SAFETY OF PASSENGERS

ARTICLE 1763 TO 1764 CASES

1. Jose Pilapil versus Court of Appeals and Alatco Trans. Co., Inc.

2. Fortune Express Inc., versus CA et al

3. Villa Rey Transit, Inc., versus CA et al

 JOSE PILAPIL
versus
COURT OF APPEALS AND ALATCO TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
G. R. NO. 52159, DECEMBER 22, 1989

FACTS:

Jose Pilapil is a paying passenger boarded on the respondent bus at San Nicoloas, Iriga
City and Naga City, upon reaching the vicinity of cemetery of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a bystander along the said
national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit the petitioner above his left
eye. The private respondents personnel lost no time in bringing the petitioner to the provincial
hospital in Naga City where he was confined and treated.

The petitioner was taken to a doctor of Iriga City where he was treated for another week
considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired. Since there was no improvement in his
injured eyes vision, he went to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City where he was treated and that
they found out the he lost his left eyes vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.
Thereafter, it then instituted before the Court of First Instance an action for recovery of damages
sustained as a result of stone-throwing incident.

The trial court rendered judgment ordering the transportation company to pay the
petitioner damages in total sum of sixteen thousand three hundred pesos.

Alatco transportation appealed to the Court of Appeals however the appellate court
render its judgment reversing and setting aside the judgment of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stoning of the bus by a stranger resulting in injury to the petitioner is
one such risk from which the common carrier may not exempt itself from liability?

RULING:

YES!

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not,
however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of

transporting passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an
insurer of any and all risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain
duties to the public as the law imposes, and hold itself liable for any breach thereof.

Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and
foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to
all the circumstances.
 Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time
being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the same is
rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence as required by
law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury is suffered by the
passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.

Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passengers safety, but that its liability for personal injuries
sustained by its passengers rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of
diligence that the law requires.

As stated earlier, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a
disputable presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established proving either that the
carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury suffered by the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Whereas, in the instant case, the injury sustained by the
petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of
transporting or to the negligent or willful acts of private respondents employees, with the injury
arising wholly from caused created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even
knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is not ought not to be held liable. To
rule otherwise, would make the common carrier the insurer of absolute safety of its passengers
which is not the intention of the lawmakers.

While, as a general rule, common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence
in the safe transport of their passengers, it would seem that this is not the standard by which its
liability is to be determined when intervening acts of strangers directly causes the injury, while
the contract of carriage exists. Article 1763 the governs, which states that, a common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the ac or omission.

Clearly under the above provisions, a tort committed by a stranger who causes injury to a
passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for
which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carriers employees
to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented
by them. Further, under the same provision, it is be noted that when the violation of the contract
is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be
exercise by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of
a family.
 FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC.
versus
COURT OF APPEALS, PAULIE V. CAORONG AND MINOR CHILDREN
G. R. NO. 119756, MARCH 18, 1999

FACTS:

A bus of the Fortune Express figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lano
del Norte, resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney including two Maranaos.
Crisanto Generalao, a volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit,
conducted an investigation of the said accident and found that the owner of the jeepney was a
Maranao and that certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning
some of its buses. Generalao rendered a report on his findings to Sgt. Batasa of the Philippines
Constabulary Regional Headquarters and was instructed to see the operations manager of the
petitioner and the latter assured him that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives
and property would be taken.

Three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of the petitioner
while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was Atty. Caorong. The leader
of the Maranaos, identified as Bashier Manggolo, ordered the driver to stop the bus on the side of
the way. Mananggolo then shot the driver on the arm which causes him to slump on the steering
wheel. Then one of the companions of Manonggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus as the
other held passengers at bay with a handgun. The passengers then including Atty. Caorong,
stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway.

However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack
in which at that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. The
driver who had gained its consciousness, hear Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to
spare the driver as he was innocent who was innocent of any wrongdoing and was only trying to
make a living. During the exchange between the assailants and Atty. Caorong, the driver climed
out of the left window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite side of the highway
and heard shots inside the bus. One of the passengers saw that Atty. Caorong was hit and the said
bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning
bus and rushed him to hospital but died while undergoing operation.

The private respondents brought a suit for breach of contract of carriage in the Reional
Trial Court.

In a decision, the trial court dismissed the complaint holding the defendant common
carrier not negligent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and awarded
damages to the plaintiff plus attorneys fees.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioner breached the contract of carriage by failure to

exercise the required degree of diligence?
 2. Whether or not the act of Maranao outlaws were so grave, irresistible, violent and
forceful, as to be regarded as caso fortuito?

RULINGS:

1. YES!

Article 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries
suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the
common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of petitioners
employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.

Despite the warning by the Philippine Constabulary that the Maranaos were planning to
take revenge on the petitioner by burning of its buses and the assurance of petitioners operation
manager that the necessary precautions would be taken, the petitioner did nothing to protect the
safety of its passengers.

Had the petitioner and its employees been vigilant that they would not have failed to see
that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple
precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and
inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passengers
constitutional rights.

From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners employees failed to prevent the attack
on one of petitioners buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family. Hence, the petitioner should be liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.

2. NO

Article 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous event as an occurrence which could
not be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. The court held that to be considered
force majeure, it is necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of obligation must be independent
of the human will; (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner;
and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury of the creditor.
The absence of the any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor from being
excused from liability.

In Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for its
failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was
warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was foreseeable, and
this, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the
present case. Despite the report of the Philippine Constabulary agent that the Maranaos were
going to attack its buses, the petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its
passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a
fortuitous event which would exempt the petitioner from libality.
 VILLA REY TRANSIT, INC.
versus
THE COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD A. QUINTOS, PRIMA A. QUINTOS
AND JULITA A. QUINTOS
G. R. NO. L-25499, FEBRUARY 18, 1970

FACTS:
An Isuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated by the defendant and
driven by Laureano Casim left Lingayen, Pangasinan for Manila. Among its paying passengers
was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row, right side of the
bus. When the vehicle was near according the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the
national highway, it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled with hay. As a result the end of a
bamboo pole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side
of the windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8feet long from the
rear bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the face of Policrinio
because of the impact, fell from his seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole then landed on
his left eye and bone of the left side of his face was fracture. He suffered other multiple wounds
and was rendered unconscious due, among other causes, to severe cerebral concussion and died
on the same day the collision happened due to traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries.

Trinidad, Prima and Julita, all surnamed Quintos, are the sisters and only
surviving heirs of Policronio who died single, leaving no descendants nor ascendants. They
brought an action against the petitioner as owner and operator of the said passenger bus for
breach of the contract of carriage between the said petitioner and the deceased to recover an
aggregate sum as damages including attorneys fees.

Petitioner claims that the mishap was due to a fortuitous event which was rejected
by the trial court and Court of Appeals both of which found that the accident and the death of
Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus driver, for whom petitioner was liable under
its contract of carriage with the deceased. It maintains that the lower courts had erred in adopting
the formula and in not acting in accordance with Alcantara case, non of the parties had
questioned the propriety of the four-year basis adopted by the trial court in making its award of
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the determination of the amount of damages recoverable by the Quintos
depends mainly upon the two factors; (1) the number of years on the basis of which the damages
shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the said respondents should
be fixe?

RULING:

The first factor was based by the trial court in which the of this was concurred by the
Court of Appeals upon the life expectancy of Policronio which was placed at 33-1/3 years, he
being over 29 years of age at the time of his demise.

Thus, the life expectancy is not only relevant but also, an important element in fixing the
amount recoverable by the private respondents. Although it is not the sole element determinative
of said amount, no cogent reason has been given to warrant its disregard and the adoption, in the
case at bar, of a purely arbitrary standard, such as a four-year rule. In short, the Court of Appeals
has not erred in basing the computation of petitioners liability upon the life expectancy of
Policronio.

It should be noted, that the court s mainly concerned with the determination of the losses
or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the
deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings but of the support
they received or would have received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence
of petitioners agent.

In fixing the amount, it must reckon with the necessary expense for his living. Stated
otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that
portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net
earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total of the earnings less expenses
necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living other incidental expenses.

All things considered, the court is of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the
deductible living and other expenses of the deceased and that; consequently, the loss sustained
by his sisters may be roughly estimated for the 33-1/3 years of his life expectancy. In other
words, the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate
sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of the promulgation of the decision of the trial
court.