ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES FOUNDATION AFW v.

NLRC

Facts:
Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the Radiologic Technology Act of 1992. Said law requires
that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without having
obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology. Petitioner Maribel Santos was hired
as X-Ray Technician in the Radiology department of private respondent St. Lukes Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC).

Pursuant to RA 7431 the assistant Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of private respondent SLMC issued a
final notice to all practitioners of Radiologic Technology to comply with the requirement otherwise, the unlicensed
employee will be transferred to an area which does not require a license to practice if a slot is available.

The Director of the Institute of Radiology issued another memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos advising her that only
a license can assure her of her continued employment at the Institute of Radiology of the private respondent SLMC and
that the latter is giving her the last chance to take and pass the forthcoming board examination scheduled in June 1998;
otherwise, private respondent SLMC shall be constrained to take action which may include her separation from
employment. On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology issued a notice to petitioner Maribel S.
Santos informing the latter that the management of private respondent SLMC has approved her retirement in lieu of
separation pay. SLMC issued a Notice of Separation from the Company to petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective
December 30, 1998 in view of the latters refusal to accept private respondent SLMCs offer for early retirement.

Petitioner Maribel Santos files a complaint against private respondent illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries,
allowances and other monetary benefits. She
further contends that her failure to pass the board licensure exam for exam for X-ray
technicians did not constitute just cause for termination as it violated her
constitutional right to security of tenure. The appellate court finds this contention
untenable, hence this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is legally dismissed pursuant to R.A. 7431
exercising police power of the State?

Held:
Yes, the petitioner dismissal is valid due to her inability to secure a certificate
of registration from Board of Radiologic Technology.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general
welfare of the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The
state is justified in prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or any other professions connected with
the health and safety of its citizens. Respondent being engaged in the hospital and health care business, is a proper subject
of the cited law; thus, having in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter cannot close its eyes and complainant
private interest override public interest. The law is clear that the Certificate of Registration cannot be substituted by any
other requirement to allow a person to practice as a Radiologic Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist (Technician

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 120095, August 5,1996; 260 SCRA 319

(Labor Standards

Artist Record Book as a requirement for overseas employment contract)

Facts The deployment of female entertainers to Japan was controlled by thegovernment through Department Order No.
3, wherein said entertainers wererequired an Artist Record Book as a precondition to the processing by the POEAof any
contract for overseas employment. Petitioners contends that overseasemployment is a property right within the meaning of
the Constitution and aversthat the alleged deprivation thereof through the onerous requirement of an ARBviolates due
process and constitutes an invalid exercise of police power.

Issue : WON an Artist Record Book is a valid requirement for overseas employment.

Held: Yes. The ARB requirement and the questioned Department order related to itsissuance were issued pursuant to a valid
exercise of police power whichconsiders the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women.
FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class suit on January 27, 1995
assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures and requirements for screening performing
artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former and other related issuance,
principally contending that the said orders, 1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for
employment; and 3.) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the
issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the constitutional right to life
liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity) filed a motion for
intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15, 1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the
trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An
appeal was made to the trial court regarding its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB
requirement was issed. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance
constituted a valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of police power by the state particularly when their conduct
afffects either the execution of a legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and
welfare and public morals. According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion
so as to not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and
manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is
certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates due process clause is to ignore the
settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or profession.
Professional leaving for abroad are required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to
practice their trade. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under
the due process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such
deprivation exists.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al

G.R. No. 132805
Feb. 2, 1999

FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company. He was assigned at the PAL
Medical Clinic and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was abou
t5-minute drive away. A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo Services. One of its
employeeshad suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, Mr. Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of
the emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the
hospital. When Dr. Fabros reached the clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient to
the hospital. The patient died the following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an investigation. In his
explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he immediately left his residence
upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio
panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him.

Finding private respondents explanation unacceptable, the management charged private respondent with
abandonment of post while on duty. He denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he only left
the clinic to have his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening upon being informed of the
emergency.

After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was given a suspension for three months
effective December 16, 1994.
Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.
On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension of private respondent illegal. It also
ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have received during his
period of suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on
record and the law on the matter. The NLRC likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON the nullifying of the 3-month suspension by the NLRC erroneous.
2. WON the awarding of moral damages is proper.

HELD: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portion of the assailed decision awarding moral damages to private
respondent is DELETED. All other aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED

1. The legality of private respondents suspension: Dr. Fabros left the clinic that night only to have his dinner at his house,
which was only a few minutes drive away from the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty so that he
could be easily reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed of Mr. Acostas condition, private respondent
immediately left his home and returned to the clinic. These facts belie petitioners claim of abandonment. Petitioner argues
that being a full-time employee, private respondent is obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight (8)
hours. Hence, he may not leave the company premises during such time, even to take his meals. We are not impressed. Art.
83 and 85 of the Labor Code read: Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any employee shall not
exceed eight (8) hours a day. Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million
(1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for
eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the service
require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they shall be entitled to an additional
compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article,
health personnel shall include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dieticians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory
technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.
(emphasis supplied) Art. 85. Meal periods. Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be
the duty of every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals. Sec. 7, Rule
I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code further states: Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods. Every
employer shall give his employees, regardless of sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off for regular meals, except in the
following cases when a meal period of not less than twenty (20) minutes may be given by the employer provided that such
shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked of the employee; (a) Where the work is non-manual work in
nature or does not involve strenuous physical exertion; (b) Where the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen
hours a day; (c) In cases of actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be performed on machineries,
equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer; and (d) Where the work is
necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods. Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty (20)
minutes shall be considered as compensable working time. Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include the meal
break. Nowhere in the law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within the company premises.
Employees are not prohibited from going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Private
respondents act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute abandonment. 2. The award of moral
damages: Not every employee who is illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. As a rule, moral damages are
recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy In the case at bar,
there is no showing that the management of petitioner company was moved by some evil motive in suspending private
respondent. It suspended private respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous, belief that private respondents act of leaving
the company premises to take his meal at home constituted abandonment of post which warrants the penalty of
suspension. Under the circumstances, we hold that private respondent is not entitled to moral damages.

GANDARA MILL SUPPLY v. NLRC

FACTS: Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife delivered their first child. He did not
however notify his employer, causing a disruption in the business of the latter. When the respondent returned to work he was
surprised upon knowing that someone has been hired to take his place.

ISSUE: Was there a case of illegal dismissal?

HELD: Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged absence without leave may
constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems from the non-observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil
Doctrine by analogy, where dismissal was not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the illegality of the
dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.

1. G.R. No. 103525. March 29, 1996MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU-MIF), Respondents. Facts: On 23 August 1984, Marcopper Mining
Corporation, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in the business of mineral
prospecting, exploration and extraction, and private respondent NAMAWU-MIF, a labor federation duly organized and
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), to which the Marcopper Employees Union (the exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file workers of petitioner) is affiliated, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective from 1
May1984 until 30 April 1987.The COMPANY agrees to grant general wage increase to all employees within the bargaining unit. It is expressly
understood that this wage increase shall be exclusive of any increase in the minimum wage and/or mandatory living
allowance that may be promulgated during the life of this Agreement. Prior to the expiration of the aforestated Agreement,
petitioner and private respondent executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein the terms of the CBA, specifically
on matters of wage increase and facilities allowance, were modified as the COMPANY grants a wage increase of 10% of the basic rate
to all employees and workers within the bargaining units. This will mean that the members of the bargaining unit will get an effective
increase of 10% from May 1, 1986.In compliance with the amended CBA, petitioner implemented the initial 5% wage increase
due on 1 May 1986.On 1 June 1987, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 was promulgated mandating the integration of the cost of living allowance
into the basic wage of workers, its affectivity retroactive to 1 May 1987. Consequently, effective on 1May 1987, the basic wage rate of
petitioners labourers categorized as non-agricultural workers was increased byP9.00 per day. Petitioner implemented the
second five percent (5%) wage increase due on 1 May 1987 and thereafter added the integrated COLA. Private
respondent, however, assailed the manner in which the second wage increase was effected. It argued that the COLA
should first be integrated into the basic wage before the 5% wage increase is computed.Consequently; the union filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages before the Regional Arbitration Branch IV,Quezon City. Labor Arbiter promulgated a
decision in favor of the union. Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiters decision and the NLRC rendered its decision sustaining
the Labor Arbiters ruling. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its resolution. Hence, the present
petition. Issue: What should be the basis for the computation of the CBA increase, the basic wage without the COLA or the
so-called "integrated" basic wage which, by mandate of E.O. No. 178, includes the COLA.

Held: The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands strong and true. However, the present
controversy involves not merely an interpretation of CBA provisions. More importantly, it requires a determination of the
effect of an executive order on the terms and the conditions of the CBA. This is, and should be ,the focus of the instant case. It is
unnecessary to delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they allegedly meant by the term "basic wage" at the time
the CBA and MOA were executed because there is no question that as of 1 May 1987, as mandated by E.O. No. 178, the basic wage
of workers, or the statutory minimum wage, was increased with the integration of the COLA. As of said date, then, the term "basic wage" includes
the COLA. This is what the law ordains and to which the collective bargaining agreement of the parties must conform.T here is
evidently nothing to construe and interpret because the law is clear and unambiguous. Unfortunately for petitioner, said law, by some
uncanny coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date the CBA increase became effective. Therefore, there
cannot be any doubt that the computation of the CBA increase on the basis of the "integrated" wage does not constitute
a violation of the CBA. While the terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is not, however,
an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract
within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is
not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must
be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction
upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.

SAROCAM VS INTERORIENT MARITIME 493 SCRA 502 (2006)

FACTS:
On June 27, 2000, petitioner Benjamin Sarocam was hired by Interorient Maritime and Demaco United Ltd., for 12-
month contract as bosun on borad M/V Despina. While navigating to China, Sarocam suffered lumbar sprain when he
accidentally fell from a ladder. On Nov 15, 2000, he was examined and was found to have neuromyositis and diabetes. The
examining physician prescribed medicine and recommended signing of and hospitalization. He was repatriated on Nov 30,
2000.On Dec 5, 2000, petitioner was referred to the company-designated physician. Sarocam was given medicine for his
back pain and diabetes and was advised to return for a checkup. On Dec 13, he returned to the clinic with normal results;
petitioner was then declared fit for duty.
On Mar 20, 2001, petitioner executed a release and quitclaim in favor of his Interorient Maritime where he
acknowledged receipt of $405 as sick wages. However on Nov2001, petitioner filed a complaint with NLRC for disability
benefit, illness allowance/reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and fees. To support his claim, he presented
medical certificates issued by his 3 personal doctors, recommending Grade VIII disability under POEA schedule of disability
grading.LA dismissed the complaint citing that he was not entitled to disability benefits because he was declared fit for duty
and had previously executed a release and quitclaim in favor of his employers and had already received his sickness
allowance. NLRC affirmed the same.

Sarocams argument: the quitclaim he executed is invalid, as the amount he received

was much lower than what he should have received under the POEA standard employment contract. Quitclaims are
frowned upon by the courts as they are contrary to public policy.

ISSUES:
W/N SAROCAMS EXECUTION OF A RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM ESTOP
HIM FROM CLAIMING DISABILITY BENEFITS UDNER THE POEA STANDARDEMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

HELD:
While the petitioner may be correct in stating that quitclaims are frowned upon for being contrary to public policy, the
Court has, likewise recognized legitimate waivers that represent voluntary and reasonable settlement of a workers claim which should be
respected as the law between the parties.

Where the person making the waiver hasdone so voluntarily, with a full understanding thereof, and consideration for thequitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as beinga valid and binding undertaking.

In the present case, Sarocam wrote the release and quitclaim with his own hand. From the document itself, the element of
voluntariness in its execution is evident. He also

NS TRANSPORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (NSTEA), ET AL. vs. NS TRANSPORT SERVICES, ET AL. G.R. No. 164049 October 30, 2006. A LABOR
RELATION CA

FACTS:

1. The petitioner file a notice of strike before the NCMB who because of its failure to settle the disputes between the parties, conducted a
strikes.

2. The dole secretary upon motion of the company assume jurisdiction over the dispute.

3. Thereafter, the company filed a complaint for declaration of illegality of strike and damages before the NLRC, alleging that while
mediation was in progress, the Union staged a strike. While on the other hand, the Union sought to hold the company for contempt for
allegedly refusing to accept its returning members. The cases were then consolidated by the NLRC.

4. Because of the failure of the parties to settle there disputes, the labor arbiter required the party to submit there position papers.

5. In the trial, NSTEA was able to present all their witnesses for examination but the NSTS, however, miserably failed to appear and present
their witnesses for examination despite having been repeatedly notified to do
So so the petitioner file a motion submitting the case for decision.

6. The NLRC held that the strike staged by the Union was legal and ordered the reinstatement of the individual complainants with full
backwages and denied all the motion for reconsideration of the respondent.

7. The respondent company filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse on the part of the NLRC in
issuing its resolution despite lack of notice and without giving it the opportunity to present its evidence and witnesses who ruled in favor of
the company and remanded the case to the NLRC for further proceedings. It found that counsel for the company changed his address
while the cases were pending before the NLRC, and that the NLRC was in fact cognizant of such change of address since it had previously
sent notices of hearings to the new address for almost 3 years while the case was on-going and denied all the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner.

8. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue. Whether or not, the right to due process of the company was violated.

According to the Supreme Court, both the parties was at fault in the delay of the decision of the case as found by the court of appeals so
it is not fare to blame it only to the respondent company and while both party was given the opportunity to present their evidence, the
respondent company was denied of its right because the case was submitted for decision during the formal hearing.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated 30 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Sp No. 75155 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.