The Indian Army 1914-1947 Mf & LgManchester. He oily baron | 1044-48; he asa wertan several books on the sory ft the Eat cng ot ce CHAPPELL spent 22 ‘at By The Wessex Regiment ite Volunteers. ince begining opin malay ‘tact n 1968 Mike hae CONTENTS ‘THE INDIAN ARMY IN 1914 ~ KITCHENER'S REFORMS: 3 ‘THE FIRST WORLD WAR 4 + Expeditionary Force A on the Western Front reditionary Force D in Mesopotamia + Representative action: the battle of Megiddo, September 1918 BETWEEN THE WARS 13 * Recruitment + Regimental reorganisation British officers indian officers - VGOs, KOIOs, ICOs indian Tervitorial Foree ‘The frontier column ‘THE SECOND WORLD WAR 23 #The Middle East The Far East * Political opposition + Representative action: the capture of Meiktila, 1945, PARTITION 30 THE REGIMENTS 32 Cavalry + Anillery + Sappers and Miners + Pioneers Infantry * Supporting Services + Followers ‘The Armies of the Princes ‘The Auailiary Foree (India) «Frontier Corps SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 58 ) THE PLATES 59 * Commentaries by Mike Chappell INDEX 64SPREY, cece 75 iiiifigg The Indian Army 1914-1947 [ | Cy s&s ae =< lan Sumner - Illustrated by Mike Chappell Series editor Martin Window‘tna sa inn 0 apy i, ‘Cou ap ny Bey Od 2 Oe on, vutntdonwanenng.om 20 oy Png ges mse. on anya gn pt a say, etn nny prin ta ‘eta hmm al prota targa gr an ei Di, Conn ety rte Eccerescenesrertactiy ‘he Manag rae: Oey Patong Li PB 8, ‘Motte erent Wk, Ute Kon rat neccsarecienat ‘The Maat Mn Op Dre UA, rat canoer Acknowledgements | wou het hank everyone who as haber inte wing a ‘ook parry my wile Maret te sae Asa. omantos Ly ar Pater Gn os se Gotan, {ess Unity sey am gato th Mores ha pl Vir sour and bran pena otectare ate Umorty Lae pers pedi harap om ‘ae eceete caletone Artist's Note ‘erste inthe book wee prevered ae aval fr rat narmearoae Mk Coppa, 2 Neen Seat, Bo Kart 14 6OR Treat mt tatty can to corerTHE INDIAN ARMY 1914-1947 THE INDIAN ARMY IN 1914 pee Indian Army of 1914 was the largest volunteer army in the work a that time. It consisted of 107 single-battalion and 11 Wo battalion regiments of infantry, 38 cavalry regiments, « joint infantrycavalry unit, three regiments of sappers and miners and 12 batteries of mountain artillery. In adliion to these units the annie ofthe Indian princes and regiments of European volunteers could i neces, be called on to reinforce the order of bate. This army can quite restonably be sid 10 be the creation of one man ~ Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, He was appointed commanderin-chief in 1003 and over the next seven years inttted a wide range of reforms, which ‘were fndamental in setting the army on the path towards becoming an eifcient, wellprepared force. Kichemer fist at was to renumber the army’ regiments, For most ofthe 10th century there had been not ane Indian Artoy bt three, each recruited by the individual Pesidencies ~ Bengal, Bombay and Madras i vhich administered the country. These three armies had evenly ‘ben wnified in 1891, but each regiment continued to retain both itsold pre-1801 number and the name of the Presidency which had originally Talsed it Kitchener abolished these numbers and ties and renumbered all the regiments in a single sequence. Kiichener then moved on to consider the cae of the Indian Saff Corps. In the wake of the Mutiny many British officers were detached fom their regiments to fill evilian posts. A. ready source of men was required to fl the consequent gaps and the remedy was found inthe creation of the Indian Staff Gorps. Officers were no longer gazcted cinecdy toa regiment; instead they joined the Staff Corps and were only tached tothe regiments with which they served. By the final quarter of the century, however, the formation and growth of the Indian Ci Service had gradually permitted many oicers to renun to regimental duties. The Staff Corps was, therefore, no longer required; Kitchener abolished it and once again officers were fully part of the regimen: in ‘hich they served More importantly, Kitchener abandoned the policy of disuibusing the army around the country, largely for internal security purpose, and of rarely moving regiments outside their own Presidency area Regiments were instead made lable for service anywhere in India and allwere required to complete a tour of duty on the North-West Fonte, fon the grounds thatthe main danger to India ly in a Ruslan invasion via Aighanistan, Higher formations ~ brigades, divisions and armies ~ weve exablshed In peacedie, providing & command structure that mis immealately available on the cutbreak of war. Divisional commancers (here were nine divisions under Kichener’sscheme-see page 4) and amy commander (there were two - Northern and Southern) were all, in dheory, fred from administrative work to allow them to concentate Weary his fl dross unto, th Coke) Rie, Frontier Fore, 4916. Suber Daet trom the Vetria Cros at Wie eae Ypres on 28 Ap 1015, ocome casualties, and then ores oight Briton and Ian bticrs to safety whit under decoration fr bravery. tein ‘nda of Marit 2d Cass fared ‘uring tho campaton sana he Hohmande In 1007 the Deh, {ollewing yer (Uae Caiastin)GeptaivSerior can Orie 2rd naerar “ToxprCorpery Sargeant Mar Corer (ee Corral rita oper Gerry ee Poeetted cars ‘Nother Army 1 Pesanen Ow ra ran Oe She) Thee Dv Bh Lucero Oi ott le Seer de rae Be Southern Ary ‘(ae Dy Sho Ow {an Pena 9 (Sondeabac Oi Birra bi [poms Seen ee a ener. ‘SHS oct ry ‘stir ager ‘Sader Maer Poor earmrto — Sone ‘Sororatar aur Of nt, ee paae 1 cnr onset ai et Date Hera ger ‘ota sa nae ce Date evr ‘ones ae hone lsat os, Laney ater Nak lca gs ne ge a ‘Aelng Laren Dataer Lance Nk ‘Sate vn ea Saver Soy Siow fon training; even divisional administration was to be handled by army headquarters. This reflected Kitchener's own particular prejudice ‘against paperwork; but his successors (he left India in 1909) were not of the same calibre and were unable to manage the mulifarions tasks and responsibilities of the post. The result was that, during the First World War, the office of the commanderin-chiet (March 1914-October 1916, Gen. Sir Bemuchamp Duff ground to a virtual halt under an intolerable burden of pety administrative detail, to the detriment of the army in the field. A further shortcoming of the Kitchener reforms was also revealed in 1914, Divisional HQs had a number of responsibilities within their particular geographical area - for their own units, British yolunteer units (the Auxiliary Force -see below) and internal security, Kitchener's reforms made no provision for a successor command to take over ‘once the divisions had left for the front, which simply added to the administrative chaos. ‘Wiih the creation of these higher formations there was @ sudden need for trained staff officers. It had been difficult and expensive for Indian officers to return t the UK to attend the Siaif College at Camberley; Kitchener therefore founded « new Staff College at Quetta When the British authorities expressed their concer that these two separate colleges might well produce two separate schools of thought, Kitchener countered by stating that he would be happy to see evidence (of any kind of serious military thought at all! In the event, the syllabus at Quetta was very similar to that at Camberley and personnel qualified at both establishments were in fact interchangeable Kitchener wrote on numerous occasions about the importance of putting aside memories of the Indian Mutiny. Nevertheless, one consequence of that traumatic event continued to withstand all his attempts at reform. Until the very end of the Second World War the government maintained at least one British battalion in every Indian infantry brigade, THE FIRST WORLD WAR On the outbreak of war, the Indian Army consisted of a trained and ‘experienced body of men, approximately 150,000 strong, and the Government of India immediately offered two infantsy and two cavalry divisions for service anywhere. This force, designated Expeditionary Force A, was destined originally for Egypt to relieve British troops there Dut at the last minute was diverted to France where the divisions weredurown into the bate of La Bassée {October-November 1914). Inthe following March the Meerut Division formed the assault division atthe battle fof Neuve Chapelle. (Note that whist Indian divisions and brigades were numbered, they were generally known, by the mame of their peacetime headgqarters to prevent confusion with similarly numbered British formations.) Under the cireumstanees the troops showed considerable courage in what was to them anew style of warfare and one for which they had not been trained. All the Indian regiments suffered from the cold, from homesickness, from the loss of their British officers, and from having to use unfamiliar equipment (some regiments had only just received their LeeEnfield rifles). They were also hampered by the failure of the reserve system, which meant that reinforcements drafted kes were drawn indiscriminately from any number of to replace cas regiments The infantry divisions were withdrawn to Egypt in October 1915, but the cavalry stayed on in France until the spring of 1918, when they too sailed for Egypt to form part of the Desert Mounted Corps. Already in that theatre was Expeditionary Force E, which consisted originally of only the Lucknow Brigade, but eventually became responsible for all Indian forces in the Near East Indian forces were also committed to East Africa, One infantry brigade (Wie Bangalore Brigade belonging to the Secunderabad Division) was sent to Tanganyika, whilst the five battalions of Expeditionary Force B were given the task of defending the Uganda Railway. By far the largest Indian force to serve outside the sub-continent was Expeditionary Force D, which consisted originally of ‘only the Poona Division and was sent to the mouth of the Euphrates in ‘Te men are wearing pa hak! rl, bat he two ofcars at te {nes with regimentsarmed with SMLE rites, strike = photographer. They ore wearing Foros A: (ee eT November 1914 to guard British oj installations around Basra. Once the Imperial forces had established themselves there they were drave further and further into the interior in the hope of gaining an easy victory over the Turks, and even of capturing Baghdad, "The campaign, undertaken largely for reasons of prestige, quickly nurned into a disster, Logistical constraints demanded that the axis of the advance was obliged to remain close to the River ‘Tigris, and the campaign consisted fof series of head-on clashes with the Turks. The advancing troops, however, far outstripped the ability of the rear echelon to keep them: supplied or to provide adequate medical arrangements. The Poona Division was trapped at Kut and forced to surrender in April 1916 despite the best efforts of two relieving divisions. An investigation into conditions at the front found an appalling state of affairs, with only rudimentary ‘are for the wounded and poor supply arrangements for both food and clothing. The campaign against Baghdad was brought to ahattas the War Office took over the direction of the campaign from the Indian Army. The officer commanding the Expeditionary Force, General Sit Joh Nixon, was sacked and new, efficient administrative arrangements were made under a new GOC, Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Mande. Tn an ‘even more farreaching move, a new viceroy and a new commanders. chief ofthe Indian Army (Gen. Sir Charles Monro) were also appointed. With a change of commander the army, both in Mesopotamia and back home in India, was revitalised. Maude, having built up his forces 8 position of overwhelming strength, set in train a series of limited oreo D: “The Indl Corp & ain Cavalry Corp France Cat Corps sen, 2 Dison Incl Corp Lan} Divo Ah Mee Oven rorweBe ‘The 27% Gangalor) Brigade and the pera Service ‘Brigade n East Aion Frcs B a kon pn Deca 1044 are nits a rh doce Eat sca Force c: Bettatons in Uganda 20m Pj fl takes of a, Brain acu ‘Rar any Rego SF. svouree 6 Date acu 1p bata a votre Ma batry arcia Pots Artslncn Feces been upon eal Membaca er suns susan saved apr, Forces in Mesopotamia ‘Cava Dison (rene fondant ade ‘Dena $916, Poon zen, 7h Meu oon {2th Ein, Hn Oven, 18h Dusen 78 oy 120 Dien, Force E: Forces i Eaypt ‘it Mourtod Oven fter Ath Gay sk, 2rd axed Din ater tn Cavs Evin 115 Don Force Fs 20th, 28h and Soh Brigades In Eayet fe, 10H Eh, The diver was broker Un n Mae 1915. Foxe 2am Brigden Gatipou “Tho igi saved ay rm pn cisobjective attacks and the fdvance along the Tigris was Ptomplete success. Faced fad the collapse of Russia the new priority in che theatre was no longer to eapture Baghdad, but © ‘any the war into Turkey fell, to the oil wells in the south of the country and flong the shores of the Caspian Sea, Baghdad fell fon 17 March 1917, but the ‘advance continued, reach ing the city of Mosul just hefore the Armistice. ‘The deployment of the Indian Army during the period of 1915-18 was rendered particularly ifielt because the principal enemy, except in East Africa, was Turkey. Fighting fellow believers led by the Caliph, man regarded as the successor to the Prophet, provoked a real crisis of conscience amongst Muslim soldiers and led to several smallscale mutinies, notably at Rangoon in December 1914 and at Singapore the following February. As fa result, some units recruited from particularly strong Muslim arcas, such as the 40th Pathans, ad to be deliberately withdrawn from the Middle East. However, the majority of the troops, even those captured by the Turks (as at Kut for example) did not change sides. Despite all dhese problems, just over one million Indian troops served outside their country, of whom 62,000 were killed and {67,000 wounded. In this, the first eampaign in which they were eligible for the award, Indian soldiers won 11 VCs. Representative action: The battle of Megiddo, September 1 The British originally assembled @ force in Egypt for the purely defensive purpose of guarding the Snce Canal against Turkish incursions Bylate 1917, however, Turkish offensves appeared tobe thing of the past and, under presi from London, plans were made fran Allied offensive inPaleaine. A frtattack directed athe town of Gazawas Bloody rele and the commanderin-chiet, Lieutenant General Si Archibald’ Murray, vas replaced by General Sir Elma Allenby Allenby resumed the offensive by mounting a fet at Gaza whilst breaking through the Turkish lines on the right, ner Beersheba, and Jerusilem fell on 9 December. Bad weather and siffening Turkish resitance (their lines had been reinforced by some German units) prevented any further gains for dhe ime being. In adlion, Allenby hal heen compelled to give up some of his most experienced troops to bolser a deteriorating sittation on the Western Front. In retten, however, he received the Indian cavalry regiments fom France, ad Some raw Indian batalions straight trom their depots. These new buatalions replaced the British ones in three of the divisions of XXI Corps making i,t all intents and purposes, an Indian formation. Shit, es, ties and wousers. {Lae Coctin)Recreate 6d Light The nee for aining within these new Fan Btalions was ugeng Many men had never handled a Lee Enfield betore: ven worse, oer =like 250 men of the 2/30th Punjabis ha arrived without ever hating fred-a musket course. There wav also a severe shortage of experience Bush and Indian oes and Indian NCOs Allenby was blige bring some unite up to strength by transerring_ whole companic from more experienced batalions, Pure, the batalions arrived Palestine in ones and twos, with the result that the dsions could no be fully asembled unit August 1918, 30 delaying the start of th proposed offensive ‘Allenby’ pans were the reverse of those ofthe previous year = hi time a fine would be made on the right, along the valle ofthe Rives Jordan, and itwas hoped that the intended breakthrough would cote on the let. Aftera heavy surprise bombardment the efensiveyot unde vy at dawn om 18 September The plan called for the four dsions XXI Corps to break through and wheel to their right allowing te cavalry of the Desert Mounted Corps to pas dough the resulting ep and exploit northwards ross the Tarkish ines of communication Te the fst phase (the battle of Sharon) some hatalions incurred hear loses (2/ Guides Infantry of 60th Dison, for example, lost 114 men), thot the Turks were driven back all along the line and the pivoding movement was completed succesfully. The Turkish defence had hes suppressed by the initial. bombardment andy once an inal breakthrough had been mad, the defenders were always ineined withdraw 10 avoid encirclement rather than fight it out. Since the sround lacked the network of tenches, barbed wie entanglements atid Conerete emplacements ofthe Western Front senior commanders mere ‘more easily able to approach the front line and ake a personal assessment ofthe station This cut-down on the response time for new orders and ensured that mistakes in deployment, for example, could quickly he rectified! on the spot Canales suffered were significantly Tewer than for ‘comparable bate on the Western Front the Turks were unable to. utilise Counterbatery fre, whilst the constant drain of men Uhrowgh tench rads and countersaids was not a Feature ofthis front. The way wis now clear for the cavalry Fortunately, Major General Barrow (ih Gavary Division) had insited thae his men be assembled cose ‘tothe front fine to ensure thatMet Peshawar} Dison red pro-war HW Fer igatan 919 nd apn Divison: me re w, NW Frontr Ncpanstn 1919 rd (aor Dison foros prewar Face, Masoptari, ohsine Paesine Oonpszon Face; bokan up by 1023 a Out) Division ors pe nar, NA Prot, ‘ores 1918 ‘sth phon) Dison: tana pro-am sc nc rng na ‘th Poon) Division: red prewar Mosopctaia, cated fekaanar A 1016 ‘im Meoru Dislon: foe pe-narFane, Mosopotaria, Peat, Palatne Oonton Force; ran 20 fam (Lasko Dison: for roar eral cy fm (Secundorabad) Division: red warn say ‘nl, ans ig t Est Aca eat lace fo ence 400 Division: formed 1014 n Eye Esp tckon op 1016 “1 Dison farmed 114m Ea Ea: bckan op 1006 {2% Deion: 1815 Maspotans: Meson, ‘debarded 110 “4h DMson- frre 1916in Meconstami, Mesanctami Toole op 1916 48h Divison forma 1016 n ecopctamis esopotams 40h Don frre! 1216; Fete, fri 119 COI "Th Dio: ora 917 espa: Mopar, Faq ‘Qecupation Foret: bon wp by 108 ‘ai Division: lor 017-0 Mesopotamia; Mescetei, eg Oosiion Force, bok p 1820 Burma Dhsion orn pre-war har sacuy 9 Bum ‘indian Cavalry Dison feed 1914 na Fen, Ferunbred a Caran December 1918; don ‘dororsepscos Mach 110 and vert o Eat ‘2nd nan Cavalry Division: res 1954 na, no rerubered a th Carn, Dasa 1918; dan ‘sores roped Mar 918 and ent aE {st Mounted Division: fooned Ey 1818 ha ery Manse Dion ncoporieg idan ones or ‘th Cory Oson France, but he aoe as thy Pest, Paesina Coat era token ip 102) ‘2 Mounted Dison: oro: Fz 018 om en ‘eens of th Covaty Ohler nF, but then ‘eure St Patt, Palate Occup Fe ‘ren up toc. Cavalry Divison: mad 1016 Mesopotans Vasant [oven up 1615s bapa hen ring Pepe Aden xia: oe rower Aen Bean Brigade: ore ri NM, Fr DeraatBrigde: ered pear NW roo: ‘Kohat Brigade: ors pons; NN Free ‘South Persia Brigade: orn 1916; Sou Pers ard Ga took up by 1328 there would be no repeat of the mistake of Cambrai, where the cavalry had found itself too far in the rear to allow it to exploit the infantry initial breakthrough. Atam on 19 September the eavalry, supported by armoured cars, advanced through the gap that the infantry had created, moving along the narrow coastal plain and lusting Turkish rearguards out of the way with a mixture of boldness and sheer courage. The 4th Cavalry Division covered 70 miles in 34 hours, with the loss of only 26 horses, The 5th Cavalry Division moved even faster, but as a consequence lost many horses to exhaustion, further north sill and, on 28 Septembs capturing the important seaport of Haifa, thanks to j— an attack by to squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers, ‘whose bold charge swept aay several machine gun ‘emplacements, They were ‘supported by the Mysore Lancers (see Plate D); a small detachment of some 15 troopers charged and completely routed an art illery battery on the heights above the town, Allenby had gambled that the Turks would be unable to move ‘ide In Mevopotami: Mort ot (Ute Cotloeton) Their objectives were ‘a detachment succeeded in‘Garay iin i, Ga. Sr Gare Baroy 0th Cavay Brigade Ve! Co bea earn, 2nd Laer, th Cowal eda Ha, tn aioe Gin Sasson ‘th Cavaley Brigade 1st Coury of London Yeoman 23 Laer 6 Jacobs Ho, 2ie acre Gur Sasron ‘2th Cova Brigade 1st Sect Yoorenn, Sh Gna, 10h Lanes, 186 Metra Cun Sqanstn Divisional oops: 2m onde Roy oe Ary ‘ivFa Samcon Fe ‘5th Caray Divison 3 Gan Hl Maca) 1h Cavaly Brigade 1s Fel Goede users ofr Hears Hore, th Laces, 1h Mace Gan Garton ‘Hin Covey rgado st Srvc Pras 20h eosin Here 3a Poona Hees, 2h Nechhe Gan Sarton | 15m omperiat service) Covaty gade: cre anc, fat Fab Larne edhpur ance, ‘ah. Machine Gun Sacto ‘Division trope: Eun ar Nts Bois oso Howe Alay (FSF Sco Re ‘Also under common ssa Moe iis, $i and tan Lig Amoied Me Str, red ‘iL Cor Pas 2OLCORPS i. cn. Se Pity Crowe ‘Sade Fa Garson Aa, 2h de Nera Baton, Hang Kong ana Shon Moxa Str 10th Division Gan. JF. Largo ‘200 Bigade! it ret, fh She FP, ‘viOtst Gers, 271% dan by 28h Torch Marta ater 300 Brigade: Pan, sam Dog, “ot Puna, Kash ty 2a ch a tiny ‘Stet Brigade: 2a es usr, 2/42 eo, an Ps, 2et Gere 3 Tach Nr Baty Divisional oops: Ll, 28 Bde ya et ly tn a in ek Conn FE, {fF Co. rt Sapoer and ers 2/15 Peers 1th Eataon Mactve Gun coe ‘rd Division) Gen. SF Nox. 150th Brigade: tvs eye Ween Fr, {U5 idan ty 158 an ty, iin cus Fic, 18 Fen Moras Sry 800 Brigade: 47 wae Sot dan ry, iS arty, 2/153 en ey, {507 Toneh oar toy ‘ett Brigade: 17% Foy Web usin “Wirinetrn, 21a tia 11 Cape Cops [Saun Afar, 100m tench Mora Baty, Dhision! Woops: 2, 2m ara 2676 Shanes Foye Fa Ati, 0m sv 7h Fil Gos RES ad Fat Co. Se Sapa a ers |V$50h Foner, Sra Staley Machine Gun Caps So eee Or eg ore Pree) ‘DESERT MOUNTED CORPS Gun Sr Heny Chal, Corps teeps: is Worcs Yom, XSW an Ted 2K CORPS. Ga. SF But) ‘Comps traps: Caco cvyegh ne ap Oi \neast’s Onn Yor oso tt ae, GV NOV, itn nd 12nd gadis Aol Gaon on ‘ar duran Bane ya Gare ty {Lahore} Dison Ps. Gan. AR Hoare) 1h erozopore) Brigade! 1a Carentan, 27h Puts, Ot Pune, 27 Guta ia 7 UT Wert iy th unr Blige: 1 Mansy, 479 Sha, 6 Fes, 2/1249 Bac, ah Lhe etch Mover Baty ‘ty Behind) Brigade: nd Ces, arn, stn atta, st Guth Fish Ut rene Mor Sty ‘Disional oops i ras Spas Roy Pa Any, 480, 20m ar at Pet Coa. rs Sapper has SA Shh Preis, rs Maxine Gin Ean 7 Moar Divison Me. Gen, Far) 808 Betra Dar) Brigade: It Sess, 250 Pankea, Sens nabs 25% ia, 1h Lg rch Morr Ey 2a Gorely gate nc a Vine, 20h Pra, VG Gunna, 2 Lerch Mer Ey 280 Insan Brigade: 273 Laces. at Sf Sc Site FP Sa Punatie 2m et ent rir Baty Dison oops: 2. azn a adn Be Fl ‘tly an Pall Ca FE a th Fd Ta CHO. ‘Scop nd Mn, 1213 Pon Mh Meche Ga ec ‘20m Divison i. Gen. SM ea) 170 god: 1am London 2/1 Pi, 2/1 Bach a6 Pare Fite, 100 hench Matar Story ‘Mt Bigade! 2130 Landen, 28% Pari, SOP Kian fs, 2/0 ry, 8 nh Ma ty {$8et Brigade: 272273 Lona 21h occa Mary, 190) ‘chs 22nd en ny 16 erch Morr ey ‘isional woeps: st nd and 3 Bue Roa Paks ‘ily, 519% and S21 Feld Cz A, a Co. fl CWO ‘Seppe and Miners, 2/107% Poneets,doh Sten Nation Gincane 7th Dslon i. Gan. Pas) ‘aand Brigade: 1% Viste, Tad Preble, 20 uiew Filo, Sr Kast. arty 2320 Tech Mra Baty 2rd Brigade: Sn Somerset, 2m Ps 2/18 ean fry rd Gare Fie, 2 Th Worry 2940 Brigades 1 Duh Cora Uh gas Files (250 Ouran ites, 52d nn bray, 204m Torch Mote Baty Distonal oops: 500 and 7ore Shands Roa aks ‘tly, Sat Aen Pu rier or, An ad Co 1h and 1h Gos. 2nd 0 Seppe ae Mins, 22nd Sh Ponca, et Bon Medina ops ‘Altacheds Dacre Fare Fae Sie ‘As under commana: 5th ger sn CGHAYTOR'S FORCE We. Gen St Es her ‘ustralan and New Zealand Mounted Deion 2 cn Brigade e-Gov ER Min Th Miata, ‘vat Srey nar Sey, Or tery Unrlgndet 3 and Sth Poy utr, a rd nd eh Wt ‘Aaa. 3h Paty Fp Fee fay, 2 re end eer Novis Stes, 185 Heo Eatery Royal Groen Any12 ‘During he Mezopotamion ‘campaign the wounded hed to be ‘swmcuated by bullock eat, since ‘raiabe. The on, slow deny and uncomtortabe vided ‘othing to al he ang Procese. ile olecton) sufficient reinforcements across suffi thrust, and he was proved correct. Meanwhile, the infantry of XXI Corps carried on wheeling right, advancing into the craggy, arid Judean Hills (the battle of Nablus). The ‘Turks continued to withdraw before the unremitting pressure of Allenby’s forces ~ their commanders were determined not to be eaughy, and keps their eyes finmly fixed on the small number of defies on the eastern edge of the hills, which offered their only means of escape By the 21s, they were caught, abandoning a good deal of transport ‘and ammunition in the process. Even those elements of the Turkish forces which passed successfully through the defiles into the valley atthe River Jordan were tunable to getaway since their reereat northwards had bbeen blocked at Beisan by the dth Cavalry Division, Pressured from the rear by Allied infantry and from above by the RAF, the Turkish Sth Army completely disintegrated and the survivors were taken into captivity along with some Turkish elements of the Tarko-German Asia Corps The way was now clear for Allenby to exploit the situation sil further, and he therefore sent the infantry of XX1 Corps along the coast to capture Beirut whilst che Desert Mounted Corps mace for Damascus, Which fell on 1 October. Between 19 September and 31 October Allenby's forces sustained 4 (otal of 5,666 casualties, of whom 853 were killed; the cavalry's total losses amounted t0 650, There are no reliable figures for Turkish casualties. Around 12,000 men were captured along. with 149 guns, a vast quantity of ammunition of all kinds and Innumerable transport wagons. In total, nine infantry and one cavalry division were either destroyed or disbanded. Partly asa result of poor food and rampant disease the morale of the Turkish troops who faced Allenby was, co say the least, uncertain. They thus crumbled rather more easily in the face of this offensive than wae the ease in previous actions. Nevertheless, much of the success at ‘Megiddo must be attributed to the men of Allenby’s army. They showed flexibility and rapidity in thei nical auacks and in their ability to keep the retreating Turks on the move, preventing thei from making firm stand. When, in the later stages of the campaign — at Irbid on 26 September and at Aleppo one month later — the Turks finally ily quiekly to meet the cavalrymounted an organised Jofence, they successfully alse Allied! attacks, The Royal Air Force also made significant contribution, Gestroying the equipment Of the retreating troops. ‘The decision to permit the Caalry to venture so deeply fio @ country where fresh water and food were not lentil was 2 bold one and Entirely Allenby’s own. In view of the amount of marching undertaken by Some of these ray batt particularly those of ith Division on the let auk of the ‘wheel’, and that the fact eis was for many ther fist taste of action, the achievement ‘of the infantry remains notable. BETWEEN THE WARS Operations conducted during the First World War had revealed a number of flaws in the Indian Army ~some stemming from Kirchener’s reforms, others from the nature of the war itself In the early 1920s, therefore, the high command structure was altered to provide the army with a geographical as well as an operational framework. Troops were allotted to one of three roles ~ the field army, covering troops, or internal security, The field army was made up of four infantry divisions and five cavalry brigades. ‘The covering troops, whose role was to suppress minor disturbances on the frontier and to act as a sreening force in case of invasion, consisted of 12 infantry brigades plus supporting arms. The intemal security troops (43 battalions) were: alloted the role of assisting the civil power and could be backed up if necessary by field army units. As many as one third of all troops in India ‘were occupied in this last duty by the outbreak ofthe Second World War, Overrecruiting in some areas during the war had also created problems. Generally speaking, the army preferred the Indians tom the north of the country to those from the south, These were men from the socalled “martial races’ — those which were considered the most ‘warlike’ by the British. OF these, Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims (or Punjabi Mussulmans, as they were Known at the time), Gurkhas, Garhwalis, Dogras, Rajputs, Baluchis, Mers and Pathans were the most numerous. Men of the same race served together, either within a single race company/squadron in a mixed race regiment, or in a ‘singleclas' single race regiment. In 1914 there were 54 single class regiments, of all branches, and 123 regiments with class companies/squadrons. Indeed, family ies and traditions of service meant that the men of a farticular sub-unit could be dravn from a very small geographical area indeed, ‘An oer of he Bian Ganon Meeopetamia Te report wat fist raised $388; wht ‘Word War twos employed on Interna secunty duo ding ‘ow asa 134 ‘Te barrel section ofa mountain {nd the munition. This arrangement cased problems gf language, customs and caste, and at the sang time “encouraged interunit rivalry aay sunpetiion 10 the advantage of the regiment performance in the field. However, it also ey 10 a lack of coordination in recruitment. Even cavalry regiment and infantry depot, every co and department recruited its own men, ensuring that each was competing for its recruits from evershrinking pool of candidates. The particu makeup of each regiment added. furthey complications. One regiment might require only @ certain number of Rajputs, another so. man Dogras for their own class companies, as well ay demanding British officers who could speak the. language of their men, As the war progressed became more and more difficult to match recruits to the vacancies in existing regiments, let alone those in all the new battalions that had bbeen formed (bx November 1918 the strength of the army had risen by approximately 420,000 to 573,484 men). ‘One solution, the creation of a pool of reinforcements, proved @ failure since Incian soldiers had a very real objection to serving with, tation. Indian soldiers fought for at for the honour and standing of themselves, thsir family, their caste and their regiment, and there was Tile iza wo be gained in fighting away from one's regiment, among strangers, Perhaps the better answer was to widen the number of "races fom which reerits were drawn, and the tentative steps taken in this direction proved successful in raising the number of men required luring the war: Yet, even then, recruitment remained centred i the north of the subcontinent; some 49 per cent of the army was dravea from the Punjab (Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs) and 26 per cent from the United Provinces and postorar reductions in strength once again saw 2 return to-a more restricted recruiting base With the experience of trench warfare in mind a reduction in the number of cavalry regiments was required. Accordingly, these wore amalgamated in pairs, after the pattern of the British Army, reducing, the number ofreyiments by I8and the number of men toa mere 56 pet cent of the pre-sar establishment. Only three regiments remained unaffected: the 2th and 28th Light Cavalry and the Guides Cavalry. The last of the amalgamations did not take place until the final regiment returned home to India in 1923. In response to the problems of recruiting and taining reinforcements all the infantry and cavalry regiments were. then ‘grouped’, The 21 cavalry regiments remaining after amalgamation were brought into seven groups, each three regiments strong, one of Which would man a common depot; the makeup of each regiment was adjusted so that all the regiments in one group had a similar class composition In the infantry there were to be 20 such groups (the Gurkha regiments were excluded). However, once these infantry groups hhad been organised, it was only asinall step to convert the regiments of ‘each. group into he battalions of one large regiment, and this wasoct in 922. Each of etow lange. Tegiments th ca of four or fhe oe ptaions pis one sre, alae mired eyo Bataon, which med as a taining unit forthe regiment. This sil fen nine ingle batalion tegen in extence and (ie vere al dabanded iomecr 1921 and 1982, Qe of the nine was the ta Intnuy (The Loyal Regiment) — 2 somewhat fei repayment for Dc ft tn aon, two of the new lange regiments ine ctappented fom she my Uist the Sr Madras Repiment was disbanded InN1028 for reaone. of teonomys_ andthe 20¢h Burma Riles tet the army ihn, in 1987, Burma ceased to be governed ae part of India, The tegimentjoined the Burmedeetablshment a the Burma Ries Insp ofall thea amalgamation traions win the new lage regents ded hard and unl Parton many cavalry regiment and Infineybatalionscontmued to reer co themes by thee pret922 number. Some manage to retain their old egimenta ie tat part and some the of regimental badge at speciation Micon. Ths the 2d Ques Own Rajput Light Ina became the Ist Batalion (Queen Victor's Own Light Infanty) 7 Rajput Roginen and wore the Queen's cipher on he lapel of hex mes den jack and on tet fall dress headgear instead he regen cm Badge, This policy led to the unual station of having "Ropl Batalonin tomoyal regiments such a for exanple, the St Raja Batalon of the th Maratea Light Infantry (bch ook ie fom the pe 1922 117th Royal Maat), Such spit wa alo evident i he Atte ken towards ater ements (wich, of cours, were Ava Aight inferior to one’s own). The officers ofthe Ath. Bombay Grenadiers habitual sferred wo he Bish Crenaier Gard ax out London ranch The 1th Gay (he ferme 27th Caray of 1908 and the Rnd Madras Lancers before that) considered thence to be the amy/ssenfor cavalry regiment, hang been rsd in ©1774, some 50 yeas before the regiment accorded senioiy in the Army Lis Sinner’ Hoes (lt Duke of Yorks Own Gaal The Uriah olficer who yolumicred for the Indian Amy had seneray graduated towards te top of his last Sands ~ sich as The competion for paces that de Indian Army could choos the be He wasnt spend a year witha Bish regiment ser vng in India on the Unauached List indan Army This gave im an introduction o ‘Atmough cata standards wore holed nthe nan Army a 41284, some exceptions wore rade, principally for regiments standards oan onorary | ‘atincton. The 18th eve was not among these, ‘wns alone to retain wo resented the regiment by the ‘ald nut ee with sor Madras Regulstons and were ‘dente! to pat borne bythe omy at ha ate, but woe ‘ering ate tine wt ne 1616 eer Cordon the Hort. West ‘anges and abeerving the fal the country and an opportunity to begin learning Urdu, Command of that language, the army's lingua france, was considered essential and the officer would be requited to pass the Lower Standard Urea exami sos ‘would also ensure that they later learned the particular language spoken by their own men, such as Pushtu, During this period, the officer would select which Indian regiment he wished to join and could spend a shor time with it giving that regiment's existing officers an opportunity to assess his suitability. Great store was set by this, since a regiments British officers formed their own small community and it was vital that a new ‘member’ fitted in quickly. Anyone who did not get on with his colleagues, or who showed no signs of conforming, vas permitted to transfer to another corps at any time in his career. Whilst serving with his British regiment, the new officer would ‘ypically be appointed a platoon or troop officer, but this was a level of command lower than he would experience in his Indian regiment. As there were only two British officers in each company, the new officer might find himselfin command ofa company within weeks of hisartival, 1 degree of responsibility which an officer in the British Army would take a number of years to attain. By insisting on this introductory year with a British regiment it was hoped that the new officers could make their mistakes before they were posted to their permanent regiment and. notin front of native troops. Life for the British officer in India offered a wide range of intellectual, social and sporting activities. For some, like Francis Yeats Brown, the 17th Cavalry author of A Bengal Lancer, it was a step on the road to spiritual fulfilment, Many more enjoyed the wide range of sporting activities from hunting (dhe Peshawar Vale Hint imported fox hhounds from England, though the quarry was jackal), big-game hunting and pigsticking, to team sports such as polo, hockey and ericket. Polo became a popular sport amongst infantry and cavalry alike, although it ‘was alleged (by infanteymen) that some cavalry regiments thought more Of the next polo tournament than hey did of theit regiment's bate honours. Otficers were permitted 60 days leave a year (90 for officers serving in frontier stations) and so had ample opportonity for rest and relaxation. During the hot weather season, soldiers and civilians alike retreated to one of a number of towns in the hills ~ Simla, Ootacamund{known to everyone as Ooty’) or Poona — which enjoyed a cooler, more ongerial climate. ‘One important measure was the introduction in 1928 of a policy of ‘tndiaisation’, or the progressive increase in the number of Indian ‘officers within the army. Potential officers were selected to attend ‘Sandhurst and then, on commissioning, would be posted 1o one of eight designated regiments in India (namely, Teh Light Cavalry, 16th Light (Govalry, 2/1st Punjabis, 5/5th Mahrava Light Infantry, 1/7th Rajputs, 1/1ath Punjabis, 4/19th Hyderabad and 2/lst Madras Pioneers). The fist Indian graduate was Syed Iskander Mirza, who went on to become President of Pakistan in 1955, Progress was, however, slow ~ the cost of sending an Indian cadet to England and the culture clash which often ‘ccurted on his arrival resulted in low takeup and success rates ‘Therefore, an Indian ‘Sandhurst’, the Indian Military College, was set up at Delia Dun in 1982. A further eight units were ‘Indianised? in the following year ~ 8rd Cavalry, 5/2nd Punjabis, 5/6th Rajput Rifles, 4/8th Punjabis, 5/10th Baluch, 5/11th Sikhs, 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment, 6/18th Frontier Force Rifles, plus three field companies of the Indian Engineers. "These changes resulted in a proliferation of officer types. Prior 10 Indianisation, Indian officers had all been commissioned from the ranks ‘y the Viceroy of India ~ before 1935 they were known as Indian Officers and after that date as Viceroy Commissioned Officers (VCOs). Thow ‘commissioned at Sandhurst held the King's Commission in His Majesty’s Land Forces (KCIO3), lke all British officers, but those commissioned at Dehra Dun held commissions only in HM Indian Land Forces as Indian Commissioned Officers (1003). Although IGOs were paid on the same scale as British officers in the United Kingdom, British officers serving in India were still the better paid because they received an extra ‘overseas allowance, It was hoped that the rank of VO would eventually be phased out and its holders replaced. 4 troop or platoon officers by the newly created ICOs. However, since VOOs were appointed from the ranks, the removal of the prospect of advancement provoked hostility amongst senior Indian NCOs Although the rank was abolished in tome regiments, the experience of the VOOs remained invaluable 1 junior (British or Indian) officers and they were reintroduced once nore during the Second World War, Although the flow of Indian olficers increased after the opening of Dehra Dun, the process of Indianisation as a whole can be Judged a failure — a political ‘expedient intended only as a sop t0 Lieutenant-Colane Opie Devs Benet, he commanding oie ofthe 2/160 Punjabis at Jn i 1926 His ufone dab with sariot facings ~ te thor Batatlone of he regiment wore major during the Fst Word Sonn, se Hetonant.ctone, from 1926 unt ne ory {o roach the grand ape of 102, sng onty 1907 (ie Cotecton) 718 reno lnger splayed, having been detored repugnant to Dataton ot he senior repent ‘ofthe moor Inn Army the ‘eigade of urd nationalist opinion. By effectively segregating Indian officers into their own regiments (i censure that they would never have command ‘over & British officer) and differentiating in terms of pay between British and Indian, i provoked deep feelings of resentment. The Scheme, which envisaged the replacement of British officers by Indians only when the former retited from the sevice, would no} have resulted in an albIndian officer comps until 1967, The pace of change became intolerable in wartime and Indianisation was ‘swept away by the manpower needs of the Second World War. Two further categories of officer, Emergency Commissioned Officers and Indian” Emergency Commissioned Officers (ECOs and IECOs) were created and all officers were paid at the same rates, The view held by many politicians and general that Indian (roops needed the steadying influence of British officers, waa shown to be nonsense, and by the end of the war many units were setving effectively under their Indian officers. Indian recruits, normally from the 16-25 age range, served for a period of 21 years with the option of re-nlisting for a further four years With the colours or four in the Reserve with a pension. However, the army Reserve scheme had not been a success, partly because it was ton inflexible: the scheme only allowed for the eallsup of all the reserves together rather than giving priority to the recall of the younger, more recently trained men, Also, the physical condition of many of the recalled reservists was far to0 poor for them to be anything but liability to the service. A new organisation, the Indian Territorial Force, was therefore formed in 1921. Its batalions were numbered as the Ith ete battalion of the parent regiment. Training took place for 28 days a year luring the cold months, with the intention that in war time the battalion would be brought up to strength and could take is place alongside the regular battalions. The purpose of the Territorial Force vs two-fold = it ‘would not only provide a reserve of oops, but would also difuse nationalist opinion by appearing to give Indians more responsibility for their own defence. Further to this end, suudents were enrolled io a ‘number of University Training Corps battalions. However, the units were {in general starved of money and this greatly restricted their effectiveness = the 11/17th Dogras, for example, did not receive Bren guns and ‘mortars until 1941, 'm peacetime, a considerable amount of recruiting was done through the Cold Weather Tour, During the cold winter months a British officer would set off 1 visit the recruiting area allotted to his regiment. Cards were printed off detailing the route and former members of the regiment were given an open invitation to attend, perhaps to discuss [grievances or to bring in a member of the family who wished to join up. In Charles Allen's book Plain Tales Prom The Raj, General Sir Reginald Savory, an officer with the Ith Sikhs between 1914 and 1950, remembered that, ‘atthe entrance to the village you'd probably be metby the local village band, big drum, pipes, sidedrums, many of them retired drummers from the regiment. Then you'd be received by your head host, generally one of the senior exarmy officers, and brought out tinder the great village tree, the peepul tree, under which the whole lage would come and sitand keep out of the rain and sun’. ‘The relationship between British officer and Indian soldier was unusual for a modern army. ‘From the day 2 man joined his unit and Game under your command,’ explained Brigadier FJ. Dillon, a mountain artillery officer in the 1920s, in Plain Tals, he became yours ina much more personal way than in the Bridsh Army. You knew all about him, where he came from, what his family was. You probably sisted his village and actually knew his parents, And he certainly relied ‘on you ifever he was in trouble" The tradition of service within a Family wis something common to both British and Indian soldiers and ‘levelopedl an esprit de corps within a regiment, which was built around a ‘network of personal loyalties, bonds which went beyond those of formal regulation and duty. Keeping in touch with ex-members ofthe regiment and dealing with their grievances in person, both features of the Cold Weather Tour, helped to strengthen these ties sil Further. Although the army fought two major frontier campaigns in the interwar period (the Third Afghan War of 1919 and the operations against the Fakir of Ipi during the period 1936-37), by far its largest task vas that of internal security, acting in aid ofthe eivil power. The civilian police found it increasingly difficult to cope with threats that ranged from industrial unrest t© outright terrorism, and the burden of maintaining order fell more and more on the army, particularly the British and Gurkha battalions. ‘This was always a distasteful job with adverse effects on both morale and training. General Sir Edmund Ironside, commander of the Meerut District between 1928 and 1931, commented that three or four years spent on these duties rendered & British battalion virwally useless. The tactics adopted in the face of lunrest were first to order a bugler to blow the Alarm, then to display a large notice reading ‘Disperse or I will fire’ in Hindi and Urdu. If the ‘rouble continued a marksman would be ordered to shoot to wound one of the ringleaders, preferably in the leg, ‘This was normally sufficient to resiore order, but from time to time, such as during the Communi Inspired Red Shirt riots at Peshawar in 1930, stronger measures including the use of armoured cars had to be employed. No matter what the tactics were, however, duties ofthis kind hardly constituted the ideal preparation for a war aguinst a major power. The Frontier Column The large frontier expeditions against rebellious tribes that characterised warfare on the NorthWest Frontier in the late Vietorian period had become a thing of the past. During the 1920s and 1930s the “frontier column’ was preferred. The frontier column normally consisted of brigade, made up of three or four infantry batalions plus ‘upporting arms, and was strong enough to deal with any local discontent amongst the tribes, Indeed, such a show of force was often sufficient to nip trouble in the bud. Ifthe authorities had to resort to stronger measures to quell a disturbance they characteristially levied a Fine from the village atthe source of the trouble, or in the worst eases, 1920 Dossolatouee the rans, tnd regiments had tay on {hair own fet Hore tho December 1990 ie Catector) burnt the village. Political pressure on the Indian Government demanded that the columns mose quickly and at minimum cost in terms of lives. In general, they provided an effective short-term solution to problems of local discontent, acceptable to both sides, The frontier tribes = the Mahsuds, Wazirs, Afridis, Orakzais, Mohmands and others = were willing to accept the check, provided it did not mean the permanent occupation of their lands the British were aware of this, and knew also that che cost of occupation would be prohibitive Im May 1987 che Bannu Brigade (Brigadier RH. Maynard) was engaged in operations against the Tori Khel Wavitis, the Followers of & local holy man, Haji Mirza Ali Khan, known to the British as the Fakir of Ipi. In composition the brigade was typical of a frontier column. The advance guard consisted of the 2/1Ith Sikhs, accompanied by a seetion fof Sappers and Miners; this was followed by the main bod, which comprised 2/tth Gurkhas, 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, ‘Tih and 19th Mountain Batteries, 12th Field Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, 8th Field Ambulance, a Supply Issue Section and the second line pack transport; bringing up the rear was 1/17th Dogras. ‘One company of Argylls and one company of Dogras were detailed t0 provide close protection and to help with the mules. The column was accompanied by seven platoons ofthe Tochi Scouts, who acted as scouts and outlying piquets. (Occasionally, a column such as this might be accompanied by a number of armoured cars belonging to one of the Royal Tank Gorps companies stationed in India.) ‘Although huge forces were no longer the order ofthe day, the wealth of experience in frontier warfare acquired over the years had not been wasted, and a number of sensible procedures had been instituted which governed the progress of the column in hostile territory. One of the most important of these was piqueting. Since the columns moved towards their objective = rebellious village, for example ~ along riveralleys, control of the hills overlooking their route was vital. One puutalion would provide the advance guard and would be responsible for posting piquets on the hills Theit location was then passed to the fattalion’s support company and to the cohumn's artillery so that fveryone knew exactly which hills were being piqueted. The piquets themselves carried a signalling flag and a number of white air {dentfication strips, both to mark their own location and to indicate the direction of an attic, ‘Afier the main body of the column had passed through it was the responsibilty of the batalion aeting asthe rear guard to collect up these piquets by means of flag or heliograph (and, eventually, by radio). The fear guard also cartied a large red flag to mark the very end of the column and no man was allowed to fall behind it, As che piquets tejoined the column they were checked off against a tally made by the advance guard to ensure that none had been forgotten. The withdrawal ff the final piquet was often a dangerous task, conducted under hostile fire whilst moving down one hill and climbing up the next, and one wvhch encouraged a certain level of fitness in those entrusted with it it was an inviolable rule that no wounded man should ever be left behind, since anyone unfortunate enough to fall into the hands of the ttibes would dic a terrible, lingering death, If necessary a counterattack svas quickly organised to ensure that the wounded were retrieved, Tt was tho important not to abandon any rifles, or even to leave behind ‘cartridge cases because they too would fll into enemy hands, Memories ould be remarkably long when such incidents were concerned: ‘Oh, that regiment - ob yes, weren't they the ones who lost those rifles in Tirah in 18942" Any soldier who lost his rifle was fined the cost ofits replacement - 84 rupees, 4 annas (around £12) ~ but despite the most stringent of precautions rifle thieves (“loose wallahs’) often found a way to make off with their prize The rough nature of the terrain and the need to halt whilst the piquets were sent out meant that a column often made only slow progress, Even ifne auack had taken place, a cohumn would often cover ‘ho more than five or six miles per day. Each evening it would make its amp. The camp layouts were generally rectangular, but could vary according tothe size ofthe column and the nature of the terrain. Camps Shared several other common features. The lines of the infantry ina sn eS orerae Seen mich strengone yt futher en ofthe yee Pate er| Marmon-Herington far of Son at Duke of Yorks (nn Gast (kines Hore) at st provided the dtonl ‘om Dison (WM NDE) battalions formed the perimeter and each of the our camp gates was made the sole responsibilty of fone of the battalions, ‘The supporting arms were placed in the centre. The perimeter of the camp way, reinforced by a breast-high wall and comer posts were created for each battalion's medium machine gone, Men slept chained to their rifles and a reserve, the Sinlying piquet’, ys mai. tained’ fully armed and equipped in case of emergency. Except for the most determined of tribesmen, however, an atack on the column on the march was far preferable to an attack against a fortified camp. Whilst the benefits of correct and efficient piqueting were well known, any failure to put the theory into practice would immediately be exploited. The dangers to the colin were increased because the tribes now included men who had served in the Indias Army during the First World War ~ men who knew the value of camouflage and concealment and who were able to put their army raining to good effect. Accompanied on this occasion by a detachment of the South ‘Waziristan Scouts, the Bannu Brigade was once more chasing the Fakir in June 1987. The Sikh batalion failed to piqueta ridge that ran parallel to the road, leaving a gap a mile wide between the Sikh piquets and those of the Dogras. Mahsud tribesmen immediately tried to filter through the gap and take both Indian battalions in the flank. ‘The Scouts, who were building that night's eamp, were sent to plug the gap, but afer a hande-hand struggle were forced from their position. The Scouts then rallied; with the arrival of reinforcements they retook the position and were eventually elieved by the Gurkhas, ‘What counted most in frontier fighting was experience, but often this experience could only be gained ata bloody price. The constant rotation of regular battalions, British and Indian, in and out of frontier posts ‘could result in battalion forgetting everything it had learnt, sometimes with disastrous consequences on its next tour of frontier duty. Snipers were a constant hazard for both the marching column and the camp. ‘The inexperienced regiment tended to blaze away immediately with every weapon they could lay their hands upon, but such tactics were rately successful. Opprobrium was heaped on a unit that adopted this approach: ‘Oh, they're the chaps that shoot back at snipers!” The experienced regiment vaited until it could pinpoint the sniper's precise location, then sent out a party at night to eliminate the threat. Incidentally, the British never caught up with the Fakir Mirza Ali Kahn, who continued to be a thorn in the side of post-partition Pakistan ‘unt his death in 1960,THE SECOND WORLD WAR ‘The Indian Army entered the Second World War woefully under- prepared. The amount of money devoted to the army by the Government of India had slowly declined after the end of the First ‘World War, Despite a subsidy from Grea: Britain it was left desperately short of modern weapons and equipment and it did not possess fulficient men able to handle mechanical wansport - not a single tember of the Royal Deccan Horse, for example, knew how to drive. (Only with the recruitment of large numer of Madrasss and Mahrattas ta this situation begin to change. Neither the Japanese depredations in China nor the outbreak of war in Europe disturbed the sanguine outlook of the British and Indian Governments ~ indeed, the advice ‘coming from London was that it was unlikely that Indian troops would be required at al, ‘The extent of the government’s miscalculation was apparent when, au the outbreak of war the Indian Army quickly found itself in the field ‘ain, immediately contributing two divisions (the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions) to the operations in the Western Desert and Abyssinia {and, curiously, four mule companies of the RIASG to the British Expeditionary Force in France). ‘Three Indian divisions (dhe 4th, 8th and 10th) went on to make a significant contribution to the campaigns in North Africa and Italy, from Mersa Matruh to the Gothie Line and the final crossing of the River Po. Another force intervened in Iraq and Persia to safeguard the overland route to the Soviet Union and also provided the trucks used to deliver aid, At this stage of the war taining in India was directed entiely towards preparing for campaigns in North Aiea and the Middle Bast, Nothing at all was done co strengthen the defences of Burma and Malaya, since the Japanese were discounted asa real threat, and the garrisons of both countries consisted only of Indian ‘States battalions and Indian Army battalions weakened by the departure ‘of drafts sent to reinforce the units in Africa ‘The fallacy of this view of Japanese intentions was quickly revealed. ‘The disasters of 1941 and 1942 inthe Far Fast saw many Indian battalions sent into captivity in Singapore (67,840 men of the Indian Army beeame prisoners of wat), whilst others were pushed out ‘of Burina until the front line became the frontier fof India itself: Slowly, but with increasing momentum, matériel to reequip the amy was brought in by sea or even manufactured in India In April 1942 General Sir Archibald Wevell, the Cin€ India, abolished the existing strrcure of regional commands and replaced. them with a single, unified command (Central) ard three armies (North-Western, Southern and Eastern); it yeas the Eastern Army that attacked so disistrously in the Arakan in 194%, Ie was renamed the Mth Army in October 1943 and received new ‘commander, General William Slim. One month later, GHQ India was placed under Mountbatten’s newly formed South-ast Asia Command. SEAC took over the prosecution of the war, whilst ‘a nan Patter Carrot ‘Skinners Horses put trough paces The high-sod oaly example were bully no “his price vehicle for though by mombars a he ace BWA IID?)‘Aroup of wooper ofthe ft, Duke of Connaught Own Lancers Watson's the rence ‘realmente Sth san Divison, featerine wth one of hele ‘nan allon hl oun 084 Tho mon ore wearing standard rtahstyle woot serge Bateeos the black beet of the Royal Armoured Corps bears the repmental cop badge, bat they pig ne other niga, (tune nassaa) Central Command, now ye ‘named India Command, became a vast recruiting and training organisation, ‘Wavell didnot survive the reorganisation in post a8 both hhe, and to a large extent the Indian Army as a whole, had forfeited the confidence of Churchill (who had been convinced by the actions of Gandhi and Nehru that the whole sub-continent was about to erupt in rebellion), Never theless, the reforms introduced by Wavell and continued by his successor, Field Marshal Sir Glaude Auchinleck, succeeded in creating a well trained and ‘well disciplined force that was to prove more than capable of meeting its Japanese opponents and defeating them. The firs. ep lal been to calla halt to the expansion of the army, which hhad taken place at the cost of efficiency at unit level, Secondly, anew ontiook on training was introduced =the work ofthe Director of Infantry, Major-General Reginald Savory ~ which was characterised by regime of tough and realistic batle drills supplemented by further tsaining when the units arived in Burma. Schools were established to provide instruction in the latest tactical doctrines, and emphasise the necessity of clove co-operation between all arms, Indian opinion was by no means united in its attiude 19 the war Opposition came largely from the Hindw-based Congress Party, led by Gandhi and Nehru, who saw the war as an opportunity to rid India of the British once and for all. As a result it proved necesary to divert 7 itary btaions to ery out ier security dis, paula in the north of the country, where they were faced with violent demonstrations and acts of pety sabotage. About one-third ofthe total of {60,000 Indian prisoners who had been captured in Malaya and Singapore were persuaded to join the “Indian National Army’ (known to the British as ‘Js! = Japanese Indian Forces). The National Army was led hy a member of the Congress Party, Subhas Chandra Bose. Bose had raised ‘small unit of Indian volunteers from soldiers eaprured in the Western Desert; he then moved to the Far Eas in 1943 and threw in his ot with the Japanese. Although the Japanese formed a number of units in the Indian [National Army these did not make any significant military contribution to ‘te Burmese campaign ~ most surrendered on contact with Allied tsoops ose himself died following a pkane crash in August 1945, is neverthlesrnirabe hat only 20 yas afer the masse of Uunarmed civilians at Amritsar in 1919 ~ a true erisis im Anglo-Indiannt Dione at over ison, dicerded Seca 12 fxd frat cison dserd Soptonbar 1909, bora arch 1042: rq ne of communication aes ‘Asano en 18 rd proworGuson. dered Sotenber 190; 6orr Spee 1043 Burn (nd cpsroboe banded ere 1945 4 fermed Sepeésr 1960, Westar Das, Eta, Sy, Tura, 89, Green astendes gust 4S sh med Sept 1959 Suan Eten, Westen Dest, irr, 0; Soba 1906 tah: formed rt 134%, ag dns Nebr 144 Th. red October 1980; Bra, Mee; banded HE ‘i: termed ctor 194; Pasa, Sy West Dasa, ap donde 148 fn rad Gentrbe 140; Malaya, Saeco ced trun 12 ‘th. rr Jour 194 kag Pas, estan Dee, ay ‘ier 1988 ‘te ‘orm Octo 1940; Mea, Sano cactied Farry 1042 ‘te fone Jruay 04S; Pa, tg: esos South Pia ven Jruy 045 ‘ fomed Mey 1942: uma, oma 26a waning fern Mch 194, Sn ard 148 fer May 142: Burry bance 1988 tomer June 198; Assam, Bure, dco 2166 foes Aol 194; Assay became eh Arbre Service of Indian divisions 1939-46 ie fia. vary TO: Bari Sobre 1047 za fr ust 942; Bua, Mal: dor 1046 om. far At 1942, Burr, dv, Surat, ‘yum: Sama Mar 1942: Coen gan; tanta 005 at so ‘era Fara 1043 on Combes Fr Cote, ‘rerio oth iin Spt 1044 ‘ered sre 1042 for Te Bum Don, ta red: bonded 1048 ‘Armourea Ovisions ‘at ern Avge 180 8 Tl fred Dn, reclraed 3et Dsoambar 1; roa. Sr, Water Desa stoned 1046 ‘edesgnaod Sard, DocerEe 194 has Lek up 0 rds ford Jy 194; ot up em th Don Fobra 1049 4m: foro Febuary 1989 om dnd ns ed Ors ‘ame ro ae 2 inary Don Ap OMe ‘Aone Division “Ath, lored Juni T4 Ran BT OR, BUTS Other formations rag Fore: oor aq Ap 1, Fan Hebe ana erg ‘et Burma Daision:xed Miro 1949; desojetin stn || Burma Ny 1082 rrr emo 8 0 ry ain Je 44 Dun ne 1942 relations ~ so many Indians gave their support to the war effort, Some 2 /emillion officers and men were serving by August 1945, compared t0 900,000 in 1941, and 80 VCs were won. The seemingly more moderate Mohammed Ali Jinnah of the Muslim League condemned the violence inspired by the Congress Party, which in turn led the British to regard the Muslim population of India as the mote reliable. Significantly, although there were three times as many Hindus as Muslims in the Indian population, Muslim regiments provided 65 per cent of Indian troops fighting in North Afvica, Tally and Burn Representative action: The capture of Meiktila, Whilst Indian regiments fought on most ofthe fronts af the Second World War, their most significant contribution came in Burtpa. The reconquest of Burma as essential forthe British in order to safeguard the north-east ltontier of India, Moving the front line farther east would also conuibure 'o the sey of te airfields in the north ofthe country, which were being, Used to channel supplies to the Chinese forces of Chiang Kaishek, The Firs step was to clear the Japanese forces from the west bank of the River ‘Chindwin, and this was completed by the end of November 1944 ‘The next sage of the campaign was to be Operation "Capital. Plans were based on the assumption that the Japanese would try to hold the‘The Maneraoh of Pattn Inepact the mam of © eye) Ina 184. Te man wear Duovers ns varity of shades, ‘The major and sabedarmajr ‘igh weorbateares, and have cs of lth - possibly in red, the regimental esing esr = backing thr ep badges. Note sign of th naan Dison tres ‘horace, nylon on wrod ‘aching, sometimes ged Whe (toa naseaen, Important centre of Mani alay by fighting a batde to the north of the ci around Shwebo, where was hoped that the fly terrain would make Japan ese positions easy meat fog Allied armour and fightey bombers. Howeves, © thin this was to misread Japanese intentions, for they bid. iy fret decided to fall back and defend the easter Dank of the Irrawaddy, Quickly rearranging his priorities the GOCin-C. of the Ith Army, General Slim, launched Operation “Exiended Capital” with 4 view to by-passing Mandalay to the south and capturing the strategic rail centre of Meiktil, thus cutting the Japanese forces Burma in wo, ‘Whilst XXXIN Corps (Lt. Gen, Sir Montague Stopford) kept up the pressure against Shwebo, Gen. Slim planned for Lith Army's other formation, IV Corps (L. Gen. Frank Messeryy), to advance in & right hook down the Kabaw valley and catch the Japanese by surprise, XXXII Corps mace its frst bridgehead across the Irrawaddy, north of Mandalay, which was established on 9 January 1945 by 19th Division, The Japanese, believing this to be just another Chindltstyle operation, at first discounted it; when, as reinforcements moved in, they came 1 realise the truth it was too late. Within four weeks, two other bridgeheads had been created. The Japanese tied to dislodge thew footholds, but they were running out of reserves and in the final analy could only contain, but not eliminate therm, This left the way clear for TV Corps to advance down the Kabaw valley ogress was by no means easy for, although there was no Japanese ‘opposition, the poor sate ofthe roads and the hilly nature ofthe terrain made progress exceptionally difficult, and prodigies were performed by the engineers and by Allied airmen to keep the troops resupplied. Evea then, the tanks had to move on their own tracks for much of dhe wa because their Wansporters could not get through. To keep the Japanese Jn the dark about the actual crossing place three feints were madle across the river by three different brigades (14th, 28th East African and 89th) The real crossing point, at Nyaungu, was apparently ignored, However, 4 reconnaissance had been made by a Sea Reconnaissance Unit and Special Bost Service section. The attack, led by 2nd South Lancashires, went ahead at dawn on 14 February. ‘When the blow finally fll it was upon on a small contingent of Bose's Indian National Army, who immediately surrendered. In the town of Nymungu there was some resistance from a Japanese garrison, who withdrew into nearby caves. Rather than risk heavy casualties winkling theenemy out the caves were simply dynamited, Enombing the defenders. Quickly deploying Thsture of pontoon ferries and Balley rafts, 70h Division procceded to form the bridgehead whilst ih Division (Maj. Gen. DT ‘Punch? Cowan), pported by 255th Tank Brigade (Brigadier {Cuude Pert) passed through and began the dash for Meiktila, Perr's force consisted of two of the Irigade’s three armoured regiments (116th Regiment RAG had been left behind to protect the bridgehead), their motor battalion, 4/4th Grenadiers, followed by 48th and 63rd Infantry Brigades plus support from Corps troops in the fonmn of 16th Light Cavalry’s armoured cars (ess fone squadron with 7h Division), 59th Self Propelled Battery, Reyal Artillery (equipped with Sextons) and 6/7th Rajputs. ‘Once again, the Japanese misread the situation and concenirated their efforts on fislodging the feint bridgehead at Seikpyu mmanved by 28th East African Brigade Group. Supported by RAF fighterbombers the tanks of 5th Brigade were able 10 brush aside any “opposition they encountered. A forward airfield feat readied at Thabukton, 18 miles away from Meikita, enabling Cowan to fly in reinforcements and, more importantly, petzol and ammunition This airfield became even more vital when a Japanese counterattack temporarily severed ‘Cowan from his bridgehead on the Irrawaddy "The attack on Meiktila began at dawn on 1 March, The town itself sma set amongst rolling hills between two large lakes, which were shallow at that time of year, as was the river that fed them, To the east ofthe town were cultivated fields, but cactus thorn bushes grew everywhere and nade progress dificult. The town’s Japanese garrison consisted of two airfield battalions, a reinforcement battalion of three provisional companies andl some administrative units; their numbers were boosted. bythe arrival of 168th Infantry Regiment en route for its parent division farther north, which attached itself to the defenders. 255th Tank Brigade, supported by the selfpropelled battery and 6/7th Rajputs, went around the eastern (rear) side ofthe position. The fist attack penetrated into the town itself, but the armour withdrew as hight fell, careful not to be caught amongst the ruins overnight. A. second attack on the following day saw the capture of the pagoda on Point 860, a hill overlooking the whole town. On the other side of Meiitla the 48th and 63rd Brigades attacked either side of the North Lake. Each brigade was accompanied by a squadron of Shermans from the Royal Deecan Horse and from Probyn’s Horse respectively ~ and. supported by the divisional artillery and RAP bombers. Despite fletermined resistance they penetrated the defences to the west and north and, after some bitter handto-hand fighting, the town fell on 5 March, Mopping up took a further two days, {eutonantKeramjot ‘Singh Judge, VE, of te 4745 Pana On 8 March 4945, doring the dafence of ‘TW Dhaionsbrdgehond on he Irrannday fiver nese Myngyen, ral Burm, Lt Judge won ‘ety Regt RAC ogsinat ‘charges whlch wiped ext tn ‘being marty woundos. ‘owns moa743) ar‘Ansa, an 4 Sharman of Lancers rym Hore Mike during W Corp" fink ls Ui Bane Singh, me. tune moeesy trawadey, 1945, rom ‘nfomatin In Aan foe Select oaraphy! end the Oi! 28 | baton. This was not the end of the bate, forthe Japanese were determined! to retake the town immediatly Iwas quickly surrounded by their ISth and 49:h Divisions but, fortunately for the British, the «wo Japanese comm: anders made litle attempt to coordinate their atacks, The gavison, now joined by 99th Brigade, was completely dependent upon air resupply. The failure of the enemy to produce an effeetve strategy now cost them dese because they were table to mount an attack suficienty strong to retake the airstrip at Meiktila defended by a contingent of the RAF Regiment, Further, they were kept offhalance by General Cowan's aggressive defence wich sent out joint infanty-armour columns, supported from the ag, seeps around the perimeter which often lasted for 48 hours at a ime, These had the effect of continually disrupting Japanese assaul preparations; and when 9h Brigade (belonging to bth Division) as airlifted in under fire as further reinforcements on 15 March, the siege wi effeeively at an end. After one final assault on the night of 20 March the Japanese withdrew; the defenders were able to link up with a colum triving south from Mandalay, and the remainder of 5th Division could now join up with 9th Brigade within the perimeter. Japanese casualties wert high: 800 men were killed and only 36 were taken prisoner. The capture of Meiktila unhinged the whole Japanese position it northern Burma and Mandalay fel at the end of March. Slim could now turn his attention to the south, towards Rangoon, whilst the Japanese could only withdraw across hostile terrain in small parties, Both in conception and execution ‘Capital’ and “Extended Capital! ‘were masterstrokes. Slim was not put off bis stride when faced with the Japanese withelrawal to the Irrawaddy, but merely recast his plans to take advantage of the new situation. The men of the Royal Decean Horse and Probyn’s Horse were by no means experienced, battle-hardened veterans of armoured combat when they entered the campaig) nevertheless, they quickly exhibited a mastery of their art. The advance of their brigade provided a fine demonstration of the fruits of years of army-air force cooperation, Teamed in the Western Desert and it ‘Normandy. Both operations stand as tribute to Savory’s work in India a well as to the professionalism of the Indian Army.Corer eer en EE he ere Lee eae! IN Dome ls. Gen Fr Messi) ‘Corps troops: Bh Modu Fegan FA, tat LA Farrand UC B7t HAA cian ah Eri Baton, 75 424h and On ado Hod Carpanos nen Enaroes 268th Tank Brigade igor C. Puts 116 Repent Royal ened Cops th ates rob, Pal Deccin Heo, 4h dary Graders 200 (E25 tian ntaity Brigade Group (3, Ts ‘Gatley: ger em Tagan en 7 Soa Btrs. Knga Aan, et Ala Fd et Aeon Engrs ‘Sh Inan Division is Gon ECA. Merseg 91 Indlan ify Brigade. A saan 2 Wie oh Fogiere, 2nd Pais sre, ‘th dara aa Kaan ray 0) {2 nian infantry Brigede i. E. Osron Yours 2rd Sulok ogre atu Region {UST Dog Reon {tt indian inane Brigade ra, EO. Pook 4m 00 al ios Ker Regimes Aa Pas Piment. ‘ures ap Begin Divisional rope) an 2 Fat Pastors 2h Meunier A, 8th AT Pager PA 2, 20 a 74% Ft on. Eons th Fak ana. bnan Enanea, 3h Jl Pama ec), “ian Puna grt, Mectine Gun Bata 7h oar Fsiment PARTITION “Tn Inan Dion ps) Gan. 2. Evers $d Indian Ifa Brigade rn, 8,Catngece 4th Pune Region, et Guna Fis, at Bama Feat 25th Indian lft Brigade 51 YA Crot Ore 08a, 1st kh Pogert. 6 Ga Pes ‘ain Ian ntaney Brigade iH Dro Pe ‘Sou areata Roginn, 4146 Pung Feent 45h una oe 240 ek Regier Bia 2 Maur RegnerTIA and. 7 and tat Fld Oo, ican Ergot et Feld Parc, xn Enea, 2m Pua Ase ec, an Bree arty ASF, Mare Can ation Foe Fire Fe ‘7m Indian Division is) on. 0" C2 40th naan leven Brigade 2, FCO. Hey 1 ‘serve eaten, 4/2 enor Porc Regma ‘V7 Gu Pies Sinan ini Brigade Ps Gis. Eur th Se Frome, 110m Bac Pegs th Gude ‘201 naan nant Bega frp. GL Tesh Purp Regiment, Ske et oy, Vr aa les Divslonal troops: 22 Fins Fagin A, tt Pik Fegirat 256 Mexnton egret, rc VT egret FA: st a 70 Fel es dan Engreos, ‘et Catia Fl Gag. 6 Jt pet eh fm apt Reamer. 994 ri Fea Fs a | Despite the end of hostilities, Indian troops continued to be engaged in gurrion and peace-keeping duties in Greece, Egypt, Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia and Indochina, ag well as forming part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. Their task in Indonesia became particularly difficult. Landing in support of the Dutch, the prevar colonial power, a single brigade (the 49h, detached from 28rd Division) proved insufficient to control nationalist forces, losing 18 officers and 374 men as casualties within three days. It proved necessary to reinforce 49th Brigade by a full division (the 5th) with armoured support, but even this much strengthened force could do litle more than control the main urban centres sich as Soerabaja (the modern Surabaya). Many of the regiments occupied on these duties ‘across the world only returned to India upon Partition in 1947, Acommitice, chaired by JE. Willeox, had been set up in 1944 t consitler the postwar size of the Indian Army. Amongst. its recommendations were changes in the structure of the army and in the number of regiments ~ the cavalry arm in particular was again to be reduced. However, all these proposals were shelved on Partition, In 1946, the British Government had finaly agreed to demands for Indianindependence, seting a date of August 1947 for the transfer of power [At the same time the territory of India was to be divided into wo, splitting off the largely Muslim communities in the northwest and the east ofthe sub-continent to form the new country of Pakistan. The Indian Atmy was also divided up, following lines of class and religion, with men and equipment divided on a 2:1 basis in favour of the new India, In addition, four of the army's ten Gurkha regiments (the 2nd, 6th, 7h and 10th Gurkha Rifles) were transferred to British service, the ‘remainder going to India. Single class regiments were easily located to one of the ovo new countries, but mixed class regiments had ‘o be dismembered, Hindu companies or squadrons joining the new Indian Army, whilst cheir Muslim brotherein-arms left for Pakistan, The Whole process was completed in a most professional manner, the army Femaining relatively immune from the religious fanaticism at large chewhere in the country, which resulted in so many hundreds of thousands of deaths. There could be no more eloquent testimony to the ‘aprit de conp ofthe old Indian Army “To capture of Meds, March 1845, rom normaton in Ale,THE REGIMENTS Cavalry Every cavalry regiment in 1914 as con with a headquarters staff, which included the regin ‘officer, the rsaldarmajor, and four sabre squadrons, by a British officer and secondin-command was divided mo two troops each commanded by a risldar with a jemadaras second- n-command, Each troop consisted of a hotdafadar eight dafadars, trumpeter and 70 sowars, AIL ranks cartied a swords NCOs and troopers also carried a rifle and a lance in those regiments designated as Lancers. rent also included a section of Hotchkiss light machine guns. The regiments serving with the Indian Corps in France handed in their lances, but these were later reissued on a piecemeal basis when the ed to Palestine. ‘own recruiting practices whieh they had inherited from 1 jes of the Honourable East India Company: Most cavalry regiments (with the exception of the 26th, 27th by the silladar system. As sd that every soldier supply his own horse, government providing only his arms. By the outbreak of the First World War, however, the sytem ‘modified so that the regiment provided the horse (in order 1 se it was of good quality) and the equipment in return for a sum of money (the assami paid by the recruit In 1905, the assamiamounted to approximately £55; the recruit had to pay at least £10 on joining th regiment and then meet the balance nts from his was around £2 (34 rupees) per month. ‘At the end of his service the assaai was either repaid to the soldier, so giving him a handy demobilisition grant, whilst the horse and ‘equipment were made ready for his replacement, or the discharged ‘whieh ‘ourably discharged forfeited the assami, whilst that of rman who died whilst sill serving was refunded to his family. Any horse lost on active service was replaced from a regimental fund to which all the men subscribed; a horse lost in peacetime had to be paid for by its rider, but every man's pay was subject to a compulsory savings pa ‘or ‘cuttings’, which laid aside a small sum every month towards this ‘A further by-product ofthe slladar system was a certain individuality in regimental equipment, Since this was provided by the regiment rather than by the ordnance services, much of it conformed to the regiments own particular pattern ~ quite frequently different from that fof any other. This tate of affairs was clearly recognised by the Dress and Clothing Regulations where many items were described inno more dail than as being of ‘regimental patter’. ‘Another unustal characteristic of siadar regiments was the durlar. a Moghul tradition adopted by the British, The siladar regiment was similar to a joint stock company with the men, by virtue of the assem, the company’s shareholders. The durdar, an assembly attended by ll the (continued on page 13)|| BeTHe WESTERN FRONT, 191415 |e Uuenan 26H Ludhiana Sikhs || 2 8upoy 129% Duka of Conaugh's Own Bais ‘5 Fiera, 8 Gara ies.(BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS {Eos Britian Roya rery 2 Lancer V8 Raptors ites1 Sepoy 4 Inn Bs bya A864 2 Suen King Ewa Vs Oa ua ies NCD, Contra ria More ay, winter 14445eTHE FAR EAST, 106-46 | eH 5/4% Pans Rogmont ata, 18 2 aman 17 Grd Ries Burma, 142 {Nag 17h Sk Rogan Bm, 12-45officers and men, gave any man the opportunity t@ raise any issue ‘Concerning the administration ofthe regiment and its assets and have it considered immediately by the colonel. Seven extra cavalry regiments (numbered from 40th to 46th) were formed during the Fist World Wat, During the conflict, however, the silladar system broke down. The supply of specialtoregiment equipment and clothing proved impossile to maintain in overseas theatres, whilst regiments lacked the funds (o refund the asvanisof the ‘unprecedentedly high number of casualties. The raising of regiments by ‘what amounted to a private contract was a1 anachronism for a modern ariny and it was abolished. ‘After the re-organisation of 1922 regiments were reduced to three squadrons of four troops each, one of which was a machine-gun troop, plus a headquarters wing. Like their British counterparts Indian cavalry regiments mechanised only very slowly and reluctantly. ‘The first regiments to be affected were the 13th Lancers and the Scinde Horse, who paraded for the last time with their horses 2s late as 14 April 1959, Hoth were designated Frontier Armouree Regiments, and comprised fone light tank squadron (with a mixture of Mk. IL, IV and VI ight tanks) land two armoured car squadrons (equipped with Crossleys). The Sehicles were those relinquished by Royal Tank Corps companies returning to England. To ease the problems posed by mechanisation three regiments (12th Cavalry, 15th Lancers and 20th Lancers) were converted into training regiments, whilst the remainder formed large {groups based on these three regiments, at depots in Jhansi, Ferozepore land Lucknow respectively. By the end of 1940 all the cavalry regiments had given up their horses, but were not yet fully armoured. A shortage of AFVs meant that a’ number of regiments, such as the Central India Horse (the reconnaissance regiment of 4th Infantry Division) or Skinner's Horse (its counterpart in 5th Infantry Division), were equipped only with 15-ewt. trucks ~ in effect making them understrength motor battalion Indeed, some regiments served in precisely that role: the 2nd Royal Lancers, Leh Cavalry and I8th Lancers were formed into 3rd Motor Brigade (Bist Indian Armoured Division) and sent to North Africa in 1941, There they were thrown into the Tobruk fighting 40. per cent below establishment in machine guns and with only one antitank rifle per regiment instead of 42 Volunteers from the regiments in this arigade went on to form the rmieleus of the Indian Long Range Squadron, an LRDC-ype unit “companies, commanded by a capuin astsied by ilentenant and two or three European warrant officers ‘or sergeants with four Tndian officers and 202 other ‘ranks. The Britsh officers were on detached service from the Royal Engineers, whilst the. warrant officers and sergeants came fom one of three RE depots set up specifically to provide European NGOs for the Sappers and. Miners, Indian Personnel consisted! of a subedar, a jmadar and shout 150 NCOs and suppers in each company Each company also hd its own establishment of pack animal to carry its tools ‘A fourth corps, the Burma Sappers and Miners, was created after the First World Was but was disbanded as an economy measure in 1029, Signals personnel were withdrawn to join the Signals Corps in 1920, Indlanisation did not affect these units ntl 1931 when the taining ot KGIOs commenced at Chatham. Although they cach retained thier individual identities the three corps were made putt of the Corps of Indian Engineers in 1932; from that time new olficers were al sgraduates of Dehra Dun. The three comps were renamed Groups in 1942 (eg, Queen Vitoria’ Own Madras Group) and the Corps of Engineers was made ‘Royal’ in I946, as the Second Lutnat Roe Btin__Royal Indian Engineers Sorhgte tres ntornot “One ofthe Engineers’ bestknown contibutons tothe military ar ‘is regiment, 88th (Coke's ‘was the Bangalore torpedo. This was a long tube filled with explosives, ‘cst Munroe hich wan mcd for wireeuting and other tall demolidon joe where as itwas dificult to posion the explosives in the normal way, particlary ‘pom the command ot in the fce of enemy fire, However, the Engineers lasing lege lay not {tr acne, naan smerely in dheir military works, but in the thousand of miles of reds Din Sura 182A rayay, vlecommunications networks and. irigation projects which De bemace mes ecemamain they had planned and helped to build, whieh to this day form the basis of the subscontinents infrastructure. loneers imple field engineering work, particularly in hostile territory, was carried out by regiments of pioncers. Pioneer regiments were also feted tm the Idan Amy at Patton by which ine he vs 0¢ enor Oran ree trained to fight as infantry and so were ideal for work in such areas. {Uae Coteton Pioneers were not used by the British Army until the First World War when they were introduced at the instigation of Kitchener, by then Secretary for War, who as a Royal Engineer himself was well aware of their value. Unlike the Sappers each sepoyin a pioneer regiment carried 4 pickaxe ora light spade in special leather equipment, whilst NCOs and Duglers carried axes, saws and billhooks. Only heavier equipment ~ shovels, explosives, etc. ~ was carried on muleback. Duting the Fist World War the work of the pioneers was aided by the formation of an Indian Labour Corps~a corps which included, in a move that smacks of| some desperation, seven ‘jail companies’ recruited from prisoners in Civilian jail, which al served in Mesopotamia,By the latter stages of the war these regiments had become more and more specialised and ‘were considered 100 valuable to pt into the firing line as assault pattalions alongside the other infantry. This was recognised in the 1922 reorganisation, which took them out of the Tine altogether, forming them into four regiments ~ three made up ‘of four batialions and one with a Single battalion. The companies that composed these Datalions ‘operated. independently in the field, and the distinctions between Pioneers and. Sappers and Miners gradually became ‘more and more blurred. In 1938, therefore, the pioneer regiments were disbanded and their personnel absorbed by the Sappers and Miners. With the outbreak of war in 1989, however, men were once again required to perform pioneer duties and in KO the Indian Labour Corps (Grom 1948, the Indian Pioneer Corps) was re-formed, The Corps ‘was eventually o consist ofsome 400 companies, with 175,000 men and 1,500,000 civilian labourers, of whom about half were engaged on civil construction projects Infantry Most Indian infantry regiments, the Gurkhas apart, consisted ofa single battalion. In 1914, each infantry battalion was composed of four double ‘companies, Fach of these was commanded by a British major or eaptain with another captain or subaltern as secondin-command, subalterns in training were frequently attached to the Company HQ. Each company alo had a sudwday and a jenaday, each of whom commanded a halk company of two sections, Every section comprised 2 hauildar and 20 sepors. The total strength was 13 British officers, 17 Indian officers and 723 NCOs and men ~ slightly weaker than a British battalion, The senior Indian officer of the regiment was the swhearmajor, the rank was the theoretical equivalent of a Britsh captain, but the individual authority of these men gave them a role and importance somewhat greater than that ‘The double company system was abolished in 1916 (Indian Army Orders 341-1916 and 684-1916) and Indian battalions were brought inc line with the British practice of four companies per battalion, each ‘under a British commander and secondhin-command. Fach company now consisted of four platoons (1wo under a suber and two under Jemadar, each assisted by a havldar): every platoon consisted of four ‘Sections of ten men under a naik or lancenaik There was also a headquarters wing, which consisted of the specialist sections, including the band, signallers, machine gunners, cooks, drivers and craftsmen, The total embarkation strength of each regiment was raised to 1,080 all ranks. etal tom a photo of the band ofthe ar (anahbac Light Intatry Mandy gust 4016, ‘stn he Agent, Le LE ‘orm wa sear with emerald. | 1 nar Madras Regiment 4922, but war dabanded the {otewing yar: (Lie Calecton) a7‘Twentyshree new infant regiments (49th, 50th, 7Odh, 7Ist, 85th, 111th, 13ist-133rd, Mch—145th, 150ch-156eh, Leh Gurkhas) were formed by a variety of means between 1914 and 1918 ~ from ney recruits, by drafts from existing regiments and by the incorporation of contingents from the police (I81st-182nd) and Imperial Service state (1401h:=145th) into the line. In addition, 44 regiments raised a second battalion, four regiments (23rd, 30th, 89th and the Guides) each raised fan extra evo battalions, and ‘one (9th) an extra three. All these battalions were disbanded during the period between 1919 and 1921 Further reinforcements came in 1916, in the form of eight battalions of the Nepalese Army, which served in India as garrison troops until 1918, In 1929, each batalion’s machine gun group, which consisted of two sections, was expanded 10 company by adding two further sections and by taking over one of the rifle companies, which now became D (MG) Company and, in 1935, D (Support) Company. Further changes were made in December 1988 to bring battalions into line with British practice. ‘The Machine Gun Company was reduced to a platoon within HQ Company, and D Company once more became a rifle company. At the same time, each company was now reduced to only three platoons bf dinee sections each; and a new Support Company was created with A group of owas trom ‘mortar platoon and a carrier platoon, {80h Vaughan’) tls, Frontior ‘The machine gun platoons of British infantry battalions stationed in aes 12t8 tenia wh nia wee also manned by Indian personnel, wo cared detr neapoe cote neaereacte on mute back When thet Bris bareion wa bout to eters Ronee Svanemenat ger tase the Indian powsonmne were uansered ts epiceonent Response Bick ona oan cing TMH for draining these Indian bop ell oa sehool wet upd te apes sroup includes two men from Of the 10th Battalion, 17th Dogra Regiment. During the Second World War the following int fantry regiments raised a machine gun batalion > regan Puri Win, She, Doprs and Pathane. following British practice: 6th, 7, 9th, 10th, Ith, 12h, 13th, Mth, {dele Cotton) 15th, 16th, 17th, and 19th. Few saw any action in their intended role, however, and most were LLL) converted back to infantry or to a different armor. service altogether. Despite plans to issue ISewe. trucks teach battalion many remained reliant on mules as battalion transport. Each battalion had around 80 animals, which carried its inch’ mortars and ammunition, reserve small ching tools and extra water fone was allocated (© the battalion's medical officer and another t HQ, The 2inch mortars which ‘equipped every platoon hhad to be carved by theirA further leguey of the Mutiny was Britain's refusal to provide Indian troops with up-to-date small arms the weapons they carried tended t0 be at least one pattern behind the British. yen as Tate as 1911, at a time when British troops ‘were armed with the Short Magazine LeeEnfield, it ‘was proposed that Indian troops should be equipped with a singleshot, non- magazine rifle. Thus, at the outbreak of the First World War, most Indian troops were armed with Lee-Metfords and long Lee- Enfielas (although a small umber of SMLEs had been issued from 1908). Such distinctions became impossible to sustain in the heat of battle and by 1918 most Indian troops had received the SMLE, The machine gun platoons, sometimes not formed until a regiment had left India, as in the case ofthe 30th Punjabisin 1916, were ‘equipped with the Vickers, Later in the war (the skillavarms badge was not authorised until 1917), a Lewis gun was allocated to each platoon ‘When a replacement for the Lewis was sought in the 1980s the Indian Army opted to “go it alone’ whilst the British Army was still tsying to ‘come to a decision. The Indian choice fell on the VickersBerthier, ‘which closely resembled the Bren gun, the eventual British selection, but which vas lighter and less robust, ‘The gun was to be manufactured in India at the Inshapore Factory near Caleutta, Production was, however, slow; by September 1939 not every regiment had received theit full allocation of 19. During the Second World War battle losses were replaced by Brens, in effect phasing out the Vickers Berthier, tthe beginning of the Second World War, as atthe outbreak of the First, the infantry arm was obliged to expand to meet the manpower needs ofthe conflict, The Sra Madras Regiment, dishanded in 1988 as an economy measure, was reraised; the Territorial battalions were incorporated into their respective regiments, and a number of regiments raised garrison butalions to free fit men for the front line. These measures were sill insufficient. Rather than repeat the mistakes ‘of the First World War, when a reluctance to look beyond the traditional “martial races’ led to overrecruitment in their home areas, the army now broadened its recruiting base and created nev regiments from non- traditional sources, This resulted in the formation of the Bihar, the Assam, the Mahar, the Ajmer and the Chamar Regiments and of the Lingayat and Coorg Battalions. Some of these units were ineffective as infanery, but once they had heen transferred to other armsofservice many of the men were a success as soldiers ~ the experience of war again ‘demonstrating the flawed nature of the whole ‘martial race’ theory. {argh nontry a Secundrabod, ty 1946, with ‘Abdul Hussein. The men Prjbi Christians (ile Coleen) 49In addition to this inerease in the numbers of conventional infanty the army was also strengthened by the raising of the first Indian pparatzoops in 1941, These consisted of one Indian and one Gurkha Parachute Battalion, numbered [59nd and 153rd respectively, and 411th (Royal Bombay) Parachute Section, Indian Engineers. The men of the two parachute battalions were drawn from most ofthe army's infantry regiments, (There were to exceptions ~ firstly, Sikh regiments, since Sikhs were unable to wear the parachutis’s helmet, and secondly. the Oth Gurkhas, who were recruited from high«aste Nepalese, and would pot have been able to live and eat with men from other regiments) ‘These units, together with the British 15lst Battalion, made up 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, part of a proposed Indian Airborne Division. The Indian and Gurkha battalions went on to form the nucleus fof the Indian Parachute Regiment, created in March 1945, but this was disbanded later in the same year. Airborne battalions were found instead from existing infantry regiments; 11 battalions had been converted to their new role by the time of Partition. Although Indian paratroops took part in several ground actions, notably a Sangshak in March 1944, they never made an operational jump: plans for an Ambemstyle attack to recapture Singapore in the company of the British 61h Airborne Division "were being developed when the war ended, In 1946, as part of the recommendations of the Willeox Committee, all the infantry egiments, exeept for the six Punjab units (Ist, 2nd, 8th, 14th-16th), lost their numbers; for example, the Srd Madras Regiment became simply the Madras Regiment. The 4th Bombay Grenadiers not ‘only tose their number, but also changed their ttle, the last vestige ofthe Presidency Armies, to became the Indian Grenadiers. A further proposal, to disband the 7th and 10ch Gurkhas, was not acted upon, Supporting Services The Indian Army had developed a number of specialist corps during the 19% century, but these were ready only to support the kind of frontier warfare in which the army had thus far been engaged. The Supply and Transport Corps of 1914 was composed entirely of animal transport Units it was not until Inter in the First World War that mechanical transport companies made an appearance, and even then they were manned exclusively by British troops transferred from Territorial Dattalions, since no Indian (and few British regulars, for thae matter) could possibly have received suitable training. During the same contfict the STC took over the supply of food, fodder and fuel, which individual regiments had previously been accustomed to finding for themselves. ‘The Comps was renamed the Indian Army Service Corps after the war sand was made ‘Roya’ in 1985. A mule transport unit of the RIASC was the first Indian Army unit to take the field in 1939 when i was sent to France (its members were evacuated in May 1940 and eventually returned (0 India). Later, the Comps shouldered much of the burden of delivering supplies to the beleaguered Russians through Persia, The Farms Department was originally part of the Supply and “Transport Corps, but was separated from its parent in 1912. Although its original responsibilities covered only grass (for fodder) and dairy produce, by the ime of the Second World War these had been extended 1 include pigs, poultry, ducks ancl rabbits‘The medical comps had a complex ancestry and at one time medical duties were split perween a number of different “organisations. The Indian Medical Service was composed of British doctors, who were responsible for Indian Soldiers and their British officers, as well as for British officials in government service and their families. A second corps, the Indian Medical Department, contained both Anglo-Indians (Le. ‘men of mixed race born in India ‘of an English father), who were able t0 treat British’ or Indian troops, and Indian doctors who could treat only Indian troops. These were supplemented by the Army Hospital Corps (responsible for the administration of hospitals for British troops, and for male nurses) and the Army Bearer Corps (which provided stretcher bearers). Nurses, who only looked after British troops, were supplied by the Queen Alexandra's Imperial Military Nursing Service for India "There was no permanent hospital service for Indians who, for the most part, were cared for at regimental level. Indeed, most regiments had an Indian Medieal Officer by the stat of the First World War, thus predating Indianisaton by some years. A number of changes were introduced in the aftermath of the First World War the AHC and ABC were amalgamated in 1920 to form the Indian Hospital Corps and six years liter the Indian Troops Nursing Service (later renamed the Indian Military Nursing Service) was formed. During the Second World War the Medical Department, the Medical Service and the Hospital Comps were further amalgamated in 1943 to form the Indian Army Medical Corps. Denial officers were withdrawn to form theit own corps from 1941. Given the large number of horses and other animals in the army it was only natural that Remount and Veterinary Services should be established at an early stage. Country-bred horses (that is, those bred in India) had a small physique, and were only deemed suitable for Indian ‘cavalry Silladar regiments provided their own horses, bred from Gulf or Bedouin Arab stock, and frequendy maintained their own stud farms For example, that of Probyn's Horse (12th Cavalry in 1903), whieh was simated, appropriately enough, at Probynabad (founded in 1864 near Bann, NorthWest Frontier Province), had long enjoyed a fine reputation for the excellence of its inounts, However, the artillery and the British cavalry regiments stationed in India needed more robust animals, They used Australian horses known as ‘Walers’after the state oF New South Wales, where many of them had been raised. The principal concern of the Remount Department was, therefore, to provide animals, {ore French photographer during the et by the regiment’ ‘Bataton, and onthe ont phe 2nd. Soe only he ‘reurabh beet traefered. 3-Arepimont marches pat ‘headed by Ke pipes and dams. ‘though bagpipes were payed {nsome Sikh regiments e180, ofthe century thet many of he Indion Army’ pipe bane ware farasto adopt tartan. Tie regent ha pot though ts Inruments have pips bannors both riding and draft, to meet the needs of the transport service and the nnow-siladar cavalry regiments as well as the British Army in India. By the Remount Department had to maintain a peacetime establishment of over 20,000 horses and 6,000 mules. A war reserve was kept up, but this was at the disastrousy low level of 500 eavalry horses, 500 artillery horses and 200 mules. No arrangements were in place 10 alloy for any major expansion on mobilisation, and the Department was badly caught ont by the unprecedented casualties. ‘The Indian Army Veterinary Corps vas not formed undl 1920 since the silladar system required cavalry regiments to look after their own wnimals and maintain their own veterinary officer (salutr). Transport tunits had also heen responsible for their owa animals, whether these be hhorses, mules, camels, bullocks or even elephants, The two departments ‘were amalgamated in 1947, only a few months before Partition Before the First World War the responsibilities of the Ordnance Department were restricted to the supply of arms, ammunition and some ‘equipment, whilst individual regiments took charge of obtaining much of their own clothing and food. The Department was officered by British officers detached from the Royal Artillery. It controlled a number of factories and arsenals, but their output was sufficient only to meet peacetime needs; during the First World War, Britain had to take up the slack and supply the extra matériel required, The breakdown of the silladar system under the pressure exerted by the war forced a reappraisal of existing arrangements, The Indian Artay Ordnance Corps was formed jn 1922 to ensure the centralised provision of matériel and to furnish ‘troops with all their arms, equipment, clothing and boots. A number of officers and men from the Ordnance Corps, as well as detachments from the Engineers and RIASC, were transferred out in May 1943 to form the Corps of Indian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. ‘The formation of the Indian Signals Corps in April 1920 pre-dated that ofthe Royal Corps of Signals, its British equivalent, by nearly threemonths, Signals companies had previously heen part ofthe Sappers and Miners. The strength of each company was set at five British officers, two Indian officers, and 44 British and 86 Indian other ranks, including tight men under taining. Signals companies were attached to each Divisional HQ, The British officers and men remained part of the Corps until 1926, when they were transferred to the Royal Corps of Signals subsequently all British personnel were on attachment, The Indian Corps of Clerks was established in 1924 to perform a variety of administrative tasks and consisted of British soldiers and Indian civilians. Mibtaristion, to bring the civilian clerks under army slisciplne, was introduced only in 1043, when the corps was renamed the Indian Army Corps of Clerks ‘Under normal circumstances provost duties were the responsibility ‘of British NCOs from the Corps of Military Police. Indian troops were subject only 10 thelr own regimental police. Even so, the Corps of Military Police (Jndia) vas formed in 1942, possibly to deal with the increasing size of the army in India and to administer prisonerofwar ‘amps; units contained both British and Indian personnel. Given the place of women in Indian society and the restrictions placed on their activities by faith or caste, taising a women’s corps proved problemati, By 194, the Women's Auxiliary Corps (India) consisted of some 1,160 officers and 8,900 other ranks, but it was recruited largely from Anglondians and Indian Christians, with few participants from non-Christian faiths. Corps members were employed in clerical duties in vdministrative headquarters and on cipher and. signals duties in rear areas, Some personnel also served with the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force, Followers Every unit, no matter what the armofervice, had its own followers, that is men who earned a living by performing menial tasks around the camp or station, Tato this category fell water carriers (Bhistis), cooks (langrs) sweepers and latrine cleaners (mehiahi), tailors (dari), cobblers (mocks) and grooms (syzs). Despite the heroie deeds of Kipling’s Gunga Din, who vas a bkist followers were not usually considered as combatant troops; exceptions were made only for drivers (drab) and retcher bearers (kakars), who were clevated to combatant status during the First World War and thus became eligible for decorations, Whilst followers did not usually wear uniform, in some regiments (e.g. 2nd Gurkhas) they did wear a special badge. The Armies of the Princes By no means all of India was ruled directly by the British, A large proportion of the sub-continent was governed by native princes who were permitted to retain a certain amount of autonomy. In each state, however, no matter hhow large or how small, their apparent independence was [lah Jewaya, who hed boon 260m Panjabi an tole successors the 2/15th Puebie ‘hotoprhed a elu 1028. He ie wearing regimental mut wth Blt and pap! tip in the {ron of his pop! te 268 shoulder tie, (ude Collection)‘Th youn Lt Optve Beatin yer Rites, 1943, Bonnet, Snhersly known a8"O0" ws {amies who ofiered the non ‘Miele Cotton) ‘curtailed by 2 British resident whose role was to make sure that the policies of the ruler accorded with British intentions. Many of these princes maintained some sort of military establishment, Which varied greatly in sie, equipment and training. In 1885), some of them offered co make their forces available to the British to combat the perceived Russian threat to India This was the precursor of a more formal scheme, which saw the: Government of India agree to contribute to the equipment of these princely contingents, to be known as Imperial Service Troops, and to supervise their training to ensure that they reached a sufficiently high standard of competence. Under this, scheme princely contingents participated in a number of campaigns on the North-West Frontier and in China. Selected young noblemen were also enrolled into the Imperial Cadet ‘Conps in an attempt to create a body of competent officers for service with the States Forces, but results were not encouraging and the idea did not survive the First World War. By 1914, some 29 states were involved providing a strength fof some 22,479 men formed into two mountain batteries, Four companies of sappers, 15 cavalry units, three camel comps, 13 infantry battalions and seven transport corps Imperial Service oops served on many of the fronts during the First World War. In Palestine a brigade was formed from the cavalry regiments of Hyderabad, Mysore and Patiala; it was the Jodhpur Lancers who captured Haifa and the famous, Bikanir Camel Corps also made a notable contribution, Contingents from Kashmir and Gwalior formed part of an Imperial Service Brigade which was badly beaten whilst, landing at Tanga in German Fast Afvica, They were forced to ‘withdraw on that occasion, but they and several more Imperial Service units continued in the theatre until the end of the conflict. Two units of sappers earned particular praise for their work ~ the Fatidkot Sappers in East Africa and the Sirmoor Sappers in Mesopotamia. All the transport units performed valuable work, particularly in Mesopotamia, where supply was so difficul, During the inter-war period some re-organisation ws fel 0 bbe necessary, From 1932, three types of unit were envisaged. Firsly, the government undertook to arm and equip a number fof units, 1 be styled Field Service Units, whieh would be available to the Crown under any circumstances and would be organised and equipped as regular Indian Army units, They would be backed up by General Service Units, which would be armed and equipped by the States, but would be brought up to the establishment of Field Service Units at the government's own expense as and when their services were required. A third category consisted of ‘militia’ units, not permanently ‘embodied and with lower scales of arms and equipment, who would serve solely 25 internal security units. To 1939, all units less than @ squadron/company/battery in strength were exchided from the scheme, The formation of modern field artillery units within Imperial Service states was discouraged as was the case in the Indian Army; only fone exception was permitted and that was Jammu and Kashmir, whichwas allowed to fore anarillery unit because it owed sn international rontie. a ‘When texted i the conditions of the Second Work! War, howeves, the revited scheme proved & Jes than resounding siccess Many of the Feld Service Unis remsizedwnderarained and under. ofcered ~ falls that could only be pc right at the expense ofthe Indian Army. The creation of a Cadet Schoo! for Ste officers to attend before they went to Officer Training Schoo! went some tay to remedying one ofthese defeets, producing Pippy ot welteamed otcers. Fewer snite ferved outside India than in 1914; unfortnately Imany of those that did 90 were sent to what was thought to be a quet sector, Malaya, where they weve captured by the Japanese. The remaining tts served largely as ines of communieations troops or as garrisons, These included Sin Infantey Brigade, composed. entirely of States’ Forces, which served in Abyssinia in TM. In 1645 a second brigade (150th) was reformed from a taining brigade to ince theee States Battalions and served as the gurison of Hong Kong. A mms and Kashmir contingent served in Burma in the Meiktila campaigns and. the Int Akal ifr, rom the Punjab wate of Nab saw action in Tey with the 10th Infantry Divison Three State battalions also formed part of Force 251 engaged in the recapture of the Dodecanese Islands in 1944, Inc-edibly, detachments from two Sates regiments, te Joohpur Lancers and the Sr Maharaja Madio Rao Seindia's Own Lance ftom Gwalior, ook part inthe last mounted action undertaken by Conmonwealth troops when, in February 1944, armed with laces, they charged Japanese atackers during the battle of the Nagakyedauk Box the Arakan ‘Mindful of the defects that had become Lo spparent in the regiments of the Princely Sates dhrng the Second World War, the Willeox Committee called for drastic reductions in theirmumber, relegating those that remained 0 internal security dies ony. No action, however had been taken before Parton intervened. At Parition the armies of the princes were incorporated into the new armiesof India or Pakistan, No problems were experienced except in three cars, The first, and mont serious i the Tong term, was that of Jammu and Kashmir when a Hind rer opted to join nia ina the wishes of the largely Maslim population, which woud have preferred to become par of Pakistan. Notorious this eritory sil Gispute between the two countries. In Junagadh and particulary in Hyderabad, which had Muslim riers bat largely Hind populations, tome force was needed before the disturbances could be queiled and peace established resets sme tnd words of ‘sce fom the subedarmafor at ort Tent, Et The regiment ‘moved te Syria for Waning ‘Commando unt, but resumed is ‘oleae conventional note a 04a, Reber ae the Knyoor ‘ites, the regiment snow far of tho Pitan Army. fovmesai77) 55‘Otcers ofthe tt Tripura Rites, ‘Arakan, 1944 Te repent ws ‘employed on ines ot ‘ommunicton ute; the wie ‘oder shoulder paton of 04th (eat Bengal of © Aree ‘est ile (ear, thie rom ht an front, ih pure ‘onder and te rgimente wore uniformed on Gurkhas, (tune woss16) The Auxillary Force (India) A the time of the Mutiny of 1857 a considerable number of European, lunits had been formed for purposes of selflefence, and many of these continued in existence for some time after it had been suppressed. by the 1890s number of these had been disbanded due to lack of interest ‘but the insularity of the English community ensured that many were stil active, trained with the help of an adjutant and instructors seconded, from the British Army. In response to declining numbers many units, particularly those raised from railway employees, began to recruit Anglo. Tndians and most became in time solidly Anglo-indian. Theve were, hhowever, some exceptions ~ the cavalry units, the Calcutta Scottish, the ‘Bengal Arillery and the Caleutta Fortress Company RE continued to recruit exclusively amongst Europeans, whilst the units raised in Karachi ‘maintained a roughly 50.50 cemposition. By 1907 wome 34,000 men were serving in these units, known collectively as the Indian Volunteer Force, The Volunteer Force provided a ready pool of officers at the outbreak of war in 1914 and many were posted away to regular Indian Army regiments. However, none of the volunteer regiments themselves \were sent to the Front ~all units were retained in India to be deployed ‘on internal security duties. In 1917 they became part of a new umbrella ‘organisation, the Indian Defence Force, with compulsory service forall Europeans between the ages of 18 and 41. The new force consisted of ten regiments of cavalry (named either Light Horse or Mounted Riles); 45 units of infantry, ranging in size from a company to a battalion, as ell as five artillery units and two engineer units, The Defence Force as an organisation was disbanded at the end of the war, but the idea of some kind of volunteer force remained active In 1920, the volunteers were incorporated into the Auxiliary Force (nia) and extra units of artillery and engineers were raised. Members were liable for calFout for local service on internal security duties. These were largely static guard duties; confronting riots was left to the British ‘Army. During the 1990s and 1940s, when units were called out for day,it was rare for all the men of one unit 10 serve together since many syolunteers worked on the railway or in other essential occupations. During the Second World War the AP() once more functioned as a reserve tor oiticers. But members of two AF(I) units, the Calcutta Light Horse and the Caleta Scottish, did see active service in March 1943, ‘They boarded some German ships in the harbour of the Portuguese colony of Goa and eliminated their spying capability ~ an exploit which later became the basis for a novel by James Leasor and a feature film, ‘The Sea Wokves. All the Auxiliary Force regiments were disbanded on Partition Frontior Corps The end of the 19%h century saw a transformation in British ideas concerning the dayto-day security of the North-West Frontier. Rather ‘than maintain a large garrison of regular troops it was decided to raise number of tribal levy units, serving under their own tribal chiefs, cach With an attached British olfcer. The role of these levies was made more important by the policies of Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India between 1899 and 1905, who withdrew Imperial forces even further from the line ofthe frontier itselfso aso allow them to be concentrated quickly in the face of a Russian attack, By 1914, a number of units had been raise: the Khyber Rifles, the North and South Waziristan Militias, the Kurram Militia, the Chitral Scouts, the Gilgit Scouts and the Zhob Militia ~and between them they covered the whole of the frontier. Control of these units rested in the hands of the Commissioner of the NorthWest Frontier Province and his Political Agents; they came under the direct control ofthe army only when serving in joint operations, After the First World War, many of these units were involved in the Third Afghan War. Fellow tribesmen and co-religionists found themselves on opposing sides in the conflict, and disaffection as particularly strong amongst the men of the Khyber Rifles and the South Waviristan Militia. Both nits were disbanded, although the Militia was then reformed as two units, the Tochi Scouts and the South Waziristan Scouts, Yet, despite this problem, the operations undertaken by these poachers-turned-gamekeepers, whether acting alone or accompanying a Frontier Column, were in general most effective, All the surviving units remained active in Frontier operations wntil Partition, ‘The strength of these units depended on the area they covered. During the 1920s the Tochi Scouts were organised into a headquarters company, two troops of ‘mounted infantry and two infantry wings, each about a battalion strong, ‘total of 12 British officers and 2,278 men. The South Waviristan Scouts ‘were stronger, containing three such wings. Each corps was commanded. bya major, the wings by a captain, a company by a subsdarand a platoon or troop by a jenadar. In contrast, the Gilgit and Chitral Seouts were both sinaller in size, about 600 men each; the Gilgits were divided into ten platoons and the Chitrals into four companies. In all these regiments the mounted infanury troops remained as siadar units until 1928 since ownership of a horse was a real incentive to enlistment. However, it was eventually realised that it was both easier, and better for the horses, ifthe {government were to maintain the animals, and the system was dropped. ‘On the North-East Frontier five battalions were raised to play a similar role. These were made up of the Asam Rifles, the Eastern 87(ot was ayo eagle on ‘row. Tha f Fadel eon) ah was 2 repreventaton a the 18th. Contry Tower ot Voy at {atopam Fort ona be-over Bengal Rifles and the Malabar Special Police Battalion. During the Second World War a cadre from the Assam Rifles became the nucleus of the Indian Army's Assam Regiment ‘At Partition all the North-West Frontier units went to Pakistan, where they have sinee been augmented by other paramilitary gendarmerie units, The Assum Rifles were allocated to India SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Indian formations appear in the British Official Histories of both World Wars and, of course, in the joint Indian~Pakistani Official History ofthe Second World War. Recent general histories inchide Shankhar Bhaduri’s The Indian Army (New Delhi, 1900) and The Indian Army and the King’s Enemies, 1900-1947 by Chavles Chevenix-Treneh (London, 1988). ‘The official wilogy covering the Afviean and Mediterranean theatres during the Second World War ~ The Tiger Strikes, The Tiger ils and The Tiger Triumphs (all Caleutta, 1942, 1944 and 1945 respectively) is unsurprisingly uncritical. Philip Mason's A Mattr of Honour (London, 1974) is esentil reading forthe social history of the Indian Army, Joh Gaylor's valuable Sons of John Company (Tunbridge Wells, 1992) includes potted regimental histories for the present century, and much ele besides. David Omissi’s books, The Spay and the Raj (London, 1994) and Indian Voices of the Gnat War (London, 1990) have shed a valuable historian’s eye on the Indian Corps in France, Regimental histories abound, though varying in quality, and are best approached through Roger Perkins’ monumental Regiments: Regiment ofthe British Empire ond Commenwvath, 1758-1993 (the author, Newton Abbot, 1904) (Of the three engagements featured in this book, the principal accounts can be found in: Armageddon 1918 by Cyril Falls (London, 1964), Te Frontier Scouts by Charles Chevenix:Trench (London, 1985), and Burma: the Longest War, 1941-45 by Louis Alen (London, 1984) On uniforms, both Boris Mollo's The Futian Army (Poole, 1981) and WX. Carman'stwo-tolume hndian Army Uniforms (London, 1968-69) cover «period of two centuries, and therefore devote relatively litle space tothe more utilitarian aspects of 20thceneury service dress. They nevertheless constiuste the statting point for any serious seudy of Indian Army uniforms, Durer, the journal of the Indian Military Historical Socies, contains much valuable material, particularly on Indian States ForcesTHE PLATES Researched and described by Mike Chappell tian Amy ufos fh prod urd in cert © changes, bag aba by the exgencen fe Zimosigns end batea of to. Wor Wars ond the ‘fapesance oth hrs rom tay seve, Fl ars (train oie now to by essed ana eh clo dnvto indo th povotscatay = becane Srv fort 00 uno ae po wr akon “he eon and cai of ans wat oon apparent in tyr, btby tat tae deincten went an fam nov coed most 0 hese. Te tan eg ung co bw Sound = drtyarurd the Pet Sound a pone ca,th tnn eboney Shes scsoring to te wom respon ace” cate. Sina and Sur ite nore 8 sen aan ss Stover aera ated so With te ser he Sn roma otal chow te pemeson: She pct. fered Wo rari tebe wound wean aune far Tho Indian so0y of 1814 prsentd @ dtntve scpnae, uch he hit (o hres roaeing ‘ron wo the iowa bagy nctrorssr bcos to ust by 157 be cot no ere en a ets Sate naa wenn the fle ‘FULL DRESS, 1014 [Xt Sowat, 28th King George's Own Light Cavaly ‘nis mounted wwooper demenstares the "view order lor of his regan. Not his ted curmarcung (vast ‘Shh Sam Browne equpment, shoulder ties good eanduct todg (chovion, snd slate badge for profency wih ‘he sword, He's wmed wh sabre anc ance 5 Frontr Fare Jaane of duty in France, 1014 oct reimants had opted a regimental pattern of mut) norced srt an ate service. ‘hair pes om the font of ce papi Plate 2. 2: Sepoy, 01st Grenadiers ‘This infor private weare Pe hurts and cummarbund wth hie pag wound around a khuie cap. Nota the grenade badge or on te latter so hie Shoulder ies, good Conduct badges deeting tong soi, and musket kia ‘ms badge, Hs carpagn medals show tat he has sored ‘rtensively in Aton Hels armed wih 2203! Leo-Enfla fie WO Ptr) anc bayonet, and is equipment is from the $908 pattern Dandolar st. Tracing tha orgs back the 18th cent, the IIs claimed t be te least regiment of genasers in Brith sve ‘8: THE WESTERN FRONT, 1914-15 Br: Lieutenant, 298th Ludhiana Sikhs ‘Tri unt was among the fst elan troops to ae in France in 1914; one of tha Brtshofcers was Lt Jaci’ Sah, ‘nho won the Vicon Cross on #8 May 1018 a the bate of Feetsber. Lttenant Sth shown hoon the drab serge ‘Servioo arose wom at hi tine Ns nt main reget ap badge and his badges of rank. He caries & t56in \isbey rvoher, ammunition and Dinocuars on his Sam Browne bot, and a’ ant-gashoimot in ahaversack, 12: Sepoy, 129th Duke of Connaughts Own Balichis ‘The fret indian winner of te, Vetora Cross was Sepoy cada Khan oft 128 Balucis.On St Octobe 1314 [t Holebere, Belgium, he Kept hs machine gun faction ‘Sthough wounded and with the rest offi detachment yng ‘ad around hr; he lator oscaped fer destroying his Gun vedas Kan is dopictes nto Kak dl urifrn wom titi December 1014: he equipment is the 1903 pater bandoler toe, and he cares a 803i Maxim machine gon, ho 129th Baluchis wsced tir origins beok to unite of Trains, one of which fought in sn action wth a Unted Stee warship a cotury before.Jnl Llcutenat 0.0. Bonnet of he Kyber Riles photographed ‘with hs armed escort on the North-west Front n August 1814. The mon ofthe escort appear to be wearing tunes ‘ever ies te loge, whereas Bennet has elected to ‘oman rather conspicuous In ie Orth ofcars unter. DOpive Beret volunteered ton this nw kn Fabry 1012, and spent ane fourysr tur with them, ing ‘he campaionsapsnet the Mahmande in 1015 bere ‘returning tthe 26th Parable Colston) {8S Riteman, 1/3004 Garwhat Files ‘Ths Garwhal soir, eented fora people who wer nest neighbours ofthe Gurkhas the focthas ofthe Hmalay, is depictad in 1015 wearhg stander Bish serves cess ‘bt wih 2 rogmantal slouch hat. He equipment fs the ‘modied 1008 pater bandoler type: his weapons are the ‘ain SMLE Neil ancl Bayona, hehe NOS {ood conduct badges, le a--arme tage, anc the hat Batch ofthe 19 Br other bataions wore hein ceront alu. Original enlisted ito the Gurkha regents from “8:5, the Garewal were formed no arogiment ote Ov (0: THE WESTERN FRONT, 1014-18 (Gt: Soway, 20th Decoan Horse ‘Thi wooper wears mounted marching ore in 1076. Note that by he tie most cavakymon wero woaeng the Beh ‘stool helmet, ae that aki rab serge Nad ben oe, Fis only reign is-a shouer tite XOHK. Most ol his clothing, equpment and eaclery ae of Bish vgn except fornia haverseck waterbot, andthe fine on he mous browband. He is med wihna aan SMLE Mik Mand bayonet, sword and lacs, e also cares the antes ‘ipment of thetime in two sl averscks (Cz Dafadar, th Prince bert Vito's Own “Th standing cavalry sargert is cepted waning the crab serge fa, pag, boschos and putes. Hla equipment Trees a bandoter and pouches fr 140 rounds, "and ‘PH anges. helmets, watebott,haversack and srencing tea, and he armed with an” SMLE and bayonet Not is badges of rank, and his orto shoulder ‘le oatsig eronead swords a severed rant hand end he ‘spl ogond POONA HORSE” The hand matt, auto date fom tho ttt cont, came fom a Persan regina ‘Sande! ceptued in bates 1857; In aver topped the fogiment’s standard stat ard was insobad "The Hand of God above all tings Transfered 10 the Middle East, both these regmants ‘would sere at Moggigo in 1818 win tho 1h Cavey gad ofthe Sth Cavalry Onion, D:THE MIDDLE EAST, 1914-18 i: Lance-dafadar, Mysore Lancors ‘Both the unis copicted on this plate sored at Moggi wth ‘he 18h [pera Senos) Cava Sigage of he sth Causy Division. Tas corporal in mourtad marching orc wears 3 ag and Hull, kata, breeches, puttees Sd Ka it fummorbund, His eaement is a mature of Sam Bowne fné bandalier ems and inokidos a. havereack. and \atebote Hs sada isthe stand Brits equipment of the tine ane notes @ O0-ound bandollreround the horse's nck ems cstncve to the Mysore Lancers ar the ack heedoolar rope, the black and wile lane pennant land the erosaod ances bags on he chain mi epaulets, ‘Adatonty to hi anes he is sre th the SMLE Ml, bayonet an eae, 1: Datadar, 1st Jodhpur Lancers “The dsmounted sorgeant wears Hoke but departs fom the ‘regulation wih a green pag salnon-eolured ‘cummerbur, a tuvar sab, and lester eggs in pace oh putees. Note Ns shoudor tos, signals qusfeaton Bacae fand atm edge, the lst two on selet patches. Hi ‘verses sevice stripes denote war service fom 1994; and he depaye the riobons ofthe indian Dietngsches Sance Medal and te 7914 Star E-THE MIDDLE EAST, 1914-10 Et: Majo Indian Meal Service ‘This ior Weare the standire ial cil erie dese of [Beeh offcor wih pith heknet, Sam Browne bat and fel boots. His Branch is inccated by his chy red goret patches and tho "MS" sheuder tiles worn beneath [badges of ark He medal roe indeate servic in South ‘rea snd on tha NorthWest Prone£2 Strotcherbearay, Army Boarer Corps Gaming a vaterotte, PH" ant-gas Pemet and folding Sietcher he wears the ‘ABC. te of he corps on hes aga and a red cross brassard onthe sleeve of is faa, (rer reigns nue good conduct bases fr moro than 12 yous serio, two Wound stipes, and the fobors ofthe Incan Genora Service Meda ang tho 1914 Sta EE Naik, 17% Pioneers {is cofporl I shown in marching order, earning a cased mattock in adcton to isl hie equipment 9 ‘nature of Dando and earlar ina Patan me, Note His hulle, pag and badge. Prnear battalions of the Indian ‘mya tis dete could function aa both infenty or ld BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS. Fi: Dafadar, Governor-Gonera's Body Guard Fulerss was restored to some unis at his timo, paricuaty fo thane invaved in ceremonial unsuprangy one even wa8 the GoverrGenerats Body’ Guard. The bodyguards of leng and disingished history. This NCO wars mesa incung tho Ina Dietnguchod Sevioo Medal and rose {or active sare nthe Great War He sara wtb nda Pata 1908 sora 2: Trumpeter, Royal Deccan Horse (th Horse) This tumpeter presents e very cilerent appearance ftom vary roginent to be dressed in "ie green, 8 colour whim alo forme the ground of his trumpet Banner, hich fer, HA ‘00 Rags of ome nan formations during the Fire Wot ‘oe Unt he eta Army onthe Wester Fro nan ey Formation anim wor thas ga on tel untorms tey tree used pep on vellon,ntcboar, The 1h tron Divison te doped har badge of wendeok nate 4017 when tay wore srg a area orth of Baghdad tenes the was common. nan Caps ete ere Inhosopetam i condsted orginal of Sr ad ih non itelon, bt the Une he bape wes scoped eso hed bee rplace by he 170 and 1 Dons: The Ayn sn ‘Syme ht wae wed by bo formations Gn Cava Bpade ‘ood wnt aratka on eon, who Euphrates Defences ‘hanged the enars obs ont bus. bout sone preted thee of is enclnt sta by te German Nex or which hs ante Wt ver ce 28.00 Format sins of sme Inn fant atone ‘uring the Seoend World Wer Asa dvigned in 1042 those ‘wore at of simple geometc shapes tuna redut ‘hoy wore soon repieed by mere donee bedges. The ‘Srecton ofthe gaden arow ona bac square ot nian Dison Gt edpinalysymboloed te dso station on tho Nontet Fret. The sigh of 10 Divan wos «lack gure erased by a sale o fed (btm let o tn ‘Sune. So al Plates H2 ath Btn 1 (1th Daan, fd Jt (0th Dison. ter tne olde rd neon tin rstang th Don; 8 wit hand branding = ‘utr sword on» Back rectangle 20% Divison 3 re ‘ockarel on yale ase rd Dalen anda Baek spade! ‘on ean squire ot Dan 6‘The now and ok uniforms, 1044 The ale Bet) weare tho Whol dil shit and shri; nots hie GHO nin Shouter patch yellow strom a rectangle halved The older sor (ght wears the now 1943 jungle ‘and unlevely Cap, G8, which was tobe Isued to all rgiments except Sh. The Gurkhas wore tal ‘loud hats whenever posible, but eventual a ‘econ the G8 ap for ont ne wt FH NDS203} Dears the copimertal crest and 11 batle honours for the Great wer Ho displays good conduct badge, 9 musket silat arms bad and Gea! War meas 3: BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS. GG: Buleter, British Rove Artilory The Inlan Ay tought many minor ware between 1918 nc 1950" Ware in mountainous ragane etten cal Tor suppor from the Inan mountsin stlery who operated the fanous ‘screw gun’ pack howitzers, Within Bah A ‘mountain bates the Paning of mules Was cated ox by Indian personnel cur fg shows ono of these dan ‘mullet onto Frontier ine 187; on te ck as tg ‘lp ofthe barl of 7m pak hawtae Harney wih the mountain arly sword. Note As. poor "RA ‘Shoulder ts, bate fash, and good conduct chores or Over 18 yours" sve; ns medal aabone denote. ate Service nthe Geet War and on the NorthWest Font, long serve (62 Lance-naik, 78th Rajputana ies ‘This sqpoy Is shown in typial alnng dress, €:1998; by now the shit, shorts and pullover of the Brien soldi Fr india rae bean adopted. Note his Rul, pag ed badge, “GAR” shaulder tiles and badge of rank, backed cafe! the colour of is garter fashes. He wear 1903 pattern webbing exuipment musketry orc, an cates '03in Vicker-Bertier Wk Il lght machine. gun and ‘magavioe pov (G3: Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Riles This NCO waar the ‘hot wasther sonice ores’ ofthe 1930s. His oaths i ll lack, ad incu 1009 pty equipment, chap sandals) andre sing te weapon 5 {he 303in SMLE MI but now ronarag the ‘No.1 Fie} File green puttees, cummerbund and page panel ale futher ile Tepinent afectatons: and ote the scat backing to he shoulder tiles ana badges of rank. Hs ribbons ee thase ofthe Incien General Service Medals ot ‘aoe and 1038 He THE MIODLE EAST, 1030-45, Sepoy, th Inclan Division; Libya, e198 ‘The theo figues en the pte ropresent the varity of Lore vem by ears of the Ian Bemy i a hae of war This pevate solder of an infaray Batiaion of the 4tn Ian Dison is depicted Inthe Kak! et ehit ang hora worn in Pot cima, Aes ik he eins isha and board uncut, and he wears his age flded inthe fasion appropri to Fis region. Otherwise is cess ciflors not a At fom that wern by other Brith toops In Libya. Hee ‘webbing equpment isthe 1957 pattern ‘bale order’ and he IS'amed wht Sin Boys ant-tane fe, ane of which wae ‘ae in infant platoon headeuares. HE: Subodor, 72nd King Edward V's Own, ‘Gurkha ifs; Tunisia, 1043, In mocetomperate alone woo see blades was wor, as rere by Subsca’ Latbahadur Thapa, VC. This ft Nestenant won the suseme decoration fer valour on 6 Act 1045 n he course of the acon he ila two of the ney wen his pst! and fourth ie hur. Ata nastre he wore the unform depicted; note the regimental anja ‘houler ites, ages of ark and hat signa, the 4 ean Divisions rec ‘eagle formation gn, and the Hone of Vetera Goss, lan Gener! Service Medal and the Aes Star Ha NCO, Central india Hors; aly, wintor 1944/65 ‘This uni athe rconmaleanca regiment of the th lxsan Divison, which saw hard fighting i appaling tera ani ‘wontharcondtions i both ‘wir ofthe akan capa, Ho is Idertiieg as an NCO by his weaoon = aan ‘Thompeon ‘machine carbine’ i Brish paranca - rhe‘tan by any vile badges of rank He wees the rexinentl badge on his old weather cap, a windroot smock over his batlocress, and American “KII043)"shoe-pa0! winter ‘verbots~avare and coveted tam [THE FAR EAST, 1941-45 {is Havilar, 5/14 Punjab Regiment; Maleya, 1941 ‘hs coat ofthe Sh Pathan) Bn, 1th Punjabis woars hat el unto wn tne eo-calad "Bornay bloomers = ‘hots which cous be unbttred an olded down vo tuk iro the Nosetops as an angus precaution He has ha 1657 Dalton wesbingeauipme el with espiator alanis ape, and is amod eth fhe No ile and bayonet. insignia tem on tepcal clathing were amostinvanaby attached ‘ny temporary, with pn or Nooks-andjes, 30 that they (Goud ecaly be removed forthe fequent laundering of ‘othing. Note Ne cloth shoulder tes, ahd he “aoa of Me fermation sgn of the slated 11 Inaan Duin, Some 50000 Inka solders were caputed bythe dapanese in Nalaya ard Signore, 12 Rifleman, 17th Gurkha Riles; Burma, 1042 ‘though the KD clothing proved impractical for jngla tata, unde the creumatanoss ofthe Japanese ctlenees In 7942 was some tine ber i coud repaced finaly, wth KD clothing rood ove gree), This sold’ Fang tess and equip ar typical ofthat dato, though the Slouch Nat was specie to the Gurkha unis; he woes no inlgnia. ands armed wis the 208 Bren ight machine un, ‘ald oe por nant ecto. Be Nai 11th Sikh Regiment; Burma, 1044-45 From 1849 the KD clothing re-dyed"unale gree’ began to bo progessioly repacas among inian and Brtsh woops sike by a purposo-made Ighiweight copy of the Bish butte in lve gran (a KO version was ao mada for fence in the dyer regions otal, out was not wes It combat zane. Tis ightweight green BD was mace two aera the blouse of an open-weave ‘aren’ the trousers faster, closer woven coon cil Thisjuricr NCO of te Sih Skene demenstates the now unorm, compete wh page 1020 pattem webbing "bate ser Incorporates pedal pouches for the magaznes of hs sn Thompson. Note toe golden arom formation ign of the 7th Ian Dison ing of al kinds were usualy removed when in ‘0 fot Ene, “2 THE FAR EAST, 1945-46 ‘St: Sapper, Queen Vitoria’s Own Sappers & Miners, ‘046 “his sappe ao woars 104 ptt Indan-mads ove gran butlofess, and hs Readgear isthe dooote. He has lid fide his weobing equipment and weapons while he Searches or Japanese mines. Note the hand and cagger eration sgt ofthe 19th ian Dison. 4B Subodar, st Battao,Indlan Parachute Fgiment, 1046 Tha shorttved erganisaton existed only between March 1045 and Oetober 1946. The oflosr weare a unform tna insignia ~ based on the green batlodoss and he Ttaroon Arbor Forees beet ~ which Is ential inal But etal o that of his Bish counterpart. His cap badge and his Airsome Foress formation sgn both have the legend ‘WoIA" eed and ho Weare Me parachuto quaiieation Asiotor ofthe Indian MitaryMureng Service. Apart rom ‘the MI sider on her shoulder straps her uniform ie dents! that of Beh Army nurses in ha QARANC. twat o 3608) wings on his right breast, rather than on the right upper eave in Baish able. Note Ns badges of var: and the ribbons of the 1699-46 Star, Bum Sis, India Sores Medal 7990-48 and Brkish War’ Medal 1950-45, Hie sidearm is ain Smith & Wesson rovover,hokstered ona 1037 patiern webbing bot. 55 Jemadar, 25th Royal Gurkha Ries; Japan, 1046 ia second Hauenart, member of tha Bite Commorweatt Oscupstisn Force i dapen, wears neon pattem bates wth a arty of insignia Not the par fn is hat, his a ary and ‘SAGA shoulder tits ~ a regimental tema, Note als is badges of rank, to Urion fag Sign of the “Bana (Bristvindan Divison), and the star paten worm by Indian Woops of th foration. Tis veteran Stow, decorated and commissioned fr galanty, dips): the ribbons ofthe Mitery Medal, tho nian General Serves Nodal 008 snd 1895, the 7639-45 Star the Burma Star ‘the cia Service Meds 1999-45 and the Beitsh Wer Med hos,smerbangrenese ¥ a hon a a 25 ee ve Boat con ir Hk 8s rn Gonanae tar” _ COMPANION SERIES FROM OSPREY och Suge ok consi oer 90 ane elongate ae erp ce dineoanal ae map EEK peacoat pate ‘colar pes of wasted ewes mem analy ace ek ‘Snoop lei oth tings ed ane, sii ia nk ace oe ncn nmr mr ay foreach lame ch Spgs okmecmas spe apa ‘minor soak age sow a et ‘ch pomp ae ‘hcg aes ret is ac 6b Theemaryoe pcan mir se ck Sopage mt ‘Shain 040 py commie rv wn ae ‘et ucal the sl prot neElite + 75 The history of military fore and techniques of warfare, artefacts s-sonalities 6 Unvvaed detail www. ospreypublishing.com Photographs The Indian Army 1914-1947 tthe height ofits strength and confidence the army of Buitish India was a unique organisation, whose officers and other ranks ~ all volunteers - were bound together by extraordinary ésprit de comps. Already the largest volunteer army Jn the world In 1914, by 1918 it dhad quadrupled in strength to nearly 600,000 men. Indian livisions served with distinction on the Western Front and, particulaely, fn the Middle Bast. After interwar campaigns on the North-West Frontier, In the Second World ‘War Indian divisions made.a major contribution to the British effort in Noth Africa, Italy and Burma, ‘With independence and pacttion the old army was divided between the new states of India and Pakistan, retaining its discipline and professional pride in the most lfficult circumstances SM qt