Professional Documents
Culture Documents
May 2013
A joint Report by AEIs critical threats project & Institute for the Study of War
About Us
About the Authors
Will Fulton is an Analyst and the IRGC Project Team Lead at the Critical Threats Project at the American
Enterprise Institute. Joseph Holliday is a Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. Sam Wyer served
as an Iraq Analyst at ISW from September 2012 until February 2013.
The authors would like to thank Kim and Fred Kagan, Jessica Lewis, and Aaron Reese for their useful
insights throughout the writing and editorial process, and Maggie Rackl for her expert work on formatting
and producing this report.
We would also like to thank our technology partners Praescient Analytics and Palantir Technologies for
providing us with the means and support to do much of the research and analysis used in our work.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization.
ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis,
and innovative education. ISW is committed to improving the nations ability to execute military
operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives.
The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute equips policymakers, opinion leaders,
and the military and intelligence communities with detailed and objective open-source analysis of
Americas current and emerging national security challenges. Through daily monitoring, in-depth
studies, graphic presentations, private briefings, and public events, the project is a unique resource for
those who need to fully understand the nuance and scale of threats to Americas security to effectively
develop and execute policy.
4
Table of Contents
5
executive summary
6
executive summary
Iraqi Shia militants are also fighting in Syria in support of Assad. Their
presence became overt in 2012 with the formation of the Abu al-Fadl
al-Abbas Brigade, a pro-government militia that is a conglomerate
of Syrian and foreign Shia fighters, including members of Lebanese
Hezbollah and Iraq-based Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah. Like
other paramilitary forces operating in Syria, these militants escalated
their involvement as the conflict descended into civil war. The open
participation of Iraqi Shia militants in Syria is an alarming indicator of
the expansion of sectarian conflict throughout the region.
The Syrian conflict has already constrained Irans influence in the
Levant, and the fall of the Assad regime would further reduce Tehrans
ability to project power. Irans hedging strategy aims to ensure, however,
that it can continue to pursue its vital interests if and when the regime
collapses, using parts of Syria as a base as long as the Syrian opposition
fails to establish full control over all of Syrian territory.
7
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Introduction
S yria is vital to Irans strategic interests in the Middle East and has long been Irans
closest state ally. The Assad regime has provided crucial access to Iranian proxies,
including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, allowing Iran
to move people, weapons, and money to these groups through Syrian territory. Iran
has provided support to Syrias chemical weapons programs, including the deployment
of Iranian scientists, the supply of equipment and precursor chemicals, and technical
training. Syria has been Irans strategic partner in deterring Israel from attacking Irans
proxies or its nuclear program. Irans strategy in Syria aims to keep President Bashar al-
Assad in power as long as possible while setting conditions to ensure Tehrans ability to
use Syrian territory and assets to pursue its regional interests should Assad fall. Iran has
conducted an extensive, expensive, and integrated effort to achieve these objectives.
Iranian training and support to the Syrian conflict has devolved from counterinsurgency
state security apparatus is intended to prolong to civil war. As Syrian state military capabilities
Assads grip on power. This effort consists of continue to deteriorate, these militias may form
an advisory and assistance mission to support the framework for Irans continued influence
the Assad regimes security forces. Iran has and activity in Syria and the region.
conducted this foreign internal defense mission
in Syria using its regular Islamic Revolutionary The Syrian conflict has already constrained
Guards Corps (IRGC) forces alongside the Irans influence in the Levant, and the fall of
IRGC Quds Force and other clandestine the Assad regime would further reduce Tehrans
services, marking a new kind of Iranian ability to project power. Irans hedging strategy
expeditionary military strategy. These missions aims to ensure, however, that it can continue
initially supported Assads counterinsurgency to pursue its vital interests if and when the
campaign, which attempted to restore state regime collapses, using parts of Syria as a
control throughout Syria. As Assad began to base as long as the Syrian opposition fails to
lose control over eastern and northern Syria establish full control over all of Syrian territory.
in the summer of 2012, the Iranian advisory This strategy is meant to guarantee that the
and assistance mission continued to reinforce mostly Alawite remnants of the Assad regime
Assads geographically consolidated grip on continue to provide support for Iranian activity
central and southern Syria. in the Levant even if an opposition government
takes power in Damascus. By encouraging
Iran is also hedging against the failure of this convergence between pro-regime militias
strategy by complementing its support for and loyalist remnants of the Assad regime by
state security institutions with assistance to supporting both the official and the paramilitary
pro-government militias in order to develop components of Assads forces, Iran is working
proxies that will survive Assad. This aspect to preserve its short-term interests while laying
of Irans approach is congruent with Tehrans the foundations for long-term influence and
longstanding efforts in Lebanon and Iraq, access in the Levant.
where it also built Shia militias to ensure that its
interests were protected even in the absence of Few observers doubt Iranian involvement in
effective or pliable host states. These paramilitary Syria. The scope and nature of that involvement,
forces have become increasingly important to however, has been difficult to describe or
Iran and the Assad regime as the nature of the pinpoint. Iran has once again demonstrated
9
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Lebanon under the alias Hessam Khoshnevis.8 those released were the current and former
Prior to his time in Lebanon, Shateri had commanders of the IRGCs Shohada unit
operated in Afghanistan and Iraq.9 The presence (West Azerbaijan province)both 2nd class
of such a high-ranking commander inside Syria brigadier generalsas well as Iranian Supreme
highlights Tehrans commitment to achieving its Leader Ali Khameneis former representative
objectives in the country, as well as its potential to that unit; the commander of the 14th
vulnerabilities should Assad fall. Imam Sadegh Brigade (Bushehr province); and
personnel linked to the 33rd al-Mahdi Brigade
Shateris mission in Syria may have been related (Fars province).13 The forward deployment of
to the al-Safir chemical weapons and SCUD high-ranking current commanders of IRGC
missile facility near Aleppo. Iranian personnel Ground Forces units is unusual, as IRGC-QF
have been involved in the operations of al-Safir is Irans traditional foreign military arm while
since at least 2005; a number were killed in an IRGC-GF is responsible for internal security
explosion at the facility in 2007.10 Rebels had and conventional operations inside of Iran.
made significant gains near al-Safir days prior The evolution of an expeditionary training
to Shateris assassination.11 It is reasonable to capability relying on the IRGC Ground Forces
conclude that Iran would dispatch a team to in addition to the Quds Force, in-country, is a
sanitize the base of documents or materials notable expansion of Irans ability to project
that could have revealed aspects of Irans its influence and military force well beyond its
WMD programs before the rebels seized them. borders and immediate neighbors.
Shateris presence in such a dangerous location
shows, in any case, that the IRGC-QF is deeply The Iranian Regime has probably used IRGC-
involved in Syria at the highest levels. GF personnel working under or alongside
IRGC-QF in Syria in order to draw on the
Iranian support to Syrian security forces may Ground Forces training and experience
include training new military units. In a leaked conducting internal security and conventional
video of a Syrian Republican Guard briefing or counter-insurgent operations. Although the
in Baba Amr, the Brigadier General giving the Quds Force is experienced in unconventional
briefing tells his troops, we are forming the warfare, it has not previously played the
416th Special Forces Battalion and they are being role of counterinsurgent. In contrast, the
trained now by domestic and foreign trainers.12 Ground Forces train for and have experience
The leaked video does not specify the location in counterinsurgency. In fact, the IRGC-
of the training, but the Syrian Special Forces GF personnel captured in Syria hailed from
training complex in al-Dreij, situated between provincial units that deal both with insurgencies
the capital and Zabadani, is a likely facility. and tribal and ethnic unrest. The regime may
Although Russia or Lebanese Hezbollah could
have provided the foreign trainers referenced
here, Iran is the prime candidate, as there is
further evidence that it has provided other
trainers.
The conventional Ground Forces of the
IRGC are also involved in this advisory and
assistance mission within Syria. The January
2013 release of 48 Iranian nationals kidnapped
near Damascus in August 2012 revealed that
IRGC-GF personnel have been operating
Photo 2 | IRGC 14th Imam Sadegh Brigade
inside of Syria since at least that time. Among Commander Mohammad Taghi Saffari returns
to Bushehr Province after being released
by Syrian rebels on January 9, 2013. (Source:
Bushehr News)
11
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
be deliberately selecting trainers from the until rebels seized the eastern desert city of
elements of the ground forces most prepared al-Raqqa in March 2013.15
for counterinsurgency.
Specific military operations have served the
The IRGC-QF and the IRGC-GF typically interests of both IRGC-QF and the Assad
operate separately due to their distinct missions regime, and may have been driven by Iranian
but appear to be working together in this case. advice. The Assad regime mounted a string
There is no available open-source information of major offensives in the first quarter of
indicating the exact nature of their cooperation 2012, beginning with the Damascus suburb
or command and control; however, despite a of Zabadani, even though the opposition had
report in September 2012 that former IRGC a greater presence in Homs. The regime may
Greater Tehran unit commander BG Hossein have chosen to begin in Zabadani for two
Hamedani is leading Irans advisory mission, it is reasons, not mutually exclusive: first, because
more likely that Qassem Suleimani commands it is closer to the capital, sitting approximately
Irans overall effort. As a three-star major forty kilometers northwest of Damascus, and
general, Suleimani outranks Hamedani and all second, because Zabadani functions as a critical
other IRGC-GF commanders, and the QF has line of supply to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
historically led Irans external operations. If
Suleimani is in charge of the effort, it appears Zabadani was the staging area for the IRGCs
that he is able both to draw on non-QF IRGC deployment to Lebanon in 1982; the IRGC
units and resources to fill capability gaps and even moved the kidnapped president of
to draw on specific expertise to support IRGC- the American University of Beirut through
QF efforts. Zabadani on the way to Tehran the following
year.16 Just weeks into the 2011 uprising, a
Some activities of the Syrian armed forces United Press International report identified
have been congruent with strategic concepts Zabadani as IRGCs main support facility
promoted by senior Quds Force officials, for Hezbollah.17 Qassem Suleimani is only
although we cannot assess what specific known to have visited Assad in Damascus
influence Iranian advisors have had on the twice since the beginning of the conflict, and
Syrian military or leadership. Assads decision one of those visits occurred just a few days
to commit the majority of his security forces prior to the Zabadani operation.18 It is possible
to secure key urban areas, for example, may that Suleimanis January 2012 visit was related
have been influenced by Iranian advice. to the imperative of recapturing Zabadani.
Qassem Suleimani said in January 2012, for Assads decision to prioritize Zabadani may
example, that the mass movement in Syria have reflected Iranian advice or pressure as
has not been in the cities but rather has much as his own perception of the regimes
been, and continues to be, in the villages. best interests.
Therefore, Syrias illness is not an illness that
will destroy the government.14 Suleimani Some of the Syrian regimes urban
concluded that Assad could contain the counterinsurgency practices may also reflect
conflict by preventing the opposition from Iranian advice that derived from lessons learned
gaining territory in Syrias urban centers. in Iraq. After clearing Zabadani, the regime laid
Indeed, Assad has concentrated his forces siege to Homs, forcing rebels to retreat by the
in cities while the opposition has flourished beginning of March 2012. Assad garrisoned the
in rural areas. Although Assads forces have city with a large contingent of his forces and
lost control of many neighborhoods even in began to construct a concrete wall around the
key cities, they had prevented the opposition former rebel stronghold. A reporter who visited
from taking control of any provincial capital the wall described it as a ten-foot high cement
12
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
barrier, around which soldiers and secret police to an Iranian nationalist opposition source,
guard a few narrow gaps in the wall and arrest Suleimani said at that time, We tell Assad to
military-aged males who attempt to pass through send the police to the streets and suddenly he
it.19 In 2008, American forces constructed a dispatches the army!23
similar cement barrier around the Shia enclave
of Sadr City, Baghdad to cut insurgents The IRGC has clearly been providing advice
supplies and limit their movements.20 Iranian and coordination, but it is unlikely that they
observers working with proxies in Sadr City at have assumed a direct combat role. The only
that time would have seen the effectiveness of evidence to the contrary has emerged from
the campaign first-hand and could have advised Syrian defectors and opposition leaders, who
the Assad regime to adopt a similar approach. have accused Iran of deploying snipers to
assist in crackdowns on protests and military
The Assad regime has not been a perfect operations.24 Regardless of whether Iran is
partner, however. Iranian senior leaders have involved in direct combat, Iranian top-level
been frustrated at times by the Assad regimes coordination with Assads military forces is
approach to the opposition. Quds Force evident and demonstrates the energy and
Commander Suleimani implicitly criticized resources that Tehran is expending in order to
the Syrian military as recently as February achieve its strategic objectives in Syria.
2013 during an address honoring Iran-Iraq
War-era IRGC commanders. After a lengthy Intelligence Support
exposition on the courage, religiosity, and
selflessness of Irans martyred commanders, Assads need for Iranian intelligence support
Suleimani concluded his speech by stating, If likely became more urgent as the regime sought
the government and country of Syria had just to suppress protests throughout Syria in the
one Hemmat and Kharrazi [war-era martyrs] of spring of 2011. A series of U.S. Department of
their own, their condition would not be [as it is the Treasury (USDOT) designations beginning
now] and we would not have seen any of the at that time indicate that a range of Iranian
events [that we have seen] in that country. The organizations have been involved in the effort,
missing link in these countries is the absence including Law Enforcement Forces (LEF), the
of individuals that we had in abundance during Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS),
the Sacred Defense.21 This critique followed and the large defense contractor Iran Electronics
Shateris assassination and may have reflected Industries (IEI). These designations also shed
Suleimanis resentment toward the regime some light on the relationships between Syrian
whose failings allowed his subordinate to be and Iranian state security institutions.
killed.
Tehran dispatched LEF personnel to advise
Quds Force Deputy Commander Brigadier and assist Assad beginning in early 2011.25
General Esmail Ghaani also issued an implicit According to the USDOT designation, LEF
criticism of the Assad regime two days after the Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ahmad
May 25, 2012 Houla massacre, during which Reza Radan travelled to Damascus [in April
Assads forces killed an estimated 90 people. 2011] where he met with Syrian security services
Apparently frustrated with Assads propensity to and provided expertise to aid in the Syrian
respond disproportionately to protests, Ghaani governments crackdown.26 The designation
told an Iranian media outlet, If the Islamic further states that the LEF provided material
Republic were not present in Syria, many more support to the Syrian General Intelligence
of its people would have been killed.22 Qassem Directorate (GID) and dispatched personnel to
Suleimani is said to have echoed his deputys Damascusto assist the Syrian government in
frustrations in September 2012. According suppressing the Syrian people.27
13
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
The U.S. Department of the Treasury had In practice, however, the LEF, like all Iranian
previously designated LEF for its role in security services, is overseen by the Supreme
the government crackdown on protesters in National Security Council (SNSC), which
the aftermath of [Irans] June 2009 election, reports to the Supreme Leader.31 It is very likely,
during which the LEF gained extensive therefore, that the SNSC developed a plan for
experience neutralizing popular unrest.28 Since supporting Assad that the Supreme Leader
that episode, addressing internal unrest has would then have approved and that this plan
become a primary mission for the Islamic is now being executed. The presence of LEF
Republics security apparatus more broadly.29 officers in Syria is the clearest possible evidence
It is understandable, then, that the Iranians that Irans whole-of-government strategy in
drew on the LEFs combination of recent Syria is being controlled directly by Khamenei
experience, training, and technological know- rather than Suleimani, the IRGC, or any other
how to support Assads early efforts to control single individual or entity in Iran.
popular protests.
The LEF is not the only Iranian security
The deployment of LEF personnel in support institution providing intelligence and
of Assad is noteworthy, however, because it technological support to the Syrian regime.
demonstrates that Iranian strategy toward Syria A variety of Iranian organizations have been
has been formulated and is being implemented cited for providing a wide range of support to
by the senior-most leadership of the Islamic Assad:
Republic. The LEF fall under the control of
the Interior Ministry and are not in the chain- June 2011: The European Union
of-command of the IRGC or the regular sanctioned IRGC Intelligence
armed forces.30 The Interior Minister in theory Organization chief Hojjat al-Eslam
reports to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Hossein Taeb for his involvement in
14
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Air Force jets have supplemented this effort and Syrias larger airports as well as its smaller
that Iran has relatively limited access to ground airbases.
and sea lines of communication.
Iranian air supply to Syria pre-dated the uprising,
USDOT has sanctioned three Iranian as Damascus has long been used as the main
airlines since the beginning of the conflict Iranian hub to supply Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran
for transporting military equipment and Air has facilitated shipments for Irans Ministry
personnel from Iran to Syria. In June 2011, of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics
USDOT designated Iran Air for transporting (MODAFL) and the IRGC since at least 2000.49
military equipment that included missile or A UN report on illegal arms transfers found
rocket components to Syria.44 According to that Syria was the top destination for illicit arms
the designation, the IRGC disguises military shipments from Iran. These arms were then
equipment as medicine or generic spare parts often passed on to Lebanese and Palestinian
in order to transport the illicit cargo. Yas Air militants.50
was designated in March 2012 for transporting
IRGC-QF personnel and weapons, including Iranian aircraft also transport personnel for
small arms, ammunition, rockets, anti-aircraft advise-and-assist missions in Syria. The U.S.
guns, and mortar shells.45 The designation Treasury Department sanctioned Mahan Air
describes a series of IRGC-QF-coordinated in October 2011 for providing travel services
Yas Air flights in March 2011, at the very outset for IRGC-QF personnel flown to and from
of the conflict, which transported weapons to Iran and Syria for military training.51 Five
Hezbollah and Syrian officials.46 months later, Treasury also designated Yas
Air for transporting IRGC-QF personnel.52
A separate USDOT designation in September These designations demonstrate the use of air
2012 cited 117 cargo and passenger planes transport to deploy IRGC-QF advisors to Syria
linked to Yas Air, Iran Air, and Mahan Air for since at least the start of the uprising.
their use in arms and personnel smuggling to
Syria.47 While the majority of the designated In addition to aircraft owned by Iranian
aircraft are commercial jetliners, five Yas commercial airlines, the Iranian and Syrian
Air military transport aircraft were also air forces have employed Ilyushin-76s from
identified, including three Antonov-74s and their own fleets. Opposition activists filmed
two Ilyushin-76s.48 Both the Ilyushin and the an Iranian Air Force-marked Ilyushin-76 at
Antonov are extremely durable and capable Palmyra Airbase in October 2012.53 Syrian Air
of shorter take-offs and landings than larger Ilyushin-76s have also been filmed landing in
commercial aircraft. By employing a range Hama and Aleppo.54 One Syrian Air Ilyushin-
of airframes, Iran has the ability to fly into 76 (tail fin number YK-ATA) has been
identified as having travelled between airfields
around Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus
in 2012.55 Unauthenticated flight manifest
records indicate that this Syrian plane has
used Iraqi, Iranian, and Azeri airspace to
deliver equipment from Russia. The aircraft
reportedly transported over 200 tons of Syrian
banknotes printed in Russia over multiple
trips in 2012.56 The aircraft also attempted to
transport refurbished Mi-25 Russian attack
helicopters in this manner, although Iraqi
Photo 4 | Iran Air Jet in Damascus authorities denied the over-flight request.57
16
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
shipping military equipment to Syria over Iraqi positions at the northernmost Rabia-Yaarabiya
airspace, coinciding with constricting ground crossing.73 The Iraqi and Syrian governments
supply corridors.70 appear well situated to maintain control of this
last overland supply route, although the recent
The last available ground resupply route through ambush also demonstrates militants capacity to
Iraq, the Al Walid-At Tanf border crossing disrupt this critical line of communication.
point, travels through the middle of the Syrian
Desert and is the most direct route between Sea
Baghdad and Damascus. A month after rebels Iran has also deployed naval vessels through the
closed the Al Qaim-Abu Kamal crossing, one Suez Canal to Syrian ports of call, demonstrating
Syrian opposition activist posted a map on the plausibility of a sea line of communication.
his Twitter account depicting the overland In February 2011, before the uprising began,
resupply route to Assad via Al Walid-At Tanf.71 Iranian naval vessels transited the Suez Canal
Sunni militants ambushed a convoy of Syrian for the first time since the 1970s.74 The two
and Iraqi soldiers near Al Walid inside Iraq in vessels, the Alvand and the Kharg, then docked
March 2013, corroborating the importance in Latakia.75 Two Iranian naval vessels made the
of this southernmost route.72 The Iraqis were same journey to the Mediterranean in February
attempting to repatriate the Syrian troops, 2012, where Iranian state-run Press TV said that
who had fled into Iraq as rebels overran their they docked in the port of Tartous to train with
18
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Syrian forces. The U.S. Department of Defense, Irans ability to support Assad with personnel
however, denied that the ships had docked or and equipment is inextricably linked to the
delivered cargo.76 The relative infrequency of maintenance of this air corridor, making it a key
these voyages suggests that Irans sea lanes to vulnerability for Iranian strategy in Syria.
Syria are more symbolic than practical.
Paramilitaries and Proxies
An unofficial sea line of communication
utilizing commercial vessels is more plausible Bashar al-Assad has relied heavily on pro-regime
but still problematic. In February 2013, the militias since the outset of the conflict, but
Syrian Economic Task Force reported that the relative significance of these paramilitary
tankers belonging to Iranian oil companies forces has increased over time. As the Syrian
frequently traversed the Suez Canal to ship oil military suffered heavy attrition and defections
between Syria and Iran. Two ships in particular in the first year of conflict, Assad increasingly
were identified, which had reflagged repeatedly looked to pro-regime militia units to fill the
in recent months. The report suggested that the requirements gap. Iran has directly supported
Iranian ships were primarily moving Syrian crude a number of Syrias pro-Assad paramilitary
to Iran, perhaps to offset Iranian investment in organizations. At the same time, Irans proxies
Assads regime.77 If the operational landscape and regional partners, namely Lebanese
significantly degrades Irans ability to transport Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militant groups, have
equipment and personnel via ground and air taken a more prominent combat role. These
routes, however, Iran could look to make use elements have augmented Assads forces in an
of this established alternate point of access to effort to preserve their mutual interests, as well
transport weapons, equipment, and personnel. as those of Iran.
continues to be maintained, with support from therefore, critical to Irans ability to achieve its
Iran and Hizballah and is modeled after the two-track strategic objectives.
Iranian Basij militia.82
By the beginning of 2013, Assad took steps
Syrias pro-regime militias like Jaysh al-Shabi to formalize and professionalize the Popular
must be understood within the Syrian historical Committee militias under a new group dubbed
context rather than as an imitation of the the National Defense Forces, or quwat al-difaa
Iranian Basij. The Syrian Baath party has used al-watani. Iran has contributed to establishing
paramilitary forces since taking power in 1963, this new organization, which gathers together
and Hafez al-Assad relied on them heavily to existing neighborhood militias into a functioning
suppress the early 1980s Muslim Brotherhood hierarchy and provides them with better
uprising. The Baath Party called its institutional equipment and training.86 One journalist who
paramilitaries Jaysh al-Shabi by the mid- has extensively interviewed regime insiders has
1980s, and included an estimated 100,000 claimed that members of the National Defense
members as of 2011.83 Forces have received training from Iranian
advisors.87
Pro-Assad militias in the current conflict
comprise two distinct but related phenomena. Iran has been training pro-Assad militants both
The Popular Committees are comprised in Syria and in Iran. Iranian training efforts for
of minority communities that have armed Iraqi and Afghan groups have previously taken
themselves, fearing the militarized and majority- place primarily in Iran, where training facilities
Sunni opposition. These local militias coordinate are robust, dispersed, and secure.88 U.S. Treasury
with regime security forces and man checkpoints designations have shown that Iran has been
in minority towns and neighborhoods.84 training Assads security forces inside Syria since
the beginning of the conflict.89 A recent report
A more extreme evolution of the pro-Assad indicates, however, that Iran is also sending pro-
militia groups grew out of the Alawite criminal Assad militants to Iran for training. In early April
networks of coastal Latakia and Tartous, known 2013, Reuters published interviews with four
for smuggling goods to and from Lebanon. fighters from Homs province, each hailing from
These smuggling gangs were known as shabiha a separate militia unit, who all claimed to have
named for the old Mercedes Shahab (Ghost) travelled to Iran for urban warfare training.90
popular for its smuggling-sized trunk and were
led by members of Assads extended family.85 This effort overlaps with Irans second
These militias have been responsible for some objective of supporting militant groups
of the most brutal forms of violence against that can survive with or without Assad. The
Sunni populations. The opposition refers to all more extreme shabiha criminal networks led
pro-government militias as shabiha. by extended members of the Assad family
are the most likely to continue fighting
Iranian support to these pro-government after regime collapse. As one militiaman
militias bolsters Assads staying power while explained, I know the Sunnis will take
setting foundations for militant groups that can revenge for what we have done. I am fighting
survive with or without Assad. Iranian support to guarantee a good future for my sons and
for the neighborhood Popular Committees grandsons. So this is the final battle: Win, or
primarily enables the first objective. The die. Theres no third choice.91 These militias
Popular Committees provide security for form a significant base for recruitment to
pro-Assad populations, freeing the Army and build militant cadres for an enduring proxy
security apparatus to conduct operations against militia force.
the opposition. This element of support is,
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Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Iran is likely to develop reliable proxies that integral role in the continued violence and has
can continue to pursue Tehrans interests if provided increasing levels of support for Assad
Assad falls. The militias and the remnants of since the beginning of the conflict.93 Hezbollah
Assads security institutions will look to Iran has also worked with Syrian officials to ensure
for continued support, fearful of the ascendant the passage of Iranian arms shipments to Syria
Sunni opposition. Indeed, even if Assad falls since the summer of 2012.94
and the Sunni opposition consolidates control
over most of Syria, the regimes remnants Over the past decade, Hezbollah has
are prepared to transform themselves into strengthened its political and military dominance
a complex and capable insurgent network, a in Lebanon and has emerged as its own actor in
transformation that Iran is well situated to the region.95 The conflict in Syria, however, has
encourage and facilitate.92 placed Hezbollah on the defensive to protect
its support base and ensure the continuation of
Lebanese Hezbollah supply routes from Syria into Lebanon.96 These
supply lines can be maintained by preserving
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) is one regional Assad, even if his regime contracts to a
partner that has taken on a more direct combat defensive posture around Damascus, Homs
role in Syria as the increasingly embattled Assad and the coast. If Assad falls, supply lines can be
regime began to lose control over parts of Syria protected by proxies as long as the ascendant
in 2012. From the early stages of the conflict, opposition is unable to effectively establish
LH has supported Assad with a robust, well- control over Syrias borders.
trained force whose involvement in the conflict
aligns with Iranian strategic interests. U.S. IRGC-QF has coordinated with LH to train
Department of the Treasury designations government and pro-Assad forces inside Syria.97
have accused Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) of According to the above-cited designations,
both directly supporting Assad and facilitating LH involvement in Syria includes logistical
Iranian activity in Syria. Hezbollah has played an support, training and advising, facilitation of
21
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
IRGC-QF activity, and direct combat action. diverted to Hezbollah personnel explained
Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in early 2011, They needed qualified snipers
also admitted in October 2012 that Hezbollah from Hezbollah and Iran.102 These early claims
militants were fighting in Syria, although he remain impossible to verify.
claimed they were fighting of their own accord
and not under the direction of Hezbollah Hezbollahs involvement in direct action inside
leadership.98 He clarified in February 2013 that Syria became more verifiable in 2012, particularly
the party as a whole was not involved in Syria, in areas near the Lebanese border. In one of
but that members of the organization living in the first unconfirmed acknowledgements of
majority Lebanese Shiite villages in Syria have LH direct action, an unnamed IRGC official
been involved in fighting.99 claimed that Hezbollah snipers had been
deployed during the Battle of Zabadani in early
Hezbollah fighters are well situated to provide 2012.103 The town of Zabadani sits in the middle
advice and training to Syrian armed forces, of a historic supply route from Damascus to
pro-regime paramilitaries, and Shia proxy Lebanese Hezbollahs headquarters in Baalbek,
groups because of their native Arabic language a town in the southern Bekaa Valley near the
and experience with light infantry combat Syrian border. The town was, as noted earlier,
operations. Any advisory and assistance force the hub for Iranian support to Hezbollah in
faces linguistic challenges operating beyond 1982. During the current conflict, LH has
its borders, and Persians operating in Arab deployed forces to protect and engaged in
lands are no exception. Hezbollahs Lebanese small skirmishes with rebel forces areas along
Arabs are better suited to work closely with this route.104 LH is also said to have numerous
Syrian counterparts than Iranian Revolutionary weapons caches in the area.105
Guards. U.S. Treasury officials noted
Hezbollahs particular contribution regarding An Israeli Defense Forces airstrike in February
counterinsurgency capabilities in low-intensity 2013 against a weapons convoy reportedly
conflict.100 With the exception of its twelve carrying SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles bound
Special Forces Regiments, the Syrian Army is for Lebanon is evidence that these routes
primarily a heavy, mechanized force that lacks the remain an integral component of Irans and
light infantry capability necessary for sustained Hezbollahs logistical network in Syria.106 This
conflict against lightly armed insurgents. area is also an active staging ground for Iranian
Hezbollahs experience fighting in low-intensity personnel in Syria. Reports state that IRGC-
conflict could be a valuable supplementary asset QF has established an operating base close to
for Assads armored forces. Zabadani.107
LH militants participate in a number of direct Another area where Hezbollah activity has
support activities in Syria, including sniper and become clearer is further north, along the
counter-sniper operations, facility and route northeastern Lebanese border near Homs.
protection, joint clearing operations, and direct Hezbollah and Syrian opposition camps sit in
engagement with opposition forces, often close proximity in Lebanons northern Bekaa
in coordination with Syrian forces and pro- valley, although these groups are only known
government militias.101 In the early stages of to fight each other inside Syrian territory.108
the Syrian conflict, the opposition frequently Hezbollahs involvement in this area was
accused LH fighters of augmenting Syrian demonstrated in October 2012 when Ali
personnel, particularly trained marksmen. Hussein Nassif, reported to be commander
Syrian security forces didnt have decent of Hezbollahs operations in Syria, was killed
snipers or equipment, a defected regime in al-Qusayr, 10 kilometers from the Lebanese
insider who managed Defense Ministry funds border and 20 kilometers southwest of Homs.109
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Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
The same month, LH launched Katyusha statement relied on this ambiguity in claiming
rockets into al-Qusayr from the northern Bekaa that the only members of Hezbollah fighting in
Valley.110 Syria hailed from Shia villages along the Syrian
border.
Hezbollah escalated its combat role in mid-
February 2013 when LH fighters, supported Hezbollahs involvement in Syria has
by Syrian air support and pro-Assad militias, aligned with Iranian strategic interests, but
launched a coordinated ground offensive against its commitment is not without limitations.
rebel-held villages near al-Qusayr.111 Syrian Lebanese Hezbollahs domestic responsibilities
opposition bodies including the Syrian National require careful calibration to avoid alienating
Council (SNC) and Free Syrian Army (FSA) its core constituency. Hezbollah has built its
denounced the assault, seeing it as a military reputation on a narrative of popular resistance
intervention by Hezbollah and the beginning against Israel but now finds itself supporting
of an open war against Syrian civilians in a repressive regime in Syria, a problem Tehran
full coordination with the Assad regime.112 also faces. Calculated infusions of direct
According to rebel groups, Hezbollah controls assistance will continue to impact the course of
at least eight Syrian villages near the north the conflict, but Hezbollah cannot invest all of
Lebanese border and is attempting to secure its resources in Syria.
more in an effort to disrupt rebel supply lines
to Homs.113 Iraqi Shia Militants in Syria
A number of factors help explain Hezbollahs Iraqi Shia militants are also fighting in Syria in
overt involvement in this case. In early 2013, support of Assad. Iranian-backed Shia militias
the Lebanese military moved to lock down established close relations with IRGC-QF and
the border crossing near Arsal, a Sunni town functioned as a disruption force during the
used to smuggle weapons and supplies to U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq. These loyal and
opposition fighters in Syria.114 With this major battle-tested proxy militias can likewise help
opposition supply line disrupted, Sunni rebels Iran to ensure a permissive environment in
have been forced to use al-Qusayr as a crossing Syria even if Assad falls.
point. This location is further north, close
During the Iraq War, IRGC-QF played a crucial
to Hermel and many predominately-Shia
role in facilitating the creation and training of
towns across the Syrian border. The February
Iraqi Shia militant groups, including both Kataib
escalation may be a consequence of this
Hezbollah (KH) and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).
shifting line of communication, with LH acting
Iran used Lebanese Hezbollah to facilitate the
to protect the predominately-Shia villages in
formation and training of these groups. It is
Syria from the growing rebel presence in the
known, for example, that Lebanese Hezbollah
area. A pro-opposition source reported that
militant Ali Mussa Daqduq travelledto Tehran
tensions between the two sides in al-Qusayr
in May 2006 to meet with Abdul Reza Shahlai
flared again in April 2013 when rebels attacked
(also known as Hajji Youssef), the deputy
fifty LH fighters, killing nine and wounding
commander of the Quds Forces Department of
fifteen others.115 The ambiguity of the Syria-
External Special Operations. There he received
Lebanon border near al-Qusayr has facilitated
directives from the IRGC-QF to oversee the
Hezbollahs cross-border activity and helped
training of Iranian-backed Shia militant groups
the group to justify it. Border disputes between
in Iraq.116
Lebanon and Syria in the northeast corner have
never been resolved, and many of the residents One of the first indications of a similar strategy
on the Syrian side have Lebanese passports. in Syria appeared in early 2012 when Jaafar
Nasrallahs abovementioned February 2013 Athab, a purported member of the Iran-backed
23
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
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Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Sayyeda Zeinab neighborhood, and securing tourism system to facilitate travel for IRGC
Shia neighborhoods and offices of Shia personnel and clandestine operatives.130 AFAB
religious leaders in Damascus.128 may be defending Sayyeda Zeinab because
of its religious significance, but it also suits
Sayyeda Zeinab is not just a symbolic location; Irans interests for its proxies to defend the
it is also key terrain for Assad and for Iran. The neighborhood for operational purposes.
Sayyeda Zeinab neighborhood is operationally
critical to the defense of Damascus and The largest hotel in Sayyeda Zeinab, the As Safir
strategically significant for long-term Iranian Damascus Hotel, is owned by the wealthy Shia
operations around Damascus. Without Nahas family, which has close ties with the Assad
Sayyeda Zeinab, the opposition could form a family. General Shafiq Fayyad, Hafez al-Assads
contiguous area of control encircling regime first cousin and the long-time commander
positions in western Damascus and would cut of the Syrian 3rd Armored Division was a
off regime access to Damascus International critical supporter of Hafez during the Muslim
Airport.129 Sayyeda Zeinab also contains many Brotherhood Uprising and Rifat al-Assads
hotels and travel agencies that provide Iran 1984 coup attempt.131 One of Fayyads sons
with the ability to move personnel throughout married into the Nahas family.132 The Nahas
the region under the guise of religious tourism. Group holding company had listed Iran Air as
Iran has previously used its Shii religious one of its strategic partners, but removed the
25
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
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Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
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Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
9. Fulton, The Assassination of Iranian Quds Force General Hassan 22. Neil MacFarquhar and Hwaida Saad, Dozens of Children Die
Shateri in Syria. in Brutal Attack on Syrian Town, The New York Times, May 26, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/world/middleeast/syrian-
10. Iran aids Syrias CW programme, Janes Defense Weekly, activists-claim-death-toll-in-village-soars.html; Commander Ghaani:
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article/ALeqM5iJugIQvDKwkxupz9eULk1ml6OZ4Q; Shells in
the Desert: Syria Tested Chemical Weapons Systems, Witnesses 23. Qassem Suleimanis criticism of Bashar Assads policies, Mazhabi
Say, Der Spiegel, September 17, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/ Melli, September 5, 2012, http://melimazhabi.com/?shenideha=%D9%
international/world/syria-tested-chemical-weapons-in-desert-in- 86%D9%82%D8%AF-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85-%D
august-eyewitnesses-say-a-856206.html. 8%B3%D9%84%DB%8C%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-
%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-
11. Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency -%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-
to Civil War, Institute for the Study of War, February 2013, http:// %D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AF.
www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime.
24. Rob Crilly and Robin Pomeroy, Iran sees support for Syria
12. YouTube, Republican Guard Briefing in Bab Amr, published essential to fend off U.S., Israeli wolves, Daily Telegraph, August
April 4, 2012, http://youtu.be/voBwOwYnOX4. 16, 2011; Rob Crilly, Iran snipers in Syria as part of crackdown ,
13. Will Fulton, IRGC Shows Its (True) Hand in Syria, AEIs The Telegraph, August 15, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
Critical Threats Project, January 14, 2013, http://www.irantracker.org/ worldnews/middleeast/syria/8702466/Iran-snipers-in-Syria-as-
analysis/fulton-irgc-shows-its-true-hand-syria-january-14-2013. part-of-crackdown.html.
14. Commander Qassem Suleimani at the Youth Islamic Awakening 25. Treasury Sanctions Syrian, Iranian Security Forces for
[conference] commencement: The enemies have been surprised by Involvement in Syrian Crackdown, US Department of the Treasury,
the course of events in the region, Hamedan Basij Mohandesin June 29, 2011, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Organization, January 18, 2012. http://goo.gl/TSn35, accessed Pages/tg1224.aspx.
March 7, 2012. Translated by Will Fulton, Critical Threats Project. 26. Treasury Sanctions Syrian, Iranian Security Forces for
15. Elizabeth OBagy and Joseph Holliday, Syria Update: The Involvement in Syrian Crackdown.
Opposition Takeover In Al-Raqqa, Institute for the Study of War, 27. Treasury Sanctions Syrian, Iranian Security Forces for
March 15, 2013, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ Involvement in Syrian Crackdown.
opposition-takeover-al-raqqa.
28. Treasury Sanctions Iranian Security Forces for Human Rights
16. Steven OHern, Qassem Suleimani in Syria Helping Regime Stay in Abuses, US Department of the Treasury, June 9, 2011, http://www.
Power, Steven OHern: The Official Website, http://www.stevenohern. treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1204.aspx.
com/qassem-suleimani-in-syria-helping-regime-stay-in-power/.
28
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
30. Statute of the Islamic Republic of Irans Law Enforcement 46. Treasury Targets Iranian Arms Shipments.
Forces, Iranian Interior Ministry, July 17, 1990, http://www.moi. 47. Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others Involved in Arms
ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=Instruction&CategoryID and Communications Procurement Networks and Identifies Blocked
=fd16893b-3c63-42cc-830f-ccc907ddf64c&WebPartID=7f44f621- Iranian Aircraft.
20b1-401f-808a-1909741e427b&ID=4f9362cc-bf18-467f-b767-
-a5793449dd6a. 48. Syria Designations; Syria Identifications; Non-proliferation
Designations; Non-proliferation Identifications; Burma Designation
31. Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran Section 16: Removals; Non-proliferation Designation Removals; Anti-Terrorism
Supreme National Security Council Article 176, Iranian Parliament Designation Update, US Department of the Treasury, September
Center for Research, http://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/133640. 19, 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/
32. COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) No OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20120919.aspx.
611/2011 of 23 June 2011, Office of the Journal of the European 49. Fact Sheet: Treasury Sanctions Major Iranian Commercial
Union, June 23, 2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ Entities.
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:164:0001:0003:EN:PDF.
50. Syria top destination for illegal Iran arms- U.N., Reuters, May
33. Treasury Designates Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and 11, 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/11/iran-syria-
Security for Human Rights Abuses and Support for Terrorism, un-idAFN1124196820110511.
US Department of the Treasury, February 16, 2012, http://www.
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1424.aspx. 51. Treasury Designates Iranian Commercial Airline Linked to Irans
Support for Terrorism, US Department of the Treasury, October
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protests: officials, Reuters, March 23, 2012, http://www. Pages/tg1322.aspx.
reuters.com/article/2012/03/23/us-iran-syria-crackdown-
idUSBRE82M18220120323. 52. Treasury Targets Iranian Arms Shipments.
35. YouTube, Spy Plane over locals, published February 14, 2012, 53. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Transport IL76 TD at Palmyra
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KApa_VfNu6I. Airport Syria, October 22, 2012. http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rzzMBU-jKMM.
36. Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others Involved in Arms
and Communications Procurement Networks and Identifies Blocked 54. Soldier carrier moving from Aleppo International
Iranian Aircraft, US Department of the Treasury, September 19, Airport, September 2, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/
2012, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ watch?v=Pjw3unsk7Tk; Hama- spotting activities Ilyushin IL-76TB,
tg1714.aspx. March 8, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpzB4c6lo0s.
37. Treasury Designates Syrian Entity, Others Involved in Arms 55. YK-ATA search results, Airliners.net, http://www.airliners.
and Communications Procurement Networks and Identifies Blocked net/search/photo.search?regsearch=YK-ATA; Syrian Flight
Iranian Aircraft; Administration Takes Additional Steps to Hold Manifests, Pro Publica, http://www.propublica.org/documents/
the Government of Syria Accountable for Violent Repression item/522212-syrian-flight-manifests; Old Helicopter Mi-25, Pro
Against the Syrian People. Publica, http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/526279-old-
helicopter-1.html.
38. Holliday, The Assad Regime, Appendix 3.
56. Syrian Flight Manifests, Old Helicopter Mi-25.
39. Syrias Intelligence Services: A Primer, Middle East Intelligence
Bulletin. Vol 2. No.6. http://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0007_ 57. M. Grabell, D. Linzer, J. Larson, Iraq Blocks Syrias Request to
s3.htm Fetch Combat Helicopters from Russia, Pro Publica, December 6,
2012, http://www.propublica.org/article/iraq-blocks-syrias-request-
40. Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society to-fetch-combat-helicopters-from-russia.
under Asad and the Bath Part, (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011),
p. 209; Alain Chouet, LEspace Tribal Des Alaouties a lEpreuve du 58. Zero Problems with Our Neighbors, Turkish Ministry of
Pouvoir: La disintegration par le politique, Maghreb-Mashreq No. Foreign Affairs, (Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/policy-of-zero-
147, 1995. Retrieved from: http://alain.chouet.free.fr/documents/ problems-with-our-neighbors.en.mfa)
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circle-idUSTRE7433TN20110504. 6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2012_395.pdf)
42. Syrian President Bashar al-Assads inner circle. 60. Iraq inspects second Syrian-bound Iran flight, finds no
illegal items, Press TV, October 28, 2012, http://presstv.com/
43. Con Coughlin, Iran pays for military base in Syria to aid arms detail/2012/10/28/269235/iraq-inspects-2nd-iranian-plane-to-
traffic, The Daily Telegraph, August 13, 2011. syria/; Iraq inspects 3rd Iranian plane to Syria this week, Associated
44. Fact Sheet: Treasury Sanctions Major Iranian Commercial Press, April 10, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/iraq-inspects-3rd-
Entities, US Department of the Treasury, June 23, 2012, http:// iranian-plane-syria-week-205143475.html; Iraq inspects Iranian
29
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
cargo plane bound for Syria, AFP, April 15, 2013, http://english. personnel to Syria via Iraq, Reuters, September 19, 2012, http://
alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/04/15/Iraq-inspects- uk.reuters.com/article/2012/09/19/uk-syria-crisis-iran-iraq-
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61. M. Gordon, E. Schmitt, and T. Argano, Flows of Arms to Syria 79. Nick Simeone, Panetta: Iran Increases Support to Assad
Through Iraq Persists, to U.S. Dismay, New York Times, December 1, Regime, American Forces Press Service, August 14, 2012; US says
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/02/world/middleeast/us- Iran training Syrian militia, BBC News, August 15, 2012.
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80. Jafari: hamle pish dastaneh nemi konim [Jafari: We will not
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63. Gordon, Schmitt, and Argano, Flows of Arms to Syria
%D9%BE%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%A
Through Iraq Persists, to U.S. Dismay.
A%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D9%86%D9%85%D9%8-
64. Kerry presses Iraq to ban Irans shipments to Syria, CNN, A-%D9%83%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%85-
March 24, 2013, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/24/ %D8%AC%D9%84%D9%88%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8
kerry-presses-for-end-to-iran-flights-over-iraq/ . %B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84)
65. Iran increases military support to Syrias Assad, diplomats say, 81. Treasury Sanctions Al-Nusrah Front Leadership in Syria and
Haaretz, March 14, 2013, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle- Militias Supporting the Asad Regime, U.S. Department of the
east/iran-increases-military-support-to-syria-s-assad-diplomats-say- Treasury, December 11, 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/press-
1.509295. center/press-releases/Pages/tg1797.aspx
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83. Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime; From Counterinsurgency
67. Sinjar Documents, http://tarpley.net/docs/ to Civil War, pp.16-19 ,30-32
CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf.
84. Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime; From Counterinsurgency
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69. Rebels attack Syrian military airport, say shot down jet, Reuters,
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87. Scott Lucas, Syria & Iran Follow-Up: The Real Story of Syrias
70. Michael Gordon, Iran Supplying Syrian Military via Iraqi
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72. Roy Gutman, Iraqis call for U.S. military aid after Nusra-linked
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Involvement in Syrian Crackdown.
northeastern-city.html.
90. Insight: Syrian government guerrilla fighters being sent to
74. Iran warships dock in Syrias Tartus port, al-Jazeera, February
Iran for training, Reuters, April 4, 2013, http://www.reuters.
20, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/20
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75. Dudi Cohen, Iranian naval ships arrive in Syria, Ynet News,
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February 18, 2012; Obama administration opens door to aid for
to Civil War, pp. 29-33.
Syrian rebels, Associated Press, February 21, 2012.
93. Treasury Targets Hizballah for Supporting the Assad Regime,
77. Luis Sanchez, Iranian tankers funneling Syrian oil through Suez,
United States Department of the Treasury, August 10, 2012; Briefing
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com/2013/02/10/iranian-tankers-funnelling-syrian-oil-through-
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Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
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treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1506.aspx; 2013. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0118/
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Communications Procurement Networks and Identifies Blocked Syria.
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releases/Pages/tg1714.aspx. Guardian, October 2, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
oct/02/hezbollah-operative-killed-syria; Daniel Nisman and Daniel
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96. Nicholas Blanford, Syrias Proxy Wars: In Lebanons Bekaa Valley, 110. Josh Wood, Hezbollah Offering Direct Help to Syrian Army,
the Specter of Conflict Looms, Time, February 14, 2013. http:// Rebels say, New York Times, October 17, 2012.
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valley-the-specter-of-conflict-looms/. 111. Khaled Yacoub Oweis and Laila Bassam, Hezbollah fighter,
five Syrian rebels killed on border, Reuters, February 17, 2013.
97. Treasury Sanctions al-Nusrah Front Leaders, Militia http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/17/us-syria-crisis-
Groups in Syria, US Department of the Treasury, December hezbollah-idUSBRE91G0CX20130217; Patrick McDonnell and
11, 2012, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/ Nabih Bulos, Hezbollah fighters reported killed in clashes with
article/2012/12/20121211139861.html#axzz2M2qKngyq. Syrian rebels, LA Times, February 18, 2013, http://www.latimes.
98. Hezbollah fighters killed in Syria will go to hell, saying former com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-hezbollah-fighters-reported-
leader, Al-Arabiya, February 26, 2013; UNHCR Report. killed-20130218,0,7954864.story; Syrian rebels pan Hezbollah
military intervention, The Times of Israel, February 18, 201, http://
99. Ali Hashem, Nasrallah Sends Message on Syria, Al- www.timesofisrael.com/syrian-rebels-pan-hezbollah-military-
Monitor Lebanon Pulse, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ intervention/.
originals/2013/02/hasan-nasrallah-sick-hezbollah-lebanon-
electoral-law.html. 112. McDonnell and Bulos, Hezbollah fighters reported killed
in clashes with Syrian rebels; Roi Kais, Rebels: 1,000 Hezbollah
100. Briefing on the Designation of Hezbollah for Supporting the fighters invaded Syria, Y Net News, February 17, 2013. http://www.
Syrian Regime. ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4346099,00.html.
101. Matthew Levitt, The Hezbollah Connection in Syria and Iran, 113. Khaled Yacoub Oweis and Laila Bassam, Hezbollah fighter,
Council on Foreign Relations, February 15, 2013, http://www.cfr. five Syrian rebels killed on border, Reuters, February 17, 2013, http://
org/iran/hezbollah-connection-syria-iran/p30005. www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/17/us-syria-crisis-hezbollah-
idUSBRE91G0CX20130217.
102. Nate Wright and James Hider, Syrian regime importing snipers
for protests, The Times of London, January 26, 2011. http://www. 114. Nicholas Blanford, Syrias Proxy Wars: In Lebanons Bekaa
theaustralian.com.au/news/world/syrian-regime-importing-snipers- Valley, the Specter of Conflict Looms, Time, February 14,
for-protests/story-e6frg6so-1226254330519 2013, http://world.time.com/2013/02/14/syrias-proxy-wars-in-
lebanons-bekaa-valley-the-specter-of-conflict-looms/.
103. Wright and Hider, Syrian regime importing snipers for
protests. 115. Nine Hezbollah members die in Syrias Al-Qusayr, local media
reports, NOW Lebanon, April 8, 2013, https://now.mmedia.me/
104. Nicholas Blanford, Lebanese military seals off a town involved
lb/en/lebanonnews/nine-hezbollah-members-die-in-syrias-al-
in Syrian rebellion, Christian Science Monitor, February 10, 2013.
qusair-local-media-reports.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0210/
Lebanese-military-seals-off-a-town-involved-in-Syrian-rebellion; 116. Marisa Sullivan, The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Trend,
Nicholas Blanford, Lebanese border means little in Syrias civil Institute for the Study of War, January 2009, http://understandingwar.
war, Christian Science Monitor, December 24, 2012. http://www. org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20Report%2012%20Sadrist%20
csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/1224/Lebanese-border- Movement%20Fragmentation.pdf.
means-little-in-Syria-s-civil-war.
117. Death of League of the Righteous member in Hama, Syria,
105. Michael Weiss, To Syrian rebels, Hezbollah is the Party of Al-Tahreer News. May 27, 2012. Translated from Arabic.
Satan, The Telegraph, January 19, 2012.
118. Death of League of the Righteous member in Hama, Syria;
106. Nicholas Blanford, Israeli strike indicates Syria, Hezbollah Death of supporter from Jaish al Mahdi in Syria, May 19, 2012.
may have crossed its red line, Christian Science Monitor, January 30, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mVVDKb2HcNk.
2013. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2013/0130/
Israeli-strike-indicates-Syria-Hezbollah-may-have-crossed-its-red- 119. Sam Wyer, The Resurgence of Asaib Ahl al Haq, Institute for
line-video the Study of War, December 2012, http://www.understandingwar.
org/report/resurgence-asaib-ahl-al-haq.
107. Alex Spillius, Syria: Irans elite Quds force advising Assad
regime, Daily Telegraph, February 9, 2012, http://www.telegraph. 120. Death of League of the Righteous member in Hama, Syria;
co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9072798/Syria-Irans- Abu Deraa and his two brothers and dozens of League of the
elite-Quds-force-advising-Assad-regime.html; The FSA hits Righteous militants to Syria on orders of Suleiman, Rasheed,
back against Hezbollah, vows to take battle all the way to Beirut, September 4, 2012. Translated from Arabic. http://www.alrashead.
Albawaba, October 10, 2012. net/index.php?prevn&id=6130&typen=2; League of the Righteous
sent elements to Syria to support the Syrian regime, al-Hadath News.
108. Nicholas Blanford, Video appears to show Hezbollah and
31
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
32
Appendix: The Assassination of Iranian Quds Force
General Hassan Shateri in Syria
by Will Fulton
Originally Published at AEIs Iran Tracker, February 28, 2013 www.irantracker.org
Beirut after having travelled to Syria to survey One source also claimed that Shateri had been
reconstruction projects.5 Syrian opposition and traveling with two other individuals who were
an Israeli source have stated that he was killed not killed in the attack, a fact that is significant
in the January 30 Israeli airstrike on a convoy and will be explored later.13
moving SA-17 anti-aircraft missiles across the
Lebanese border.6 The idea that a very senior Quds Force general
had gone to a city that is likely soon to come
An assessment of the timeline of reporting on under the control of Syrias opposition in order
this event, however, indicates that the IRGC to look into construction projects is nonsensical.
has been trying to walk back and contextualize It likely reflects a reflexive boilerplate cover-
some of the details leaked early on, particularly story based on Shateris best-known public
Shateris presence in Aleppo. role overseeing the reconstruction of southern
Lebanon after the 2006 war. It does not seem
The initial report came early February 13 from to have occurred to Iranian officials in Lebanon
the Ahlul Bayt World News Agency (ABNA). that the fact they most needed to conceal was
This report stated only that Shateri was killed Shateris presence in Aleppo itself rather than
by Zionist mercenariesoutside of Iran what he might ostensibly have been doing
and that Suleimani had confirmed the report there.14
moments ago and personally visited Shateris
family.7 Since then, ABNA has been in the lead The IRGC took 24 hours to develop an official
and appears to have an inside track on Shateri response and message discipline, giving an
reporting. ABNA was the first site to post alternative, retrospective, official story that has
images of Shateris body being buried, Shateri been echoed ever since. IRGC Public Relations
with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei before Deputy Brigadier General 2nd Class Ramazan
2007, and Shateri with President Mahmoud Sharif told reporters on February 14 that Shateri
Ahmadinejad.8 ABNA is the reporting agency had been in Syria to implement construction
for the Ahlul Bayt World Assembly, headed headquarters projects and was martyred by
by former two-time ambassador to Syria supporters and mercenaries of the Zionist
(1986-1997 and 2005-2008) Ayatollah Hassan regime while traveling between Damascus and
Akhtari.9 Akhtari was also involved in standing Beirut.15 Sharif s statement then became the
up Lebanese Hezbollah in the 1980s.10 He was official Iranian narrative.
deeply involved in Iranian efforts to support
Hezbollah, and the leading role that ABNA has Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Qazanfar
taken in reporting on Shateris death accounts in Roknabadi told the Islamic Republics official
part for the emphasis on Shateris participation Arabic news network al Alam on February 18
in Iranian activities with Hezbollah as opposed that Hessam Khoshnevis [the alias Shateri
to the various other important missions Shateri used in Lebanon] was directly targeted by armed
has undertaken outside the Levant. individuals while traveling from Damascus to
Beirut and we are investigating his death. Iran
The next reports provided details about Shateris considers the Zionist regime the primary actors
destination in Syria. A Lebanese source reported in the assassination of [Shateri].16 He did not
that Shateri had been in Aleppo to research mention Aleppo. The Iranian regimes message
construction projects and was killed on his discipline had finally reached Beirut.
way back to Lebanon.11 The Iranian embassy
in Beirut issued a statement claiming that The Syrian opposition has yet to converge on
Shateri had been sent to Aleppo to implement a single narrative of how Shateri died. One
development and construction projects and unnamed Syrian rebel commander claimed
was killed on his way to Damascus airport.12 on February 14 that his forces had killed an
34
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Iranian official near Zabadani, a Syrian city east Shateri were held in Tehran and Semnan on
of Damascus near the border with Lebanon, February 14 and 15, respectively, during which
though this report was never confirmed and is Shateris remains were presented but in a closed
typical of Syrian opposition overstatement.17 A casket.25
spokesman for the Free Syrian Army, however,
stated on February 14 that Shateri had, in fact, Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Roknabadi
been killed in the January 30 Israeli airstrike on also rejected the claims that he died in an
a convoy in Jamraya carrying SA-17 anti-aircraft airstrike, stating, Those responsible for Shateris
missile systems bound for Lebanon.18 A report assassination have published contradicting
published by Britains The Sunday Times on reports; some of these groups suggest that he
February 24 cites an anonymous Israeli security was killed during the Zionist regimes strike
source also claiming that Shateri was killed in in Jamarya. These reports are absolutely
that airstrike.19 The source further asserts that inaccurate; especially the report published by the
Shateri had actually been the primary target, Free Syrian Army claiming that Khoshnevis was
and that Israel would not launch such a high- killed in the Jamarya region in an Israeli airstrike.
risk attack into heavily defended Syrian airspace Shateri was killed in Reef, Damascus. The
to strike a weapons convoy.20 Zionist regime killed Khoshnevis by using its
mercenaries.26 [UPDATE: French newspaper
Israel may, indeed, prefer that the world believe Le Figaro reported 2 APR 2013 that Shateri
that Shateri was killed in the January 30 airstrike was killed in an ambush between Damascus
in Jamraya. So, too, might the Syrian opposition. and Beirut in February and that Israel was
Iran has long claimed that the Syrian opposition responsible. The report also claims Shateri had
is actually helping Israel achieve its objectives met IRGC-QF commander BG Mohammad
in the region; therefore, Iran must support the Reza Zahedi in Damascus shortly before his
Assad regime in order to fortify the axis of death.27]
resistance and combat the Zionist regime.21
Indications or even questions of Israel providing One could argue that Tehran would prefer to
training or intelligence to Syrian rebels in a deny that Shateri was traveling with a convoy
joint effort to assassinate Iranian and Lebanese of weapons bound for Lebanese Hezbollah.
Hezbollah targets would play directly into Irans But the counter to this argument is actually
rhetorical strategy and undermine both Israeli the most compelling reason to believe that the
and Free Syrian Army narratives. Iranian version of events is closest to the truth;
namely, the official Iranian narrative is much
How Shateri Died more problematic for Tehran than the seeded
Israeli narrative. Iranian support for Hezbollah,
The available evidence on Shateris death does even their coordination in Syria, is not a startling
not support the Israeli or Syrian opposition claim revelation. The presence of a very senior Quds
that he died in the airstrike. Images of Shateris Force officer near Aleppo, which is besieged by
body being placed in its tomb in Semnan, the Syrian opposition, raises several important
Iran on February 15 show no burn marks or questions about Irans current covert activity in
other injuries indicative of an airstrike.22 On Syria.
the contrary, the visible portion of Shateris
face appears unharmed and his head is heavily Who Was Hassan Shateri?
bandaged, suggesting, rather, that Shateri was
killed by a gunshot wound.23 [UPDATE: Sohrab Hassan Shateri was born in 1955 in Semnan,
Jafari, a friend and colleague of Shateri, stated Iran, and studied civil engineering before joining
on 8 MAR 2013 that he had seen Shateris bullet the IRGC after the 1979 Iranian revolution.28 In
wound before he was buried.24] Funerals for 1980, he was sent to Sardasht, West Azerbaijan,
35
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Former Hezbollah South Ahul Bayt World Quds Force Supreme Leaders
Lebanon Commander Assembly Chairman Deputy Cmdr Rep to S. Lebanon
Supreme Leader
Rep to Universities
Head of
Jihad al Bina
Supreme
Leaders Rep to
Quds Force
Quds Force
Commander
where he served initially as the head of IRGC Shateri in Irans Covert Global Force Projection
logistics in the region. Shateri was subsequently Network
promoted to head the IRGCs Sardasht
headquarters and later the Hamzeh Seyyed al- An assessment of Shateris post-war external
Shohada Base combat engineering unit and activities and the network of external operators
Saheb al Zaman engineering brigade.29 It was with whom he was affiliated indicates that he
during this time that Shateri developed the was far from a mere Iran-Hezbollah interlocutor
ability to lead local paramilitary organizations. as the media currently seems to suggest; rather,
According to one account from a soldier who Shateri was a senior official within Irans global
served under Shateri in Sardasht, It was his force projection network. At some point after
illustrious morality that most influenced the the Iran-Iraq War, Shateri gave up his domestic
hearts of the troops, particularly indigenous IRGC role and began deploying abroad. Shateri
[local] troops. He would address [people] from was first sent to Afghanistan where he worked
his hearts belief, and there were few indigenous alongside Northern Alliance leader Ahmad
Basij [volunteer militia] who did not know Hajj Shah Massoud.31 There is little information on
Hassan and did not have friendly relations Shateris activity in Afghanistan. The limited
with him in the indigenous language.30 Such reporting currently available indicates that
talent was likely of use to Shateri in his future he was in country ostensibly to undertake
operations. reconstruction activities, and that he left shortly
after Ahmad Shah Massouds assassination in
2001.32
36
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Map | Areas That The Assad Regime and Its Remnants Will Attempt To Hold
The other Tehran ceremony attended by Other notable attendees at the numerous
Darabi was also attended by Hojjat al- events commemorating Shateris death
Eslam Ali Reza Panahian.46 Panahian is provide further evidence of Shateris senior
the deputy head of the Ammar Base, a standing in Irans global force projection
think tank supportive of Irans Supreme network. Imad Mughniyehs father attended a
Leader, and a representative of Khamenei February 19 mourning ceremony in Tehran,
to Irans universities.47 Panahian delivered a and was greeted warmly by former Quds
speech at Shateris funeral in Tehran, during Force Commander and current Minister of
which he described how he met Shateri in Defense Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, and
Lebanon in 2008 and subsequently sought was seated next to IRGC Commander Major
Shateri out whenever he was in Lebanon.48 General Jafari.52 The Representative of the
More important, however, is that Panahian Supreme Leader to the Quds Force Ali Shirazi,
referred to Shateri as no less than Imad former IRGC-QF Ramazan Base Commander
Mughniyeh, the former Hezbollah external Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, and Supreme
operations commander assassinated in Syria National Security Council Secretary Said
in 2008.49 Panahian is also seen in an undated Jalili also attended this event.53 Attendees of
image alongside Shateri and Kazem Darabi Shateris Semnan funeral include Quds Force
at a ceremony unveiling a statue of Ahmad Deputy Commander Brigadier General Esmail
Matousalian in Lebanon.50 Matousalian Ghaani, the Supreme Leaders Representative
headed the IRGCs Mohammad Rasoul Allah to Southern Lebanon, Hojjat al-Eslam Yousef
brigade in its efforts to stand up Lebanese Tabatabaei, and the aforementioned head
Hezbollah in the early 1980s.51 of the Ahul Bayt World Assembly Ayatollah
38
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Akhtari, who notably attended the service as a on February 12 and took control of most of
representative of the Supreme Leader.54 Base 80 on February 13.60 Base 80 is home to
the Assad regimes 80th regiment and is tasked
The final indication of Shateris elite status in with securing the nearby Aleppo International
the Islamic Republic was the Supreme Leaders Airport and Nayrab military airport.61 The Assad
reaction to the news. According to Khameneis regimes loss of these bases, combined with
representative to the Quds Force, Ali Shirazi, Israels bold attack on the Lebanese Hezbollah
Khamenei said after hearing of Shateris death, military convoy in January, may have compelled
Blessed Hajj Hassan Shateri, was on a path of Iran to secure and/or sanitize the al Safir
service to religion, the revolution, the velayat, facility before completely losing access. Given
and the Imam; in the end he drank the sweet Irans involvement in Syrias chemical weapons
syrup of martyrdom and he drew out the best and ballistic missile programs, it is reasonable
ending for his life.55 Khamenei also received that Tehran would want to retrieve or destroy
the Shateri family in his home to offer his sensitive materials, remove remnants of the
condolences.56 research and development program there, and
perhaps close the facility before losing access
Shateris Mission in Syria
to it entirely. Shateris background as a technical
The largest, most compelling question officer, high rank, and familiarity with Lebanon
remains: what was Shateri doing in Syria? More and with the Assad regime would have made
specifically, what was Shateri doing in Aleppo? him an ideal candidate to undertake such a
Aleppo is currently being heavily contested by mission.62
Syrian rebels and cannot be said to be within
the Assad regimes control.57 The ground routes Conclusion: A Global Asset
into and out of Aleppo are extremely unsafe. Western media has missed the significance
To send a very senior Quds Force officer into of Shateris assassination. Reporting on his
such territory suggests that he was sent in to death highlights his activities in Lebanon, both
undertake a sensitive mission of high importance. because he was assigned there most recently
Speculation that Shateri had been sent into and because of the location and manner of his
Syria to coordinate Lebanese Hezbollah forces death. But Shateri was not simply a supporter
or oversee a weapons shipment does not fully of and rebuilder of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
consider Shateris seniority. It is unlikely that Rather, Shateri was a senior, covert Quds Force
Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani operative whose assignments ranged from the
would have sent one of his top lieutenants Hindu Kush through Mesopotamia to the
to Aleppo on a mission that could have been Mediterranean. His involvement in the Syrian
served by a less senior operational commander. conflict is further indication of the depth of
Another possible scenario is that Shateri had Irans commitment to its interests in Syria and
been dispatched to lead a mission related to the grand strategic importance it places upon
Syrias al Safir chemical weapons and missile that conflict. Shateris presence in Syria also
facility. Al Safir is located thirty kilometers east raises broader questions about how Syria fits
of Aleppo and houses a Scud missile base, into Irans global force projection strategy. A
missile storage, chemical weapons production, forthcoming paper published by AEIs Critical
and weaponization and testing facilities.58 The Threats Project and the Institute for the Study
facility is known to have had an Iranian presence of War will address the depth of Iranian
on site before the current conflict broke out.59 involvement in Syria and the implications of
By February, the base was in danger of being the difficulties the Syrian regime is facing for
overrun. Syrian rebels captured the Assad Iranian regional and global strategy.
regimes Jarrah military base in Aleppo province
39
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86_%D8%A7%D8%B2_%
APPENDIX NOTES
D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA_%D8%B1%DB%
8C%DB%8C%D8%B3_%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA_%
1. Martyrdom of the head of the Lebanon Reconstruction committee D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C
by the Zionist regimes mercenaries, ABNA, February 13, 2013. 12. Reflection by world media on the martyrdom of Hassan Shateri,
Available in Persian: http://abna.co/data.asp?lang=1&id=390561 Javan, February 16, 2013. Available in Persian: http://www.javanonline.
2. The Supreme Leaders Representative to the Quds Force, Ali Shirazi, ir/vdcjv8eituqevyz.fsfu.txt
said on February 16, The enemies know that we will quickly take 13. Details of the assassination in Aleppo of the head of the Iranian
revenge from Israel for the martyrdom of Hassan Shateri. reconstruction committee in Lebanon, Blogh, February 13, 2013.
Representative of the Supreme Leader: We will quickly take Available in Persian: http://www.blogh.ir/post-11900/
revenge from Israel for Martyr Shateri, Arna News, February 14. Two other reports soon after claimed that Shateri had been killed by
16, 2013. Available in Persian: http://arnanews.ir/index. Israeli mercenaries in Aleppo, though it seems now that these sources
php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1421:%D9%86%D9%85% may have assumed that he had been targeted in Aleppo since the exact
D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%87-%D9%88%D9% location of his death was not given.
84%DB%8C%E2%80%8C%D9%81%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%
87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C- Details of the assassination in Aleppo of the head of the Iranian
%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85- reconstruction committee in Lebanon, Blogh, February 13, 2013.
%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF- Available in Persian: http://www.blogh.ir/post-11900/
5. Behind the curtain of the assassination of Shateri, in the words Explaining the details of Commander Shateris martyrdom in Lebanon
of the Iranian ambassador, ABNA, February 18, 2013. Available in in the words of the Iranian ambassador in Lebanon, ABNA, February
Persian: http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=1&Id=392005 18, 2013.
Explaining the details of Commander Shateris martyrdom in 17. Saeed Kamali Dehghan, Elite Iranian general assassinated near
Lebanon in the words of the Iranian ambassador in Lebanon, Syria-Lebanon border, The Guardian, February 14, 2013.
ABNA, February 18, 2013. Available in Persian: http://abna.ir/data. 18. Rebels: Iranian official killed in airstrike on Syria, YNet
asp?lang=1&id=392119 News, February 14, 2013. Available: http://www.ynetnews.com/
6. Rebels: Iranian official killed in airstrike on Syria, YNet articles/0,7340,L-4345171,00.html
News, February 14, 2013. Available: http://www.ynetnews.com/ 19. Israel on global alert after killing Irans fox, The Sunday Times,
articles/0,7340,L-4345171,00.html February 24, 2013. Available: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/
7. Martyrdom of the head of the Lebanon Reconstruction committee news/world_news/Middle_East/article1220354.ece
by the Zionist regimes mercenaries, ABNA, February 13, 2013. 20. Ibid.
8. Picture / the moment that Shateri kissed the Supreme Leaders 21. America is Seeking Syrian Destruction and Implementing Israeli
hand, ABNA, February 15, 2013. Available in Persian: http://abna. Plan. alAlam Network, November 4, 2012. Available: http://fa.alalam.
ir/data.asp?lang=1&id=391035 ir/news/391464
Picture / Commander Hajj Hassan Shateri salutes Ahmadinejad, Israel Arms Syrian Extremist Groups. ABNA, November 11, 2012.
ABNA, February 15, 2013. Available in Persian: http://www.abna.ir/ Available http://www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=1&Id=36401
data.asp?lang=1&Id=391089
Irans foreign minister accused Israel of being behind a conspiracy
Picture / Final images of the Commander Martyr Hajj Hassan against Syria, CNN, July 29, 2012. Available: http://www.cnn.
Shateris funeral, ABNA, February 15, 2013. Available in Persian: com/2012/07/29/world/meast/syria-unrest
http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=1&id=391165
22. Picture / Final images of the Commander Martyr Hajj Hassan
9. About the Ahlul Bayt News Agency, ABNA, September 21, 2007. Shateris funeral, ABNA, February 15, 2013.
Available in Persian: http://abna.ir/list.asp?lang=1&gId=2418
23. Ibid.
10. Hamas and Hezbollah are children of the Iranian Revolution,
Etemad, May 25, 2008. Available in Persian : http://www.magiran. 24. Mourning ceremony for Martyr Shateri in Qom occurred,
com/npview.asp?ID=1627811 ABNA, March 8, 2013. Available in Persian: http://abna.ir/data.
asp?lang=1&Id=398184
11. The Iranian embassy in Lebanon informs of the martyrdom of
the head of the Iranian Committee for the Reconstruction of Southern 25. Funeral for Martyr Hassan Shateri was held, IRNA, February 14,
Lebanon, IRNA, February 14, 2013. Available in Persian: http://irna. 2013. Available in Persian: http://irna.ir/fa/News/80544534/%D8%
ir/fa/News/80544041/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D8%A7/%D
B%8C/%D8%B3%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA_%D8% 9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%85_%D8%AA%D8%B4%
40
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
30. Ibid. Photo report of mourning ceremony for Shateri, Noor Portal,
February 19, 2013. Available in Persian: http://noorportal.net/news/
31. Engineer Hessam, Habilian, February 21, 2013. Available shownews.aspx?id=79897
in Persian: http://www.habilian.ir/fa/201302214459/human-r
ights/%D9%85%D9%87%D9%86%D8%AF%D8%B3- Photo report: Funeral for Commander Martyrs Hassan Shateri in
%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85.html Semnan, Arsh News, February 15, 2013. Available in Persian: http://
arshnews.ir/vdchmwnx.23nwidftt2.html
32. Ibid.
Photo report: A special visit by Sheikh Nabil Qaouk with friends of
33. Martyr Shateri went wherever he was need by the Islamic Martyr Shateri, ABNA, February 21, 2013. Available in Persian: http://
Revolution, Fars News, February 21, 2013. Available in Persian: www.abna.ir/data.asp?lang=1&id=393099
http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13911203000769
Photo report: Mourning ceremony for Shateri in Tehrans al Rasoul
34. Ibid. Mosque, ABNA, February 21, 2013. Available in Persian: http://abna.
35. Iran To Build 100 Schools In Lebanon, IRNA, October 13, ir/data.asp?lang=1&Id=393084
2006. Available on World News Connection. 45. Photo report: A special visit by Sheikh Nabil Qaouk with friends
36. Fact Sheet: U.S. Treasury Department Targets Irans Support for of Martyr Shateri, ABNA, February 21, 2013.
Terrorism Treasury Announces New Sanctions Against Irans Islamic Robert Rabil, Hezbollah: Lebanons Power Broker, The Journal of
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force Leadership, U.S. Department International Security Affairs, Fall 2008.
of the Treasury, August, 3 2010. Available: http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg810.aspx 46. Photo report: Mourning ceremony for Shateri in Tehrans al Rasoul
Mosque, ABNA, February 21, 2013.
37. U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Jihad al Bina in
February 2007 for deceptive practices in its fundraising efforts for 47. Hojjat al-Eslam Panahian: The function of velayat-e faghih in
Hezbollah. According to the designation, In cases when intended society is being explained, ISNA, November 8, 2013. Available in
solicitation targets were thought to object to the groups relationship Persian: http://isna.ir/fa/news/91081811278/%D8%AD%D8%A
with Hizballah and the Iranian government, the organization employed C%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%84%
deceptive practices, applying in the name of proxies not publicly linked D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%BE%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%87%DB
to Hizballah. As of 2009, Jihad al Bina was run by Hashem Safi al Din, %8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%A-
a member of Hezbollahs Executive, Jihad, and Shura councils. Safi al 9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-
Din is also a maternal cousin of Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General %D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-
Hassan Nasrallah. %D9%81%D9%82%DB%8C%D9%87
41
Iranian Strategy in Syria | Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, Sam Wyer | May 2013
Selection of the Ammar Base Board, Tabnak, April 16, 60. Syrian rebels capture military airport near Aleppo:
2011. Available in Persian: http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news opposition, Reuters, February 12, 2013. Available: http://
/158727/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8 www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-syria-crisis-airport-
%A7%D8%A8-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA- idUSBRE91B0F120130212
%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3%D9%87-%D9%82
Rebels seize most of army base in north Syria, NGO says, AFP,
%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%AF%D8%A7%D9%87-
February 13, 2013. Available: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/
%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1
nowsyrialatestnews/rebels-rebels-seize-most-of-army-base-in-north-
48. Panahian: Shater was no less than Mughniyeh, Raja News, syria-ngo-says
February 14, 2013. Available in Persian: http://rajanews.com/detail.
61. Ibid.
asp?id=150462
Elizabeth OBagy, The Free Syrian Army, forthcoming from the
49. Ibid.
Institute for the Study of War .
50. Ceremony of Hajj Ahmad Matousalian statue unveiling by
62. Syria welcomes 13 IRGC missile commanders, Mashregh News,
Martyr Shateri, ABNA, February 18, 2013. Available in Persian:
August 12, 2012. Available in Persian: http://www.mashreghnews.
http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=1&id=392009
ir/fa/news/145419/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%
51. Who is the new IRGC Tehran commander? Khabar, D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D
December 24, 2011. Available in Persian: http://www.khabaronline. B%8C%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D8%B2-
ir/detail/190855 13-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-
% D 9 % 8 5 % D 9 % 8 8 % D 8 % B 4 % DA % A 9 % D B % 8 C -
52. Martyr Mughniyehs father in Iran, IRDC, February 20, 2013.
% D 8 % B 3 % D 9 % B E % D 8 % A 7 % D 9 % 8 7 -
Available in Persian: http://www.irdc.ir/fa/content/27435/default.
%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3
aspx
Syria has expanded chemical weapons supply with Irans
Mourning Ceremony for Martyred Commander Shateri, Nedaye
help, documents show, The Washington Post, July 27, 2012.
Enghelab, February 20, 2013. Available in Persian: http://www.
Available: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-07-27/
nedayeenghelab.com/vgla0in0.49n0m4hkk6514.,.html
world/35489623_1_chemical-weapons-chemical-plants-president-
53. Shirazi: Martyr Shateri went to Lebanon in service of bashar
Hezbollah and the Islamic community, Fars News, February
20, 2013. Available in Persian: http://farsnews.com/newstext.
php?nn=13911201000682
Mourning ceremony for Shateri occurred in Tehran, Mehr News,
February 20, 2013. Available in Persian: http://mehrnews.com/
detail/News/2001473
54. Funeral for Commander Shateri in Semnan, Tabnak,
February 15, 2013. Available in Persian: http://www.tabnak.
ir/fa/news/302845/%D8%AA%D8%B4%DB%8C%DB
%8C%D8%B9-%D9%BE %DB%8C%DA %A 9%D8%B1-
%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-
%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B1%DB%8C-
%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86
Quds Force Deputy Commander: Martyr Shateri improved
the damaged areas of Lebanon, Fars News, February 15,
2013. Available in Persian: http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.
php?nn=13911127000548
55. Martyr Shateri went wherever he was need by the Islamic
Revolution, Fars News, February 21, 2013.
56. Shateris family visits with the Supreme Leader, ABNA,
February 19, 2013.
57. Joseph Holliday, Assad: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War,
forthcoming from the Institute for the Study of War.
58. Iran aids Syrias CW programme, Janes Defense Weekly,
October 21, 2005.
Al-Safir Missile Base, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011. Available:
http://www.nti.org/facilities/483/
59. Ibid.
Syria blast linked to chemical weapons: report, AFP,
September 19, 2007. Available: http://afp.google.com/article/
ALeqM5iJugIQvDKwkxupz9eULk1ml6OZ4Q
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