Pant and Super

Indias non-alignment conundrum:
a twentieth-century policy
in a changing world
HARSH V. PANT AND JULIE M. SUPER
The release in 2012 of a report titled Non-alignment 2.0 brought back to the forefront
of Indian policy circles a seemingly antiquated debate.1 Yet, as any serious exami-
nation of Indian foreign policy over the past six decades will underscore, Indian
policy-makers fixation with non-alignment never really petered out. It has
remained a central component of Indian identity in global politics that is manifest
in continuities: since independence in 1947 India has been in pursuit of strategic
autonomy, a quest that in practice has led to semi-alliances fashioned under the
cover of non-alignment and shaped by regional dynamics. In this setting, the rise
of China now raises an interesting conundrum for Indian policy-makers as New
Delhi seeks to balance the benefits and risks of an increasingly assertive neighbour
and a network of alliances with like-minded countries.
This article approaches that conundrum by delineating continuities of
non-alignment, from the early roots of the policy through the Cold War era and
into the modern-day international system. The primary focus is restricted to the
role of external factors in shaping Indian policy, especially the ongoing challenges
posed by Pakistan and China, and the role of power politics in the global system.
Though domestic factors have had a significant influence on the trajectory of
Indian foreign policy, the continuities of non-alignment have prevailed through
changes in leadership and domestic vicissitudes. By exploring the foundation of
non-alignment and how India has operationalized the policy, this article maintains
that to some extent continuity will persist: India is likely to continue its rhetoric
in favour of strategic autonomy while in practice moving closer to the West and
allies of the West within the region. Yet in order to effectively balance Chinas
growing influence, India will need to be more assertive in building these alliances,
as the success of its modern-day pursuit of strategic autonomy may well rest on a
strong foundation of strategic partnerships. The coming to office in May 2014 of
the National Democratic Alliance government led by Narendra Modi has signalled
a move away from even the rhetoric of non-alignment, with significant implica-
tions for the future of Indian foreign policy.
1
Sunil Khilnani,Rajiv Kumar,Pratap Bhanu Mehta,Prakash Menon,Nandan Nilekani,Srinath Raghavan,
Shyam Saran and Siddharth Varadarajan, Non-alignment 2.0: a foreign and strategic policy for India in the twenty
first century (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2012), http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/Non
Alignment%202.0_1.pdf, accessed 6 May 2015.
International Affairs 91: 4 (2015) 747764

2015 The Author(s). International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Published by John Wiley & Sons
Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford ox4 2dq, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
INTA91_4_Fullissue.indb 747 07/07/2015 10:15:23

Harsh V. Pant and Julie M. Super
The origins of non-alignment in India

A full analysis of the many factors that contributed to the development of
non-alignment in India falls outside the scope of this article. It will suffice here to
identify three main factors to which the origins of non-alignment can be traced:
nationalist inclinations, proximity to the Soviet Union, and economic troubles on
the eve of independence.
In the early twentieth century, the Indian National Congress leaders took
the view that there were no significant external military threats to India. In
the absence of such threats, the biggest security risk was being drawn into the
conflicts of other nations, and this in turn implied that the armed forces would
be better applied to ensuring internal security than supporting a forward British
policy.2 This assessment carried over into the independence movement, forming
a pillar of the call for non-alignment. Pakistan had become a buffer between India
and Afghanistan, and India was confident it could defeat any lingering Afghan
tribal threat. Similarly, Congress did not consider China to be a serious security
concern, despite doubts among some officials.3 China was in the midst of recov-
ering from civil war, and according to Nehru offered little reason to believe in the
early 1950s that there was a dispute over their shared border or any other grounds
for imminent hostilities.4
With minimal external threats to India, the newly created state of Pakistan
was Indias dominant security concern. Tensions surrounding partition in 1947
had led to violence in divided areas and an armed conflict in Kashmir that ended
with an inconclusive UN-sponsored ceasefire in 1949. Even so, Pakistan was not
a substantial enough military threat to necessitate Indias seeking armed support
from an external power. Congress estimated that non-alignment would allow
India to devote resources to deterring threats from Pakistan while minimizing
external threats from other countries by not aggravating political or economic
differences. In addition to the general absence of provocation that would flow
from Indias pursuit of friendly policies, the political cost to a nation threatening
war with an independent and non-aligned India would be highand with negli-
gible economic return.5 Indias nationalist inclinations towards non-confrontation
would thus serve to reinforce its security.
Second, Indias proximity to the Soviet Union, in terms of interests as well
as geography, required close consideration in developing a foreign policy and
ultimately supported the adoption of non-alignment. As the worlds largest
democracy and with close links to Britain, India seemed a natural fit in the western
bloc. Yet having visited the Soviet Union in 1927, Nehru admired its successful
2
Lorne J. Kavic, Indias quest for security: defence policies, 19471965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962),
p. 21.
3
Vallabhbhai Patel warned Nehru of a united and strong China with expansionist ambitions under a cloak
of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. See Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: the history
of the worlds largest democracy (London: Macmillan, 2007), pp. 1689.
4
Jawaharlal Nehru, Changing India, Foreign Affairs 41: 3, April 1963, p. 457.
5
Chris Smith, Indias ad hoc arsenal: direction or drift in defence policy? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.
42.
748
International Affairs 91: 4, 2015
Copyright 2015 The Author(s). International Affairs 2015 The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Indias non-alignment conundrum
and rapid industrialization, and retained a positive opinion in the 1940s based on
the socio-economic progress he had witnessed earlier. Rajen Harshe identifies
this apparent contradiction in Indias domestic set-up, explaining that even in its
nascent stage, Indian development represented a mlange in which democratic
structures and a partially planned economy were combined. Given this, Harshe
maintains, India was not well positioned to decisively reject the ideology of either
Cold War camp.6 Indias geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, and to China,
acted further to inhibit any likelihood of hostility based on ideology.
The socio-economic situation in India at independence formed a third factor
underlying non-alignment. Indias economy in 1947 was stagnant. Some 60
per cent of its GDP was derived from an agricultural sector that depended on
monsoon rains and struggled to meet the demands of a growing population.7 The
condition of an already insufficient industrial sector was worsened by partition,
and the creation of Pakistan led to an influx of millions of refugees. Faced with
widespread hunger and poverty, Nehru believed that peace was a prerequisite for
development and non-alignment was a prerequisite for peace.8 By establishing
a non-threatening existence, non-alignment would theoretically allow India to
minimize defence expenditures, reduce the chances of costly conflict, and draw
on multiple sources of aid without strict preconditions. Throughout the 1950s
and 1960s, India was indeed successful in attracting financial and technical assis-
tance from a variety of industrialized countries and by 1960 had received some $70
million in support from the World Bank.9
The decision to adopt non-alignment was thus not merely an idealistic dream
of neutrality, but was rather based on a realistic assessment of Indias geopolitical
situation. Nehru intended to give India room to manoeuvre according to its own
interests rather than allowing it to become confined within the limitations of a
Cold War alliance. Hindsight reveals the consequences of this approach. Although
providing the benefits of flexibility, non-alignment gave way to an inward-looking
foreign policy that gave real credence only to Pakistan as a threat. This in turn
created a reactive foreign policy.
Non-alignment in an aligned world

In the early years of independence, non-alignment formed the foundation of
Indian foreign policy with apparent success. As intended, India was able to secure
support from both camps of the Cold War, albeit mostly in the form of diplomacy
and economic aid.
6
Rajen Harshe, Indias non-alignment: an attempt at conceptual reconstruction, Economic and Political Weekly
25: 78, 1990, pp. 399-400.
7
David M. Malone, Does the elephant dance? Contemporary Indian foreign policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011), p. 76.
8
Raju G. C. Thomas, Nonalignment and Indian security: Nehrus rationale and legacy, Journal of Strategic
Studies 2: 2, 1979, p. 158.
9
World Bank Group historical chronology, World Bank Archives, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20035657~menuPK:56307~pagePK:367
26~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html, accessed 6 May 2015.
749

The Soviet Union began a bid for friendly relations as early as 1951, with
food aid to India. This was augmented by a 1953 trade deal, with Indo-Soviet
trade reaching $1.6 million in the first year of the agreement and $94.6 million
by 1958.10 As Nikita Khrushchev rose to prominence, Soviet openness towards
India continued to grow as part of a more engaged foreign policy. During 1955
an amiable exchange of official visits took place: in the Soviet Union, enthusiastic
crowds lionized Nehru, and Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin received an equally
warm welcome in India later that year. In the course of their visit to India, the
Soviet leaders voiced support for non-alignment and notably expressed recogni-
tion of Kashmir as a part of India.11 In an apparent sign of reciprocal friendship,
India remained quiet the following year when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary
and abstained from voting on a resolution in the UN General Assembly that called
for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Non-alignment was received more coolly in Washington. American Secretary
of State Dean Acheson did not view Nehru favourably, and his successor, John
Foster Dulles, was vocal in his disdain for non-alignment, which he considered
neutralism. Dulles openly chided Indias policy in 1955, calling neutrality an
obsolete conception, and again in 1956 when he described neutrality as being
except under very exceptional circumstances ... an immoral and short-sighted
conception.12 Nevertheless, India remained important to the United States in
its efforts to curb the spread of communism, and its continued membership of
the British Commonwealth and espousal of democratic values were helpful in
assuaging western concerns. For its part, India retained hopes of a strategic relation-
ship with the United States that would benefit its own developmental ambitions
without the restraints of a formal alliance. Despite nuances of frustration, relations
between the United States and India were thus affable overall through the 1950s,
during which time the US became the largest aid donor to India.13
Yet Indias lack of formal commitment to either power was not without conse-
quence. Perhaps the greatest repercussion was the US decision to arm Pakistan
after it joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South-East
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1955. In the short term, this increased the
perceived threat from Pakistan in Indiaa perception that, in the long term, fed
an increasingly regionally focused policy centred on Pakistan.
Outside the major powers, non-alignment gave India pre-eminence among
developing countries, as reflected in the success of the 1955 Bandung Confer-
ence, which laid the groundwork for the Non-Aligned Movement and exhibited
a spirit of cooperation between China and India. The friendly air of Bandung
contributed further to the approach of mutual friendship and trust towards
China that India had pursued since the early 1950s. Chinas annexation of Tibet
10
Smith, Indias ad hoc arsenal, p. 83.
11
Guha, India after Gandhi, p. 163.
12
As quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of containment: a critical appraisal of American national security policy
during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 151; Thomas, Nonalignment and Indian
security, p. 160.
13
Ashley J. Tellis, The transforming USIndian relationship and its significance for American interests, Work-
ing Paper, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Arlington, VA, 16 Oct. 2006, pp. 12.
750

in 1951 was met with reticence in India, which tacitly recognized the move as
legitimate in a 1954 agreement with Beijing that promoted exchanges with the
Tibet region of China. In the same agreement, China and India agreed to five
principles of peaceful coexistence, or panchsheel, which included mutual respect
for territorial integrity, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs.
Nehru also pushed for Chinas international recognition and tended to downplay
the significance of Chinese border movements, despite Chinas rejection of the
1914 McMahon Line as the legitimate Indo-Chinese frontier in the latter part of
the decade.
Nehrus conciliatory policy towards China was not motivated by idealism
alone. Although it was an exchange of letters with Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai
beginning in 1958 that brought the border dispute to the fore, Nehru had taken
some steps prior to this to address a potential Chinese threat, including improve-
ments in border infrastructure, troop reinforcements, and a more direct govern-
ment role in administering border areas.14 Nehru was not opposed to the use of
force, but India was not in a position to embark on a major war, especially with
a comparatively stronger country such as China.15 Acknowledging China as a
threat would have demanded a huge increase in defence spending and necessi-
tated seeking greater support from the western bloc.16 Further complicating the
situation was the US decision to arm Pakistan. A growing threat from Pakistan
accelerated Indias perceived interest in devoting military resources to its western
border while trying to avoid hostilities on two fronts. Nehrus attempts to assuage
tensions with China were thus in accordance with a key goal of non-alignment: to
reduce the chances of hostilities for the sake of economic growth.
As it transpired, Nehru was mistaken in discounting the possibility of a major
attack from China, and Indias two-pronged approach of strategic prepared-
ness and trust, with diplomacy at the helm, ultimately proved insufficient. That
the countrys foreign policy was largely defined by, and vulnerable to, regional
dynamics within the context of Great Power politics came into sharp focus when
China invaded India in 1962.
Indias pivot
The shock of the 1962 conflict affected India deeply and called into question the
very principle of non-alignment. One of the clearest challenges was Nehrus appeal
to the United States during the conflict. At his behest, Washington provided India
with arms and ammunition, and the State Department considered imposing an
embargo on China if hostilities did not cease.17 US support to India extended
beyond the immediate conflict, moreover, with pledges of some $310 million in
grants and loans from 1962 to 1965 and another $500 million in 1964 that was to be
14
Kavic, Indias quest for security, pp. 4751.
15
Bharat Karnad, Nuclear weapons and Indian security: the realist foundations of strategy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002),
p. 166.
16
17
Jeff M. Smith, A forgotten war in the Himalayas, Yale Global, 14 Sept. 2012.
751

spread over a five-year period in support of Indias defence.18 Though the United
States stopped short of providing modern combat weapons and failed to follow
through on its 1964 pledge, American support during the conflict, subsequent
economic and food aid, and pledges of continuing assistance undermined Nehrus
policy by demonstrating overt dependence on the United States.
A second challenge arose as it became apparent that policies of friendship were
not sufficient to ensure security. Rapprochement towards China did not prevent
invasion, and friendship towards the Soviet Union produced little benefit in the
light of a military threat from China. Nehru lamented Chinas betrayal of good
faith and attributed the attack to a Chinese foreign policy based on a stark view
that the world was divided into communists and imperialists, between whom war
was inevitable.19 For him, the conflict was not a consequence of non-alignment,
but did prove that India must be prepared to fend off hostility from other nations
by building up its defence capabilities, which in the short term would require
assistance from other countries. For many members of parliament, however, the
future value of non-alignment was dubious, and members of opposition parties
and Congress alike voiced support for Indias attachment to the US-led military
bloc.20
These challenges ultimately did not terminate Indias commitment to non-
alignment, but did begin to redefine it. Recognizing the limits of friendship, Nehru
increased defence spending as part of Indias development objectives. In addition
to American pledges, India garnered support from the United Kingdom, Canada,
France and Australia, and increased defence imports from the Soviet Union.21
New Delhi applied these procurements to its 1964 rearmament plan with an eye
on building up defences against the Chinese threat, which intensified with Chinas
first nuclear test in 1964, while also working to resolve the Kashmir dispute as
part of a broader effort to assure President Ayub Khan that rearmament was not a
measure of hostility towards Pakistan.22 In a broader sense, the shock of the war
showed that India could no longer fully avoid taking sides. Domestic limitations
meant that substantial external support was necessary for security.
Taking sides
IndiaUS cooperation was short-lived, and Pakistan and China became key factors
in Indias move towards the Soviet Union. An early driver was the 1965 war, in
which Pakistan used American-supplied arms against India, leading to thousands
of casualties on each side. The conflict added to growing Indian disenchantment
with US defence cooperation. After 1962, US military aid to India had become
contingent upon its settling the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, and American
18
K. Subrahmanyam, Indian security: the absence of conceptual evolution, India International Centre Quarterly
23: 1, 1996, p. 84.
19
Nehru, Changing India, pp. 45860.
20
Thomas, Nonalignment and Indian security, p. 162.
21
Smith, Indias ad hoc arsenal, p. 81; Soviet data based on SIPRI trade registers, http://armstrade.sipri.org/
armstrade/page/trade_register.php, accessed 6 May 2015.
22
These efforts ultimately ended with Nehrus death in 1964. See Guha, India after Gandhi, pp. 34761.
752

defence inspectors were placed on the ground to ensure American-supplied equip-
ment did not end up along the Pakistani front.23 Frustrations deepened when
border skirmishes in early 1965 elicited no punitive action by the United States
and plummeted with the subsequent onslaughts of August and September.24
A 1965 American arms embargo against both India and Pakistan added to this
deterioration, as did post-conflict efforts by the United States to make vital food
aid to India contingent upon government-led agricultural reforms and efforts to
temper criticism of American policy in Vietnam.25 The continuation of economic
aid from the United States, paired with an unwelcome Soviet warming towards
Pakistan amid crumbling Sino-Soviet ties, kept India manoeuvring between
the two superpowers through the 1960s, but the gap between New Delhi and
Washington became noticeably wider.
In 1971 Indias shift away from non-alignment accelerated as relations between
India and the United States reached a nadir. A sudden American rapprochement
with China and the prospect of a third war with Pakistan in response to a military
crackdown in East Pakistan prompted India to enter a 20-year treaty of peace,
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. In immediate terms, the treaty
allowed India to take action in East Pakistan by providing security against Chinese
intervention and a shield from international censure in the United Nations Security
Council.26 More broadly, the treaty signalled a decisive move away from the West.
American support for Pakistan in the subsequent 1971 war, though limited, drove
the wedge between India and the United States deeper, and following the Indian
victory in East Pakistan, American influence on the subcontinent waned.
Though not an explicit military alliance, the Indo-Soviet treaty was a sharp
departure from non-alignment. It stated that neither country would enter into a
military alliance or hostile actions against the other. If either side were subjected
to an attack or threat, the two countries agreed to enter into mutual consulta-
tions in order to remove such a threat and to take appropriate effective measures to
ensure peace and security of their countries, hinting that the treaty allowed room
for a military alliance in any circumstances that constitute a threat to peace.27
Equivocal language allowed India to maintain a semblance of non-alignment, but
the treaty in effect created deterrence against any form of a USChinaPakistan
detente and rendered India increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for its
defence capabilities.
India used its move towards the Soviet Union to secure its place as a regional
power-broker. The treaty paved the way for India to successfully engage Pakistan
militarily and divide the state with the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Soviet
deterrence, paired with its veto of resolutions in the Security Council aimed at
23
Subrahmanyam, Indian security, p. 84; Thomas, Nonalignment and Indian security, p. 162.
24
Subrahmanyam, Indian security, p. 85.
25
Tellis, The transforming USIndian relationship, p. 2; Office of the Historian, USAID and PL480, 1961
1969, US Department of State, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/pl-480, accessed 6 May 2015.
26
Sumit Ganguly, Wars without end: the Indo-Pakistani conflict, Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 541: 1, Sept. 1995, Small wars, p. 175.
27
Ashok Kapur, Indo-Soviet treaty and the emerging Asian balance, Asian Survey 12: 6, 1972, p. 464.
753

halting military hostilities, allowed this to be very much a bilateral move.28 Having
secured assurance of continuing protection under the treaty, Indias success in
the conflict demonstrated New Delhis ability to manipulate power politics to
increase its regional clout. This push to build security in its immediate neighbour-
hood without the interference of external powers became a central component of
Indias diplomatic efforts after the success of the 1971 war.29
Closer ties with the Soviet Union also ensured a reliable supplier of defence
equipment. There is marked continuity in this aspect of the relationship, which
was sustained through leadership changes and periods of warmer and cooler
relations. Under Indira Gandhi in the 1970s, concerns about overdependency
and the quality of products imported from the Soviet Union were offset by
depleted foreign exchange reserves, which left little alternative for procurement.30
Increasing efforts to diversify supply under the Janata government in the late 1970s
brought more Soviet offers, and the reversal of US sanctions against Pakistan
following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan tempered Indian objections to
the invasion itself. With renewed American support after 1979, Pakistan was able
to revitalize its nuclear programme and military modernization, which provoked
an unprecedented level of Indian arms purchases from France and the Soviet
Union, including an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1980 for the transfer
of $1.63 billion in defence equipment to India.31 Rajiv Gandhis election after his
mothers assassination renewed interest in reducing dependency on Soviet arms
and initiated a warmer tone towards the United States. Yet his defence policy
was still marked by continuity; economic limitations continued to favour Soviet
offers, and the challenge of shifting to western suppliers proved difficult to meet,
owing in part to technology gaps and continuing deliveries of Soviet equipment
ordered by previous administrations.32 Adding to the continuity of Indo-Soviet
relations throughout the Cold War were other measures of collaboration, including
Soviet support for Indias economic plans, favourable oil prices, the launching of
two satellites for India, generous loan rates and a willingness to accept goods in
exchange for military equipment.33
Yet even at the zenith of relations with the Soviet Union, India retained space
for leverage by reaching out to the West. By the 1980s, this was accompanied
by an improvement in political relations. This was partially a result of Ronald
Reagans efforts to bridge the divide between the United States and India as part
of a broader strategy to undercut Soviet influence.34 But there was also a growing
overlap of interests. Although Rajiv Gandhis ability to shift away from Soviet
dependency was limited, the US welcomed his more liberal economic policies,
and there were elements of agreement regarding Pakistan, especially following the
28
Ganguly, Wars without end, p. 175.
29
Kapur, Indo-Soviet treaty, pp. 4712.
30
Smith, Indias ad hoc arsenal, pp. 956.
31
Smith, Indias ad hoc arsenal, pp. 10911; Subrahmanyam, Indian security, p. 94.
32
33
Harshe, Indias non-alignment, p. 402; Santosh K. Mehrotra, India and the Soviet Union: trade and technology
transfer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 668.
34
Tellis, The transforming USIndian relationship, p. 2.
754

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and growing concerns over a possible nuclear
weapon. The Indo-US relationship remained tenuous until the end of the Cold
War, owing to lingering suspicions of loyalties and intentions, and continuity
in relations with the Soviet Union ultimately prevailed, given Indias persisting
regional concerns and economic limitations. But the warming in relations with
America was indicative of a gradual shift away from dependence on the Soviet
Union, which accelerated with the Soviet collapse in 1991.
Looking East, leaning West

The loss of its key patron and economic distress in the 1990s pushed India towards
the economic liberalization initiated under Rajiv Gandhi and contributed to
closening ties with Washington. With economic liberalization came opportuni-
ties for greater foreign investment and an effort to diversify defence relationships.
By the end of the 1990s, India had secured defence agreements with Italy, South
Africa, the UK and the US, and between 2000 and 2008 New Delhi would secure
another 19 defence agreementsa staggering change from the seven total agree-
ments secured in the first 53 years of independence.35 Pakistans slip from its privi-
leged position in American foreign policy upon the collapse of the Soviet Union
also injected energy into bilateral Indian ties with the United States, but this
was countered by the gap between the two countries in their stances on nuclear
proliferation.36 The Clinton administrations push for non-proliferation and
Indias reluctance to oblige led to mounting vexations on both sides that peaked
with Indias rejection of the US-led Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 and
a nuclear weapon test in 1998. In a strange twist, it was Pakistan that pushed
India and the United States back together through its incursions into Kargil in
1999. This marked the first occasion on which Washington supported India against
Pakistan and was followed by a momentous visit to India by President Clinton in
2000the first by an American president in more than two decades.
Bilateral cooperation accelerated in the 2000s as interests converged. The
September 2001 attacks on the United States and the attack on the Indian parlia-
ment by Pakistani gunmen later that year spurred Indo-US cooperation on
counterterrorism measures, leading to regional security dialogues and US pressure
on Pakistan to curb cross-border attacks. Despite a massive upsurge in American
aid to Pakistan as part of the US-led war on terror, that relationship remained
rocky and did not substantially hinder a closer relationship with India. In part, this
demonstrates a shift in US interests. Conflict with Pakistan would devastate Indias
economy and thus undercut increasing US interest in India as a balance to China.37
More broadly, the closer USIndian relationship is a reflection of increasing US
support for India as a regional power-broker, and of progress in cooperation over
35
Brian K. Hedrick, Indias strategic defense transformation: expanding global relationships, Letort Paper,
Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2009, pp. 1112, 42.
36
Tellis, Transforming USIndian relationship, p. 2.
37
For more on this, see Daniel S. Markey, Reorienting US Pakistan strategy: from Af-Pak to Asia, Special Report no.
68 (New York and Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014).
755

Indias nuclear programme. The year 2005 marked a significant turning point in
this relationship. In the course of that year, India and the US finalized the Next
Steps in Strategic Partnership initiative, which expanded bilateral cooperation
and commerce in space, civilian nuclear activities and high-technology trade,
and signed a landmark defence agreement calling for bilateral military exercises,
an expansion of two-way defence trade and an increase in intelligence-sharing.
Perhaps the most substantial pivot came with the unveiling of a new framework
for nuclear cooperation in 2005, which led to the 2008 USIndia Civil Nuclear
Agreement and reversed Indias status as a nuclear pariah.38
The enthusiasm of the 2000s waned somewhat at the turn of the decade, but
bilateral relations have retained importance on both sides, particularly with the
US strategic pivot to Asia under the Obama administration. Despite some vacil-
lations in practice, the policy is directed at prioritizing a balance of power in
Asia by strengthening existing alliances and expanding partnerships throughout
the region. The strategy points to India as a pillar, with hopes that it will be a
regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean
region.39 This support for Indias rise and regional leadership has helped revive
the bilateral momentum of the previous decade. The two nations have continued
to expand defence and diplomatic cooperation, including ongoing trilateral talks
with Japan and a series of meetings under the USIndia Strategic Dialogue, which
was initiated in 2010 as a response to the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai and has
reinforced cooperation across a range of security issues.
At the same time, Indian policy-makers have continued to place emphasis on
strategic autonomy, a relic of non-alignment, as a means of mitigating the poten-
tial costs of a strategic partnership with the United States. This balancing act
is evident in relations with China: despite interest in cooperation with the US,
India stands to benefit from an economic partnership with China and wishes to
avoid antagonizing its more powerful neighbour by serving as the linchpin of the
US pivot to Asia, which the Chinese broadly perceive as a measure of contain-
ment.40 There is also lingering concern over US reliability, not only owing to its
relationship with Pakistan but also because of its vulnerability to China during the
financial crisis of 20082009.41 Likewise, India has balanced its still strong defence
relationship with Russia against its interests in cooperation with the United States.
New Delhi has sided with Russia, China and Iran in avoiding interference in Syrias
civil war and, despite voicing concern over the spread of the Islamic State and its
medieval ideology, has continued to promote a Syrian-led process of institution-
building. India has similarly aligned itself with Russia over the latters actions
38
For a discussion of the USIndia civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement, see Harsh V. Pant, The USIndia
nuclear pact: policy, process, and great power politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
39
US Department of Defense, Sustaining US global leadership: priorities for 21st century defense (Washington DC,
2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf, accessed 6 May 2015.
40
This view was expressed by several Indian policy-makers whom the authors interviewed in New Delhi (Nov.
Dec. 2014).
41
A detailed examination of how India has responded to the US pivot to the AsiaPacific region can be found
in Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, Indian foreign policy responds to the US pivot, Asia Policy, no. 19, Jan.
2015, pp. 89114.
756

in Ukraine through equivocation and a lack of support for US measures against
Russia, staying notably silent on the matter of territorial integrity.42 Finally, there
is a more general concern in India that the countrys capabilities in the event of a
conflict with Pakistan may be limited by overreliance on the US, which continues
to extend defence aid to Pakistan despite a drop after 2011.43
Despite this hesitancy, India is facing a major shift in power dynamics with
the rise of China that adds impetus to its pursuit of constructive relations with
the United States and Americas Asian allies. The perceived threat from China is
multidimensional. First, the border dispute between the two countries remains
unresolved. There was progress on this front with the signing of a defence cooper-
ation agreement in October 2013, which called for communication about border
movements and restraint in situations of conflict. Yet Indias decision to add
40,000 troops along the Line of Actual Control in 2013 and a border stand-off in
September 2014 suggests that the success of any dialogue has been limited. After
tensions cooled, India unveiled plans to invest $6.5 billion in the construction of a
road along the disputed border. Presented as a means to connect remote commu-
nities, the project may also aid defence movements and add to ongoing tensions.44
A second concern for India stems from Chinas increasing presence in its neigh-
bourhood, where smaller states looking to balance Indias regional hegemony,
such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan, have welcomed Chinese
soft power and investments. This has led to a sense of encirclement by China
in Indias immediate vicinity. While expanding its regional influence, China has
also demonstrated assertiveness in territorial disputes, as seen in its confrontation
with Japan over the Senkaku Islands in 2014. Meanwhile, China and Russia have
stepped up cooperation, especially in the light of a growing wedge between the
United States and Russia over Syria and Ukraine.
Of particular concern to India is Beijings burgeoning relationship with Pakistan.
China has replaced the United States as Pakistans leading trading partner, with
estimated bilateral trade reaching more than $15 billion in 2013 and reports of
deals totalling $34 billion in the pipeline.45 China has also made strides in Pakistan
through investment projects such as a port at Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, which
opened in 2007 with some $200 million of Chinese funding. The operation of the
port was transferred to China Overseas Port Holdings in 2013, adding to concern
at its role as part of a larger Chinese network of strategic bases and diplomatic
ties reaching from the Middle East to the South China Sea. China is Pakistans
top supplier of weapons, selling 51 per cent of the weapons Islamabad imported
between 2010 and 2014.46 Chinese investments in Pakistans nuclear infrastructure
42
Tanvi Madan, Indias reaction to the situation in Ukraine: looking beyond a phrase, Brookings Institution,
14 March 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/03/14-ukraine-india-madan, accessed
6 May 2015.
43
Based on authors discussions with members of the Indian foreign policy bureaucracy in New Delhi (Nov.
Dec. 2014).
44
Subir Bhaumik, Why India is planning a new road near the China border, BBC News, 16 Oct. 2014.
45
Faseeh Mangi and Kamran Haider, Xi postpones $34 billion Pakistan trip amid protests, Bloomberg, 6 Sept.
2014.
46
Reuters, PM approves deal to buy eight Chinese submarines, 2 April 2015.
757

add to Indian apprehension. China is a key enabler of Pakistans nuclear programme
and has repeatedly demonstrated willingness to violate its obligations as a member
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) by providing Pakistan with nuclear
reactors, claiming that its support to Pakistan predates Chinese NSG membership
and is thus acceptable under a grandfather clause. Adding to general concerns
over advances in Pakistans nuclear capability is the troubling reality that its facili-
ties are expanding in an unstable environment where they are subject to attacks
by militant groups.
India has long aspired to rise as a major player in the global system and is, in
some ways, positioned to do so as an economic giant, a responsible nuclear weapon
state and a dominant presence in the Indian Ocean. But India is unlikely to be able
to balance Chinas rise on its own, at least in the short to medium term. Chinas
GDP far outstrips that of India and has consistently recorded higher percentages
of growth. This gap carries over into defence spending and capabilities. Though
estimated Indian defence spending in 2013 was 2.4 per cent of its GDP as opposed
to Chinas 2.1 per cent, the gap in GDP means that China allocated well over three
times as much money as India to defence.47 Moreover, India has been hobbled by
domestic policy paralysis and shaky relationships with bordering states. In this
context, a strategy that focuses on engaging China economically while relying
on a quasi-alliance with the United States may not be sufficient. India will need a
more comprehensive strategy to balance China and foster its own rise by stepping
up wide-ranging cooperation with other regional players.
Indias Look East policy, initiated in 1991, is an important step in this direc-
tion and has gained momentum as Asian states have turned to India as a potential
counterbalance to China.48 India has increased its presence and role in regional
organizations such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of
which it became a full dialogue partner in 1995 and a strategic partner in 2012.
Indias bilateral trade with ASEAN increased from $2.9 billion in 1993 to $71.8
billion in 2012, during which time the partnership also expanded to include
dialogue and cooperation in the security and political fields.49
India has also made strides in regional bilateral cooperation. New Delhi has
stepped up its role as a provider of military equipment in the region, especially
evident in increasing sales to Indonesia and Vietnam, and has conducted joint
military exercises with a majority of regional players while deepening naval ties
with countries that share concern over piracy and Chinese influence in the Indian
Ocean and South China Sea. Recent years have transformed Indias relationship
with Japan into a robust strategic partnership with substantial efforts in maritime
cooperation, and have also brought India and South Korea together in tighter
47
Based on World Bank GDP and military spending data, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.
XPND.GD.ZS, accessed 8 May 2015.
48
For a more detailed discussion, see Harsh V. Pant, China rises, India ponders: Indias Look East policy gathers
momentum, Fearless Nadia occasional papers vol. 1 (Melbourne: Australia India Institute, 2013), http://www.
aii.unimelb.edu.au/sites/default/files/China%20Rises,%20India%20Ponders.pdf, accessed 6 May 2015.
49
Overview of ASEANIndia dialogue relations, Jan. 2015, http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/
india/item/overview-of-asean-india-dialogue-relations, accessed 6 May 2015.
758

cooperation, again with strong emphasis on building naval capabilities.50 India
has also deepened bilateral economic and defence cooperation elsewhere. In states
such as Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines, maritime disputes with
China have helped energize interest in India as a regional partner. In Australia,
relations with India were boosted by former Prime Minister Julia Gillards state
visit in 2012, during which she named India as an integral part of Australias future
in Asia.51 The two nations have demonstrated deepening trade ties and amplified
maritime cooperation through joint exercises and dialogue.
In sum, though India continues to attach importance to strategic autonomy, it
has taken substantial steps towards the United States and Americas allies in the
AsiaPacific region. With China rising in prominence on the global scene and
exerting its power in the region, these ties are growing stronger and approaching
strategic dimensions.
Echoes of the past: Non-alignment 2.0

Despite Indias clear shift towards strategic partnerships, non-alignment made
a bold re-entrance into Indian policy in 2012 with the release of Non-alignment
2.0, a document produced by prominent strategic thinkers in India that pulls
the post-Cold War threads of strategic autonomy into a full revival of Nehrus
non-alignment for modern times. The report echoes Nehru in calling for a focus
on internal development by maximizing room to manoeuvre on the global scene.
Its reasoning harks back to ideas put forth by Congress upon independence, basing
the decision to revive non-alignment on a regional threat assessment within the
context of global politics, a desire for strategic autonomy and a need to address
problems of poverty. To this end, the report calls for wide-ranging economic
engagement, the strengthening of domestic institutions, an active role in shaping
global norms and a sustained effort to avoid provoking hostility. The document
warns that although the United States may seem a likely ally, a formal alliance
risks eroding strategic autonomy, as the US can be too demanding in its friend-
ship and resentful of other attachments India might pursue.52 The essence of the
report suggests that India would benefit most from keeping equal distance from
the United States and China, pursuing friendship with each but using its potential
as a partner as leverage against both.
As in years past, the policy prescription is largely centred on China and
Pakistan. The writers rightly identify China as one of the most significant foreign
policy and security challenges facing India. They give credence to the many
potential points of conflict: the disputed border, Chinese interest in the Indian
Ocean, asymmetry in economic and trade relations, unpredictability in Sino-US
ties, and Chinese wariness over IndiaUS cooperation. And they wisely recom-
mend building up Indias naval capacity, in part by strengthening cooperation
50
Pant, China rises, India ponders, pp. 79.
51
Philip Hudson, Julia Gillard will elevate India to the highest priority for Australia, The Australian, 17 Oct.
2012.
52
Khilnani et al., Non-alignment 2.0.
759

with countervailing powers such as Indonesia, Vietnam and Australia. The
report also points to the nuclear shadow over relations between China, India
and Pakistan that raises the stakes of any escalation of hostilities and therefore,
along with Chinas focus on internal stability and economic growth, acts as a
mutual deterrent by limiting the likely scale of warfare. Thus, three of the key
recommendations are that India reallocate resources from the Pakistan border to
the Chinese border, be strategically prepared to leverage asymmetric advantages
in case of conflict, and generally avoid provoking hostility and punitive policies
from China by not moving irrevocably closer to the United States or Japan. The
reports treatment of Pakistan also evokes past notions of non-alignment in hardly
mentioning the role of outside powers. Though it mentions engagement with
China on this front, acknowledging Chinas robust friendship with Pakistan, the
report ultimately focuses on reducing the salience of terrorism through diplo-
macy, the promotion of dialogue and military exchanges, and a strengthening of
Indian police, intelligence and counterterrorism capabilities. Each is presented on
a bilateral level, implying little scope for external powers.
The report acknowledges the changing global strategic environment and
accords much significance to the rise of China, but the rhetoric and recommen-
dations are old; this manner of pushing for strategic autonomy has been evident
throughout Indias independent history. India may not be quick to drop the idea
of non-alignment, as it forms a part of its national identity. Yet this has never
entirely precluded alignments in practice, as was apparent in the 1962 war, during
the remainder of the Cold War, and even into the post-Cold War era. There will
be continuity in this sense. Even Non-alignment 2.0 encourages defence cooperation
with regional players for the sake of balancing Chinas maritime ambitions, and
since its publication in 2012 India has continued to advance its ties with the United
States and its Asian allies.
Yet Chinas remarkable rise suggests that the old practice of non-alignment will
not be sufficient. As noted, other states are looking to India to step up its role in
the region as a balance to an increasingly assertive China. It is in New Delhis own
interest to do so; but if India does step up to the plate, it will be required to make
hard decisions at timesquite contrary to the reports recommendation to avoid
sharp choices. Indeed, as Ashley Tellis has argued, Indias very strategic position
in relation to China and Pakistan makes an avoidance of sharp choices potentially
dangerous.53 Beyond this, maritime disputes flaring up in East and South-East
Asia mean that tighter security cooperation with Asian states may compel India
to articulate support for its quasi-allies, particularly as they become more central
to Indias own security policy. This should not be viewed as a loss of strategic
autonomy, but rather as an exercise of it.
In contrast to the idea put forward by Non-alignment 2.0, alignments and
strategic autonomy no longer need to be mutually exclusive in todays increas-
ingly multipolar world. In apparent recognition of this point, Narendra Modis
government has in fact initiated a departure from Indias past manner of balancing
53
Ashley Tellis, Can India revive nonalignment?, Yale Global, 28 Aug. 2012.
760

relations. Modi demonstrated assertiveness in his approach to China early in his
tenure as prime minister. During an official visit to Japan, he offered a barely
veiled criticism of China when he claimed that everywhere around us, we see
an eighteenth-century expansionist mind-set: encroaching on another country,
intruding in others waters, invading other countries and capturing territory.54
Less than a month later, he welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping to India and
described the two countries as being at the brink of great potential. During his
visit to China in May 2015, Modi openly stressed the need for China to recon-
sider its approach on some of the issues that hold us back from realizing the full
potential of our partnership and suggested that China should take a strategic
and long-term view of our relations. In his speech at Tsinghua University, Modi
went beyond the rhetorical flourishes of Sino-Indian cooperation and pointed
out the need to resolve the border dispute and in the interim, clarify the Line
of Actual Control to ensure that our relationships with other countries do not
become a source of concern for each other55. This was a significant shift in Indian
traditional defensiveness vis--vis China, underscoring a recalibration in Indias
China policy. Modi has also extended a message of confidence to South-East Asia
by rebranding Indias Look East policy as Act East, suggesting a new energy in
Indias approach to regional partnerships. Modis visit to the United States in
September 2014 rapidly brought another indication of assertiveness: he is bringing
India to the global platform by promoting its uniqueness. He gifted the Bhagavad
Gita to the American President, showcased a colourful, traditional wardrobe, and
sipped water at a White House dinner in observance of a fast, acts that seemed to
exude an image of a leader rooted in his countrys traditions, yet able to engage
confidently with the outside world.56
Adding to this new confidence is Indias clear prioritization of the Indian
Ocean region in foreign policy. During visits to the Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri
Lanka in March 2015, Modi managed to make strides in a region where in recent
years China has outpaced India in building strategically beneficial partnerships.
Among the most significant advancements were agreements for India to take a
role in developing Assumption Island in the Seychelles and the Agalega Islands in
Mauritius, both of which may help give New Delhi a strategic boost amid a strong
Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean.57
In respect of Sri Lanka, with which India has had complicated relations for
decades owing to its unsuccessful peacekeeping role in the islands civil war, Modi
made the first visit by an Indian prime minister in 28 years, and at an opportune
time. Over the past few decades, Sri Lanka has developed a distinct tilt towards
China, as evident in its reliance on Chinese support in infrastructure development
under former President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The scope of Chinas involvement is
54
Mitsuru Obe and Niharika Mandhana, India and Japan pursue closer ties to counter China, Wall Street Journal,
1 Sept. 2014.
55
Chris Buckley and Ellen Barry, Modi calls on China to rethink stances that strain ties to India, New York
Times, 15 May, 2015.
56
This perception of Modi was shared with the author (Harsh V. Pant) by a US State Department official in
Washington DC in January 2015.
57
S. K. Chatterji, Narendra Modis active Indian Ocean diplomacy, The Diplomat, 23 March 2015.
761

well demonstrated by its key role in the $1.4 billion Colombo Port City develop-
ment project. Sri Lanka has also given positive support to Chinas Maritime Silk
Road Initiative, spearheaded by Xi Jinping to build economic links throughout
South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean, and stirred concern in India by allowing
the docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo in 2014.
The election of Maithripala Sirisena as Sri Lankas president in January 2015 has
opened up an opportunity to rejuvenate ties between New Delhi and Colombo,
especially as Sirisena called for a review of Chinese investments in Sri Lanka on
suspicion of corruption and made India the destination of his first visit abroad
as president. With his timely visit in March 2015, Modi seized a chance to make
progress on this front. During his visit, the countries signed four agreements, and
Modi emphasized his wish for Indias neighbours to benefit from its economic
growth, pledging some $1.5 billion in a currency swap with Sri Lanka and more
than $300 million in support of developing the Sri Lankan railway sector. Perhaps
aware of shifting dynamics in the region and scepticism about its motives, China
has recently promoted trilateral cooperation with India in facilitating Sri Lankan
development.58
Modis assertiveness also continues to be apparent in strategic cooperation with
the United States. In addition to the successful summit in September, Obamas
participation in Indias 2015 Republic Day celebrations demonstrates a new will-
ingness by New Delhi to showcase the IndiaUS partnership on the world stage,
particularly as such an invitation is commonly reserved for Indias closest partners.
Obamas visit also brought progress in bilateral defence cooperation by finalizing
the renewal of the USIndia Defense Relationship framework for another ten
years; it will include strengthened cooperation in military-to-military and mari-
time matters and in developing new opportunities in trade and technology. Modi
has gone beyond strategic cooperation by describing India and the US as natural
allies that are linked closely through shared democratic values, the Indian diaspora,
and a convergence in world-views on a variety of situations. He explained that this
partnership should not be viewed in the context of what one can do for the other,
but on what India and the US can do together for the world.59
There remains much scope for growth in the IndiaUS partnership. India and
the United States still share an interest in the emergence of a stable Afghanistan,
and a concern about instability in Pakistan. Yet there remains a gap in views on
the issue of Pakistan, particularly as India retains its wish to minimize outside
influence in its bilateral relations with Islamabada wish that is perhaps reflected
in the near-absence of Pakistan from an almost 6,000-word joint statement from
Modi and Obama following their meeting in January 2015.60 Both America and
India would benefit from improved dialogue and engagement on this historically
58
P. S. Suryanarayana, Neighbourliness in IndiaSri Lanka tiesanalysis, Eurasia Review, 21 March 2015.
59
Nancy Gibbs, Zoher Abdoolcarim and Nikhil Kumar, Exclusive interview with Narendra Modi: We are
natural allies, Time Magazine, 7 May 2015, http://time.com/3849492/narendra-modi-interview/, accessed 9
May 2015.
60
Teresita C. Schaffer, India and its South Asian neighbours: where does the US fit in?, in The second Modi
Obama summit: building the IndiaUS partnership (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, Jan. 2015), pp. 79.
762

sensitive issue that lies at the heart of many shared interests. Adding separately to
the mounting importance of bilateral dialogue and cooperation is the emergence
of a branch of Al-Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent and the evolution of Islamic
State in Syria and Iraq over the past year. As both countries face increased threats
and the flow of citizens to these groups, there is a pressing need for close coopera-
tion in counterterrorism and intelligence, both of which have been slow-moving.61
There is little sign that closer ties with the United States have jeopardized or
will jeopardize Indias relations with Russia or China. In a meeting with Vladimir
Putin in December 2014, Modi offered reassurance that Russia would retain its
importance as a defence supplier in India, and the two states pledged to continue
working to expand bilateral trade. With China in particular, Modis confidence
has the potential to create more leverage than India has enjoyed in the past. Candid
about his concerns in respect of Chinese assertiveness in the security sphere, he has
still demonstrated keen interest in expanding economic relations; and rather than
accomplishing this by avoiding actions or rhetoric that might aggravate China, he
is positioning India to use its renewed partnerships across the global scene to make
progress in its relations with China.
As throughout its history, India has vested interests in retaining a variety of
partners, many of whom do not always see eye to eye with one another. China
has huge economic potential for India, and with a difficult neighbour to the
west, lingering tensions over Tibet, and a shared border that extends well over
2,500 kilometres, it is not in Indias interest to provoke hostility from Beijing.
But passivity is not a sufficient approach, and in the absence of a strictly bipolar
world, stronger cooperation with the United States and its allies does not preclude
deepening engagement with China. That engagement may help India emerge as a
regional interlocutor and add stability to a potentially volatile region; and indeed,
these two factors would also be in the interests of the US and its regional allies. The
Modi government is redefining strategic autonomy as an objective that is attain-
able through strengthened partnerships rather than the avoidance of partnerships.
By doing so, it seems to be underlining that in todays complicated global environ-
ment, strategic autonomy and non-alignment are not necessarily a package deal.
Conclusion
Finding an effective grand strategy inevitably requires a balancing act. Non-
alignment has been Indias answer to this challenge and an influential tenet of its
foreign and security policy since it emerged from colonization. This approach has
in the past enabled India to avoid many of the limitations and entanglements of
formal alliances; but it has also left the country in a position of shaping policy in
a reactive manner, often based on Pakistan and China.
India is now at a crossroads. Chinas rise and assertiveness as a regional and
global power and the simultaneous rise of middle powers in the region mean that
61
Bruce Riedel, Strengthening counter terrorism cooperation against growing turmoil, in The second Modi
Obama summit, pp. 435.
763

this balancing act is increasing in both complexity and importance. Chinas growth
presents great opportunities for positive engagement, but territorial disputes and
a forward policy in the region raise concerns for New Delhi, particularly in the
Indian Ocean and with Pakistan. The region itself is riddled with rivalries; a desire
to balance China may push states together, while other issues divide them. The
same complexity applies on the global level as well, as noted by a degree of unpre-
dictability in Sino-US relations.
The revival of non-alignment in 2012 recommends handling the changing
global system by pursuing friendship with, but keeping a safe distance from, major
powers while building naval cooperation with regional states. In reality, India
stands to benefit from being more assertive. Already, cooperation with regional
players is boosting its economy and defence capabilities, and as a pillar of the US
pivot to Asia, India is finding support for an increased role as a regional power-
broker. These growing partnerships do not need to bar engagement with China.
Moreover, assertiveness in regional and global relations may actually carve out
more room for India to pursue the strategic autonomy it values.
Indias rising global profile is reshaping New Delhis approach to its major
partnerships in the changing global order. Though it may not be quick to drop its
attachment to non-alignment in theory, New Delhi is showing signs of pursuing
strategic autonomy separately from non-alignment under Narendra Modi. This
separation is overdue in Indias foreign policy, and the country stands to benefit
from leveraging partnerships rather than shunning them. Under the Modi govern-
ment, India is charting new territory in its foreign policy, predicated on the belief
that, rather than proclaiming non-alignment as an end in itself, India needs deeper
engagement with its friends and partners if it is to develop leverage in its dealings
with its adversaries and competitors. India is today well positioned to define its
bilateral relationships on its own terms and would do well to continue engaging
more closely with those countries that can facilitate its rise to regional and global
prominence.
764

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Indias non-alignment conundrum:

International Affairs 91: 4 (2015) 747764

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The origins of non-alignment in India

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Non-alignment in an aligned world

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Looking East, leaning West

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Echoes of the past: Non-alignment 2.0

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