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EVANGELINE LADONGA VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005

Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculams regular customers in
his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from
him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990
issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post
dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a
third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22,
1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason CLOSED
ACCOUNT; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a
criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because
there was no sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks
were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the
checks when they mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in
the issuance thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced
but her co-accused husband under the latters account could be held liable for violations of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

Held: The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was
present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence
with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the
crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONIO MENDOZA Y BUTONES


G.R. No. 152589 & 152758. January 31, 2005

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant of our Decision dated
24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said decision, we modified the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-
appellant guilty of rape under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and instead, we
adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the court a quo with regard
to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-
appellant to suffer the ultimate penalty of death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness.

Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no sufficient basis to
modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-
G.There is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts
but does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article 366 of the Revised
Penal Code states: (a)ny person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon the other person of
either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by
prision correccional. As explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness
have the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two. In rape, there is the
intent to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent in acts of lasciviousness. In this case, the series
of appalling events which took place on the night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private
complainant and of accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to ravish his very
own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the trial court, accused-appellant,
taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the absence of his wife, removed her (private
complainants) clothing and thereafter placed himself on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly
naked as private complainant, then proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until
finally, he rendered private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These dastardly acts
of accused-appellant constitute the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made. Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness,
they are indisputably overt acts executed in order to consummate the crime of rape against the person of
private complainant.

SALVADOR D. FLOR VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 139987. March 31, 2005

Facts: Information for libel was filed before the RTC, Branch 20, Naga City, against the petitioner and
Ramos who were then the managing editor and correspondent, respectively, of the Bicol Forum, a local
weekly newspaper circulated in the Bicol Region. It states: On or about the 18th day up to the 24th day of
August, 1986, in the Bicol Region comprised by the Provinces of Albay, Catanduanes, Sorsogon, Masbate,
Camarines Sur, and Camarines Norte, and the Cities of Iriga and Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court under R.A. No. 4363, and B.P. Blg. 129, the above-named accused
who are the news correspondent and the managing editor, respectively, of the local weekly newspaper
Bicol Forum, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without justifiable motive and with
malicious intent of impeaching, discrediting and destroying the honor, integrity, good name and
reputation of the complainant as Minister of the Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization
and concurrently Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, and to expose him to public hatred, ridicule
and contempt, write, edit, publish and circulate an issue of the local weekly newspaper BICOL FORUM
throughout the Bicol Region, with banner headline and front page news item read by the public
throughout the Bicol Region VILLAFUERTES DENIAL CONVINCES NO ONE. The trial court found
the petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned news item is libelous.


Held: No. Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural person or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead. The law recognizes two kinds of privileged matters. First are those which are classified as
absolutely privileged which enjoy immunity from libel suits regardless of the existence of malice in fact.
The other kind of privileged matters are the qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications which,
unlike the first classification, may be susceptible to a finding of libel provided the prosecution establishes
the presence of malice in fact. The exceptions provided for in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code fall
into this category. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life
may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. Rising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to
the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of Government public opinion should be the constant source of
liberty and democracy.

NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public
funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as
technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under
Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information
which pertinently reads: That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused:
NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and cashier,
respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable
for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and
confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V of
the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply
for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine
Currency, which amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school
teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellants co-accused, Nenita
Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellants
sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant,
now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellants part.

2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.

Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule
131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The presumption of criminal intent will
not automatically apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for
public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act
when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal leave
benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. There is no dispute that the
money was spent for a public purpose payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in
the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers wages enjoy as claims against the
employers funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence
of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence
would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of
Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent
nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the
absence of criminal intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellants conviction. 2. The Court notes that
there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State
College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which requires that the
public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by
the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)
allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or law
contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the
forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the
terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount
for payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

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