RODRIGUEZ VS GMA

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to
the petitioner.[61] It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.[62] Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances.[63] It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent
investigation and action.[64]

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.[65] As an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy especially the right to informational
privacy[66] the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or
administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant
access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains
erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.[67]

As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo,[77]command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict. tCommand responsibility. One of the issues raised in this case was whether or not the President, as
commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Supreme Court held that the President may be held responsible or accountable. To hold someone liable
under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a superior-subordinate
relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the superior knew or had
reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and (c) the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The President, being the commander-in-
chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the
command responsibility doctrine. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a
strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, the same may nonetheless be established through circumstantial
evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge.
Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when: (a) the acts are widespread within the
government officials area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of
responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved. As to the issue of failure to prevent or
punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military. The Supreme Court held, however, that aside from Rodriguezs general
averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish former President Arroyos responsibility or accountability for his
abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life,
liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it. In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo
and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 &
G.R. No. 193160. November 15, 2011.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-
legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command
responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance
with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine
the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under
the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not
be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b)
accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have
failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although
there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless
be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

PEOPLE VS MALMSTED
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal
effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to
believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought
to be searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably
believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of
the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside
said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with
hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his passport,
and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession.
To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without warrant, in the light
of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

KURODA VS. JALANDONI

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second
only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations, the United State and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles
therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them for
our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and
principle of international law as continued in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of
United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the rights and obligations
contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of
full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those
who committed crimes against crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the
case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372): . . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect
the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during then Commonwealth because it is an offense
against the same sovereign people. . . . By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while
we were a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.

NAVIA VS. PARDICO (writ of amparo)

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity."

Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent right to life, while
Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the
right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This overarching
command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The
Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law."

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject
thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was
carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden
of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish
that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government.
This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State
complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens
disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition
whether as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its
agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the
Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But
even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still,
government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at
Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work
for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or
governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records
has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the
requisites under RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in
religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.

Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on
the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons,
regardless of sexual orientation.

We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would
be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in
particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups
struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant,
and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal,
standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we
explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied
equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in
Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation."48Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.49

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by
secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human
Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the
right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in
force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens
have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic government based on the
consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote
have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on
objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by
unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No
person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should
indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.

PEOPLE VS. MARTI

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between
the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place
of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a
warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of state authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of the government without the latter transgressing appellants
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted.

PHARMACEUTICAL VS. DUQUE

Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law binding on WHO member states, it provides an excellent
example of the power of "soft law" in international relations. International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of
international law-"hard law"-from non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior-"soft law." WHO has
during its existence generated many soft law norms, creating a "soft law regime" in international governance for public health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps in laying the political groundwork for improved
international cooperation on infectious diseases. These resolutions clearly define WHO member states' normative duty to
cooperate fully with other countries and with WHO in connection with infectious disease surveillance and response to outbreaks.

This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of the SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful politically for two
reasons. First, the SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that participating in, and enhancing, international cooperation on
infectious disease controls is in a country's self-interest x x x if this warning is heeded, the "soft law" in the SARS and IHR
Resolution could inform the development of general and consistent state practice on infectious disease surveillance and
outbreak response, perhaps crystallizing eventually into customary international law on infectious disease prevention and
control.

Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be
deemed part of the law of the land.
It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency, the duty of a state to implement the IHR Resolution
was still considered not binding or enforceable, although said resolutions had great political influence.

As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not
presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven that any compliance by
member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.

Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be
deemed part of the law of the land.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions
of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions
of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

Second, the Court will determine whether the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by virtue of its
powers and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law.

Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national
health policy and implement a national health plan within the framework of the government's general policies and plans,
and issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation of established health policies .

It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk substitutes
provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national health policy.

Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014, dated May
23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as
early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and
beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3) micronutrient supplementation; (4)
universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in exceptionally difficult
circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national health policy. However, nowhere
in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion
of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.

The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on
advertising for breastmilk substitutes.

In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion
of breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows
that a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally
authorized branch of government, the legislature.

Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by
the DOH through the subject RIRR.

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence
state behavior.31

"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the
International Court of Justice.32 It is, however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state
behavior.33 Certain declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category.34 The most notable is the
UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia,35 Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,36 Mijares v. Raada37 and Shangri-la International Hotel
Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc..