Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EDLD 8431
Facts: The plaintiffs in this case were John F. Tinker (15 years old), Christopher Eckhardt
(16 years old), and Mary Beth Tinker (13 years old). All were in attendance in a high school and
junior high in Des Moines Iowa. The students met at the Eckhardt farm with adults in 1965 to
discuss how to publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam. They planned to wear
black armbands to their schools. Aware of the plan, the principals of the schools met to adopt a
policy indicating that any student participating in wearing the armband would be asked to
remove it and if he or she refused, they would be suspended. Students Mary Beth and
Christopher wore their armbands to school on December 16, 1965 and John Tinker on the 17th.
They were all suspended from school and did not return until after New Years day. The case was
deemed en banc by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and was equally divided. The
Issue: Whether or not the school violated constitutional freedom of speech or expression
by suspending the students for wearing armbands in expression towards their view on the
Vietnam War and whether or not the Des Moines Independent School Districts decision to
implement such suspension was constitutional due to reasonably forecasting material and
Answer: Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. The District Court found
that the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence that it is
necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not
constitutionally permissible. The record did not demonstrate any facts, which might reasonably
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred. In the
given circumstances, the Constitution does not permit officials of the State to deny student's form
of expression. The District Court expressed no opinion as to the form of relief, which should be
granted, this being a matter for the lower courts to determine. The Court reversed and remanded
Reasoning of the Court: The wearing of the armbands for the purpose of expressing
certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. As the Court mentioned, it can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. The
school indicated that their actions were due to reasonable fear of a disturbance from wearing of
the armbands. However, undifferentiated fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands
and fear of a disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. In fact,
the Courts reminded us that our Constitution says that we must take this risk and our history
says that this is sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national
strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively
Further reasoning indicated that in order for a State in the person of school officials to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action
was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid opinion, it must be able to show that
its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. The paperwork of the school
officials in this situation did not even mention the fear or anticipation of disruption. The case
review stated that the students were not vocal or disruptive and did not cause interference to the
schools work or impinge upon the rights of other students. It is also significant to mention that
the school officials did not prohibit the wearing of all political or controversial symbols and that
many students wore political campaign buttons and some students even wore the Iron Cross, a
symbol of Nazism. This indicated further singling out of only the black armbands. The Court
reminded us that the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not
constitutionally permissible. School officials also do not possess absolute authority over their
students.
In the same sense that this case is in regards to the P-12 sector, state public institutions of
higher education and private institutions receiving substantial federal or state monies cannot
disallow students freedom of expression and of speech. The Court made it clear that a public
school or university can limit speech if and only if the school officials are able to reasonably
forecast material and substantial disruption to the institution. The Court of Appeals later on
would indicate that regulations, which are essential in maintain order and discipline on school
property are reasonable. The right of free speech does not give a student the right to prevent
lawful access to campus facilities (such as a sit in that prevents access to essential campus
facilities). Freedom of speech is not absolute and still subject to reasonable regulation.
Considerations such as time, place, and manner, will be a consideration is cases against
universities. If a peaceful protest becomes violent, freedom of speech and expression is no longer
valid and the state officials must act accordingly. Students and organizations must never interfere
with the normal activities of the university or infringe upon the rights of others. Student
organizations may also be denied recognition by universities if federal civil rights statutes apply
due to discrimination against certain groups based on race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, etc.