SURVEY OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW mortal.
Since the said wound was not mortal, Labiaga should be convicted of
January-December 2013
Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra
Book I
ATTEMPTED FELONY
People v. Barra, G.R. No. 198020, 10 July 2013.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) conviction of
accused Barra for committing the crime of attempted robbery with homicide. The
facts of the case show that, upon entering the victims house, Barra demanded
money from the former while poking his gun against the formers victim. Barra shot
the victim when the latter stated that he did not have the money.
Barras intention was to extort money from the victim. By reason of the
victims refusal to give up his personal property, the victim was shot in the head,
causing his death. The element of taking was not complete, making the crime one
of attempted robbery with homicide.
The fact of asportation must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Since this fact was not duly established, Barra should be held liable only for the
crime of attempted robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article
297 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Barra is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only when he
commenced the commission of robbery directly by overt acts and did not perform
all the acts of execution which would produce robbery by reason of some causes or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
People v. Labiaga, G.R. No. 202867, 15 July 2013.
The lower court convicted accused Labiaga of the crime of frustrated
murder. The Supreme Court, however, held that Labiaga committed the crime of
attempted murder.
As in the instant case, if the evidence fails to convince the court that the
wound sustained would have caused the victims death without timely medical
attention, the accused should be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated
murder. Here, it does not appear that the wound sustained by the victim was
1
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
CONSPIRACY
People v. Hong Yeng E, G.R. No. 181826, 9 January 2013.
Accused were convicted of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
When conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all conspirators.
Direct evidence of conspiracy is not necessary as it can be clearly deduced from the
acts of the accused.
There is conspiracy in the instant case. Although the plastic bags containing
shabu were found solely in the possession of accused Chua, it was evident that co-
accused Yen-E had knowledge of its existence. As the records would show, Yen E
negotiated for the sale of dangerous drugs. When Chua arrived in the vicinity, she
approached Yen E before delivering the shabu. Accuseds acts indubitably
demonstrate a coordinated plan on their part to actively engage in the illegal
business of drugs.
People v. Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919, 9 January 2013.
Appellants Espiritu and her mother, Seraspe, were convicted of conspiring
to sell, transport, deal in, administer, deliver, negotiate, and distribute shabu.
The Supreme Court did not uphold Seraspes claim that she did not
conspire with Espiritu in committing the crime. Both the prosecutions evidence and
Seraspes testimony sufficiently prove that conspiracy existed. As in here, an
accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same
object, one performing one part and another performing another so as to complete
it with a view to the attainment of the same object. Also, their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating
closeness of personal association, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments.
People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, 13 February 2013.

Eduardo and Edwin, the accused, were convicted of the crime of
murder.Here, both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to
achieve a common purpose for assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns.
Proof of the actual agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because
conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts.To be a conspirator, one did
not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he have to know
the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal acts.
In the instant case, the accuseds acting in concert was manifest not only
from their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but
also from their joint attack that Eduardo commenced by firing successive shots at
one of the victims and immediately followed by Edwins shooting of the other
victims. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle
as soon as they had achieved their common purpose.
People v. Pondivida, G.R. No. 188969, 27 February 2013.
Accused Pondivida was convicted for the crime of murder. He counters
that the prosecution has not established his conspiracy with persons named Reyes
and Alvarico.
Pondividas argument does not hold water. Conspiracy may be deduced
from the mode, method, and manner in which the offense has been perpetrated. It
may be inferred from the acts of the accused when those acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Proof of a
previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential, but the fact
that the malefactors have acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.
In the instant case, while there is no evidence of any previous agreement
among Pondivida, Reyes, and Alvarico to commit the crime, their concerted acts
before, during, and after the incident establish a joint purpose and intent to kill.
People v. Salvador, G.R. No. 201443, 10 April 2013.
Accused Betty and Monico were convicted of conspiring to commit the
crime of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom.
The Supreme Court held that Betty and Monico acted as conspirators and
not as accomplices.
2
While conspirators and accomplices both know and agree with the criminal
design, they differ in that:
Conspirator Accomplice
Knows the criminal intention Comes to know about the course of action after
because he himself has decided the principals have reached the decision, and
upon such course of action only does he agree to cooperate in its execution
Decides that a crime should be Merely assents to the plan and cooperates in its
committed accomplishment
Author of a crime Merely the principals instrument who performs
acts not essential to the perpetration of the
offense
AccusedMonicos assistance to the victim when the latter descended the
basement stairs and Bettys visit to the safehouse to bring Jollibee food items were
not indispensable acts in the commission of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
However, what spells the difference on why we still find the Betty and Monico as
principals and co-conspirators in the kidnapping is the circumstance that their acts
of assisting the victim to the safehouse and bringing of food to the latter coincide
with their ownership of the safehouse.
People v. Collado, G.R. No. 185719, 17 June 2013.
Only accused Ranada was convicted of violation of Section 14 of R.A. 9165.
Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy.
In the instant case, it is clear that it was only Ranada who was caught
having in his possession an aluminum foil intended for using dangerous drugs. As to
his co-accused, not one drug paraphernalia was found in their possession. The
police officers were only able to find the other drug paraphernalia on top of a table.
Thus, there is no conspiracy between Ranada and his co-accused.
Bacasmas v. People, G.R. Nos. 189343, 189369, and 189553, 10 July 2013.
Accused were convicted of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In order to establish the existence of conspiracy, unity of purpose and
unity in the execution of an unlawful objective by the accused must be proven.
Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It is enough that there be proof
that two or more persons acted towards the accomplishment of a common
unlawful objective through a chain of circumstances, even if there was no actual
meeting among them.
In the instant case, a cash advance request cannot be approved and
disbursed without passing through several offices, including those of accused. It is
outrageous that they would have the courts believe that they did not conspire
when over hundreds of vouchers were signed and approved by them in a course of
30 months, without their noticing irregularities therein that should have prompted
them to refuse to sign the vouchers.
Clearly, they were in cahoots in granting the cash advances to Gonzales. By
these acts, accused defrauded the government of such a large sum of money that
should not have been disbursed in the first place, had they been circumspect in
performing their functions.
Posadas and Dayco v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. Nos. 168951 &
169000, 17 July 2013.
Petitioners were convicted of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. In
insisting on their innocence, they deny having acted in conspiracy as there is no
evidence to prove it.
Conspiracy was sufficiently proven here. For accused to be held as
conspirators, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. Therefore, if
it is proven that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating
a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a
conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert
means is proved.
Here, despite the claim of accused Posadas that he just saw the
appointment papers in question on his desk when he returned from his trip, the
admitted fact is that co-accused Dayco made those appointments for Posadas and
the latter acted upon the same favorably as he collected the compensation therein.
People v. Alawig, G.R. No. 187731, 18 September 2013.
Accused were convicted of the crime of murder.
3
Conspiracy was found to be attendant in this case. Conspiracy must be
proven during trial with the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the
agreement of the parties either by direct or circumstantial evidence of the
conspirators conduct before, during and after the commission of the felony to
achieve a common design or purpose.
Here, by manipulating the entries in the logbook, accused conspired to
make it appear that they were in some place other than where the killing took place
and that they were performing acts independent of each other. The entries were
recorded with the concurrence of all the accused.
People v. Gambao, et al., G.R. No. 172707, 01 October 2013.
The accused were convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may
be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during, or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense.
In the instant case, the testimonies, when taken together, reveal the
common purpose of the accused and how they were all united in its execution from
beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that:
1. Before the incident, two of the accused kept coming back to the
victims house;
2. During the kidnapping, accused changed shifts in guarding the victim;
and
3. Accused were those present when the ransom money was recovered
and when the rescue operation was conducted.
People v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 201723, 13 June 2013; People v. Credo, G.R.
No. 197360, 3 July 2013; People v. Niegas, G.R. No. 194582, 27 November
2013, and People v. Maglente & Velasquez, G.R. No. 201445, 27
November 2013. (same doctrines as discussed above)

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
Flores v. People, G.R. No. 181354, 27 February 2013.
Accused Flores was convicted of the crime of homicide.
Flores did not act in self-defense in committing the crime. Relating to the
second element constituting self-defense, the Supreme Court has held that the
means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the
nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted. It must also be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.
In the instant case, the continuous shooting by Flores which caused the
fatal gunshot wounds were not necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed
unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already lying flat on the
ground after he was first shot on the shoulder.
Sombol v. People, G.R. No. 194564, 10 April 2013.
Accused Sombol was convicted of the crime of homicide. He argued that
he should be acquitted from this charge because he only acted in self-defense.
Sombols argument cannot be upheld. For the element of unlawful
aggression to be present, there must be an actual physical assault, or at least a
threat to inflict real imminent injury upon a person. It presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected, or imminent dangernot merely threatening and intimidating action.
It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones
life.
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense to be
appreciated. Without unlawful aggression, the accused has nothing to prevent or
repel, and there is then no basis for appreciating the two other requisites.
In the instant case, while Sombol testified that the victim attacked him
with a soldering iron, this self-serving testimony was belied by the testimonies of
two prosecution witnesses who never mentioned any attack, and by the testimony
of his own defense witness, who categorically stated that the victim did nothing
with the soldering iron.
4
Labiaga, G.R. No. 202867.
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the
burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
elements of his defense. However, accused Labiagas version of the incident was
uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the two principal witnesses of the prosecution.
Labiagas failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his
testimony, and his unconvincing demonstration of the struggle between him and
the victim before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), led the Court reject his claim of
self-defense. In contrast, the witness account of the incident is persuasive. Both
the CA and the RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were credible and
presented in a clear and convincing manner.
People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340, 24 July 2013; People v. Roman, G.R.
No. 198110, 31 July 2013.
Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing
as there is nothing to repel. The unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life
and personal safety of the person defending himself in actual peril. A mere
threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful aggression.
People v. Vergara, G.R. No. 177763, 3 July 2013.
Accused were found guilty of committing the crime of murder. Accused
counter that they merely acted in self-defense in committing the crime.
This, however, cannot be upheld because the element of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim is absent. By the testimonies of all the
witnesses, the victims actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant
the use of force employed by accused-appellant. The records reveal that the victim
had been walking home albeit drunk when he passed by accused. However, there is
no indication of any untoward action from him to warrant the treatment that he
had by accused-appellants hands.
Credo, G.R. No. 197360.
For the accused to be entitled to exoneration based on self-defense or
defense of relatives, complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful aggression, there
would be nothing to prevent or repel. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger Accused Bartolome was convicted with the crime of illegal sale of shabu. In
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. insisting on his innocence, Bartolome claims that the police officers involved have
merely instigated him in committing the said crime.
There can be no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim because at
the time of the incident, he was only holding a lemon and an egg. The fact that he Bartolomes argument cannot be upheld. There is a definite distinction
was unarmed effectively belied the allegation of the accused that he was prompted between instigation and entrapment:
to retaliate in self-defense when the victim first hacked and hit him on his neck.
Instigation Entrapment
Since the criterion for determining whether there is a valid self-defense
Means by which the accused is lured into Employment of such ways and means
and a valid defense of relatives require that there be unlawful aggression
the commission of the offense charged in for the purpose of trapping or
perpetrated by the victim on the one making the defense or on his relative, it is safe
order to prosecute him capturing a lawbreaker
to conclude that when the trial court held that there can be no valid self-defense
Officers of the law or their agents incite, The criminal intent or design to
because there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, it was, in
induce, instigate, or lure an accused into commit the offense charged originates
effect, likewise saying that there can be no valid defense of a relative for lack of an
committing an offense which he or she in the mind of the accused.
essential requisite. In other words, when the trial court made a ruling on the claim
would otherwise not commit and has no
of self-defense, it, at the same time, also necessarily passed upon the issue of
intention of committing Law enforcement officials merely
defense of a relative.
facilitate the apprehension of the
criminal by employing ruses and
schemes. Thus, the accused cannot
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE; INSTIGATION justify his or her conduct.
Where law enforcers act as co-principals, Cannot bar prosecution and conviction
People v. Tapere, G.R. No. 178065, 20 February 2013. the accused will have to be acquitted

Accused Tapere was found guilty of illegally selling shabu. He counters that
his arrest has resulted from an instigation, not from a legitimate entrapment.
The difference between entrapment and instigation lies in the origin of the
criminal intentin entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal, but in instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime
and suggests it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
Here, the police officer offered to buy from Tapere a definite quantity of
shabu. Even if, as Tapere claimed, he was unaware that the police officer was then
working as an undercover agent for the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, he
had no justification for accepting the latters offer to buy the shabu. What is clear to
the Supreme Court is that the decision to peddle the shabu emanated from
Taperes own mind, such that he did not need much prodding from the police
officer or anyone else to engage in the sale of the shabu.
People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, 6 February 2013.
5
As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of
entrapment, is a valid means of arresting violators of R.A. No. 9165. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.
In the instant case, the accused was not arrested following an instigation
for him to commit the crime. Instead, he was caught in flagrante delicto during an
entrapment through buy-bust. In a buy-bust operation, the pusher sells the
contraband to another posing as a buyer; once the transaction is consummated, the
pusher is validly arrested because he is committing or has just committed a crime in
the presence of the buyer.
People v. Rebotazo, G.R. No. 192913, 13 June 2013.
Accused Rebotazo was convicted of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II,
of R.A. No. 9165.
 The Supreme Court upheld Rebotazos conviction. At the outset, buy-bust
operations are legally sanctioned procedures, provided they are undertaken with
due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards. They are one form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a
criminal in the act of committing an offense, and must be undertaken with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to comply with said
safeguards. In particular, it has sufficiently established the chain of custody required
in prosecuting dangerous drugs cases.
Seraspe, G.R. No. 180919.
Appellants Espiritu and her mother, Seraspe, were convicted of conspiring
to sell, transport, deal in, administer, deliver, negotiate, and distribute shabu.
Seraspe raises the defense of instigation to gain her acquittal. Her defense
cannot be upheld, however. Entrapment in this case has been clearly established. It
was only upon receipt of a report of Espiritus drug trafficking activities from the
confidential informant that a buy-bust team had been formed and negotiations for
the sale of the shabu had been made.
Seraspe also testified that she had agreed to the transaction of her own
free will, seeing it as an opportunity to earn money. Equally notable is that she
quickly produced a sample of the drug. Clearly, she was never forced, coerced, or
induced through incessant entreaties to source the prohibited drug for the buy-bust
teama fact which even she admitted in her testimony.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; MINORITY
People v. Buado, Jr., G.R. No. 170634, 8 January 2013.
Accused Buado was convicted of two counts of of rape of his two minor
daughters. He was not otherwise penalized for the crime of qualified rape, for the
prosecutions failure in proving the minority of one of the victims.
6
Jurisprudence has previously settled the guidelines in establishing the age
of the minor victim, either as an element of a crime or a qualifying circumstance:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents
such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of
birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document were shown to have
been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the clear and credible
testimony of the victims mother or a member of the family, either by
affinity or consanguinity, who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree shall suffice. This rule shall apply under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim were alleged to be below three years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than seven years old;
b. If the victim were alleged to be below seven years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
and
c. If the victim were alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the
testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age,
the complainants testimony will suffice, provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended
party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of
the victim.
People v. Pamintuan, G.R. No. 192239, 5 June 2013.
Accused Pamintuan was convicted of committing the crime of rape against
his niece, a minor.
Article 266-A (1)(d) provides for the crime of statutory rape. Its elements
are:
1. That the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
 2. That such woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
In the instant case, the lower courts should have recognized the victims
entitlement to exemplary damages, considering that the crime which accused
Pamintuan has been convicted of has as aggravating circumstances the victims
minority and Pamintuans common-law relationship with the victims mother.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, 23 January 2013.
The accused were convicted of the crime of murder. Accuseds claim that
the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, however, cannot be upheld. This circumstance could only be
appreciated when there is evidence showing the following:
1. The time when the offender was determined to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination;
and
3. A sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow
himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
None of these circumstances were shown in the instant case.
People v. Alinao, G.R. No. 191256, 18 September 2013.
Together with his son, accused Alinao was convicted of the crime of
murder with the use of illegally possessed firearm. Among others, Alinao claims that
there is no evidence categorically showing evident premeditation.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must
be proved:
1. The time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
2. An act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and
3. Sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal
act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry
7
out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.
In the instant case, in razing the victimshouse in order to drive him out
and shooting the latter the moment he appears at his front door, Alinao clearly had
a previously and carefully crafted plan to kill his victim. The time it took Alinao and
his son to device their plan, plot where the gasoline should be poured, and procure
the gasoline and the firearms, as well as the time it took to go to the victims house,
and even the time when they waited for the victim to come out of the house, all
afforded Alinao sufficient opportunity to reflect upon (1) the consequences of his
act to kill the victim and (2) his determination to commit the cold-blooded deed
from the time of its conception until it was carried out.
Alawig, G.R. No. 187731 and People v. Dearo, et al., G.R. No. 190862, 9
October 2013. (same doctrines as discussed above)
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH
Credo, G.R. No. 197360.
Accused-appellants were convicted of murder. There can be no denying
that they have taken advantage of their superior strength to ensure the successful
execution of their crime. This was evident from the fact that there were three of
them against the victim who was alone. Also, the victim was unarmed while the
three of them were each armed with a bolo.
There is abuse of superior strength when the perpetrators of a crime
deliberately used excessive force, thereby rendering the victim incapable of
defending himself. The notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair advantage
for the aggressor.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY
People v. Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603, 16 January 2013.
Rarugal was convicted for the crime of murder.
As an aggravating circumstance, treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
 This circumstance was present in the instant case when Rarugal suddenly
stabbed the victim while the latter was innocently cycling along the street. Here,
Rarugal suddenly and swiftly attacked and stabbed the victim. The swift turn of
events left the victim defenseless to protect himself, allowing Rarugal to commit
the crime without risk to his own person.
Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. It may
still exist even if the attack were frontal, so long as the same is sudden and
unexpected.
In the instant case, it was clear that the victim had no inkling of the
impending danger against him. The attack was sudden, despite appellants act of
placing their arms around the victim in a friendly manner.
Also, the victim was 57 years old at the time of his death. His age then may
have slowed down his thought processes and reflexes in understanding appellants
intentions. The attack was, therefore, clearly sudden and unexpected.
People v. Zapuiz, G.R. No. 199713, 20 February 2013.
Accused Zapuiz was convicted of the crime of murder. There is treachery
when the attack against an unarmed victim is so sudden that he has clearly no
inkling of what the assailant is about to do. This is the case here because, while the
victim was sitting down before a table, busily writing, Zapuiz came up behind him
and, without warning, shot him at the back of the head. Evidently, the victim, who
was unarmed and unaware, had no opportunity at all to defend himself.
People v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 198789, 3 June 2013.
Accused Bernardo was found guilty of the complex crime of murder with
attempted murder.
The presence of treachery qualifying the killing was clearly manifested in
the facts of this case. The presence of two conditions is necessary to constitute
treachery:
1. The victim was not in the position to defend himself at the time of the
attack; and
8
2. The means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Here, the prosecution established that the victims were unarmed aboard a
motorcycle when another motorcycle suddenly appeared and shot them several
times. This clearly showed that the victims were totally defenseless when they were
fired upon by Bernardo.
People v. Calara, G.R. No. 197039, 5 June 2013.
Accused Calara was convicted of the crime of murder. In insisting his
innocence, Calara argues that treachery is not present as to have qualified the
crime to that of murder.
Calaras argument was not upheld.The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime,
depriving the victim of any chance to defend himself or repel the aggression, thus
insuring its commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation
on the part of the victim.
In the instant case, the post-mortem findings indicate that the victim has
sustained a fatal wound on his back chest. The position of the fatal wound is more
than clear indication that the victim has been stabbed from behind, leaving him in a
defenseless state.
Vergara, G.R. No. 17763.
Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
Here, accused Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw his
arm around the victims shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The number and
severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that he was rendered
immobile and without any real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly
raising his arm to ward off the attack.
People v. Hatsero, G.R. No. 192179, 3 July 2013.
Accused Hatsero was convicted of the crime of murder. Hatsero claims
that it has not been established that he has consciously and deliberately used the
icepick in killing the victim in such a way as to insure his safety from any retaliation
or that the attack is sudden as to give the victim no opportunity to defend himself.
Hatseros defense cannot be upheld. The essence of treachery is that the
attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. The manner by which the victim was stabbed by Hatsero is obviously
indicative of treachery, when the latter would make the friendly gesture of offering
a drink to a person he intended to kill, intentionally luring the latter into a false
sense of security.
Labiaga, G.R. No. 202867.
A treacherous attack is one in which the victim was not afforded any
opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack. The existence of treachery is not
solely determined by the type of weapon used. If it appears that the weapon was
deliberately chosen to insure the execution of the crime, and to render the victim
defenseless, then treachery may be properly appreciated against the accused.
In the instant case, the victims were unarmed when accused Labiaga shot
them. The use of a 12-gauge shotgun against two unarmed victims is undoubtedly
treacherous, as it denies the victims the chance to fend off Labiaga.
Avelino v. People, G.R. No. 181444, 17 July 2013.
Avelino and his co-accused were convicted of the crime of murder.
The qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated in this
case. The elements of treachery are established by the testimony of one of the
witnesses, showing Avelinos unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim whose
vehicle was suddenly blocked by three men, at least one of whom was armed with a
firearm. The victim was then unarmed and had no opportunity to defend himself.
Alawig, G.R. No. 187731.
The circumstances surrounding the killing must be proved as indubitably as
the crime itself. Treachery cannot be presumed.
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Treachery is present in the instant case. Considering the contusions,
abrasions, and puncture wounds sustained by the victim, it is clear that he was first
manhandled prior to the shooting. The location of the gunshot wounds is likewise
indicative of the relative positions of the assailants vis--vis the victim. More
importantly, the assailants were positioned on a higher level than the victim which
could mean that the victim was in a kneeling or stooping position.
People v. Ibanez, G.R. No. 197813, 25 September 2013.
Accused Edwin and Alfredo were convicted of murder. Indeed, nothing can
be more sudden and unexpected than when accused Edwin and Alfredo attacked
the victim. The latter did not have the slightest idea that he was going to be
attacked because he was urinating and his back was turned from his assailants. The
prosecution was able to establish that petitioners attack on the victim was without
any slightest provocation on the latters part and that it was sudden and
unexpected. This is a clear case of treachery.
People v. Dearo, et al., G.R. No. 190862, 9 October 2013.
Accused were convicted of the crime of murder. The Supreme Court has
ruled that treachery is present when an assailant takes advantage of a situation in
which the victim is asleep, unaware of the evil design, or has just awakened.
Here, it has been established by the prosecution, and even confirmed by
the defense, that the victims were sleeping when they were shot. It was also clear
that the women were in no position to defend themselves, having been rudely
awakened by the shooting of their companion. The fact that they shouted for help
also showed their loss of hope in the face of what was coming rapid gunfire from
long firearms.
People v. Villarmea, G.R. No. 200029, 13 November 2013.
Accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. Clearly, there was treachery in the case at bar. The victim was stabbed
without warning. There was no showing that he was armed. The attack was
unexpected and sudden, giving the unarmed victim no opportunity to resist the
assault. The numerical superiority of the assailants left the victim with zero means
of resistance or defense. Before he could fight back or run away, his attackers
pounced on him like some prized animal. Finally, the wounds located in the trunk
are too many to disregard or negate treachery.
People v. Zulieta, G.R. No. 192183, 11 November 2013.

Accused Zulieta was convicted of murder. Treachery was present in this
case as the victim had been totally unaware of the threat. He was merely sitting on
the bench in front of a sari-sari store eating bananas when Zulieta, without any
provocation or prior argument, suddenly stabbed him on his chest, piercing the
right ventricle of his heart thus causing his instantaneous death. The stabbing was
deliberate, unexpected, swift and sudden which foreclosed any escape, resistance
or defense coming from the victim.
People v. Canaveras, G.R. No. 193839, 27 November 2013
Accused was convicted of the crime of murder.
The Supreme Court held that treachery, as a qualifying circumstance that
raised the crime to that of murder, was not present here. Treachery is not present
when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not
preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation
on the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when
the killing is done at the spur of the moment.
In the instant case, there was no time for accused Canavares and his
companions to plan and agree to deliberately adopt a particular means to kill the
victim. Even the choice of weapon, a beer bottle readily available and within
grabbing range at the table as Canavares followed outside, shows that the intent to
harm came about spontaneously.
People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 175602, 13 February 2013; Dela Rosa, G.R. No.
201723; People v. Mores, G.R. No. 189846, 26 June 2013; People v.
Jalbonian, G.R. No. 180281, 1 July 2013 (same doctrines as discussed
above).
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Collado, G.R. No. 185719.
Some of the appellants were found guilty as accessories for the crime of
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia.
The lower court erred, however in convicting the appellants as accessories.
In the instant case, what has been violated is Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165, which is a
crime of malum prohibitum. The degree of participation of the offenders then is not
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considered. All who have perpetrated the prohibited act are penalized to the same
extent. There is no principal or accomplice or accessory to consider. In short, the
degree of participation of the offenders does not affect their liabilities, and the
penalty on all of them are the same, whether they are principals or merely
accomplices or accessories.
R.A. No. 9165 itself likewise provides that, notwithstanding any law, rule,
or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the RPC, as amended, shall not apply
to the former law, except in the case of minor offenders.
People v. Eusebio, G.R. No. 182152, 25 February 2013.
The accused were convicted of conspiring with each other in committing
the crime of murder. The Supreme Court held, however, that the accused should be
convicted as accomplices instead of as conspirators because there is doubt as to
their degrees of participation in committing the crime.
The line that separates a conspirator by concerted action from an
accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is indeed slight. Accomplices do not
decide whether the crime should be committed. But, they assent to the plan and
cooperate in its accomplishment.
As in here, the solution in case of doubt is that it be resolved in favor of the
accused. Pertinently, previous jurisprudence has held that, when there is doubt as
to whether a guilty participant in a homicide has performed the role of principal or
accomplice, the court should favor the milder form of responsibility. He should be
given the benefit of the doubt and can be regarded only as an accomplice.
PENALTIES
Buado, Jr., G.R. No. 170634.
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibited only the imposition of the death penalty.
It did not affect the corresponding pecuniary or civil liabilities. It is likewise
mandated that a civil indemnity of P75,000 be imposed if the crime were qualified
by circumstances that warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
People v. Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, 3 April 2013.
Accused Vitero was found guilty of qualified rape under Article 266-A of
the RPC. While the Supreme Court upheld here the CAs ruling that Vitero be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, he is not
eligible for parole. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 provides that persons convicted of
offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of the said law, shall not be eligible for parole under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL).
People v. Suansing, G.R. No. 189822, 2 September 2013
Suansing was convicted of qualified rape. In convicting Suansing, however,
the lower courts did not consider the victims mental retardation as a qualifying
circumstance that would make the crime of rape punishable by death.
Paragraph 10 of Article 266-B of the RPC expressly provides that the
penalty of death shall be imposed "when the offender knew of the mental disability
x x x of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime." The
supreme penalty of death should have been imposed on the appellant due to the
special qualifying circumstance of knowledge at the time of the rape that "AAA"
was mentally disabled.
However, the enactment of RA 9346 prohibited the imposition of the
death penalty. In lieu thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in
accordance with Section 2 of RA 9346. In addition, as provided under Section 3
thereof, appellant shall not be eligible for parole.
COMPLEX CRIMES
Bernardo, G.R. No. 198789.
Accused Bernardo may be convicted only of the complex crime of murder
with attempted murder, not of the two separate crimes of murder and attempted
murder. The evidence does not conform to the information, which contains no
allegation that the accused was actuated by more than one criminal impulse. In
fact, the information merely alleges that the accused shot the victim, but it does not
allege that he did so several times.
In the absence of such a clear statement in the information, the accused
may be convicted only of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder.
After all, the concept of complex crimes is intended to favor the accused by
imposing a single penalty, irrespective of the number of crimes committed.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
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Escalante v. People, G.R. No. 192727, 9 January 2013.
The lower court erred in imposing the applicable penalties against
petitioner Escalante for having violated the election gun ban. The Omnibus Election
Code pertinently provides that any person found guilty of any election offense
imposed therein shall be imprisoned for not less than one year but not more than
six years and shall not be subject to probation.
Meanwhile, the ISL provides in part that, if the offense were punished by
any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and
the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Applying the ISL then, the imposable penalty for violation of the election
gun ban should have a maximum period, which shall not exceed six years, and a
minimum period which shall not be less than one year.
People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 188841, 6 March 2013.
Accused Fernandez was found guilty of unauthorized possession of 2.85
grams of shabu. This quantity is less than the ceiling of 200 grams provided in R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of the unauthorized possession of
which is prision correccional.
Applying the ISL, and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance that has attended the commission of the crime, the maximum period
is prision correccional in its medium period, which has a duration of two years, four
months, and one day to four years and two months. The minimum period is within
the range of the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor, the duration
of which is one month and one day to six months.
In the instant case then, the Supreme Court affirms the penalty of six
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision
correccional, as maximum, imposed upon Fernandez. It likewise affirms the CAs
deletion of the fine imposed by the RTCs since the law only provides for the
penalty of imprisonment.
People v. Linda, G.R. No. 200507, 26 June 2013.
Accused Linda was convicted of the crime of illegal sale of shabu.

Under R.A. No. 9165, the quantity of shabu is not material in the
determination of the corresponding penalty therefor. Meanwhile, the ISL provides
that, if the offense were punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same.
Here, considering the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 were, thus, correctly imposed. They
are within the period and range of the fine prescribed by law.
Bacolod v. People, G.R. No. 206236, 15 July 2013
The information specifically alleged that the house burned by the accused
was an inhabited dwelling. Pursuant to Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613
(Amending the Law on Arson), the penalty to be imposed if the property burned is
an inhabited house or dwelling is from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
Not being composed of three periods, however, such penalty should be
divided into three equal portions of time, and each portion forms one period of the
penalty. Yet, reclusion perpetua, being an indivisible penalty, immediately becomes
the maximum period, leaving reclusion temporal to be divided into two in order to
fix the medium and minimum periods of the penalty. The three periods of the
prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua are then as follows:
Minimum period 12 years and 1 day to 16 years;
Medium period 16 years and 1 day to 20 years;
Maximum period reclusion perpetua.
Section 1 of the ISL requires the court, in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the RPC, or its amendments, to sentence the accused "to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." Accordingly, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty in this case should be within the range of the medium period
of the penalty, i.e., from 16 years and 1 day to 20 years, because neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the crime; and
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the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the crime, without regard to its
periods.
CIVIL PENALTIES; AWARD OF DAMAGES
Rarugal, G.R. No. 188603.
For suddenly stabbing the victim, who was cycling along a street, accused
Rarugal was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The
lower court found that treachery was present, considering Rarugals sudden and
swift attack on the victim.
As to the award of damages, the Supreme Court held that, when death
occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered:
1. Civil indemnity ex delicto for the victims death;
2. Actual or compensatory damages;
3. Moral damages;
4. Exemplary damages;
5. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and
6. Interest, in proper cases.
It is also well-settled that the ordinary or qualifying nature of an
aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil
aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the
unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.
People v. Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, 23 January 2013.
Accused was convicted of the crime of rape. Insofar as the award of
damages is concerned, the Supreme Court has ruled here that moral damages in
rape cases should be awarded without need of showing that the victim has suffered
trauma or mental, physical, and psychological sufferings constituting the basis
thereof.
Meanwhile, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance,
either as qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified under
Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.

People v. Deligero, G.R. No. 189280, 17 April 2013.
In rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, stepfather,
uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual
force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place
of violence and intimidation.
Exemplary damages can be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender.
Pamintuan, G.R. No. 192239.
Accused Pamintuan was convicted for committing the crime of rape
against his niece, a minor.
Article 266-A (1)(d) provides for the crime of statutory rape. Its elements
are:
1. That the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
2. That such woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
In the instant case, the lower courts should have recognized the victims
entitlement to exemplary damages, considering that the crime which accused
Pamintuan has been convicted of has as aggravating circumstances the victims
minority and Pamintuans common-law relationship with the victims mother.
People v. Piosang, G.R. No. 200329, 5 June 2013.
An award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon a finding of the
fact of rape, and moral damages may be automatically awarded in rape cases
without need of proof of mental and physical suffering. Exemplary damages are also
called for, by way of public example, and to protect the young from sexual abuse.
People v. Manalili, G.R. No. 191253, 28 August 2013.
Pursuant to recent jurisprudence, there is no longer any debate that the
victim in statutory rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of P50,000.00, moral
damages of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages of P30,000.00. The award of civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. Similarly,
13
the award of moral damages of P50,000.00 is mandatory, and made without need
of allegation and proof other than that of the fact of rape, for it is logically assumed
that the victim suffered moral injuries from her ordeal. In addition, exemplary
damages of P30,000.00 are justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set an
example for the public good and to serve as deterrent to those who abuse the
young.
Alawig, G.R. No. 187731.
In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim is affirmed. This is given without need of
proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of appellants
responsibility for it. The Court also affirmed the grant of P50,000.00 as moral
damages. This is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without need of
allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. In addition, the award of
actual damages is sustained but only to the amount of P103,472.00 representing
expenses incurred during the wake of the victim supported by uncontroverted
receipts. "Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts or other credible evidence." The award of exemplary damages was also
sustained but in the increased amount of P30,000.00 to conform to prevailing
jurisprudence. The Court also imposed interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all
damages awarded from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Gambao, G.R. No. 172707.
The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all
those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of
their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence, each
principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.
People v. Galagar, Jr., G.R. No. 202842, 9 October 2013.
As to the award of damages, the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. The Court of Appeals, in addition thereto, awarded moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00. Under the present law, an award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. This is exclusive of the
award of moral damages of P50,000.00, without need of further proof. The victims
injury is now recognized as inherently concomitant with and necessarily proceeds
from the appalling crime of rape which per se warrants an award of moral damages.
 Exemplary damages should likewise be awarded pursuant to Article 2230
of the Civil Code since the special aggravating circumstance of the use of a deadly
weapon attended the commission of the rape. When a crime is committed with an
aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages is justified. This kind of damages is intended to serve as
deterrent to serious wrongdoings, as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured, or as punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct.

People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 206095, 25 November 2013.

AAA is entitled to moral damages as they are automatically awarded to

rape victims without need of pleading or proof. The award of civil indemnity is
likewise proper in the light of the ruling that civil indemnity, which is distinct from
moral damages, is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.

People v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, 5 June 2013; People v. Penilla, G.R. No.
189324, 20 March 2013; Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 201723, 13 June 2013; Zulieta, G.R.
No. 192183. (same doctrines as discussed above).

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