opinion & comment

COMMENTARY:

Better out than in

Luke Kemp
Continued US membership in the Paris Agreement on climate would be symbolic and have no effect on
US emissions. Instead, it would reveal the weaknesses of the agreement, prevent new opportunities from
emerging, and gift greater leverage to a recalcitrant administration.

A
fter the election of President Trump
and a two-house Republican majority,
many fear for the future of US climate
policy. The new administration has indicated
that they will abolish Obamas climate legacy
through executive orders1. The repeal of
domestic measures will likely result in the
US missing its first nationally determined
contribution (NDC) under the Paris
Agreement, which is an inadequate target
of reducing emissions by 2628% compared
to 2005 levels by 2025. If other countries
adopted comparable targets, global warming
would likely exceed 2C (ref. 2). The US
would need to implement the Clean Power
Plan and additional measures to reach its
NDC3. Preliminary research suggests that
the policies of the Trump administration
would instead lead to emissions increasing
through to 20253.
Now the predominant concern for
much of the international community is
that the US will withdraw either from the
Paris Agreement, or the overarching United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)4. The former would take
four years and the latter only one. Both are
legally possible and within the presidential
mandate5. The conventional wisdom is that
a US withdrawal would be a worst-case
scenario for international climate policy.
However, a sober analysis of the political,
legal, and financial impacts suggests
otherwise. The modified matrix of risks
posed by a recalcitrant US administration
summarized in Table1, and explored in
detail below, highlights the paradox of
US participation: a rogue US can cause
more damage inside rather than outside of
theagreement.
Domino effect
There are fears that a US exit could trigger
others to free-ride or withdraw. One analysis
found that if the world were to follow a
laggard US in delaying action by 8years,
cumulative future emissions over the next
century would be doubled, and the 2C
target would be out of reach6. Such concerns
are reasonable, but speculative.
The closest parallel is the Kyoto Protocol,
which the US signed but never ratified. The
refusal to ratify empowered the international
community to adopt the 2002 Marrakech
Accords. The spirit of solidarity was short-
lived. In 2007, amidst the second term of the
Bush administration, parties launched the
Bali Road Map. This marked the beginning
of the process of abandoning Kyoto and
creating an alternative agreement with
US participation: the Paris Agreement.
The example of Kyoto suggests that US
withdrawal is unlikely to unravel Paris in the
short-term, but a second Republican term
may trigger a domino effect. Whether the
experience of Kyoto repeats itself is for now
uncertain; the architecture of Paris is different
and international politics haveevolved.
However, a domino effect could also
occur without withdrawal. The success of
Paris largely relies on its pledge and review
process to create political pressure7, and
drive low-carbon investments8. A great
power that wilfully misses its target could
provide political cover for other laggards
and weaken the soft power of process.
This would lay bare the weaknesses and
legal porousness of the Paris Agreement
and undermine any public and investor
confidence vested in the agreement.
Paris may forfeit legitimacy due to the
loss of a major emitter, but it is equally likely
that its legitimacy will be grievously injured
by the US blatantly violating the spirit and
purpose of the agreement.
A laggard at the table
Continued membership would also raise
the problem of the US watering down
the provisions and details of the Paris
Agreement (known as the Paris rulebook),
which are to be confirmed by the end
of 2018. In a consensus-based process

Table 1 | A modified risk matrix for US participation in the Paris Agreement on climate.
Risk Likelihood Consequence Withdrawal required?
US misses its domestic targets High Moderatesevere (moderate if it only impacts US emissions, and severe if it No
creates a domino effect)
US actions create an Lowmedium Severe (potential reneging on targets, free-riding and a cascade of withdrawals) No (this may be exacerbated or
incentive for others to lessened by formal withdrawal)
free-ride or withdraw
US obstructs and waters Medium Moderatesevere (the impacts depend on US diplomatic actions. At worst, this No (this requires
down the Paris rulebook could result in a stalling of the Paris rulebook development and weakening of continued participation)
and other negotiations key provisions, as well as the obstruction of negotiating issues beyond both the
rulebook and 2018)
Cancellation of climate High Majorsevere (undermining of public and investor confidence. Potential No
financing slowdown of action in developing countries. Severe if it creates a domino effect)

NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange 1

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opinion & comment

such as the UNFCCC9, the US would have
an effective veto. If the administration
so desired, the US delegation could
procedurally obstruct these and other
critical negotiations. It is an approach that
has been successfully deployed by other
laggards such as Saudi Arabia10.
The US would have a vote until
withdrawal takes effect. Withdrawal from
the UNFCCC would likely ensure that
the US has no procedural voice when the
rulebook is adopted at the end of 2018.
Other parties would be less likely to cede
to their demands if they have announced
an intention to drop-out, and a chair could
feasibly overrule a US veto, as occurred with
Russia in 20129.
Money matters, not legality
Paris enshrines a minimal number of
procedural, ambiguous, and difficult-to-
enforce legal obligations. US withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement primarily means
that there would be no need to submit
non-binding pledges every five years.
Withdrawal from the UNFCCC would
mainly lead to the US having no obligations
to maintain greenhouse gas inventories or
provide national reports. The greenhouse
gas emissions of the US are divorced from
international legal obligations; withdrawal is
unlikely to change US emissions.
In contrast, the cancellation of climate
financing from the US would likely have
a severe impact. The US is the largest
contributor to the Green Climate Fund
(GCF). It has pledged US$3billion,
approximately one third of the fund. To
date, only US$1billion has been deposited
by the US. The buy-in of developing
countries has been contingent on public
funding from developed countries11. Many
developing countries have made their
NDCs, or conditional targets, dependent
on international support from developed
countries. These provisional targets
promise increases to mitigation efforts of
253% (ref.12). The draft America First a unique opportunity for China and the
budget indicates that funding of climate
programs both at home and abroad will be
cut. This includes funds for the GCF and
the UNFCCC. The underfunding of the
UNFCCC secretariat could impede the
conduct of negotiations and fundamental
processes under Paris such as the global
stocktake. The severing of funds from the
largest climate donor would provide a
stronger reason for developing countries
to free-ride or drop out than simple legal
withdrawal would.
But financing is distinct from withdrawal.
The Paris Agreement has only one financial
obligation for developed countries, which
is simply the continuation of their existing
obligations under the Convention to
provide financing for developing countries.
No timeline is stipulated and the US has
already fulfilled this obligation by depositing
US$500 million into the GCF while it was
a member of the Paris Agreement under
Obama. The US can cut further funding and
still be compliant with Paris.
Emerging opportunities
There are positive opportunities that could
arise from US withdrawal. One is the
re-emergence of climate trade measures,
such as border carbon adjustments. The
idea of instituting a carbon tax of 13%
on US imports in the event of withdrawal
was raised by former French presidential
nominee Nicholas Sarkozy 13. Trade measures
are risky maneuverers that could trigger
negative impacts such as a trade war 14.
However, trade measures have tended to be
a key component of successful international
agreements, such as the 1987 Montreal
Protocol15, and institutions like the World
Trade Organisation. Even the occurrence of
a trade war or other perverse effects would
likely result in a reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions and greater political salience.
Withdrawal could embolden other great
powers to show more effective climate
leadership. Despite having some internal
problems16, neither China nor the EU
face the same institutional hurdles as the
US17 and can offer far more decisive and
ambitious leadership. A US withdrawal could
embolden both by offering comparative
economic and soft power advantages. In
a world of plummeting renewable energy
costs18, a withdrawal would further signal
that US firms have lost government support
and regulatory certainty. This combined
with mounting domestic concern over
the state of global action could motivate
the EU and China to ruthlessly pursue
an unassailable comparative economic
advantage. A withdrawal could also make
the US into a climate pariah and provide
EU to take control of the climate regime
and significantly boost their international
reputations and soft power.
A new coalition between the EU and
China could take numerous forms. One
approach is the linkage of their emissions
trading systems19, although this would
be subject to technical challenges. Other
options include the creation of a more
ambitious jointly determined contribution
between the two countries20. Either of these
options could be combined with a common
border carbon adjustment. Trade pressure
and a loss of both competitiveness and
political influence could drive US climate
action in the longer-term19.
Forceful leadership by the EU and China
is doubtful if the US does not make the
drastic move of withdrawal.
Looking to the future
It appears that the Paris Agreement will not
be Trump-proofed. Indeed, US-proofing
the agreement would require wide-reaching
amendments to the agreement 19. The
Paris Agreement was blind to the threat of
US recalcitrance, and instead was weakened
to allow for US legal participation21. It
was a short-sighted mistake that future
international agreements can learn from.
While Paris is fragile, international climate
action can be antifragile22: the shock
of Trump could make action stronger
by allowing trade measures and new,
emboldened leadership to blossom.
Luke Kemp is at the Australian National University,
Fenner School of Environment and Society,
Building 141, Linnaeus Way, Canberra, Australian
Capital Territory 2601, Australia.
e-mail: luke.kemp@anu.edu.au
References
1. Davenport, C. Trump signs executive order unwinding Obama
climate policies. New York Times (28 March 2017).
2. Climate Action Tracker USA (Climate Action Tracker, accessed
27March 2017).
3. A Trump presidency could mean 3.4 billion tons more US carbon
emissions than a Clinton one. luxresearch (2 November 2016).
4. Stavins, R.N. & Ki-Moon, B. Why the US should stay in the Paris
climate agreement. The Boston Globe (20 April 2017).
5. Bodansky, D. Legal Note: Could a Future President Reverse US
Approval of the Paris Climate Agreement (Centre for Climate and
Energy Solutions, 2016).
6. Sanderson, B.M. & Knutti, R. Nat. Clim. Change 7, 9294 (2017).
7. Jacquet, J. & Jamieson, D. Nat. Clim. Change 6, 643646 (2016).
8. van Asselt, H. Quest. Int. Law 26, 515 (2016).
9. Kemp, L. Int. Environ. Agreem. Politics Law Econ.
16, 757779 (2016).
10. Depledge, J. Glob. Environ. Politics 8, 935 (2008).
11. Pickering, J., Jotzo, F. & Wood, P.J. Glob. Environ. Politics
15, 3962 (2015).
12. Synthesis Report on the Aggregate Effect of the Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions (UNFCCC, 2015).
13. Harvey, C. From France to Canada, countries are reeling from
Trumps climate plans. Washington Post (16 November 2016).
14. Paterson, M. Br. J.Politics Int. Relations 11, 140158 (2009).
15. Barrett, S. Resour. Energy Econ. 19, 345361 (1997).
16. The European Union in International Climate Change Politics:
Still Taking a Lead? (eds Wurzel, R. K. W., Connelly, J.
&Liefferink, D.) (Routledge, 2017).
17. Bang, G., Hovi, J. & Sprinz, D.F. Clim. Policy 12, 755763 (2012).
18. New Energy Outlook 2016: Powering a Changing World
(Bloomberg, 2016).
19. Kemp, L. Clim. Policy 17, 86101 (2017).
20. Kjellen, B. & Mller, B. Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends,
Once More: a Call for Europe to Demonstrate Renewed Leadership
in the International Climate Change Regime (Oxford Climate
Policy, 2017).
21. Kemp, L. Clim. Policy 16, 10111028 (2016).
22. Taleb, N.N. Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder
(PenguinBooks, 2012).
Acknowledgements
I thank F. Jotzo for his insightful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper, and for the various discussions which
have helped to inform and strengthen the analysis. Id like
to express my gratitude to C. Downie and L.-S. Luzzi for
their invaluable edits and feedback.
Published online: 22 May 2017

2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION | www.nature.com/natureclimatechange

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