ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DIALECTICAL METHOD
Pact, Paowucer
Eastern Kentucky University
Abst
[Jurn confusions. Mary aso considered chat his science compared well meeting
Introduction
One fimdamental problem coloring the history of interpretations of
Marx's work is rooted in his lack of expositional clarity in making explicit
his dialectical methodological procedures. This has been compounded
by an additional problem in conceptual practice: What is the relation-
ship becwcen hhis yeuctal sociology viz. historical materialism—and his
study of capitalist society specifically—viz. the critical analysis of the
capitalist mode of production? And, to complicate matters further, these
two problems are often conflated with Marx's contribution to the his
tory of the socialist/communist political-evolutionary project. Clearly
then, within Marx’s work there exists divergent, though often overlap-
ping, goals, foci, and interests that are not always clearly related. In his
social scientific moments, nevertheless, the common thread that exists
is his use of the dialectical method.
Before Marx had even died signs of trouble in interpreting Cepital
had already begun to appear. The number and quality of prefaces added
to the first volume testify « te Fact that they continued despite his
attempts to answer critics and quell problems in understanding—not to
mention, as he points out, to correct errors. He seemed to recognize
that one of the central difficulties in Capital was a lack of clarity over
shat brand af science informed it what instfied his nresentation of
a,
ASSIIMPTIONS OF THE DIALECTICAL METHOD 7
data, and his drawing of conclusions. Today, the justifiable and uni-
versally agreed upon opinion is that Marx’s method is dialectical. But,
what is meant by the term? There is scarcely little agreement. Should
one trace it back to Aristotle or Hegel? Should one trace out the series
of debates and presentations surrounding Marv’s use of dialectics in the
literature? If so, should one focus on the philosophers of science or the
methodalogists of sociology? Should an explicit setting of debates be a
goal, or a fair presentation of the overall method?
Across them, all sicutific snciliuds are organized by at least three
things—central assumptions, sets of attendant concepts, and basic research
procedures. The more closely these three realms fit each other, the more
clegant the science. When Mars reported that he would like to make
his method clear to the average reader, he would have had to at least
address these topies. After over 120 years of subsequent Marxist schol-
arship perhaps an outline is ready to come into clearer view. A possi-
bly logical place to hegin wonld he a presentation of the social scientific
assumptions with which Marx worked. A next fruitful step would be to
present the language and concepts central to his analysis uf collected
data, Finally, the actual research and analytical procedures that animate
the assumptions and constructs could be examined as a way to round
out an overall view of the general approach. This chapter is the first
of these three investigations.
Marx's First Assumptions
In Marx’s work, the investigation of any social phenomena does not
begin arbitrarily or haphazardly, as may an abstract art, a eross-word
puzzle, ordinary guesswork, or carefree fishing. Nor does his work begin
in the fashion of most other social seiences—with set of propositions
to be accepted or rejected, leading to subsequent hypotheses deduced
Weretiom, followed by data measurement and conclusions. Nor did
Marx begin with preconceived political goals being the litmus test by
which a sociological analysis of modern society could be established. He
begins, however, neither just anywhere in space or time, nor does his
investigation tacitly accept what is given, apparent, or the common sense
explanation of things.
‘The establishment of a social science has its warnings and dangers
It ig Mare’s view that—“All science would be ouperfluous if the fous
of appearance of things coincided with their essence” (Marx 1967: 797).
Appearances can be deceiving. Matx’s entire scientific program is basedlis PAUL PAOLUCCE
recuuise to methodologies that err by accepting the level of appear
rinoes—what society says about itself, what strikes immediate percep~
tion. Subsequently, he fist conceived of society as a social wholes is
basic unit is itself as it appears as a whole. Anything that occurs within
it is caused by it. Marx, therefore, assumes much of social science as
fan exercise in tautology to the extent it remains on this level of appear~
ances, Social reality is, in this sense, a tautology as well: society creates
seeiety and social facts explain other social facts. For Marx, an authen=
tig science should not and would not remain satished with suelt & tau
tological approach. One attempts not to negate this tautological nature
Of social life, but to reflexively acknowledge it and attempt to create
Gbstractions which efficiently match up with the social processes one
investigates and attempts to explain. For Marx, the scientist’ job is to
construct a series of related abstract concepts that reflect observe €On-
crete, regular social practices, The concepts must be bot logically com
gguent with the way social phenomena funtion and develop, and logically
related to each other.
The Assumption of Totaly
Totality has been a controversial and often dered ie
farx’s analysis and this has spilled over into social science general
Ofer, a Deen interpreted ‘rif all of a social formation i explained
or thought explainable, The most common and most probicaath: form
of this approach isthe assumption that a cota socal formation, oF at
thing and everything that appens within i, can be reduced c0 the
economy or technology ar materialism. Totality, on the contrary, refers
thot to the assumption that there is some whole entire society or phe-
yhomena that can, eventually, be completely explained in all its nuances
and trajectories. Nor i his concept meant 10 es e pean
Tmplete picture of all social fats forced into a dereriptive framework,