CHAVEZ VS PCGG CASE DIGEST (CONSTI 2: RIGHT TO

INFORMATION)]March 8, 2010

Right to Information, access to public documents

CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

Facts:
-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government
official) initiated this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its
chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of
Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold
hoard"; and (2) to compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they
ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and
agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."
-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who
committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
country's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news
reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items
referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public
interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a
right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no
showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he
has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and
operative official acts, not to those still being considered.

Issue:Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of
any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.

Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement
dated December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and
all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to
disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions
embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.

RD:
- The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution
have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information
- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where there is
no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold
documents and other information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict
confidence" and given "scrupulous protection." (2) trade secrets and banking transactions
-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related
laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28)
are also exempted from compulsory disclosure (3) criminal matters
- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the
apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts neither may
nor inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law
enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police
information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert
criminal activities.(4) other confidential information.
- The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using
or divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of
their office and not made available to the public." Other acknowledged limitations to
information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court.
- In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be
"matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of
full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be
"subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
- As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, elucidated: In determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance,
as it relates to or affects the public.
-As to whether or not the above cited constitutional provisions guarantee access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement, this same clarification was
sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations, MR.
SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements,
or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the
contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction?
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
- Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court believes that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners
and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of
the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed above such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 130716 May 19, 1999

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO, (in his
capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A.
JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.

RESOLUTION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Before the Court are (1) a "Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion for Leave to File the Attached Partial Motion for
Reconsideration . . ." and (2) "Partial Motion for Reconsideration," both filed on January 22, 1999, as well as movants'
Memorandum of Authorities filed on March 16, 1999.

Movants Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Irene Marcos-Araneta allege that they are parties and
signatories 1 to the General and Supplemental Agreements dated December 28, 1993, which this Court, in its Decision
promulgated on December 9, 1998, declared "NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution." As such,
they claim to "have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against
both as to warrant their intervention." They add that their exclusion from the instant case resulted in a denial of their
constitutional rights to due process and to equal protection of the laws. They also raise the "principle of hierarchical
administration of justice" to impugn the Court's cognizance of petitioner's direct action before it.

The motions are not meritorious.

Intervention Not Allowed

After Final Judgment

First, we cannot allow the Motion for Leave to Intervene at this late stage of the proceedings. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court, provides that a motion to intervene should be filed "before rendition of judgment . . ." Our Decision was
promulgated December 9, 1998, while movants came to us only on January 22, 1999. Intervention can no longer be
allowed in a case already terminated by the final judgment. 2

Second, they do not even offer any valid plausible excuse for such late quest to assert their alleged rights. Indeed, they
may have no cogent reason at all. As Petitioner Chavez asserts, 3 the original petition, which was filed on October 3,
1997, was well-publicized. So were its proceedings, particularly the oral arguments heard on March 16, 1998. Movants
have long been back in the mainstream of Philippine political and social life. Indeed, they could not (and in fact did not)
even feign unawareness of the petition prior to its disposition.

Third, the assailed Decision has become final and executory; the original parties have not filed any motion for
reconsideration, and the period for doing so has long lapsed. Indeed, the movants are now legally barred from seeking
leave to participate in this proceeding. Nevertheless, we shall tackle their substantive arguments, most of which have
been taken up in said Decision, so as to finally dispose any allegation, even in the remote future, of lack of due process or
violation of the right to equal protection.

No Denial of Due Process

Movants claim that their exclusion from the proceeding regarding the Agreements to which they were parties and
signatories was a denial of "their property right to contract without due process of law."

We rule that the movants are merely incidental, not indispensable, parties to the instant case. Being contractors to the
General and Supplemental Agreements involving their supposed properties, they claim that their interests are affected by
the petition. However, as exhaustively discussed in the assailed Decision, the Agreements undeniably contain terms an
condition that are clearly contrary to the Constitution and the laws and are not subject to compromise. Such terms and
conditions cannot be granted by the PCGG to anyone, not just to movants. Being so, no argument of the contractors will
make such illegal and unconstitutional stipulations pass the test of validity. 4 The void agreement will not be rendered
operative by the parties' alleges performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void ab intio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect
at all. 5 In legal terms, the movants have really no interest to protect or right to assert in this proceeding. Contrary to their
allegations, no infraction upon their rights has been committed.

The original petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to enforce a constitutional right against the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) and to determine whether the latter has been acting within the bounds of its authority. In
the process of adjudication, there is no need to call on each and every party whom said agency has contracted with.

In any event, we are now ruling on the merits of the arguments raised by movants; hence, they can no longer complain of
not having been heard in this proceeding.

Petition Treated as an Exception to

the Principle of Hierarchical

Administration of Justice

Movants allege that despite petitioner's own statement that he did not intended "to stop or delay . . . the proceedings
involving the subject agreements as an incident before the Sandiganbayan," this Court ruled the validity of the said
Agreements. They submit that it thereby preempted the Sandiganbayan and rendered moot the three-year proceedings
so far undertaken by the latter court regarding the same. Movants pray that the proceedings before the anti-graft court be
allowed to take their due course, consistent with the principle of the hierarchical administration of justice.

This matter has been discussed and ruled upon in the assailed Decision. Movants have not raised any new argument that
has not been taken up. In any event, we wish to point out that the principle of the hierarchy of the courts generally applies
to cases involving factual question. The oft-repeated justification for invoking it is that such cases do not only impose upon
the precious time of the Court but, more important, inevitably result in their delayed adjudication. Often, such cases have
to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum or as better equipped t resolve to the issues, since the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 6 Inasmuch as the petition at bar involves only constitutional and legal questions
concerning public interest, the Court resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.

Moreover, in taking jurisdiction over the Chavez petition, the Court actually avoided unnecessary delays and expenses in
the resolution of the ill-gotten wealth cases, which have been pending for about twelve years now. With this Decision, the
Sandiganbayan may now more speedily resolves the merits of Civil Case No. 141. Finally, it is an elementary rule that this
Court may at its sound discretion suspend procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice. 7

Petition Sought to Define

Scope of Right to Information

Movants insist that there was "nothing "secret" or "furtive" about the agreements as to warrant their compulsory disclosure
by the Honorable Court . . .." They submit that when they filed their Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreements
before the Sandiganbayan, they practically "opened to public scrutiny the agreements and everything else related
thereto."

In our Decision, we have already discussed this point and, hence, shall no longer belabor it. Suffice it to say that in our
Decision, we ruled that the Chavez petition was not confined to the conclude terms contained in the Agreements, but
likewise concerned other ongoing and future negotiations and agreement, perfected or not. It sought a precise
interpretation of the scope of the twin constitutional provisions on "public transactions." It was therefore not endered moot
and academic simply by the public disclosure of the subject Agreements.

Alleged Partial Implementation

of Agreements Immaterial

The movants also claim that PCGG's grant to their mother of access rights to one of their sequestered properties may be
equivalent to an implied ratification of the Agreements. As we have ruled, the subject Agreements are null and void for
being contrary to the Constitution and the laws. Being null and void, they are not subject to ratification. 8 Neither will they
acquire validity through the passage of time. 9
 Petition Presented Actual

Case and Judicial Question

We reiterate that mandamus, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, is proper recourse for a citizen to enforce a
public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when mandated by the Constitution. As aptly
pointed out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, 10 "procedural rules . . . [are] not cogent reasons to deny to the Court its taking
cognizance of the case."

There is no political question involved here. The power and the authority of the PCGG to compromise is not the issue. In
fact, we have not prohibited or restrained it from doing so. But when the compromise entered into palpably violated the
Constitution and the laws, this Court is duty-bound to strike it down as null and void. Clearly, by violating the Constitution
and the laws, the PCGG gravely abused its discretion. 11

In sum, we hold that the motions are procedurally flawed and that, at this late stage, intervention can no longer be
allowed. Moreover, movants are not indispensable parties to this suit which principally assails the constitutionality and
legality of PCGG's exercise of its discretion. In any event, the Court has ruled on the merits of movants' claims. Hence,
they can no longer complain, however remotely, of deprivation of due process or of equal protection of the law.

WHEREFORE, the motions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Let the Decision of this Court, dated December 9, 1998,
be now entered. 1w phi 1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Melo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII;
HIMLAYANG PILIPINO, INC., respondents.

City Fiscal for petitioners.

Manuel Villaruel, Jr. and Feliciano Tumale for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review which seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII
declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, of the Quezon City Council null and void.

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The
area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later
than six months from the date of approval of the application.

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after
the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:

RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in
Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended
for paupers burial.

Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9
of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City, a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Sp. Proc. No. Q-16002) seeking to
annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal both petitioners and respondent agreed to the
rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of
Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void.

A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and
that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power, " to make such further
ordinances and resolutions not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this Act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious
because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property.

The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the
property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his property outright under the
State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order
to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to
prevent the spread of a conflagration.

We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-founded. We
quote with approval the lower court's ruling which declared null and void Section 9 of the questioned city ordinance:

The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

An examination of the Charter of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any provision
that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting police power to the
City. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license
fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or
practised in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12, R.A. 537).

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (People vs. Esguerra, 81 PhiL 33,
Vega vs. Municipal Board of Iloilo, L-6765, May 12, 1954; 39 N.J. Law, 70, Mich. 396). A fortiori,
the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not
only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under
Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private
cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled.' The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in
effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery. Neither can the ordinance in
question be justified under sub- section "t", Section 12 of Republic Act 537 which authorizes the
City Council to-

'prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and
provide for their burial in such proper place and in such manner as the council
may determine, subject to the provisions of the general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries and governing funerals and disposal of the dead.' (Sub-
sec. (t), Sec. 12, Rep. Act No. 537).

There is nothing in the above provision which authorizes confiscation or as euphemistically

termed by the respondents, 'donation'

We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid
exercise of police power. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12,
Rep. Act 537 which reads as follows:

(00) To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote, the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and
for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such
lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions
of subsection (jj) of this section.

We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in
the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).

On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes
with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are
said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.

Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining
 and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon,
V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property
of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to
destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover
from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said
that police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and
always one of the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39
PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole
system of public regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said
that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to
be expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival
itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential
insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the
demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field
and scope of police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest
and public welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they
cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which
the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995,
May 31, 1957).

The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause
being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of
government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.

It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of
mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few
cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance,
the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not
a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

In sustaining the decision of the respondent court, we are not unmindful of the heavy burden shouldered by whoever
challenges the validity of duly enacted legislation whether national or local As early as 1913, this Court ruled in Case v.
Board of Health (24 PhiL 250) that the courts resolve every presumption in favor of validity and, more so, where the ma
corporation asserts that the ordinance was enacted to promote the common good and general welfare.

In the leading case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila (20 SCRA
849) the Court speaking through the then Associate Justice and now Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando stated

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the a of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically
by Justice Malcolm 'The presumption is all in favor of validity. ... The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular ... municipality and with all the
facts and lances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body,
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the
well-being of the people. ... The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
(U.S. v. Salaveria (1918], 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of
validity of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Ebona v.
Daet, [1950]85 Phil. 369.)

We have likewise considered the principles earlier stated in Case v. Board of Health supra :

... Under the provisions of municipal charters which are known as the general welfare clauses, a
city, by virtue of its police power, may adopt ordinances to the peace, safety, health, morals and
the best and highest interests of the municipality. It is a well-settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered and society, that every holder of property, however absolute and may be
his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the
rights of the community. An property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, which
 are necessary to the common good and general welfare. Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations,
established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them
by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient. The state, under the police power, is
possessed with plenary power to deal with all matters relating to the general health, morals, and
safety of the people, so long as it does not contravene any positive inhibition of the organic law
and providing that such power is not exercised in such a manner as to justify the interference of
the courts to prevent positive wrong and oppression.

but find them not applicable to the facts of this case.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic
Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within
the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general
law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides
in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to
pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.

As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal
corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always
received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the
questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and
permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as
having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - City Government of
Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983]
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983]

First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 5 concur

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and
Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing
Penalties for the Violation thereof provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be
set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least
5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the
application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City,
to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have
failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City
Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced.
Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002)
seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the
questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a
judgment on the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void.
A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the petition or review
with the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation.

Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from
a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation
without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the
Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center
of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy
or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it
continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance
is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development
of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made
to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
GERONA vs. SECRETARY of EDUCATION

(1959)
Montemayor J
FACTS:
RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rules (Department Order 8)says
that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do
anything while the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge (panatang
makabayan). Petitioners children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the
flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They
followed Exodus 20:4-5 'thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven
above, or that is in earth beneath or that is in the water under the earth. They consider the flag to be an image in this
context. Because of this they were expelled from the school in Sep 1955.
Petitioners thru counsel petitione SecEd that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent
and stand at attention. SecEd denied petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued.
ISSUE:
WON Dep Order 8 is unconstitutional
HELD:
Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non- discriminatory Therefore it is constitutional
RATIONALE:
The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but it's exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former must
yield.
What is the nature of the flag? Petitioners maintain that it is an image but that is not so. It is the symbol of Republic of
the Philippines. It is not a religious symbol. Saluting it is not therefore a religious ceremony. The determination whether a
ceremony is religious or not is left to the courts not to any religious group.
Petitioners are willing to remain silent and stand during flag ceremony. Petiotners salute the flag during boy scout
activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge is judged to be
completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks
about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force, military service, or duty to defend the country.
There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a
penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education. Take it or
leave it. Hamilton vs Univ of California: Apellants were members of Methodist Episcopal Church who believed that war
and preparations for war are gainst God's wishes. They did not take required military service training which was
requirement to graduate. Court said that they were not being drafted to attend university. University did not violate due
process when it required the mil service. Minersville School District vs Gobitis: two Jehovahs Witness children were
expelled from school for refusing to salute flag. Requirement of participation of all pupils in flag ceremony did not
infringe due process. West Virginia State Board of Education. vs. Barnette: reversed the former decision at a divided
court. This court leans towards Gobitis decision. Special circumstance of Barnette case was that it expelled the students
although attendance in schools is mandatory turnimg them all into truants headed for reformatories. Fortunately, the
law requiring compulsory enrollment here in the Philippines is so riddled with exceptions and exemptions that there is no
crisis if the children didn't attend school. There is no penal sanction for failing to attend school. Whenever a man enjoys
the benefits of society and community life he becomes a member and must give up some of his rights for the general
welfare just like everybody else. The practice of religion is subject to reasonable and non-discrimantory regulation by the
state.
Prince vs. Commonwealth of Massachusets: Sarah Prince (Jehovahs Witness again)was convicted under the Child Labor
law because her hiece distributed religious pamphlets. Court said that state can limit control of parent/guardian. The
right of practice religion freelydoes not include liberty to expose child to ill health. This case was decided after Barnette,
supra.
SecEd was not imposing a religious belief with the flag salute. It was Merely enforcing a non-discriminatory regulation
applicable to members of all religions. State carried out duty to supervise educational institutions and teach civic duty.
Petitioners do not question the right of the school to conduct the flag Salute ceremony but question the attempt to
compel them. The trouble of exempting the petioners is that it would disrupt school discipline and demoralize the greater
student population.
There are exemptions for cases of religiious belief like an understanding that anti-war religious believers will not be made
to fight but help war effort in other non-combat ways. But that is for the legislature to decide, not the courts.
DISPOSITION:
decision affirmed. constitutional. writ of preliminary
injunction dissolved. No costs.
March 1, 1993
Ponente: Grio-Aquino, J:
FACTS:
All the petitioners in these two cases are school children who are members of Jehovahs Witnesses who
were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by R.A. No. 1265 (July 11, 1955) and by DECS Department Order No. 8
(July 21, 1955) which makes the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovahs Witnesses may be
expelled from school (both public and private) for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag
ceremony.
RATIO:
It has been held previously in the case of
Gerona vs. Secretary of Education (1959) Under a system of complete separation between church and state, the flag is
utterly devoid of any religious significance and therefore saluting it is not a religious ceremony. The requirement of the
flag ceremony, which seeks to develop reverence for the flag and love of
country, etc., is a non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to students and teachers regardless of their religion.
While the necessity to develop such respect for the flag and respect for the country still persists until today,
there is recognition that religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights (Fernando separate opinion in German vs. Barangan)
Two-fold aspect of religious profession:

Freedom to believe absolute as long as

confined to the realm of thought

Freedom to act on ones belief subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts affecting the public
welfare
Petitioners contend that while they did not participate in the flag ceremony, they did not engage in any disruptive
behavior that would offend those who choose to participate but rather they just quietly stood at attention during the flag
ceremony to show respect to their countrymen. Therefore, in the absence of a grave
and present danger which is the sole justification for a prior restraint on the exercise of religious freedom, according to
Teehankee in his dissent in German vs. Barangan, there is no warrant to justify their expulsion.
What petitioners seek is only exemption from the flag ceremony and therefore the virtues (e.g. patriotism,
respect for human rights, love of country, etc.) they are supposed to imbibe from their participation in the flag ceremony,
they can get in their study of the Constitution, the democaratic way of life and form of government, the history and
culture of the Philippines, the life of our heroes, etc.
To force a small religious group through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates
their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities which are
precisely the values the court in Gerona feared will be lost by exempting some members of the Jehovahs Witnesses to
participate in the flag ceremonies.
let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to
the country is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska)
expulsion of the members will violated their right as
citizens under the Constitution to receive free education which is the duty of the State to protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality education and to make such education applicable to all.
in closing, the court hopes that it will not take
another foreign invasion of our country for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag as what
happened during WWII.