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in Africa
A Quick Sketch of the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia Bush War
2011- 08- 08 00:08:32 Peter Baxter

I have not iced a lot of search t raf f ic on t his sit e pert aining t o t he
Zimbabwe/Rhodesian War. Aside f rom t he Wikipedia ent ry covering t he
period, t here is very lit t le on t he world wide web dealing wit h t he subject . What
f ollows is a t humbnail sket ch drawn f rom my own reading of t he episode which
is not int ended t o be an accurat e hist orical synopsis.

The political background to the Rhodesian Civil War

T he Rhodesian War of t he 1970s was a civil war. It was f ought f or t he

preservat ion of t he Anglo/Saxon values and cult ure t hat had been graf t ed
ont o t he landscape as a consequence of Brit ish imperialism of t he lat e 19t h
and early 20t h cent uries. T he t errit ory of Rhodesia comprised Mashonaland,
Manicaland and Mat abeleland, acquired by t he Brit ish Sout h Af rica Company
during t he 1890s and occupied by a whit e, mainly Brit ish set t ler communit y
over t he course of t he 90-years t hat f ollowed.

World War I broke t he back of t he Brit ish Empire, as it did imperial Europe as a
whole, af t er which World War II ef f ect ively killed it . One of t he f irst key t riggers
of event ual war in Rhodesia was t he cont ribut ion made by Sout hern Rhodesia
t o t he Brit ish war ef f ort of 1939/45. All t he colonies and dominions in one f orm
or anot her cont ribut ed, but Sout hern Rhodesia is recognised as having made
t he most comprehensive per capit a manpower cont ribut ion. Ot hers included
Aust ralia, New Zealand, Canada, India and Sout h Af rica.

Why t his is import ant is because Rhodesia was at t hat t ime classed as a Self
Governing Colony, while t he ot her part icipant s, wit h t he except ion of India,
where classed a Dominions. A Dominion, by def init ion, was a colonial
possession earmarked f or independence wit hin t he Commonwealt h. T here
was very lit t le dif f icult y wit h t his because in none of t hese t errit ories did t here
exist a suf f icient ly large nat ive populat ion t o warrant polit ical at t ent ion. T his
was very dif f erent in t he case of Sout h Af rica and Sout hern Rhodesia, bot h of
which did.

In recognit ion of her cont ribut ion t o t he war ef f ort , meanwhile, Sout hern
Rhodesia was promised by t he Imperial Government , alt hough t his was never
of f icially commit t ed t o t reat y, t hat she would also be grant ed independence
wit hin t he Commonwealt h once host ilit ies had ceased, t his in grat it ude f or her
service t o t he Crown in war. T he assumpt ion here was t hat independence
would be grant ed under t he t erms of an exist ing const it ut ional st at us t hat
limit ed t he black f ranchise under propert y and educat ional qualif icat ions t o
almost zero.

To grant Sout hern Rhodesia minorit y rule independence may very well have
been t he Brit ish int ent ion during WWII and in t he immediat e af t ermat h, and
cert ainly much of t he Brit ish polit ical est ablishment would have pref erred t o
have been able t o honor t his commit ment , however, t he new global polit ical
realit y in a post -war world simply did not permit it . T he independence of India
int roduced a powerf ul new voice int o t he Commonwealt h t hat wholly changed
t he complexion of t he global order. Indian independence was quickly f ollowed
by Egypt and t he Suez Crisis, Malaysia, Burma, Ghana, Nigeria and a host of
smaller ent it ies. T his was accompanied by increasing independence on t he
part of t he principal whit e dominions of t he Empire, namely Canada, Aust ralia
and new Zealand, all t hree of which made st rong pet it ion t o t he Crown t o
grant Sout hern Rhodesia independence only under a majorit y rule const it ut ion.

Rhodesia, however, t hen under t he leadership of Sir Godf rey Huggins, held t he
Brit ish t o t heir original commit ment t o grant independence under a minorit y
rule const it ut ion, which est ablished a polit ical st alemat e bet ween t he t wo
government s t hat would in one way or anot her endure unt il 1980.

The Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland

T he Federat ion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, meanwhile, was est ablished in

1953 as an ef f ort t o f ind a workable f ormula t hat would allow f or a
cont inuat ion in t he medium t o long t erm of whit e rule in t he region. Against a
backdrop of det ermined black resist ance a f ederal const it ut ion was
negot iat ed bet ween t he t hree t errit orial government s of Nort hern and
Sout hern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and t he Imperial Government . T he
emergent black leader of t his period was f ut ure Malawian president Hast ings
Banda.

By t he 1960s t he Federat ion was in t he grip of sust ained and organized black
civil unrest t hat in due course result ed f irst in t he independence of Nyasaland
as Malawi, and t hen Nort hern Rhodesia as Zambia. T his precipit at ed t he
collapse of t he Federat ion it self and t he wit hdrawal of whit e Sout hern
Rhodesia behind powerf ul def enses, and an even more powerf ul
det erminat ion t hat t he colony, t hereaf t er known simply as Rhodesia, would
not go t he same way as t he rest of Af rica.

It must be remembered at t his point t hat 1960 had seen t he handover t o black
rule of t he Belgian Congo amid scenes of t ypical anarchy and slaught er, all of
which did not hing t o mollif y whit e Rhodesia f acing similar demands f rom
blacks wit hin it s own borders. Likewise t he event s of t he Mau Mau Uprising and
t he separat ist war in Biaf ra all t ended t o st rike f ear in t he heart s of whit es at
t he prospect of black rule in Rhodesia. Brit ain, in t he meanwhile, morally
weakened and clearly no longer a global power, f ound herself in a dif f icult
quandary. She could do not hing but f all in line wit h t he mood of t he global
f orums which all demanded t hat she grant independence t o Rhodesia only
under t erms of majorit y rule const it ut ion. No mat t er how much whit e Rhodesia
might seek t o remind her of promises made during WWII, t here was not hing by
t hen t hat Whit ehall could ef f ect ively do.

UDI and the rise of the Rhodesian right

T he second key t rigger t hat pit ched t he colony in t he direct ion of war was an
abrupt swing t o t he right of t he whit e Rhodesian elect orat e in t he f ace of such
change and uncert aint y. From t his emerged t he Rhodesian Front, a powerf ul,
whit e nat ionalist polit ical f ront headed in t he f irst inst ance by a somewhat
(Brit ish) collaborat ionist Winst on Field, and t hen lat er by t he hawkish,
uncompromising and highly charismat ic Ian Douglas Smit h.

Smit h t ook over t he premiership of Rhodesia in 1964 on a wave of approval f or

his hard-line, no-nonsense approach t o t he problem of independence. (Read
brief biography of Smit h here) He recognized very early in his premiership t hat
t he 20-years or so of appeal and negot iat ion wit h Whit ehall t hat had preceded
his of f ice had achieved absolut ely not hing, and moreover never would. He
t heref ore adopt ed t he st rat egy of picking a f ight wit h t he Brit ish in t he hope
t hat he could bring t he mat t er one way or anot her t o a head. His principal
weapon was t he implied t hreat of a unilat eral declarat ion of independence.

Smit h, as wit h most whit e Rhodesians, was unable or unwilling t o embrace t he

current realit y of global polit ics, pref erring t o view t he st eady advance of
black polit ical independence down t he lengt h of Af rica as part of a wider
communist assault against t he west ern, Christ ian values t hat he purport ed t o
represent . It must be said here t hat Ian Smit h, a t renchant and somewhat
deluded charact er, was nonet heless a man of unshakable moral rect it ude and
a clear believer in t he sanct it y of his mission. He was not an ogre or a monst er
as he is of t en port rayed under a cont emporary light . It may now be said t hat
he was wrong in t he broader object ive he sought t o achieve, but he was
neit her corrupt nor sociopat hic as his successor had proved himself t o be.

Inevit ably, however, Ian Smit h f ailed in his ef f ort s t o negot iat e independence
f or whit e Rhodesia, as he possibly bot h knew and hoped t hat he would.
T heref ore, on 11 November 1965, a unilat eral declarat ion of independence
(UDI) was issued t hat ef f ect ively recast Rhodesia as a rebel republic, a st at us
it remained subject t o unt il t he advent of majorit y rule in 1980.

Shooting war in Rhodesia

T he ramif icat ions of UDI were immediat e. One t he one hand Rhodesia
became subject t o a broad range of int ernat ional sanct ions t hat included bot h
an arms and f uel embargo, and on t he ot her hand t he rebel colony was
removed f rom any hope of direct Brit ish milit ary support , and nor, indeed, any
overt polit ical support . T he black populat ion of t he t errit ory, meanwhile, were
served by UDI wit h ef f ect ive not ice t hat whit e Rhodesia was not going t o
collapse quit e as easily as t he Brit ish Empire had elsewhere on t he cont inent .
One of t he f irst act ions of t he new independent Rhodesian government was
t o ban t he t wo principal nat ionalist organisat ions Zimbabwe African Peoples
Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and t o imprison or
rest rict t heir polit ical leadership.

Bot h organisat ions t hen t urned t o what had become known as t he Frontline
States in t his case primarily T anzania and Zambia and t he new Organisation
of African Unity f or guidance and support . Bot h movement s set up
government s in exile in Zambia and commenced planning an armed insurgency
t o t opple whit e rule in Rhodesia.

T he Rhodesian milit ary machine at t hat t ime consist ed of a large t errit orial
f ormat ion comprising t he eight bat t alions of t he Rhodesia Regiment and
associat ed independent companies; a single Rhodesian Af rican Rif les
bat t alion; a newly f ormed, all-whit e regular bat t alion of t he Rhodesia Light
Inf ant ry (RLI); t he C Squadron Rhodesia SAS; t he Rhodesian Air Force and t he
various paramilit ary arms of t he Brit ish Sout h Af rica Police. Nat ional Service
and ongoing t errit orial commit ment s were mandat ory and af f ect ed all able-
bodied whit e males in t he count ry. A police reserve exist ed as a support
element of t he civil f orce, but ult imat ely it became a civil def ence unit t hat
included t he highly ef f ect ive Police Ant-Terrorist Unit.

Init ial host ile incursions deployed by bot h nat ionalist organisat ions began
along t he nort hern f ront ier of Rhodesia bordering newly independent Zambia.
T hese were init ially disorganised, amat eurish and experiment al, and were
dealt wit h wit hout dif f icult y by t he Rhodesian army. T his phase of t he war
culminat ed in what became known as t he Battle of Sinoia, a combined police
and air f orce operat ion t hat ran t o ground a group of seven ZANU milit ant s
just out side t he t own of Sinoia, now known as Chinoyi, ending wit h t he
comprehensive annihilat ion of t he ent ire group.

By t he end of t he 1960s it had become clear t o t he leadership of bot h

liberat ion f act ions t hat at t empt ing t o direct ly challenge a mot ivat ed, well
t rained and highly ef f icient Rhodesian army in a cont est of wit s and f ire would
be suicidal. T he Rhodesian securit y and int elligences services combined very
ef f ect ively t hroughout t he 1960s t o locat e and deal wit h one insurgent group
af t er anot her. Perhaps t he most ef f ect ive t ool in t he Rhodesian arsenal was
t he rural black populat ion it self , which was seldom remiss at t hat t ime in
passing back inf ormat ion t o t he aut horit ies regarding t he movement of
unknown groups armed men t hrough t heir areas.

By t hen, however, t here were a number of key members of bot h nat ionalist
organisat ions arriving back in Zambia f rom periods of milit ary and polit ical
t raining overseas, part icularly in China and t he Soviet Union. T hese men
ret urned wit h a much clearer and more det ailed sense of revolut ionary
st rat egy. It was now underst ood t hat bef ore an ef f ect ive insurrect ion could
t ake place t he people needed t o know and underst and precisely what was
t aking place. T heref ore a process of educat ion began in t he count ryside,
carried out by polit ical commissars who, wit h a combinat ion of
indigenous/cult ural and Marxist t ype re-educat ion st rat egies and ext reme
violence int roduced t he populat ion of t he nort heast of Rhodesia t o t he realit y
of peoples war.

The end of the Phoney War

Soon af t erwards, in 1972, a second and more det ermined phase of t he war
began wit h a series of hit -and-run at t acks mount ed against f arms and
homest eads in t he Cent enary area. T his t ime t he cust omary Rhodesian
milit ary response was met wit h somewhat less success t hat hit hert o. Guerrilla
groups ret reat ed int o t he heavily populat ed Tribal Trust Lands and t he pre-
prepared support syst em t hat had been caref ully put in place f or t his
moment . Int elligence sources dried up while t he insurgent groups simply
disappeared.

T he Rhodesian securit y est ablishment it self t hen ret reat ed in order t o ponder
a response t o t his new sit uat ion. In t he f irst inst ance an operat ional area,
Operat ion Hurricane, was est ablished in t he nort heast , t he f irst of what would
ult imat ely be six ongoing operat ions count rywide. T hereaf t er experiment s
began t o t ake place using pseudo t act ics developed by t he Brit ish in Malaya
and Kenya during t he uprisings in t hose count ries. From t his was born t he
Selous Scout s Regiment , a unit conf igured t o ut ilized t urned guerrillas f or t he
purpose of inf ilt rat ing aut hent ic guerrilla groups eit her t o acquire int elligence
or set t he enemy up f or a more convent ional inf ant ry at t ack.

T he pseudo st rat egy worked ext remely well once it had been properly
organised and resourced. A key f act in it s success, however, was t he parallel
development of Fireforce, a vert ical envelopment st rat egy using heliborne
inf ant ry and parat roopers in combinat ion wit h f ixed wing air support t o act
quickly and decisively on int elligence delivered by t he Selous Scout s. Firef orce
unit s were placed on permanent st andby at various Forward Air Fields
scat t ered across t he count ry in order t o react immediat ely t o f resh
int elligence regarding t he movement or presence of guerrilla groups.

T here is a considerable amount of t echnical mat erial out t here regarding

Firef orce. T he def init ive st udy of t he st rat egy was writ t en by Prof essor
Richard Wood in his book Fireforce.

T hus, by 1974, Rhodesia had f or all int ent s and purposes re-est ablished it s
dominat ion of t he bat t lef ield. At t his point it st ill appeared t hat a milit ary
solut ion t o t he crisis was possible. T he Rhodesian Government remained in
ongoing negot iat ions wit h Brit ain alt hough a f ormula f or independence
remained elusive. If t he reasons f or t his can be put in a nut shell it could
perhaps be said t hat Ian Smit h sought on behalf of whit e Rhodesia a means
t o ret ain all t he principal inst rument s of power in whit e hands while at t he
same t ime allowing f or at least t he appearance of meaningf ul black polit ical
development . T his was, however, pract ically impossible because by t hen t he
black nat ionalist s had begun t o demand absolut e power immediat ely while
Smit h and his government insist ed on subst ant ive whit e cont rol int o t he
f oreseeable f ut ure.

A new future

April 1974 saw a quant um shif t in t he geo-polit ical landscape of sout hern
Af rica. A milit ary coup in Lisbon result ed in t he oust er of t he right wing
dict at orship of Marcello Caet ano and t he inst allat ion of a milit ary government .
One of t he principal cat alyst s of t his act ion had been t he long and bleeding
wars t hat had been ongoing in bot h Angola and Mozambique. T he new
government t heref ore promised t o end t hese wars, which in ef f ect meant t hat
Port ugal was now willing t o count enance t he independence of her overseas
provinces. To Rhodesia t his meant t he pot ent ial f or a radical widening of t he
war f ront down t he ent ire east ern quadrant of Rhodesia.

Indeed, on June 25 1975 Mozambique achieved independence. By t he

beginning of 1976 at t acks by ZANLA (Zimbabwe Af rican Liberat ion Army), t he
milit ary wing of ZANU, were beginning t o be f elt down t he lengt h of t he
east ern border regions adjacent t o Mozambique. By t he middle of 1976 t he
war was being f ought in earnest more or less t hroughout t he count ry.
Rhodesia was now wholly reliant on Sout h Af rica f or survival, and Sout h Af rica
f requent ly proved herself t o be less t han t he f riend-in-need t hat whit e
Rhodesia might have hoped she would be. In t he meanwhile whit e Rhodesian
societ y became int ensely milit arised wit h nat ional services and t errit orial
commit ment cut t ing deeply int o t he economic viabilit y of t he count ry, and t he
army it self increasingly less able t o ef f ect ively garrison t he count ry.

External Operations

In Oct ober 1976 t he Selous Scout s regiment conduct ed a daring cross-border

raid int o Mozambique t hat annihilat ed a ZANLA st aging camp on t he
Nyadzonia River in t he Manica Province of Mozambique, killing upwards of 1000
ZANLA combat ant s who had been poised f or deployment int o Rhodesia. T his
marked a t urning point in t he Rhodesian war st rat egy. Increasingly now t he
t errit orial and rear echelon element s of t he army would deal wit h t he sit uat ion
int ernally while on a large scale t he war would be t aken int o Mozambique and
Zambia in order t o neut ralize enemy build-ups at t heir source. A corollary of
t hese at t acks would be t he signif icant damage inf lict ed on Zambian and
Mozambican inf rast ruct ure which served t o illust rat e t o bot h government s t he
high cost of war wit h Rhodesia.

T hese ext ernal raids were more or less ongoing f rom 1976 onwards. T hey
were conduct ed in t he main by eit her t he SAS or t he Selous Scout s wit h
act ive assist ance f rom t he RLI, now a commando bat t alion, and various ot her
specialist branches of t he army. T hese raids have been exhaust ively covered
as individual act ions in many biographies and hist ories since, and need not be
dealt wit h in any det ail here. For f urt her reading see Prof . Richard Woods
Operation Dingo, Pamwe Chete by Col. Ron Ried Daly and The Elite by Barbara
Cole.

None of t his, however, served t o alt er much t he general t raject ory of t he war,
and increasingly it became clear t hat a polit ical solut ion would be required. By
t hen, however, Ian Smit h could f airly be accused of having squandered many
viable proposals and was lef t at t his lat e st age wit h very f ew opt ions. T he
shoot ing down of Air Rhodesia Flight 825 en-rout e f rom Kariba t o Salisbury,
result ing in t he deat h of all but eight of t he 56 passengers on board, t en of
whom were murdered on t he ground by a ZIPRA (Zimbabwe Peoples
Revolut ionary Army) group, shocked an increasingly demoralised whit e
Rhodesia t o t he core. A series of at t empt s on t he lif e of ZAPU leader Joshua
Nkomo f ailed, alt hough one of t hese, Operat ion Bastille, despit e it s f ailure, is
recognised as one of t he most brilliant and daring SAS raids of t he war.

T he role of t he Rhodesian Securit y Forces now became one of cont ainment

while a polit ical solut ion was sought . Ext ernal raids cont inued while int ernal
operat ions and t he count rys general securit y needs cont inued t o make
unsust ainable demands on t he whit e populat ion of t he count ry. Plans were
made f or t he raising of a t hird bat t alion of t he Rhodesia Af rican Rif les while a
syst em of Securit y Force Auxiliaries made use of supposed support ers of t he
moderat e int ernal black part ies as an adjunct t o t he hopelessly overst ret ched
core of t he Rhodesian army. Whit e emigrat ion was perhaps t he single most
direct t hreat posed t o t he short or medium t erm survival of t he count ry.

Negotiated defeat

T he polit ical solut ion when it was f ound amount ed t o comprehensive

capit ulat ion even t hough t he Rhodesian army had suf f ered not one signif icant
t act ical def eat at any t ime during t he period of war. A ceasef ire was declared
as a consequence of t he Lancaster House Agreement t hat saw a ret urn t o
Rhodesia of all of t he exiled black leaders and a general elect ion held t o
det ermine t he f ut ure polit ical f ace of Zimbabwe. T he process had been
exhaust ing and came as a bit t er shock t o a war weary and f earf ul whit e
populat ion. T he closing act ions of t he Rhodesian Army were t hree operat ions.
T hese were Uric, Miracle and Cheese which all wit nessed int ensive at t acks
delivered against insurgent f acilit ies and t he t ransport inf rast ruct ure of bot h
Mozambique and Zambia. All t he key arms of t he Securit y Forces were
involved, and arguably t hese last act s were among t he most daring and
brilliant of some 15-years of accelerat ing war.

T he disint egrat ion of t he Rhodesian armed f orces when it came was quick
and quiet . T he Selous Scout s, a unit conf igured on maverick t erms, aimed a
f ew swif t and bloody punches at t he undeserving vict ors, but f or t he rest t he
f orces of Rhodesia died wit h dignit y and due process under t he prot ect ion of
a negot iat ed t reat y. Brit ain could at last wash her hands of her errant child
while Zimbabwe set t led uneasily int o exist ence.

Very lit t le on t he whole has been writ t en t o chronicle t he hist ory of eit her of
t he liberat ion movement s, and cert ainly no at t empt has been made t o locat e
and commemorat e gravesit es and t o assemble a roll of honour. T he f orces of
liberat ion in Zimbabwe have not deport ed t hemselves wit h a great deal of
dignit y, and cert ainly cannot claim t o have upheld of t heir t radit ions wit h
int egrit y. T his, at t he very least , cannot be said f or whit e Rhodesia. What ever
polit ical st andpoint one might view t his episode of hist ory, t he Rhodesian
armed f orces ret ain a highly respect ed placed in Brit ish and general milit ary
hist ory and have been st udied and chronicled perhaps more t han any ot her.