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    8-3bowles and Gintis PDF

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    Daniela Paz Piña Benítez

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    ed. A. Fosey etal. Notre Da ‘of Notre Dame Press and Swxpnrnc, R. (eds) 1994, The Handbook of Economic Sacilogy, New York: Russel Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press Handbook of Economie Socio and Princeton Uni egy, and expanded eda, New York oly. Princeton, NJ: Prince K. 1994, Social Network Pres Gerth and C. Wright Mill. New York: Oxford University Press, Analyse Methods and Applications, ions. London; New Left Books. f Interpretive Sociology, Berkeley: University of LS. Zukin CHAPTER 53 THE EVOLUTIONARY BASIS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION SAMUEL BOWLES HERBERT GINTIS 1 INTRODUCTION behavior. (Bénabou tracts ( governance (Wit (Varshney 2003) have produced impo Fong 200%; Fong, Bowles, and (Stern 2003). Amon, lard model is the I i form of voluntary contribu al activities and other 18785 Wood 2003; Scott 1976), the adherence to sot Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998), and the Harding 1978; When one is motivated references ate ater regard those who violate norms ate casey ring and sl ea ease) the acon te adopted in economics and deck enero behavior as “ration And sele-egarding petro on theory, raved on a gratuit thst the po he view frequently advanced by economies eed tet, cooperative bhai cane fll eaplinedon te ae re of interactions and the 4 cooperating group Me sho te ‘tong influences on behaves * concer forthe wellbeing of ote rrbaton. We review recent behavioral exp Sent thes ed soil pefrencs nd he meaner in we 8 minority of individuals with social preferences cr: dens behavior (see Bowles and Gintis -2005b; Gintis et al. 2005; a @ more extensive review of this. evidence). ° istence of ly affect group and Henrich et a. 2004 for ESM MERBERTGINTIS 955, The second is the puzzle of how these social preferences could have evolved by ansmission and natural see th. The puzzle arises because the preferences are often in one’s group while entailing costs—and altruistic behaviors will be in most evolutionary processes that favor higher payoff types. Our trea topics is necessarily cursory, drawing extensively on work presented mote fully in Bowles and Gi etal (2005), and Hen (2004) 2 THE COOPERATIVE SPECIES Cooperation among humans is unique in nature, extending to a large number of als and taking a vast array of forms. By cooperation we mean beneficial y self-regarding preferences. In this case, cooperation is a form of what Il mutualism, namely an activity that confers net benefits both on the biologists actor and on others. this case coopera ie cooperation, tives were nay also incur net costs to the individual constitutes a form of altruism. In contrast to mutual altruistic cooperation would not be undertaken by an individual whose entirely self-regarding and thus did not take account of the effects of one’s actions on others. cooperation in humans relative to other the high frequency of alteu plausible explanation ist ies and that strongly promote our relative reproductive fitness, Thus we seek an mn of cooperation that works for humans, but which, because it involves ue to humans, does not work for other species, or works » and physical capac- the emergence norms and the capaci asethnicity and linguistic differences, ‘g20ups. Also important is the unique human capacity to use projectile weapons, @ consequence of which sto lower the cost of pu and to render intergroup conflicts more lethal. Tus, our account reconsideration of the canonical ly conflicts among 954 THE BVOLUTIONARY BASIS OF CoLLECTIVE ACTION REGINTIS 955 ‘more than isinvoled The extaordinary level of. iety cannot be u selection ‘canonical economic ler which assisting another would be r sufficient to make mutual assistance a for uded an extend dispersal so that groups re The regul ! norms and institutions plays no ess 4 derstanding how the t regulate behaviors among non-kin affect the rewards and me, mutual dependence, and other re ‘main together, extended periods of parental care, attenuated dominance hierarchies, and frequent combat with conspecifics and predators. Foraging bands of humans, he pointed out, exhibit all ofthese conditions. Michael Taylor (1976) and Robert Axelrod and Wil ton (1981) subseq theory of repeated games. In economics, ied ssongasimeracoware cece ob epente wait een) sb her mn snd inddare nt tv npn Poker ad Makin as Fader the individual S : many inper sions tha son copeton nang e clntedaconcnrtben fies mince an den ote caleba so themosend ee tnd eqn wae mona ea Our reas is discis eaten c that oe ‘among very large numbers of people who do not share the fe common knowledge of one In fact, the scope of application of the he forms of cooperation we sck fol theorem is quite restricted, especially n groups of any significant size, once the istorical accounts, and behavioral m of cooperation is posed in an evolutionary setting noise” arising fo threatened, and cooper consistency others. uur models can account for hun ‘based simu- ‘Applausible model of cooperation must satisfy the following five conditions. First, it values consistem with what can be neces a operation under parameter snust be incentive compatible. In partcolar, those who provide the rewards and inflict inferred about the envitonmes tated by the rules for cooperation must have the motivation todo so. 1 must be dynamicaly stable 38 (the emergence of nov ‘or entail excessive efficiency losses. Third, the organizational forms and incentive mechanisms deployed in the model must reflect the types of strategic interaction and incentives widely observed in human groups. In particular, the m g10up sizes on the order oft and the incentive to punish Id reflect those deploye ld public goods game settings. ld not require extraordinary informational requirements. the model should work with plausl suppose that within a group faced by apublic goods game, there discount factors among members, and average discount factors can be high in ne periods and low in others, as the probability of group dissolution rises an which humans evolved. 3 Morvatistic CoopEraTtion ecaute mutuals cooperation wi scfreging preference as an expreton of Rotert ives the long run they bene the organi risk tt f i ae their own” (pp, 34-5). C voperatior wih atime lg Tres explanation be sustained by individuals with ent is treated in standard biological and economic mo ‘Natural selection favors these behaviors)” wrot “because in two individuals who lected over those who face drowning on vers’ interpretation, is simply symbi found favor among bioloy th the common ows that all models of coopera ategies, when played among self-intereste tions, and hence fail to solve the problem of cooperation A careful analysis lated repeated game at least one of these leractions in the relevant e rods games—food olding social norn s ms among group membe defense—rather than dyadic interact insurance, up- information sharing, and common ing cooperation related repeated game strategies increases exponen ‘group size (Boyd and Richerson 1988; Bowles and Gin reason is that instance, there ¢ redistribution in advance industrial even among those who cannot expect to be net beneficarien (Feng: nder some circumstances grouy . 1p incentives for large work teams are opportunity for reciprocation is absent and the mare so widely shared that a self-interested group member. om free ridi effort of others (Ghemawat 1995; Hansen 1997; atory and field experiments show that other: causes of cooperative behavior, even in one- regarding motives are frequently robs shot, anonymous settings. 4 Strone Reciprocity: EVIDENCE FROM Bewaviorar Experiments ‘A more direct reason for dout the interpretation that mist cooperation i mut als given bythe comping evidence tat many (petapt eed eee vas onset mption tat they are motated by elf rgding preferences. suggestive ody of evidence points te de behaviors that we ll strong repre: k situation witha predapesion to cooper behavior onthe pat of ethers by ma 1d to-cooperative his level of cooperation, gam 1997: Piecione 2002; ly and INTIS 957 jor on the part of others by retaliating against the fo himself, and even when he cannot not reasonably expect on, The strong reciprocator is thus both a ic cooperator and a conditionally altruistic punisher whose actions it from “weak” (ie, self-regarding) forms of reciprocity, such as reciprocal alte Strong reciprocity is an example of a larger clas of s0- which describe the motivations of people who care (one way the well-being of others, + the states they and others experience but also care about how the states came about In the ultimatum game, under conditions of anonymity, two players are shown 4 sum of money, say $10. One of the players, called the “proposer” to offer any number of dollars, from $1 to $10, to the second playes responder.” The proposer can make only one offer. The responder, again under sof anonymity, can either accept or reject this offer. Ifthe responder accepts 1¢ money is shared accordingly. Ifthe responder rejects the offer, both players receive nothing ‘Since the game is played only once and the players do not know each other’s iden ty a self-interested responder will accept any positive amount of money. Knowing is, a self-interested proposer will offer the min this accepted. However, when actual attained and never even approximated. In have documented, under varying conditions and lents very substantial amounts (50 per cent of th respondents frequently reject offers below thand Tietz 1990; Roth etal. 1990. ental games, some of which are 3s, given the one anonymous nature of the game, self-regarding agents would neither contribute to the common good, nor reward others for so contributing. Nor would they punish Yet, in ech game, under many different conditions and in different cultures, a considerable fraction of agents contributes, and enough agents punish fre riding that even the sef-regarding agent often contributes simply to avoid punishment, led social preferences Ir preferences were entirely self-regarding, the extent of human cooperation would indeed be puzaling. But if social preferences are common, the puzzle takes a some- what different form: how might strong reciprocity and other altruistic preferences Table 531 Seven experimental games useful for measuring soil preferences Game Definition ofthe game Reahife camp Prion =m Twi hoes pinnae apn Pisoners Two players each of whom can Production of cgath — Diem either copeat rd Fane ee Gag Ghreopeateordeee erates Gatton ug Sh choose to cooperate.“ Respracae lows ise) exchnge wou dng Communesioninreses ees i contac sae frequency of exopetin Dawes Seon operate Defect sta" cooperate Hn OSE Dee Ts Heute, 7 iss se Goods mplayer smitaneosy decide Gane bout ther contrbuton gu 9 Ogg eMC 3 808 Rennes rane ec ote foatimeceaine, are ‘retin cng aon Sen eri x acepted te proposer Broposershasa song negate saa ep ines eet compton ep tam trons responders Seong, decreases lth Schmtoerge and Schanze (92) Comer aga Dictator ~ Uke the UG but the responderChaableshrog of windfall No shrng:thetis x= 0. Onaveagepropases less Pure Game camot recta the gin ery winners hing e028 Stonguratons situs ‘pope? dcntes(S-"x,3. _ snonmousy to strange) tess expecta! soe ‘rdadils Kaenan Roca and Thaler (1986);* Camerer_ feo Thst Game. Instr hasendowment Sand Sequel exchange without Tse mpmysothng: x= 0. Onaverage y= 0.85 an wstess Tres Imatea wane octen O and bling contact ying fan’ lover isting: y =O. epy sgh kes thon DSS 115 show poste tote tree ste recees_seleson eb Toctsingn Bo Dethaut, epost, dyand an sen backany x dnd McCabe (128) Comer between and 2. iver eas taco Suyeetnrceans ym ch “employer fers wage nto Non-contract or Wk const e= 1. Employer for ineses with the wage w. Wesker change the"Wore and amouncts»—toncenfreabiy of the pay teminmum wage. Epler gay wapes theta forrecpcate Game desired eflert il € Worker petormance efor, ual of tbo Be mitinam Motes genous wees Sods of wots or see deere ofes id ow nog but wage oes {6,8 both eam noting. taped vith ¢= -incontstto Caples srr atthe an choose theo competion among appeito frye betveen and 1. Then wrote spond baino wore Epler cas eo impact on wage se Fa, reco by Wort eons cok dhe (ester ond el 198)" feng efor eat wich tty seneaus increas ine. vee Thic-garty” Aand Bplay 06. Cobsenes Sai approval of Aaocits noting toB. Creer PuismenofAishighr the sanctions Pinsent haw muchofomount Ss unaceepaletestmentoohes punishes A less Aslostes to fetrand vation of Game aoated to. Cean push A. edn eghbos. frctache (000 Song bette potent ae ety ae fe Serotes survey pape. Dente apes that introduce the respective games Source: Camerer snd Fir 2008, human history? The puzzle ic evolution favor igher levels of material success, 4 payoff monotonic dynamic is not *s and Gintis (2004) adopt just such posed especially clearly ifthe processes of cultural lbchavioral traits th We think that this assumption of what is cal entirely adequate. But presence in a popula gh levels of cooperation among group members One inition beind thes model that in Present group member whose slereguding pet Ung cmon rac hed y bing os 0g recpoctos bea the cot nto so of punbhing the shirking ofthe self mereted motos Te common enough, however, the self-interested members oe hs in re to cape punishes they ree ‘oc ee en Songer wil beet able suvie sth gap esesseeer rete verse climatic con is, In such situations, a group of s« ‘ a sul syd since xh meme wg be ca ake of abandoning the group rather than beari ea Preserve the group, moo the gal oh Since suongreciprocator enforce cooperation who ead conform to cooperati or eliminating the fitness 1 srl group siz mite ig ited migration, hed with cooperative behavior, Coop, inte capac of humans to contract grup competition and ede phenotype ingroup ths heghening the stn iportanceaftatage eos nd hence allowing individual cet bu propper ae coevolve with these supporting environ ee ith these supporting environments through a process of interdemic ater spe Alerander (978), and cultural change ( nal structures such as resource-sharing that have emerged fused repeatedly in a wide variety of ecologies during the course of 6 PRoxiMAte Motives: INTERNALIZED Norms anp Sociat EMOTIONS sanctions, value certain is nearly univers ‘enhance personal fine , work habits, and control of emotions. Cultures also widely promote that subordinate the individual to group welfare, fostering such beha honesty, fairnes, wi (Brown 1991). even a fraction of riders and other norm violators a high degree the long run. The puzzles are two: why do we int promote cooperative behaviors? Gintis (2003) provides an evolutionary model Which the capacity to internalize norms develops because this capacity enhances individual fitness ina world in which social behavior has become learned through personal experience alone. norm is fitness enhancing, then for internalization of norms is evolutionarily stable. This framework implements the suggestion in Simon (1990) norms can “hitchhike” on the general tendency of internal norms to be fitness enhancing. Pro-social emotions are physiological and psychological reactions that induce agents to engage in cooperative behaviors as we have defined them above. The pro-social emotions include some, such as shame, guilt, empathy, and sensitivity to social sanction, that induce agents to undertake constructive social interactions, and others, such as the desire to punish norm violators, that reduce free ride ing when the pro-social emotions fail to induce suficiently cooperative behavior in some fraction of members of the social group (Frank 1987; Hirshleifer 1987). Without the pro-social emotions we would all be sociopaths, and human soci ety would not exist, however strong the institutions of contract, governmental law enforcement, and reputation. Sociopaths have no mental deficit except that theit ty internalizes the norms of cooperation and punish free eration can be maintained in malize norms, and why do cultures capacity to experience shame, gu or absent, “somatic markers} that is, a bod) ute: ch a given action may signal which says: beware of danger ahead this outcome. ... the automated si thus increases the probability thet individuals will heed pain source or correct their consequences” (p. 264), Does shame serve a purpose similar to that of pain? If 8 costs, and ifthe amount of shame i c then the answer is affirmat agent experiencing it to repair such situatio optimization proces and do not do it again. Since shame is evolut led and is costly to u 8 selective advantage on those who experience it. Two types are at work here. First, shame may raise the fitness of| formation (e.g. as to how fitness reducing a particular a imperfect information-processng capacity, and/or a tendency and benefits that accrue in the future, Pr react suboptimally to social disappr brings us closer to the opti aversive stimulus that led to the stimulus, ike pain, repl lective advantage agent who has incom, ably all three conditions conspire to tion in the absence of shame, and shame im. OF course the role of shame in alerting negative consequences ure presupposes that society is organized to impose those costs on rule violators, The emotion of shame may have co evolved emotions motivating punishment of tions (the reci ‘our model). The second selective advantage to those experiencing effects of group competition, Where the e of antisocial actions will be particularly effective and asa result seldom asad Tie ‘groups in which shame is common can sus ited cost and will be more likely to spread th Bowles and Gintis 2004; ‘mizing on costly within-group punishment, While we think the evidence ame arises through the of shame is common, punishment ty function that captures five dist of the payors to ‘emotional states nwever, can identify the areas of the brain that are activated when an experimental subject is confronted with a moral dilemma or unfair treatment by another experimental ner forms of cooperative behaviors exhibits rial scientists. In the Marxian tradition, and among. anthropologists, and political scientists, the fact that in the pursuit of common objectives, even when this ss dilemma game, is frequently invoked mies. Among economists, bi y contrast, self-egarding actors will rarel ‘The study of 4 curious disparity ar many historians, sociolo people often behave pro-s involves in an n-person pr structures and t by their mods cooperate in such a inctodeloga inal adopted by conomis ‘ the more heist or stroctura :pproaches adopted by historians and many social ents ute of ecmomics. Acorn Mans cnegein coe to bent : The question needs an answer, but in light of what we now know about the 964 _THE EVOLUTIONARY BASIS OF CoLLEGTIVE ACTION fact that strong reciprocity and other in most human populations to supy settings, Rererences ‘Annev, D., Peance, D, and Sracciern, th impesfect monitoring. Econometrics, 5 RD. 1979. Biology and Human Aff of Washington Journal of Economic Litera Im and an expression of Bayes snd Hananton, W. D. 1981. The evolution of coopera 1983. A theory of compe sh A M9 among. pressure groups for repeated prisoners dilemma ing. Journal of Ezonomic Theory, 02: 40-69 The evolutionary development of morality as an effet of dominance behavior ference, Journal ofS ———_20051. Social preferences, Hono economicus, and z00n Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, o4. R. E. Goodin and C. i University Pi Gx Saraon, Band Waernono, R195. Nationalism and Ra Cambridge Univesity Press. Human Universal New York: McGraw —

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