Selence and Education : 537-575, 2000, (© 2000 Kiuwer Academic Publishers. Primed in the Netherlands. Turning Vygotsky on His Head: Vygotsky’s ‘Scientifically Based Method” and the Socioculturalist’s ‘Social Other’ 8. ROWLANDS, University of Plymouth, Centre for Teaching Mathematics, Diake Circus, Piymotth, PLA SAA Devon, UK (Phone: (0)! 752 232772; Fax: (O)L 752 232772; E-mail s-rowlands@plymouth. ack ABSTRACT. Vygotsky has become an authority, but the authority has mote to d> with jusiving & sociocultural teatvism than it bas with his Marxist objectist appro%ch 1 psychology andl pedsgogy. This paper is an attempt to understand Vygotsky's perspeaive in relation to Mant epistemology, and wil critically examine the sococultral interpretation ‘of Vyotsky but within the light of bis om perspective. It will be showa thatthe reltivism ‘of the sociocultural school not cnly takes Wygoisks zone of proximal development out of its social and historical context, but a5 a consequence downplays the zone of prosimal development as a dynamic researh methodology. As an extension of the diseusion of dhe ‘one of proximal development, this paper wil also examine the sociocularal interpretation ‘of Vygotsky’ relation hereon scientific and everyday concepts, and the pedagopicslconse- ‘quences of such an interpretation, KEYWORDS: constructivism, epistemology, abjectivism, pedayory, psychology, relativism, science, sococultrism, theory and practice 1, INTRODUCTION Although Vygotsky died in 1934, at the age of 37, he has become some- what of a social phenomenon within the education academic community. ‘That ‘ijt might even be said that Vygotsky is now in’ (Rosa and Montero 1990, p. 59), would be an understatement — he has become an authority for many science and mathematics educationalists. His works are not ‘reated as historical artefacts but as ‘incompletely understood blueprints {or the future of psychology’ (Kozulin 1990, p. 6), and there is a consensus that his work has become more modern as time has gone by (e.g., Blanck 1990). However, judging by the context in which he is referenced, that authority seems more to do with the way Vygotsky has been assimilated into peoples’ schema of things, than it has with the very perspective that he was constructing. As Van der Veer and Valsiner (1993) have noted, the references to the ‘genius’ of Vygotsky are ‘a good means of advertising but perhaps not conducive to an understanding of the content and implications of the ideas of the genius’ (p. 1). This paper is an attempt to understand Vygotsky's perspective in the very spirit of what he was trying to construct ~ a psychology structured according to Marsist epistemology and its ramifications in pedagogy Within that perspective we will look at the various references to Vygotsky538, S. ROWLANDS, to show that, far from these being an attempt to understand, refine, or even revise areas of his work, Vygotsky has been completely turned on his head in order to justify a sociocultural relativism at the expense of his objectivist approach. This paper is not an attompt to claim Vygotsky as ‘one of our own’ within the Marxist camp; rather, itis an attempt 10 see ‘Vygotsky in his own light, with reference to the Marxist concept of kistori- cal materialism and the Marxist epistemology of theory and practice.’ This paper will elaborate Vygotsky's perspective with reference to Marx, En- gels and Lenin:* and within that perspective this paper will examine the arguments from the various authors who have referred to Vygotsky as an authority in support of their view. In the spirit of that perspective, this paper will also try to understand the material conditions of the society that Vygotsky lived in, so that we can begin to see why Vygotsky saw the pressing need to build such a perspective, and how that perspective is structured according to that need. Why bother? I would reply that the authority of Vygotsky has to be judged with reference to the logic of his perspective, not the perspectives that people have of him: ‘Fame is a socially constructed entity which functions for the purposes of the constructors, rather than for the desig- nated bearers of that role themselves. A fiting proof of the societal construction of Vygotsky's stature is the list of ideas that the fascinated public has been persistently overlooking in the discourse about Vygotsky” (Van der Veer and Valsiner 1984, p. 5). The societal construction of ‘Vygotsky's stature has more to do with the justification of popular trends than it has with his perspective. Many radical and social constructivists refer to Vygoisky as an authority to substantiate their position (¢.g., Cobb 1996; Emest 1991, 1994, 1998; Fosnot 1996: Smith 1994; Steffe and Tzur 1994; Von Glasersfeld 1995). For example, social constructivists claim Vygotsky as their founding father (Von Glasersfeld 1995) and see them- selves working in his legacy (Ernest 1994; Smith 1994). Even radical constructivists appeal (0 the authority of Vygotsky (e-g., Steffe and Tzur 1094) or are eager to point out the compatibility between themselves and Vygotsky (e.g., Von Glasersfeld 1995). There are some accounts of classroom activity that share a constructivist perspective along with references to Vygotsky's zone of proximal development (e.g., Jaworski 1994, 1998). By looking at the logic of his perspective we can begin to see just how strange the attraction is by his supporters. The philosopher of science, Stephen Toulmin (1978), in his review of the first English translation of Vygotsky's Mind in Society, prophetically stated: “To conclude: unless behavioural scientists in the West begin to develop & mote general theoretical frame of thei own Which has something approaching the seope and iatogratve power that “hiworical materialism’ has had for the Russians, our ows arguments are ‘Soomed (I believe) to remaining split down the mide. On the one hd, there will be those who sce all human hehaviour as ane more phetomenan of Narure: who are con cemed, thats to discover in hornan behaviour only general laws,’ dependant on universal,TURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 539 sthistoricalproseses and 40 free of all cultura variability. On the other hand, there wi bre those who see Culture as a distinct and entirely auonomous fell of study. st over igen: Nature’ fel within which divers and vars are the rae, and general laws are not to be looked for (p. 3. emphasis added) ‘A more general theoretical frame from the West has not been forth- coming, not even the semblance of a theoretical frame as constructed by ‘Vygotsky himself. What we have instead is the recent dectine of the view that human behaviour can be studied free of cultural variability (the Piagetian school) to an ever increasing one-sided emphasis on the role of the ‘social other’ (Van der Veer and Valsiner 1994) by the sociocultural school. This paper will attempt to show that contrary to the relativism of the sociocultural school, Vygotsky's perspective is wholeheartedly ob- jectivist in nature. Objectivist not only in the sense that reference is made to the material conditions of society (‘Culture in general does not create anything new over and above what is given by nature, but transforms nature according to the goals of man’. Vygotsky, quoted by Van der Veer and Valsiner 1993, p. 218), but also because the perspective regards science as explaining the real, objective, material world, It will be shown that Vygotsky's Marxist perspective maintains an objectivist view in the philosophy of science, and that this objectivism is essential in understand: ing Vygotsky's psychology as rooted in Marxist epistemology, ‘This paper may be justified by the following proposition: if so many researchers refer to Vygotsky as an authority to substantiate their position then itis important to understand the philosophy that supposedly underlies that authority. Section 2 examines Vygotsky's zone of proximal develop. ‘ment (ZPD) in the light of the Marxist objectivist philosophy of seience. and will attempt to show that the relation between the private and the social is essentially one of method ~ that to understand the higher mental functions of an individual as a developmental process, the teacher or researcher has to facilitate the process, Section 3 describes the mainstream interpretation of the ZPD, and argues that this interpretation is a relativist ‘one that downplays the ZPD as a dynamic research methodology. Section 4 is a brief historical note that makes reference to the material conditions Cf the young Soviet state in order to see Vygotsky's perspective as a response to the conditions and needs of the time ("Tt has frequently been claimed that Vygotsky was ahead of the time in which he lived. However, his work can only be understood within the historical context in which he developed’, Rosa and Montero 1990, p. 74). Section 5 concludes with a discussion of what Vygotsky meant by scientific concept and its relation to everyday concepts within the ZPD, and reports on the controversy as 10 whether the teacher should refer to the pupils’ everyday experiences in the teaching of scientific concepts540 5. ROWLANDS 2. VYGOTSKY'S ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT: A RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE ‘Vygotsky (1978) defines the ZPD as ‘the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers’ (p. 86) ‘The actual level of development is determined by the problems and tasks that the student can do unaided, whereas the potential level of develop- ment defines those psychological functions that are in the process of ‘maturation but have not yet matured (Zeuli 1986). A group of children may have equal levels of mental development, but their capability to learn under a teacher's guidance could vary considerably (Vygotsky 1978) Clinically, for example, the cognitive development of two students, who supposedly have the same 1Q, can be compared by how they respond to mediation. ‘The pedagogical implication, however. and one that will be elaborated on throughout this paper, is that this mediation would not only depend on the student's cognitive response to the mediation bat would also depend upon either the target-concept to be reached, the domain of structured knowledge to be understood or the task to be completed. ‘Vygotsky saw dialectical materialism, that all phenomena be sudied as processes in motion and change, as a solution to the scientific paradoxes facing his contemporaries (Cole and Scribner, Introduction to Vygotsky, 41978). According to Wertsch (1985). the fundamental clsim in Vygotsky's genetic or developmental analysis is that mental processes can only be Understood by considering how and where they occur in growth ~ that we should not concentrate on the product of development but insteed on the very processes by which higher forms are established. The ZPD treats cognitive development as a development in process and change rather than as an end-product established as a set of diserete levels. For example, if-a child can successfully complete @ task unaided, then prior knowledge of the abilities required to complete the task would merely enable us to say what abilities the child has ~ ‘merely’ because we would be looking at the child's abilities that have already matured in the child - we would be looking at a ‘snap-shot’ of the maturation process as an end-product, ‘To understand the maturation process as @ process then we would have to facilitate the child’s completion of a task that the child cannot do unaided. How a child responds to the mediation in completirg a task ‘enables us to explain the abilities of the child as they mature, rather than simply describe the abilities that have already developed. (Rowlands et al, 1996) ‘According to Wertsch (1985), Vygotsky's relationship between develop- ‘ment and instruetion is ambiguous because there remains the unanswered. question as to what Vygotsky considered to be ‘development’. Wertsch reports that, on the one hand, Vygotsky writes of development in terms, of its own internal dynamic (e.g., as setting the ‘upper limit’ of a child'sTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 541 potential development) and, on the other hand, in terms that suggest that itis little more than the product of learning in instruction (e-g., instruction as ‘awaking and rousing to life an entire set of functions’). However, while there is certainly a sense in which Vygotsky speaks of the ZPD as a methodology in understanding this internal dynamic (c.g. ‘{iJhe zone of proximal development furnishes psychologists and educators with a tool through which the internal course of development can be understood! Vygotsky 1978, p. 87), nonetheless Vygotsky (1978) states that learning processes are not synonymous with internal development but consist of & unity in which ‘one is converted into the other’ (p. 91). If instruction proceeds ahead of development but leads that development then the instruction is within the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky 1978) and it is in this sense that development and instruction are inseparable (instruction can lead development but development can also hold back instruction). The epistemological point, however, is that to know how “Tearing precedes development’ is to know how the child, student or class responds to the mediation. Vygotsky does not make explicit any particular teaching style and does not make explicit what form this mediation should take (although Vygotsky (1987), in chapter six of Thinking and Speech, ‘warns against rote-learning; and Van der Veer (1998) states that “Vygotsky was no supporter of the form of discovery learning in which students are left to themselves to rediscover well-established scientific concepts. Rather, he emphasized that texchers should explicitly define the scientific concepts and guide the students in their efforts to come to an understand- ing of these concepts’, p. 92), but some form of mediation between ‘in- structor’ and instructed is necessary if we are to understand how instruc- tion leads development. No particular teaching method is mentioned, but fone is most certainly implied. Vygotsky the “developmentalist’ makes it clear that by learning ‘scientific concepts’ we become consciously aware ff these concepts and can deliberate in their use (learning ‘scientific concepts is a process that leads to ‘abstract rationality’ as an “ideal” — see Section 5). However, to explain how this is possible (e.g., ‘it becomes fan important concern of psychological research to show how external knowledge and abilities in children become internalised’, Vygotsky 1978, p. 91) necessitates having to ‘interfere’ with the process by consciously creating the conditions to provoke such a development. In other words, if the development is the result of the internatisation of knowledge, then ‘any psychological research on this development must create the conditions for development to take place. The central point of this paper is that any consideration as to the conditions necessary to evoke development must hhave, as its starting point, the content of the body of knowledge (and by content I mean its logical structure, its theoretical objects and the way these theoretical objects speak of the world). This, it will be argued below, is Vygotsky the ‘Marxist epistemologist’ and the ZPD « the context of this epistemology. ‘Wertsch (1990) states that ‘Indeed, at certain points in Vygotsky’s writ- ight to he seen in342 5. ROWLANDS ings he explicitly stated that his work on this topie represented an attempt to outline the psychological correlates of Marx's Sixth Thesis on Feuer- bach’ (p. 114). With reference to Marx’s Sixth Thesis, Wertsch (1985) notes that for Vygotsky, understanding the individual requires understand ing the social relations in which the individual exists: “The influence of Mary’s claim on Vygotsky is manifested in the following statement: “To paraphrase a well-known position of Marx's, we could say that humans’ psychological nature represents the aggregate of intemalised social relations that heve become functions for the individual and forms of the individual's structure, We do not want to say that this is the meaning of Mary's position, but we see in this position the fullest expression of that toward which the history of cultural development leads us’ (Vygotsky, 1981b, p. 164)" p. $8. As will hopefully become clear in the subsequent sections, for Vygotsky, ‘spiritual culture’ (e.g., the sciences as abstract forms of rationality) is the highest form of cultural development, but that it is precisely this “spiritual culture” that socioculturists downplay in their emphasis on the social other’ (a term coined by Van der Veer and Valsiner 1994). Meanwhile, this section will place Vygotsky's Marxist psychology within the framework of Marxist epistemology. Since reference has been made to the ‘Thesis on Feuerbach’, then a closer examination on the ‘theses’ might throw light on Vygotsky's attempt to reformulate psychology in the ‘Scientifically correct method? of Marx. According to Rosa and Montero (1990): ‘This celatioaship between theoretical aad applied science (what be called practical psyc'ol- ogy) vas given prime methodological importance by Vygotsky. According to this Kea, practical pyshology fs the supreme test that psychology has 10 pas in order to adjust its "corse arincples. Tais concept of practical psychology caa be seen within the context ‘of Marxist philosophy. Ir har 10 be remembered that Mare in his “Thesis on Feuerbach? ‘pointed out that te objective of knowtedge should be not to understand the wend bu #2 ‘ransfoum i (p. 8, emphasis given). ‘The last sentence is a misinterpretation and may, inadvertently, add fuel to the relativist consensus that science does not in any way explain a world that exists independently of us (and may also justify the downplay of science as a formal academic discipline by socioculturists). ‘The objective of knowledge t to understand the world, but the whole point of the ‘theses’ is that the world can only be really understood by our transforma- tion of it and arswers the question as to how seience, a fallible, mutable and historical-sociocultural product on the one hand, can explain the world the existence of which is prior to cognition. Consider the well known and, T would argue, much misunderstood statement (and epitaph) by Marx: ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the word, in various ways the point, however is to change it (Mare 1969, X1 Thesis on Feuerbach, author's emphasis). ‘This statement is not making the ethical judgement that changing the world for the better is more worthwhile than armchair theorising, it is making the epistemological point that we have to change the world inTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 343 order to know it: ‘Ibis precisely he alteration of nature by men, not nature as such, whiel is the most essential and immediate basis of human thought’ (Engels, Dialectics of Nature; quoted in the forefront of Vygotsky 1978, ‘emphasis given). We interact with the world, and in so doing we gain knoviledge of the world. This knowledge is not of the world ‘as it is” but in the way the world has changed as a result of its transformation. Just as the anthropologist changes the behaviour of the tribe that he or she is researching, so conversely, the anthropologist can understand the tribe according to the way its behaviour has changed. Consider the Second Thesis on Feuerbach: "The question whether ebjetive [gegenstandiche) cuth can be aeibuted to human think: {ng snot a question of theory, but i @ practical question, In practice man must ave the trith, thats, the realty and power, the thissidednes [Diessitighet] of bis thinking. The cispute over the reality or non-reuty of thinking which ssolated fiom practice ia purely scholasie question (Marx 1969, author's emphasis). According to Suchting (1986), Marx was attempting to solve the fundamental problem of knowledge in which the various classical options (scholasticism’) had failed to resolve, namely, if an independent world exists prior to our knowing about it, then how is knowledge of this world possible? Marx resolves this fundamental problem of knowledge in terms of practice — that the ideas we have about the world, our ‘representations of the world, are formed as a result of our interactions with the worl. Contrary to forming our ideas of the world and then seeing what our ideas represent, we first form practical relations between objects and human beings and then ideas are formed from these relations (Suchting 1986) Hence the notion of ‘practice’ in the sense that our living in the world is, prior to our ideas of the world. The problem is, many educationalists in general and many socioculturists in particular refer to “practice” (e.g.,"dis- cursive practice’) as praxis but in a way that seems to suggest that any theory or abstract knowledge that results from practice is superior in some Way to ‘spiritual culture’. For example, many educationalists have given an interpretation of “theory and practice’ that suggests that it is only ‘praxis’ that generates legitimate theory, an interpretation that appears to bbe much in common with action research (theory a8 generated through collaborative reflection on practice) * In Marx, however, there is a sense in which practice not only entails the notion of praxis but also the notion that theory is prior to practice in the endeavour to understand the world (practice in a sense to ‘pursue an idea’). Consider the following statement by Suchting (1986) Bur whatever the differences between the concepts formed at the levels of everyday knowledge on the one hand and scientific knowledge on the other, what They have ia ‘ornmion i that they ate ultimately anehored semantically, they ars iasrodueed, by proce- ‘dures which apply them, whether directly. or, especially inthe case of science often Indveetly (P. 14, author's emphasis. ~ often indirectly in science because it models the real world with sheoretiS44 S. ROWLANDS cal objects, These theoretical objects are the result of the practice of science and it is in this context that practice is prior to theory. However, it is precisely because of the ‘indirect’ nature of science that theory is also prior to practice in the sense that knowledge claims about the world ean be considered true if the world is changed according to the claim: Macs cleurly defined the consitions ia which a relation between theory and practice ‘become possibe. It is n9t enough that thought should scok to realize itself reality must also strive toward thought". (Lukics 1974, p. 2) Marx is not attributing volition to matter, but is making the point that nature has to be changed ‘according to the goals of man’. If the goal is to verify Snell's law for the refraction of light, then a li physically constructed so that a parallel beam of light (a be produced ~ a parallel beam of light is a creation, required by theory. to explain refraction as a physical phenomenon, Science does not consist of ‘theoretical fictions’ (as Von Glasersfeld (1995), for example, believes. See pages 22 and 46) but theoretical objects that can explain the behaviour of real ones. If we want to describe nature in a certain way (e.g. a8 ‘electrons’), then we have to show that nature can be described in that way (e.g., that the electron has a certain ratio of charge to mass, or that its wave-packet has a certain amplitude) — just as the atom is, on the one hhand, a mental model, yet on the other hand Rutherford managed to split the thing! Vygotsky is an out-and-out objectivist because he believed that he could transform psychology into a science: if science, by changing the world, can describe the world (according to that charge), then so can psychology. ‘The sense in which theory is prior to practice is not a ‘chicken and eae” problem. On the one hand there is practice in the sense of praxis: ‘Lenin speaks about cognition being a ‘reflection’ of the real world, that is, of ideas in some way produced by human engagement in the world? (Mat- ‘thews 1980, p. 97), and on the other hand there is practice in the sense of “to pursue’ in which theory is prior to practice: “There is a real object of science (objects and events in the world) and there is a theoretical object of science (formulae, descriptions, observations). Knowledge construction begins with the latter and ends in the construction of a new theoretical object” (Matthews 1980, p. 100, author's emphasis). [This concept of the ideal whereby the ideal is prior to practice seems to feature prominently in Vygotsky's psychology and pedagogy. According to Davydov (1988), the ideas formulated in the works of Lenin were utilised to elaborate the problems of psychology, especially the laws that govern the transition from lively concentration to abstract thought and then to practice in the achievement of true knowledge. Even the concept of accivity is “internally associated with the concept of the ideal’ (Davydov 19884, pp. 9/10). The two senses of practice ~ engagement in the world (praxis) and ‘theoretical practice’® ~ are eloquently explained in Suchting (1986). To illustrate this concept of the ideal and the sense in which theory isTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 545 prior to practice, consider the following question: is Newton's first law of motion true, i.e., will a macroscopic object move in uniform motion in the absence of force? If we gave an ice-puck a shove on a frictionless surface in a vacuum, and the puck moved with uniform motion, then the first law of motion can be seen to be trae. The problem is, a frictionless surface is physically impossible - they only exist in thought-experiments However. the smoother we make the surface, the closer nature gets to showing the law to be true (of course, we can always consider the effects of friction, but then we would be involved in a modelling procedure and not an experiment to show the first law to be true). Scientific law does not approximate to nature; rather, it is the other way round — nanwe approximates to the law with the lavy as ant ideal. The smoother we make the surface, the closer we ate to changing nature towards the ideal, The first law of motion can be thought to be true by considering one of Galileo's thought-experiments (see Matthews 1994), but to show that nature obeys the first law of motion we have to artificially create tie conditions for the first law of motion to be obeyed (this is not to imply, however, that an experiment is an act of contrivance to prove an otherwise false law}. This is similar to the experimental-developmental method of Vygotsky: ‘which calls for an experimenter to intervene in some develop- ‘mental process in order to observe how such intervention changes it, Again the primary motivation for doing this is to observe genetic processes: ‘Our method may be called experimental-developmental in the sense that it artificially provokes or creates a process of psychological development? (Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 61-62)" (Wertsch 1985, p. 19, emphasis added). For Vygotsky, an artificial combination of conditions can be created to reveal the action of some specified law in its clearest form (Van der Veer and Valsiner 1993), but the “experimental subject” cannot be separated from all contextual cues including the input of the researcher (Toulmin 1978). In other words, the subject’s answer given in mediation cannot be separated from the question posed by the researcher: ‘In order to under stand Marx's epistemology, we have to situate it in the context of its own problems and debates. To ignore the historical context is like trying to understand Antony's speeches independently of Cleopatra's replies: one person’s contribution to a dialogue cannot be understood as if it were a soliloguy” (Matthews 1980, p. 78). For example, the intuitive ideas that students have of foree and motion (‘misconceptions’), would be better understood in the context of the questions that prompt these intuitive ideas. For Vygotsky, theoretical analysis, in the form of thought-experimen's, abstracts certain features of the world and expresses those features in the form of a law (Van der Veer and Valsiner 1993). This understanding of scientific law is very similar to Chalmers’ (1982) (historical materialist) ‘understanding of scientific laws as transfactual tendencies rather than as ‘empirical generalities or descriptions of localised states of affairs. Chal mers (1982) cites the first law of motion (‘the explanation of the real by546 5. ROWLANDS the impossible’) as an example. According to Chalmers, all bodies obey the first law of motion, but rarely get the chance to show it. If this law is true then it is always true whether under experimental conditions or not; the point, however, is to create the conditions that show that the law obeyed (Chalmers 1982). In other words, ‘Nature is invariably tortured in order to expose its secrets’ (Matthews 1980, p. 83), and this ‘torture’ is designed according to the theory. It is this sense of practice that answers the question as to how science explains the independently existing world: ‘This real workd makes itself known by the ways in which it constrains the outcome of, experiments and determines the conerote results ofthe application of various systems of fepresentatons, (As Wittzenscein said in the Tract, its not that a systra applies but hhow at does so that tells us what hs world i like). Suchting (1986, p. 32) If psychology is to become a science, then psychologists have to artificially create the conditions to show that certain laws are obeyed. Prior to creat- ing the conditions, however, is the idea (or thought-experiment) that determines how the conditions should be designed and created.° ‘This is consistent with Toulmin’s (1969) argument that no scientist performs an experiment without some theoretical point in mind and that the experi- ment is designed according to the theory. This is also consistent with Chalmers’ (1982) argument that all observation and experiment are theory-laden, and Hestenes’ (1992) argument that all models in physics are ‘explanations’ and all experimental ‘games’ are model deployment ‘games’. According to Matthews (1980): ‘This proces, stated paradoxically by Marx as ‘ascending from the abstract tothe concrete, Js claimed t@ be ‘obsiousy che scientifically correct method’. There is good evidence for “Marx in afirming this. A mathematical sienee requires analysis al abstraction; it requires clearly defined theoretical abjecs (p. 105). .The tozality of scicace at it appears in the hhoad is a ‘product of a thinking head’. Scicace does not begin with real objects in the ‘world but with intollactually constructed objects, with conceptions. (p. 106) For a psychology to be rooted in the “scientifically correct method’, then it must formulate its own clearly defined theoretical objects prior to changing the world according to the formulation. How the world changes will throw light on these theoretical objects, and depending on the thea- retical objects, might in turn throw light on the way the world has changed. Such theoretical objects are well-defined by other theoretical objects, hence forming a system of concepts. Such systems (or what I would define as Wittgenstein’s ‘nets’ ~ see Tractatus proposition 6.421) do not contain fan infinite number of definitions (one definition after another with no definition upon which the system rests) but have, as their starting point, fan axiom oF set of axioms that defines the central ‘unit’ of analysis, In his analysis of the role of the environment in child development, Vygotsky (1994a), states: you rc when we wete discussing the methods we employ in our since, ¥atempted to defend the idea that in science the anals's into clements ought 20 be replaced by ‘analsis which reduces a complex unity, a complex Whole, to its units. We have said that,TURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 547 tulice elements, these units represent such products of analysis which do not low any of the propertis which are characteristic of the whole, but which manage to roti in the font eluscitany nan is yaopeties exe hn the woke (pp. 341-24) ‘Vygotsky's reliance on Marx’s Capital (Blanck 1990), together with the following passage (taken from Vygotsky 1978): [Lwant to find out how science has tobe built, t0 approach the study of che mind having learned the whole of Marx's method. In ordet 9 ereate such an enabling theorymethod in the generally accepted Scientic manner. itis necessary to discover the essence of the _Siven arca of phonomenn, the laws according t9 Which they change, heir gualiaive and ‘quantitative characteristics, thei causes. Iti necessary to formulate the eategeries and ‘Concepts that are specifically relevant fo them ~ in other Words, to create ooe's own Capital. (p. 8, author's emphasis) suggests that, for Vygotsky, the structure of Capital is the very exemplar ‘upon which psychology ought to emulate if itis to be a science. Vygotsky's reference to finding the molar-unit or germ in formulating 2 Marxist psychology is equivalent to the molar-unit or germ that structures Capital (namely vaiue) and indeed the molar-unit or germ that structures the Newtonian system (namely force as defined by the laws of motior). [Al- though Capital (or Mars’s critique of political economy) should not be regarded in any way as a natural science, nevertheless, as @ de- contextualised system of concepts, it is similar in logical structure to Newtonian mechanics]. According to Wertsch (198 In an unpublished notebook Vygotsky (1078) observed that: ‘the whole of Copia is written according tothe following mothod: Mars analyzes a single living eel of sapitalst society ~ for example, the ature of value, Within this ell he discovers the structure of the entire sytem und lofts economic insttions. He says tht to layman this analysis may seom a murky tangle of tiny deus. Indeed, there may be tiny details, but they are ‘oxacily those which are essential to “microamatoms". Anyone who cou) discover what a ‘poyshologizal cal is ~ the mechanism producing even a single response - would thereby find the key to psychology a8 a whole. (Cole and Serbacr, 1978, p.8)’. Thus in oder to pursue his study of human consciousness, Vygoisky viewed his task as one of identifying an invesignble microcosm. (p. 193) In child development, Vygotsky (1994a), just before his death, identifies cone such unit of analysis as emotional experience ~ ‘An emotional experi- ence {perezhivanie} is a unit where, on the one hand, in an indivisibte state, the environment is represented, i.¢., that which is being experienced ~ an emotional experience {perezhivanie} is always related to something which is found outside the person — and on the other hand, what is represented is how I, myself, am experiencing this...” (p. 342, author's emphasis). ‘According to Van der Veer and Valsiner (1993): ‘Many of the arguments advanced by Vygotsky have even found their way into introductory textbooks on the philosophy of stience (¢.g., Chalmers, 1982)’, (p. 154). ‘Vygotsky's psychology can be seen as an attempt to develop the Marxist philosophy of science to human cognition so that psychology itself can become a natural science. Many socioculturists, however, have interpreted548, S. ROWLANDS Vygotcky’s paychology in terms of ‘vocial-activity’ with @ political edge. For example, aceording to Newman and Holzman (1993) ‘Traditional science ~ including eaical, ecologically valid science ~ sets up experimental tuations that roplieate reel life and we them to Geseibe what in the Marxian sence, Aicoated reality. The Vygotskian enterprise, as we see it sto erate zones of proximal ‘evelopment ~ environmen's where people ean perform life ~ and in so doing transform alienated realy. The difference could nor be greater. (p. 28) The authors argue that the laboratory setting is contrary to Vygotsky's perspective because it distorts life-as-lived and does not transform life as a ‘revolutionary’ activity. However, according to Van der Veer and Valsiner (1993), for Vygotsky. the greater the artificial conditions the closer we are to understanding the psychological processes scientifically. Van det ‘Veer and Valsiner (1993) state that: In his [Vypotsy’s} view seience was based on the reconsteuction and interpretation of indirectly piven phenomena, anc in this respect. he saw no fundamental differences be- ‘heen the natural and socal sciences andthe study of history” Referring to Max Planck ‘and Engels, Vygotsky argued that all ofthese sciences transcend the dicey wsble by ‘making use of instruments and making inferences about the unkown. (p. 148) As for the ZPD as “revolutionary” activity, Lenin (1969) would have retorted that there are material constraints to transforming our lives (namely the state and capitalist society), and that, quite contrary to being ‘revolutionary’, the form of activity proposed by Newman and Holzman is in fact reformist (Vygotsky may be a ‘revolution’ in psychology and ‘education, but if we are to use the term in the context of Marx and Lenin, then ‘revolutionary activity’ would involve the overthrow of the capitalist state, not the gradual transition of society). Many socioculturists and constructivists are in error because of this fundamental fallacy: The retativism of Marc and Vygowsky is a dental of their objectivism.’ An exemplar is Wardekker (1998), who states tha ‘Vygotsky thought scentide concepts important not primary because of thelr referential vale (25a product of science) but because they ‘open up the gate for conscious awareness" (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 191)... This view of cience and its language tse may have been sate of the art in Vygotsky's day. However, Wells (1996) pointed out that this interpretation of the distinetion [the dtinction between ho dovontextalised theoretical Isngoaye of science And the language of everyday observation], quite apart from being philosophically untea- able, does not fit very well within a Vygotskian framework and is probably not whet ‘Vygotsky had intended. (p. 144) (Wardekker then goes on to say that because terms like “element” are ifferent in chemistry than in everyday life, then it iy mot really «good idea to devote most schooling time to the learning of scientific concepts in this sense). It is a if Vygotsky might have been an objectivist but this is not what he intended (and all because Wardekker wants to use the ‘authority’ of Vygotsky in order to make the claim that ‘ajn interpretation of the idea of scientific concepts as the products of science that should supersede prior everyday knowledge of pupils is untenable and obscuresTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 549 the relation between learning, reflection, and morality’. Abstract, p. 143). It Vygotsky was alive today and read this nonsense, he would most proba- bly declare that ‘I am not Vygotskian’! Lenin (1972), who was criticising the relativists in the Bolshevik Party, stated ‘The materialist dialectics of Mars and Engels certainly does contain relativism, but isnot reducible to relativism, hat i, it recognises the relativity of all out knowledge, notin the sense of denying objective teuth, but in the sease that the liits of approximation of our knowledge to this tith are Bistorcally conditional. (p. 138) Pedagogically, the importance of the objectivism of Vygotsky is this: Although science is a consensual social construct, nevertheless students ought t0 be socialised in science, not because science is consensual, but because it is the highest form of abstract rationality that can explain the independently existing world (and Suchting 1986 makes the point that, for Marxism, any attempt to ‘block’ a scientific understanding of the world cannot be in the interests of the working class). We have here an historical irony in that Marx is regarded by some as one of the founding fathers of social constructivism (Ernest 1991; Phillips 1997; both authors, however, recognise the objectivism in Marx).® Although all forms of thought may be considered as originating from social relations, nevertheless Marx and Vygotsky would have regarded the truth of the Copernican system, for example, as independent of the social relations that existed at the time of the Renaissance: ‘{jJust as it is clear that Copernican astronomy was true before Copernicus but had not been recognised as such’ (Lukacs 1974b, p. 237). In very much the same way, all higher mental functions originate from the interaction between human beings ~ but the functions themselves can transcend the context from which they originate, For example, a student’s understanding of mathematics may be developing such that the understanding is still specific to the context in which it is taught (e.., specific to the examples given, the explanation offered, etc.). At any given level (for example, one that has been specified by a public examination syllabus) @ fully evolved understanding of mathematics is independent of the specific examples used, and the approach taken, by the teacher. An understanding that is evolving is a process of enculturation. At any level, 2 fully evolved understanding of mathematics means that the student has been encultured into mathematics at that level, ise. is conscious of the related concepts (has a ‘conceptual understanding’ of the system of related concepts) and can act on them at will in solving unfamiliar problems. This process is a development in abstract rationality that is necessary in understanding the world scientifically. Downplaying science and mathematics as objective bodies of knowledge would be to downplay the enculturation into these disciplines. In science and mathematics education, the ZPD can become a dynamic research methodology because it could enable us to understand in practice the cognitive processes involved in the internalisation of science and mathe- ‘matics (‘Any investigation explores some sphere of reality. An aim of the550 5. ROWLANDS psychological analysis of development is to describe the internal relations of the intellectual processes awakened by school learning.’ Vygotsky 1978, p. 91), The next two sections will endeavour to show that this point is lost on the sociocultural school. 3, THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DESCRIPTION: THE ZPD AS MEANING. ALL THINGS TO ALL PEOPLE In a sense historical materialism, the theory of society and socal change initiated by Kot ‘Marx, isan abjectvist theory in which the objectivist approach ... i applied society as ‘whole, Mars objectvism evident in his well-known remath, “Iris nor the consciousness ‘of men that determines thie being but, on the contrary. their socal being tha dctersines their conssiousness. From the materialist point of view individuals are bora into some part ofa pre-existing soci strcture that they do not choose andthe conssiousmess is Formed by what they do aad experience in that structure. (Chalmers 1982, p. 121) We are bom into a society that has already made sense of the world, and part of that sense includes objective scientific knowledge which is devel- ‘oped and taught to ezch generation. A scientific understanding of the world is not the private construction by the individual ‘groping in the dark’, nor is it constructed out of making sense of experience, A thousand students who have an understanding of the Newtonian system, for example, does not mean to say that the Newtonian system has been invented a thousand times over. ‘The Newtonian system has already been invented, but the understanding of the system is facilitated either by a teacher or from a book — never alone! The individual cannot be separated from the social, but the social also includes ‘spiritual culture” (e.¢., science and mathematics) thet has developed over the centuries. ‘The ZPD is an epistemology in two connected senses — ant epistemology in the sense of how we learn (e.g.. play as embryonic of rule-based behaviour) and an epistemology in the sense of a methodology that researches the cognitive processes involved in how we learn (the connected sense is that both contain the ideal: e.g., rule based behaviour of the very subject-matter to be learnt). In science and mathematics education, understanding how we learn necessitates understanding the structure of the topic to be taught prior to how the student or class responds cognitively to the mediation or facilitation of that structure. In a child's ZPD, there is a sense in which the ‘social’ cannot be separated from the ‘ingividual’. For example. according to Ernest (1994) ‘This approach (based on “Vyyorskian roots’) views individual subjects and die realm of the social ax indistolubly inferconnected, with human subj2cts formed through their inweretions with each othet (as well 2s by their internal processes) ia social contents (p, ® and according to Newman and Holzman (1993): ‘The significance of the ZPD, in our view, is chat it isnot premised on the indvidual-TURN:NG VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 551 sosiaty saparstions itp an Sbtosioal unity. ta fact, ¢ methoudalogiclly destroys the need for inteactionist solutions to the dualism of mind und society because it does not accept ‘hei onte sepaation in the fist place! (. 79) Although Vygotsky emphasises the social over the individual, which is in accord with Mar’s point that consciousness is from the very beginning a social product, nevertheless he speaks of the ZPD as a methodology to understand the transition from social interaction to individual cognitive development. Methodovogically, the sense in which the social cannot be separated from the individual is an epistemological one: if we are to understand the child's cognitive abilities as a process, or indeed, if we are to establish the laws of 2ognitive development,” then we have to instigate that process by interacting with the child, Many socioculturists, however, have used the ZPD as if it were a metaphor for their awareness that “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness’. Moll and Whitmore (1993), for ecample, uses the ZPD as a concept for the ‘child in-social-activity” that emphasises sociocultural conditions. Metaphors can be useful devices, but the problem with metaphors is that they can become idiosyncratic and mystified with rhetoric (there have even been complaints by socioculturists that the ZPD has been spoken of as some kind of ‘foree- field’, Lerman 1996, or ‘aura’ of socialness, Lave and Wenger 1996). The ZPD has become a multifaceted metaphor for something ‘social’ — a kind of ‘social activity with others’, or an ‘activity theory’, or ‘communial Knowledge’. The ZPD has also been used as @ metaphor for the non- separation between school and community life, and with this metaphor there seems to be a vision that downplays formal education and the formal subject areas of that education: For this ciseussion, stories ate presented from severn levels of community life foeused srounul one classroom, Ms Stevens's. in order to ilustrate the Kind of changes that are taking place in this community's ZPD, (McNamee 199, p. 295) ‘The theory of mathematic learning ofthis perspective is that of the social contewetion ‘of meaning. stemming fron the theory of the social origins of thought of Vygotsky (1962) ‘and the activity theory of Leontey (199%) and others...This theory sees children 2s needing to actively engage with mathemati, posing as wel as solving problems, discussing the mathemetics embedded i their own lives and environments (ethnomathemats) 5 well broader social contexts (Ernest 1991, p. 208). Situated cognition isthe asion of learning knowledge and skills in contexts that eofect the way the knowledge will be tsoful in real life (Colin, 1991; Lave aad Wenger, 191) The seisites aa domain ane eamed by its cultuse (Lave, 1988: Wertsch. 1981) ‘Theit mesning and purpose are socaly constructed through negotiations among present and past members (Brown, Collins and Duguid, 1989). Many activities stadents perform {in school would aot be eoczgnised by provitoners ofa culture that they are intended to represent that is, dey are nat authentic actives. (Wikoa etal. 1903, p. 74) ‘Locating’ learning in clastoom interaction is not an adequate substitute for a theory stout what schooling as an activity sysiem has to do with earning, Nor isa theory of the sovioristorical structuring of schooling (or simple extrapolations from it) adequate to552 5S, ROWLANDS account for other kinds of communities and the forms ef legtimate per therein, (Lave and Wenger 199, p. 18) According to Brown etal. (19998), activity i school should be authentic, which implies that school asivities should include tho oxdinary practice of diferemt scence cultures School teaching is modeled by apprenticeship learning: The teacher is seen as tbe master fr practioner, and the students are appremices. The teacher's tsk, ay master. is 0 ‘onfiont the apprentices with effective strategies that ean be used to solve everyday problems (e.g. everyday mithematiel problems), THe goal of teaching in sebool isthe Student's aoqustion of slils practiced Within Science communities ..In the oo ‘apprenticeship approach, Collins otal. (1989) stressed the learning of cultural strategies ‘ofthe diferent scientific disciplines bus advised not to teach the science concepts directly to the students. The teacher sbould instead support ite swdens! use of their everviay knowledge procedures... (Hedegsard 1998, p. 15) eral participation History has proven Toulmin’s (1978) prophesy to be correet ~ sociocultur- ists (and social constructivists) have placed a one-sided emphasis on cule tural variability of some sort, and the one-sided borrowing from Vygotsky of the importance of the ‘social other’ has been reported by Van der Veer ‘and Valsiner (1994). It is worth noting at this juncture that Vygotsky's importance was enhanced by the movement for (Leontev’s) activity theory (Van der Veer and Valsiner 1994), and much reference has been made by socioculturists to activity theory. However, the idea that Leont’ev ‘was an official interpreter and a direct desceadent of Vygotsky's ideas is a myth" (Kozalin 1996; Van der Veer and Valsiner 1993, 1994). The use ‘of the ZPD as a metaphor has produced some very spurious arguments, and a modest sample will be examined next. According to Moll (1990). "Vygotsky never specified the forms of social assistance to learners that constitute @ zone of proximal development... Nevertheless, he considered what we would now call the characteristics of classroom discourse as central to his analysis’ (p. 11). Moll has inferred ‘Vygotsky's prominence of the classroom over everyday experience; how- ever, this prominence is tured on its head when Moll states, a few pazes later, that the role of the adult is not necessarily to provide structured ues but to import everyday activites into the classroom. Moll justifies this ‘argument by stating that the problem in applying the concept of the ZPD in the analysis of classroom instruction is that it emphasises the “transfer” of knowledge by those knowing more to those knowing less — this is a false claim that such an approach would encourage passive learning and didactic teaching! This is despite the use of the term ‘transfer’, which suggests a transmission model of teaching, By developing Moll’s argument, Hatano (1993) has become more explicit in this interpretation of the ZPD. Hatano states that Vygotskian instructional rescarch has overlooked ‘Vygotsky's discussion of scientific and everyday concepts “because the so- called Vygorskian conception enabled them to start with the knowledge possessed by a more mature member, neglecting what the less mature member has already acquired’ (p. 165). Hatano certainly seems to down- play any role that Vygotsky's ‘adult, teacher or a more competent peer” plays in the ZPD. However, quite apart from not overlooking Vygotsky'sTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD $53 iscussion of scientific and everyclay concepts (which will become apparent in Section 5), a true Vygotskian perspective would have to statt with the knowledge possessed by the more experienced member, even though the ZPD has to take into consideration the knowledge state of the leamer."" Crawford (1996), elaborating on the “transmission model of learning’, swiftly (within an average journal page) advocates a relativist perspective that is wholeheartedly subjectivist In general, researchers have interpreted Vygotsky’ concept (ofthe ZPD) in non-ilectical, tems thi fit more closely with the assumptions of « transmission model of karing, in which an export “teaches” a nove, that undelie the socal organisation of existing insttuionalsed settings. (p43). Vagotsky's view of human lesming, and the develep- mental experience of being and acting in a caltral context, challenges many of the ccristemological beliefs end assumptions uaderlying educational praciice. In paretlar ‘challenges adonal views of mathematics as value free, objective and divorced from ‘everyday personal concerns... 44, emphasis ade) Ejser (1904 p. 100) bluntly articulates these questions in discussing recent scent views thous the limits of abjectvty: “What sense can we make of reality, if atin teams of our ‘own experionse? And if our esperiences are aecestarly personal and selective, how can we make sense of anyone else's, and come anywhere near sharing their reality? (p. 44) ‘The theorem of Pythagoras, for example, is value free and outside most peoples’ everyday personal concerns and is objective because its truth is independent of Crawford or the sociocultural community! The last para graph of the quote reflects more the subjectivism of Von Glasersfeid than it does the objectivism of Vygotsky (what would be consistent with this last paragraph is the notion that Vygotsky can only make sense ir terms of our own experience — for example, Newman and Holzman 1993 refer to ‘our Vygotsky’ — so no account can be offered as to what Vygotsky's perspective actually is. “If our experiences are necessarily personal and selective’, then Vygotsky can only be assimilated idiosynctatically. How- ever, as Matthews 1997 has intimated, making sense of experience, e.8.5 radical constructivism, and finding out about the world, e.g., science, may be two entirely different endeavours). According to Litowitz (1993), the use of the zone of proximal develop- ment ‘can come perilously close to a description of learning as a neobehav- iouristic shaping of behaviour (p. 190) and that it is an ‘adultocentric” view of the child’s behaviour which is ‘too exclusively concerned with what is being done by the dispensers of knowledge’ (p. 190), Litowitz proposes, as a better ‘capture’ of the child's perspective, Winnicott’ “po- tential space” which is an * area that is neither what the child nor the mother knows. It is the range of the child’s grandiosity and omnipotence. In that space the child sees herself as more capable than she really is’ (p. 190), If there is no correct understanding of what the ZPD really , then it becomes a sign for the various idiosyncratic pedagogical perspectives. For example, if the ZPD is regarded as too ‘adult orientated’, then it would be better to have a child orientated metaphor, such as ‘potential space’, that represents what the child doesn’t know or understand, This554 S. ROWLANDS is a relativistic emphasis on the chile (Litowitz argues that the benefit of ‘potential space,’ unlike the ZPD. includes fantasy and illusion). Litowitz (1993), preters Winnicott’s ‘potential space’ rather than the ZPD because Cf the inclusion of fantasy’ and because it reminds us of where the child is coming from. On the one hand, Litowitz speaks of fantasy as linked with illusion, then we find that’ ‘The mie of fantary in creating goals for activities is inexplicably underappreciated in ‘Vygotsky's theory of learning, considering that Marx claimed (in Cepital thatthe lifer cece between the most talented bees snd even inept architec s one of imagination and fancasy. (9. 191) Fantasy in this context would have more to do with Harré and Secord’s controlled use of the imagination in the development of scientific ideas (see Heather 1976) than it would have with illusion, However. Marx states: ‘But even the worst architect differs from the most able bee from the very outset ix that before he builds a box out of boards he has already constructed it in his head’ (Capital, quoted in the forefront of Vygotsky 1978). According to Hedegaard (1998): “The upper level of the ZPD is norma- tive, In one society, the skill of rowing a kayak around the age of 6 years ‘becomes an expectation for children; in another society, itis riding a bike’ (p. 119). However, according to Wertsch (1985): ‘The kind of instruction ‘Vygotsky had in mind was not concerned with “specialized, technical skills such as typing or bicycle riding, that is, skills that have no essential impact ‘on development (1934, p. 222)”, but rather had as its goal all-round development, stch as instruction in formal, academic disciplines, cach of which has a sphere in which the impact of instruction on development is, accomplished ard fulfilled (ibid.)° (p. 71). Also, for Hedegaard to place the ZPD in tems of kayak rowing would be contrary to Vygotsky’s evolutionary view of universal human rationality. According to Wertsch (1996): ‘Primitive thinking in general differs from modern forms in that the former does not rely on abstract concepts. Such abstract concepts are viewed as emerging at a later historical point. One of the results of this formulation is that what we would today call cross-cultural differences were for Vygosky and his colleagues cross-historical in nature (see Wertsch, 1985)’ (p. 27). Newman and Holzman’s (1993) Lev Vygoisky: Revolutionary Sctentist, ‘an introductory text for undergraduate and advanced students in psychol- ogy, linguistics, education and philosophy, elaborates the sociocultural perspective with respect to many of its advocates. The elaboration has uch rhetorie, but ironically itis as yet the clearest expression of sociocul- turalism (which, despite much overlap, is not homogencous). For the authors, the ZPD ‘is an activity, an historic nity, the essential socialness as Mars put it” (p. Clay’ is “revolu- of human beings expressed as revolutionary activity 79). Much reference is made to “revolutionary act tionary activity’ and even language acquisition is ‘revolutionary practicalTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS BEAD 355 critical activity’), but it becomes (fairly) clear that revolutionary activity involves a ‘socially relevant psychology’ ~ a kind of critical theory — that can contribute to eliminating social ills and injustice (e.g., “Thus, a ZPD is created by ‘putti ther" elements of the societal environment in ways which help to see activities, reactions, which are clear-cut and trans- parent.’ p. 90). The authors themselves locate their ideas in the days of the radical ‘Sixties’, and Van der Veer and Valsiner (1994), referring to ‘progressive’ young Marxists (p. 5) who saw in Vygotsky an ‘anti establishment’ critical psychology, state that ‘il is fascinating to see how part of mainstream psychology gradually absorbed the former leftist hero and made him a common name in psychology textbooks’ (p. 5). It seems as though the ‘anti-establishment” ctitical psychology of Vygotsky has become mainstream. If some socioculturists have been influenced by the radical ideas of the “Sisties’, then it is possible that Vygotsky has been ‘re-interpreted’ under that influence (there is an irony in that Vygotsky’s popularity has increased cover a period of decline in working class militancy). A socioculturist may react to this by claiming that ‘our Vygotsky’ is an adaptation to the educational conditions that exist in capitalist society (particularly in the USA). However, as the next section will endeavour to show, the ZPD has been taken Out of its ‘socio-cultural’ contest ~ that of the needs of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the revolution. The point is that if the ZPD is seen as representing more than a research methodology into higher psychological processes, or as a pedagogical methodology into the steps necessary 10 facilitate the construction of the target concept or the completion of a task, then Vygotsky's ZPD has been taken out of its historical and social context. 4, THE ZPD PLACED IN ITS ‘SOCIO-CULTURAL? CONTENT ~ THE MATERIAL BASIS FOR SUCH A CONTENT ‘Vygotsky and his followers devoted their lives making certain that the new socialist state, based on the principles of Marx and Lenin, would suceced (Wertsch 1985; Moll 1990), and were committed to formulating a psychology grounded in Marxism (Wertsch 1996). Vygotsky saw the practical objectives of his psychology as providing concrete solutions 0 problems in education (Moll 1990), and asa Marxist he ‘viewed rationality as.an essential {ool for constructing a centrally planned economy and state" (Wertsch 1996, p. 25). The ZPD has a sociocultural context, and the whole aim of this section is to show that this context is only specific to the conditions of the Soviet Union at the time cf Vygotsky. According to Rosa and Montero (1990): ‘One of the great challenges facing the new state was education. According to Downing (1988), the average literacy rate in the USSR at the tmte of the Revolation was about556 S, ROWLANDS 30%, with region in which there were virtually no lterates. In spite of the tremendous Uificuies that enstod, the fiabt against iliteracy was begun immediately. On October 29, 1917, a few diys after the installation of the revolutionary government (Council of ‘National Commis). Lunachatsk, the fist national commissar of education, calling for ail itzens to achieve complete literacy, created a national system of schools end a system for teacher trainieg (Nazarova, 1988), On December 26, 199, Lenin signed the decree ‘Oa the liquidotcn of illteracy amengs! the population of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republi” Lenin himielt. his wife, Krupskaia, and other distinguished leaders ave this adertakig top priority. Lenin's aim was to mobilize every literate in the fight ‘agains Meracy. and 400,060 volunteers Yesponded to his call. Cusses were established fn factories end brrracks, and teachers even followed nomadic qibes migrating through Central Asia. (p95: emphasis given) Education was a top priority if the Soviet State was to be managed under any semblance of workers’ control, ““An illiterate person” Lenin wrote, “stands outside politics; he must first be taught the alphabet” (Davydov 1988, p. 8). By politics, Lenin meant the active and conscious engage- ment of the werking class with the planning process of the means of production. According to Frank Furedi’s (1986) The Sovier Union De- mystified — A Materialist Analysis For the Holshevils the fist task of the proletarian dictatorship after the defeat of the ‘capitalist clas wr to set up works control over the economy. “The chit dificult’, Lenin wrote, is te establishment oa a countrywide see of the most precise and most, conscientious acccuntiag and contra, of worker" consol of the produetion and distribu tion of goods’. Werkers control wasnot an end i itself: it was a precondition fr successful planning ~ a ssseen in Which the economy came under direct workers’ management, (p. in) Under conditions of proletarian dictatorship, workers contol over the economy depends ‘00 a combination of centralised administration and local initiative. The commitment and active participation of workers in economic life is esemtal to ensure that all aspects of the economy are run by the working class. Without this ackve involvement, meer the wide knowledge they have of work, nor tele broader cultural and poliical experience, will fn it oy nto the socil plan. The creaive spirit of the proetaiat will be wasted and information vital the planaing process wll not be Sortheaming Joan the workplaces. (p. 15, emphasis added) “The disintegration of the working cnss [used by the Great War, the Cisil War, the invasion by allie countries and famine] and the burcaucratisation ofthe Bolshevik Pasty limited the e'feciveness of she proletasian dictatorship. Another problem: was the fow ‘eultural and educciona level ofthe Soviet working clas. Lenin recognised that given the ‘general lack of sll nd taining, the proletariat coulé not do without specialist fom the ‘ld Tourist regime: “The exploiters have been eliminated. Bus the cultural fevel has not ben sased, and therefore the bureavcrats are ccoupsing thet old postion’ (Lenia “Eighth congress ofthe RCP, report on the party programme’). (p. 19, emphasis added) ‘The survival of uch of the old state apparatus ~ 2 concern whieh haunted Lenin throughout his lat monte ~ as the inettable consequence af the material conditions ‘that prevailed in the Soviet Union. Onl assistance from a vitorions revolution in Furope cond have counteracted the negative effets of economic backwardness, In these dificil Crcumsunces the Bolshevik only option wes 10 lmunch @ canspegn to renew tke politcal Ie of a working clas that had been worn out and to fight 10 vase the cultural leel of the ‘masses. (p. 21, erphasis added} Education was not so much a right or a luxury ~ it was a necessity if the young workers’ state was to survive. Education was a necessary conditionTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 387 for workers’ control and the development of a planned economy. How- ever, the fight to raise the cultural level of the masses was countered by the emerging bureaucracy’s ability to raise party membership by granting privileges (the emerging bureaucracy gained control of party membership, and introduced privileges through the Lenin levy ~ see Firedi 1986) rather than building a membership that was capable of objective debate. This, together with the isolation of the USSR, resulted in the consolidation of the power of the emerging bureaucracy and the development of a cont- ‘mand economy. It was against this backdrop that we can begin to under- stand Vygotsky's priorities. According to Rosa and Montero (1990) ‘The recommendations of the National Commissariat for Education were focused on the {tegration of seademic work with physical ucivity and the natural environment ~ felis, people, garden work, factory wists, ant so on ~ without sessing adherence to a preestad- lished curriculum, In this way substantial latitude was givan 10 the exeativty of teachers atthe loel level. From 1923 10 1925 an experimental program based on the same principles ‘vas implemected, this time providing materials and swggestions to teachers (Nazarow, 1968). The most ardent advocate of this kind of progressive education was V. N. Shulgin, ivecto of the Marx-Engles Institute of Pedagogy. To hit formal education was merely ‘a complement to spontaneous education; when the authentic socialist society was established ‘the schoo! would disapneor to give way fo the socal environment (p. 65, emphasis added) ‘The material conditions that prevailed in the young Soviet state necessi- tated ‘spontaneous’ education as a complement to formal education — production workers, office workers, soldiers, technicians and scientists became teachers as well. However, the very idea that formal schooling would eventually give way to the social environment is similar in context to the Marsist notion of the ‘withering away of the state’, but this is the context of world communism and the abolition of class relations (see Lenin 1969) ~ this context has nothing to do with schooling and education under the existing social relations of production (ie. capitalism and class society, or indecd Stalinist states), but it is precisely this point that the sociocultural school has either confused or overlooked. For example (usually within the context of the United States), the use of the ZPD as ‘a metaphor to prescribe the non-separation between formal schooling and the environment overlooks this one essential point: the necessary condition for the divide between format schooling and everyday experience to wither is the full cultural development of the population. Under these conditions, the individual is elevated to that of the scientist, artist and teacher. Vygot- sky himself, in the final passage of Pedagogical Psychology, a little known book because of its reference to Trotsky and Nietzsche's concept of Super- man, sketches the qualities of the ‘new man’ under communism (Van dor ‘Veer and Valsiner 1993). ‘The point is that the material conditions, that ‘would allow the necessary condition for the divitle between formal school- ing and everyday experience to wither, do not exist. From the Vygotshi- ‘an-Marxist perspective of historical materialism, there is no material basis, nor has there been. for the ZPD to be used as a metaphor for the non-seper- tation between formal education and everyday experience."558, 5. ROWLANES: Moll and Greenberg (1990) discusses e ZPD. at length within the context of different class family backgrounds. They argue that these households share or exchange funds of knowledge — the ‘nuts and bolts of survival’ — that contain information and strategies essential to main- taining their well being. Moll and Greenberg's version of the ZPD becomes the metaphor for the withering of the divide: Without a focus on social elionships and persons-in-atiiis, te wery cosy for outsiders {edveators) to underestimate the wealth of funds of kaowledge available in working lass hhouscholds... Yet this knowledge and its forms of sansmission, as we discuss ia the next section, rarely make their way into classmooms in any substantive way. (p. 327) Moll and Greeniberg’s aim becomes clear in their next section: (ur claim ie thot by developing social notworks thet conaeet classrooms to ouside resources. by mobilizing funds of kaowledge, we can tranform classrooms into more sdvanced contexts for teaching and learning. .-(p. 343). Vygotsky (1987) wrote that in "receiving instruction in 2 gstem of knowledge the chi learns of sings that are not before is eyes, things thot fr exceed te limits of hs actual and even potearialiexmediate experience’ (p. 181). We hardly believe that rote inscuction of low-lavel skills is the system of knowledge that Vygotsky had in mind, We perceive the students’ community, fad its funds of knowledge, asthe most important resource for reorganizing insinaction in ways tht far exceed the limits of eusent schooling. (p. 345) Moll and Greenberg turn “far exceed’ on is head; from the reference 10 the child’s immediate experience to “the linits of current schooling.” The ‘whole point of the exercise seems to be the downplay of schooling (giving the impression that rote learning is not only the main practice of schooling, but that schooling is synonymous with rote learning) and highlighting everyday experience as the source of knowledge and understanding. The value of Moll and Greenberg's article consists of highlighting the disparity between the teaching methods and forms of assessment of children from different socio-economic and cultural backgrounds, although this disparity has more to do with state education reffecting class society than it has with funds of knowledge far exceeding the limits of current schooling. Survival strategies (or ‘funds of knowledge’) of the oppressed cannot be used to facilitate a scientific and objective understanding of the world (this is a Marxist position despite how ‘politically incorrect’ it may sound)! A scientific understanding has to be developed from ‘above,’ in sehool; it ‘cannot come from “below,” in the everyday experience of having to survive in the world. This is despite the schooi as a surveyor of ideology reflecting and maintaining class relations, and asa contributory factor in the develop- ment of labour-power (see Matthews 1980). The glorification of spontan- cous consciousness can be considered both @ patronisation and a contradic~ tion, According to Floden and Buchmann 11993): Usually, people prtising the simplicity of others ~cildren, ‘matives.” working-lass people ~ ae not themselves spontaneous and uncritical, nor members of such groups, sharing thir typical experienes. People who lusuriate in ‘he coramunaly ley passionate lives lot omers are themsetves practitioners ofthe reecave life, amare OF Hs value. The PraseTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAT 559 ‘ofthe unlettered by the highly educated, as Richard Rodriguez (18) learned at college, ‘8 primary theme of elitist nostalgic literature. (p. 45, authors eraplasis) Lenin (1973), in his What is to be Done?, expresses the same view as Floden and Buchmann, but within the context of the Let's overestimation of the spontaneity of everyday consciousness (@ point worth making if wwe are to understand Vygotsky's perspective as Marxist), Lenin's main argument throughout his book is that revolutionary consciousness comes, from without, it cannot arise spontaneously from everyday consciousness. For example: We have ssid that there could nor yet be Social-Democratic [fie , revolutionary] com sciousnoss anoag the workers. I could only be Brought to them from without. The history of all counties shows that the working class, exclusively by its ewn effor, is able t0 {eveop only trade uaion consciousness, le. the conviction that its meeesaty 10 combine {in unions, Sight the employers and stsive to compel the government to pass necessary pour legisltio, ete. The theory of Socialism, however, grew ont of the philosophic, bistorics! and economic theories that were elaborated by the edca'ed representatives of the propertied classes, the intelletoals, According to tir social status, the founders of modern scientiie Socialism. Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois ineligentsia. In the very same way, in Russa, the theoretical datine of SocalsDemoc- racy arose quite independent of the spontaneous growth of the working-class movement, it arose as © natucal and inevitable outcome of the dovelopmeat of ideas among the revolutionary socialist intelligentsia. At the time of which we are speaking, ., the middle of the ‘ninetess, this doctrine not oaly represented the completely formulated program of the Emancipation of Labour group, but had slready won aver to fis sie the majority of the revalutionary youth in Resa Hence, we had both the spomancous awakening of the masies of the workers, the woking t conscious life ad conscious sirggle, ana « revoludonary youth, armed with ‘re Social-Democratic theory. eager to come into contact With the workers. (p- 37, eauphasis added on les: paragraph) The last paragraph is reminiscent of the West and Pines (1985) ‘vine” metaphor tc illustrate Vygotsky's “scientific concepts’ moving down from without to transform spontaneous concepts moving u>. I suspect that Vygotsky's ‘scientific concepts’ are ambiguous because he is actually draw- ing ideas from Lenin’s concept of the vanguard party: a party that struggles to attain the highest theoretical standards, and intervenes in the class struggle with ‘scientific socialism,’ the categories of which are formulated in Marx's Capital (a hierarchical system or structure of concepts that is very similar to the logical structure of Newtonian mechanics). In other words, I suspect that Vygotsky's idea of scientific concepts, raising and transforming higher mental functions, is derived from the idea of the ‘scientific cencepts’ of Marx raising and transforming class-consciousness {an essential point in witich the many volumes in Lenin’s collected works attempted to address). It seems as if, for Vygotsky, the relation between the Leninist vanguard party and the working class becomes the simile for the relation between the teacher and the class: if the party can embody the ‘ideal form’ of ‘scientific socialism’, then supposedly the teacher can become the embodiment of the ‘ideal form’ of the sutject that is being ‘taught (the unfortunate connotation of this simile is a bureaucracy that560 S. ROWLANDS proclaims itself to be the embodiment of the ideal form and so cannot be ised — just as the teacher can assert a knowledge claim with authority but without the tether of reason). Marx, and Vygotsky (1987), make the point that if appearance and reality coincided, then all science would be superfiuous. The implication for both the revolutionary communist and the classroom teacher is that ‘funds of knowledge’ may have to be contradicted. Howard (1987), who does not seem to be 2 Marxist, recognises this point when he states: Revolutionaries and union organisers often work by stirring up dissatisfaction with the ‘way things ae, They contzonc people with anomalies in thet he situation, with contadc- lions that they may never even have thought about before... The teacher eiso needs ro ‘bea revolutionary. or eoublemaker, making students dssatisied with their current scher>- ‘ta by showing thom anomalies the misconception: cannot handle. The dissatisfaction may then mativase stedemts ¢9 acquire a now schema tha: ean resolve the contadietons. Leatning some new sthemata can only be considered asa revolt in everyday thinking “The notions of matter consisting of particles or the contiaents on Moating, moving plates are indeed revointuonary.(p. 13) From 2 materialist perspective, the conditions that make funds of knowl- edge necessary for survival implies that, despite all good intentions, the glorification of these funds of knowledge is also an acceptance of the conditions that prevail. Funds of knowledge as a resource for reorganising instruction offers no guarantee that the conditions will change. Despite the reformist character of socioculturalism (another ‘educational road to socialism’), essentially nothing would change. Science is an attainment of human thought, a development of “spiritual culture’ ~ an ideal form the structure of which should not be downplayed in the teaching of science. If science, a5 a body of knowledge, is down- played by socioculturalists for something deemed more relevant to the lives of children, then socioculturists coulé not distance themselves further from Vygotsky! In his elaboration of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete in Marx's Capital, Hyenkov (1982) states that ‘fin general, Marx has always been decidedly opposed to the Leftist view of the development of spiritual culture which ignores all the previous attainments of human. thought... . Lenin enaphasised this point in his strugele against the Leftist views of the proponents of the so-called proletarian culture, who insisted that proletarian culture should be developed “straight from life”, while all attainments of human thought should be discarded as useless refuse” (p. 159). The individual cannot be sepzrated from the social, but the social also includes ‘spiritual culture’ ~ thetefore the ZPD should be seen primarily as a methodology to enable the “acilitation of the individual into spiritual culture. ‘The ZPD is a research methodology that examines psychological pro- cesses in motion and change, but processes in motion and change towards what? The answer has to be the task to be completed, the concept to be acquired or the subject-area to be leamt and understood. This is an epistemological point because it is only when we understand the natureTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 561 of the task/conceptsubject-area that we can instigate change and under- stand the processes involved." This epistemological point is essential in understanding the pedagogical implications of the ZPD and for this reason it will be elaborated further in the next and final section on everyday experience and the teaching of scientific concepts, 5. CONCLUSION ~ SHOULD REFERENCE BE MADE TO EVERYDAY CONCEPTS IN THE TEACHING OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS? Understanding the development of “scientific” (or ‘academic’) concepts requires understandirg the nature of those concepts ~ which may explain why, according to Penofsky et al. (1990), Vygotsky's ideas on scientific concepts constitute a central part of his overali theory, and why, according to Howe (1996), he devoted a major portion of his most widely read book, Thought and Language, to bis understanding, of scientific concepts. The problem is that he discussed schooling only in abstract terms and did not provide any useful treatment of instructional practice (Tharp and Galli- ‘more 1988). Consequently, his discussion of scientific concepts, and their relation to everyday or spontaneous concepts, has left itself open to inter- pretation, Many authors refer to the essential distinction that Vygotsky makes hetween scientific concepts and everyday concepts: the presence and ab- sence of a system (Howe 1996, p. 37). A scientific concept is detached from the object that it refers to, and is specified according to the system. of concepts to which it belongs (Tharp and Gallimore 1988). On the other hand, a spontaneous. or everyday, concept is defined in terms of the perceptual, functional or contextual properties of the referent (Panofsky et al, 1990). This is wit is meant by scientific concepts as decontextualised concepts ~ such that, according to Panofsky et al, (1990), the development of scientific concepts begins with analytic procedures rather than concrete experiences. In learning a concept within a system of concepts, the stu- dent’s attention shifts ftom a sign-object relationship 10 a sign-sign rela tionship (Wertsch 1985). While many authors make this distinction be- tween scientific and everyday concepts, they also argue thet scientific concepts ought to be ‘contestualised” by the teacher by making constant references to students’ everyday concepts (the main interpretation of the sociocultural schoo!) and that this isin keeping with the spirit of Vygotsky. Contrary fo this interpretation, however, is a small minority wio argue that Vygotsky's distinction between scientific and everyday concepts is also a distinction betweer. the teaching/learning of scientific concepts (formal instruction) and the aequiring of everyday concepts in our everyday lives. The implication is that the classroom should provide an ‘educative break’ (a term from Zeuli 1986) trom the community within which it is situated and that it is this that is in keeping with a Vygotskian perspective. ‘That there is a cortroversy seems to be the result of an historic irony.502 Ss. ROWLANDS ‘One of the aims of Vygotsky’s psychology was to provide practical sola. tions to problems in education and yet no teaching strategy was made apparent. With the Soviet Union on the verge of collapse and the need to raise the cultural level of the masses, no practical pedagogical advice ‘was forthcoming from Vygotsky. However, placed in the context of the ‘scientifically correct method’ this irony is not so surprising. According to Mahn and Jobn-Steiner (1998), “His approach was not to prescribe pedagogical methods; rather it was to deseribe the processes at play’ (p. 88) and this is because you cannot prescribe pedagogical methods until you understand the processes at play. This is an example of theory first then practice rither than trying out pedagogical methiods and then theorising about then. Although no pedagogical advice was forthcoming, neverthe- Jess what has become clear is that Vygotsky saw scientific concepts as “being tied to the discourse of formal instruction. Indeed, at one point he ‘went so far as to write (1934/1987, p. 214) that “the basic characteristic of [the] development [of scientific concepts] is that they have their source in school instruction”. (Wertsch 1996, p. 28). According to Van der Veer (1998) Scientific concepes, according to Vygotsky, are introduced in school and form a coherent ‘stem in afield of science. Such concepts are properly defined, and their systematic ‘ature and hierarchical, logical organization are made explicit from the heginning. AS & retult, the child is able to tall about such concepts — or in other word, ' conschous ‘oware of, can make deliberate ue of, and cam reflect on scientific concepts. There ‘every reason to belive that Vygotsky’ preferred scientific eamcapts or coacepiual systems thc reflec the genetic oF storie nature of reality. Darwin's theory of evolution and Maras amiysis of society were his favorite examples (p. 60)... i equally clear that sch concepis ate mostly introduced at school by tating thts formal definition and their ralation 1 other concep, although parents, of course, do provide formal definitions now ‘and thon... Iris lear that such genuine conceptual knowiedge isthe ideal ~ an ideal that ‘even by adults is achioved only in some speciic domsis, p. 21) Consider the following, often quoted, passage from Vygotsky that seems, to have left itself open to interpretation: ‘The child becomes conscious of his spontancous concepts relatively Inte: the ability to define then in words, to operate with them at will, appears long ater he has acquired the concepts. He has the concept {e., knows the object to which the coacept refers), but is not consckwus of his own ac: of thought. The development ofa scentic coocept, on the ‘other hand, sally begins with ies verbal desinicon and ils use in non-spontancaus pee tions ~ with working on the coneept ise, I start i fe sm the chills mind atte Level that his stontaneous concepts reach ony later. .One might say that zhe development of the childs spomaneous concepts proceed upward, and the development of his scientific concepts Cownwards, © 2 more elementary and concrete level, This isa consequence of the ciflerene ways in which the twa kinds of eaneeps emerge. The inception af & spontan- ‘cons concept can usually he traced %0 a face-to-face mectig with @ concrete situation, ‘hile scientific concept involves from the first a ‘meciated’ atiude toward its object. (Vygoesky 1962, p. 108, author's ermphasis) In the passage Vygotsky states that the scientific concept involves from the first a ‘mediated’ attitude towards its object (implying the assent fromTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 563 the abstract to the concrete which will be elaborated below) ~ it usually begins with its verbal definition and use in non-spontaneous operations. Tt seems as though, for many, this begs the question as to what form this mediation should take, What has been implied, however, is that scientific concepts ought to be ‘mediated’ by everyday concepts. For example, according to Moll (1990): ‘Vygoisky ako emphasized that everyday concepts are interconnected and interdependent ‘ici davelepment is mutually influonsal. One cannot exst without ch othor Is through the use of everyday concepts that childrea make sense ofthe definitions and explanations of sciemii concepts: everyday concepts provide the ‘ving knowledge” forthe develop ment of sciemific concepts. That, everyday concepts mediate the acquisition of scenic concepis.(p. 10, emphasis aed) ‘There seems to be a mainstream (sociocultural) consensus that reference hhas to be made to everyday concepts in the development of scientific concepts. Howe (1996) argues that At the sam? time, the child must it everyday concepts into the system learned in school, ‘going from the abstract to the concrete and from the concrete tothe abstract, Movement In both directions is necessary. The child moves toward understanding in a zigag fasion, gong back and forth between araking everyday experience Mins the scene conceptual system and applying the systematic constrict to everyday experience. (p40) Howe argues that conceptual change is an ongoing process in which the teacher or a more capable peer enables the student to integrate everyday concepts into a coherent system of related concepts, and states emphati- cally It is clear that deconiestulized tasks, chosen to representa process but unrelated to children’s everyday knosledge oF interests, would not have place in a science curriculum informed by a Vygorstian perspective. (Howe 196, p. 46) This interpretation of Vygotsky js tacitly assumed by many socioculturists, who ask about the ways in which the abstract can be related to the concrete. For example, Martin (1990) states that the collaborators of a esearch project “asked about the ways the regularities of the everyday and the scientific can be interleaved so that the otherness of an abstract conceptual system is internalized as part of the child’s thinking and ques- tioning’ (p. 393), and concludes that deterioration in learning can be attributed to the unrelatedness of the information to students’ experiences With reference to Vygotsky, Hedegaard (1998) states: ‘On the one side, the acquisition of subject-matter knowledge extends the meaning of every- day knowledge, and on the other side, subject-matter knowledge can only bbe understood and become functional for children if it builds on children’s everyday knowledge’ (p. 118). This view is echoed by Tharp and Gallimore (1988), who has defined Vygotsky's scientific concept as schooled concept: Everyday concepts stand between schooled concepts and the expetienced world Schooled ‘concepts, Jovian detachment, can connect with the world below through the everyday feancepI® tar nave risen through practical aciviy. Fer example, iis well enough «O564 5. ROWLANDS ‘undertend theoretical ecamomics in its ternal celationshis, but it ei be used as 8:90 {or verbal thought and problem-solving only if concepts ike supply and demand age reid ‘through the everydayness of eggs and butter, trucks and taxes. The constant rcting of schooled with everyday concepts enriches and saves schooling from avidity, but this seating ‘also profoundly changes the nature of everyday concepts that arc touched, making them ‘ever more systematic, autonomous, and Cool lke. (P. 107) ‘This “building on everyday knowledge’ does seem to be in keeping with the ‘social other’ interpretation of the ZPD. A more extreme version of this is the discusson of scientifie and everyday concepts in the context of the non-separation between school and community life, For example, in Goodman and Goodman's (1990) article Vygotsky in a Whole-Language Perspective, ‘The authors argue that: If we aovept the concept that learning i diferent in school and out of school and thet scentfe concept ae leamed only in sehool and spontaneous concepts only out of school, ‘then we ae pat in the position of accepting the notion that experience should be substan- tively diferent for schooleemed concepts, We belleve, rate. dha earning in schoo! and learning out of school are not diferent... But the process of concept Jevelopment is a ‘unitary one. Whether concepts ate spontaneous or scientific, they ate all leammed in much the same way, For leemers, « teacher may label a concept scientie, but thar docsa't mean they een or will eara it difterently, (p. 229, authors’ emphasis) This is an ‘extreme version’ because it flies directly in the face of Vygotsky. ‘Vygotsky (1987) speaks of concept development as a unitary process but siricdy in the sense that the development of scientific concepts and the development of everyday concepts are non-antagonistic. That concept de- velopment is a unitary process does not mean to say that scientific concepts originate from the same source as everyday concepts: ‘{t]he verbalism of the scientific concept begins to disappear as it becomes increasingly mote concrete. This has its influence on the development of spontaneous con- cepts as well. Ultimately, the two developmental curves begin to merge {(Shif, 1935)...” (Vygotsky 1987, p. 169, emphasis added), and Vygotsky (1987 ~ see page 173) centrally criticises the view that concept develop- ment originates from the same source. This extreme view of Goodman and Goodman is by no means unique. According to Mahn and John-Steiner (1998) “Through his examination ofthe intertelations of scientific concepts and everyday concepts Vygotsky theorized that learning and development are dynamic proceses that are con- stantly unfolding and being infenced by each otber. A mes, the Way in which Vygousky's ‘approach has boon interpreted has obscured is dynamic nature, 2 the distinction he drew between sciemific and everyday concepts has been hardened into a éichotomy. This ichotomization ignores Vygotsky's view of sciemific and everyday concepts as aypects of ‘unified process of concept formation. (p. SL) Exactly how this dichotomisation, ane that Vygoisky himself makes, ign- ‘ores concept formation as a unified process in the sense outlined by him (as an non-antagonistic process) has not been made clear, Are the authors’ implying the existence of an interpretation that views the two developnen- tal paths us running parallel with no interaction? According to the authors:TURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 565 Far more attentiov hasbeen given to Vygotsky's drawing the distinctions between siemie concepts and everyday concepts than has been given to the interrelation he destibed beincet them, From this focus, a misconception arose that Vygotsky posted an impen- crab dichotomy between scientific concepts and everyday concepts, and from. that ‘misconception anther arose ~ that Vygotsky advocated a formal, clases), radiional ‘rode! of instracton in which knowledge or concepts are transmitted from the teacher to the students. (p. 37) Again, no references have been forthcoming. In the context of Piaget, Vygotsky (1987) does warn against positing such an impenetrable di- chotomy, but this was at a time when the disparity between scientific concepts and their intuitive counterparts (c.g., student ‘misconceptions’ of force) was not apparent. However, what Mahn and John-Steiner ate implying is that if any reference is made to this disparity then ipso facio you are advocating a didactic or transmission model of instruction and that Vygotsky is being used to justify such an advocation. Without references then such an implication is unwarranted (personally [ have yet to see any reference to Vygotsky justifying the transmission model). With reference to Vygotsky, John-Steiner et al, (1998) argue that ‘sx tific concepts rise on the foundation of everyday concepts’ (p. 126) as if the development of scientific and everyday concepts follow the same path Mahn and John-Steiner (1998) state that: ‘According to Vygotsky, the acquisition of subject-matter knowledge extends the meaning of everyday knowledge, ane on the other side, subject-matter knowledge can only be understood and become functional for children if it builds on children’s everyday knowledge (p. 118)" (p. 83). Actually, this quote is according to Hedegaard (1998) and has taken Vygotsky completely out of context. Nowhere has Vygotsky stated that subject-matter knowledge shoukl be built on everyday knowledge. What Vygotsky (1962 1987) does say, time and time again, however, is that the development of everyday concepts have to be at a certain level before the acquisition of scientific concepts. For example, the student must understand how to use “because” in its various everyday contexts before the student can understand ‘causaliy’ in the scientific context. This by no means implies that the scientific context should be built on everyday knowledge’. As Van der Veer (1998) states: ‘He argued that scientific concepts are dependent on everyday concepts in the sense that sciemtfic concepts presuppose everyday concepts as their foundation, but that scientific concepts, in their turn, are able to transform everyday ones’ (p. 91, emphasis added). I would argue that the emphasis placed on everyday concepts in the mediation of scientific concepts const tutes a downplay of science as an academic discipline because many fortal scientific concepts do nor admit to being contextualised with reference to everyday concepis and below I will illustrate this claim with respect to Marx’s Capital. Meanwhile, this brings us to the alternative interpretation of the relation hetween everyday and scientific concepts: that no immediate connections should be made with students’ everyday concepts. For example:366 5. ROWLANDS “The work of Vygorsky (1934/1962, 1930-1966/1078) leads support 10 instructional sp- proaches that strive for greater separation from ~ not more continuity with ~ twin? ‘versday experiences, Vigotsky concludes trom bs studies of scaool learning that ehldren ‘Go not acquire systematic understanding of academic subjects by drawing on Uke Concepts they bring with them, Children are not consciously aviare of these concepts ane thus ‘cannot work with thet abstractly. For example, conespis of family relationships (2.8. brother, sister, mother) can be applied to concrete sitations, bot not fo answering abstract ‘questions of kinship (e.g, the identity of brothers fathers sister). Chilécen evervoally Tiecome sonscious of these logical relations. but may be confused because everyday con ‘cepre ae ‘saturated with experience” (Vyzotsky. 1984/1942, p, 108). By contrest, abstract ‘anceps (e.g, the concept of exploitation) aro learned consciously theit lack of eatcrete reference allows chileren 10 keep conceptual relations stright. (Foden and Buckman 1993, p. 39) ‘This does seem to be consistent with Vygotsky (1987), who states; “The child's incapacity 10 ise above the situational meaning of this word [brother his inability to approach the concept “brother” ay an abstract concept, and his incapacity 10 void logial contractions while operating with it, are the dangers present i the develop- rent of everyday concepts. (p. 218) ‘And this seems to be consistent with Zeuli (1986), who argues that sharp breaks between school instruction and everyday concepts may be more likely to promote students’ scientific understanding because ‘miscorcep- tions’ or ‘preconceptions’ are resilient to change, hence they cannot be built upon or refined. According to Zeuli (1986): For Vygotsky, however, the school envionment isthe creation of a special contet for purposes distin’ fom everyday leering, Collaborative interaction within the zone of proximal development focises on teacher support of student Teaming as students try ta Understand dacontextuslised scientine concepts. It is questionable that efor to cennect subject mattcr to students everyday concepts end experiences wil foster their comitive evelopment. (6) With respect to Vygotsky, West and Pines (1985) identifies two sources of Knowiedge ~ everyday knowledge formed by interaction with the en- vironment, and goal directed and structured bodies of knowledge formed in the process of instruction. They propose a vine metaphor and refer to the conflict situation between the learner's reality and the principles being presented. Floden and Buchmann (1993) make the point that not only do everyday concepts conflict with scientific understanding, but some science concepts do not refer to everyday experience at all: ‘Its the sun, and not the earth, that stands still: hammers dissolve into electrons and protons: \water is actually a combination of gases; and so on, There are also concepts with no counterparts in the everyday world, such as latent heat’, (Floden and Buchmann 1993, p. 38) ‘That there is a conflict between stucient everyday concepts and the concepts of science has been made apparent in the last two decades of research into student intuitive ideas of force and motion, and this does appear to contradict Vygotsky's claim that the development of scientific and everyday concepts is non-antagonistic. However, had Vygotsky's work continued into the realm of student intuitive ideas of force and motionTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 567 then he might have realised the disparity between force as defined within the logical structure of mechanics and intuitive ideas of force that are ‘more akin with Aristotle and the medieval impetus school. Written just before his death, Vygotsky (1994) wrote that one of the failings so far im his work was that a child’s social scientific concepts have been ap- proached from a general rather than a specific point of view because For us, they served move aa prototype of any actdemie concept in general, rather than 4 definite and speciah type of one specific aspect of academic concepts this is Because {Guring the carly stages of a ew study it was necessary to differentiate berwees academic oncepts and everyday ones. and to demonstrate what characterizes sovial science (oBsh- ‘hesrvovedeno] concepts as representing one typeof academic concept. Bur the differences ‘vhich exe wii individual aspects of academe concepts (arithmetical. narura-scientifc, socialscentifc), could nox Become the subjec of asmdy before a demarcation line, dividing laeademic and evervéay concepts, fad first been drawn, These ctcunstances explain hy the cycle of concepts which were scluded on tis say of concepts & not represensatve of tony Kind of sir ef asie inherent concepts which make up te logical racre of the Subject ise bt acer hari inchuded a nuberof conceps which were empirical selected tn ahe basis of programmatic materia! of separate. seals unconnected concepts. (P. 367. emphasis added) Vygotsky's discussion of scientific and spontaneous concepts may be seen 1s an atiempt to analyse the relationship between everyday concepts that are formed in the process of social development of the child (the child in “social activity’), and concepts that exist independently of the child (con- cepts that exist within a system of concepts) but have yet to be constructed by the child, facilitated by the teacher. as a psychological process of enculturation. This psychological process is facilitared by reference to the everyday only if the everyday is referenced from the abstract. Davydov (1988b), in developing Vygotsky's ideas to “developmental teaching’, re~ fers to the ‘problem-based exposition of knowledge” whereby the teacher structures the path leading to the conclusion already reached (‘the embriol- ogy of truth’): “In so doing, the teacher demonstrates to the pupils the very route taken by scientific thought, obliges the pupils to trace the dialectical movement of thought toward the truth, makes them, as it were, coparticipants in scientific exploration’ (p. 16). For Davydov, the teacher should not zig-zag between the scientific and the everyday: “The exposition of scicatiie knostedge is implemented by means of an ascent from the sbvirat io the concrete, in which substantial abstractions, generalizations. and theoretical ceonceprs are utilized. (9.20) Davydov refers to the “kernel” of the academic subject (p. 22) which serves as a general principle whereby pupils can orientate themselves in order to assimilate i conceptual form factual material in the ‘ascent from the abstract to the conercte’ (p. 23). Davydov argues that abstract material introduced relatively early serves as a means for children to ‘get their ‘hands on” the baseline of item specific action (p. 73). [Science should be seen as the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, and the teaching of science should be the assent from the abstract to the concrete]568, 5. ROWLANDS. Of course, the teacher should always relate the abstract to the concrete whenever possible, but this is different to building the abstract from the concrete which is rarely, if ever, possible. Consider, by way of illustration, a ‘social-scientific’ example. Supposing a teacher wanted to introduce Marx's Capital in order to elaborate on a theory of capitalist crisis and attempted to explain the tendeney for the rate of profit to fall with cate- 2 are defined by the concept of commodity value, such as surplus value, constant and variable capital ete. Here we have a system of concepts whereby value is the ‘Kernel’, ‘germ’, ‘molar unit’, ‘cell’ or ‘essence’ of the system of concepts, and ‘the teacher would find it very difficult to connect these decontexualised concepts with reference to everyday con- cepts, such as Tharp and Gallimore’s (1988) example of theoretical cconomics with reference to eggs and butter (of course, how the teacher gains the receptivity of the class may be a different matter. It may be necessary to challenge any misconceptions regarding tite crisis, such as the crisis is eyclic, or implicit overconsumptionist theories ete). If it is possible to relate the abstract to the concrete, then either the coherence of the theory is shown by its account of the concrete, or the concrete illustrates the abstract as an instance of the general. The number of eges or the amount of butter can stand in for the variables of a theory, but that is completely the opposite to developing schooled concepts from the experi- ence of eggs and butter. Quite contrary to Tharp and Gallimore, everyday concepts do not stand between the abstract on the one hand, and the experienced world on the other, and should not be seen as units for medi- ation. The essential point is that sciemtific concepts, such as physics con- cepts, are well-defined. For example, momentum is well-defined as the product of mass and velocity (Hestenes 1992), and to understand the law of conservation of momentum is to understand the ‘kernel’ of the system of concepts (namely force as defined by the laws of motion) History has shown the emphasis placed on the “social other’ to be a preconception! Published for the first time in English, Vygotsky's (1994a) The Problem of the Environment is part of a collection edited by Van der Veer and Valsiner (1954) in response to the ‘societal construction of ‘Vygotsky's stature’. Vygotsky (199da) argues that the child’s language acquisition or mathematical development is only possible if the ideal (or ‘ideal-form) is already present in the environment ~ namely the langu: or mathematics as communicated by adults but orientated towards the child: So this, generally, means that if we are dealing wit a sivation where chs ideal form is ‘not present in ene environment, and what we hive is interaction between several radimen tary forms, the resulting development has a extremely limited, reduced and impoverished character. (p. 250) In other words: the teacher can only facilitate language acquisition or an understanding of mathematics if the teacher embodies the ideal! The ZPD is the distance between potential development (what could be achieved)TURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD 559, and actual development (what has been achieved), it is also the distance between the ideal and the present cognitive state of the student (It is because of this ‘idea’ that learning precedes development. In mathematics or science education, that ideal is mathematics or science as an objective body of knowledge)."* T suspect that the relativism of the sociocultural school — the emphasis placed on everyday experience, the ZPD used as « metaphor to emphasise community life over formal schooling and the rejection of abjectivism — has more to do with the postmodernist times in which we live, and science losing its popularity since the Second World War (see Gillott and Kumar 1995), than it has with coming to terms with what Vygotsky was attempting to construct, Vygotsky may be a hero, but a very misunderstood hero! ‘Understanding Vygotsky may be a long process that cannot happen over- night (especially Since ‘preconceptions are amazingly tenacious and resist~ ant to extinction’ - Ausubel). However, emphasising the following point may help to ‘encapsulate’ Vygotsky and sid the process: losing sight of the objectivity of science and emphasising ‘sociocultural conditions’ would deprive students of a very important intellectual resource. Notes * You do pot have to be a Marxist co appreciate the contibution dat Manx or Vygoky ‘ean make to edveation. Personally, however, I agree with Matthews (1980) that: "Marrist epistemology is important to education... In theoretical terms, an epistemology is required in order to ground and criticise much of the curent radial extiqu of sehooking”(p. 8) This paper elaborates on Marxist epistemology and, similary with Matthews (1980), this gpistemology 5 elucidated in terms ofthe philosophy of science * ‘although Vypotsly’s work was intertwined with current psychological research abread (Van det Veer and Valsines 1954), nonetheless he approached this work from 3 Marist perspective (Van der Veer and Vatsiner 1993). For exempic, Crawford (1985) states that [a] basic premise underlying the action research processes is that knowledge is generated through paticipation in collaborative aetion with fa intent to transom existing fo fe inconsistent with the tratitional ass restoned logic about facts and principles rather than emotional iavolvement” (p20), ‘and. fsties this interpretation wih reference to Vygotsky: “Vygotsky has challenged he assurnptions underlying positivist views of absolute and objective reality. Acconding to Vygot- sky. consciousness, knowiedge and maturing forms of awareness or insight have a socal bvigin, and ase mediated rhrough zcton in a social context, Furthermore, cognitive structires fare actualy formed as a result of such action (p. 243). Firstly, the assumption of an absoLte and objective reality is not positive (according to Lenin 1972, positivism sa form of idealism fad not objectvism, and sccording to Carmap 1934, positivism would regard ‘an absolate and objective reality’ as an apriosi judgement that cannot be reduced, of based om, fn empirical observation andl should therefore be discarded as metaphysical speculacin) Secondly, if Vygotsky wes a Marxist then he would not have denied an objective reaity (Gshich is what this paper shall attempt 0 show) and thindy, if Vygotsky was & Marxist thea theory is not simply a result of praxis (unless the prans i a science, ., has a researh progcarme ia the sense outlined by Chalmers 1982) ~ which wil be atiempied tobe shown ‘within the next few pages570 5. ROWLANDS * Tao separation is made between ‘real’ and theoretical’ objects then Row can we reconcile the ‘real miotian of a throwa ball (the ball going “upward withthe fact hati sin ree {all (a “heoretial’ objet)? (Exannple inspired hy Suehting 1986), To sess the point further, if theory (outside of any scientific research paradigm) was rerely the result of existing praxis, then action researchers Would have gained an iasighi fnto schooling as maintaining and sefecting the existing soeil relations of production (t0 {gin an insight, see Matthews 198L), However, i would appear tha action research has not {ined this insight, For example, many action reseaschers argv for a “contestation theory {ithat schools play a role in producing (not just reproducing) social and eultaral relations ‘of society theoual the political struggles amongst those people involved in the world of ‘education’ (Kemmis and McTaggart 1988. p. 31), and the authors argue that schools ere not powerless to change the socal class straiication of society. I salman! ai the working ‘lass can come to own the means of procicion through good educational practice (a sort ‘of ‘edustional road 20 socialism if you ike). [W]e should ako recognise that schools have ‘always simed co foster the improvement of society by impting is best knowtecige, is highest views of culture, ite most humanitarian disposioas; in these ways, sehools work to transform society’ (Kemmis and MeTaggare 1988, p. 37, fist emphasis given). How can Kemmis and McTaggast sate this, given tat atthe en ofthe century sehocling encouraged 1 patiotism that led 2 whole generation vo slaughter snd carnage! So much for edueations) prin generating theo. For exaniple, fo waderstand the aature of intuitive ideas of force and motion, we have to tsk questions thatthe students may never have thought about before ~ the ‘misconception ray be a response, to the question, that is formed in the student's mind for the first ime (aud not simpy formed aver years of experience or formed as part ofthe students “eoncept cology’). A set of differen: questions that demand essenially the same answer (questions structured secording tothe tagger concept, Le, parallel questions) but waere the choice of question is determined by the student's response 10 the previous queston, may reveal 3 pattern of reasoning, The methods of generalsability may then reveal a law. Prior to any Interview or experimental conditions, however, isthe idea (prior to the plot study isthe target-soncopt that dotermines the set of questions subsequently, iti the modified set of ‘questions that will enable us to determine which response to evoke). Ths ies, o¢ target ‘concept is pat of the ileal form’ of interelated system of concepts, that make up mechan {cs as stuctured body of knowledge. In other words, what “misconception wo evoke would depend party on the way the question is structured uecording to the logical structure of mechanics (an examination of the lopieal siucture of Newtonian mechanics is given by stones 1987, 1992; and Wittgeastein's Tracianus propositions 6.341-8 35). © According, © Geelan (1997), although Vygotsky can be clesiied as a 'soxial-objctvit, sowetheless he Would have rejcted the tag ‘objectivist” because he tended to teat science {3 «consensual socal construct into which stents are to be socialisod. However, couse the folowing statement by Vygotsky “The regularity in the change and development of ies, the appearance and death of ‘amncepts, even the ciange in cesifeations, ete. can all be explained scientifically bused ‘on the connection ofthe science in question with (1) the Sociocultural substratem ofthe tins. (2) the general laws and conditions of scientific knowlodg>, (3) the objective demands the nature ofthe phenormens currenly under investigation make on séentife cognition, in other words, with the demant of the objective reality sued bythe scence in question {quoied from Rosa and Montero 1980. p. 64). ‘Contrary to treating sience merely as a consensual social construct, Vyyosky’s scientifically ‘based explanation” contains (1) ¢ Sosiocaearal element, (2) an objectvis element and (3) 4 materials element, Bevstse Von Claserfetd (1985) cannot get his own way with Vpotsky (Won Gilasersfeld 1995 i a subjecrivist, and soe norilly does get his own way by ismming the edues of others and forming ap eclectic mix that denies realism. For example. read ‘chapter 2), he argues that the abjectiism of Vygotsky may he attributed totaving to appease his pobiicsl wasters (as if Vygotsky could not, in his heart of hears, be an objecTURNING VYGOTSKY ON HIS HEAD sm tivist) However, according to Rosa and Montero (990), up until 1928 there was freedom of academic recur, such that any posal erism was sesiive enough 0 as 10 Bot hndermine the rests ofthe research. Ths maybe de o Lenin’ (1972) afgument tht all Scientists n practic, ae materials 1 the Maru perspective evar siece asa practi tat describes in some way the objective, real, material world, then the results of th practice, according to the perspective, must he indopendeat of whether the seontst fan ‘seals, postvist ox whatever Ths pint Sere is that by understanding the perspective we can understand Vygotsky's work ~ and thea, if necessry, forma jadatiment of that work {Given shat Vsgosky Was & “materials, it would be foolish ta downplay his objetvsm 'Roste's (199) programme fora radical sociology’ of malBemates (an even stonget version than Bloor'sstong programme’ of flav) begins with Marx on science 8 2 Locil acy. Tele worth noting ot ie plot thot mach of Reso erpument bared on thetore, For example "Te deine of Pavone, Pythagorean, formalist, and foundatooalis Drejuies has opened the door for socal tlk about mathemati. 209). Watch out ~ Soka’ about "For okampie, Vyeorst’s (1887) law of development of ssenfe concepts: “the develop ines of sceafe and spontaneous conceps take oppose paths’ (p. 217). 2" According to Koalin (1986), although the origin of activity teary can Be found in the sty wesings of Vgothy,neverhces, Leon? evs acity dor) i Tevisons® becatse it isan atempt to plce practi (ate) actions atthe forefront wie atthe sume tine plaving down Vygotshy’s emphasis on the role of signs as mediators of human act "Thor are many scious (eg Mol Hata, Howe) who refer to thr perspective as neo-Vygotsian 2s opponed to Vygoskan. The reason for the qualification & thet interpretation ofthe vo-caled Vyetskia conception of Knowledge acquisition by instru tio’ (FHetano 1983, p. 154) a8 the mainstream Vsgotkian perspostive (thous, for ell ppeatanes i's a though the uoo-Vygotakians rein the masters). Th inepreta- tion sees Vgoteknnism as advovating a drl-and-practce frm of iastraction. Unfortunately, references 10 thote advocating sich @ form of istmelion have not beea forthcoming. | ‘spect hal, for many sococulturs any so-called Vygotkin’ whe pices an empha ob the subject tobe taught, over and above the every experiences of the pupil eavoseting ‘a dsil-and-pracsic frm of instruction, However (ila Nok: 1997 erie of constr: tii) F would argue that an empsis placed on raonaliy does ao constitute a teensex of Kaowiedge’ ofa uansmison model of edicationt Despite thei labs, T would repatd the soeocatural schoo! asthe mainstream "Vygotskian’pespectiv. and those Vyyotsans ‘who are objetvits, oF who argue Zoran edocauve break trom everyay experiences (e2, Buchinann and Faden, Ze), asthe minority, or true’ Vygoakisns [nthe context ofthe ZPD, Vypotsky makes mich reference to ads and “nore competent pects. Pese aroup collaboration has been much referenced by socialists a8 if i were prescribed by Vyzosky a ¢ universal teaching method. However, peer sroup callaborstion ‘oul! be seen in the context of informal education unde the onciions that prevaled ia the Soviet Union In my own observation of peer aroup collaboration inthe mathematics lassroom, have noted th tendency of more competent peers to become didactic. Tudge (1990) notes the possiblity ofthe repression of more compatent peers 2D" Vyotshy (978) makes asia pont in the context of play: A numberof investors, altuoush not belonging tothe camp of dalecceb terials, have approached his sve ‘lng the lines recommended ty Marx when he si that “the anatomy of man i the Fey tothe anatomy ofthe ape”. They have begun the examinason of early pay inthe gh of later rule based pay and have eoaladed fom this eat play involving sn imaginary situation in io foc, ral baved ply’ (pe 1). 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