5/26/2017 A.M.No.

MTJ051580

RepublicofthePhilippines
SupremeCourt
Manila
THIRDDIVISION


LOURDESB.FERRERand A.M.No.MTJ051580
PROSPERIDADM.ARANDEZ, [FormerlyOCAIPINo.041608MTJ]
Complainants,
Present:

CARPIOMORALES,Chairperson,

BRION,
versus
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA,JR.,and
SERENO,JJ.
JUDGEROMEOA.RABACA,
MetropolitanTrialCourt,Branch Promulgated:
25,Manila,
Respondent. October6,2010
xx

DECISION


BERSAMIN,J.:


ThisadministrativecasechargesHon.RomeoA.Rabaca,thenthePresidingJudgeofBranch25
oftheMetropolitanTrialCourtofManila(MeTC),withignoranceofthelaw,disregardofthe
law,derelictionofduty,knowinglyrenderinganunjustinterlocutoryorder,andviolationofthe
CodeofConductforGovernmentOfficials.

ThecomplainantswerethePresidentandtheExecutiveDirectoroftheplaintiffinCivil
Case No. 176394CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Womens Christian
Association,Inc.v.ConradoCano.Aftertrial,CivilCaseNo.176394CVwasdecidedonJune
[1]
22,2004byrespondentJudge, whodisposedasfollows:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavoroftheplaintiff
andagainstthedefendantorderingthelatterasfollows:

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(a)to vacate the premises located at Ground Floor, YMCA, 1144 Gen. Luna St., Ermita,
Manilaandsurrenderpossessionthereoftoplaintiff

(b) to pay plaintiff the sum of Php45,211.80 representing his arrears in rentals from
February2003toJuly2003atPhp7,535.30amonthplusthefurthersumofPhp7,535.30amonth
asreasonablevalueforthecontinueduseandoccupationofthepremisesstartingAugust2003
untilthesameisfinallyvacatedandpossessionthereofisturnovertoplaintiff

(c)topaytheplaintiffthesumofPhp20,000asattorneysfeesand

(d)topaythecostsofsuit.

SOORDERED.

OnJuly12,2004,theplaintiffscounselfiledamotionforimmediateexecution, praying
thatawritofexecutionbeissuedfortheimmediateexecutionoftheaforesaidJudgment. The
[2]
plaintiffcitedSection19,Rule70oftheRulesofCourtasbasisforitsmotion.

In his order dated July 14, 2004, however, respondent Judge denied the motion for
[3]
immediateexecution, stating:

A Notice of Appeal dated July 9, 2004, having been seasonably filed by counsel for the
defendant,lettherecordsoftheabovecaptionedcasebe,asitisherebyordered,elevatedtothe
RegionalTrialCourtofManilaforappropriateproceedingsanddisposition.

Inviewthereof,nomoreactionshallbetakenontheMotionforExecutiondatedJuly8,2004
filedbytheplaintiffthrucounsel.

SOORDERED.

According to the complainants, their counsel talked with respondent Judge about the matter.
Allegedly,respondentJudgetoldtheircounselthatifyouthinkthecourtiswrong,fileamotion
forreconsideration.Withthat,theplaintifffiledamotionforreconsideration,whichrespondent
[4]
JudgenonethelessdeniedinhisorderdatedJuly28,2004, thuswise:

ConsideringthattheCourthasalreadygivenduecoursetotheappealofthedefendantwhichwas
perfected within the reglementary period, no more action will be taken on the Motion for
ReconsiderationdatedJuly19,2004filedbytheplaintiffthrucounsel.

TheBranchClerkofCourtisherebydirectedtoimmediatelyforwardtherecordsofthiscaseto
theRegionalTrialCourt,Manila.

SOORDERED.

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The complainants averred that respondent Judges denial of their motions had rendered their
victoryinutile,andhadunfairlydeprivedtheplaintiffofthepossessionofthepremises.They
furtheraverredthatrespondentJudgesrefusaltoperformanactmandatedbytheRulesofCourt
hadgivenundueadvantagetothedefendanttotheplaintiffsdamageandprejudice.

TheCourtrequiredrespondentJudgetocommentontheadministrativecomplaintagainsthim.

[5]
In his comment dated September 16, 2004, respondent Judge denied the charges. He
explainedthathehadhonestlythoughtthathiscourthadlostjurisdictionoverthecasepursuant
totheprovisionofSection9,Rule41oftheRulesofCourt(whichprovidesthatinappealsby
notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals
filedinduetimeandtheexpirationofthetimetoappealoftheotherparties)oncehehadgiven
duecoursetothedefendantsnoticeofappeal.Heclaimedthathehadissuedtheordersingood
faithandwithnomaliceafterafairandimpartialevaluationofthefacts,applicablerules,and
jurisprudence and that if he had thereby committed lapses in the issuance of the orders, his
doingsoshouldbeconsideredaserrorofjudgmentonhispart.

HelastlyinsistedthathedidnotknowpersonallythepartiesinCivilCaseNo.176394CV,and
had absolutely no reason to give undue favor or advantage to the defendant that the
complainants did not submit evidence to show that the orders had been issued for a
consideration,materialorotherwise,orthathisissuanceoftheordershadbeenmotivatedbyill
willorbadfaith.

[6]
Intheirreply dated September 22, 2004, the complainants contended that respondent Judge
exhibitedhisignoranceofthelawandprocedureinrelyingonSection9,Rule41oftheRulesof
CourtwhichreferredtoappealsfromtheRegionalTrialCourtthatRule40,whichcontained
provisionsonappealfromtheMunicipalTrialCourtstotheRegionalTrialCourts,andwhich
provided in its Section 4 that the perfection of the appeal and the effect of such perfection
shouldbegovernedbytheprovisionsofSection9ofRule41,concernedappealsbynoticeof
appeal in general and that instead, the applicable rule should be Section 19, Rule 70 of the
RulesofCourt.

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The complainants pointed out that respondent Judge apparently did not know that appeal in
forcibleentryanddetainercaseswasnotperfectedbythemerefilingofanoticeofappeal(asin
ordinaryactions)butbyfilingofanoticeofappealandasufficientsupersedeasbondapproved
bythetrialjudgeexecutedtotheplaintifftopaytherents,damagesandcostsaccruingdownto
the time of the judgment appealed from. They asserted that respondent Judges invocation of
good faith and error of judgment did not absolve him of liability, because he had grossly
neglected his duties mandated by law by failing and refusing to act on their motion for
immediate execution and motion for reconsideration and by giving due course to the appeal
despitenosupersedeasbondhavingbeenfiledandapprovedbythetrialcourt.

[7]
InhismemorandumdatedJanuary13,2005, thenCourtAdministratorPresbiteroJ.Velasco,
Jr.,nowAssociateJusticeoftheCourt,recommendedthattheadministrativecomplaintagainst
respondentJudgeberedocketedasaregularadministrativematterandthatrespondentJudge
be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
wouldbedealtwithmoreseverely,basedonanevaluationofthecharges,asfollows:

EVALUATION:We agree with the complainants that respondent erred when he did not act on
complainantsmotionforimmediateexecution.

Section19,Rule70ofthe1997RevisedRulesonCivilProcedureprovides:

SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
immediatelyuponmotion,unlessanappealhasbeenperfectedandthedefendanttostay
executionfilesasupersedeasbond,approvedbytheMunicipalTrialCourtandexecuted
infavoroftheplaintifftopaytherents,damages,andcostsaccruingdowntothetime
of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he
deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. XXXX
XXXXXXXX.

Itisclearfromtheforegoingthattheperfectionofanappealbyitselfisnotsufficienttostaythe
execution of the judgment in an ejectment case. The losing party should likewise file a
supersedeasbondexecutedinfavoroftheplaintifftoanswerforrents,damagesandcosts,and,if
thejudgmentofthecourtrequiresit,heshouldlikewisedeposittheamountoftherentbeforethe
appellatecourtfromthetimeduringthependencyoftheappeal.Otherwise,executionbecomes
ministerialandimperative. (Philippine Holding Corporation vs. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA 401 as
cited in Hualam Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA
612,626).

Inthecaseatbar,defendantseasonablyfiledhisNoticeofAppealdated9July2004on13July
2004hehoweverfailedtofileanysupersedeasbond.Priortothefilingofsuchnoticeofappeal,
more specifically on 12July2004, complainants have already filed their Motion for Execution
dated8July2004.InsteadofactingontheMotionforExecution,respondentJudgeRabacagave
duecoursetotheappealinanOrderdated14July2004anddirectedhisBranchClerkofCourtto

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elevate the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court
howeverfailedtoforwardtherecordstotheRTC.ThisfactisclearfromJudgeRabacasOrder
dated28July2004whereinhedirectedtheBranchClerkofCourttoforwardtherecordsofthe
casetotheManilaRegionalTrialCourtimmediately.

Fromtheforegoing,itisclearthatwhenthecomplainantmovedfortheimmediateexecutionof
JudgeRabacasdecision,thelatterstillhadjurisdictionoverthecase.Hethereforeclearlyerred
whenherefusedtoactontheMotionforExecution.Therelevantquestionthatweshouldresolve
howeveriswhethersucherrorisanerrorofjudgmentoranerroramountingtoincompetencethat
callsforadministrativediscipline.

JudgeRabacaclaimsthatherefusedtoactonthecomplainantsMotionforexecutionbecausehe
honestlythoughtthatwhenhegaveduecoursetothedefendantsappealwhichwasseasonably
filed, and ordered the elevation of the records to the appellate court, his court already lost
jurisdictionoverthecase..Inmakinghisruling,respondentassertshereliedontheprovisionsof
Section9,Rule41oftheRulesofCourt.Thisprovisionreadsasfollows:

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfectionoftheappealsfiledinduetimeandtheexpirationofthetimetoappealofthe
otherparties.

HelikewiseallegedlyreliedontherulingoftheCourtinAdministrative Matter OCA IPI
No. 031513MTJ: Susana Joaquin Vda. De Agregado vs. Judge Thelma BunyiMedina, MeTJ
whereintheCourtsaidthat

RespondentJudgeiscorrectinsayingthatshehadlostjurisdictiontoentertainthe
motionforexecutionaftertheperfectionoftheappealandaftersheissuedanorderto
transmittherecordsofthecasetotheappellatecourtforreview.

The facts of the case against Judge BunyiMedina are however different from those
prevailing in the instant case. In the Medina case, the fifteen (15) day period within which to
perfecttheappealhadalreadylapsedbeforethecomplainantthereinmovedfortheexecutionof
theexecutionjudgment.Clearlytherefore,appealhadalreadybeenperfected.Intheinstantcase,
although the defendant had filed his appeal, the period to appeal had not yet lapsed since the
plaintiffstillhadhisownperiodtoappealfromthejudgmentandsuchperiodhadnotyetlapsed.
TheprovisionrelieduponbyjudgeRabaca,morespecifically,Section9,Rule41oftheRulesof
Court,clearlystatesthat,Inappealsbynoticeofappeal,thecourtlosesjurisdictionoverthecase
uponperfectionoftheappealsfiledonduetimeandtheexpirationofthetimetoappealofthe
other parties. Moreover and more importantly, the herein complainants filed their Motion for
ExecutionevenbeforethedefendanthadfiledhisNoticeofAppeal.Suchmotionwastherefore
stillwellwithinthejurisdictionofthelowercourt.

Itisbasicruleinejectmentcasesthattheexecutionofjudgmentinfavoroftheplaintiffisa
matterofrightandmandatory.This has been the consistent ruling of the Court in a number of
casesinvolvingthesameissueposedbeforetherespondentjudge.RespondentJudgeisexpected
toknowthisandhisjustificationoferroneousapplicationofthelaw,althoughmitigating,could
notexculpatehimfromliability.

WeagreewithandadopttheevaluationoftheCourtAdministrator.

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Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution
considering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having
appealed. Granting the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty
uponthedefendantsfailuretofilethesufficientsupersedeasbond.Section19,Rule70,ofthe
RulesofCourtclearlyimposessuchduty,viz:

Section19.Immediateexecutionofjudgmenthowtostaysame.Ifjudgmentisrendered
againstthedefendant,executionshallissueimmediatelyuponmotion,unlessanappealhas
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond,
approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the
rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless,duringthependencyoftheappeal,hedepositswiththeappellatecourttheamount
ofrentduefromtimetotimeunderthecontract,ifany,asdeterminedbythejudgmentof
theMunicipalTrialCourt.Intheabsenceofacontract,heshalldepositwiththeRegionalTrial
Courtthereasonablevalueoftheuseandoccupationofthepremisesfortheprecedingmonthor
period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal
TrialCourt,withtheotherpapers,totheclerkoftheRegionalTrialCourttowhichtheactionis
appealed.
xxx

RespondentJudgesexcuse,thathehadlostjurisdictionoverthecasebyvirtueofthedefendants
appeal,wasunacceptableinlightoftheclearandexplicittextoftheaforequotedrule.Tobegin
with, the perfection of the appeal by the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the
plaintiffsmotionforimmediateexecution.Theexecutionofthedecisioncouldnotbestayedby
themeretakingoftheappeal.Onlythefilingofthesufficientsupersedeasbondandthedeposit
withtheappellatecourtoftheamountofrentduefromtimetotime,coupledwiththeperfection
oftheappeal,couldstaytheexecution.Secondly,hecouldnotalsocrediblyjustifyhisomission
toactaccordingtotheprovisionbyclaiminggoodfaithorhonestbelief,orbyassertinglackof
malice or bad faith. A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be misread or
misapplied, but should be implemented without evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or
honestbelief,orlackofmalice,orlackofbadfaithjustifiesanoncomplianceonlywhenthere
isanasyetunsettleddoubtonthemeaningorapplicabilityofaruleorlegalprovision.Itwas
notsoherein.And,thirdly,giventhathiscourt,beingvestedwithoriginalexclusivejurisdiction
overcasessimilartoCivilCaseNo.176394CV,hadbeenassignedmanysuchcases,hewasnot
atrialjudgebereftofthepertinentpriorexperiencetoactontheissueofimmediateexecution,a
factthatfurtherexposedtheabjectinanityofhisexcuses.

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Weagreewiththecomplainantsinsistence,therefore,thatrespondentJudgesomissiontoapply
Section19wasinexcusable.Hehadignoredtheurgingtofollowtheclearandexplicitprovision
of the rule made in the plaintiffs motion for immediate execution. Had he any genuine doubt
abouthisauthoritytograntthemotionforimmediateexecution,ashewouldhaveusbelieve,he
couldhaveeasilyandcorrectlyresolvedthedoubtbyaresorttotheRulesofCourt,whichhe
well knew was the repository of the guidelines he was seeking for his judicial action. Neither
was it relevant that he did not know any of the parties, or that he did not corruptly favor the
defendantbyhisomission.HismerefailuretoperformadutyenjoinedbytheRules of Court
sufficedtorenderhimadministrativelyaccountable.

Thiscaseisanopportuneoccasiontoremindjudgesofthefirstlevelcourtstoadherealwaysto
themandateunderSection19,Rule70,oftheRulesofCourttoissuewritsofexecutionupon
motionoftheplaintiffsinactionsforforcibleentryorunlawfuldetainerwhenthedefendanthas
appealedbuthasnotfiledasufficientsupersedeasbond.Thesummarynatureofthespecialcivil
action under Rule 70 and the purpose underlying the mandate for an immediate execution,
whichistopreventtheplaintiffsfrombeingfurtherdeprivedoftheirrightfulpossession,should
alwaysbeborneinmind.

TherecommendedpenaltyofP5,000.00withwarningthatarepetitionofthesameorsimilaract
would be dealt with more severely is also correct. The Court Administrator rationalized the
recommendationofthepenaltythuswise:

Under A.M. No. 01810SC, Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure is classified as
serious offense for which the imposable penalty ranges from a fine to dismissal. However, we
findrespondentsactsnotingrainedwithmaliceorbadfaith.Itisamatterofpublicpolicythatin
theabsenceoffraud,dishonestyorcorruptmotive,theactsofajudgeinhisjudicialcapacityare
not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous. In Domingo vs. Judge
Pagayatan, A.M. No. RTJ031751, 10 June 2003, the penalty of fine in the amount of five
thousandpesoswasdeemedsufficientwhereitwasheldthatrespondentslackofmaliceorbad
faithfreeshimfromadministrativeliabilitybutnotforgrossignoranceofthelaw.

WeconcurwiththerationalizationoftheCourtAdministrator.Verily,evenifrespondent
Judgesomissionwouldhaveeasilyamountedtogross
[8]
ignoranceofthelawandprocedure,aseriousoffenseunderSection8, Rule
140, of the Rules of Court, as amended, the fact that the complainants did not establish that
maliceorbadfaithimpelledhisomissiontoact,orthatfraud,dishonesty,oracorruptmotive
attended his omission to act demands a downgrading of the liability. In the absence of any

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[9]
showing that he had been held guilty of any other administrative offense, and without our
attention being called to other circumstances that might demonstrate respondent Judges dark
motives for his inaction, we should find and consider the recommended penalty of P5,000.00
withwarningthatarepetitionofthesameorsimilaractwouldbedealtwithmoreseverelytobe
[10]
commensuratetotheoffense.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent JUDGE ROMEO A. RABACA, Presiding Judge of
Branch 25, Metropolitan Trial Court, in Manila guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure,
and, accordingly, impose upon him a fine of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition of the
sameorsimilaractwouldbedealtwithmoreseverely.
SOORDERED.



LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:




CONCHITACARPIOMORALES
AssociateJustice
Chairperson






ARTUROD.BRIONMARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice




MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
AssociateJustice

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[1]
Rollo,pp.48
[2]
Id.,pp.910.
[3]
Id.,p.12A
[4]
Id.,p.16.
[5]
Id.,pp.1821.
[6]
Id.,pp.2835.
[7]
Id.,pp.3741.
[8]
Section.8.Seriouscharges.Seriouschargesinclude:
1.Bribery,directorindirect
2.DishonestyandviolationsoftheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesLaw(R.A.No.3019)
3.GrossmisconductconstitutingviolationsoftheCodeofJudicialConduct
4.Knowinglyrenderinganunjustjudgmentororderasdeterminedbyacompetentcourtinanappropriateproceeding
5.Convictionofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude
6.Willfulfailuretopayajustdebt
7.Borrowingmoneyorpropertyfromlawyersandlitigantsinacasependingbeforethecourt
8.Immorality
9.Grossignoranceofthelaworprocedure
10.Partisanpoliticalactivitiesand
11.Alcoholismand/orvicioushabits.
[9]
Berinv.Barte, A.M. No. MTJ021443, July31,2002, 385 SCRA 527 Esguerrav.Loja, A.M. No. RTJ001523, August 15,
2000,338SCRA1Conductov.Monzon,A.M.No.MTJ981147,July2,1998,291SCRA619.
[10]
SeeDomingov.Pagayatan,A.M.No.RTJ031751,June10,2003,403SCRA381,388389.

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