The treaty of peace of 1783 between Great Britain and the United States stipulated that inhabitants of the

United States
should continue to exercise the privileges theretofore enjoyed in common with British subjects in the fisheries of
Newfoundland, Labrador, and other parts of the North Atlantic Coast. Great Britain regarded this treaty as abrogated by
the war of 1812, whereas the United States considered it as only suspended by and during the war. However, on
October 20, 1818, a new treaty was signed, article I of which defined the rights and obligations of inhabitants of the
United States as to fishing in certain parts of British north Atlantic coast waters.2 Differences arose as to the scope and
meaning of this article. Beginning with the seizure of American fishing vessels in 1821-2, the controversy over fishing
rights continued in more or less menacing form until 1905 when, on account of the severe restrictive legislation by
Newfoundland, affairs reached a critical stage. Negotiations were begun looking to a settlement, and in 1906 a modus
viveruti1 covering the fishing season of 1906-7 was agreed upon by the two Governments for the purpose of allaying
friction until some definite adjustment could be reached. The modus was renewed for the fishing seasons of 1907-8/
1908-9 5 and I909-10,6 and on January 27, 1909, a compromis was signed submitting the controversy to the Permanent
Court of Arbitration at The Hague. A tribunal was created composed of the following members of the panel of the court:
Heinrich Lammasch, of Austria-Hungary; A. F. de Savornin Lohman, of Holland; George Gray, of the United States; Louis
M. Drago, of Argentine; and Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, of Great Britain. The session of the tribunal began June 1, 1910,
ended August 12, 1910. The decision which was rendered on 7 September 1910, dealt with seven questions put to the
Tribunal by the compromise.

Pursuant to Article I of a convention entered into on 20 October 1818, Great Britain and the United States agreed that inhabitants of the United
States would forever have the same rights as British subjects to engage in all types of fishing on a specified part of the British coastline of
Newfoundland and Labrador. In addition, American fishermen were forever entitled, subject to certain conditions, to dry and cure fish in all
bays, harbours and creeks of this same coastline. Pursuant to the same article, the United States renounced forever any rights exercised or
claimed by its inhabitants up to that time, to take, dry or cure fish, within three nautical miles of the coast, bay, harbours or creeks of the British
dominions in America, except for those described above. A number of disputes arose between the two governments concerning the
interpretation of this article. In 1909, they agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration.

The publication of this award and related documents on the Hague Justice Portal has been made possible with the ongoing support and co-
operation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.

The produce of an enemy's colony is to be considered as hostile property so long as it belongs to the owner or the soil,
whatever may be his national character in other respects, or whatever may be his place of residence.
An island in the temporary occupation of the enemy is to be considered as an enemy's colony.
In deciding a question of the law of nations, this Court will respect the decisions of foreign courts.
The law of nations is the great source from which we derive these rules respecting belligerent and neutral rights which
are recognized by all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and America. This law is in part unwritten and in
part conventional. To ascertain that which is unwritten, we resort to the great principles of reason and justice, but, us
these principles will be differently understood by different nations under different circumstances, we consider them as
being in some degree fixed and rendered stable by a series of judicial decisions. The decisions of the courts of every
country, so far as they are founded upon a law common to every country, will be received not as authority, but with
respect. The decisions of the courts of every country show how the law of nations in the given case is understood in that
country, and will be considered in adopting the rule which into prevail in this.
Without taking a comparative view of the justice or fairness of the rules established in the British courts and of those
established in the courts of other nations, there are circumstances not to be excluded from consideration, which give to
those rules a claim to our attention that we cannot entirely disregard. The United States having at one time formed a
component part of the British empire, their prize law was our prize law. When we separated, it continued to be our prize
law, so far as it was adapted to our circumstances, and was not varied by the power which was capable of changing it.
It will not be advanced, in consequence of this former relation between the two countries, that any obvious
misconstruction of public law made by the British courts will be considered as forming a rule for the American courts, or
that any recent rule of the British courts is entitled to more respect than the recent rules of other countries. But a case
professing to be decided on ancient principles will not be entirely disregarded, unless it be very unreasonable or be
founded on a construction rejected by other nations.