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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

and
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM)

Session 5
Application of FMEA RCM as part of a wider
integrity program

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Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk
Application of FMEA RCM as part of a
wider integrity program

So far we have looked at the tools and method of FMEA/RCM


application but how does it work in practice?

On the next slide there are some real life problems from an operating site and
we shall work though the application of FMEA and bring in the wider integrity
aspects of RCM to determine what planned maintenance might be appropriate to
improve reliability.

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Targeting RCM/FMEA

Computerised Maintenance Management System Report

Recovery System recirculation pump failures over last 12 months


System Function Reported Repair Occurrences Lost
Failure over 12 Production
months Impact
Recovery Hyd R-P3 Main Bearing Bearing 3 144 hrs
failure replaced
Recovery Hyd R-P3 Hyd Oil Filters 5 80 hrs
Contamination replaced full
system
flushed
Recovery Hyd R-P3 Main drive Manufacturer 1 12 hrs
shaft fracture overhaul
Shaft replaced

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Targeting RCM/FMEA

Recovery System Hydraulic recirculation pump


The hydraulic power for the unit is provided by
a rotary-vane pump. This pump is electrically
driven (direct coupling). It contains a set of
retractable vanes that spin inside an oval
chamber.
As the vanes spin, they pull hydraulic fluid from
the return line at low pressure and force it into
the outlet at high pressure. The amount of flow
provided by the pump is governed by a
feedback loop from a downstream pressure
sensor controlling the driving motor.
The pump is designed to provide adequate flow
when idling and can move much more fluid
than necessary as speed increases. To allow for
this the pump contains a pressure-relief valve
diverting excess fluid .
The hydraulic pump is self lubricating (uses the
hydraulic oil it circulates for bearings)

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RCM/FMEA Steps

Step 1 Process Function and Requirements


Step 2 Potential Failure Mode
Step 3 Potential Failures and their Effects
Step 4 What are the causes
Step 5 Occurrence Evaluation
Step 6 Potential Prevention/Detection
Step 7 Prioritising
Step 8 Deciding Maintenance Actions
Step 9 Who does what and how often?
Step 10 Re-Design and Contingencies

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Applying the model

Step 1 Process Function and Requirements


Determine and identify the Function, its features and/or its requirements

Recovery System recirculation pump


Hyd R-P3
To deliver clean hydraulic fluid at 50PSI
upon demand for operation of recovery
systems

Remember: Agree the primary and secondary functions of the system


Remember: Primary + PIECES

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Applying the model

Step 1 Process Function and Requirements

Recovery System recirculation pump


Hyd R-P3

Primary To deliver clean hydraulic fluid at 50PSI upon demand for


operation of recovery systems

Protection Relief valve, filters (remote)


Image / Appearance Not Applicable
Environmental integrity Sealed / bunded
Control / compliance / containment / comfort Pressure sensor (remote)
Economy / efficiency Current usage monitored
Safety / structural integrity Pump body, PRV, pipework
and couplings (some
remote)

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Applying the model

No function
Step 2 Potential Failure Mode Partial/Over/Degraded Function
Intermittent Function
Unintended Function
What can go wrong?
In this example we are going to concentrate on just the primary function
System Function Reported Repair Failure Mode Lost
Failure Production
Impact
Recovery Hyd R-P3 Main Bearing Bearing replaced No Function 144 hrs
failure
Recovery Hyd R-P3 Hyd Oil Filters replaced Degraded 80 hrs
Contamination full system Function
flushed
Recovery Hyd R-P3 Main drive shaft Manufacturer No Function 12 hrs
fracture overhaul
Shaft replaced

Remember: Fill in a separate worksheet for each function

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Applying the model

FMECA worksheet
Controls

Confidence

Frequency
Detection
Potential

Severity
Potential

Occur
Potential

RPN

Skill
Performance Effects of Causes Maintenance
Requirements
Failure
Failure
Actions Contingencies
Mode of options
Mode Failure Prevention Detection

No
Function

No
Function
Deliver
clean
hydraulic No
fluid at Function
50PSI upon
demand for No
operation of Function
recovery
systems
No
Function

No
Function

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Applying the model
Step 3 TABLE X Potential Failures and their Effects Scoring the severity
EFFECT Criteria: Severity of Effect This ranking results when a potential failure mode results in a final customer and/or production/assembly plant defect. The SCORE
final customer should always be considered first. If both occur use the higher of the two severities.

Customer effect Production/assembly effect

Hazardous without Very high severity rating when a potential failure mode affects safe operation and/or Or may endanger operator (machine or product) without 10
warning involves non-compliance without warning warning.

Hazardous with Very high severity rating when a potential failure mode affects safe product usage and/or Or may endanger operator (machine or product) with warning 9
warning involves non-compliance with warning

Very High Inoperable (loss of primary function) Or 100% of product may have to be scrapped or 8
rework/production overtime in excess of defined time off
line repair or prolonged on line repair

High Operable but at a reduced level of performance production/customer dissatisfied Proportion (less than 100%)of product may be scrapped or 7
rework/production overtime up to 0.5 of defined time

Moderate Operable but comfort/convenience item(s) inoperable customer/production dissatisfied Proportion (less than 100%)of product may be scrapped or 6
rework/production overtime up to 0.5 of defined time

Low Operable but comfort/convenience item(s) operable at a reduced level of performance Proportion (less than 100%)of product may be scrapped or 5
customer/production somewhat dissatisfied rework/production overtime up to 0.25 hour off line repair

Very Low Poor operability, inconvenient but can be carried to repair opportunity Or the product may have to be sorted and a portion (less 4
Problem noticed by 75% of production operators than 100%) reworked

Minor Poor operability, inconvenient but can be carried to repair opportunity Or the product may have to be sorted and a portion (less 3
Problem noticed by 50% of production operators than 100%) reworked on line but out of station

Very Minor Poor operability, inconvenient but can be carried to repair opportunity Or the product may have to be sorted and a portion (less 2
Problem noticed by discriminating production operators (less than 25%) than 100%) reworked on line but in station

None No discernable effect Or slight inconvenience to operation or operator, or no effect 1

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Applying the model

FMECA worksheet
Controls

Confidence

Frequency
Detection
Severity
Potential
Potential

Occur
Potential

RPN

Skill
Performance Effects of Maintenance
Requirements
Failure
Failure
Causes of Actions Contingencies
Mode options
Mode Failure Prevention Detection

Loss of
No
primary 8
Function
function
Loss of
No
primary 8
Function
function
Deliver
clean Loss of
hydraulic No
primary 8
fluid at Function
function
50PSI upon
demand for Loss of
No
operation of primary 8
Function
recovery function
systems
Loss of
No
primary 8
Function
function
Loss of
No
primary 8
Function
function

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Applying the model
Step 4 - What are the causes

This is where the problem solving we looked at is utilised

Information Equipment Material


Why?
Why?

Causes Failure Why?


Mode
Why?
Why?
People Environment Methods

Remember: the 4 Causes of Failure


Wrong from start
Something has changed
Human error/omission
Deterioration

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Applying the model

Building - Cause and Effect Diagrams using brainstorming and why


analysis
Machine
Coupling Step 1 Ask Why?
sheared
Why?
Pump Step 2 Brainstorm ideas
Overloaded Inop Brainstorming Prompts:-
Why? Why? Wrong from start
Bearing Why?
Failed Pump shaft Something changed
seized/collapsed Deterioration
Pump/Motor Human intervention
drive Inop Why?
Step 3 + Repeat

EFFECT
Why?

No Hydraulic
Pressure
delivery Why?
Why?

Recovery System
Motor Inop
recirculation pump
Hyd R-P3
No Function

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Applying the model

Homing in on root cause


Contaminated Seized
Oil Step 1 Ask Why?
Step 2 Brainstorm ideas
Blocked
Alignment Brainstorming Prompts
Wrong from start
Something changed
Inadequate Deterioration
system Inadequate Human intervention
sealing Why? system not aligned
Why? Why? sealing Why? on fit
Step 3 + Repeat
Why? Why?
Filter
Why? Failure
Why?
Why?
Filter No alignment
Overheating specification? procedure

Why?
Why?
Why? Hydraulic oil
Why? specification
Debris Why?
changed
ingress Bearing specification?
Bearing Failed
Increased
friction Detail from previous
CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk
Applying the model

FMECA worksheet
Controls

Confidence

Frequency
Detection
Severity
Potential
Potential

Occur
Potential

RPN

Skill
Performance Effects of Maintenance
Requirements
Failure
Failure
Causes of Actions Contingencies
Mode Pre options
Mode Failure vent Detection
ion

Loss of Bearing
No
primary 8 failure -Debris
Function
Deliver function ingress
clean
hydraulic Loss of Bearing
No
fluid at primary 8 failure filter
Function
50PSI function failure
upon Loss of Bearing
demand for No
primary 8 failure Oil
operation of Function
function contaminated
recovery
systems Loss of Bearing
No
primary 8 failure
Function
function misaligned

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Applying the model

TABLE Y
Probability of Failure Likely Failure Rates Score

Multiple failures per shift


10
Very High persistent failures
At least 1 per week
9

1-3 per month


8
High frequent failures
4+ every 6 months
7

2 - 3 every 6 months
6
Moderate occasional failures
1 every 6 months
5

2+ per year
4
Low relatively few failures
1 per year
3

Failure rate less than 1 per year


2
Remote failure is unlikely
No record of failure during operating history
1

The example covers a wide range operations and hence functions across a
varied production site and is therefore robust enough to capture all operating
environments. CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk
Applying the model

FMECA worksheet
Controls

Detection Confidence

Frequency
Severity
Potential Potential

Occur
Potential

RPN

Skill
Performance Effects of Maintenance
Requirements
Failure
Failure
Causes of Actions Contingencies
Mode options
Mode Failure Prevention Detection

Loss of Bearing
No
primary 8 failure -Debris 8
Function
Deliver function ingress
clean
hydraulic Loss of Bearing
No
fluid at primary 8 failure filter 7
Function
50PSI function failure
upon Loss of Bearing
demand for No
primary 8 failure Oil 7
operation of Function
function contaminated
recovery
systems Loss of Bearing
No
primary 8 failure 7
Function
function misaligned

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model

Step 8 Maintenance Options/Actions how do we use this knowledge?


Detection Criteria Detection method options Maintenance Option
(where safety is a factor re-design may be only option)

Almost impossible Absolute certainty of non- Cannot detect or is not checked RTF, functional testing, scheduled replacement, re-design
detection
P-f interval negligible
Very remote Will probably not detect Indirect or random checks only RTF, functional testing, scheduled replacement, re-design
Negligible P-f

Remote Poor chance of detection Visual inspection only RTF, functional testing, scheduled replacement, re-design or PMs
Very short P-f (including SOP)

Very Low Poor chance of detection Double vision inspection (OP + RTF, functional testing, scheduled replacement, re-design or PMs
Short P-f Tech) (including SOP)

Low May detect Trending RTF, Functional testing, scheduled replacement, scheduled CM on PMs
Measurable P-f (including SOP)

Moderate May detect Local gauges and go/no go Functional testing, scheduled replacement, scheduled CM on PMs
Measurable P-f (including SOP)

Moderately High Good chance of detection Secondary production indication CBM, PM


Measurable P-f or CBM

High Good chance of detection Production indication or CBM CBM or PM


Measurable P-f

Very High Almost certain to detect Production indication and CBM CBM
Readily Measurable P-f

Very High Certain to detect Production indication and online CBM


Readily Measurable P-f CBM

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model

FMECA worksheet

Controls

Detection Confidence

Frequency
Severity
Potential
Potential Maintena

Occur
Potential

RPN

Skill
Performance Effects of
Requirement
Failure
Failure
Causes of nce Actions Contingencies
Mode Failure options
Mode Prevention Detection

Bearing
Loss of Vibration
No failure - Intervention
primary 8 8
Function Debris procedures
function
ingress

Loss of Bearing
No Indicator
primary 8 failure filter 7
Function fitted
Deliver clean function failure
hydraulic fluid
at 50PSI Loss of Bearing
No Check
upon demand primary 8 failure filter 7
Function specification
for operation function failure
of recovery Bearing
systems Loss of Intervention
No failure Oil procedures
primary 8 7
Function contaminate
function
d

Loss of Bearing
No
primary 8 failure 7 Vibration
Function
function misaligned

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model
Step 6 TABLE Z Potential Prevention /Detection - what is available to us?
Detection Criteria A B C Detection method options Score

Almost impossible Absolute certainty of non- X Cannot detect or is not 10


A = CBM or FLOAC reading that detection checked
can indicate condition. P-f interval negligible

(CBM should always be on Very remote Will probably not detect X Indirect or random checks 9
Negligible P-f only
cost/benefit analysis)
Remote Poor chance of detection X Visual inspection only 8
Very short P-f
B = Gauging or go/no go;
Very Low Poor chance of detection X Double vision inspection 7
Short P-f (OP + Tech)

C = Manual inspection Low May detect X X Local gauges and go/no go 6


Measurable P-f

Moderate May detect X X Trending production 5


Measurable P-f and/or CM (manual)

Moderately High Good chance of detection X X Secondary production 4


Measurable P-f indication or CBM

High Good chance of detection X X Production indication or 3


Measurable P-f CBM

Very High Almost certain to detect X X Live Production indication 2


Readily Measurable P-f and CBM

Very High Certain to detect X Live Production indication 1


Readily Measurable P-f and online CBM

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Developing and Applying a
practical model
Step 7 Prioritising

The Risk Priority Number (RPN).

It allows us to identify the failure modes that we need to concentrate on.

It equates to:

Effect x Occurrence x Confidence of detection

When the data is gathered on a spreadsheet is a simple matter to sort by RPN


number the RPN is now entered onto the worksheet

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model

FMECA worksheet

Controls

Detection Confidence

Frequency
Severity
Potential
Potential

Occur
Potential

RPN

Skill
Performance Effects of Maintenance
Requirement
Failure
Failure
Causes of Actions Contingencies
Mode options
Mode Failure Prevention Detection

Bearing
Loss of
No failure - Intervention
primary 8 8 Vibration 3 192
Function Debris procedures
function
ingress

Loss of Bearing
No Indicator
primary 8 failure filter 7 6 336
Function fitted
Deliver clean function failure
hydraulic fluid
at 50PSI Loss of Bearing
No Check
upon demand primary 8 failure filter 7 6 336
Function specification
for operation function failure
of recovery Bearing
systems Loss of Intervention
No failure Oil procedures
primary 8 7 6 336
Function contaminate
function
d

Loss of Bearing
No
primary 8 failure 7 Vibration 3 168
Function
function misaligned

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model

Step 8 Maintenance Options/Actions how do we use this knowledge?


Detection Criteria Detection method options Maintenance Option
(where safety is a factor re-design may be only option)

Almost impossible Absolute certainty of non- Cannot detect or is not checked RTF, functional testing, scheduled replacement, re-design
detection
P-f interval negligible
Very remote Will probably not detect Indirect or random checks only RTF, functional testing, scheduled replacement, re-design
Negligible P-f

Remote Poor chance of detection Visual inspection only RTF, functional testing, scheduled replacement, re-design or PMs
Very short P-f (including SOP)

Very Low Poor chance of detection Double vision inspection (OP + RTF, functional testing, scheduled replacement, re-design or PMs
Short P-f Tech) (including SOP)

Low May detect Trending RTF, Functional testing, scheduled replacement, scheduled CM on PMs
Measurable P-f (including SOP)

Moderate May detect Local gauges and go/no go Functional testing, scheduled replacement, scheduled CM on PMs
Measurable P-f (including SOP)

Moderately High Good chance of detection Secondary production CBM, PM


Measurable P-f indication or CBM

High Good chance of detection Production indication or CBM CBM or PM


Measurable P-f

Very High Almost certain to detect Production indication and CBM CBM
Readily Measurable P-f

Very High Certain to detect Production indication and CBM


Readily Measurable P-f online CBM

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model

Step 8 Deciding Maintenance Actions

This is where the RCM element is applied and we utilise the classic RCM
decision diagram.

Many will be run to failure decisions, where the failure is not serious

CBM or FLOAC is often a practical approach because it works with all six failure patterns

Serious hidden failures will need to be found by functional testing

Time based or scheduled intervention will be appropriate where deterioration is taking


place

Where a serious failure cannot be avoided and it cannot be predicted then a re-design is
needed

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model
Does the failure mode Does the failure mode cause a
cause a loss of function loss of function or other damage Does the failure mode have a
Will the loss of function caused YES NO NO direct adverse effect on
or other damage which which could breach any known NO
by this failure mode on its own operational capability? (output,
could hurt or kill environmental standard or other
become evident to the operator quality, service or operating cost)
someone? compliance regulation?
under normal circumstances?

NO YES YES YES

Is a task to detect whether the Is a task to detect whether the Is a task to detect whether the Is a task to detect whether the
failure is occurring or about to failure is occurring or about to failure is occurring or about to failure is occurring or about to
occur technically feasible and occur technically feasible and occur technically feasible and occur technically feasible and
worth doing? worth doing? worth doing? worth doing?
Scheduled Scheduled Scheduled Scheduled
on-condition task YES NO on-condition task YES NO on-condition task YES NO on-condition task YES NO

Is a scheduled restoration task to Is a scheduled restoration task to Is a scheduled restoration task to Is a scheduled restoration task to
reduce the failure rate reduce the failure rate reduce the failure rate reduce the failure rate
technically feasible and worth technically feasible and worth technically feasible and worth technically feasible and worth
doing? doing? doing? doing?
Scheduled Scheduled Scheduled Scheduled
restoration task YES NO restoration task YES NO restoration task YES NO restoration task YES NO

Is a scheduled discard task to Is a scheduled discard task to Is a scheduled discard task to Is a scheduled discard task to
reduce the failure rate reduce the failure rate reduce the failure rate reduce the failure rate
technically feasible and worth technically feasible and worth technically feasible and worth technically feasible and worth
doing? doing? doing? doing?
Scheduled Scheduled Scheduled Scheduled
discard task YES NO discard task YES NO discard task YES NO discard task YES NO
Is a failure finding task to detect Is a combination of tasks to No scheduled No scheduled
the failure technically feasible avoid failures technically maintenance maintenance
and worth doing? feasible and worth doing?
Scheduled Re design may be Re design may be
failure finding task YES NO YES NO desirable desirable
Could the multiple failure Combination of Re design is
affect safety or the tasks compulsory
environment?
RCM Decision Diagram Aladon Ltd 1991
Re design is No scheduled Re design may be
compulsory maintenance desirable
YES NO
CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk
Applying the model

FMECA worksheet
Controls

Detection Confidence

Frequency
Severity
Potential
Potential

Occur
Potential

RPN

Skill
Performance Effects of Maintenance
Requirement
Failure
Failure
Causes of Actions Contingencies
Mode options
Mode Failure Prevention Detection

CBM,
Bearing Scheduled on
Loss of
No failure - Intervention condition
primary 8 8 Vibration 3 192
Function Debris procedures
function Redesign
ingress
(procedures)

Loss of Bearing PM
No Indicator
primary 8 failure filter 7 6 336 Scheduled
Function fitted
function failure restoration
Deliver clean
hydraulic fluid Redesign +
at 50PSI Loss of Bearing
No Check Redesign
upon demand primary 8 failure filter 7 6 336
Function specification Change
for operation function failure
procedures
of recovery
systems CBM-
Bearing Intervention Scheduled on
Loss of
No failure Oil procedures condition
primary 8 7 6 336
Function contaminate
function Redesign
d
(procedures)

Loss of Bearing CBM-


No
primary 8 failure 7 Vibration 3 168 Scheduled on
Function
function misaligned condition

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


A Practical Maintenance Programme

Step 9 Who does what and how often?

The FMEA output needs to be refined into a practical programme

Step 10 Re-Design and Contingencies


The opportunities for improvement need to be taken back to the
teams and the tasks gathered together to make sensible packages of
work

Additionally where there is no maintenance option there are 2 further


actions under this step
Re-design requirement how is that generated within your workplace.
Contingency measures

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model

FMECA worksheet (extract)


Controls

Detection Confidence

Frequency
Severity
Potential
Potential

Occur
Potential

RPN

Skill
Performance Effects of Maintenance
Requirement
Failure
Failure
Causes of Actions Contingencies
Mode options
Mode Failure Prevention Detection

CBM,
Scheduled on Add to T
Loss of Bearing failure
No Intervention condition Vib e
primary 8 -Debris 8 Vibration 3 192 1M
Function procedures Analysis c
function ingress Redesign schedule h
(procedures)

Check
PM T
Loss of indicator
No Bearing failure Indicator e
primary 8 7 6 336 Scheduled & replace 14D
Function filter failure fitted c
Deliver clean function restoration filter as
h
hydraulic fluid required
at 50PSI
Redesign +
upon demand Loss of Bearing failure
No Check Redesign
for operation primary 8 filter failure 7 6 336 Check company change controls
Function specification Change
of recovery function (spec)
procedures
systems
CBM-Scheduled
Loss of Bearing failure Intervention C
No on condition Lube Oil
primary 8 Oil 7 procedures 6 336 o 14D
Function Redesign Analysis
function contaminated n
(procedures)

Add to T
Loss of
No Bearing failure CBM-Scheduled Vib e
primary 8 7 Vibration 3 168 1M
Function misaligned on condition Analysis c
function
schedule h

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Applying the model

Summary
We have ascertained in the limited time and space we have here how the model
is applied and samples of the output.

You should be able to see from the example how a comprehensive and
auditable maintenance regime emerges from the stepped application.

On filling in the last columns of the worksheet we have considered


The maintenance options - from the RCM decision tree
Actions/maintenance tasks - as detailed
Skill required to carry out the task Technician, Contractor, etc
Frequency of task with consideration to the failure rates and P-F interval

We also have enough information to be able to guide us in putting together


scheduled work packages.

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk


Join us in our last session as we look
at some Frequently Asked Questions

CSA Ltd www.maintenanceconsultants.co.uk

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