1.

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS

Rule 137
Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related
to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties
in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
chan robles virtual law library
.

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. -

If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above
provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the
official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall
thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with
his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall
be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but
no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in
favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case. chan
robles virtual law library

2. A retaining lien differs from a charging lien. A charging lien is placed on any monetary
recovery due the client at the conclusion of the lawsuit...On the other hand, a retaining lien is a
passive lien and rests entirely on the right of an attorney to retain possession of his clients
papers, money, securities, and files as security for payment of the fees and costs earned by the
law firm to that point.

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Because the contingency has not occurred, the law firm could not assert a retaining lien for fees
it contends it is owed on collection matters that were still pending when it was discharged. If the
law firm believes it is owed money for services it rendered in the collection of delinquent unit
owner fees, it may file a charging lien and is entitled to the reasonable value of its services on
the basis of quantum meruit, limited by the contract flat fee the parties agreed to.

Attorney's Lien
The right of a lawyer to hold a client's property or money until payment has been made for legal
aid and advice given.

In general, a lien is a security interest used by a creditor to ensure payment by a debtor for
money owed. Since an attorney is entitled to payment for services performed, the attorney has a
claim on a client's property until compensation is duly made.

A charging lien is an attorney's right to a portion of the judgment that was won for the client
through professional services. It is a specific lien and only covers a lawyer's claim on money
obtained in a particular action.
A retaining lien is more general in its scope. It extends to all of a client's property that an
attorney might come into possession of during the course of a lawsuit. Until an attorney is
compensated for services, he or she has a claim or interest in such property.

G.R. No. L-12905 February 26, 1959

ELENA PERALTA VDA. DE CAIA, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. GUSTAVO VICTORIANO, ET AL., respondents.

This issue to be determined is whether the attorney's lien of respondent Dalisay for services he
had rendered in the ejectment case can be ordered annotated on the back of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 51585.

An attorney's lien is of two kinds: one is called retaining alien and the other charging lien. The
retaining lien is the right of the attorney to retain the funds, documents, and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and disbursements have been
paid and to apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. The charging lien is the right which the
attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of
said judgments, which he has secured in litigation of his client (Section 33, Rule 127; Rustia vs.
Abeto, 72 Phil., 133). Under this rule, this lien, whether retaining or charging, takes legal effect
only from and after, but not before, notice of said lien has been entered in the record and served
on the adverse party (Macondray & Company, Inc. vs. Jose, 66 Phil., 590; Menzi and Company
vs. Bastida, 63 Phil., 16).

It may therefore be seen that the right of a lawyer to insure the payment of his professional fee is
either to retain the funds, documents, and papers of his client which may have lawfully come into
his possession, or to enforce it upon any judgment for the payment of money he may secure in
favor of his client. And it has been held that the retaining lien is dependent upon possession and
does not attach to anything not in attorney's hands. The lien exists only so long as the attorney's
retains possession ends (Rustia vs. Abeto, supra).

In the instant case, the lien which respondent attorney tried to enforce for the satisfaction of his
professional fee is charging in the sense that his purpose is to make of record his claim in order
that it may be considered in the execution of the judgment that may be rendered in the case, and
this he has already done. Thus, he had already caused a statement of his claim to be entered in
the record of the ejectment case and that is all what the rule requires of him to do. Certainly, he
cannot go any further, such as what he led the trial court to do, that is, to have his lien annotated
on the back of the title of petitioners which is beyond the province of the court. The lien of
respondent is not of a nature which attaches to the property in litigation but is at most a personal
claim enforceable by a writ of execution. The respondent judge has therefore exceeded his
authority in issuing the order subject of the present petition for certiorari.

Petition is granted. The order of respondent judge dated July 10, 1957 is hereby set aside. Costs
against respondent Flaviano T. Dalisay, Jr.

3. A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his
capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a profession in
which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily
meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.14 The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who
must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness

to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients.16

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that
he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to
violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in
the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused
the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts
of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled
"Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only
the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients
that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19
he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have
refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.20
Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence
address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief
data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal
Clinic, Inc.:22

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of
law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of
graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations
and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings
in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published
principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief
biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program.
Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower
dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address,
being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name
listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis
and italics supplied)

4. Attorney; Champertous contract. Complainants engaged the legal

services of Atty. Baez, Jr. in connection with the recovery of their
properties from Fevidal. Complainants signed a contract of legal
services, where they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees
to Atty. Baez Jr., but that the docket fees would instead be shared by
the parties. Under the contract, complainants would pay him 50% of
whatever would be recovered of the properties. Later, however,
complainants terminated his services and entered into an amicable
settlement with Fevidal. Atty. Baez, Jr. opposed the withdrawal of their
complaint in court. Thus, complainants filed a case against him
alleging that the motion of Atty. Baez, Jr. for the recording of his
attorneys charging lien was the legal problem preventing them from
enjoying the fruits of their property.
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to
intervene in a case to protect his rights concerning the payment of his
compensation. According to the discretion of the court, the attorney
shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money
rendered in a case in which his services have been retained by the
client. In this case, however, the contract for legal services is in the
nature of a champertous contract an agreement whereby an attorney
undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to enforce the
clients rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing
in dispute. Such contracts are contrary to public policy and are thus
void or inexistent. They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which states that lawyers shall not lend
money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for
the client. Thus, the Court held that Atty. Baez, Jr. violated Canon
16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Conchita Baltazar,et al. v.
Atty. Juan B. Baez, Jr., A.C. No. 9091, December 11, 2013.

XXXX Attorney; Gross misconduct. Heenan filed a complaint against

Atty. Espejo for violation of the Lawyers Oath due to the latters failure
to pay a loan. The Supreme Court found Atty. Espejo guilty of gross
misconduct. The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance
of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned. Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. The
prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a
lawyer. The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the
worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of
Heenan is of no moment. A lawyer may be disciplined not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross
misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may
not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non-
professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in
suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct
outside of the lawyer professional dealings is so gross in character as
to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his
licenses and the law confer. Thus, Atty. Espejo was suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years. Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda
Espejo, A.C. No. 10050, December 3, 2013.

Judge; Gross Ignorance of the Law. Complainant claimed that since

Judge Cajigals appointment as presiding judge of RTC, Branch 96,
Quezon City, the latter has displayed gross inefficiency by failing to
resolve within the prescribed period a number of incidents. Moreover,
complainant questions the propriety of the Judges decision in a case
he is involved in. The Supreme Court held that the charges of
ignorance of the law are bereft of merit. Judge Cajigals order was
issued in the proper exercise of his judicial functions, and as such, is
not subject to administrative disciplinary action; especially considering
that the complainant failed to establish bad faith on the part of the
judge. Well entrenched is the rule that a judge may not be
administratively sanctioned for mere errors of judgment in the
absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance,
corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her
part. Moreover, as a matter of public policy, a judge cannot be
subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be
to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. Narciso G. Dulalia v. Judge Afable E. Cajigal, RTC,
Br. 96, Quezon City, A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3492-RTJ, December 4, 2013.

Judge; Voluntary inhibition. Rallos charges Justice Hernando with bias

because he voluntarily inhibited himself in CA-G.R. CEB SP. No. 06676
only after the promulgation of the March 28, 2012 and April 13, 2012
resolutions. The Supreme Court held that the fact that Justice
Hernando voluntarily inhibited himself after writing the assailed
resolutions did not establish his bias against Rallos and her co-heirs
considering that the inhibition was for the precise objective of
eliminating suspicions of undue influence. The justification of Justice
Hernando was commendable, and should be viewed as a truly just and
valid ground for his self-disqualification as a judicial officer in a specific
case. Further, Rallos insists that she was entitled to be informed about
the inhibitions of the Justices and about their reasons for the
inhibitions. The Court held that there is nothing in Rule V or in any
other part of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that specifically
requires that the party-litigants be informed of the mandatory or
voluntary inhibition of a Justice. Nevertheless, a party-litigant who
desires to be informed of the inhibition of a Justice and of the reason
for the inhibition must file a motion for inhibition in the manner
provided under Section 3, Rule V of the Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals.

However, the Court held that henceforth all the parties in any action or
proceedings should be immediately notified of any mandatory
disqualification or voluntary inhibition of the Justice who has
participated in any action of the court, stating the reason for the
mandatory disqualification or voluntary inhibition. The requirement of
notice is a measure to ensure that the disqualification or inhibition has
not been resorted to in order to cause injustice to or to prejudice any
party or cause. Re: Letters of Lucena B. Rallos, for alleged
acts/incidents/occurences relative to the resolutions(s) issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
06676 by Court of Appeals Executive Justice Pampio Abarintos and Associate
Justices Ramol Paul Hernando and Victoria Isabel Paredes/Re: Complaint filed
by Lucena B. Rallos against Justices Gabriel T. Ingles, Pamela Ann Maxino, and
Carmelita S. Manahan, IPI No. 12-203-CA-J/A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA,
December 10, 2013.

5. G.R. No. 176389 - ANTONIO LEJANO, petitioner, -versus- PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 176864 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, -versus- HUBERT JEFFREY
P. WEBB, et al., appellants.

Promulgated:

December 14, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

BRION, J.:

In addition to my vote and independently of the merits of the present case, I write this
opinion to point out the growing disregard and non-observance of the sub judice rule, to the
detriment of the rights of the accused, the integrity of the courts, and, ultimately, the
administration of justice. I seize this opportunity fully aware that the present case dubbed in the
news media as the Vizconde Massacre is one of the most sensational criminal cases in Philippine
history in terms of the mode of commission of the crime and the personalities involved. From the
time the charges were filed, the case has captured the publics interest that an unusual amount of
air time and print space have been devoted to it. Of late, with the publics renewed interest after
the case was submitted for decision, key personalities have again been unabashedly publicizing
their opinions and commenting even on the merits of the case before various forms of media. A
Senior Justice of this Court, who was a witness in the case (while he was in private law practice)
and who consequently inhibited himself from participation, was even publicly maligned in the
print and broadcast media through unsupported speculations about his intervention in the case.
That was how bad and how low comments about the case had been.

In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending
judicial proceedings. The restriction applies not only to participants in the pending case, i.e., to
members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and witnesses, but also to the public in general,
which necessarily includes the media. Although the Rules of Court does not contain a specific
provision imposing the sub judice rule, it supports the observance of the restriction by punishing
its violation as indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. x x x

a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
 xxxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]

Persons facing charges for indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule often
invoke as defense their right to free speech and claim that the citation for contempt constitutes a
form of impermissible subsequent punishment.

We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of speech under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution is not absolute. A very literal construction of the provision, as
espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, 1[1] may lead to the disregard of other
equally compelling constitutional rights and principles. In Vicente v. Majaducon,2[2] this Court
declared that [the freedom of speech] needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated
with the requirements of equally important public interests such as the maintenance of the
integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. Courts, both within
and outside this jurisdiction, have long grappled with the dilemma of balancing the publics right
to free speech and the governments duty to administer fair and impartial justice. While the sub
judice rule may be considered as a curtailment of the right to free speech, it is necessary to
ensure the proper administration of justice and the right of an accused to a fair trial. 3[3] Both
these latter concerns are equally paramount and cannot lightly be disregarded.

Before proceeding with this line of thought, however, let me clarify that the sub judice
rule is not imposed on all forms of speech. In so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, two
classes of publicized speech made during the pendency of the proceedings can be considered as
contemptuous: first, comments on the merits of the case, and second, intemperate and
unreasonable comments on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case. Publicized speech
should be understood to be limited to those aired or printed in the various forms of media such as
television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and internet, and excludes discussions, in public or in
private, between and among ordinary citizens. The Constitution simply gives the citizens the
right to speech, not the right to unrestricted publicized speech.

Comments on the merits of the case may refer to the credibility of witnesses, the
character of the accused, the soundness of the alibis offered, the relevance of the evidence
presented, and generally any other comment bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. 4
[4] The danger posed by this class of speech is the undue influence it may directly exert on the
court in the resolution of the criminal case, or indirectly through the public opinion it may
generate against the accused and the adverse impact this public opinion may have during the
trial. The significance of the sub judice rule is highlighted in criminal cases, as the possibility of
undue influence prejudices the accuseds right to a fair trial. The principal purpose of the sub
judice rule is to preserve the impartiality of the judicial system by protecting it from undue
influence.5[5] Public opinion has no place in a criminal trial. We ruled that

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 it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries,
in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and
that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.6[6]

The right to a fair trial is an adjunct of the accuseds right to due process which guarantees [him]
a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial x x x where the conclusions
reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument
given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.7[7]

In foreign jurisdictions, the courts do not hesitate to exercise their power to punish for
contempt where necessary to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications that tend
to impair the impartiality of verdicts.8[8]

If the media publish prejudicial material, they can appear to urge, or may
in fact be urging, a particular finding: the media can wage a campaign against one
of the parties to proceedings. If the jury decides in accordance with an outcome
promoted by the media, it will appear as if the jurors were swayed by the media.
By the same token, if the jurys decision does not accord with media opinion, it
may appear as if they were deliberately reacting against it. Either way, it may
appear that the jurys decision was not impartial and based on the evidence
presented in court, even if it was.9[9]

The accused must be assured of a fair trial notwithstanding the prejudicial publicity; 10[10] he has
a constitutional right to have his cause tried fairly by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publication or public clamor.11[11] The sub judice doctrine protects against the appearance of
decisions having been influenced by published material.12[12]

As may be observed from the cited material, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts
to insulate members of the jury from being influenced by prejudicial publicity. But the fact that
the jury system is not adopted in this jurisdiction is not an argument against our observance of
the sub judice rule; justices and judges are no different from members of the jury, they are not
immune from the pervasive effects of media. It might be farcical to build around them an

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impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion.13[13] As
I said in another case, in a slightly different context, even those who are determined, in their
conscious minds, to avoid bias may be affected.14[14]

Also, it is not necessary that the publicity actually influenced the courts disposition of the
case; the actual impact of prejudicial publicity is not relevant to liability for sub judice
contempt.15[15] In several cases, the Court has noted the

enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience x x x Even while it may be

difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on
[witnesses and judges] directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a
fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees.
The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the
testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can
likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to
it.16[16]

Comment on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case becomes subject to a
contempt proceeding when it is intemperate, is contumacious, and unduly impairs upon the
dignity of the court. A comment that impairs of the dignity of the court excites in the mind of the
people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes their minds to
obey them[.]17[17] If the speech tends to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the court and its members, and lowers or degrades the administration of justice,
then the speech constitutes contempt.18[18] Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein. 19[19]
Without the sub judice rule and the contempt power, the courts will be powerless to protect their
integrity and independence that are essential in the orderly and effective dispensation and
administration of justice.

This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of criticism against the court. As the third
branch of the government, the courts remain accountable to the people. The peoples freedom to
criticize the government includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions.
This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental to our democratic society and ensures
that (a) there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the publics

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confidence in the administration of justice is maintained. 20[20] The criticism must, however, be
fair, made in good faith, and not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. 21[21] And to
enhance the open court principle and allow the people to make fair and reasoned criticism of the
courts, the sub judice rule excludes from its coverage fair and accurate reports (without
comment) of what have actually taken place in open court.

In sum, the court, in a pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment or

influence in its all-important duty of deciding the case.22[22] Any publication pending a suit,
reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to
the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is
punishable. The resulting (but temporary) curtailment of speech because of the sub judice rule is
necessary and justified by the more compelling interests to uphold the rights of the accused and
promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.

If we do not apply at all the sub judice rule to the present case, the reason is obvious to
those who have followed the case in the media both parties are in pari delicto as both have
apparently gone to the media to campaign for the merits of their respective causes. Thus, the
egregious action of one has been cancelled by a similar action by the other. It is in this sense that
this Supplemental Opinion is independent of the merits of the case. Their common action,
however, cannot have their prejudicial effects on both; whatever the results may be, doubts will
linger about the real merits of the case due to the inordinate media campaign that transpired.

Lest we be misunderstood, our application of the sub judice rule to this case cannot serve
as a precedent for similar future violations. Precisely, this Supplemental Opinion is a signal to all
that this Court has not forgotten, and is in fact keenly aware of, the limits of what can be publicly
ventilated on the merits of a case while sub judice, and on the comments on the conduct of the
courts with respect to the case. This Court will not standby idly and helplessly as its integrity as
an institution and its processes are shamelessly brought to disrepute.

ARTURO D. BRION, Associate Justice

6. Attorney's fees; nature of; how recovered - G.R. No. 169293

G.R. No. 169293

"x x x.

In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees may be recovered as actual or compensatory

damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, [28] to wit:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

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 (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled
workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability
laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
Even if it were true that DBP had a hand in the transfer of Traverses insurance coverage to Central,
such act is not sufficient to hold it solidarily liable with Central for the payment of attorneys fees
and cost of litigation under the above provision of the Civil Code.

Records show that during the testimony of the former insurance examiner of DBP-Tarlac, Victoria Punzalan
(Punzalan), she claimed that she had repeatedly reminded Mrs. Lourdes Roxas, Traverses President, of
the impending expiration of Traverses insurance coverage with FGU. [29] Mrs. Roxas, however replied that
her son would not be able to attend to it as he was out of the country at that time. Subsequently, Atty.
Ruperto Zamora of Central called up Punzalan, upon the supposed instruction of Mrs. Roxas, to draw up
Traverses insurance coverage.[30] DBP only came to know that Traverse had already renewed its insurance
policy with FGU on May 6, 1981, after Central had already drawn up Policy No. TAR 1056. [31]

We thus find that DBP could not be blamed for facilitating such transfer in light of the previous delays in
Traverses submission of its insurance policy. It is worthy to note that Policy No. TAR 1056 was drawn on
May 7, 1986, the date that Traverses previous FGU policy was set to expire. Moreover, Central was not
only one of DBPs accredited insurance companies, but it also had a local branch office, which made
transactions with it faster and easier.

This Court also cannot sustain the insinuation that DBPs lax attitude in pursuing its claim against
Central was tantamount to bad faith as to make it liable for attorneys fees and costs of suit. Even a resort
to the principle of equity will not justify making DBP liable.

The award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule and the court must state
explicitly the legal reason for such award.[32] As we held in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court
of Appeals[33]:
The general rule is that attorneys fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because
of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorneys fees
under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
rights, still attorneys fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith
could be reflected in a partys persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of
the righteousness of his cause.[34] (Emphasis supplied.)

It should be remembered that Traverses insurance policy was assigned to DBP. While it is true that DBP
still had the real estate mortgage to ensure the payment of Traverses loan, it would be in its favor to
facilitate Centrals payment on Policy No. TAR 1056 rather than go through the process of foreclosing
Traverses lot or having to demand payment again, albeit from Traverse this time. Moreover, Traverses
own evidence shows that DBP had tried its best to facilitate and coordinate meetings between Traverse
and Central. DBP Tarlac even suggested to its main office to have Central blacklisted from its roster of
accredited insurance companies as an effect of its handling of the Traverse fire insurance claim. [35]

It was not DBPs act of facilitating the transfer of Traverses insurance policy from FGU to Central that
compelled Traverse to litigate its claims, but rather Centrals persistent refusal to pay such claims. Thus,
only Central should be held liable for the payment of attorneys fees and costs of suit.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion filed by DBP to direct the lower court to issue a writ of partial execution
has become moot.

x x x."