Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance?

Clientelism and Intra-Party Conflict in

Ghana
Author(s): Nahomi Ichino and Noah L. Nathan
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 2 (April 2013), pp. 428-441
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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 Do Primaries Improve Electoral Performance?
Clientelism and Intra-Party Conflict in Ghana
Nahomi Ichino Harvard University
Noah L. Nathan Harvard University

We consider the effect of legislative primaries on the electoral performance of political parties in a new democracy. While
existing literature suggests that primaries may either hurt a party by selecting extremist candidates or improve performance
by selecting high valence candidates or improving a party's image, these mechanisms may not apply where clientelism is
prevalent. A theory of primaries built instead on a logic of clientelism with intra-party conflict suggests different effects of
legislative primaries for ruling and opposition parties, as well as spillover effects for presidential elections. Using matching
with an original dataset on Ghana, we find evidence of a primary bonus for the opposition party and a primary penalty
for the ruling party in the legislative election, while legislative primaries improve performance in the presidential election
in some constituencies for both parties.

olitical party leaders in new democracies have of cies where vote buying and patronage are more important
ten constrained for whom citizens may vote by than policy positions in determining the electoral success
JL. controlling their parties' nominations (Field and of candidates.

Siavelis 2008). An increasing number of political parties To address this, we develop a theory of primary elec
in Latin America (Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006; tions in which aspiring candidates compete for nomi
Kemahlioglu et al. 2009) and Africa (Ohman 2004) have nations through the distribution of patronage to local
adopted primary elections, however, allowing party mem party members, not their policy positions. This patron
bers to democratically select their candidates. But with age spending builds ties between local party members
the exception of Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006), the and primary aspirants, and defeated aspirants can use this
electoral impact of primaries has been little studied out support within the local party to dispute the nomination
side the United States, and whether political parties that result or defect from the party after the primary. Because
use more democratic internal procedures perform better local party members are crucial for mobilizing voters,
in elections in new democracies is an open question. these intra-party conflicts after primaries can result in a
While some theories suggest that primaries may rec negative effect of primaries on the party's performance
oncile factions within a party or select popular nominees in the general election. For the ruling party, primaries
with local appeal, others argue that primaries lead to the in competitive constituencies are particularly problem
selection of unpopular extremist candidates and generate atic because losing aspirants will have invested heavily
intra-party conflict that could destabilize political parties in a valuable nomination and withholding their support
and harm nascent democracies. But these theories assume from the nominee in order to bargain for compensa
competition over policy in primaries and provide limited tion can be electorally consequential. Moreover, exiting
guidance for the analysis of primaries in new democrathe party with one's supporters to contest the general

Nahomi Ichino is Associate Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02138
(nichino@gov.harvard.edu). Noah L. Nathan is Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge St.,
Cambridge, MA 02138 (nlnathan@fas.harvard.edu).

We thank Jorge Dominguez, Adam Glynn, Barak Hoffman, Macartan Humphreys, Joseph Luna, Amanda Pinkston, Alastair Smith, and
workshop participants at Harvard and CAPERS (Columbia/NYU) for comments, and Abel Boreto, Sangu Delle, Daniel Kroop, Jitka Vin
duskova, and Sumorwuo Zaza for their research assistance. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2011 Midwest Political Sci
ence Association meeting in Chicago, IL. We gratefully acknowledge grant support from the Committee on African Studies and the Institute
for Quantitative Social Science at Harvard University. Replication files and data are available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/nichino.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 2, April 2013, Pp. 428-441

2012, Midwest Political Science Association DOI: 10.111 l/j.l540-5907.2012.00624.x

428

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PRIMARIES AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN GHANA 429

sources in the
election may be a viable option state, Ghana
for shares with other
a losing new democ
aspirant.
racies underlying
In an opposition party, by contrast, institutional
lower and socioeconomic char
investment by
acteristics thatless
primary aspirants overall generates affect political
severe competition, the pervasive
intra-party
conflict, and exit options are
ness
less
of clientelism,
attractive
and the development
for losing
of political par
as
ties (Kitschelt
pirants. As a result, primaries and Wilkinson 2007).
in opposition While the
parties magni
may
benefit the party in the general
tude of the
election
effects would likely
by vary
identifying
with some institu
nominees with the most support
tional and in
political
the details
local
of particular
party.
cases, we These
expect
hypotheses of differing effects
similar on
overalllegislative
results of divergent elections
effects from primaries
per
in ruling and opposition
formance for ruling and opposition parties in those
partiesa cases where
primary
"penalty" for the ruling party
clientelism and
and vote a primary
buying "bonus"
are common, aspirants have
for the opposition partycontrast
only their ownwith
resources predictions
and little help from the from
party
existing models of primaries.
in pursuing elected office, and local party organizations
are the vital connection
Our theory produces an additional novel between candidates and voters
hypothesis
during campaigns.
of a spillover, or "reverse coattails," Moreover, on
effect our study highlights the
presiden
tial elections, since local party members
significance of considering thealso mobilize
prevalence of an informal
practice
voters for the party's candidate like clientelism
for president,in the theoretical
a far and more
empirical
important prize than a legislative
analysis of the
seateffects
in of presidential
formal institutions on electoral
sys
tems. Material inducements distributed
outcomes. during primary
elections encourage local partyWe review the currentand
members literature on the electoral ef
potential
new members to become more
fects ofinvolved innext
primaries in the the party's
section. We then elabo
campaign efforts, by making
ourparticipation in the
argument for the differing party
effects of primaries in
ing and
organization more financially opposing parties
rewarding. where patronage
Therefore, repolitics
prevalent
gardless of whether there are and policy
internal considerations
conflicts over are not signifi
the
We present
legislative nomination, we expect background information
legislative primaries on the
toprimary
tem in Ghanaelections
have positive effects on presidential and introducein
our both
dataset in
rulthe follow
ing and opposition parties. sections before presenting and discussing our empiri
analysis.
We find general support for this argument in an anal
ysis of an original dataset on primary elections in Ghana
for the 2004 and 2008 elections. Employing matching
The Primary
methods, we show that the electoral Bonus and
impact ofPenalty
primaries
differs for the two major parties in Ghana. Primaries in
the governing party, the New
While Patriotic
an emerging literatureParty
examines the(NPP),
strategic de hurt
its performance in parliamentary
cision of partyelections, while
leaders to adopt primary elections indemo
new
cratic selection of nominees democracies
in the(Deopposition
Luca et al. 2002; Ichinoparty,
and Nathan the
National Democratic Congress (NDC),
2012; Kemahlioglu improved
et al. 2009; its per
Serra 2011), their effects
formance in these elections. While our results for the on the general election outcome are generally unknown.
opposition party conform with previous models In
ofone
pri
of the few empirical works on the effects of pri
mary elections (Adams and Merrill 2008; Serra 2011), our in new democracies, Carey and Polga-Hecimovich
maries
(2006)
overall findings for both ruling and opposition parties arefind that parties with presidential candidates se
more consistent with our patronage-focused model lected
of leg through primaries perform better in the general
islative primaries. Moreover, we find some evidenceelection.
for a They propose two mechanisms to account for
reverse coattails effect for both parties, connecting this
devel
primary bonusthe influence of primaries on voter
opments in the local party to national electoral outcomes.
support for the nominee and the influence of primaries
Parliamentary primaries result in better performance in
on consensus within the party or coalition. In the first
mechanism, primaries confer a "democratic seal of ap
the concurrent presidential elections for the opposition
NDC and in stronghold constituencies only for the proval"
rulingon nominees, important for voters who gener
NPP. ally distrust nominations that emerge from opaque, back
By considering the impact of clientelism, we extend room negotiations (533). Moreover, as Adams and Mer
the literature on political parties and primaries for new rill (2008) and Serra (2011) also argue, primary election
democracies. With its strong presidency, a majoritar voters may be better than party leaders at identifying
ian electoral system, and concentration of economic re nominees who have higher valence or broad appeal

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 430 NAHOMIICHINO AND NOAH L. NATHAN

among general election Primaries

voters. in Patronage
In the Polities
second m
primaries build consensus by providing a fa
deciding the nomination, forestalling fract
We depart from the existing literature to study the elec
the party elite or coalition leaders (Carey
toral effects of primary elections where the policy po
Hecimovich 2006, 534). With data from 90 p
sitions of aspiring nominees are not a major issue in
elections across 18 countries in Latin Ameri
the nomination contest. Instead, we develop a theory of
timate that candidates selected through prima
primaries focusing on the patronage relationships built
vote share 6 percentage
points higher than th
between aspirants and local party members during pri
through other means, controlling for each
mary campaigns in settings where clientelism is prevalent
electoral performance, incumbency
(Ichino and Nathan 2012). status, a
economic conditions.1
Primary elections allow party leaders to select nomi
It is not clear,however, that primaries gene
nees for parliament who have support among local party
prove the legitimacy and credibility of the par
members and bring their own campaign funds, instead of
mary electorate can be restricted to a small
needing support from the resource-poor party. The local
delegates and maybe quite different from the g
party members are crucial for mobilizing voters in the
torate, so they may not select a broadly popula
general election, and having aspirants compete over their
with higher valence. votes
They may
with material instead
inducements both motivateschoose
current
who appeals to a narrower group of party
members and attracts new or less active members to work acti
more extremist policy positions than the g
on behalf of the party. Allowing local party members to
lic (Brady et al. 2007; Burden 2004; Gerber a
select the nominee also means that party leaders must
1998; but also Bruhn 2011), resulting in a prim
relinquish awarding nominations as political favors or to
rather than a bonus.2 Moreover, if primaries in
aspirants with policy preferences most similar to those of
electorates and sparse media coverage, few g
the leaders. The nominees' policy positions are not cru
tion voters may be familiar with how the can
cial to their election, however, and party leaders can hold
selected. Even in the United States, where vot
elected MPs to the party line through patronage and other
miliar with primaries through the media, ben
inducements.
the selection of higher valence
Since individual MPs often have candidates
little influence on the m
tially offset by the loss of support from vote
government's policy decisions, local party members also
discouraged that their favored aspirant did no
have little concern over aspirants' policy preferences when
nomination (Stone 1986).
voting in primary elections. They expect aspirants to offer
It is also not
evident that primaries generally
favors and money for their votes in primaries and may
the legitimacy of the nominee within the par
accept inducements from multiple aspirants. Although
tion. Concerns about electoral fraud are common in new
local party members may still consider aspirants' ethnic
democracies, and the rules and management of the pri
ities or other valence characteristics, patronage spending
mary process itself may be the focus of disagreement and
helps build connections to particular aspirants and is a
tarnish the legitimacy of the nominee. Even if the process
major factor determining the nominee.
were trusted, as in the United States, eventual nominees
Consequently, patronage-rather than policy
may be dragged through long, expensive campaigns, and
centered competition characterizes primary elections.
attacks by opponents from within the party may harden
The overall level of spending is constrained by the
intra-party divisions. Evidence from American presiden
aspirants' own personal contributions and fundraising,
tial nominations suggests that candidates emerging from
but is increasing in the expected value of the nomina
long, divisive primaries may perform worse in the general
tion.3 This value comprises several elements, the first of
election (Kenney and Rice 1987; Lengle et al. 1995; Stone
which is the access to personal benefits and influence in
1986; but also Atkeson 1998).
the targeting of public resources, such as control over
a constituency development fund in many countries
(Keefer and Khemani 2009), that comes with winning
'However, Kemahlioglu et al. (2009) find that this result is not
robust to the inclusion of additional elections and primaries or the
exclusion of elections of doubtful democratic quality.
3The entry of a single wealthy aspirant will not necessarily deter
2 Jackson et al. (2007) argue that even in settings where the policy of the entry of less-resourced competitors, unless one aspirant has
nominees is an important consideration, primaries do not always overwhelming resource advantages. Without polling or campaign
select for more extremist nominees, depending on whether primary finance disclosures, primary aspirants are often uncertain about
voters and aspirants can easily switch parties. the popularity or resource constraints of their opponents.

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PRIMARIES AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN GHANA 431

any seat in parliament. The aspirant

second has a more
is realistic
whether prospect of
thewinning
party
the gen
is likely to win the presidency.
eral election, A
so heseat
is more in
likelyparliament
to pull his supporters as
a member of the president's
away
party
from the party.
is significantly
Challenges to the primary
more
result
valuable than a seat in thewithout defection also can besince
opposition, harmful where
this the vote
brings
access to additional connections and control over state margin is small and disaffected local members can throw
resources, as well as possible ministerial appointments.their support behind a viable opposition party candidate
for parliament. As a result, defections and disputes in
The third is the competitiveness of the constituency, since
a nominee in a party's stronghold constituency is much
competitive constituencies are likely to harm the ruling
more likely to win the general election than a nominee
party's performance in the general election.
for the same party in a competitive constituency. By contrast, the value of opposition party nomina
While patronage spending in primaries can benefit
tions, in both its stronghold and competitive constituen
local party members and make participation in the local
cies, is significantly lower than in the ruling party, with
lower overall spending by the aspirants. Although local
party more attractive, it also can create intra-party divi
party members of the opposition party receive more ben
sions and conflict. A losing aspirant is left without a direct
path to office, and he has only limited options to try efits
to than if there were no primary, the patronage rela
tionships between aspirants and local party members that
recover his losses. The first option is to actively challenge
develop during the primary are weaker than in the ruling
the primary process as unfair or rigged in order to reverse
the outcome. Alternatively, a losing aspirant may try party.
to It is therefore more difficult for a losing aspirant to
get a valuable appointment within the party or govern
use his supporters in the local party to engage in disputes
ment in return for his support for the nominee. The last
after the primary or to withhold their support from the
option is to leave the party and run as an independent nominee.
or A losing aspirant is also less likely to run as a mi
minor party candidate, but this is quite costly. Running
nor party or independent candidate, since with only weak
as an independent requires setting up a campaign orga
ties, local party members are unlikely to follow an aspi
nization and attracting supporters without the help ofrant
an and defect with him. Therefore, in contrast with the
ruling party, the opposition party is more likely to bene
existing party. Joining a new party may be complicated
by a mismatch between the politician's ethnicity and the
fit from aspirant spending in primary elections without
ethnic profile of the new party or resistance from long
suffering the negative consequences of severe intra-party
time members of the new party to accommodating conflicts.
an
opportunistic newcomer. All three options require that A complementary dynamic may contribute to the
an aspirant have spent substantial resources to develop primary
a penalty for the ruling party. Because the overall
level of resources available to a nominee after the primary
strong following in the local party that may be withheld
from the selected nominee. affects his performance in the general election, primaries
can create a penalty if they force the eventual nominee to
Nominations for the expected ruling party are very
expend substantial personal resources to secure a nomi
valuable, so aspirants in these primaries spend signifi
nation, particularly where political parties do not provide
cant resources to build support among primary voters.
significant supplementary funding after the primary. The
The viability of aspirants' options after losing a primary
more valuable nominations in the ruling party may at
in the ruling party differ with the competitiveness of the
constituency in which they seek their nominations.tract
In wealthier aspirants, but competition among multi
stronghold constituencies, defecting from the partyple
is wealthy aspirants will drive up the cost of each vote
unattractive to losing aspirants, even though a partic
so that the nominee may be left with far fewer resources
ularly well-resourced aspirant may be able to fund than
an if he had not faced a primary.4 The value of the
independent campaign. The ruling party's nomineenomination
is and, consequently, aspirant spending to se
cure a nomination are both smaller in the opposition
almost certain to become the MP in a stronghold con
party than in the ruling party. This limits the eventual
stituency, and is unlikely to direct benefits to his primary
opponent's supporters who left the party. Disgruntled opposition
as party nominee's expenditures in a potential
pirants and party members in stronghold constituencies
may still dispute the outcome of the primary, but they 4If one aspirant in the ruling party is much wealthier than the other
do not have viable alternative candidates to support. For
aspirants, he may still have significant resources remaining after
securing the nomination and may not suffer a primary penalty
these reasons, primaries in the ruling party's strongholds
from resource depletion. But in such cases there may not be a
are unlikely to consistently hurt the party's performance
primary election at all since such an aspirant with overwhelming
in the parliamentary election. In competitive constituen
resource advantages may also deter other aspirants from seeking
the nomination or induce them to withdraw from the contest.
cies, however, the party is more vulnerable. A defecting

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 432 NAHOMIICHINO AND NOAH L. NATHAN

primary, such that margin between

any the NDC and NPP, substantial
penalty from enough resour
is less likely to to affect the outcomethe
outweigh of the election between the major
benefits of t
relationships developed
parties. during primary elect
opposition party. Election to parliament, particularly as a member of
Finally, for both ruling
the party which controls
and the presidency,
oppositionbrings a series part
liamentary primariesof benefits
may to a politician in Ghana. MPs from all parperform
improve
presidential election. Aspirants'
ties receive efforts
personal perks from office, from improved to
career prospects
port of primary voters and business opportunities
generally make to smaller active
in the party rewards like favorable
organization more loans on new cars. MPs receive
attractive to
members in both an annual salary
parties. of approximately US$24,000, equal
Disagreements to
over
mentary nominationroughly
also 30 times
need the GDP per capita,
not and control at
diminish t
of local party least US$43,000
members each year in funding
in either party for constituency
for th
tial candidate, development
because the projects (Lindberg 2010). Opposition
presidency is the party m
icant potential MPs,of
source however, are sometimes stymied
benefits. Asin their attempts as
long
another party is to reward their supporters
unattractive towith these constituency
those who de su
feated parliamentaryvelopment
aspirants,
funds by district-level
spending
officials appointed by
in t
the president (Nugent
can spur greater turnout in 2001),
the making these funds moreele
general
crease voter support valuable
for to ruling
the party MPs who can more
party's effectively
presiden
distribute them.
This "reverse coattails" or Moreover,
spilloverbecause the Ghanaian
effect con
dential election should
stitution
improve
stipulates that a majority
both of the government's
the perf
the presidential candidate and
cabinet ministers must the
be MPs, nearly half overall
the MPs from
constituency with a the ruling party have theprimary.
legislative additional benefit of serving in
senior government positions in the executive branch dur
ing a legislative term (Vieta 2005). The MPs serving as
ministers gain additional influence over the distribution
Primary Elections in
of state resources not available Ghana
to MPs from the opposi
tion party.
Ghana is well suited The NPPexploring
for and the NDC have had officialthis
policies re argum
competitive quiring
elections withprimaries inpervasive
every constituency in which clienteli
more
major parties hold
primaries
than one aspirant seeks the nomination,
for beginningmany, with but n
liamentary the 2004 elections, but not
nominations. In this section, w all constituencies that met this
benefits MPs receivecriterion
from office
have held primary in
elections. Aspirants may Ghana,
only e
the ruling party, and
seek nominations
the innature constituencies in whichof they reside
the prim
system. or have family roots and must be dues-paying members of
The National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the the local branch of the party for at least two years before
New Patriotic Party (NPP) have dominated Ghanaian the primary. These rules preclude aspirants from "con
politics since the democratic transition in 1992. The NPP stituency shopping" and prevent opposition party politi
held the presidency and parliamentary majority from cians from easily switching to the ruling party (Ichino
2001 to 2009, while the NDC has controlled the presi and Nathan 2012). Additionally, aspirants must finance
dency and parliament from 1992 to 2001 and since 2009. their own campaigns without assistance from the party
Two hundred thirty MPs are elected from single-member (Lindberg 2003). Incumbents frequently face challengers
constituencies by plurality vote, while the president is with significant private financial resources in these pri
elected by a majority of votes cast in the entire country in maries, and senior government ministers have lost to these
a run-off system. Approximately 40% of these constituen challengers. Defeated primary aspirants may run as inde
cies swing between the NPP and NDC in each election, pendent candidates in the general election, but only by
while the remainder are strongholds of either party. De forgoing access to an established local party organization
spite the dominance of these two parties, independent crucial for mobilizing voters.
and third-party candidates still influence the outcome of Each primary has between 100 and 300 primary vot
some parliamentary elections. On average, independent ers, chosen by polling station-level party committees from
and third-party candidates together won about 10% of among its members in a single neighborhood, town, or
the parliamentary vote in 2004 and 2008. In over a fifth of group of villages. The small number of local party mem
the constituencies, these candidates won more than the bers voting as delegates in the primaries have "enormous

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 PRIMARIES AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN GHANA 433

leverage to extract personalised goods

multiple aspirants.10 from
Nominations candidates"
for which party lead
(Lindberg 2010, 125). Aspirants
ers declare anestimated that
open primary but intervene primary
such that there
campaigns cost many thousands of
is only one aspirant dollars,5
remaining and
on primary day aspi
are classi
rants are reported to give primary
fied as not havingvoters
a contested primary.
gifts Using
ranging
these data,
from direct cash handouts to
we estimate
motorcycles
the total effect of primary
and cars.6
elections on par
Se
nior national party leaders also and
liamentary acknowledged and
presidential vote share in Ghana com
for the
2004 and 2008
plained about the distortionary elections. of extensive pay
effect
Although
ments to primary voters during we obtained
the lead-up official to
general
theelection re
2008
elections.7 sults from the Electoral Commission of Ghana, neither
Nominations for the ruling party generally attract the major parties nor the Electoral Commission kept sys
more aspirants and generate more intra-party conflict tematic records on parliamentary primaries. We assem
than those for the opposition party. There were greater bled our dataset using newspaper sources, mainly The
numbers of aspirants contesting primaries and more in Daily Graphic and The Ghanaian Chronicle. From these
fighting over the outcome and conduct of primaries sources, we can confirm whether or not a primary was
in the ruling NPP than in the opposition NDC be held for 461 of the possible 920 nomination contests in
fore the 2004 and 2008 elections.8 Although not de this period for the NDC and the NPP, with four observa
cided by primary elections, nominations for the 2000 tions dropped in 2008 because the general election result
general elections for the then-ruling NDC resulted in was not available.11 In our sample, approximately two
greater conflict within the party than in the then thirds of the nomination processes in the NPP and half
opposition NPP (Nugent 2001). In addition, primaries of the nomination processes in the NDC, or a combined
held in 2011 for the 2012 election in the now-opposition 60% of nominations, were contested primary elections
NPP had far fewer disputes than primaries for the 2008 among two or more aspirants.
election.9 . As a first cut, we visually examine differences between
constituencies that held and did not hold primary elec
tions for each party's parliamentary election outcomes.
Figure 1 displays (a) the share of parliamentary elections
A First Cut
won in a bar graph, (b) vote shares for the NDC (opposi
tion party) and (c) vote shares for the NPP (ruling party)
We analyze an original dataset on primaries in the major using beanplots, which combine rug plots with estimated
parties in Ghana for the 2004 and 2008 elections at the
probability distributions (Kampstra 2008). In each bean
party-constituency-year level, also examined in Ichinoplot, the distribution of vote shares for constituencies
and Nathan (2012). We define a contested primary elecwith primary elections is on the right side (darker color),
tion as occurring when actual voting takes place betweenthe distribution of vote shares for constituencies without
primary elections is on the left side (lighter color), and in
dividual observations are represented by tick marks. The
5Author interview with 2008 NPP aspirant, Ayawaso East Con
stituency, Accra, May 12, 2010.
mean of each distribution is indicated by the horizon
tal black segments, and the overall mean is given by the
6See, for example, Edmond Gyebi, "Thomas Broni Denies Votedotted line.
Buying Allegation," The Ghanaian Chronicle, June 25, 2004.
These figures suggest some of the findings from the
7Author interview with former NPP National Chairman, Accra,
matching analysis in the following section. Figure 1 panel
April 26, 2010; author interview with former NPP Communica
tions Director, Accra, January 28, 2010. (a) shows that the NDC won more often and the NPP
8In our newspaper sources, described below, we coded whether
lost more often in constituencies where they held pri
mary elections. Panel (b) shows that average NDC vote
there was any mention of an intra-party dispute after the nomina
tion was decided in each constituency. These records suggest thatshare is 4 percentage points higher for constituencies with
disputes after primarieswhich include numerous legal challenges
NDC primaries than those without, but differs little be
to the result, threats from losing aspirants and party members to
tween
defect from the party, and some street protests by disgruntled party constituencies with and without NPP primaries.
memberswere concentrated in the ruling NPP. We do not use
these data to measure the extent to which the effects of primaries
travel through intra-party disputes, however, because we are uncer 10This competition-based definition is also used by Ansolabehere
tain about the extent of errors of both commission and omissionet al. (2006) for primaries in the United States.
in the reporting of these events.
"We have partial data, such as the number of contestants for
'Author interview with NPP Communications Director, Accra,the nomination, on a total of 620 nominations, but are unable
July 19, 2011. to confirm the final candidate selection process for 159 of these.

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434 NAHOMIICHINO AND NOAH L. NATHAN

Figure 1 Primary Elections and Parlia

Note: For each party, darker regions (right) represen

primaries. Individual observations are represented by

Similarly, panel (c) shows that

stituency in constitue
when deciding
tion (Ichino
the NDC held primaries, the NPPand Nathan
performe
7 percentage points onoutcomes
average, between cons
suggesting th
benefited from a primary
mary bonus.
elections found in
Similar plots for to baseline
presidential differences
vote r
share and
for each party at the constituency
adjust for this andlevel sh
other
stituencies with primary elections
use matching andfor par
regre
nominations have onpartyaverage
at aa time.
higher vote
To specify the covari
presidential election than constituencies witho
observations, we build
elections (see the supporting information). Th
tive of a reverse which
coattails examines
effect. the
Turnout trea
in th
election is lower for decision by national
constituencies part
with prima
with a larger primaries
difference in some
in the NDC thancons
in t
leaders in Ghana can pr
party's nomination to a
Matching Analysis
all other aspirants or by
draw. But canceling a pr
We cannot analyze ourbers
datawho lose
as if the opport
primary elec
randomly assigned to ments from aspirants
constituencies, wh
however
leaders consider the loss to primary
electoral voters m
competitiven

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 PRIMARIES AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN GHANA 435

aspirants would compete for Polga-Hecimovich

a valuable (2006),nomination.
party leaders may allow for a
Party
leaders are concerned about the
primary backlash that
to offset the advantages gainedmay ensue,
by the opposing
since a constituency's local party
party from members
having a primary. Butare both
where the the
effects of
principal means by which the
primaries
party are driven
mobilizes
more by the allocation
voters
of resources in
that constituency as well as the
and rents frompeople who
aspirants to primary votersselect
(Ichino and the
Nathan 2012),
next slate of party leaders. Party a party leader'stherefore
leaders decision to allow for allow
pri
primary elections more often
maryfor
electionsmore
may be influenced
valuable
by the decision
seats
in the in
their strongholds where they
otheranticipate
party only when there that canceling
is a direct path through which a
primary would spur a substantial negative
primaries voters response.
denied rents in one party can access rents
We include five variables infrom the
the primary of empirical
the other. analy
However, this is unlikely in
sis in Ichino and Nathan (2012)
Ghana.that
The local incumbent
influenceparty in a constituency
the party usu
ally selects its nominee
leader's decision to allow a primary after the local
election. opposition we
First, party in
clude the party's vote share selects
in the its nominee,
previous
and the former presidential
is unlikely to incor
election as a measure of the likelihood that the nominee porate any disappointed primary voters who defect from
will win the general election. We use the vote share fromthe latter. Accommodating these defectors means that
the previous presidential election rather than the parlia core supporters of the local incumbent party would have
mentary election because it is a more reliable measure
to be displaced or that the rents would be divided over
of the underlying potential support for a future nominee a larger number of local party members, possibly anger
from the party, since in any given year, voters face theing the original members and working against the party
same set of presidential candidates in all constituencies. leader's main objectives. Knowing that defectors are un
Presidential candidate- or election-specific idiosyncrasies likely to benefit from the local incumbent party's primary,
that affect the presidential vote share are also sharedleaders of the local opposition party need not anticipate
across constituencies, while parliamentary candidate- or the other party's decision when deciding whether to hold
election-specific idiosyncrasies are not, so that vote sharetheir own primary.
in the previous parliamentary election is a less reliable Although we believe the theory delineated above best
accounts for the incidence of parliamentary primaries
measure.12 Second, since more aspirants are likely to seek
the nomination in more diverse areas, we include a mea in Ghana, we include additional matching variables sug
sure of ethnic diversity of the constituency population. gested by several alternative theories in a second specifi
This is calculated as the usual Herfindahl fractionaliza cation. First, despite our argument to the contrary, party
tion index using population shares of the seven major
leaders may still be more likely to hold primaries when
the other party in the constituency does so.13 To address
ethnic categories plus "other" used by the Ghanaian cen
sus. We also include and match exactly on the election
this possibility, we include a three-level variable for the
opposing party's nomination process in the alternative
year, whether the party won the seat in the previous elec
tion, and whether the incumbent seeks reelection if the
specification of covariates, coded as having a primary, not
incumbent is a member of the party. having a primary, or missing data. Second, party leaders
In this main specification, we do not match may
on adopt primaries in response to intra-party conflicts
that
whether the other party in a constituency also holds a threaten to split the party (Kemahlioglu et al. 2009;
primary. If party leaders anticipate legitimacy andPoir
va 2002), so we include an indicator for whether there
was an ongoing internal dispute within a party in a con
lence benefits from primaries, as proposed in Carey and
stituency prior to the decision to hold a parliamentary
12A constituency in which the NPP parliamentary candidate wonprimary. We coded this variable from the same newspa
45% could be a constituency in which the NPP has very little per
sup sources as the primary election indicator.
port but had an especially skilled candidate, a constituency in which For nominations in the ruling party, we include an
the NPP has overwhelming support but had a breakaway faction
indicator for whether the incumbent MP is a govern
in a particular election year, or a constituency that is consistently
competitive for both the NPP and NDC. We have a particularly ment minister or deputy minister, since fewer challengers
severe, though identifiable, version of this problem when a may ma contest against these powerful politicians and party
jor political party supports an independent candidate instead of
leaders may protect members of the president's cabinet,
running its own parliamentary candidate in a given constituency.
In this situation, a party's parliamentary vote share will be 0 even
though its underlying support may be substantial. Such alliances 13The local incumbent party was equally likely to have a primary
affected 9 of 430 nominations in the 2000 and 2004 elections. Ex when the local opposition party had a primary (38/57, or 67%) as
cluding constituencies with these alliances and using the previous when the local opposition party did not have a primary (33/49, or
parliamentary vote share does not substantively affect our results 67%) in our data. But these rates may be different without missing
(not shown). data.

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 436 NAHOMIICHINO AND NOAH L. NATHAN

although the analysis in Ichino Balanceand Nathan (2

not support this. For both parties, we also inc
distance between the incumbent MP's hometown to the Before matching, constituencies with NDC primaries
centroid of his or her constituency, since party leaders have higher NDC vote share in the previous presidential

may use primaries to replace an "outsider" MP. Primary election on average, are more diverse ethnically, and are

elections may also be more likely in constituencies with less likely to have an incumbent seeking reelection than

more politically aware and active populations. To capture constituencies without NDC primaries. Constituencies
this, we include an indicator for whether the constituency with NPP primaries similarly have higher NPP vote share
is urban, the proportion of the constituency population in the previous presidential election, are more diverse, and
are less likely to have an incumbent seeking reelection
that is literate in English, and the proportion of the con
stituency population that is employed in the public or than those without primaries. Competitive constituen
semi-public sectors.14 We calculate the ethnic fractional cies with NPP primaries are more ethnically diverse, and
ization index and the other constituency-level variables by stronghold constituencies with NPP primaries are slightly
georeferencing a constituency boundaries map and link less diverse on average than their counterpart constituen
ing it to enumeration area-level records from the 2000 cies without primaries. NPP stronghold constituencies
Ghana Population and Housing Census. with primaries are significantly less likely to have incum
As noted earlier, we cannot confirm the candidate bents seeking reelection.

selection process used in nearly half of the nominations. Matching improves overall balance as well as uni
variate balance on all included variables for each of our
Missingness is not related to whether the constituency is
urban or its ethnic diversity, but data are missing more subsets. The smallest p-values for t and KS tests are 0.25
for the NDC overall, 0.10 for the NPP overall, and 0.62
often for nominations where the party has historically
performed poorly in elections. Consequently, our esti for the NPP in competitive constituencies. For the NPP
mates of the effect of primaries on electoral outcomes in its stronghold constituencies, the KS test p-value for
ethnic fractionalization is 0.32 but is 0.004 for vote share
should not be extrapolated beyond constituencies where
the party has some realistic probability of winning the in the previous presidential election. We are not partic
general election.15 ularly concerned with imbalance on the latter covariate
We use one-to-one genetic matching with replace since the sample has already been restricted to stronghold

ment following Sekhon (2011) and conduct matching on constituencies that are quite similar on this dimension.
four subsets of the data in which each observation is a With the alternative specification with additional covari

constituency-year. First we match constituencies in theates, balance for the NPP sample overall is not as good,
and we are unable to obtain good balance for the NPP for
same election year with and without primaries for (a) the
opposition NDC and (b) the ruling NPP. For the NPP, competitive or stronghold constituencies.16
we then match for (c) only its competitive constituen
cies and (d) only its stronghold constituencies, in order
Effect on Parliamentary Election Results
to examine effects at different levels of competitiveness
within the ruling party. Competitive constituencies are Our estimates for the total effect of parliamentary
defined as those in which neither the NPP nor the NDC primaries on the performance of the NDC and the NPP
won more than 60% of the vote in the previous presidenin parliamentary elections are presented in Table 1 panel
(A). Panel (B) presents separate estimates for the ruling
tial election. Stronghold constituencies are those in which
the NPP presidential candidate received more than 60% NPP in its competitive constituencies and its stronghold
of the vote in the previous election. constituencies. We expect a negative average effect of
primaries in competitive constituencies, where viable
alternatives are available for disgruntled losing aspirants,
but
I4The urban variable is highly correlated with several measures of not in stronghold constituencies. Each row of the
economic development, such as the percentage of households in
table is a different outcome variable and each column
the constituency using electricity, percentage of households using
modern sanitation facilities, and percentage of households with refers to different estimands. The first column presents
running water. Including these additional variables in the model OLS estimates of the effect of a primary election from
does not substantively alter the results reported below. a regression of the outcome on the treatment and the
15Data on the candidate selection process are also less likely to becovariates. The second and third columns give matching
available where a smaller proportion of the constituency population
was literate in English or employed in the public or semi-public
sectors, but these factors do not affect the incidence of primary
16See the supporting information for balance checks for both spec
elections (Ichino and Nathan 2012). ifications, including q-q plots.

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PRIMARIES AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN GHANA 437

Table 1 Effect of Primary Elections on Parliamentary Election Results

Panel A

NDC (Opposition) NPP (Government)

Outcome: OLS ATE ATT OLS ATE ATT

Win Election 0.0907 0.1399** 0.1358* -0.0545 -0.0574* 0.0689+

(0.0634) (0.0447) (0.0652) (0.0448) (0.0295) (0.0358)
NPP vote share -0.0435** -0.0522*** -0.0473*** -0.0242* 0.0121+ -0.0232**

(0.0153) (0.0104) (0.0131) (0.0109) (0.0070) (0.0088)

NDC vote share 0.0066 0.0150 0.0131 0.0057 -0.0004 -0.0002

(0.0168) (0.0108) (0.0156) (0.0124) (0.0079) (0.0092)

Panel B

NPP Competitive NPP Stronghold

Outcome: OLS ATE ATT OLS ATE ATT

Win Election 0.1381+ -0.1477** -0.0511 0.0661 0.0499 0.0596

(0.0804) (0.0520) (0.0687) (0.0544) (0.0378) (0.0523)

NPP vote share -0.0329* -0.0262** -0.0077 -0.0001 0.0046 -0.0081

(0.0156) (0.0101) (0.0136) (0.0200) (0.0120) (0.0164)

NDC vote share 0.0283 0.0243* 0.0068 -0.0164 -0.0229** -0.0174

(0.0196) (0.0123) (0.0150) (0.0134) (0.0088) (0.0112)

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, fp < 0.1. = 169 for NDC, = 291 for NPP overall, = 128 for NPP Competitive, = 118 for NPP
Strongholds. There are 86 treated observations for NDC, 193 in the NPP overall, 82 for NPP Competitive, and 82 for NPP Strongholds.
With post-matching regression adjustment using main set of covariates. Standard errors in parentheses.

estimates for the average treatment effect (ATE) and the
average treatment effect for the treated (ATT), respec
tively, with post-matching adjustment with regression
with our core covariates. The ATT estimate (tatt) is
the estimated average effect of having a primary for
only those constituencies where primaries were actually
held. The ATE estimate (ate)> on which our discussion
focuses, is the estimated average effect of having a
primary for both constituencies that did and did not have
primaries. Estimates without the regression adjustment
are similar but have larger standard errors (not shown).
The overall results, including different effects of
primaries on the electoral performance of the NPP in
competitive and stronghold constituencies, support our
theoretical argument. With our preferred specification,
we find that primary elections in the opposition NDC
decrease the vote share of the ruling NPP by about
5 percentage points and increase the probability that the
NDC will win the parliamentary election {ate = 0.14,
= 0.002). The positive estimate for the effect of NDC
primary elections on NDC vote share is not statistically
significantly different from zero and is much smaller than
the nave difference in means of 4 percentage points pre
sented in Figure 1. Our estimates of the effect of primaries
in the ruling NPP on its vote share and the probability
that it will win the parliamentary election are negative
and substantial, similar to Figure 1(b).
In the bottom panel of Table 1, we find clear evidence
of a primary penalty for the ruling party in competitive
constituencies. Primaries significantly decrease the prob
ability that the NPP will win the parliamentary election in
competitive constituencies { = 0.148, = 0.005),
while having a positive but statistically insignificant ef
fect in stronghold constituencies, where there is little
chance that an opposition party candidate could win the
election ex ante. Consistent with these results, we also
find in the main specification that primaries in the NPP
have no effect on the NPP vote share in stronghold con
stituencies but decrease the NPP vote share in competi
tive constituencies ( = 0.026, = 0.01).17 With the
exception of estimates for NPP strongholds that are not
170ur theory implies that the effect of primaries on electoral out
comes should be the same in stronghold and competitive NDC
constituencies, and consequently the same in the overall NDC
sample as in each of these NDC subsamples. Separate results for
competitive and stronghold NDC constituencies are not reported
here, however, because missing data limit us to small samples, and
post-matching covariate balance is poor for the stronghold con
stituencies. Results for the NDC overall and for NDC competitive
constituencies are similar. A more detailed discussion and analysis
for these NDC subsets are in the supporting information.

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438 NAHOMIICHINO AND NOAH L. NATHAN

Table 2 Effect of Primary Elections on Presidential Election Results

Panel A

NDC (Opposition) NPP (Government)

Outcome: OLS ATE ATT OLS ATE ATT

Party's vote share 0.0251* 0.0253*** 0.0228* -0.0053 -0.0038 -0.0088

(0.0112) (0.0073) (0.0099) (0.0078) (0.0052) (0.0059)

Turnout 0.0026** 0.0010 0.0000 0.0085 0.0121* 0.0098+
(0.0089) (0.0058) (0.0099) (0.0070) (0.0047) (0.0057)
Panel B

NPP Competitive NPP Stronghold

Outcome: OLS ATE ATT OLS ATE ATT

Party's vote share 0.0189+ -0.0195* -0.0050 0.0251* 0.0200** 0.0158+

(0.0130) (0.0082) (0.0108) (0.0104) (0.0076) (0.0092)
Turnout -0.0030 0.0041 0.0043 0.0273* 0.0289* 0.0202+
(0.0094) (0.0057) (0.0073) (0.0129) (0.0098) (0.0110)

***p < 0.001, " < 0.01, *p < 0.05, + < 0.1. = 169 for NDC, n = 291 for NPP overall, = 128 for NPP Competitive, = 118 for NPP
Strongholds. There are 86 treated observations for NDC, 193 in the NPP overall, 82 for NPP Competitive, and 82 for NPP Strongholds.
With post-matching regression adjustment using main set of covariates. Standard errors in parentheses.

significantly different from zero in either specification, the Primaries in competitive constituencies have the
estimates using the fuller set of covariates are signed in the opposite effect on the presidential vote share {iate
same direction as those from our preferred specification 0.0195, = 0.018), however. One possible explanation
(seethe supporting information). The general consistency for this unexpected result is that negative consequences of
of these results suggests that the additional covariates do intra-party conflict fostered by high spending for a ruling
little beyond the variables in our primary specification in party nomination are more difficult to contain in compet
capturing the treatment assignment mechanism. itive constituencies where aspirants have viable outside
options. Alternatively, we may not have sufficiently ac
counted for unobserved underlying differences between
Effect on Presidential Election Results competitive constituencies with and without primaries
in our matching. Party leaders may have allowed some
On average, primary elections in the opposition NDC
of these constituencies to have parliamentary primaries
improve the vote share of the NDC presidential candidate because they expected the presidential candidate to per
by approximately 3 percentage points (Table 2 panel (A)). form poorly in those areas, for reasons not captured by the
This positive reverse coattails effect is consistent with past
our presidential vote share variable. Then the presiden
argument that transfers from parliamentary aspirants to candidate in these constituencies may still perform
tial
primary voters mobilize the local party organization for
worse than in constituencies where primaries were not
the party's presidential nominee. held, even if primaries have a positive spillover effect.
In its stronghold constituencies, the NPP's vote share
in the presidential election increases on average by ap
proximately 2 percentage points, where we expect the Discussion
greatest expenditures by NPP aspirants for valuable nom
inations on the ticket of the ruling party (Table 2 panel
Our finding of a primary penalty in the ruling party and
(B)). Estimates using the fuller set of covariates are very
a primary bonus in the opposition party for parliamen
similar (see the supporting information). These results,
tary elections in Ghana is consistent with our argument
consistent with our argument, are particularly strikingthat
be the potential for damaging disputes or defections
cause these are constituencies where the NPP presidential
within the local party increases with the value of the nom
candidate already has a high baseline level of support,
ination, leading to different effects of primaries between
with only limited room for any further improvement.these parties. Apart from primaries in the ruling party's

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PRIMARIES AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN GHANA 439

competitive constituencies, policy

our in the selection of nominees
findings or ultimate
also election
conform to
of spillover
our expectation of a positive legislators (Kitschelteffect
and Wilkinsonof
2007).parliamen
Second,
vote buying
tary primaries on presidential should be expected
elections. and common insuffering
Despite elec
toral campaigns,
a penalty in the parliamentary such that eventhis
election, if primary electorates
spillover to
are larger
the presidential election may meanthan they that
are in Ghana, we would the
even expect priruling
party benefits overall from mary elections to be patronage-driven spending compe
primaries.
titions.
All together, these results do Third,
not the party should be resource
support Careypoor, suchand
Polga-Hecimovich's (2006) expectation
that candidates pursue elected of a universal
office using their own fi pri
nancial resources rather than
mary bonus from improvements in voters' perceptions of party funds and that the
transfer
party legitimacy, selection of of resourcespopular
more from aspirants to candidates,
primary voters is or
a significant
greater consensus among party benefit for Only
elites. local party members.
our Finally, lo
results for
opposition parties are consistent
cal party members
with and activists
the should
predictions
provide a crucial in
Adams and Merrill (2008) link
and betweenSerra (2011),
parties and voters which
such that there is a clear both
argue that primaries will connection
be more beneficial
between developments in the local partyto
and opposi
election outcomes.
tion parties than ruling parties because This is theless
case in many new democ
competitive
racies in theselecting
parties have more to gain from developing world, but this final condition with
candidates
is not in
better valence characteristics as clearly satisfied where candidates
primary elections,and parties which
is different from our mechanism. Neither account is con
can connect with voters directly through the mass media
sistent with our finding of (Mainwaring
a negative and Zoco 2007).
effect of primaries
in ruling parties.
Confidence in our explanation for these different ef
fects would be bolstered with more direct tests of our
proposed mechanisms, but the unavailability of data on
Conclusion
spending by aspiring candidates or the defection of local
party members limits our ability to extend the present A growing body of empirical scholarship in comparative
analysis in this direction. We also cannot definitively politics has sought to explain the democratization of can
demonstrate that the different effects for the different par didate selection for legislative office in new democracies
ties are attributable to general differences in the value of(Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006; De Luca et al. 2002;
nominations in incumbent and opposition parties, rather Kemahlioglu et al. 2009), and additional work has ex
than idiosyncratic differences between the NPP and NDC. amined the consequences of the adoption of primaries
Although data availability limits the analysis to two elec on representation, participation, and discipline within
tions in which the incumbent president belonged to the political parties and legislatures (Hazan and Rahat 2010;
NPP, the overarching similarities between these partiesSiavelis and Morgenstern 2008). However, few works have
in their organizational structures and primary electionassessed the effects of primaries in new democracies on
institutions (Ichino and Nathan 2011) and the greater general election outcomes. Our study is one of the first to
competition and acrimony over nominations in the NDC analyze systematically the effect of legislative primaries on
than in the NPP when the NDC was the incumbent party election results in a developing country and, to our knowl
(Nugent 2001) suggest that the divergent effects of pri edge, the first for sub-Saharan Africa. Using matching
maries correspond to a party's incumbency status.18 methods with an original dataset on legislative primaries
Data may be available in other countries, however, in Ghana in 2004 and 2008, we find that the opposition
for similar analyses of the total effects of primaries on party benefits from a primary bonus, while the ruling
general election outcomes in incumbent and oppositionparty suffers from a primary penalty in its stronghold
parties, as well as mediation analyses that investigate our constituencies for legislative elections. However, legisla
proposed mechanisms of internal disputes and defections tive primaries improve performance in presidential elec
following spending by aspirants. A test of this theorytions for both parties in a reverse coattails effect.
beyond Ghana requires four conditions. First, as is com Recent studies of clientelism in contemporary new
mon in many new democracies, the distribution of pademocracies have greatly improved our understanding
tronage and targeted benefits to voters should outweigh of how parties engage with voters, demonstrating the
effectiveness of particularistic and clientelistic appeals
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005;
18The upcoming 2012 general elections also provide an opportu
nity to test our theory with the NDC in government and NPP in
Wantchekon 2003). But the politics within parties, shaped
opposition. by the interaction of party elites, aspiring candidates, and

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 440 NAHOMIICHINO AND NOAH L. NATHAN

the local party activists who

Jackson, Matthew ., Laurent actually
Mathevet, and Kyle Mattes. 2007. im
clientelistic "Nomination
strategies, Processes and significantly
may Policy Outcomes." Quarterly
Journal of Political Science 2(1): 67-92.
tiveness of
strategies for votervarious m
Kampstra, Peter. 2008. "Beanplot: A Boxplot Alternative for
results presented in this article, and in
Visual Comparison of Distributions." Journal of Statistical
finding of a reverse coattails
Software 28:1-9. effect on th
election outcome, Keefer,
highlight the import
Philip, and Stuti Khemani. 2009. "When Do Legislators
cal party members play as
Pass on Pork? The intermediaries
Role of Political Parties in Determining
elites or candidates and the voters in new democracies. Legislator Effort." American Political Science Review 103(1):
99-112.
Further theoretical development and empirical testing of
Kemahlioglu, Ozge, Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro, and Shigeo Hirano.
the intra-party dynamics surrounding candidate selec
2009. "Why Primaries in Latin American Elections." Journal
tion will improve our understanding of electoral politics
of Politics 71(1): 339-52.
in new democracies with pervasive clientelism.
Kenney, Patrick J., and Tom W. Rice. 1987. "The Rela
tionship between Divisive Primaries and General Election
Outcomes." American Journal of Political Science 31(1):
31-44.
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PRIMARIES AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN GHANA 441

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in previous parliamentary election

Supporting Information Table SI: Summary Statistics for the Data

Table S2: Original Results for NDC
Table S3: Results for NDC Competitive and Stronghold
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the
Constituencies
online version of this article at the publisher's web site:
Table S4: Results for Past Parliamentary Elections with
Figure SI: Primary Elections and Presidential Election Additional Covariates
Outcomes in 2004 and 2008 for NPP and NDC.
Table S5: Results for Parliamentary Elections with Addi
Figure S2: Quantile-quantile plot of balance on main set
tional Covariates
of covariates after matching (for ATE) for the NDC and Table S6: Results for Presidential Elections with Addi
NPP analyzed in the manuscript tional Covariates

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