CPBRD POLICY B RIEF

CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND BUDGET RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

JULY 2011 NO. 2011-8

Accountability
Mechanisms in the Implementation of
Conditional Cash Transfer Programs *
The global appeal of conditional cash transfers (CCTs)1 as a development tool has been evident
based on the number of developing countries that have implemented or are actively showing
interest in them.2 Despite its popularity, past experiences indicate CCTs like the countrys
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) encounter substantial implementation challenges from a
governance and anti-corruption perspective.3 Putting adequate accountability mechanisms in
key CCT activities are therefore criticalespecially when there is a scale-up of implementation
to mitigate the risks associated with CCT, and to effectively implement these programs.

Characteristics of CCTs

It should be realized that no perfect safety net program exists. But there are a number of
reasons why it is difficult to implement such programs. For one, they cover a large number of
beneficiaries as well as total volume of individual payments (see Table 1). Another is that the
program implementation is a shared responsibility among different state institutions that cuts
across levels and among multiple departments. For example, the nature of CCT benefits, e.g.
education and health services, imply decentralized service delivery.4

Table 1.
Coverage and Total Cost as Percent of GDP of
Conditional Transfer Programs in Selected Countries
Coverage Total Cost as % of
Country
(mNo. of Households) GDP
Philippines 1.3 M (2010) 0.52 (2010)
Mexico 5.0 M Data Unavailable
Brazil 1.1 M (2006) 0.33 (2005)
Columbia 2.7 M (2010) 0.3
Indonesia 1.0 M (2010) 0.23 (2009)
Source: DSWD, 2010
_____________________

Prepared by Rommel V. Asuncion and Novel V. Bangsal in consultation with CPBRD OIC Director General Romulo Emmanuel
Miral, Jr. The views, opinions, and interpretations in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the House of Representatives as an
institution or its individual members.

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CCT programs also exhibit consumption and production characteristics of private goods.5
Consumption of CCT goods and services is exclusionary yet the programs cost is not
recoverable from the beneficiaries.6 There are no competitive pressures for providing social
protection and consequently no market signals to provide information about quality of services.
This implies that service providers can have a degree of monopoly power and may not provide
the services in the way that the program intended.

Related to this, there are information asymmetries in the service delivery with regards to
beneficiaries accessing information on the benefit package and its access procedures.7 For
example, providers can offer services of lower quality by reducing the benefit amountwhich is
easy when goods are in the form of cashthereby giving way to fraud and corruption.

The risk for fraud and corruption is further heightened because the beneficiaries group profile
renders them less likely to forward complaints. Given the nature of individual consumption, it is
relatively costly to check if services/goods have actually reached the intended beneficiaries. At
any rate, the CCT programs are prone to risks of error, fraud and corruption 8 in the
implementation stage thereby resulting to leakages. Hence, it is important to identify
areas/activities in CCT implementation where improvements are needed the most, and institute
sufficient accountability mechanisms to minimize and manage the risks associated with CCT.

CCT in the Philippines

In February 2008, the Philippines launched its CCT programthe Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino
Program (4Ps)and has been implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD).9 The pilot program had 6,000 beneficiary households in four (4) pilot
municipalities and two (2) cities.

The economic crisesthe food and fuel price shock in mid-2008 and global financial crisis
towards the end of the yearprompted the government to scale-up the program. The 4Ps
coverage increased to 340,391 households in 2008 (Set 1) and reached 630,000 in 2009 (Set 2).10
As of December 2010, the 4Ps has more than one (1) million beneficiary households in 1,010
cities and municipalities in 79 provinces in all 17 regions of the Philippines. The program is
expected to expand by two-fold, covering 2.3 million households, by the end of 2011. 11

In terms of cash transfers, poor households with 0-14-year-old children and/or pregnant women
are eligible for health transfer set at P500 for each household per month or P6,000 a year.12 The
education transfer is P300 per month for 10 months every year for up to a maximum of three
children per family.

The main activities of the 4Ps implementation include: targeting, compliance verification system,
payment systems and grievance redress system. Brief descriptions of these activities are as
follows:

National Household Targeting System (NHTS)which targets the poor households

consists of a two-step process.13 The first step used geographic targeting based on the

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 2006 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FEIS) and the 2003 Small Area Estimates.
Using these surveys, the DSWD formulated a list of the poorest provinces and
municipalities.14

The second step involved the household assessment using the Household Assessment
Form, a two-page questionnaire with 35 variables, administered through interviews.
These were encoded and a proxy means test (PMT) model was applied to estimate the
income of households. As of February 2011, the NHTS has already identified 5,219,936
poor households as potential CCT beneficiaries.

The compliance verification system (CVS) is a six-step process that monitors how the
beneficiaries comply with the conditions set by the 4Ps 15 (see Figure 1). The National
Project Management Office (NPMO) distributes CVS Forms to school officials, health
center officers and the municipal/city links.

These CVS forms will indicate and verify the attendance of school children, visits to
health centers of mothers and the attendance to the family development sessions of
family heads. The municipal/city links will collect them on a quarterly basis and submit
to the regional IT office or the NPMO for encoding and consolidation. The report
generated from this shall be the basis for the payment of benefits.

Figure 1. Flow of Activities under the Compliance Verification System

6. CV Based Payments Processing 1. Generation of CV Forms

National Project Management Office (NPMO)-
National Project Management Office (NPMO)-
Management Information System (MIS), LandBank
Management Information System (MIS)
(Cash Card/Over the Counter)

5. Encoding of CV Forms, 2. Distribution of CV Forms

Recommendations and Approvals
Regional IT Officers, Regional Focal Persons, Regional DSWD Regional Field Offices, City/Municipal
Director, NPMO CVS Focal Person, NPMO Program Links, LGUs
Manager

4. Collection of CV Forms 3. Quarterly Monitoring of Non-

Compliances
DSWD Regional Field Offices, City/Municipal School Teachers, Principals and Supervisors (for
Links, Local Government Units.. education), heads of health centers (for health),
Municipal Links (for FDS)

Source: DSWD, 2011

Payment system entails cash grant paid quarterly through the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) using a cash card.16 The cash grants shall be received by the most
responsible person in the householdusually the mother. The households will receive
the cash grant for a maximum of 5 years.

Where there are no ATMs and cash provision through card is not possible, over-the-
counter payment is allowed. Last October 2010, the DSWD piloted the distribution of
grants through the GCASH Remit of Globe Telecoms in three hard-to-reach and
unbanked areas in the provinces of Quezon and Palawan covering some 10,000
beneficiaries.17 GCASH Remit is a cash remittance service where beneficiaries can pick
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 up their cash transfers in accredited partner outlets such as pawnshops, sari-sari stores,
cellphone shops and airtime reloading stations, among others.

Grievance redress system is a set of systems and procedures aimed at resolving

complaints, queries and requests.18 Grievance committees are established at the national,
regional, and provincial levels to resolve complaints accordingly. Complaints may be
submitted through drop boxes found in barangays, filing a grievance form in municipal
offices or reporting through email or electronic forms available on the 4Ps website.

Overall, program implementation is being managed by the DSWD together with an advisory
committee composed of representatives from the departments of education and health, the
oversight agencies19, coordinating agencies20, Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) and local government units. Under Joint Memorandum Circulars 1 and 2 of 2009 and
2011, respectively, the roles and responsibilities of each of the agencies were identified to ensure
availability of supply on health and education needed for the implementation of the program.

Challenges/Issues in CCT Implementation

Similar to the Latin American experiences, the 4Ps has encountered a number of implementation
challenges that impact on service delivery and open opportunities for error, fraud and
corruption. A process risk mapping by the World Bank identified decision-points where
program implementers both at the national and sub-national level have high-degree of
discretion.21 With wide latitude for discretion, the potential for leakage can be significant. Note
that the rapid scale-up of the 4Ps has highlighted these issues that were not readily observed
during the pilot years. Clearly, this casts serious doubts on the institutional capacity of DSWD
and its partners and the readiness of the systems to implement the 4Ps on such a scale.

The areas/activities where the risks are mostly likely to emerge are: targeting/registration of
beneficiaries, payment system and monitoring of the compliance of conditions.22 Equally
important is the institutional design/arrangements, as well as organizational capacity, to service
delivery. It is noteworthy that defining the lines of authority and responsibility is the take-off
point for ensuring an adequate accountability framework.

The implementation issues are the following:

Defining lines of responsibility and assigning incentives. The multi-sectoral nature

and the decentralized service delivery of the 4Ps program require the coordination of
multiple institutions across levels and properly aligning incentives to service providers.23

A key concern in this area is how incentives can be properly aligned with institutions to
ensure effective performance.24 For example, local governments may not necessarily
comply with their administrative/operational responsibility in the 4Ps, e.g. supply side
provisions, without the incentives to do so. LGUs may consider this as a burden which
they may or may not comply with. Or, if LGUs are given significant discretion in
determining eligibility, there is a tendency to enrol as many people as possible. Apart
from excessive enrolment, LGUs can also exercise political discretion among borderline
cases for rent-seeking purposes. Discretion can introduce risks of corruption and
political influence into the registration process.

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 Another institutional concern pertains to the issue of supply constraint. Compliance
with the CCT conditions depends on adequate supply-side investments (in schools,
health care facilities, etc.). Based on the Memorandum Circular, the DepEd, DoH and
the LGUs are tasked to ensure availability of such goods and services. However, the
DSWD has yet to complete its supply-side assessment in 320 of the 729 cities and
municipalities that have been listed as CCT areas by November 2010. 25 Of the 409 CCT
towns and cities audited, the overwhelming majority do not have adequate capacity to
provide social services.

As indicated in Tables 2 and 3, more than two-thirds of elementary schools in CCT areas
have not met seven of the nine quality benchmarks set by the DepEd.26 Similarly, more
than half of the cities and municipalities with CCT programs have not met all three
benchmarks on health personnel set by the DoH.27

Table 2. Performance of Municipalities/Cities with CCT

on meeting Department of Health Benchmark Standards (as of
November 2010)
No. of No. of
municipalities/cities municipalities/cities
Indicator (benchmark ratio) Percent (%) Percent (%)
meeting DoH meeting DoH
standards standards
Doctor to Population ratio
124 30.32 285 69.68
(1:20,000)
Midwife to Population ratio
172 42.05 237 57.95
(1:5,000)
Nurse to Population ratio (1:
175 42.79 234 57.21
20,000)
Source: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2011
Notes: 1. Data from CCT areas in phase 1 and phase 2; partial data from phase 3 areas. DSWD refers to each phase of CCT
expansion as a set
2. Data from 409 cities and municipalities out of 729 covered by CCT phases 1 and 3

Table 3. Performance of Elementary School vis a vis Department

of Education Standards in CCT-Covered Areas (as of November
2010)
No. of Schools Percent No. of Schools Percent
Indicator (Benchmark Ratio) Meeting DepEd Not Meeting
(%) (%)
Standards DepEd Standards
General Data
Pupil to Deworming Pills Ratio (1:2) 555 11 4,665 89.37
Pupil to Seat Ratio (1:1) 1,896 36.32 3,324 63.68
Pupil to Classroom Ratio (45:1) 4,573 87.61 647 12.39
Pupil to Teacher Ratio (45:1) 4,923 94.31 297 5.69
Learning Materials
Pupil to Science Textbook Ratio (1:1) 422 8.08 4,798 91.92
Pupil to English Textbook Ratio (1:1) 901 17.26 4,319 82.74
Pupil to Math Textbook Ratio (1:1) 901 17.26 4,319 82.74
Pupil to HEKASI Textbook Ratio (1:1) 1,034 19.81 4,186 80.19
Pupil to Filipino Textbook Ratio (1:1) 1,091 20.90 4,129 79.10
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 Source: PCIJ 2011
Note: Data based on 5,250 schools in 729 cities and municipalities covered by Sets 1, 2 and 3

Targeting Beneficiaries. Methodological issues in the NHTS appear to contribute to

significant exclusion errors (that is the non-inclusion of eligible households).28 Note that
the poorest municipalities and cities in the provinces were selected based on the 2003
Small Area Poverty estimates. Only those with poverty incidence greater than or equal to
36.99% are included in the screening process.29 Already poor households who happen to
live in mixed and upper-income areas are excluded from the program. More so, the
system has effectively excluded 755 cities and municipalities from the program.30 As a
result, some 40% of the poor are not covered by the 4Ps. 31

The NHTS also suffers from the lack of appropriate tool updates. The use of the 2003
Small Area Poverty estimates as part of the targeting instrument has been criticized as
out of date after a few years of crisis and/or rapid economic change. The regular update
of PMT is highly desired because the level of household consumption is expected to
change more quickly across time than multi-dimensional poverty indicators.32 Otherwise,
this will leave many more families who did not registerbut are equally poor and
vulnerableout of the system.

Compliance to conditionalities. Compliance rate of 4Ps conditionalities has been

generally high for the pilot years.33 A spot check report by the Social Weather Station
last February-March 2010 on the compliance to the education conditionality in Northern
Samar indicated a high rate of compliance at 97% enrolment of children 6-11 years old
and an 88% compliance with the requirement for attendance (85% of the time).34

However, with the rapid expansion of the 4Ps, the roll-out of the computerized
compliance verification system (CVS) has delay issues which could affect the timely
transfer of payments to beneficiaries, as well as the enforcement of sanctions for non-
compliance.

The first quarterly payment to beneficiaries does not require the verification of any of the
conditions.35 But subsequent cash transfers will require information from the CVS to
determine the amount of the grant to be paid or if sanctions are to be imposed.
Apparently, the development of the CVS has been delayed with computerized
implementation of verification having started only in the first quarter of 2010 (for benefit
payments in June 2010) and only for Set 1 areas.36 Set 2 CVS implementation started in
the 3rd quarter of 2010 (for payments in December 2010) and Set 3 implementation was
planned for the 1st quarter of 2011 (for payments in June 2011).37

The lack of reliable information clearly impedes establishing a meaningful relationship

between the conditions and payments through the enforcement of sanctions. Unless the
CVS becomes fully operational, the payment system cannot make the precise calculations
of the amount to be paid to each family or suspend payment due to non-compliance.

Benefit Payments. Making precise cash payments on time is another major challenge
of the 4Ps for specific reasons. One, payments require very accurate payroll and this
entails adequate data entry applications from the programs management information
system. Discrepancies in data from the registration process and CVS have already
resulted in double payments to beneficiaries, payment to non-compliant beneficiaries and
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 delays in disbursements. There were instances, as reported by the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism, that beneficiary households received one-year lump sum grants,
including the 10-months when they were not yet CCT eligible, as their first payout.38
Other families with three children reportedly receive less than the amount, while others
received P15,000 despite having less than three children.39

Second, beneficiary households usually live in remote or poor areas where banks have
very little or no presence. The lack of automated teller machines in these areas presents a
risk in the programs implementation, including illegal charges of officials for certain
services. To address the issue of access, the 4Ps must pursue systems of mixed payments
that can be adapted to the conditions and circumstances of the geographical area where
the payments are made.

On this note, the DSWD has partnered with Globe Telecoms to use GCASH Remit as
another means to distribute cash transfers to beneficiaries in far-flung areas. As of
March 2011, some 18,000 partner outlets have been accredited in 16 of the remotest
districts and a total of P1 billion have been disbursed through this system.40

Mitigating the Risk Factors

The rapid scale-up of the 4Ps implementation has brought to light implementation issues that
could undermine its ability to reach the target population by 2016. Broad public support to 4Ps
operations is pivotal to ensure its political and financial sustainability. Hence, putting the
necessary accountability mechanisms in key 4Ps activities will mitigate the risks and help
maintain program credibility.

Effective accountability measures can be implemented at the program level, such as

recertification of beneficiaries, MIS and spot checks; or at the beneficiary level, such as grievance
redress system and other strategic communication plans. Program and beneficiary level
approaches represent distinct ways of reviewing the program cyclefrom targeting, compliance
verification and benefit deliveryand of coordinating the institutions and actors involved in
each of these processes.

Increase frequency of re-certification (e.g. application of proxy means test) to

minimize the risk of inclusion and exclusion errors. Part of the design features of
CCT programs is its ability to re-evaluate assumptions about recipient eligibility and the
frequency of recertification. Among OECD countries, it is common for recertification
to take place after two years or less.41 In the case of the NHTS, recertification is being
required every 3 years.42 Recertification is less frequent among developing countries
because of institutional capacity or resource constraints.

Targeting errors can also be reduced during implementation by good validation and
grievance redress systems (GRS). Through the GRS, a total of 46,740 households has
been delisted from the 4Ps since 2008. 43 Validation arrangements, however, should be
carefully designed to avoid local capture and undermining the PMT system.

Improve management information system (MIS) to facilitate flow of reliable and

accurate information in all the stages of 4Ps implementation. The information
requirement of the internal monitoring system of the 4Ps which covers all aspects of the
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 implementation processfrom registration of beneficiaries, verification of compliance to
payment systemis being handled by a computerized management information system44.
In effect, the MIS ensures that every beneficiary household meets all the eligibility criteria
and is receiving the right amount of cash grant depending on its current status and
compliance with program conditionalities.45

While an effective MIS can be a key instrument for accountability in the CCT program, it
can also be an additional source of risk for potential errors, political manipulation, service
interruption, and fraud.46 These types of problems can be lessened by implementing
several strategies on data quality and database management such as:

The size of targeting errors can be decreased through the use of good
information management practices that focus on data quality (cross-checking
with official sources, automatic detection of duplications, etc.).47
Improved monitoring of compliance requires ex-ante and ex-post mitigation
strategies such as introduction of financial incentives to improve data recording
by focal persons and cross-checking data (e.g. manually in paper-based programs
and automatically in electronic programs); spot checks based on unusual results
(e.g. if hours attended exceed hours of school); and implementation of automated
checks for inconsistencies.48

Conduct regular spot checks to determine quality, effectiveness and efficiency of

the program and detect short-term issues with respect to the program cycle. In
the case of 4Ps, spot checks are conducted twice a year by a third party. Among the
cases with successful application of spot checks was Colombias Familias en Accin
program. Interviews were conducted in a randomly selected sample of 20 municipalities.
Program staff interview participants, program officials, and local government staff using
structured questionnaires covering 400 indicators of critical program aspects including
enrolment, verification of compliance with conditionalities, payment, appeals, and
participation in and quality of health education sessions.

Design effective communication strategy to broaden awareness and sustain

public and political support. Misconceptions about the 4Ps have been rooted from
lack of awareness and knowledge about its design and features. Chief among them is
that the 4Ps is a dole-out rather than a development program. The communication
strategy must be able to impress upon the public the soundness of the technical design
and rules of the 4Ps, especially in the targeting and selection process. This will reinforce
the credibility of the program, as well as of the participating institutions, and minimize
perception of political capture of the process. Finally, there is a need to mobilize
coordinated support from the LGUs, DOH and DepEd to ensure prompt response to
supply-side gaps and effective resolution of grievances.

Conclusion

In the scale up of the 4Ps program, there are implementation issues that urgently need
government attention so as to mitigate the risks of error, fraud and corruption. These issues,
however, are not insurmountable, as shown by experiences of other countries. It is important to
realize that CCTs are not a panacea to poverty yet it has the potential to increase human capital
formation while providing a lifeline cash transfer to the very poor to meet their survival needs.
8
As such, it can be an important tool to help bridge the gap in achieving the Millennium
Development Goals, i.e. reduce poverty, achieve universal primary education and improve
maternal health, where the country lags behind.

Early assessment of the program has shown that the program has the potential to achieve this as
shown by good compliance rates of beneficiary households on education and health conditions.
All of these, however, depend on the efficient delivery of services within the program. The
DSWD should therefore ensure the effective implementation of the program by putting in place
accountability mechanisms to achieve the expected goals. By doing so, the Pantawid Pamilyang
Pilipino Program or 4Ps may serve as a blueprint for more targeted social protection programs of
the government.

Endnotes
1 CCT is a form of social assistance through which a regular amount of money is given directly to particular groups
(e.g. the unemployed, pregnant women or families with children) in exchange for compying with a set of
requirements.
2 Countries with CCTs in 2008 include Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, Costa

Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Kenya, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Turkey and Yemen
(Asian Development Bank. 2009. Proceedings from the Regional Workshop).
3 Arulpragasam, Jehan, et al. 2011. Building Governance and Anti-Corruption in the Philippines Conditional Cash

Transfer, Philippine Social Protection Note No.1. Manila: World Bank.

4 Mathauer, Inke. 2004. Institutional Analysis Toolkit for Safety Net Interventions, Social Protection Discussion

Paper Series No. 0418. Washington, DC: World Bank.

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Error is an unintentional violation of program that results in the wrong benefit amount being paid or in payment

to an ineligible applicant. Fraud occurs when a claimant deliberately makes a false statement or conceals or
distorts relevant information regarding program eligibility or level of benefits. Corruption commonly involves
manipulation of beneficiary rosters, for example, registering ineligible beneficiaries to garner political support,
and staff accepting illegal payments from eligible or ineligible beneficiaries (Philippine Social Protection Note,
World Bank, 2010).
9 Department of Social Welfare and Development. 2010. 4Ps: Building Human Capital for Social Resiliency (A

primer), Manila.
10 Numbers are cumulative. Set 1: 340,391 households; Set 2: 289,658 households; Set 3: 413,042 households and Set

4: currently at 553, 229. The remaining target households for Set 4 c and d with a total of 749,921 households
shall be registered by the end of May 2011 to complete the 2.3 million target.
11 Arulpragasam, op cit., p. 3
12 DSWD (2010), op cit., p.2.
13 For a complete discussion of the NHTS, please refer to the article titled National Household Targeting System:

Concepts and Methodology which appears on CPBRD Notes Vol. 1 No. 1, 2011.
14 Ibid.
15 DWSD (2008), op cit., p. 8.
16 Ibid.
17 As per discussion with the 4Ps staff of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in July 2011.
18 DSWD (2008), op cit., p. 10.
19 Oversight agencies include the Department of Budget and Management, National Economic and Development

Authority and National Anti-Poverty Commission.

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20 Coordinating agencies include the National Nutrition Council, Council for the Welfare of Children and the
Philippine Commission on Women.
21 World Bank (2011), op cit., p. 2.
22 Ibid.
23 CCTs constitute an intervention that requires an inter-sectoral approach. For example, assistance based on
whether a child is immunized or whether it is regularly attending school may not work if clinics or schools
are not accessible or of unacceptable quality.
24 World Bank. 2007. Control and Accountability Mechanisms in Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: A Review
of Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean. Operational Innovations in Latin America and the
Caribbean, Volume 1 Number 1, Washington, D.C.
25 de los Reyes, Che. Deficit in Education, Health Services Weighs Down CCT. Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism. Website: http://pcij.org/stories/deficit-in-education-health-services-weighs-down-
cct/.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28 Reyes, Celia M. 2011. Issues on Targeting and Implications of new Methodology in Measuring Poverty. A
presentation to the Committee of Poverty Alleviation in the House of Representatives. 23 March. Quezon
City.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32 Asian Development Bank. 2009. Social Assistance and Conditional Cash Transfers: Proceedings of the Regional
Workshop. Metro Manila.
33 Without the installation of computerized CVS, it is assumed that manual tracking was used to monitor
compliance of conditionalities during the pilot years.
34 The data herein were presented by Mr. Mahar Mangahas, President of the Social Weather Station, during the
forum on the National Household Targeting System and Conditional Transfers sponsored by the
Committees on Poverty Alleviation and Health, and the Congressional Policy and Budget Research
Department in the House of Representatives on February 21, 2011.
35 The first cash payment is made upon signing by mothers of the agreement to participate and comply with the
conditionalities.
36 Asian Development Bank. 2010. Project Administration Manual: Social Protection Support Project. August
2010. Metro Manila.
37
Ibid.
38 de los Reyes, op cit, p.1.
39
Ibid.
40 Globe Telecoms GCASH REMIT in support of the Philippine Governments Poverty Alleviation Programs.
http://technology.cgap.org/2011/03/29/globe-telecom%E2%80%99s-gcash-remit-in-support-of-the-
philippine-government%E2%80%99s-poverty-alleviation-programs/
41 World Bank (2007), op cit., 10.
42 Based from consultation with NHTS-PR staff, July 2011.
43 Department of Social Welfare and Development. 2011. Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program: Status Report on
the Implementation for the First Quarter of 2011. August 18. Quezon City.
44 MIS is an integrated web-based system connected through a dedicated network between 17 DSWDs regional
offices and its NPMO.
45 Fernandez, Lusia and Olfindol, Rosechin. 2011. Overview of the Philippines Conditional Cash Transfer
Program: The Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (Pantawid Pamilya). Philippine Social Protection Note
No.2. Manila: World Bank.
46 Baldeon, Cesar, and Arribas-Banos. 2008. Management Information Systems in Social Safety Net Programs: A
Look at Accountability and Control Mechanisms. SP Discussion Paper No. 0819. World Bank.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.

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