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F.Supp. 128 (1970). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Supreme Court of the United States Circuit affirmed, 446 F.2d 545 (1971). We granted
LLOYD CORPORATION, LTD., Petitioner, certiorari to consider petitioner's contention that the
v. decision below *553 violates rights of private property
Donald M. TANNER et al. protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 404
U.S. 1037, 92 S.Ct. 703, 30 L.Ed.2d 728 (1972).
No. 71-492.
Argued April 18, 1972. Lloyd Corp., Ltd. (Lloyd), owns a large, modern
Decided June 22, 1972. retail shopping center in Portland, Oregon. Lloyd Center
embraces altogether about 50 acres, including some 20
Action was brought to prevent a shopping centeracres of open and covered parking facilities which
from barring distribution of handbills. The United States accommodate more than 1,000 automobiles. It has a
District Court for the District of Oregon, 308 F.Supp. 128,perimeter of almost one and one-half miles, bounded by
enjoined interference with the distribution, and the four public streets. It is crossed in varying degrees by
shopping center appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, several other public streets, all of which have adjacent
446 F.2d 545. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, Mr.public sidewalks. Lloyd owns all land and buildings
Justice Powell, held that where the owner of a shopping within the Center, except these public streets and
center which contained parking facilities, malls, private sidewalks. There are some 60 commercial tenants,
sidewalks, stairways, escalators, gardens, auditorium and including small shops and several major department
skating rink as well as a single, large, multi-level building stores.
complex containing stores put notices in the sidewalk that
areas in the center used by the public were not public The Center embodies a relatively new concept in
ways but for use of center tenants and the public shopping center design. The stores are all located within a
transacting business with them and that permission to use single large, multi-level building complex sometimes
such areas could be revoked at any time, and the center referred to as the Mall. Within this complex, in addition
had a policy, strictly enforced, against distribution ofto the stores, there are parking facilities, malls, private
handbills within the building complex and malls, theresidewalks, stairways, escalators, gardens, an auditorium,
was no such dedication of the center to public use as to and a skating rink. Some of the stores open directly on the
entitle persons to exercise therein the asserted First outside public sidewalks, but most open on the interior
Amendment right of distributing handbill invitations to a privately owned malls. Some stores open on both. There
meeting to protest the draft and the Vietnam War. are no public streets or public sidewalks within the
building complex, which is enclosed and entirely covered
[EDITED] except for the landscaped portions of some of the interior
malls.
Judgment reversed and case remanded with
directions to vacate injunction.
[EDITED]
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. The distribution of the handbills occurred in the The
This case presents the question reserved by the Court Center is open generally to the public, with a considerable
in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.effort being made to attract shoppers and prospective
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 shoppers, and to create customer motivation as well as
L.Ed.2d 603 (1968), as to the right of a privately owned customer goodwill in the community. In this respect the
shopping center to prohibit the distribution of handbills onCenter pursues policies comparable to those of major
its property when the handbilling is unrelated to the stores and shopping centers across the country, although
shopping center's operations. Relying primarily on Marshthe Center affords superior facilities for these purposes.
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 Groups and organizations are permitted, by invitation and
(1946), and Logan Valley, the United States District Courtadvance arrangement, to use the auditorium and other
for the District of Oregon sustained an asserted First facilities. Rent is charged for use of the auditorium except
Amendment right to distribute handbills in petitioner's with respect to certain civic and charitable organizations,
shopping center, and issued a permanent injunctionsuch as the Cancer Society and Boy and Girl Scouts. The
restraining petitioner from interfering with such right. 308Center also allows limited use of the malls by the

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American Legion to sell poppies for disabled veterans, Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
and by the Salvation Army and Volunteers of America to 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968), compelled
solicit Christmas contributions. It has denied similar use affirmance. FN5
to other civic and charitable organizations. Political use is
also forbidden, except that presidential candidates of both FN5. The Court of Appeals also relied on Wolin
parties have been allowed to speak in the auditorium.FN3 v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (CA2
1968).
The Center had been in operation for some eight
years when this litigation commenced. Throughout this Marsh involved Chickasaw, Alabama, a company
period it had a policy, strictly enforced, against the town wholly owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp. The
distribution of handbills within the building complex and opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice Black, described
its malls. No exceptions were made with respect to Chickasaw as follows:
handbilling, which was considered likely to annoy
customers, to create litter, potentially to create disorders, Except for (ownership by a private corporation) it
*556 and generally to be incompatible with the purpose ofhas all the characteristics of any other American town.
the Center and the atmosphere sought to be preserved. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a
system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a business
On November 14, 1968, the respondents in this caseblock on which business places are situated. A deputy of
distributed within the Center handbill invitations to a the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves
meeting of the Resistance Community to protest the as the town's policeman. Merchants and service
draft and the Vietnam war. The distribution, made inestablishments have rented the stores and business places
several different places on the mall walkways by five on the business block and the United States uses one of
young people, was quiet and orderly, and there was nothe places as a post office from which six carriers deliver
littering. There was a complaint from one customer.mail to the people of Chickasaw and the adjacent area.
Security guards informed the respondents that they were The town and the surrounding neighborhood, which can
trespassing and would be arrested unless they stopped not be distinguished from the Gulf property by anyone not
distributing the handbills within the Center. FN4 The guardsfamiliar with the property lines, are thickly settled, and
suggested that respondents distribute their literature on according to all indications the residents use the business
the public streets and sidewalks adjacent to but outside of block as their regular shopping center. To do so, they now,
the Center complex. Respondents**2223 left the premisesas they have for many years, make use of a company-
as requested to avoid arrest and continued theowned paved street and sidewalk located alongside the
handbilling outside. Subsequently this suit was instituted store fronts in order to enter and leave the stores and the
in the District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive post office. Intersecting company-owned roads at each
relief. end of the business block lead into a four-lane public
highway which runs parallel to the business block at a
FN4. The city of Portland has an ordinance distance of thirty feet. There is nothing to stop *558
which makes it unlawful to trespass on privatehighway traffic from coming onto the business block and
property. Portland, Or., Police Code s 16-613. upon arrival a traveler may make free use of the facilities
available there. In short the town and its shopping district
I are accessible to and freely used by the public in general
The District Court, emphasizing that the Center isand there is nothing to distinguish them from any other
open to the general public, found that it is the functional town and shopping center except the fact that the title to
equivalent of a public business district. 308 F.Supp., atthe property belongs to a private corporation.' 326 U.S., at
130. That court then held that Lloyd's rule prohibiting the 502-503, 66 S.Ct., at 277.
distribution of handbills within the Mall violates . . . First
Amendment rights. 308 F.Supp., at 131. In a per curiam A Jehovah's Witness undertook to distribute religious
opinion, the Court of Appeals held that it was bound byliterature on a sidewalk near the post office and was
the factual determination as to the character of thearrested on a trespassing charge. In holding that First and
Center, and concluded that the decisions of this Court inFourteenth Amendment rights were infringed, the Court
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. emphasized that the business district was within a
265 (1946), and *557Amalgamated Food Employeescompany-owned town, an anachronism long prevalent in

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some southern States and now rarely found. FN6 them for purposes of exercising such rights cannot be
denied absolutely. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58
FN6. In commenting on the necessity for citizens S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
who reside in company towns to have access to 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939); Schneider v.
information, the Court said: Many people in the State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939);
United States live in company-owned towns. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed.
These people, just as residents of municipalities,869 (1943).
are free citizens of their State and country. Just
as all other citizens they must make decisions The Court then considered Marsh v. Alabama, supra,
which affect the welfare of community andand concluded that:
nation. To act as good citizens they must be
informed. 326 U.S., at 508, 66 S.Ct., at 280. The shopping center here is clearly the functional
equivalent of the business district of Chickasaw involved
**2224 In Logan Valley the Court extended thein Marsh. 391 U.S., at 318, 88 S.Ct., at 1608.
rationale of Marsh to peaceful picketing of a store located
in a large shopping center, known as Logan Walley Mall, But the Court was careful not to go further and say
near Altoona, Pennsylvania. Weis Markets, Inc. (Weis), an that for all purposes and uses the privately owned streets,
original tenant, had opened a supermarket in one of the*560 sidewalks, and other areas of a shopping center are
larger stores and was employing a wholly nonunion staff. analogous to publicly owned facilities:
Within 10 days after Weis opened, members of All we decide here is that because the shopping
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 (Union) center serves as the community business block and is
began picketing Weis, carrying signs stating that it was a freely accessible and open to the people in the area and
nonunion market and that its employees were notthose passing through, Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326
receiving union wages or other union benefits. The U.S., at 508, 66 S.Ct., at 279, the State may not delegate
picketing, conducted by nonemployees, was carried out the power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to
*559 almost entirely in the parcel pickup area exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise
immediately adjacent to the store and on portions of the their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner
adjoining parking lot. The picketing was peaceful, with and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to
the number of pickets varying from four to 13. which the property is actually put.' Id., at 319-320, 88
S.Ct., at 1609.
Weis and Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., sought and
obtained an injunction against this picketing. The The Court noted that the scope of its holding was
injunction required that all picketing be confined to publiclimited, and expressly reserved judgment on the type of
areas outside the shopping center. On appeal theissue presented in this case:
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the The picketing carried on by petitioners was directed
injunction, and this Court granted certiorari. In framing specifically at patrons of the Weis Market located within
the question, this Court stated: the shopping center and the message sought to be
conveyed to the public concerned the manner in which
The case squarely presents . . . the question whetherthat particular market was being operated. We are,
Pennsylvania's generally valid rules against trespass totherefore, not called upon to consider whether
private property can be applied in these circumstances to respondents' property rights could, consistently with the
bar petitioners from the Weis and Logan premises. 391First Amendment, justify a bar on picketing which was
U.S., at 315, 88 S.Ct., at 1606. not thus **2225 directly related in its purpose to the use
to which the shopping center property was being put.
The Court noted that the answer would be clear if Id., at 320 n. 9, 88 S.Ct., at 1609.
the shopping center premises were not privately owned
but instead constituted the business area of a The Court also took specific note of the facts that the
municipality. Id., at 315, 88 S.Ct., at 1607. In the latterUnion's picketing was directed solely at one
situation, it has often been held that publicly owned establishment within the shopping center, Id., at 321, 88
streets, sidewalks, and parks are so historically associated S.Ct., at 1610, and that the public berms and sidewalks
with the exercise of First Amendment rights that access to were from 350 to 500 feet away from the Weis store. Id.,

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at 322, 88 S.Ct., at 1610. This distance made it difficultU.S., at 502, 66 S.Ct., at 277. The Court simply held that
to communicate (with) patrons of Weis' and to limit where private interests were substituting for and
(the) effect (of *561 the picketing) to Weis only. Id., atperforming the customary functions of government, First
322, 323, 88 S.Ct., at 1611.FN7 Logan Valley was decidedAmendment freedoms could not be denied where
on the basis of this factual situation, and the facts in this exercised in the customary manner on the town's
case are significantly different. sidewalks and streets. Indeed, as title to the entire town
was held privately, there were no publicly owned streets,
FN7. The Court also commented on thesidewalks, or parks where such rights could be exercised.
increasing role of shopping centers and on the
problem which they would present with respect FN8. 308 F.Supp. 128, 130, 132 (Or.1970); 446
to union activities if picketing were totally F.2d 545, 546 (CA9 1971).
proscribed within shopping center areas:
Business enterprises located in downtown areas Logan Valley extended Marsh to a shopping center
(on public streets and sidewalks) would be situation in a different context from the company town
subject to on-the-spot public criticism for theirsetting, but it did so only in a context where the First
(labor) practices, but businesses situated in theAmendment activity was related to the shopping center's
suburbs could largely immunize themselves fromoperations. There is some language in Logan Valley,
similar criticism by creating a cordon sanitaire of unnecessary to the decision, suggesting that the key focus
parking lots around their stores. 391 U.S., atof Marsh was upon the business district, and that
324-325, 88 S.Ct., at 1612. The concurringwhenever a privately owned business district serves the
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas also emphasized public generally its sidewalks **2226 and streets become
the related purpose of the picketing in Logan the functional equivalents of similar public facilities. FN9
Valley: Picketing in regard to labor conditionsAs Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Logan Valley
the Weis Supermarket is directly related to that emphasized, this would be an incorrect interpretation of
shopping center business. 391 U.S., at 326, 88the Court's decision in Marsh:FN10
S.Ct., at 1612.
FN9. Amalgamated Food Employees Union
II Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
The courts below considered the critical inquiry to be 308, 319, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 20 L.Ed.2d 603
whether Lloyd Center was the functional equivalent of a (1968).
public business district.'FN8 This phrase was first used in
Logan Valley, but its genesis was in Marsh. It is well to FN10. As Mr. Justice Black was the author of the
consider what Marsh actually decided. As noted above, it Court's opinion in Marsh, his analysis of its
involved an economic anomaly of the past, the company rationale is especially meaningful.
town. One must have seen such towns to understand that
functionally they were no different from municipalities
of comparable size. They developed primarily in the Deep Marsh was never intended to apply to this kind of
South to meet economic conditions, especially those situation. Marsh dealt with the very special *563 situation
which existed following the Civil War. Impoverished of a company-owned town, complete with streets, alleys,
States, and especially backward areas thereof, needed an sewers, stores, residences, and everything else that goes to
influx of industry and capital. Corporations attracted to make a town. The particular company town involved was
the area by natural resources and abundant labor were Chickasaw, Alabama, which, as we stated in the opinion,
willing to assume the role of local government. Quite except for the fact that it is owned by the Gulf
literally, towns *562 were built and operated by private Shipbuilding Corporation . . . has all the characteristics of
capital with all of the customary services and utilities any other American town. The property consists of
normally afforded by a municipal or state government: residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage
there were streets, sidewalks, sewers, public lighting, disposal plant and a business block on which business
police and fire protection, business and residential areas, places are situated.' 326 U.S., at 502, 66 S.Ct. at 277.
churches, postal facilities, and sometimes schools. In Again toward the end of the opinion we emphasized that
short, as Mr. Justice Black said, Chickasaw, Alabama, had the town of Chickasaw does not function differently from
all the characteristics of any other American town. 326 any other town. 326 U.S., at 508, 66 S.Ct. at 279. I think
it is fair to say that the basis on which the Marsh decision

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rested was that the property involved encompassed angoodwill. There is no open-ended invitation to the public
area that for all practical purposes had been turned into a to use the Center for any and all purposes, however
town; the area had all the attributes of a town and was incompatible with the interests of both the stores and the
exactly like any other town in Alabama.' 391 U.S., at 330-shoppers whom they serve.
331, 88 S.Ct., at 1614.
Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting in Logan Valley,
The holding in Logan Valley was not dependent upon noted the limited scope of a shopping center's invitation to
the suggestion that the privately owned streets and the public:
sidewalks of a business district or a shopping center are
the equivalent, for First Amendment purposes, of In no sense are any parts of the shopping center
municipally owned streets and sidewalks. No suchdedicated to the public for general purposes . . .. The
expansive reading of the opinion of the Court is necessarypublic is invited to the premises but only in order to do
or appropriate. The opinion was carefully phrased to limit business with those who maintain establishments there.
its holding to the picketing involved, where the picketing The invitation is to shop for the products which are sold.
was directly related in its purpose to the use to which the There is no general invitation to use the parking lot, the
shopping center property was being put, 391 U.S., at 320pickup zone, or the sidewalk except as an adjunct to
n. 9, 88 S.Ct., at 1609, and where the store was located in shopping. No one is invited to use the parking lot as a
the center of a large private enclave with the consequence place to park his car while he goes elsewhere to work.
that no other reasonable opportunities for the pickets to The driveways and lanes for auto traffic are not offered
convey their message to their intended audience were for use as general thoroughfares leading from one public
available. street to another. Those driveways and parking spaces are
not public streets and thus available for parades, public
*564 Neither of these elements is present in the casemeetings, or other activities for which public streets are
now before the Court. used. 391 U.S., at 338, 88 S.Ct. at 1619.

A It is noteworthy that respondents' argument based on

The handbilling by respondents in the malls of Lloyd the Center's being open to the public would apply in
Center had no relation to any purpose for which the center varying degrees to most retail stores and service
was built and being used. [EDITED]. It is neverthelessestablishments across the country. They are all open to the
argued by respondents that, since the Center is open to the public in the sense that customers and potential customers
public, the private owner cannot enforce a restrictionare invited and encouraged to enter. In terms of being
against handbilling on the premises. The thrust of this open to the public, there are differences only *566 of
argument is considerably broader than the rationale ofdegree-not of principle-between a free-standing store and
Logan Valley. It requires on relationship, direct orone located in a shopping center, between a small store
indirect, between the purpose of the expressive activityand a large one, between a single store with some malls
and the business **2227 of the shopping center. Theand open areas designed to attract customers and Lloyd
message sought to be conveyed by respondents was Center with its elaborate malls and interior landscaping.
directed to all members of the public, not solely to patrons
of Lloyd Center or of any of its operations. Respondents B
could have distributed these handbills on any public A further fact, distinguishing the present case from
street, on any public sidewalk, in any public park, or in Logan Valley, is that the Union pickets in that case would
any public building in the city of Portland. have been deprived of all reasonable opportunity to
Respondents' argument, even if otherwiseconvey their message to patrons of the Weis store had
meritorious, misapprehends the scope of the invitationthey been denied access to the shopping center.FN12
extended to the public. The invitation is to come to the **2228 The situation at Lloyd Center was notably
Center to do business with the tenants. It is true that different. The central building complex was surrounded
facilities at the Center are used for certain meetings and by public sidewalks, totaling 66 linear blocks. All persons
*565 for various promotional activities. The obviouswho enter or leave the private areas within the complex
purpose, recognized widely as legitimate and responsiblemust cross public streets and sidewalks, either on foot or
business activity, is to bring potential shoppers to the in automobiles. When moving to and from the privately
Center, to create a favorable impression, and to generate *567 owned parking lots, automobiles are required by law

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to come to a complete stop. Handbills may be distributed property contrary to its wishes and contrary to a policy
conveniently to pedestrians, and also to occupants of enforced against all handbilling. In addressing this issue,
automobiles, from these public sidewalks and streets.it must be remembered that the First and Fourteenth
Indeed, respondents moved to these public areas andAmendments safeguard the rights of free speech and
continued distribution of their handbills after being assembly by limitations on state action, not on action by
requested to leave the interior malls. It would be an the owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily for
unwarranted infringement of property rights to require private purposes only. The Due Process Clauses of the
them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are also relevant to this
under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues case. They provide that (n)o person shall . . . be deprived
of communication exist. Such an accommodation wouldof life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
diminish property rights without significantly enhancingThere is the further proscription in the Fifth Amendment
the asserted right of free speech. In ordering thisagainst the taking of private property . . . for public use,
accommodation the courts below erred in theirwithout just compensation.
interpretation of this Court's decisions in Marsh and
Logan Valley. [2] Although accommodations between the values
protected by these three Amendments are sometimes
FN12. The Court's opinion in Logan Valleynecessary,*568 and the courts properly have shown a
described the obstacles resulting from the special solicitude for the guarantees of the First
location of the Weis store in the shopping center, Amendment, this Court has never held that a trespasser or
and its relation to public streets and sidewalks: an uninvited guest may exercise general rights of free
Petitioners' picketing was directed solely at one speech on property privately owned and used
establishment within the shopping center. Thenondiscriminatorily for private purposes only. Even where
berms surrounding the center are from 350 to public property is involved, the Court has recognized that
500 feet away from the Weis store. All entry onto it is not necessarily available for speaking, picketing, or
the mall premises by customers of Weis, so far as other communicative activities. Mr. Justice Black,
appears, is by vehicle from the roads alongside speaking for the Court in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
which the berms run. Thus the placards bearing 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966), said:
the message which petitioners seek to
communicate to patrons of Weis must be read by The State, no less than a private owner of property,
those to whom they are directed either at ahas power to preserve the property under its control for
distance so great as to render them virtuallythe use to which it is lawfully dedicated. For this reason
indecipherable-where the Weis customers arethere is no merit to the petitioners' argument that they had
already within the mall-or while the prospective a constitutional right to stay on the property, over the jail
reader is moving by car from the roads onto the custodian's objections, because this area chosen for the
mall parking areas via the entrance ways cut peaceful civil rights demonstration was not only
through the berms. In addition, the pickets are reasonable but also particularly appropriate . . .' Such an
placed in some danger by being forced to walkargument has as its major unarticulated premise the
along heavily traveled roads along which trafficassumption that people who want to propagandize
moves constantly at rates of speed varying from protests or views have a constitutional right to do so
moderate to high. Likewise, the task of whenever and however and wherever they please. That
distributing handbills to persons in movingconcept of constitutional law was vigorously and
automobiles is vastly greater (and moreforthrightly rejected in two of the cases petitioners rely
hazardous) than it would be were petitioners on, Cox v. Louisiana, (379 U.S. 536), at 554-555, (
permitted to pass them out within the mall to **222985 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471) and ( 379 U.S.
pedestrians. 391 U.S., at 321-322, 88 S.Ct., at559), at 563-564, ( 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487). We
1610. reject it again. The United States Constitution does not
forbid a State to control the use of its own property for its
III own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.' 385 U.S., at 47-
[1] The basic issue in this case is whether 48, 87 S.Ct., at 247.
respondents, in the exercise of asserted First Amendment
rights, may distribute handbills on Lloyd's private Respondents contend, however, that the property of a

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large shopping center is open to the public, serves the commercial purposes. We do say that the Fifth and
same purposes as a business district of a municipality,Fourteenth Amendment rights of private property owners,
and therefore has been dedicated to certain types *569 ofas well as the First Amendment rights of all citizens, must
public use. The argument is that such a center hasbe respected and protected. The Framers of the
sidewalks, streets, and parking areas which areConstitution certainly did not think these fundamental
functionally similar to facilities customarily provided byrights of a free society are incompatible with each other.
municipalities. It is then asserted that all members of the There may be situations where accommodations between
public, whether invited as customers or not, have the them, and the drawing of lines to assure due protection of
same right of free speech as they would have on the both, are not easy. But on the facts presented in this case,
similar public facilities in the streets of a city or town. the answer is clear.

The argument reaches too far. The Constitution by no [6] We hold that there has been no such dedication of
means requires such an attenuated doctrine of dedication Lloyd's privately owned and operated shopping center to
of private property to public use. The closest decision in public use as to entitle respondents to exercise therein the
theory, Marsh v. Alabama, supra, involved the assumptionasserted First Amendment rights. Accordingly, we reverse
by a private enterprise of all of the attributes of a state- the judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals
created municipality and the exercise by that enterprise ofwith directions to vacate the injunction.
semiofficial municipal functions as a delegate of the
State.FN13 In effect, the owner of the company town was It is so ordered.
performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and
stood in the shoes of the State. In the instant case where is Judgment reversed and case remanded.
no comparable assumption or exercise of municipal
functions or power.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice
DOUGLAS, Mr. Justice **2230 BRENNAN, and Mr.
FN13. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Logan Mustice STEWART join, dissenting.
Valley, emphasized the distinction between a Donald Tanner, Betsy Wheeler, and Susan Roberts
privately owned shopping center and the(respondents) brought this action for a declaratory
company town involved in Marsh, which hejudgment that they have the right under the First and
said had assumed all the attributes' of aFourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
municipality. 391 U.S., at 332, 88 S.Ct., at 1615. to distribute handbills in a shopping center owned by
(Original emphasis.) petitioner and an injunction to enforce that right. *571
Relying primarily on our very recent decision in
[3][4][5] Nor does property lose its private character Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
merely because the public is generally invited to use it for Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603
designated purposes. Few would argue that a free- (1968), the United States District Court for the District of
standing store, with abutting parking space for customers, Oregon granted the relief requested. 308 F.Supp. 128
assumes significant public attributes merely because the(1970). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
public is invited to shop there. Nor is size alone the Circuit affirmed. 446 F.2d 545 (1971). Today, this Court
controlling factor. The essentially private character of areverses the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
store and its privately owned abutting property does not attempts to distinguish this case from Logan Valley. In my
change by virtue of being large or clustered with other view, the distinction that the Court sees between the cases
stores in a modern shopping center. This is not to say that does not exist. As I read the opinion of the Court, it is an
no differences may exist with respect to governmentattack not only on the rationale of Logan Valley, but also
regulation*570 or rights of citizens arising by virtue of on this Court's longstanding decision in Marsh v.
the size and diversity of activities carried on within a Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265
privately owned facility serving the public. There will be, (1946). Accordingly, I dissent.
for example, problems with respect to public health and
safety which vary in degree and in the appropriate [EDITED]
government response, depending upon the size and
character of a shopping center, an office building, a sports
arena, or other large facility serving the public for As I have pointed out above, Lloyd Center is even
more clearly the equivalent of a public business district

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than was Logan Valley Plaza. The First Amendment We must remember that it is a balance that we are
activity in both Logan Valley and the instant case was striking-a balance between the freedom to speak, a
peaceful and nondisruptive; and both cases involve freedom that is given a preferred place in our hierarchy of
traditionally acceptable modes of speech. Why thenvalues, and the freedom of a private property owner to
should there be a different result here? The Court's answer control his property. When the competing interests are
is that the speech in this case was directed at topics of fairly weighed, the balance can only be struck in favor of
general interest-the the Vietnam war and the draft- speech.
whereas the speech in Logan Valley was directed to the
activities of a store in the shopping center, and that this Members of the Portland community are able to see
factual difference is of constitutional dimensions. I cannot doctors, dentists, lawyers, bankers, travel agents, and
agree. persons offering countless other services in Lloyd Center.
They can buy almost anything that they want or need
A. It is true that in Logan Valley we explicitly left there. For many Portland citizens, Lloyd Center will so
open the question whether property rights could, completely satisfy their wants that they will have no
consistently*578 with the First Amendment, justify a bar reason to go elsewhere for goods or services. If speech is
on picketing (or handbilling) which was not . . . directly to reach these people, it must reach them in Lloyd Center.
related in its purpose to the use to which the shoppingThe Center itself recognizes this. For example, in 1964 its
center property was being put. 391 U.S., at 320 n. 9, 88director of public relations offered candidates for
S.Ct., at 1609. But, I believe that the Court errs in President and Vice President the use of the center for
concluding that this issue must be faced in the instant political speeches, boasting that our convenient location
case. and setting would provide the largest audience (the
candidates) could attract in Oregon. App. 187.
The District Court observed that Lloyd Center invites
schools to hold football rallies, presidential candidates to For many persons who do not have easy access to
give speeches, and service organizations to hold Veterans television, radio, the major newspapers, and the other
Day ceremonies on its premises. The court also observed forms of mass media, the only way they can express
that the Center permits the Salvation Army, the Volunteers themselves to a broad range of citizens**2235 on issues
of America, and the American Legion to solicit funds in of general public concern is to picket, or to handbill, or to
the Mall. Thus, the court concluded that the Center was utilize other *581 free or relatively inexpensive means of
already open to First Amendment activities, and that communication. The only hope that these people have to
respondents could not constitutionally be excluded frombe able to communicate effectively is to be permitted to
distributing leaflets solely because Lloyd Center was not speak in those areas in which most of their fellow citizens
enamored of the form or substance of their speech. The can be found. One such area is the business district of a
Court of Appeals affirmed, taking the position that it was city or town or its functional equivalenent [EDITED].
not extending either Logan Valley or Marsh. In otherAnd this is why respondents have a tremendous need to
words, the District Court found that Lloyd Center hadexpress themselves within Lloyd Center.
deliberately chosen to open its private property to a broad
range of expression and that having done so it could not Petitioner's interests, on the other hand, pale in
constitutionally exclude respondents, and the Court ofcomparison. For example, petitioner urges that
Appeals affirmed this finding. respondents' First Amendment activity would disturb the
Center's customers. It is undisputed that some patrons will
[EDITED} be disturbed by any First Amendment activity that goes
on, regardless of its object. But, there is no evidence to
B. If respondents had distributed handbills*582 indicate that speech directed to topics unrelated to
complaining about one or more stores in Lloyd Center or the shopping center would be more likely to impair the
about *580 the Center itself, petitioner concedes that ourmotivation of customers to buy than speech directed to
decision in Logan Valley would insulate that conductthe uses to which the Center is put, which petitioner
from proscription by the Center. {EDITEDI cannot seeconcedes is constitutionally protected under Logan Valley.
any logical reason to treat differently speech that is related On the contrary, common sense would indicate that
to subjects other than the Center and its member stores. speech that is critical of a shopping center or one or more
of its stores is more likely to deter consumers from

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purchasing goods or services than speech on any other might have increased, that is not a sufficient **2236
subject. Moreover, petitioner acknowledges thatreason for barring First Amendment activity. See, e.g.,
respondents have a constitutional right to leaflet on anySchneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct.
subject on public streets and sidewalks within Lloyd 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). If petitioner is truly concerned
Center. It is difficult for me to understand why leafletting about litter, it should accept a previous suggestion by this
in the Mall would be so much more disturbing to the Court and prosecute those *583 who throw handbills
Center's customers. away, not those who use them for communicative
purposes.FN6 Id., at 162, 60 S.Ct., at 151.
I also find patently frivolous petitioner's argument
that if handbilling in the Mall is permitted, Lloyd Center FN6. Since petitioner's security guards have full
would face inordinate difficulties in removing litter from police power, they can enforce state laws against
its premises. The District Court found that respondents' littering, just as they have enforced laws against
activities were litter-free. Assuming, arguendo, that if loitering in the past. App. 45 (testimony of R.
respondents had been permitted to continue their Horn, manager of Lloyd Center).
activities, litter might have resulted, I think that it is
immediately apparent that even if respondents confined In sum, the balance plainly must be struck in favor of
their activities to the public streets and sidewalks of the speech.
Center as Lloyd's private police suggested, litter would
have been a problem as the recipients of the handbills C. 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131
carried them to the shopping and parking areas. Petitioner
concedes that it would have had to remove this litter.
There is no evidence that the amount of litter would have END OF DOCUMENT
substantially increased if respondents distributed the
leaflets within the Mall. But, even assuming that the litter

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