G.R. No.

113375 May 5, 1994

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED vs. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR

FACTS:
The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its
revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after
learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the
Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc.
became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the
citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its
equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign
stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly
opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns,
however the project pushed through.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and

2. Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as
amended by B.P. Blg. 42.

RULING:

1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the
public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably
affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal
standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its
sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.

2. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with
any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign. The
language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege to
hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities, the PCSO cannot exercise it in collaboration, association or joint
venture with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the
phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise
with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or
lease such franchise.
G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA),

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

FACTS:
Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures
Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses.
The said AO embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and
agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
March 1999, Sec DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses, it covers the following:
(1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional
and other non-agricultural purposes;
(2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as
livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land
from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage;
(3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously
authorized; and
(4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15
June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other
pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.
The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002
Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for
conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions particularly addressing
land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
To address the conversion to lands to non- agricultural, Sec of DAR suspended
processing and approval of land conversion through DAR Memo 88.
CREBA claims that there is a slowdown of housing projects because of such
stoppage.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not DARs AO entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the Petition shall dismissed for having been filed directly with the
Court
 RULING:

1. Yes. RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or suitable for
the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of
livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and
other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by a person whether natural or juridical, and not
classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.

However, he issued an AO included in this definition - lands not reclassified as

residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
1988. In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be
agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise.

This is violation of RA 6657 because there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic

Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the
jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be
submitted to its conversion authority.

It also violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided
therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or
requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect
reclassification.

The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the
constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section
2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs
jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from
legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties.

More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in
favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.

2. YES. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive.
It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of
Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not; however, to be taken as according to
parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
 That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior)
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the
Courts docket.

G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY

ALLAN T. DRILON, NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

1. The petitioners, namely, Samuel Occea and Ramon Gonzales, members of the
Philippine BAR and delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention are suing as
taxpayers.

2. In the prohibition proceedings, they challenged the validity of three (3) Batasang
Pambansa Resolution, which consists of the following:

(a) Proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for
residential purposes;

(b) dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly;
 (c) amendment to the article on the Commission on Elections.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the 1973 constitution is a fundamental law.

2. Does the Interim Batasang Pambansa have the power to propose amendments?

3. What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as a standard for

proper submission?

HELD:

1. Citing the case of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary where they dismissed the
petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification with a
vote of six(6) to four(4), the Supreme Court said: This being the vote of majority,
there is no further judicial obstacle to the new constitution being considered in
force and effect(in force and effect on January 17, 1973). With such the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court, and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but
must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter
of law, all doubts are resolved. The 1973 constitution is a fundamental law.

2. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable.

The applicable provision of the 1976 amendment is quite explicit, which reads:
The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members
shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the Members thereof."14 One of such powers is precisely that of
proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested
the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon
special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be
ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments.

3. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose

amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits
as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far
as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when,
as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power
to propose amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement
of three- fourth votes applies, such extraordinary majority was obtained.
Resolution 1 was approved by a vote of 122 to 5; Resolution 2 was approved
with a vote 147 to 5 with 1 abstention, and; Resolution 3 was approved with a
vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.

As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed
not only from the standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of
the plebiscite but also from the standpoint of such amendments having been
called to the attention of the people so that it could not plausibly be maintained
that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the period,
the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no
ambiguity to the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of
such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by
the InterimBatasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5
and 27, 1981. Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing.