions going with this Brigade have been concentrating on Mountain Warfare on the N.W.F.P. and have received no training with modern weapons’ or ‘in the technique of modern warfare against a first- enemy.” Its badly under-strength 7/14th Punjab Regiment, needed 376 recruits to make up its war establishment with the result that ‘half of the sepoys in the Bn will be untrained.” This rushed redeployment of Indian formations to threatened areas necessitated major chopping and changing in their composition, organisation, transport and equipment for their new roles further undermining battle-worthiness.’ Until they improved, the mainstay of the Indian garrison was the battle-experienced 70th Division and two further British divisions that were sent to join the immature and still partially trained formations serving in India Command. Doctrine and Training The conduct of jungle warfare against the JA had clearly emerged as a major new training commitment in India Command, in addition to that for combined operations.* Little was known, however, about either form of fighting or the likely opponent given that to date of all GHQ Indian training establishments, doctrine and training had focused exclusively on preparing units and formations for desert warfare in the Middle Bast. To address a desperate need for information about Japanese military characteristics and organisation, equipment and training, two older publications were quickly reprinted. A manual originally prepared at Singapore by the General Staff at the Naval Base, intended to provide ‘regimental officers with a general idea of the characteristics, organisation, armament, tactics and training of the Japanese Army’ was hurriedly reprinted in January 1942, including a new section covering Japanese tactics in Malaya. This discussed the conduct of the attack, defence, arms and equipment and finally the role of the fifth column.’ Of far greater usefulness was a new edition of Colonel Francis B. Brink's Japanese Tactical Methods that provided far more detailed information about the campaign. As Wavell noted in the introduetion: ‘I commend them as Worthy of careful study by everyone who may have to train troops to fight the Japanese.’'® A series of more detailed publications were also steadily issued by the Military Intelligence Department at New Delhi about the organisation and -€quipment of the IJA in the form of War Information Circulars and intelligence pamphlets during the spring.!! ‘The Indian military authorities also produced written sources upon which training for jungle fighting could be based. Copies of Tactical Notes for Malaya48 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 1940, already reprinted for use by its own instructors preparing units for despatch to the Malayan Peninsula, were quickly given a wider circulation.'? A new edition of its Military Training Pamphlet No. 9: Forest Warfare was also quickly prepared and issued to formation HQs, training establishments and individual units as a stop-gap measure until more information became available, supplementing existing publications dealing with conventional training. Its foreword, written by the General Staff, India and dated January 1942 began: FS.R. Vol. II Section 98 deals with forest warfare against a primitive enemy. In Malaya British forces have been faced with Forest Warfare against a modern and fully equipped enemy. The possibility may arise in other Forest areas of Asia and Africa. The less dense the forest the nearer will tactical methods approach those of normal warfare. This pamphlet considers the special problem of fighting in thick forests. ‘These notes amplify the instructions in Field Service Regulations and consider warfare against a modern enemy. Based on the limited information forwarded from Malaya Command it began by outlining possible theatres of war, stressing the importance mobility and special conditions in relation to arms, before discussing in turn the attack, defence, counterattack, withdrawal, protection, minor tactics and training. It also included a section entitled ‘Recent Notes from Malaya’, as well as various suggestions about countering Japanese tactics. Last but by no means least it also discussed health and hygiene in a forest environment.'* Later that year a Roman Urdu edition also appeared specifically for Indian officers, NCOs and men,'* The Indian military authorities employed various other means of passing on information about the tactical conduct of the war in the Far East. Following standard practice since 1940, the Army in India Training Memoranda War Series (AITM) provided the main medium of communication. A section discussing lessons appeared in the January-February edition that reproduced a Special Order of the Day issued to the Army in Burma by the Supreme Commander in the South West Pacific. It then outlined the contents of a note issued by General Wavell that began by outlining the main features of the recent fighting in Malaya before discussing means of counteracting characteristic enemy tactics in defence and withdrawal. Various notes sent by Malaya Command were also summarised. It also contained an account of operations by the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and 5/2nd Punjab Regiment on the Grik road from 19-22nd December 1941. It was prefaced: “The tactical doctrine for jungle fighting evolved by this bde by trial and error for the last 2% years has proved to be correct.’!° As more information slowly became available further information was contained in the March-April A/TM. It listed various lessons from Malaya, stressing that none were new, and went on “but as they represent the considered opinion of officers Who escaped from Singapore, they are included to emphasise the importance of the lessons.” A clear note of warning was sounded: Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 49 Certain of the tactics of jungle warfare are specialized and, to employ them successfully, special training is required. This does not mean, however, that there is any black magic about this form of warfare. All the well-known principles of war still apply. Reading these lessons and others that have been printed in the last few weeks, it is evident that almost as many of our mistakes were due to our neglecting the original principles of war, as were due to our not having leamt and practised the special application of those principles necessary for this type of warfare. ‘The importance of appropriate, highly realistic training was emphasised, with stress on road discipline, small arms fire for air defence, anti-tank defence, concealment and the offensive spirit in attack and defence. It also highlighted the importance of toughening troops ~ accustoming them to limited rations, les reliance on MT and hardship — given the physical demands of operating in a jungle environment.'® The urgent necessity for hard, intensive realistic training before the next encounter with the IJA, based these written sources of doctrinal information, was emphasised in army, corps and divisional training instructions. A training directive issued on Ist April by Lieutenant-General Henry Pownall, now GOC Ceylon Command, urged: ‘We have got to set our house in order...We must take advantage of the weak points of the Japanese ...and learn from the hard experi- ence of others, and we must go about it with a sense of great urgency.’'7 Divisional commanders were also equally insistent. To quote Major-General Douglas Gracey, GOC 20th Indian Division, in a memorandum issued to his officers in April 1942: ur job is to fight and destroy Japanese forces whenever we meet them. Trg must be entirely based on these facts ~ the enemy are Japanese, the country is tropical country. We are not to train against any other enemy until we are expert in and absolutely sure of carrying out our present job... Some excellent pamphlets on Japanese Tactical Methods have been issued, giving the characteristics of Japanese methods and showing how we can deal with them. These pamphlets must be intensively studied by BOs, BORs, and English speaking VCOs and IORs and the content made known at once to every soldier in the Div Ttended: ‘This is not to be regarded as just “another piece of bumph”. I intended this Div to be imbued throughout with the absolute determination to achieve the efficiency and the ruthless spirit to knock hell out of any Japanese and any of their traitor followers whenever and wherever they may be met.!* The hard-won practical knowledge of Japanese fighting methods and jungle warfare possessed by those officers who had escaped from Singapore was at a Premium in the spring of 1942, with information from Burma in short supply. In particular, Lt.~Colonel Tan Stewart and his fellow officers from the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were heavily employed by the Indian military authorities to ‘pass on’ what they had learnt. This battalion was amongst the few units that50 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 had emerged with credit from the Malayan campaign — a tribute to the minor tactics and training regime developed by its CO that had fitted it so effectively to war in the jungle. As General Sir Archibald Wavell later wrote: If all units in Malaya had been trained and led with the same foresight and imagination that Brigadier Stewart showed in the training of his battalion, the story of the campaign might have been different. It was the realization of this that led me to order Brigadier Stewart's return to India... to impart his knowledge and ideas to units preparing for the return match with the Japanese." Immediately following his arrival Stewart prepared a detailed report on the Malayan campaign that was widely circulated to formations deployed in India Command and formed also the basis of various notes in ATM. Unsurprisingly it ‘was scathing about training and events in Malaya Command, particularly the failure of senior staff officers at HQ to study his jungle fighting methods and its failure to ensure that units carried out hard, intensive training in the jungle. Lt-Colonel Jan Stewart, Major Angus Rose and Captain David Wilson from the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were also employed in a personal cap- acity to spread their doctrinal ‘gospel’ of jungle fighting and training, with Wavell’s strong endorsement. Soon after they returned to India they embarked on a lecture tour of training establishments, formations and units around the subcon- tinent. Although still obviously shaken by their experiences Stewart and Rose, for example, lectured at the Poona Tactical School, located in the Deccan College outside the city, in late February 1942. Both officers delivered several lectures and carried out a series of informative model exercises and demonstrations dealing with jungle fighting for the staff who, apart from one officer, had no experience of such operations or jungle terrain, Indeed, this important information formed the basis of jungle warfare instruction at the Tactical School until officers with combat experience in Burma joined the Directing Staff later that year.! When Stewart returned to the UK in the early summer, Major Angus Rose and Captain David Wilson, continued No. 6 Training Team’s work, by carrying out further lectures, demonstrations and supervising unit and formation exercises throughout India Command. Other experienced officers also carried out similar work during the su and autumn of 1942. A small party consisting of Lt-Colonel Arthur Cumming (who had won a VC near Kuantan while OC 2/12th Frontier Force Regiment), Captain Ishar Singh and Lieutenant Hussain Khan also did the rounds of units and formations in India Command, lecturing to British officers, VCOs and NCOs in English and Urdu on the Malayan Campaign in an attempt to foster morale. The results of the Commander-in-Chief’'s own enquiry into what had gone wrong in Malaya became available in May 1942, although it contained little new information. Written by Major H.P. Thomas this report, based on information collected from reports and interviews with over 50 officers who escaped from Lessons of defeat, February—October 1942 51 Singapore, drove home even further the necessity for intensive training. This comprehensive document, covering the background and conduct of the campaign, devoted several pages to lack of training before the outbreak of hostilities observing that ‘weakness in training was little short of disastrous’. A failure to realise that conditions in Malaya required specialised training was identified as a basic cause of the poor battlefield performance of Commonwealth units, with the minimum time required to carry out such instruction suggested by one officer as being six months. An unquestioning reliance on MT was also explicitly blamed for defeat. Particular criticism was levelled at Malaya Command’ failure to issue adequate guidance. This was explicitly identified as having led to an: ‘unimaginative approach to the whole problem of jungle warfare, lack of detailed study necessary formation of a definite policy, with the result that conspicuous successes scored by certain units and formations were the result of their own theories, experiments and . Failure to prepare in peacetime had fatally compromised Commonwealth ability to fight successfully. This shocking indictment of Malaya Command drove home earlier assessments made in India about the urgency of dramatically improving basic training, as well as specialised instruction in jungle warfare. The need for such practical, highly realistic training carried out wherever possible under jungle conditions was driven home repeatedly in training instructions and other directives issued by the GHQ New Delhi during the summer of 1942 to improve the preparedness of Commonwealth units. The Commander-in-Chief in India, however, remained acutely concerned about the basic fighting quality and morale of the British and Indian troops under his command, believing that Commonwealth units had been defeated primarily due to lack of fighting spirit and both moral and physical toughness.* A note issued to all officers down to unit COs that month explicitly identified what Wavell believed were the root causes of defeat — lack of moral and physical toughness, lack of discipline, lack of enterprise and offensive spirit, exaggerated fear of air attack and heaviness of equipment and training — before suggesting various means of overcoming them. It directe We have experienced in the five months of the war against Japan a series of humiliating defeats which may tend to destroy the morale and confidence of the Army in India, unless we realise what is wrong and take steps to put it right. As a result of these defeats our fighting reputation stands low in the East at the present ~a reproach which every member of the Army in India must con- centrate on removing as soon as possible. It can be done by training, but only by real hard intensive training such as we have not yet undertaken. The exploits of 4th Indian Division, which has established for itself a reputation under all conditions second to none in the Middle Bast, have set a standard to be aimed at by Indian troops. It concluded with the striking observation that: ‘Our motto should be LIVE HARD, FIGHT HARD, and when necessary DIE HARD.”52 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 The Lessons of Burma The retreat from Burma had been another bitter defeat for the Indian Army, severing the flow of arms and equipment to Nationalist China, exposing the Indian subcontinent to direct attack and further undermining morale. Defeat had stemmed from lack of effective pre-war planning and preparation to meet an invasion in terms of providing sufficient troops, administrative services, aircraft, arms and equipment to mount a credible defence. To quote Kirby: ‘the British army in Burma was called upon to carry out a task beyond its powers’.° A deadly combination of underestimation of the ITA, overestimation of the defensive value of jungle terrain and lastly a completely unrealistic assessment of the combat effectiveness of Commonwealth troops had compounded the problem. As Wavell later summed up: The troops who fought in the Burma campaign ...were opposed to a well- trained, vigorous and determined enemy, usually superior in numbers; they had to fight in a type of country and under conditions quite unfamiliar to the majority; they had no relief and very little rest during more than five months; in the later stages they were almost entirely deprived of air support... In the cireumstances the troops put up a remarkable performance and showed a ie fighting spirit.” A heavy price had been paid by the Army in Burma with British and Indian units suffering 10,036 casualties in the course of the fighting, of which 3,670 were killed or wounded and 6,366 were posted missing. Burma Rifle and other Burmese units, moreover, suffered an additional 363 dead and wounded and 3,064 missing.”* The fact that Burcorps had made its escape after a retreat of 1,000 miles was a remarkable achievement and that some units ~ 7th Armoured Brigade, 48th Indian Infantry Brigade and the three regular British battalions flown in from India — had performed creditably in combat despite exceptional testing conditions, however, provided some cold comfort. The deployment of 23rd Indian Division as a limited protective screen, gave the former Burcorps’ battered and exhausted remnants, a much-needed opportunity to rest, reorganise and reflect upon its recent experiences. The British had clearly suffered a salutary defeat at the hands of an adversary they had badly underrated. In Slim's words: ‘The outstanding and incontrovertible fact was that we had taken a thorough beating. We, the Allies, had been outmanoeuvred, outfought, and outgeneralled. It was easy...to find excuses for our failure, but excuses are no use for next time; what are wanted are causes and remedies.’”” Much had been learnt, much of lasting value in the hard school of experience, however, about the ISA, jungle warfare and operating in the largely alien jungle environment. The retreat from Burma had demonstrated yet again that the ITA was a formidable fighting opponent, whose highly effective units appeared organised, equipped and highly trained specifically to operate in a jungle environment. As Wavell admitted in his despatch on the campaign: *We found ourselves up against a new feature in Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 53 warfare — an enemy fully armed, disciplined, and trained on the continental model using the mobility, independence of communications and unorthodox tactics of the savage in thick jungle.’*” Individually the Japanese soldier had shown himself to be a tough, confident and highly aggressive opponent, who displayed considerable offensive spirit, skill in minor tactics and whose light equipment and ability 10 live off the country gave them a cross-country mobility that the British could not match. As Slim candidly admitted: “The Japanese could — and did --do many things we could not,’ No effective answer was found to three key Japanese tactical methods: infiltration, encirclement and the roadblock. Like in Malaya these had been used repeatedly with deadly effect against units reliant on MTT as first Hine transport until many officers and men had acquired a ‘road-block’ mentality.*! The telling criticisms that emerged from Malayan campaign about the combat effectiveness of Commonwealth units equally applied to those in Burma. Like in Malaya long tails of wheeled vehicles and lavish scales of equipment had tied Commonwealth units to the roads depriving them of freedom of manoeuvre and tactical flexibility. Heavy losses of arms, heavy equipment and vehicles from Japanese encirclement normally meant fighting power fell alarmingly. Although pooling vehicles and commandeering local resources was tried towards the end of the campaign to improve cross-country mobility, it had had limited success and failed to overcome a road-bound mentality many British officers displayed. The single widely acknowledged greatest factor undermining the Army in Burma’s combat effectiveness had been lack of sound basic training and relevant specialised skills for jungle fighting.’ As lan Lyall Grant, OC 70th Field ‘Company Bengal Sappers & Miners, has noted: ‘It was like entering a team of amateur footballers, who had never seen each other before and were uncertain of the rules of the game and how to play it, into the field against a well-experienced and highly motivated team of professionals.’*° Like in Malaya the standard of basic training of the young soldiers and inexperienced officers and NCOs had been poor. Few had mastered basic military knowledge — skill-at-arms, marksmanship and minor tactics - before being committed to battle. Lack of training, discipline and confidence in their leaders and own abilities meant morale was brittle and units had quickly disintegrated under the stress of battle. ‘The virtual absence of specialised knowledge and training to live, move and fight under jungle conditions compounded this problem, except in the open ter- rain of the central Burmese Plain. As John Hedley has written: ‘Far and away the ‘most important point was that the Japs were trained for jungle war and we were not, and nothing — air support, friendly inhabitants, or anything else, would have made any difference as long as that fact remained.’ Few British, Indian or Burm- ese troops were physically and psychologically accustomed to living, moving and fighting under jungle conditions. None possessed the necessary knowledge to find food and potable water, build shelters or navigate their way through dense vegetation. As Slim later summed up in his memoirs: To our men, British or Indian, the jungle was a strange, fearsome plac moving and fighting in it was a nightmare. We were too ready to classity54 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 jungle as ‘impenetrable’, as indeed it was to us with our motor transport, bulky supplies, and inexperience. To us it appeared only as an obstacle to movement and to vision; to the Japanese it was a welcome means of concealed movement and surprise. The officers and men of Burcorps had clearly learnt much from painful experience about the jungle and the Japanese of lasting value from the retreat from Burma that urgently needed passing on to the rest of India Command to prepare them for the next round with the Japanese. By far the most detailed source of tactical and administrative lessons learnt from the retreat from Burma was submitted in June 1942 by the HQ of 17th Indian Division, possessing perhaps the most ive sustained experience of jungle fighting in all the Commonwealth . In a covering letter dated 18th June, Major-General David ‘Punch’ Cowan, GOC 17th Indian Division since the Sittang Bridge debacle, endorsed the report and observed: In view of the fact that this Division was in the ‘shopwindow’ throughout the lessons learnt which we duly recorded, may be considered of sufficient value to be ‘Passed On’ to other formations... am in agreement with the opinions expressed by the Committee... Training must approach as near as possible ‘Active Service conditions’ and in this part of the world that means Jungle... Our tps must, therefore live and train in jungle as part of their training, so that movement and control in it becomes second nature, There is unlimited scope for ‘harnessing the forces’ of dense forest country on our side. Prepared by a small committee chaired by Brigadier Ronnie Cameron (GOC 48th Indian Infantry Brigade), consisting of Lt-Colonel W.D. Lentaigne, Lt.-Cololnel W.D. Edward and Major R. Elsmie, the report was packed full of useful information about jungle fighting. It discussed the terrain over which the campaign had been and different types of fighting that had occurred, stressing that jungle warfare had been the primary experience, except in central Burma where fighting methods appropriate for open warfare had relevance. It also covered the characteristics of a Japanese opponent and the organisation, equipment and training of British units for war in this environment, Japanese roadblocks and the best means of countering them was discussed at some length. The way it recommended of forcing such an obstacle was a direct frontal attack using all available troops, since Commonwealth troops were incapable of mounting a tactically demanding deep turning movement around the flanks of such obstacles. As it admitted: ‘It calls for a very rich standard of training and is beyond the ability of our war trained amy to carry out with success.’ ‘Blitz parties’ — troops heavily armed with automatic weapons ~ were recommended as the best means of dislodging Japanese ‘shock troops’ from jungle by spraying the surrounding area with bullets. It also stressed the importance of patrolling to gather information in the jungle and the best method of clearing villages held by determined Japanese infiltrators and units Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 55 that had formed the majority of the actions that had been fought. The Cameron Report concluded: The lessons of the Burma Campaign are many...In the Campaign dealt with, all the infantry, and many others were receiving their introduction to the modern battlefield. They were meeting modern weapons, and especially the automatic one, face to face at close quarters for the first time. They were meeting the picked, trained, hardy, fanatical Japanese soldier, who had already been blooded in the Chinese struggle. The strangeness of the jungle, novel to most, and the individualistic nature of the fighting in it had to be overcome and learnt. Practice without weapons had been of the slightest, or none at all, and mastery of them was only obtained day to day each new experience was met. Under these circumstance, there can be no substitute for the bold, resourceful and remorseless leadership of the officer... Nothing of tactical theory will avail if common speech and guts are lacking in our future fighting in the East... If the troops are well led, the fight will prosper.*° The Indian military authorities’ immediate response to the many serious faults in British organisation, equipment and training revealed during the fighting in Malayan and Burma took two forms. First, major changes were implemented in the organisation of units and higher formations to fit them for war in the jungle and second, the publication and dissemination of further detailed advice about jungle fighting upon which training could be based. ‘The limited cross-country mobility and vulnerability of Commonwealth units operating with high scales of arms, equipment and MT had been a striking feature of the fighting in Malaya and Burma, At a conference held for formation commanders and senior staff officers at New Delhi in July 1942, the lessons of the recent fighting regarding organisation and equipment were discussed. To pre- pare troops for future operations in northern Burma the Indian Light Division ‘was hurriedly devised, intended to combine the maximum firepower and mobility practicable in jungle, while the pack component of the existing A&MT formations was dramatically increased. The Indian Light Division (an organisation adopted by 39th Indian and 17th Indian Divisions) consisted of a divisional HQ, a support battalion equipped with Bren gun carriers and MMGs, and two infantry brigades. Each of the latter contained a reconnaissance battalion, with two jeep and two mounted infantry companies capable of acting as ‘mobile shock troops’ in the jungle, and two infantry battalions. All first line transport, with the exception of supporting arms and services, was on a pack mule basis. The divisional MT component ‘was also limited to four jeeps and four light four-wheel drive lorry companies, Possessing a relatively high degree of off-road mobility when terrain and vegetation permitted, Six mule companies provided the main divisional transport lift giving it the ability to operate away from a road for an extended period of time. Two mountain artillery regiments organised on a pack basis, one mechanised56 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 field regiment and a mixed light anti-aireraft and anti-tank regiment pro- vided artillery support, while one RE field park and two field companies provided engineer support. The Animal & Motor Transport Division largely remained unchanged, but was given an increased establishment of pack and MT to improve its mobility and tactical effectiveness. It allowed one brigade to operate away from the road on a ‘hard scale’ for a limited period, while the two others could operate just off the road on a ‘fighting pack’ scale. To give it the necessary freedom away from a road all infantry weapons were manhandled, except for 3” mortars and AT Rifles and the amount of baggage carried was slashed. Eventually five divisions — 7th, 14th, 20th, 23rd and 26th Indian Divisions ~ were reorganised on this basis during the summer and autumn of 1942.57 ‘An experimental brigade was hurriedly formed at Ranchi, led by Brigadier Arthur Curtis, to investigate types and forms of organisation suited to warfare under jungle conditions. Much of its initial work was initially concerned with the divisional reconnaissance battalions being formed within the Light Divisions.** The tactical lessons of Malaya and Burma were embodied in a new edition of Military Training Pamphlet No. 9 (India), intended to provide an authoritative, standardised and fully up-to-date guidance for Commonwealth units upon which training and tactical methods could be based. Prepared by the Military Training Directorate at Meerut during the late spring and summer of 1942, it was based on the carefully collated, sifted and analysed combat experience of British and Indian troops in Malaya and Burma. While the earlier January 1942 edition had provided useful basic guidance, based on the limited sources of information then available, its limitations had become increasingly obvious. A considerably enlarged and revised edition — significantly now entitled Military Training Pamphlet No. 9 (India): Jungle Warfare — was distributed in late Augustearly September 1942 to units, formations and training establishments throughout India Command, It superseded both its predecessors, the Indian edition of Tactical Notes for Malaya 1940 and a GHQ letter issued in April listing the lessons of Malaya. Issued on a scale of one copy per officer and NCO in British units and every officer in Indian units, it provided officers with an important synthesis of recent experience.” It began: In the space of five months, considerable British forces were driven out of Malaya and were forced to surrender Singapore; another allied army was pressed back and finally withdrew, involuntarily, from Burma. Many reasons have been put forward to account for these disasters With notable exceptions, we were out-fought by an enemy who had trained intensively for the operations he knew he would have to undertake. Next time we meet the enemy we are going to out-fight him. In the meantime — and time may well be short — we must train all out to do so, ‘This pamphlet is based on a careful review of the lessons and experiences gained during the Malayan and Burmese Campaigns. It is, however, only a guide. The methods set out herein can, with study, practice and trial, be Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 57 improved upon. Suggestions for improvement should be reported to G.H.Q India, so that all may benefit from them. The pamphlet confines itself very largely to operations in jungle or, at any rate, close country. This does not mean that we shall fight the Japanese only in such country. In many potential areas of operations, there are, as in Burma, large tracts of open country, great mountain ranges and a wide variety of types of terrain. ‘An immediate effort was made to debunk a growing myth about the fighting ability of Japanese troops, enjoining: ‘They are NOT super-men. Our better trained troops, British, Australian, Indian and Gurkhas, have proved more than once.” It went on: ‘When next we join battle, all our troops must be capable of pricking the bubble of Japanese “invincibility”.’ The final section of a note issued to the Army in Burma by Wavell formed the last part of the introduction of the pamphlet, urging the importance of leadership, fighting spirit and above all guts in combat, was quoted in extenso. This concluded: “We have good equipment; better is on its way. Real hard training will give us the tactical skill to use that equipment. Guts already displayed by our troops at Sidi Barrani. Keren, Damascus, Tobruk and in the wary stubborn withdrawal from Rangoon, will prove — as ever = the “deciding factor”.” Military Training Pamphlet No. 9 (India): Jungle Warfare began by describing the differing types of jungle country likely to be encountered by Commonwealth troops operating in the Far East, emphasising their different military characteristics. Japanese tactical methods and characteristics of the Japanese soldier were briefly summarised, since so much had already appeared in print and it referred readers directly to Japanese Tactical Methods that had already been issued to all units. It did, however, briefly sum up the key elements of Japanese tactics - mobility, speed, infiltration and encirclement ~ that had hitherto proved so effective in earlier campaigns. General tactical considerations affecting the conduct of jungle operations were discussed at some length, especially the importance of maintaining the initiative, the offensive and superior mobility to prevent the LIA employing its favoured “fixing-encircling-infiltration’ attack. To counter this it recommended defence in depth, employing fighting patrols and continually counterattacking, especially when defending roads. It went on: ‘The idea of a front, where the enemy is regarded being on one side of a line and we on another, must be broken down; otherwise encircling attacks are bound to have undue moral effect, The idea that a force which is surrounded is in a hopeless position must not be permitted ... Troops must realise that the enemy who are behind them are just as much cut off from their comrades as they themselves are, Resolute, offensive action against them will not only bring about their destruction, but will make such tactics much less likely in future. It also examined special conditions in jungle warfare relating to each arm of service, beginning by observing that the infantry were the “general purpose’ arm.58 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 Although it noted experience of handling tanks in jungle was limited, it suggested they might have a role working in close co-operation with infantry and have a useful place in village fighting, counterattacking, covering rearguards and lastly destroying enemy roadblocks. The different phases of military operations under jungle conditions were carefully discussed — the advance to contact, the attack, the defence, and withdrawal.” The varied lessons learnt by Stewart in Malaya and also laid down in 17th Indian Division's Cameron Report can clearly be dis- cerned in its pages. Unsurprisingly, the Cameron Report had perhaps the greatest influence on this manual, given the fact operations were most likely to occur in Burma, Indeed, MTP No. 9: Jungle Warfare ended by stressing the importance of morale, discipline and leadership by quoting directly from the Cameron Report that: ‘One requirement stands out above all else. It is leadership... If troops are well led the fight will prosper.’*! Other methods also passed on what had been learnt in Burma, including the transfer of experienced personnel to other units and formations who had not yet undergone their baptism of fire and to training establishments as instructors.” Burma veterans were also employed on lecture tours, organised by armies and commands, in India to pass on their personal experience to other units."’ To reflect the importance of experience in Burma during the autumn the composition of No. 6 Training Team was changed to Lt.-Colonel PC Marindin and Major J. Hume, both of whom had seen active service during the retreat and arguably possessed much more relevant information for the formations deployed in Eastern Command.* Early Preparations for Jungle Warfare ‘The Army in India made considerable efforts to prepare itself for the next round with the JA, but it faced a major uphill task during the summer and autumn of 1942, especially in making good the deleterious effects caused by the Indian ‘Army's over-expansion since 1939. Despite important progress having been made with improving training on 14th June Wavell reported: ‘I am very far from satisfied with state of training of troops and all Indian formations require about another six months training. British formations require acclimatisation and specialised training.” The dissemination of tactical guidance by the Indian military authorities about the jungle and the Japanese during the summer of 1942, in the form of successive training letters, memoranda and tactical pamphlets, however, did not immediately translate into dramatically improved combat effectiveness. It was left up to formation commanders and unit COs to carry out training based upon them, who in many instances were fully occupied by other tasks. Time and opportunity to carry out uninterrupted realistic individual, sub-unit, unit and then higher collective training in brigades and divisions, with all necessary equipment to do so, as instructed in the July 1942 edition of ATM was vitally needed."® Although an immediate attempt was made by units, formations and training establishments in India Command to do so, however, the progress actually made during the autumn varied widely. Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 59 ‘The work of the already large training organisation in place in India Command in preparing troops for the war in the Far East was handicapped by a number of factors. Nearly all the Directing Staff knew comparatively little about jungle ;hting. As Charles Chevenix Trench has written: ‘Intensive training was given in jungle war by instructors none too well versed in it themselves.’*” Few had seen jungle before, placing reliance upon a handful of experienced officers who joined them after Malaya and Burma fell and written information, Members of staff of the Officer Training Schools (OTS) at Bangalore, Mhow and Dehra Dun completely lacked knowledge about jungle warfare, although such specialised instruction formed only a small part of the syllabus for potential officers. In the words of E.D. Smith: Everything had happened so swiftly that no one knew what lessons to teach us or what might be relevant in the future. Jungle warfare was beyond the ken of the pre-war Indian Army: with few exceptions, the instructors at Bangalore had years of experience only in fighting the Pathans on the North- West Frontier, and after a few half-hearted attempts at teaching us the obvious about operating in ‘thick country’, they turned with relief and unbounded confidence to the world of picquets, sangars, and tribesmen.** By August 1942 jungle warfare, however, had become a key component of the expanded tactics syllabus at the OTS at Bangalore, with nineteen periods devoted to the subject including discussions of Japanese tactical methods, organisation, equipment and training, lectures and several exercises based on MTP No. oe Similarly the syllabus of the Tactical School at Poona was expanded based on information from No. 6 Training Team during the summer by Lt-Colonel William Alston, with further lectures, model exercises, demonstrations and practical jungle warfare exercises added using hurriedly located suitable terrain near Mahabaleshwar.*? Those officers running Regimental Training Centres, already under immense pressure turning out new recruits because of heavy wastage in units decimated by battle casualties and disease, also lacked knowledge of jungle warfare until experienced officers joined them, although some information reached them direct from front line units.5' Many were located in parts of India, moreover, where suitable terrain for instruction was marked by its absence making improvisation the order of the day. Staff of the Ist Punjab Training Centre, for example, produced their own ‘synthetic jungle’ (made from reeds and cane) to add at least a semblance of realism to training.*? The Training Centre serving the Jat Regiment at Bareilly was better placed in terms of suitable terrain, but still managed only a ten-day course for its recruits in a jungle camp at Fatepur, west of Haldwani on the road to Nani Thal.** A major gap in training still existed since only very basic instruction could be given to recruits in jungle fighting often under very unrealistic conditions. Towards the end of the year the need for specific post-basic training in jungle fighting for recruits destined for units serving in Eastern Command was officially recognised. In December authority was granted by GHQ India to raise @60 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 Jungle Warfare Training Centre at Raiwala Bara in northern Punjab, commanded by Major Angus Rose, to give recruits 2-3 weeks specialised individual training in jungle warfare before drafting to front line units.°* ‘The front line divisions serving in Eastern Army, comprising 4th Corps in Assam and 15th Indian Corps in Bengal, also immediately embarked on absorbing lessons from the recent Campaign to fit themselves for a return match against the Japanese Fifteenth Army, although much depended on the operational role of formations and the availability of trained instructors and equipment. The 17th Indian and Ist Burma Division, facing the IJA across the rugged jungle-covered mountains, started training almost immediately under active service conditions with a projected readiness date of late November 1942.55 With a large number of experienced officers to provide guidance about jungle fighting, it was far better placed than their counterparts to train effectively. A training instruction issued by the GOC 17th Indian Division on 4th June 1942 directed: The Division has acquired considerable practical experience of fighting against the Japanese and many lessons have been learnt from their methods which can well be adopted by us. We have also tried out various techniques — some of which have proved successful... NOW it is the time to train and practise these new methods and to drive in the good lessons before they are forgotten. Instruction emphasised discipline, turn-out, individual training and skill-at-arms, especially since fire discipline had been so ‘sadly lacking in the last campaign’. Only one exception was made in the case of “Blitzing’ enemy hidden in thick cover when firing from the hip was recommended, Animal management, moreover, now formed an important element of training for units, with instruction given by cadres by Indian Army officers trained in its use. Particular attention was directed towards maintaining physical fitness and dealing with Japanese roadblocks. It ‘went on: ‘Units and formations will not only practice the “Busting of Rd Blocks” (always against an “Enemy”) but will practise laying their own with improvements on the Jap Method, because he himself will in future have to work with an L of C.’ Village fighting merited particular attention, as well as patrolling to both dominate the jungle and to gain information, Emphasis was also placed on the importance of ‘jungle-mindedness’ and maintaining control in jungle, since “the new draft will not know the jungle. They will feel lost and confused = if not actually frightened of it’.°° Later that month a further training instruction noted that experience gained by those in the Burma campaign had to be passed on to the ‘New Entry’, before outlining various subjects needing particular attention to umn it into ‘a Storm Troops Division’. To carry this out it observed that sufficient literature now existed to carry out all aspects of fighting the Japanese, in the form of AITMs, the Cameron Report, the report on the Malayan Campaign and lastly Japanese Tactical Methods, and ended with the admonishment to: ‘GET ON WITH IT’ and ‘DO IT Now’ 7 Lessons of defeat, February~October 1942 61 Several courses held under divisional direction taught specialised skills ‘A small jungle warfare school was run by Captain James Blueboys near Imphal, whilst a three-week jungle lore course was held by Mr F. Kingdon Ward, a naturalist, at Haflang for officers and NCOs who in turn instructed their own units. Small parties were also regularly attached to the Chin levies and other similar units recruited from local tribesmen to familiarise themselves with living, moving and fighting in the jungle. The 23rd Indian Division, still only partially trained when it was deployed on the eastern frontier, had to learn primarily ‘on the job’ about their new arms, equipment and jungle fighting whilst covering the front and patrolling up to and along the line of the River Chindwin, Much work remained to be done, given that this improvised formation knew only the barest elements of soldiering in this, new terrain while malaria made massive inroads into its fighting strength. The hastily improvised 15th Indian Corps ~ 14th and 26th Indian covering the southern half of the Indo-Burmese frontier in eastern Bengal and the coastal route from Arakan, made far more limited progress in improving basic and jungle training, With the construction of widely dispersed field defences and the maintenance of law and order in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa taking priority during the spring and summer training never progressed above section and platoon level.5! Lack of vehicles and instructors, moreover, initially crippled 26th Indian Division’s instruction. Some limited instruction in jungle warfare was carried out with the assistance of No. 6 Training Team by units of 14th Indian Division when they deployed at Feni in April and May. Between 21~24th April 1942, for example, both officers lectured on the Malayan campaign to officers of 47th Indian Infantry Brigade at Feni, before directing two exercises held by 14th Indian Division in the Comilla area.” Similarly it also visited 26th Indian Division, but otherwise Jack of trained instructors and suitable jungle terrain within both divisional areas badly hampered British officers trying to accustom troops to living, moving and fighting in jungle.®* Unsurprisingly in the absence of detailed directions from the GOC, junior officers concentrated on basic military skills to the detriment of more specialised instruction.“ When he assumed command of 15th Indian Corps in June 1942 Slim, still described it as ‘not yet battleworthy’ and its jungle training ‘as leaving ‘much to be desired’.© Little progress was made, however, by its new commander with either formation before they were placed directly under the HQ of Eastern Army. The ‘new’ 15th Indian Corps, reformed in late August at Ranchi, benefited most from Slim’s hard-won experience, who had a free rein to pass on his ideas about tactics and training derived from the retreat from Burma. Indeed, the mixed jungle and open terrain on the Ranchi plateau proved an ideal training ground for the training programme he instituted for 70th Division, 50th Indian Tank Brigade and corps troops, who had previously trained for a mobile role exploiting its motor transport, as it slowly got underway.°* A premium was placed on physical toughening, weapon training and practising cross-country movement with guidance taken from a directive promulgated to all units by Slim, summarising key tactical ideas that had impressed him in Burma. This emphasised that the62 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 individual soldier ~ combatant and non-combatant — must learn to live, move and fight in the jungle and fully realise that itis not an impenetrable barrier, Patrolling a key to jungle fighting was intensively practised during training with all units being familiarised with the idea of having the Japanese operate deep in their rear Instead of holding long defensive lines possible avenues of approach should be defended, Slim advocated, with immediate counterattacks launched to head off enemy penetrations. The importance of mobility and seizing the initiative was stressed throughout his training regiment with hooks employed instead of frontal attacks to bypass enemy points of resistance. Tanks could be employed anywhere, Slim also believed, moreover, and in greatest numbers possible even in dense jungle. As he later wrote: “These were the lessons I had learnt from defeat and Ido not think I changed them in any essential throughout the rest of the war." Training was delayed, however, by the monsoon and since 70th Division still had a mobile role, as Eastern Command reserve, in case a Japanese invasion force landed on the coast or advanced from Arakan. ‘The conduct of jungle warfare was not the sole subject being studied elsewhere in India Command during the late summer and autumn of 1942, with training depending on each formation’s operational role. ‘The newly formed divisions serving in what became 33rd Indian Corps on Ist November 1942 ~ 19th Indian Division and 25th Indian Division - concentrated their training efforts on preparing for a mobile role in southern india. No thought was given at all to jungle fighting. The 2nd Division in GHQ Reserve in southern India, for example, carried out training that dealt in turn with open warfare, combined operations and jungle warfare against a Japanese opponent. Training for the latter was based on notes compiled by its GSO1 after interviewing General Alexander, extracts from notes prepared by Lt.-Colonel Ian Stewart, visits to Eastern Army and lastly advice obtained from officers who had been attached to units recently returned from Burma.” No. 6 Training Team was also placed at its GOC’s disposal in mid-July, giving lectures and supervising cloth model discussions and demonstrations. Six lectures were delivered at the Poona Garrison Library for officers from divisional units, for example, covering the Malayan campaign, the general principles of jungle warfare, the attack, defence and protection and finally minor tactics.” As the flat, open terrain near Ahmednagar was devoid of trees improvisation was the order of the day. Jungle Exercises Without Trees quickly replaced the more traditional Tactical Exercises Without Troops to give officers at least a theoretical idea of jungle conditions.”! The greatest brake on improving standards of basic and specialised jungle training of all units in India Command and in particular those on the NE frontier were chronic shortages of equipment needed to allow units to adopt new war establishments developed for the war in the Far East, the monsoon, endemic tropical disease affecting man and beast and lastly the Quit India movement. ‘The conversion of divisions to the new establishments laid down in July 1942 to fit them to jungle fighting could not, however, take place overnight. Equipment still remained in acutely short supply during the autumn of 1942, especially the October 1942 63 Lessons of defeat, Februa four-wheel drive vehicles capable of operating in jungle-covered hills of Assam. It represented the main limiting factor on the readiness of formations in NE India without which hard and realistic training was impossible. An acute shortage of officers, NCOs and ORs trained in animal management, packing and unloading mules, and care of tack, further delayed the conversion of divisions to their new establishments. To meet demand a temporary new wing was set up by the Royal Indian Army Service Corps (RIASC) at the Animal Transport School at Jullundur to train infantry officers and NCOs with little or no experience in animal manage- ment, loading and unloading mules and equitation who could form a nucleus in each division.’? An exceptionally heavy monsoon that deluged the NE frontier with torrential rainfall during the autumn of 1942 made living conditions difficult and trans- formed the few roads and tracks into seas of thick cloying mud. Floodwater breached riverbanks, caused landslides and transformed tracks into seas of mud and thereby seriously complicated the basic tasks of moving and maintaining troops in NE India. Such dislocation also massively delayed reorganising and re-equipping units, bringing up reinforcements, and sending back personnel going on leave, as well as complicating administrative arrangements in NE India. ‘A massive increase in the incidence of virulent tropical diseases — malaria, dysentery, scrub typhus and assorted skin complaints ~ occurred during the monsoon amongst troops already debilitated by food shortages, poor living conditions and living almost permanently wet to the skin, In particular, India suffered the worst malaria epidemic it had known for years during the autumn of 1942. It cut a swathe through the ranks of fighting and administrative units occu- pying the forward areas, with the exception of those deployed on the Imphal Plain and surrounding country above 4,500 feet. Transport units working on the lines of communication in Assam suffered heavily with a concomitant drop in the flow of supplies, reinforcements and equipment. Malaria struck down between 75-100% of the personel of some units and meant few could perform their alloted tasks.” As the CO of 309th General Transport Company, working on the Dimapur-Imphal road throughout the autumn, later wrote: ‘We had now been up at the front for four weeks and, out of the four hundred and thirty men with whom we had started, four hundred and twenty-two had malaria.’ Throughout the summer and autumn a combination of malaria caught in the Kabaw Valley or en route to Imphal from India and the slow arrival of reinforce- ments meant 23rd Indian Division, for example, remained badly under strength and undermined fighting efficiency.”* Over 20,000 sick, in addition to 15,000 before the monsoon, were evacuated from Eastern Army area between October— December due to lack of local hospitals overburdening the entire already strained lines of communications. Losses on this high scale kept formations permanently below strength since reinforcements were slow in arriving and many had already Contracted the disease en route to Eastern Army. Only with the advent of drier and colder weather, with a consequent fall in tropical disease, could training begin afresh.”°64 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 Lastly the Quit India civil disturbances that rapidly spread across Bihar, Orissa and Bengal from August to September at the instigation of Congress paralysed the lines of communications in NE India, delayed all offensive preparations and had a seriously bad effect on the efficiency of troops that should otherwise have been training and equipping for the dry season. A total of 57 infantry battalions were eventually deployed to control attacks, including 24 drawn from the Field ‘Army and seven formed from manpower from Reinforcement Camps and Training Centres. The decision to use the latter delayed the flow of reinforcements to formations on the NE frontier already seriously below strength. A fortnight was required to maintain a semblance of law and order and a further four weeks to restore normality in Eastern Command, with the mechanised 70th Division being employed throughout to deal with incidents throughout Eastern Army’s area.” ‘The First Arakan Campaign The serious training deficit still existing in formations, widespread shortages of equipment and trained manpower did not stop the Indian high command planning offensive operations. During the summer and autumn of 1942 pressure on Wavell to go on the offensive, once the monsoon ended steadily increased, not least to restore the Indian Army’s shaken morale and the prestige of the British Raj. In September 1942 Wavell issued a first directive ordering the recapture of the airfields on Akyab Island and northern Arakan during the dry season of 1942-43. It involved an amphibious British 29th Independent Brigade and 6th Infantry Brigade, supported by an overland diversion mounted from eastern India intended to draw away its defenders.” In many respects it was based on wishful thinking, In a paper written the same month, Wavell optimistically declared: ‘I have a “hunch”, which may be unjustified, that Jap opposition in Burma may be a lot less than anticipated if we can act with boldness and determination... The Jap has never fought defensively and may not be much good at it.’ After stressing the need for greater determination and the need for unorthodox thinking, he concluded: I want proposals for locating, training and organizing forces in India, on the assumption that the recapture of Burma is to be the first consideration in our minds and defence of India second. So that in the event of opportunity offering wwe have available troops organised and trained as far as possible for fighting in Burma.” ‘The area chosen by the British high command for the forthcoming operations — ‘Arakan — contained some of the most difficult inhospitable, mountainous and ‘malaria-ridden country in all of Burma. In general it consisted of a mass of tangled, jungle-covered hills interspersed with paddy fields and mangrove swamps in the lower lying regions nearer the coast. The main focus for operations, however, was the 90-mile long Mayu Peninsula that steadily tapered in width Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 65 down to Foul Point at its southern end that faced Akyab Island. This narrow strip of land was divided into two by the rocky, precipitous, jungle-covered Mayu Mountains, whose 1,000-2,000 foot high razor-edged crest was initially judged impassable to Commonwealth troops. Its slopes and foothills were also thickly covered in bamboo and other tropical vegetation that seriously impeded movement and provided dense cover and concealment. A series of steep jungle-covered hills rising out of the paddy dominated low-lying areas. While easier going the coastal strip itself was split by large numbers of deeply incised streams (chaungs) and tidal inlets that in many respects made the area ideal for defence, made troop movements extremely difficult and severely curtailed deploying motor vehicles and heavy weapons. Except between Maungdaw and Buthidaung no roads existed and large amounts of engineer and bridging equipment was needed to build bridges, tracks and ferries. Further eastwards the Mayu River valley consisted mainly of flat paddy fields and swamps and was also intersected by tidal chaungs that restricted cross-country movement.*? ‘The 14th Indian Division, commanded by Major-General Wilfred Lloyd, was selected in September 1942 for Operation CANNIBAL, since it was judged the only fully operational formation in Eastern Command. While covering the Arakan front and defending the coast of Bengal during the summer and early autumn of 1942 its units had been widely dispersed occupying hastily constructed company and battalion-defensive localities mostly located in paddy fields near Chittagong, As already noted although necessary for safeguarding the frontier, this deployment over a wide area, however, had prevented it carrying out any collective training higher than battalion level, with a consequent drop in effectiveness. As Brigadier G. Creffield later noted: ‘There was very little opportunity for training and none of the areas included country really suitable for jungle training.’*! To overcome this problem a small jungle warfare school, under the command of Major Anthony Firth (who had served throughout the retreat from Burma with the 2nd Duke of Wellington Regiment) was it had opened at Sonamura Bridge, on the Comilla— Agartala road, in August, with a platoon of the 1/16th Punjab Regiment provid- ing demonstrations and the Tripura Rifles guidance on jungle craft. Instruction was based on the recent lessons of that fighting, covering the importance of fighting for the control of roads, the necessity of fighting on even if surrounded, mastery of tactics suited to the jungle, jungle that was not impenetrable, the importance of health discipline and lastly the importance of a high degree of physical fitness. It taught officers, NCOs and complete platoons about jungle fighting and Japanese methods with the aim of providing suitably qualified instructors.*? Seven courses were run for officers from its front line brigades before the school was taken over by the HQ of 88th Indian Infantry Brigade in December 1942." Like all other British formations in the area, L4th Indian Division’s operational efficiency had been badly undermined by the heavy monsoon and malaria, loosing large numbers of officers and men and placing an even greater strain on the replacement system Further disruption was caused by changes in its order of battle. In September 123rd and 47th Indian Infantry Brigades were placed under its command and it was later joined by 5Sth Indian Infantry Brigade deployed from the North-West66 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 frontier. Three previously unallotted battalions were formed into 88th Indian Infantry Brigade, moreover, protecting the division's line of communication. Originally organised, equipped and trained on a mechanised basis up to mid-1942 for the defence of Bengal, it converted into an A&MT division at the last moment causing further disorganisation. Unfortunately following the monsoon little time ‘was made available for the formation to carry out any higher collective training on this new divisional organisation. ‘The amount of air support allotted by the RAF for the Arakan offensive, moreover, was minimal. The 22 Air Support Control was allocated to 14th Indian Division in 3rd November 1943, with six Hurricane fighters, six Blenheim light bombers and later Vultee Vengeance dive-bombers on call, with 1-2 Dakota DC3s to provide air supply when required. A detachment of 28 Squadron was also on call for tactical and photographic reconnaissance. Little thought had been given to basic problems of operating in the jungle, however, such as locating and marking targets.*> The much-publicised Arakan offensive started on 21st September, with Lieutenant-General Noel Irwin (GOC Eastern Army) assuming direct overall command. Initially, the pace of 14th Indian Division's advance was dictated by administrative considerations, as its precarious line of communications from Dohazari and Cox’s Bazar needed major improvement. Unfortunately as this work proceeded the resources allocated to this ambitious combined operation originally envisaged as the central part of CANNIBAL were steadily whittled away, until all that remained was the overland diversion. Although Akyab Island remained the objective, a short-range seaborne assault launched from Foul Point, at the tip of the Mayu Peninsula, was substituted using a handful of available landing craft, assorted motor Iaunches and three paddle steamers. By the end of November four battalions could be maintained in the Zeganbyin—Taung Bazar area and Lloyd, accordingly, began preparations for driving in the Japanese outpost line covering Maungdaw and Buthidaung on 2nd December 1942, Clearly aware of the poor state of training of his men Lieutenant-General Noel Irwin, however, delayed this operation until two brigades were available, further work on the line of communications was completed and sufficient supplies amassed, to prevent it going off at ‘half cock’ and guarantee a desperately needed s A ‘The 14th Indian Division’s forward troops had by the end of 1942 occupied the small port of Maungdaw and the town of Buthidaung, linked by the only motorable road in the region. Little resistance was encountered from 33rd Division’s two seasoned battalions garrisoning the area that wisely withdrew to avoid useless losses.*” As a result of these initial successes morale soared amongst the hitherto unblooded Commonwealth troops. Serious problems, however, were already becoming apparent. A US Military Observer noted that British and Indian troops lacked aggressiveness, officers lacked experience and training and that: “The standard of training of the British and Indian troops could only be rated as fair.’®* A combination of malaria, dysentery and skin complaints, mostly contracted during the autumn in Bengal, had already made serious inroads into units’ fighting strength, especially amongst trained personnel. On 27th December Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 67 the forward elements of 47th Indian Infantry Brigade occupied the village of Indin and four days later a Bren gun carrier patrol reached Foul Point without encountering resistance. Unfortunately the advance briefly paused, however, due to growing administrative difficulties and until minor operations were completed against small parties of Japanese troops threatening 14th Indian Division’s eastern flank from Kondan. un-enterprising leisurely methodical advance and unfortunate brief pause gave the Japanese to consolidate their defensive positions in the Donbaik- Laungchaung area on the Mayu Peninsula and at Rathedaung on the eastern bank of the Mayu River. By the time 47th Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier E.H. Blaker, advanced on 7th January, with one column moving along the coastal strip and another along the eastern flank of the Mayu Range, the Japanese were ready. A carefully sited, exceedingly well-camouflaged and skilfully con- structed Japanese bunker complex was discovered on the coast, a mile north of the small village of Donbaik. This immensely strong defensive position, occupied by a mixed company of the Japanese III/213th battalion (ordered to hold its position at all costs until reinforcements arrived), stretched along the line of the so-called F.D.L. Chaung from the coast to the foothills of the Mayu Range. A single company from the Ist Iniskilling Fusiliers was unable to capture these positions with a hasty attack, Further assaults, carried out in increasing strength over the following two days failed to break through at the cost of 100 casualties. The stoutly built and mutually supporting bunkers occupied by the Japanese, with thick log and earth walls and ceilings up to five feet thick, proved formidable fortifications capable of withstanding sustained bombing and shelling from the limited available artillery. Due to the skill with which many were camouflaged and concealed, it was exceptionally difficult to locate them in the dense scrub. Many were built on reverse slopes where it was impossible to locate them until they opened fire with devastating effect. To the shock and horror of British officers the skill displayed by the IIA in constructing field defences was complemented by a ‘fanatical’ willingness to stand and fight quite literally to the last man and round, requiring each position to carefully cleared of all surviving Japanese infantrymen before an attack could progress.*? Elsewhere in Arakan the situation was equally discouraging. Initial efforts by the 10th Lancashire Fusiliers to occupy the village of Rathedaung on the eastern side of the Mayu River valley at the end of December encountered steadily increasing Japanese opposition. When 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier A.V. Hammond, attacked on 9th January little progress was made against now strong Japanese defences and despite early progress the troops were back in their start positions by nightfall. On both sides of the Mayu River, therefore, the two leading brigades of 14th Indian Division had by 10th January been brought to a standstill.” The bravery, skill and tenaciousness demonstrated by the ITA fighting on the defensive came as an unpleasant surprise to the British-Indian Army, although Australian and US experience at Buna, Gona and Sanananda in New Guinea had provided some advance warning. Other problems also compounded the difficulties68 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 being experienced in Arakan, Following a visit to 14th Indian Division Wavell noted on 15th January that: ‘Communications are complicated by lack of roads and insufficient river craft which make progress slow while jungle covered hills, present tactical difficulties. We are killing good number of Japanese and have had about 100-150 casualties ourselves mainly in two British battalions. We have still great deal to learn about jungle fighting.’? The Japanese defences at Donbaik were attacked repeatedly by 47th Indian Infantry Brigade, supported by a field and a mountain artillery regiment, on 18th and 19th January, but after heavy losses (especially amongst officers) it withdrew. Despite enjoying considerable numerical superiority failure occurred largely because this conventional set-piece frontal attack was restricted to the area between the coast and foothills, insufficient close air support and artillery was available and because considerable difficulties were experienced in locating or neutralising well-camouflaged enemy machine guns and mortars. Massed field and mortar fire was simply insufficient for the job. Further attacks on Rathedaung on 18th and 19th proved equally unsuccessful, largely due to the strength of the Japanese field defences. Despite these setbacks Inwin ordered Lloyd to resume his, offensive as soon as possible and 14th Indian Division regrouped in preparation for a further deliberate attack. The 5Sth Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier J.M. Hunt, began its preparations for attacking Donbaik on a narrow front. To give its attack ‘punch’ the remainder of the divisional artillery was brought forward along with eight Valentine tanks of C Squadron 146th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps (RAO), despite strong opposition from Slim and the commander of 50th Tank Brigade about using AFVs in ‘penny packets’.*? No attempt was made, moreover, to give its infantry units training in tank-infantry co-operation.” On Ist February 55th Indian Brigade, supported by Valentine tanks and the divisional artillery, attacked Donbaik, but failed to take the position, whose resolute defenders skilfully quickly knocked out the AFVs, many of which had bogged down crossing F.D.L. Chaung, and their counterattacks inflicted heavy losses on the accompanying infan- try. Despite employing superior numbers of artillery — 32 guns in all — in an attempt to swamp the position they fired insufficient weight of shell to damage the Japanese defences.” Another attack on 2nd February by 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade on the hills north of Rathedaung was also unsuccessful, eventually withdrawing after having made some initial progress to positions north of the town. These repeated setbacks caused widespread consternation and prompted searching questions about the military efficiency of 14th Indian Division, Writing on 6th February Irwin informed Wavell: “It seems quite clear that we are facing a form of “BUNA and GONA” and it is for consideration to what extent we would be advised to continue to incur casualties if you are prepared to accept the unpalatable conclusion... that “AKYAB” is too remote for this spring season.’°> During early February the fighting in Arakan bogged down following these alarming setbacks into stalemate, apart from active patrolling, as reserves of food, ammunition and equipment as well as fresh units were brought along the Lessons of defeat, February—October 1942 69 atrocious line of communication into Arakan. It was known that large numbers of Japanese reinforcements, however, were being redeployed from central Burma making it a race against time. The ist Indian Infantry Brigade (part of 26th Indian Division) and the British 6th Brigade joined Lloyd’s command, who was ordered to attack Donbaik again as soon as possible, The former was woefully deficient in jungle training and the latter had only received some rudimentary instruction at Thana, near Chittagong in jungle methods sandwiched in between instruction for combined operations.”° On 18th February 1943, 55th Indian Infantry Brigade attacked Donbaik once again, employing four infantry battalions supported by all the available artillery. A frontal assault using little tactical subtlety was carried out, although on this occasion the leading Punjabis penetrated the Japanese position. Heavy losses were suffered, however, from mortar and machine gun fire brought down by the Japanese on their own bunkers secure in the knowledge that their occupants were safe from harm. By evening the attackers were back in their former positions having suffered heavy casualties. Following this setback Lloyd regrouped his now badly shaken command, now swelled to nine attenuated brigades. The 7ist Indian Infantry Brigade occupied the forward positions at Donbaik, but as the threat of attack from east of the River Mayu steadily increased and with time little remaining for an assault on Akyab before the monsoon, Lloyd informed Irwin that he was assuming the defensive. At a conference at New Delhi on 26th February Wavell overruled them both, believing a success was essential to restore the shaken morale of Commonwealth troops and demonstrate that the Japanese could be defeated. The new plan devised to assault Donbaik involved 6th Brigade advancing along the coastal strip, 71st Indian Infantry Brigade along the foothills and 47th Indian Infantry Brigade moving along the summit of the Mayu Range outflanking the defences. This potentially promising conception, however, was overruled by Irwin, who had clearly lost faith in his subordinates’ ability. Instead, Irwin ordered a carefully planned concentrated, phased attack with very limited objectives. After visiting the HQ of 14th Indian Division he explained his reasons to Wavell: It is a monstrous thought that it should be necessary to undertake it in this way, the duties which should be properly carried out by the Divisional, Bde. and Bn Commanders, but not only in this instance but also as a result of the day I spent on the RATHEDAUNG front I am left in no doubt that we are most weakly served by our relatively senior commanders and by the lack of training and, unpleasant as it is to have to say so, the lack of determination of many of our troops.?7 As Rob Lyman has recently observed it was not greater determination, but new tactics, proper equipment and greater imagination that was required to defeat the Japanese.** The military effectiveness of 14th Indian Division's battle-weary British and Indian units, many of whom had been in the front line for five months, was dramatically declining. A combination of poor food, lack of shelter and most10 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 importantly no opportunity for rest and recuperation caused growing demoralisa- tion, Tropical disease primarily concerned medical officers, however, with the fighting strength of all battalions being rapidly whittled away by scrub typhus, dysentery and particularly malaria, Most of the troops had been infected by malaria before the fighting began and quickly succumbed to the disease when weakened by life under active service conditions in the jungle. Few men who had recovered, evacuated to base hospitals in India and then to Regimental Training Centres to recuperate, returned to their units while the campaign continued. This reason for failing combat effectiveness was compounded by the large numbers of ‘soft’ and inadequately trained British and Indian replacements, products of the overstrained reinforcement system, arriving to fill gaps in units. Many arrived straight fom Infantry Training Centres (ITC) in India where basic training had been patchy at best and none had received instruction in jungle fighting. Few units had either time or opportunity to assimilate these new arrivals and carefully train them up to the necessary high standard for jungle fighting, especially since officers and NCOs were in acute short supply.” By February 1943 the 1/14th Punjab Regiment, for example, was filled primarily by raw recruits, many of whom had not even fired or seen all the types of infantry weapons, fresh from training units. Many were physically unfit, moreover, and obviously bewildered by active service in the jungle.'° It appears the Indian high com- mand had little knowledge of the poor state of reinforcements, despite this being reported months before. Many reinforcements had already been infected by malaria while en route to 14th Indian Division and most also suffered another virulent psychological disorder generally affecting British-Indian troops. The myth of the Japanese superman, exacerbated by tales being spread by men returning to India, exerted a powerful psychological influence throughout India Command undermining morale before troops even reached Arakan. A suspected Japanese attack on the 1/15th Punjab at Temple Hill near Rathedaung, for example, revealed the full extent of this demoralisation and poor training, when the badly panicked defending Indian troops showered the illusionary Japanese attackers with hand grenades without even removing their safety pins.'°" As Major-General Cyril Lomax later observed: ‘The troops were badly trained. They certainly did not lack courage and there were many individual and collective acts of bravery... They lacked jungle craft and in many cases, particularly in reinforcements, their standard of ‘weapon training was lamentable. The Japanese ‘bogey’ was at its height Morale suffered inevitably and troops returning northwards did little to encourage those coming forward to take their places.'? ‘The abortive month long effort by 14th Indian Division to breakthrough the enemy bunker defences at Donbaik and Rathedaung allowed the Japanese sufficient breathing space for Major-General Koga’s well-trained 55th Division to assemble at Akyab. With the British still stalled on the Mayu Peninsula and deadlocked elsewhere the situation was ripe for a major counteroffensive against the widely Lessons of defeat, February—October 1942 71 dispersed and vulnerable British forces. Despite growing evidence of this threat it dismissed by the Indian high command with both Wavell and Inwin firmly con- vinced that an assault on Akyab Island could still succeed." On 7th March 1943 Wavell informed Irwin that: ‘I should like to finish this campaigning season with a real success which will show both our own troops and the Jap that we can and ‘mean to be top dog.’"™ Given the state of the British and Indian troops this was a highly optimistic assessment. When Slim visited 14th Indian Division on 10th March to report on the situation it was clear the HQ was badly overloaded with nine infantry brigades under command and that morale was in a bad way. As he later recalled: “There was every night a great deal of panicky firing which on one occasion developed into a full-scale battle at least in ammunition expenditure — between two adjacent parts of the force. Warren, Lloyd’s chief staff officer remarked dryly the next morning “At least we won that battle!” "!°° ‘The Japanese counteroffensive began on 7th March when the Miyawaki Column attacked the covering detachment deployed in the Kaladan Valley. Under heavy pressure it fell back the following day towards Buthidaung and Htizwe. The 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade was attacked by the Tanahashi Column the same day north of Rathedaung and despite the arrival of 55th Indian Infantry Brigade a withdrawal was ordered when it became clear the Htizwe bridgehead was untenable. A com- bination of deep and wide outflanking manoeuvres and infiltration tactics as used a year earlier, aimed at the British line of communications, were employed east of the Mayu River with effect by 55th Division against Commonwealth troops between 7—19th March that ruthlessly exploited its superior mobility and familiarity with the jungle. As one officer on attachment from 70th Division later observed: “The jungle on the EASTERN flank was mentally handed over to the enemy whereas it was any man's land and the key to manoeuvre. Neither leaders nor tps were jungle minded.’!° The Japanese, displaying characteristic drive, determination and speed, threw the British-Indian troops off balance and seized the initiative, which they held for the rest of the campaign. In a striking demon- stration of their continued ascendancy in jungle fighting, Japanese companies ran rings around Indian battalions, battalions outmanoeuvred brigades and regiments defeated several times their own number in strength using the jungle either to ‘outflank or to infiltrate British positions. As yet this was a tactic for which the British-Indian Army had no answer and as soon as their line of communication Was threatened British commanders withdrew. Writing in mid-March Wavell observed: The Japanese are setting us a rather a fresh problem in tactics by combining the fanaticism and mobility of the savage with modem weapons and training. He is refusing to surrender and fighting to the death with modern weapons very skilfully employed; and is showing an independence of lines of communication and an ability to live on the country which one does not expect from an organised modern army. We shall find the answer, but in the meantime our progress is slow, especially as both climate and topography are difficult."72 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 Although 71st Indian Infantry Brigade was committed a week later to extricate troops in the Htizwe bridgehead, the situation rapidly deteriorated. The Japanese, soon controlled most of the eastern side of the Mayu River valley after the British forces withdrew to Zedidaung exposing the flank of the forces operating in the Mayu Peninsula. ‘The Japanese offensive had not halted planning for a further offensive down the Mayu Peninsula. A final attempt to break through at Donbaik was made on 18/19th March when 6th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier R. Cavendish, launched a deliberate frontal attack on the Japanese positions. Six infantry battalions were employed on a narrow front, supported by two field regiments, despite advice from other commanders to outflank the position along the mountain crest.'* This set-piece attack, led by the Durham Light Infantry and the Royal Welch Fusiliers made little progress. The leading troops penetrated some distance into the Japanese defences, but once again many bunkers escaped destruction and heavy losses were inflicted by counterattacks and supporting Japanese artillery, mortars and machine gun fire brought down on the position.' Before the attack was finally called off the following morning 6th Brigade suffered 300 casualties. Writing soon after Wavell expressed his own acute disappointment, anxiety and surprise at the methods employed by his subordinates: It seemed to me to show a complete lack of imagination, and was neither one thing nor the other. An attack in real depth with determined soldiers like the 6th brigade would, I am sure, have accomplished something, though it have cost us casualties. But to use one battalion at a time, and that usually only deploying one company, seems to me to be poor tactics. With the Japanese in a pocket like that, I cannot believe that a plan could not have been made to eat them up; it looked to me like practically ideal for covering machine gun and mortar fire from a flank. I should now like to see what can be done in the way of a very gradual point by point advance, using a little imagination and originality.'"° It was now too late to prosecute another attack on Donbaik as the Japanese counter- offensive continued to gain ground. ‘The Japanese had not been idle while the 6th British Brigade battered away at the Donbaik. While the Miyawaki Column contained the British forces at Zedidaung, the Tanahashi Column began preparations to cross the Mayu River. By 18th March the Japanese had secured the eastern side of the Mayu River valley after a single battalion forced 55th Indian Infantry Brigade to withdraw in disorder. Static linear British defensive measures proved unable to stop small columns of Japanese troops, who infiltrated between defensive localities that blocked their line of advance and attacked them from unexpected directions. Surprise proved particularly effective weapon against increasingly demoralised and exhausted Commonwealth troops that recoiled at the slightest threat of encirclement. On the night of 24/25th March 1943 Tanahashi Column crossed the Mayu River and using narrow paths through the jungle advanced over the crest of the supposedly ‘impassable’ Mayu Range. a Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 73 The following day it cut the line of communication of 47th Indian Infantry Brigade to Kyaukpandu. With their line of communications threatened, the position of the two forward British brigades was clearly untenable. Following the capture of the mountain crest near Atet Nanra on 29th March, Lloyd, acting contrary to his instructions to hold his position until the monsoon broke, ordered the 47th Indian Infantry Brigade to retreat west of the mountains to avoid entrapment. That evening his order was quickly countermanded by Irwin, however, who replaced luckless divisional commander and assumed control of operations in Arakan, as well as sending forward part of 26th Indian Division to bolster the position in the peninsula, This was not, however, a major addition to the fighting power of the troops in the Arakan since it was even less well-trained than 14th Indian Division had been and completely lacked experience. ‘The new divisional commander — Major-General Cyril Lomax (formerly GOC ion) ~ in Arakan was unable to immediately influence the rapidly developing situation. On 3rd April disaster struck when the Tanahashi Column built a roadblock north of Indin village cutting the line of communication of 6th and 47th Indian Infantry Brigades running along the coastal strip. An attempt by the 6th Brigade to clear it failed, but worse was to come. When elements of 112th Infantry Regiment infiltrated past the British positions into the village on the night of 5/6th April, it overran 6th Brigade’s HQ and captured Brigadier Cavendish, his adjutant and six staff officers. Lomax immediately realised the seriousness of the situation and ordered a retreat from Indin, During the ensuing confused fighting 6th Brigade only escaped destruction by retreating along the beach road. Similarly the now isolated 47th Indian Infantry Brigade only narrowly escaped capture by destroying its heavy equipment and then escaping in small parties cross-country to the beach and then along it to reach British lines from Where it was withdrawn to India to reorganise. The disastrous events at Donbaik and Rathedaung, ending with the attack on 18-19th February and the withdrawal of Commonwealth troops east of the Mayu River, had seriously undermined morale. Following the catastrophe at India, Lomax skilfully regrouped his rear brigades to defend the Maungdaw—Buthidaung road and reorganised his shattered forward troops as they escaped northwards.'"" By early April the alarm bells were finally ringing in New Delhi where Wavell at last comprehended the deficiencies of his troops in the Arakan, their worryingly low morale and their inability to counter Japanese infiltration tactics.!!? Most of the shaken disease-ridden battalions in Arakan were by now nearing exhaustion, with losses amongst vitally needed junior leaders being particulatly heavy, and most now contained a large proportion of recently arrived physically weak, inad- equately trained and mostly sick recruits psychologically unprepared for the claustrophobia, sights and sounds and humidity of the jungle. As no trained formations were available in India to replace them, however, there was little option but to retain them in combat. By early April morale in most Commonwealth units had plummeted to an alarming new low as a result of a long series of defeats, heayy battle casualties and growing losses from malaria.'!* Desertions from several units caused considerable fears about the loyalty of the remaining men.!!*‘The 6th Brigade, for example, was evacuating 50 men from malaria a day and ‘most units could only field around S00 men. Despite employing mepacrine as a suppressive treatment and use of anti-mosquito nets, cream and the wearing of long trousers at night in eight weeks it lost half of its total strength from the dis- ease largely because it was difficult to carry out these measures under combat conditions. A report prepared by its Medical Officer concluded: “The psycho- logical effect of the jungle, an unseen enemy and our own casualties on the mind of the British sojdier also cannot be ignored.’!'> The ‘poisoned chalice’ of Arakan became the responsibility of 15 Corps’s HQ, commanded by Lieutenant-General William Slim, on 14th April. The 14th Indian Division was far from battleworthy, with Lomax still struggling to create order from the chaos, According to one staff officer: ‘The whole division was clearly in a bad way, frightened and trigger happy.”!'® Four days after he took command, Slim warned Irwin: All Brigadiers...are worried about the state of their troops. This is the most serious aspect of the entire show. If our troops were in first-class fighting form and health we should have little to worry about. The British troops are tired and they are ‘browned off’ with the operations in the Arakan as a whole: Their health is deteriorating... The Indian troops, except 4 Brigade, are tired too, but with them the fault is the inferior quality in physique, training and spirit of the men, especially of the drafts that have joined in Arakan Whatever happens in ARAKAN it is imperative that the highest authorities get down to improving the quality of men in our infantry, and raising their powers of endurance." This feeling of demoralisation also affected many senior officers in Arakan who displayed an attitude of almost complete subordination to the Japanese.!'® The Japanese attacked the British defences covering Buthidaung and Maungdaw on 24th April, with the aim of securing better defensive positions when fighting resumed after the monsoon. The 55th Indian Infantry Brigade held the first attack at Kanthe, A carefully prepared plan to entrap and destroy the leading Japanese elements advancing alone the spine of the Mayu Mountains in early May quickly fell apart after two exhausted and demoralised battalions gave way and the sides of the box crumbled.!!? On 9th May Buthidaung was captured by the Japanese and the 55th Indian Infantry Brigade and attached troops only escaped destrtiction by abandoning its vehicles and heavy equipment and trudging by foot over the jungle-covered hills to safety. Five days later the port of Maungdaw was evacuated as realisation spread that the now exhausted British-Indian forces were incapable of halting the Japanese advance except in more open country near Cox’s Bazar. As Slim later wrote: Our only hope of stabilizing the front, if the Japanese really pushed us, was to hold the rice-field country. Our men were still untrained for the jungle they feared jt more than they did the enemy. We had to select areas where we could give our troops reasonable fields of fire and open manoeuyre.'*” A report prepared by a liaison officer irom 145t1 indian Worps, Who had’ visited 4th, 6th and 71st Brigades, while the withdrawal was in progress from Buthidaung, revealed that the fighting efficiency and will to resist of many units had now reached a shockingly low level. During a suspected attack on Hill 551 on 28th ‘April the men of a clearly shaken 8/13th Frontier Force Regiment fired off nearly all their ammunition at an imaginary opponent and when attacked the following day had no option other than retreat. A staff officer at the HQ of 4th Indian Infantry Brigade reported that British officers were liable to find themselves suddenly alone whilst on patrol if contact with the Japanese was likely. Particular battalions were singled out for criticism. Both the 10th Lancashire Fusiliers and 2/8th Punjabis, for example, were regarded as ‘useless’ by the GSO2 of 26th Indian Division and incapable of further operations. This shocking report concluded: I came away unfortunately with the definite impression, gained from personal observation and conversations with senior and junior officers, NCOs, men and escaped POW that on this front the Japanese soldier, with the notable exception of the gunners, was definitely superior to the troops forming the bulk of our forces in the area, Outstanding was the fact that our troops were either exhausted, browned off, or both, and that both Indian and British troops did not have their hearts in the campaign. The former were obviously scared of the Jap and generally demoralised by the nature of the campaign, ie. the thick jungle and the subsequent blindness of movement, the multiple noises of the jungle at night, the terror stories of Jap brutality, the subsequent blindness of movement, the undermining influence of fever, and the mounting list of failures; the latter also fear the jungle, hate the country, and see no object in fighting for it, and also have the strong feeling that they are taking part in a forgotten campaign in which no one in authority is taking any real interest Reinforcements that have arrived have consisted mostly of untrained men, many of whom according to the CO of the L.F. had never even seen a Bren Gun, All complained of the lack of pre-campaign training, and units stated that the long spell in CALCUTTA Area was of no value to them when faced with the precipitous jungle of the MAYU range. ‘To sum up the man to man situation the seasoned and highly trained Jap troops are confronted by a force which, although impressive on paper, is little better, in a large number of cases, than a rather unwilling band of raw levies. This shocking indictment of Commonwealth units in Arakan ended with the observation that the majority of COs and staff officers of 26th Indian Division no longer had confidence in the men under their command.'?! Conclusion The Japanese SSth Division had, fortunately for the British-Indian Army, halted its counteroffensive after recapturing the Maungdaw—Buthidaung line, leaving76 Lessons of defeat, February-October 1942 their shattered, demoralised and broken opponents in approximately the same positions from which the attack had begun five months earlier. It was badly beaten army that settled down to sit out the monsoon and reflect upon yet another Japanese victory. The Indian high command had been taught yet another salutary lesson, with the attempt to capture Akyab ending in complete failure. Although the cost in dead and wounded for the Army in India had not been particularly high, with 916 killed, 2,889 wounded and some 1,252 ‘missing’ during the course of the campaign, morale of British and Indian troops had suffered a body blow. Perhaps the most worrying aspect for British officers was that the myth of Japanese superiority and skill as a jungle fighter par excellence had been strongly reinforced in the minds of Commonwealth troops throughout India Command. Exaggerated tales of Japanese military prowess were rife with the tale growing all too much in the telling as it spread. The Japanese had displayed their skill in conducting operations in such a difficult environment yet again. Not only were the Japanese demonstrably better skilled at living and moving in the jungle, they were now shown to be formidable opponents on the defensive whose skill at con- structing elaborate and strong field fortifications was unparalleled. Indeed the Japanese had set the British a thorny new tactical problem. 3 Forging the Weapon, May 1943-September 1944 ‘The Arakan debacle added to the already long catalogue of disasters British arms had suffered since the outbreak of war with Japan.' It is difficult to disagree with Raymond Callahan that it was perhaps the ‘worst managed British military effort of the war’ and ‘as bad as anything that had happened in Malaya and Burma’? Despite enjoying overwhelming numerical superiority at the beginning of the campaign, superior artillery and a monopoly in tanks, the first British offensive to free Burma had ended in dismal failure.’ While losses had been relatively light morale plummeted in India Command, as stories grew in the telling about the invincibility of the IJA and the terrors of the jungle. Many serious weaknesses. clearly still existed in the organisation, equipment and above all tactical training of British and Indian units. British tactical methods had also been inappropriate, combined arms tactics non-existent and inter-service co-operation negligible. Too often attacks had been on ‘strict Staff College lines’ and mounted on narrow fronts rather than exploiting the jungle that to most troops remained a forbidding environment.’ An attempt was quickly made to see some redeeming features, from this debacle, however, upon which further changes in the Army in India could be based. As Field Marshal Wavell later observed in his despatch: ‘The greatest gain from the campaign was experience, of the enemy’s methods and of our own defects in training and organisation. The serious loss was in prestige and morale.’ The overall military position in the Far East was not all dark. Indeed, the British- Indian Army in SE Asia had perhaps some grounds for optimism that partially dispersed the pall of gloom now shrouding India Command. Perhaps of greater significance for the regular army was the victory achieved in New Guinea by other Commonwealth troops that marked Japan’s first real defeat on land. In New Guinea regular Australian troops had put the IJA to flight at Milne Bay, on the Kokoda Trail and later at Buna~Gona-Sanananda on the north coast of Papua, As Slim later observed in his memoirs; ‘Of all the Allies it was Australian soldiers who broke the spell of Japanese invin of the Japanese Army.”® Nearer to home the subsequently well-publicised operation carried out by Brigadier Orde Wingate’s 7th Indian Infantry Brigade — the Chindits — in northern Burma attracted widespread attention. Although achieving nothing of strategic value, suffering heavy casualties (one third of the force deployed) and teaching nothing of specific tactical value to the regular army, it lifted morale and further helped dispel the myth of Japanese78 Forging the weapon, May 1943—September 1944 invincibility.’ In the longer term, moreover, the Chindits also taught the Army in India further important general lessons about the strengths and limitations of air supply in maintaining formations in the field, the conduct of jungle warfare and also Japanese fighting methods.* Learning from Defeat: The Post-mortem The post-mortem begun at GHQ India and in Eastern Command into the lacklustre Arakan campaign, however, was the main focus of official attention and growing recriminations. Indeed, it raised serious doubts about the long-term planning and conduct of the war in the Far East, A fortnight after being appointed DMT Major- General Temple Gurdon observed: ‘We are miles behind planning operations with our training and time is all too short.”? For officers who had served at the ‘sharp end’ the low fighting effectiveness and morale of British and Indian troops was scandalous. A report on morale between February-April prepared by GHQ India added weight to these fears, warning that troops in Eastern Army were engaging in ‘gloomy, alarmist, and defeatist talk’ and that Japanese propaganda had induced desertions from some Indian units." Both the problem and indeed its solution were clear. In a note written for GHQ in April 1943 Lieutenant-General Noel Irwin warned: “The period remaining between now and the next cold weather is not long enough, having regard to the limited form of training which can be carried out during the monsoons, to bring formations up to the standard adequate to fight the Jap with success.’!' A search for scapegoats gained momentum once the monsoon ended active operations in Arakan. Ina letter dated 8th May to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief Inwin observed: ‘Although the Commanders are far from being much good; the cause unquestionably lies in the inability of troops to fight.”!? In a letter dated 15th May 1943 addressed to all officers in Eastern ‘Army down to company and equivalent level command, Irwin tried to explain why Eastern Army had been beaten, in which the inferiority of British and Indian infantry compared to the Japanese (due to poor training and ‘absence of fanatical quality’) and poor planning by junior and senior officers were explicitly identified as the main reasons for defeat. After outlining what had been achieved by specially trained troops in 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, Irwin stressed what could be learnt from defeat: We must learn individually to be better soldiers than the Japs. We must know our weapons and guard them with our lives. We must learn the jungle and the hill. We must learn not to fear loneliness, danger of capture or shortage of food. Training therefore must be intense and time, I hope, will be available for this.' The urgent need for intensive basic and specialised training was widely acknowledged by senior British officers, especially for the predominant arm in jungle warfare. As the GOC of 1Sth Indian Corps had already noted on 18th April: ‘We are fighting an army in which the best men go into the Infantry, and Forging the weapon, May 1943-September 1944 79 we shan’t make much progress until we follow suit.’ Work had already begun to do so. At GHQ India the training system had undergone careful examination during the spring, during which proposals for forming training divisions was first mooted, Perhaps the most worrying part of the entire operation was the poor quality of the British and infantry battalions. As Major-General Gurdon wryly observed ‘on 25th May 1943: ‘The standard of training of recruits and reinforcements has been disgracefully low ...I keep on insisting that unless we take our chance in putting our house in order now, we shall never get another chance... What we want is quality and not quantity and in order to achieve the former we must be ruthless about cutting down the latter.’ First and foremost basic military skills and standards of training needed improvement. As one ser Tth Indian Div- ision who had visited Arakan later wrote: ‘We must not again be outnumbered in individually trained tps. The minor trg of tps going into action against the Japs must be of the highest order. Skill with all weapons, incl grenades, camouflage, digging, bayonet fighting etc etc Also minor leading ~ patrols, ambushes, siting trenches, fire control and so on.’'® Several problems encountered in Arakan were directly related to an almost instinctive fear of the jungle displayed by many troops. As Brigadier Geoffrey Bull, commanding 71st Indian Infantry Brigade, noted at the end of May: “Tps must be taught, and with all sincerity, that the Jungle is their best friend. It provides the best cover from ground and air. It offers the best concealed approaches. Tps must be taught that the labour of getting through jungle is more than compensated for by the advantages of its protection.’!7 Much still needed to be learnt by Commonwealth troops about minor tactics, jungle craft and Japanese tactical methods that called into question the relevance of training and experience gained in other theatres of war, An observer from 70th Division noted after visiting Arakan It is not enough for us to rest on our Middle East laurels however well deserved they may be ~ those days should only be regarded as a starting point in effi- ciency for only 100% trained tps and I mean 100% will defeat the JAPANESE in ARAKAN or in any other theatre of operations." ‘The fallout from Arakan spread further, with news of the final defeats reaching Field Marshal Wavell while attending the Anglo-American TRIDENT conference at Washington. As the full extent of the debacle became known it exposed him to ing rebukes from Winston Churchill who described it as ‘one of the most disappointing and indeed discreditable which had occurred during the course of the war’! Despite his dogged defence of the Indian Army and his plans, the Commander-in-Chief was well aware that things were not well in Indi Command. In a letter to the CIGS dated 22nd May he candidly admitted: ‘I knew the difficulties and dangers, since I was employing troops not fully trained or of best quality, These troops had been intended and trained for the defence of Bengal up to the autumn, We have found weakness in the present Indian Army which we knew to exist owing to the great expansion, but which are more pronounced than We realised. We shall do our best to remedy them.’*° Action had already been80 Forging the weapon, May 1943-September 1944 taken. Six days earlier Wavell had instructed General Sir Alan Hartley, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief at New Delhi, that immediate ‘steps should be taken to profit by the lessons learnt from the Arakan and Chindit operations, so that the Indian Army could meet the Japanese on equal terms when operations resumed in the dry weather of 1943-44’ 7! “The Commander-in-Chief made known his own views on the recent fighting on 22nd May 1943 in a confidential letter addressed to all officers serving in India Command. Wavell carefully took stock of the British position and suggested ways of preparing imperial troops for operations following the monsoon. To galvanise enthusiasm about prosecuting the war against Japan he directed offi- cers to explain to their British and Indian troops the importance of the war in the Far East, the ‘treacherous’ character of Japanese troops and the vital role India would take in their eventual defeat. After stressing the importance of training specifically to counter Japanese fighting methods and the characteristics of the theatre in which they would have to fight, Wavell went on: We have fought — on a very limited scale — the first round of our counter~ offensive against the Japanese. We have had the advantage of numbers, of equipment, and of air superiority, yet our achievement has on the whole been isappointing. The troops engaged have done the enemy much damage and have fought with considerable dash and courage; but the enemy in defence and in attack has shown himself to on the whole more skilful, more enterprising and more determined. We have failed on a number of occasions to turn him. out of his prepared positions, yet he has several times manoeuvred us, or fought us, out of positions, of which we have had possession for quite long enough to plan and prepare an adequate defence. It is not our way to sit down under this sort of thing, it is most certainly not our way to lose heart when we have been worsted. We have never yet failed to avenge a defeat or to regain what we have lost. We must examine calmly and with confidence the reasons for our failure and work to remedy them before we fight the next round. Japanese tactical skill and fighting spirit were identified by Wavell as instrumental reasons for their victory in Arakan, which he believed could be instilled in Commonwealth troops by hard training and proper recognition of the importance of the war in the Far East. While acknowledging that finding suitable jungle country for training was difficult and that time was required to ‘adapt the mentality of a plains-bred man to fighting in jungle and hills’, Wavell clearly believed it was possible, In conclusion this letter stressed the importance of making full use of the next six months to improve physical fitness, train junior officers, adapt to jungle fighting and mentally prepare troops for the intense fighting to come.* The Infantry Committee ‘The Infantry Committee, chaired by Major-General Roland Richardson (the DCGS) and with Major-General Cecil Toovey, Major-General Roland Inskip, Forging the weapon, May 1943—September 1944 81 Major-General John Grover, Major-General Henry Davies, Brigadier Arthur Hammond and Brigadier W.B Thomas serving as its members, assembled at New Delhi at the end of May 1943. Its terms of reference specifically directed it: “To examine and report on the present standard of readiness for war of British and Indian Infantry bns in India, and to make recommendations for their improve- ment.’ For a fortnight it carefully investigated the conduct of the campaign and interviewed a series of witnesses. Unsurprisingly the First Arakan campaign formed a major topic of study for the committee, especially the reasons that had adversely affected the fighting efficiency of Commonwealth units. ‘The Infantry Committee began by acknowledging that the fighting spirit of the infantry was fundamentally sound and the basic causes of defeat in Arakan had not been the fault of the British and Indian soldier. It considered that the over- expansion of the Army in India still lay at the heart of the problem, gravely affecting combat performance and leading to a series of grave problems with the troops deployed against the Japanese between 1941-43. ‘The Committee considered that the failure to recognise the predominant part played by infantry in the war against Japan and its development as an increasingly technical arm requiring specialist skills had undermined fighting performance. ‘The low status and inferior pay of the infantry vis-a-vis the other arms and services meant it had been starved of intelligent, well-educated recruits and good junior leaders capable of mastering complex infantry tactics, skill-at-arms and other specialised skills required to handle heavy weapons, signals equipment and main- tain vehicles, in addition to mastering knowledge of jungle craft and jungle lore. Similarly the best-qualified potential officer were creamed off by the technical arms and services with the result that the infantry had seldom received officers of a sufficiently high calibre. The overall effect had been to considerably undermine combat performance. To redress this situation the Infantry Committee urged that high command give greater recognition to the paramount role of the infantry to help improve its status, improve pay and incentives in recognition of its services and finally that it should receive the best men from OTS as officers. The rushed, inadequate and often irrelevant basic training given to British and Indian soldiers in India had compounded difficulties. Drafts of British personnel direct from the UK or ‘milked’ from units on IS duties in India had alarmingly low standards of basic military skills, discipline and physical fitness. Most of British troops from the UK were not acclimatised and had spent a considerable period aboard ship or in reinforcement camps en route to India, while the latter came from units critically short of modern equipment and had been trained primarily for duties in aid of the civil power. None had had the slightest familiarity with jungle conditions before being committed to battle. ‘The quality of Indian recruits was if anything even worse, with most completely Jacking even basic military skills — skill-at-arms, fieldcraft and musketry training. ‘Those that had reached Arakan were little more than an indisciplined ‘mob of Partially trained village youth’. The reasons were clear-cut. Some ITCs supported between 12-15 active service battalions many of which were organised, equipped and trained on very different lines which greatly complicated basic and specialist82 Forging the weapon, May 1943—September 1944 training that had to cover a very broad syllabus. The Regimental Centre of the 13th Frontier Force Rifles, at Abbottabad, for example, provided recruits for 14 battalions, including six differently armed and equipped types. “The diametrically opposed requirements in desert and Jungle Warfare’, the Committee noted, ‘have produced fundamental differences in outlook, policy and tactics’. It went on: ‘The major training implication is that all troops have been trained for Western theatres are generally mechanised whereas what is required for jungle is the specialist foot soldier with a knowledge of jungle craft and jungle lore. In these units which have hitherto trained on an M.T. basis all ranks are road ded and unable to adapt themselves readily to the changes and improv- isations necessary on the tracks and elephant paths of the jungle. Other serious difficulties existed. Too much was being attempted in too short atime with the result that overall standards fell. The sheer number of recruits they had to supply, moreover, had overwhelmed many ITCs with the end result that the quality of training plummeted. A chronic shortage of modern arms and equipment compounded the problem by limiting realistic instruction, especially for the growing numbers of specialists (signallers, Vickers MMG and mortar crews and drivers) now required by infantry battalions, This had resulted in ‘a rushed programme and has produced a recruit who is “jack of all trades and master of none’. A chronic shortage of good COs, 2i/es and good VCO and NCO instructors ‘was the last major problem. Despite repeated pleas for good officers to fill such appointments, many front line units displayed a pethaps understandable reluc- tance to part with them, with the result that standards of instruction of the recruits they later received was low. A radical improvement of basic training at ITCs, the Infantry Committee concluded, carried out over a longer period of time, was urgently needed, as well as a period of post-basic training in jungle warfare based upon a cut and dried jungle warfare doctrine to simplify training and to cut down complications caused by preparing men for different theatres of war. Lastly, a short supply of experienced leadership in Indian infantry battalions ~ officers, VCOs and NCOs — and to a lesser extent British units had had a major effect on combat efficiency in Arakan, The absence of middle piece pre-war regular, with 5-8 years service, in particular was identified as a major problem resulting in low overall standards of leadership, poor minor tactics, fragile morale and inability to maintain discipline. A minimum of three such men were required for each battalion to provide a hard core who could teach ECOs about basic soldiering, man management and the language of their men, The supply of good quality ECOs, moreover, was identified as a growing problem as the pool of potential officers already in India neared exhaustion. The fact that none of the formations committed to the Arakan had completed collective training at higher than battalion level before the campaign had begun was singled out for major criticism. A combination of operational commitments and frequent changeovers in constituent units and brigades meant few units, staff Forging the weapon, May 1943-September 1944 83 officers and commanders knew each other; had practised combined arms tactics; co-operation with the RAF or had had an opportunity to train together and shake down as a division and in turn develop esprit de corps. The 14th Indian Div- ision’s conversion from a MT to an A&MT division just before it was committed to battle, moreover, had made it impossible for it to carry out realistic collective training on this new organisation under jungle conditions, and had had severely limited combat effectiveness. Accordingly the Infantry Committee recommended that: ‘To achieve the smooth working of staffs of H.Q.rs, proper team work, and a good formation esprit-de-corps, a petiod of collective training is absolutely essential before any formation is deployed in a major offensive operation.’ The inability of the Indian high command to relieve front line units with fresh, highly trained reserves was identified as another major cause of the Arakan debacle. Few units had been withdrawn for rest in the rear as a result, despite having been engaged in long periods of intensive combat and having lived for a lengthy time on short rations and under very difficult climatic conditions. Indeed, some battal- ions had served in the front line for 5-6 months continuously without relief. A resulting combination of growing sickness and battle casualties had badly undermined fighting efficiency and morale plummeted as units had been reduced to 50 per cent of establishment. Malaria had made major inroads into the strength and fighting efficiency of Commonwealth units, despite instructions about strict malaria drill and the employment of suppressive medical treatments. Indeed, it accounted for a staggering 90 per cent of the casualties suffered in Arakan and in turn had badly undermined units’ fighting efficiency. Few officers and men who had contracted the disease had been returned to units once cured, moreover, due to the absence of hospitals to treat malaria near the front line, On average it took between 3-8 months before such men returned to units depriving them of their trained soldiers and complicating the reinforcement problem. To prevent a repetition the Infantry Committee recommended the creation of special medical organ- isation immediately behind the front line geared to treating such casualties and a careful examination of the problem administratively as well as operationally to cut down the lengthy period of time needed to treat and return casualties from malaria. The complete breakdown of the machinery for providing trained British and Indian reinforcements was regarded as by far the most serious problem facing the Indian high command. As the Infantry Committee observed: “This is the most urgent problem facing us, and one which requires prompt and energetic action if results are to be produced in time for the winter campaigning season.’ It had mas- sively undermined fighting efficiency and ultimately resulted in the breakdown of infantry battalions in Arakan, Manpower for British units had been drawn hap- hazardly from the GHQ Reinforcement Camp at Deolali or from IS units with the result that few units received men from their own regiments undermining esprit de corps. Few were well trained, some were completely unfamiliar with company or platoon weapons, most were physically unfit and none know anything about jungle warfare. Junior leaders and NCOS particularly had been in short supply.